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Prof. Giuseppe Cambiano
Scuola Normale Superiore, Piazza dei Cavalieri 7, I 56126 Pisa,
giuseppe.cambiano@sns.it

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WHAT DID INDIAN PHILOSOPHERS AGREE ON? WITH SPECIAL REFERENCE TO THE SARVADARŚANASAṂGRAHA

Johannes Bronkhorst

Abstract · This article asks what qualified a view to be considered a *darśana* 'philosophy' in classical India. It focuses in particular on the 14th century text called *Sarvadarśanasaṃgraha* 'Compendium of all philosophies'. It turns out that this text includes views that we would not call philosophies (such as alchemy) but does not include Islamic philosophy, which must yet have been known (if only by hearsay) to its author. Different possible answers are reviewed before reaching a conclusion.

Keywords · Philosophy, *darśana*, *Sarvadarśanasaṃgraha*, Vijayanagara, liberation.

India has a long tradition of rational debate, in which representatives of different schools of philosophy confronted each other. These schools belonged primarily to three different socio-religious currents: Brahmanism, Buddhism and, to a lesser extent, Jainism. The antagonism between debaters was at times ferocious, the language to describe these confrontations warlike, and it appears that the consequences of a lost debate might on occasion be catastrophic. In other words, the debates might take place between sworn enemies, who yet bothered to listen to their opponents and present arguments to refute their positions. Why did they do so?

The answer to this question lies, at least in part, in the connection with political power. Ideally, inimical debates took place at the royal courts, if possible in the presence of the ruler. It was the ruler who could reward the winner and punish the loser. Winning debates was particularly important in view of the fact that religious institutions depended for their finances on political authorities. A major role was played by so-called *agrahāras*, 'gifts' of land and its inhabitants to donees entitled to its produce, which they were supposed to use to dedicate themselves to their religious observances. These might include studying philosophy. Also Buddhist monastic establishments – including its big 'universities', such as Nālandā – depended on the surrounding villages to whose produce they were entitled. Arrangements like these provided a certain continuity over time, but clearly political rulers were free to change them when they felt like it. Debates were one of the factors that might convince local rulers that they were betting on the right horse.

Debates – and especially public debates – require a minimal acquaintance with the positions of one's opponents. Such acquaintance is reflected in the philosophical texts belonging to various schools, and clearly increased over time, being minimal at the beginning. A very early 'philosophical' text, the Buddhist *Kathāvatthu* (latter half of the second century BCE), criticizes rival Buddhist views, but does not appear to understand

johannes.bronkhorst@unil.ch, University of Lausanne.

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them at all.[1] Also in the following centuries, roughly until the sixth century of the Common Era, Buddhist texts were mainly concerned with rival Buddhist views, about which they were now better informed, but they only rarely mentioned Brahmanical schools of thought; Brahmanical texts of that period returned the compliment by ignoring Buddhist views. It is only from the middle of the first millennium CE onward that philosophical texts fully engage with each other. To quote Eltschinger (2012: 60 n. 143):

> With a few exceptions (Āryadeva's *Catuḥśataka*, the pseudo-Nāgārjuna's *Vaidalyaprakaraṇa*, discussions scattered throughout Vasubandhu's *Abhidharmakośabhāṣya*), the Buddhists start criticising Brahmanical (and sporadically Jaina) philosophies systematically during the first half of the sixth century, or slightly earlier in the case of Dignāga (Dignāga, Dharmapāla, Dharmakīrti, Bhāviveka, Guṇamati, *Sagāthaka* of the *Laṅkāvatārasūtra*, etc.). The same seems to hold true of the Brahmanical philosophers' critique of Buddhist doctrines (*Nyāyabhāṣya* and *Nyāyavārttika*, *Vṛttikāragrantha* and especially [*Ślokavārttika*], *Yuktidīpikā*). More generally, sustained philosophical confrontation between Buddhists and non-Buddhists starts to be reflected in extant philosophical literature from the beginning of the sixth century onwards.

