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IS THERE AN INNER CONFLICT OF TRADITION?

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The question I wish to address in this paper is the following. Does the opposition which the early Indian tradition itself introduces by distinguishing Aryans from non-Aryans help us to understand later developments of Indian culture? Put more generally: Do we have to assume any kind of opposition in order to understand some of the later developments, whether or not the parties concerned referred to themselves as Aryans? I will limit the discussion of this question to a few examples, representing the views of some chosen scholars.

In the study of Vedic culture, and more in particular that of the Vedic sacrifice, non-Vedic influences have occasionally been claimed by modern researchers. I mention here the use of bricks in the Agnicayana, which Hyla Stuntz Converse (1974) tried to explain through the assumption of indigenous influence on Vedic ritual. Another example is the Mahāvīra vessel in the Pravargya, which J.A.B. van Buitenen (1968: 23 f.) considered to have an iconic nature, and the worship of which he did not hesitate to describe as *pūjā*.¹ Converse (1974: 85) believed, moreover, that the inverted firing technique used to make the Mahāvīra vessel betrays the influence of indigenous non-Vedic culture. Van Buitenen cautions against the use of 'non-Aryan', calling it "rather loose". He prefers to speak of 'non-Vedic', or perhaps 'non-Brahmanistic', but more precisely 'non-śrotriya'. His essential point is however clear: The kind of worship found in connection with the Mahāvīra figure has no parallels in other Vedic sacrifices. The only way to understand it is to assume that it is due to non-Vedic influence. Hiding behind this explanation is the assumption of a fundamental opposition within society of the time concerned. This opposition, it is claimed, allows us to understand this particular feature of the Pravargya ritual.

Both these cases, and especially the one proposed by Converse, have subsequently been acclaimed by some,² and criticized by others.³ This is not the place

¹ Falk (1994: 322 f.) discusses some Vedic and early post-Vedic passages that refer to statues.

² See Staal, 1978; 1983: I: 130 f.; 1990: 61; forthcoming; Thapar, 1983: 18 f.; Parpola, 1983: 47, 57; 1994: 154, 169, 201, 221; see also Bandhari, 1981. Gonda (1979: xv) describes van Buitenen's attempt to show that the Pravargya contains elements of non-brahmanic origin as being "not without success".

to take sides with regard to their positions. The main thing for us is to observe that the scholars concerned try to explain what they consider an irregular feature in the material they study with the help of a historical development. [34] If something does not fit in its context, it is because it has been borrowed from another context where it did. Since there is, in these cases, little or no direct evidence concerning that other context, nor about the presumed fact that the feature concerned has been borrowed, these historical reconstructions are bound to be speculative. This does not however invalidate the general principle. I do believe that an historical explanation of a feature that does not fit its present context may often be appropriate. I just want to emphasize that in practice it may be encumbered by many uncertainties. When can we say that a feature does not fit the context in which we find it? How can we be sure that it must originally have fitted its context? Is it conceivable that certain features of Vedic sacrifices, or of other cultural entities, have never fitted in any context?

Of course, there are more direct indications that middle Vedic literature was acquainted with a non-Vedic population. It has repeatedly been suggested that the Asuras, the eternal enemies of the gods, were somehow linked with the non-Vedic population. I doubt whether such a link can be generally postulated. In some cases it does however seem to hold.⁴ One of these is the famous passage of the Śatapatha Brāhmaṇa (3.2.1.23) where the Asuras are stated to exclaim in barbarous language *he 'lavo he 'lavaḥ*. Paul Thieme (1938: 4 (10)) has argued that this stands for *Māgadhī he 'layo he 'layaḥ* (so cited by the grammarian Patañjali), corresponding to Sanskrit *he 'rayo he 'rayaḥ* "hail friends!". David Carpenter (1994: 30) is tempted to conclude from this and other evidence that later Vedic society is to be viewed "as a hybrid culture forged out of Indo-Aryan and indigenous ... elements under the aegis of the cultural norm represented by the sacrifice and its language". F.R. Allchin remarks similarly, on the basis of archaeological and literary evidence (1995: 331): "The period must have witnessed the further development of a multi-ethnic society in which Indo-Aryans or their descendants, and self-styled Indo-Aryans of various origins, formed elite groups, claiming dominance and power over a mixed population of whom an increasing proportion were what we referred to as 'acculturated Aryans', that is to say descendants of the earlier population of any region who had acquired Indo-Aryan speech and perhaps other traits." The question to be asked is, of course, to what extent the non-Vedic elements (I would hesitate to use the term "indigenous" here) were integrated in this society, and to what extent they were, at that time, ready to accept the cultural norm represented by the sacrifice and its language.