It is also from this period onward that a new type of text comes into being: surveys of different philosophies.[2] By their nature, these texts concentrate on what different philosophies do *not* agree on. However, by presenting those philosophies together, they also reveal what they have in common, at least from the point of view of the authors of these surveys. In the present article I will consider one of these texts in particular: the *Sarvadarśanasaṃgraha* 'Compendium of all philosophies', a presentation of sixteen philosophies in sixteen chapters.

The *Sarvadarśanasaṃgraha* was composed toward the end of the fourteenth century, in the still young Vijayanagara Empire, situated in the south of the subcontinent. The text claims to have been composed by Mādhava the son of Sāyaṇa, but there are reasons to think that it was composed by the son – called Cannibhaṭṭa – of this Mādhava's teacher Sarvajñaviṣṇu. Moreover, it is possible or even probable that the final chapter, on Śaṅkara's philosophy, had been composed by someone else.[3] Whatever the details, the *Sarvadarśanasaṃgraha* originated in surroundings that were close to royal power: both Sāyaṇa and his older brother Mādhava (different from Sāyaṇa's son of that name) had intimate links to the court.[4]

This last detail is not without significance. At the time of the Vijayanagara Empire, Islam had made major inroads into India, and various neighbouring rulers who were Muslims threatened its very existence. Indeed, its capital was going to be completely destroyed some two centuries later, after those neighbours had beaten its army. Islam was therefore hardly unknown to the intellectuals of the Vijayanagara Empire. And yet, the *Sarvadarśanasaṃgraha* completely ignores it. Assuming that its author knew that there was intellectual life also in Islam, how would he justify this omission?

The example of Islam suggests that there are views not dealt with in the *Sarvadarśanasaṃgraha* that may yet have been known to its author. Does it merely mean that he did not agree with them? The answer must be *no*, for his book is full of ideas with

[1] Bronkhorst 1993.

[2] Mainly composed by Mādhyamika Buddhists, Śvetāmbara Jainas and Advaita Vedāntins; see Halbfass 1988, pp. 350-351, Qvarnström 1999, pp. 174. Qvarnström (1999, pp. 176) draws attention to an earlier doxography, Āryadeva's *Skhalitapramathanayukti-hetusiddhi* (English translation by Clark & Jamspal 1979), but this one is of an altogether different genre.

[3] Bronkhorst forthcoming.

[4] See, *e.g.*, Galewicz 2009.

which he did not agree. In an important sense, he did not agree with any of the philosophies he described, with the exception of Advaita Vedānta (the chapter on which may not even be by his own hand). What qualified all these philosophies to be included in his book? Since its title proclaims that it deals with *all* philosophies, we must perhaps reformulate this question: What qualified a view to be considered a philosophy, a *darśana*? This is the question to be addressed in this article.

Let us consider some possibilities (most of which we will refute below):

– Philosophies associated with other religions do not count as *darśana*.
– Philosophies produced or adhered to in politically inimical states do not count as *darśana*.
– Philosophies produced by thinkers belonging to a lower social class do not count as *darśana*.
– A *darśana* is and has to be expressed in Sanskrit.
– Only old traditional systems of thought can be accepted as *darśana*s.
– Only systems of thought that accept the authority of the Veda and/or Purāṇas can be *darśana*s.
– *Darśana*s accept the succession of time cycles.
– *Darśana*s aim at liberation.

Let us look at these points one by one.

1. Religious Affiliation

This is perhaps the most natural way to try to explain what is and what is not included in the *Sarvadarśanasaṃgraha*. Most of its philosophies, one might be tempted to think, are Hindu philosophies. Indeed, we have the testimony of perhaps the first Muslim visitor to India to take a serious interest in its religious and philosophical traditions, Al-Bīrūnī, who commented several centuries before the composition of the *Sarvadarśanasaṃgraha* that «we believe in nothing in which they believe, and *vice versa*» (Sachau 1888, p. 19). We may assume that the author of the *Sarvadarśanasaṃgraha* had similar ideas about Muslim beliefs (if he had any information about them at all). The question is whether he considered those beliefs more different from his own than the philosophies of Buddhism and Jainism and the philosophy of Cārvāka, which he yet included in his compendium, and if so, why.[1] What is more, it is not even obvious that he looked upon the schools discussed in the other chapters as being part of one religion, as being different expressions of 'Hinduism'. The view according which the Vijayanagara Empire was a defensive bulwark of Hinduism against the onslaught of Islam has been shown to be overdrawn.[2] The Vijayanagara Empire, for example, sometimes supported Islam, and this was not felt as a contradiction.[3] Moreover, the religious traditions known

[1] Romila Thapar's (2018, p. 147-148) claim that «the author of the compendium [*i.e.* the *Sarvadarśanasaṃgraha*], Madhavacharya, states that although he personally did not subscribe to the Lokayata philosophy, others did, and so it had to be given recognition», besides overlooking the fact that this author did not subscribe to most of the philosophies in his book, does not explain why Muslim thought is not even mentioned.

[2] See Lycett & Morrison 2013.

[3] «The early fifteenth-century court seems to have actively supported Islam, a fact made evident in Ahmad Khan's having dedicated the founding of a mosque in the capital city to his patron Devarāya II» (Stoker 2016, p. 188, with a reference to Verghese 1995, p. 126). Olle Qvarnström's (1999, p. 176) conjecture that «[the presence

from inscriptions at Vijayanagara are not in close correspondence with the philosophies described in the *Sarvadarśanasaṃgraha*. The chapter headings of a study of these inscriptions (Verghese 1995) give a good impression of those religious traditions: Śaivite traditions (ch. 2); the Narasiṃha cult (ch. 3); the Rāmāyaṇa tradition (ch. 4); Kṛṣṇa and Viṭhala cults (ch. 5); Śrī-Vaiṣṇava traditions from the Tamil country (ch. 6); minor cults and popular religion (ch. 7); temples and festivals (ch. 8); ascetics, maṭhas and agrahāras (ch. 9); non-Hindu religions (ch. 10). From among these, the following are *not* dealt with in the *Sarvadarśanasaṃgraha*: the Narasiṃha cult; the Rāmāyaṇa tradition; the Kṛṣṇa and Viṭhala cults; the minor cults and popular religion (Harihara, Caturviṃśatimūrtis and Daśāvatāras of Viṣṇu, goddesses, Hanumān, Nāgas, Satīs and heroes); temples and festivals; maṭhas and agrahāras. From among this list, only Śaivaism, Śrī Vaiṣṇavism and some non-Hindu religions (Buddhism and Jainism) are dealt with, primarily in their most philosophical shape. Devotion (*bhakti*) appears here and there, most prominently in the chapter on the philosophy of Rāmānuja, where devotion is central.

2. Veda and Purāṇas

We can be brief about acceptance of the authority of the Veda as a requirement for being a *darśana* in the *Sarvadarśanasaṃgraha*. It is not. The inclusion of the Buddhist and Jaina philosophies as well as the philosophy of Cārvāka shows this sufficiently. For the author of the *Sarvadarśanasaṃgraha*, also thinkers who rejected the authority of the Veda could produce *darśana*s, worthy of inclusion in his survey.[1]

The same can be said about the Purāṇas, which played a unifying role in the making of Hinduism (Bisschop 2018). They are not frequently referred to in the *Sarvadarśanasaṃgraha*, not even in the 'Hindu' chapters. The most striking exception is chapter five, which presents the philosophy of Madhva. Unfortunately, many of the so-called references to different Purāṇas in this chapter are not real references at all: Madhva invented them, as Roque Mesquita (2007) has shown. The other chapters sporadically refer to a Purāṇa. Where identifiable, all these references appear to be to one Purāṇa: the *Viṣṇu Purāṇa*. A passage in the final chapter suggests, moreover, that its author (who appears to be different from the author of the preceding fifteen chapters) looked upon this Purāṇa as *śruti*, *i.e.* as a Vedic text with Vedic authority.[2]

3. Political Considerations

One might think that Islamic thought is ignored in the *Sarvadarśanasaṃgraha* because it was associated with political entities, *i.e.* neighbouring Muslim states, that threatened the existence of the Vijayanagara Empire. This would not be correct. The *Sarvadarśa-*

of Islam] may have functioned as an incentive to the composition of doxographies introducing one's own philosophy (and others') to adherents of an ideology that was far more foreign than those with which it had coexisted in the past and that had not posed any immediate threat, either in a political or a religious sense» may therefore have to be read with caution.

[1] The *Sarvadarśanasaṃgraha* does not even distinguish between *āstika* philosophies that are Vedic, and *nāstika* ones that are non-Vedic; it appears to consider Pūrva-Mīmāṃsā a *nāstika* philosophy. See Bronkhorst forthcoming a.

[2] *Sarvadarśanasaṃgraha* (ed. Abhyankar) ll. 16.771-773 appears to present a verse that occurs in the *Viṣṇu Purāṇa* (5.17.14) as *śruti*. Some of the other chapters refer to the *Viṣṇu Purāṇa* by name.

nasaṃgraha says nothing that might support (or refute) this idea. Moreover, a more recent episode in the history of Vijayanagara shows that bellicose confrontation did not stand in the way of philosophical interaction. At the beginning of the sixteenth century CE, King Kṛṣṇadevarāya of Vijayanagara waged war with the state of Kaliṅga. In spite of this war, or perhaps because of it, the ruler of Kaliṅga sent Kṛṣṇadevarāya a philosophical work accompanied by the challenge that his court pandit refute it.[1] Philosophical confrontation was in this case an extension of political confrontation.

4. Social Class

The *Sarvadarśanasaṃgraha* does not say that only twice-born people may produce philosophy, and it seems unlikely that this was its silent presupposition. Some of the schools it represents were critical of the class-caste system, and some of its texts may have been composed by authors who were not twice-born. This applies to Buddhism, Jainism and to the philosophy of Cārvāka.

5. Sanskrit

The texts that are used or referred to in the *Sarvadarśanasaṃgraha* are all in Sanskrit. It seems reasonable to assume that the author of the *Sarvadarśanasaṃgraha* was convinced that there was no philosophy worth the name in languages other than Sanskrit and its cognates.[2] It seems equally probable that he could not read texts in languages too different from Sanskrit (such as Arabic or Persian, associated with Muslim culture). This does not necessarily mean that he thought other philosophies had to be inferior – *i.e.*, not *darśana*s – *because* they did not find expression in Sanskrit. He certainly does not say anything of the kind. What is more, he cites authors who also wrote in other languages than Sanskrit, as, for example, Veṅkaṭanātha (quoted l. 4.204; equally known as Vedānta Deśika), who also wrote in Tamil.[3] And his seventh chapter, which deals with the philosophy of the followers of Śiva (*śaivadarśana*), concerns what is better known by the name Śaiva-Siddhānta, which by that time had produced philosophical works in Tamil.[4] Language in itself can hardly have been a condition for being considered a *darśana*. Having said this, it is good to remember that the Vijayanagara Empire appears to have emphasized the use of Sanskrit more than its predecessors. To quote Sheldon Pollock (2006, p. 337): «The Vijayanagara empire … saw a dramatic decrease in the production of expressive political inscription in Kannada (also in Telugu and Tamil), while a Sanskrit imperial idiom modestly reasserted itself».

6. Ancient Systems

It would be conceivable that the *Sarvadarśanasaṃgraha* started from the assumption that anything of philosophical value had been expressed ages ago, by the ancient sages

[1] Bronkhorst, Diaconescu & Kulkarni 2013.

[2] He would then disagree with the following statement: «Indian philosophy has been written in many languages, including Pali, Prakrit, Sanskrit, Malayalam, Urdu, Gujerati, Tamil, Telugu, Bengali, Marathi, Persian, Kannada, Punjabi, Hindi, Tibetan, Arabic, and Assamese» (Ganeri 2017, p. 1).

[3] Freschi 2018. The *Sarvadarśanasaṃgraha* refers to some specific languages different from Sanskrit in its 15th chapter, where it mentions *karṇāṭagauḍalāṭabhāṣā* 'the languages of Karnataka, Bengal and Lāṭa'.

[4] Brunner 1981, p. 104.

whose names are connected with the fundamental texts of various schools.[1] This does not however appear to be the case. Some of the chapters carry the names of individuals who lived just a few generations before the author of the *Sarvadarśanasaṃgraha*, and who he knew were historical figures belonging to a recent past. This is particularly true of the chapters called after Rāmānuja (no. 4) and Pūrṇaprajña (= Madhva; no. 5). Several modern scholars have been struck by this. Halbfass (1988, p. 353), for example, stated: «it is … remarkable that the Sarvadarśanasaṃgraha steers clear of the six-fold (as well as any other numerical) scheme, and also includes several doctrines that were considered quite modern at the time it was written. It is also interesting that this work makes a clear distinction between sectarian philosophies and the classical systems, setting the former alongside the latter as something new». Stoker (2016, p. 72) adds: «These [systems that were of relatively recent origin and often prevailed in the Sringeri Smārtas' milieu] would include chapters on Rāmānuja's thought, Madhva's thought, and several different systems of Śaivism». There was apparently place in the *Sarvadarśanasaṃgraha* for recently developed philosophies. [A proviso must be added. Is it possible that the author of the *Sarvadarśanasaṃgraha* thought that these philosophies, though associated with recent names, had ancient roots? Stoker (2016, p. 77) points out that Madhva appears to say something of the kind: «In Madhva's Anuvyākhyāna 2.2, v. 549, a minicommentary on his own commentary on foundational Vedānta scriptures, the Brahma Sūtras, Madhva expresses the idea that all currents of thought are, like streams of water, beginningless».][2]

7. Cyclical Nature of Time

One of the characteristics that most 'Hindu' sects share with Buddhism and Jainism is their belief in time cycles: long periods of time at the end of which the world begins all over again. It is tempting to think that the author of the *Sarvadarśanasaṃgraha* took this belief for granted in the philosophers he was willing to take seriously. This temptation is not justified. Nowhere does the *Sarvadarśanasaṃgraha* mention this particular belief. What is more, while discussing the philosophy of Jaimini (= Pūrva-Mīmāṃsā; ch. 12), he quotes a verse from Kumārila's *Ślokavārttika* (7.366) that states that there is a beginningless and uninterrupted tradition of handing down Vedic knowledge from teacher to pupil,[3] which suggest that this particular school believed in an eternal and essentially unchanging world, not in time cycles.

8. Liberation

There is, finally, one topic that is referred to in most chapters of the *Sarvadarśanasaṃgraha*: liberation. It is even mentioned in the first chapter, dealing with the philos-

[1] This would agree with Qvarnström's (1999, p. 174) following observation: «The most salient [generic property of the different doxographical texts] is their lack of a historical *point d'appui*; the various philosophical strands are treated as once and for all fixed systems (*siddhānta*) and not as products of history …».

[2] A note specifies: *darśanānāṃ pravṛttatvān manda āśaṅkate punaḥ / anādikālato vṛttāḥ samayāḥ hi pravāhataḥ /* «The fool doubts that [the *darśanas*] are streams that flow in [real] time in a continuous way from time that is beginningless, because [he is confused] by the fact that the different *darśanas* are proclaimed [by specific individuals]».

[3] *Sarvadarśanasaṃgraha* l. 12 140-141: *vedasyādhyayanaṃ sarvaṃ gurvadhyayanapūrvakam / vedādhyayanasāmānyād adhunādhyayanaṃ yathā //* «All study of the Veda is preceded by a teacher's study, because Vedic study is always the same, like study today».

ophy of Cārvāka, where its possibility is rejected.[1] The chapter on Nyāya speaks of the belief that in the state of liberation there is complete annihilation of pain as established doctrine in all schools of thought (*sarvatantrasiddhāntasidddha*).[2] This belief is here called *ghaṇṭāpatha*, lit. the chief road in a village, and therefore a or the central notion in all these philosophies. Liberation is mentioned only in passing in the chapter on Vaiśeṣika, but in a manner that indicates that the role of liberation (here: *niḥśreyasa*) is taken for granted; indeed, the very first lines of this chapter emphasize the role that knowledge of Vaiśeṣika plays on the path toward the end of suffering. It is not mentioned in chapter 8, on the philosophy of Pratyabhijñā, no doubt because the goal of this philosophy, identity with the Highest Lord, here plays the role that liberation plays in the other chapters. The only real exception is chapter 12, on Jaimini's philosophy, *i.e.* on Mīmāṃsā. And here one may suspect that the fundamental role of ritual Mīmāṃsā with respect to all schools of Vedānta – including the philosophy of Rāmānuja (ch. 4), the philosophy of Madhva (ch. 5) and the philosophy of Śaṅkara (ch. 16) – made it impossible to leave this school out.[3] Moreover, ideas about liberation did enter ritual Mīmāṃsā, for example in the work of the commentator Kumārila Bhaṭṭa,[4] who is extensively referred to in the chapter on Jaimini's philosophy, though not on the topic of liberation.[5]

We are therefore left with the question: Could it be that, in order to qualify for being a *darśana*, ideas have to include views on liberation?

This seems to make sense. It is clearly not the case that all philosophies discussed in the *Sarvadarśanasaṃgraha* say the same about liberation. Indeed, liberation can be conceived of in quite different ways. The liberated person is identical with Brahma in one of them, separate from but associated with the Supreme Lord in another, completely on his own in a third, etc. etc. But liberation is a recurring theme in all. This seems to justify the conclusion that a philosophy is only worthy of being included in the *Sarvadarśanasaṃgraha*, and is therefore one of «all the *darśana*s» promised by its title, if it has a position with respect to liberation.

This conclusion answers questions that might otherwise remain puzzling. It explains the absence of Muslim thought. However little the author of the *Sarvadarśanasaṃgraha* may have known of Muslim thought, it may have sufficed to convince him that it had no place for anything like liberation as conceived of in Indian thought. It also explains the presence of chapters dealing with ideas that we may not be inclined to call «philosophical». A very clear example is the one dealing with «the philosophy of the Lord of Mercury» (*raseśvaradarśana*; no. 9), which shows the way to attaining the perennity of the body (*piṇḍasthairya*) with the help of mercury, *i.e.* by alchemical means. This per-

[1] Could this be an illustration of Doniger's (2018, p. 154) observation that «Indian philosophers kept the Charvakas alive because the viewpoints attributed to them, satirically or not, disclosed hidden questions upon which much of the Indian philosophical edifice reposed»?

[2] *Sarvadarśanasaṃgraha* l. 11.104-106: *sarveṣāṃ mokṣavādinām apavargadaśāyām ātyantikī duḥkhanivṛttir astīty asyārthasya sarvatantrasiddhāntasidddhatayā ghaṇṭāpathatvāt/*. In the then following lines the text illustrates this with the help of an analysis of the doctrines of the Mādhyamikas, the Vijñānavādins, the Jainas, of Cārvāka and of Bhaṭṭa Sarvajña.

[3] Note in this connection that Mīmāṃsā is not included in certain early enumerations of schools; see Gerschheimer 2007.

[4] See *e.g.* Mesquita 1994.

[5] Note that the chapters on Pratyabhijñā (ch. 8) and on Jaimini's philosophy (ch. 12) do not use the expressions *puruṣārtha* ('human goal') either, unlike virtually all other chapters. Liberation is, of course, the highest human goal (*paramapuruṣārtha*).

ennity of the body is here called *jīvanmukti* 'liberation-in-life'; the chapter uses this expression in a way quite different from other thinkers (see below). Liberation of sorts clearly plays a central role, even in this chapter.

This expression 'liberation-in-life' is only used in the chapter on alchemy. This is peculiar. The author of the *Sarvadarśanasaṃgraha* must have been aware of the existence of the book called *Jīvanmuktiviveka* 'Investigation of Liberation-in-Life', or at the very least of the ideas promulgated therein. This *Jīvanmuktiviveka* was composed by Mādhava the older brother of Sāyaṇa (after he had adopted the name Vidyāraṇya upon taking *saṃnyāsa*). This Mādhava was the uncle of the author of the *Sarvadarśanasaṃgraha* or at least, if Cannibhaṭṭa was indeed its author, someone he knew or knew about. There is evidence that the author of the *Sarvadarśanasaṃgraha* was closely acquainted with at least one earlier work of this Mādhava: Its chapter on the philosophy of Jaimini (*i.e.*, Pūrva-Mīmāṃsā) shows the influence of the latter's *Jaiminīyanyāyamālāvistara*.[1] And yet, the notion of liberation-in-life as dealt with in the *Jīvanmuktiviveka* – *i.e.* liberation before death, but different from the perennity of the body – is absent from the *Sarvadarśanasaṃgraha*. Only the chapter on alchemy mentions the terms *jīvanmukta* and *jīvanmukti* several times, but uses these in an altogether different manner, as we have seen.[2] This same chapter specifies that in all other philosophies (as it puts it: in all *six* philosophies) liberation takes place after death.[3] This last claim is historically incorrect. Some earlier authors, among them Śaṅkara himself, knew the notion of liberation before death and used the expression *jīvanmukti* to refer to it.[4] However, the author of the *Sarvadarśanasaṃgraha* does not correct this claim, neither here nor elsewhere in his book. Liberation *tout court*, on the other hand, is a frequent topic, as we have seen. We cannot but conclude that the ideas of Mādhava/Vidyāraṇya had not convinced him.

The above claim as to the absence of the term *jīvanmukti* in all chapters of the *Sarvadarśanasaṃgraha* with the exception of the chapter on alchemy has been challenged. According to Raffaele Torella (1980, p. 409), the word did originally occur in chapter 8, which deals with the philosophy of *pratyabhijñā*. In his study of this chapter, Torella points out that parts of it have been taken *verbatim* from other works, including the *Īśvarapratyabhijñāvimarśinī* of Abhinavagupta. On the basis of that text, he proposes to emend a passage of the *Sarvadarśanasaṃgraha* that does *not* contain the word *jīvanmukti* in such a manner that it now *does* contain this word.

Torella's proposal cannot be accepted for the simple reason that the passage as it occurs in all editions of the *Sarvadarśanasaṃgraha* makes perfect sense.[5] Rather than emending the text, we have occasion to observe that, to all appearances, the author of the *Sarvadarśanasaṃgraha* modified the wording of the *Īśvarapratyabhijñāvimarśinī* in such a manner that the word *jīvanmukti* does not occur in his own text. In other words, he consciously avoided this term.

[1] Kurata 1994.

[2] This chapter quotes many verses from the *Rasārṇava*, an alchemical text that promises *jīvanmukti* in the form of an immortal body through the use of mercury.

[3] *Sarvadarśanasaṃgraha* (ed. Abhyankar) l. 9.11: *ṣaṭsv api darśaneṣu dehapātānantaraṃ mukter uktatayā* «Because it has been stated in all the six philosophies that liberation takes place after the death of the body».

[4] See Oberhammer 1994, pp. 15-17; Fort 1991, p. 2015; Slaje 1986; 2000, p. 172.

[5] For details, see the Appendix to my article *The Vaiśeṣika Path to Liberation in Context* (in preparation).

How can we make sense of the fact that the author of the *Sarvadarśanasaṃgraha* ignored ideas about liberation-in-life that were so close to his own concern with liberation, ideas that were being developed under his nose, so to say? One reason may be that the *Jīvanmuktiviveka* «departs from the mainstream Advaita of Śaṅkara by prescribing in addition to knowledge a further program of yogic discipline based on such texts as the Bhagavad Gītā …, the Pātañjala Yogasūtras …, the Gauḍapādīya Kārikās …, and the Laghu-Yogavāsiṣṭha … He integrates the structures of thought from the Śaṅkaran Advaita and the Pātañjalīya Yoga systems into one system bearing on the life and goal of the renouncer». (Goodding 2002, pp. 1-2). This may not have been to the taste of the author of the *Sarvadarśanasaṃgraha*. It is also not impossible that the *Jīvanmuktiviveka*, which appears to be a product of its author's last years (Sprockhoff 1964, p. 225), had not yet been composed at the time of the *Sarvadarśanasaṃgraha*.

However, perhaps the most important reason for the absence of liberation-in-life in the *Sarvadarśanasaṃgraha* may be the following: The *Jīvanmuktiviveka* and its ideas had a political dimension. By establishing the possibility of liberation-in-life within the Advaita tradition and criticizing the rejection of this possibility by the followers of Viśiṣṭādvaita, Mādhava/Vidyāraṇya emphasized the superiority of his own (Advaita) tradition, and the special spiritual status of its gurus.[1] Stoker (2016, p. 61) describes the situation as follows:

> By regarding many of their monastic heads as having achieved this state [of *jīvanmukti*], Smārta Advaitins implicitly claimed a particularly authoritative spiritual status for their religious leaders. In a paradoxical way, the sect extended its worldly influence through the presumed liberation of their leader from this world. Śaṅkara (c. eighth century) and especially Vimuktātman (c. tenth-eleventh century) each argued for the necessity of a qualified teacher to achieve *mokṣa* and strongly implied that the most qualified teacher would be one who is in the state of *mokṣa* himself. We should not then find it surprising that, as proponents of the Advaita tradition became organized into monastic institutions, leading teachers in these communities came to be regarded as *jīvanmuktas*.

A response to this challenge came more than a century later, when another form of Vedānta, Dvaita Vedānta, inspired by the teachings of Madhva, had come to predominate in the Vijayanagara Empire. Its mouthpiece was Vyāsatīrtha.[2] Vyāsatīrtha argued that *jīvanmuktas* have their place in Dvaita Vedānta as much as, if not more than, in Advaita Vedānta.[3]

Whatever the details of this later development, what interests us at present is that the introduction of liberation-in-life in the *Jīvanmuktiviveka*, *i.e.* liberation before death, was not politically innocent. Is it possible that the author of the *Sarvadarśanasaṃgraha*, in spite of his preference for Advaita Vedānta, did not wish to be involved in this political drama? It cannot be denied that the *Sarvadarśanasaṃgraha* would be a very different work if its preference for Advaita Vedānta was not, or not exclusively, based on arguments that support it, but rather on the claim that liberation-in-life is its exclusive privilege.

[1] Goodding 2002, p. 19; Stoker 2016, p. 55. Goodding points out that Vidyāraṇya may have countered criticism with respect to the Advaita notion of *jīvanmukti* from the side of Vedānta Deśika.

[2] Also known as Vyāsarāya. This is the name under which he and his works are discussed in the relevant volume of the *Encyclopedia of Indian Philosophies* (Potter 2016, p. 380 ff.)

[3] For details, see Stoker 2016, p. 61.

Where does all this leave us with respect to the question what Indian philosophers agreed on? Judging by the *Sarvadarśanasaṃgraha*, there were few if any topics about which all philosophers agreed. However, all the philosophies considered worthy of inclusion in this book agreed that liberation was a central concern, whatever precise interpretation is given to it.

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