³ See Kashikar, 1973, 1979, 1981, 1982; Rau, 1972: 72.

⁴ Cp. Bronkhorst, 1993: 69 f.

I will now turn to another problem, one which has interested scholars for a long time. In late Vedic literature certain new ideas make their appearance, which are absent (or at any rate not clearly present) in earlier Vedic literature, and which form the backbone of much of later Indian thought. These same ideas are strongly present in, and determine to some extent, a number of new religious movements which make their appearance in about the same period or soon after. I am, of course, speaking of the belief in reincarnation [35] and in the role of actions therein; or in good English: about the doctrine of karma. The question I wish to raise is: Is there reason to assume behind these particular innovations an opposition between different communities of people? Or is there no need for such an assumption?

The question is hardly original, and it is impossible to discuss all the answers that have been proposed to it. I will confine myself to discussing the opinions of some few scholars which have been, and still are, particularly influential.

The French sociologist Louis Dumont, to begin with, speaks of a fundamental opposition between the renouncer and the man in the world.⁵ He presents this opposition as characterizing Indian society throughout most of its history, and as being responsible for all its innovations. In reality it is the late Vedic period and the beginnings of Buddhism and Jainism which he thinks about in the first place. Since this is not generally realized, we have to pay some attention to his words.

The renouncer, according to Dumont, has played a major role in a great number of religious and other innovations in India. This is how he describes that role (1982: 94-95):

For more than two millennia Indian society has been characterised by two complementary features: society imposes upon every person a tight interdependence which substitutes constraining relationship for the individual as we know him, but, on the other hand, there is the institution of world-renunciation which allows for the full independence of the man who chooses it. Incidentally, this man, the renouncer, is responsible for all the innovations in religion that India has seen. Moreover, we see clearly in early texts the origin of the institution, and we understand it easily: the man who is after ultimate truth forgoes social life and its constraints to devote himself to his own progress and destiny. When he looks back at the social world, he sees it from a distance, as something devoid of reality, and the discovery of the self is for him coterminous, not with salvation in the Christian sense, but with liberation from the fetters of

⁵ The following remarks draw heavily upon an article "Louis Dumont et les renonçants indiens" which will appear in *Orientalia Suecana*.

life as commonly experienced in this world. The renouncer is self-sufficient, concerned only with himself. His thought is similar to that of the modern individual, but for one basic difference: we live in the social world, he lives outside it. ... The renouncer may live in solitude as a hermit or may join a group of fellow-renouncers under a master-renouncer, who propounds a particular discipline of liberation.

This passage is but a brief restatement of an earlier article called "World renunciation in Indian religions", published in French in 1959 and in English in 1960.

Note to begin with that Dumont's theory does not claim to be an exact description of the present situation in India. Dumont characterizes his theory as trying "to show that it is useful to distinguish two 'ideal types', which in fact combine more and more in the course of time" (1960: 47). Dumont's lack of appreciation for present-day ascetics in India is clear from [36] a passage in his booklet *La civilisation indienne et nous*. Here he says:⁶ "Que de nos jours on soit souvent conduit à se faire une assez piètre idée de la masse des renonçants contemporains, mendiants, yogis ou sadhus, ne change rien au fait que c'est dans cette condition que la pensée indienne a trouvé les racines de sa vie."

Dumont's theory therefore primarily concerns the past, more precisely the rather remote past. It is not based on contemporary observation, but on philology. Dumont says so himself, where he describes his theory as an attempt "to bring together from a sociological vantage point the main findings of Indology" (1960: 37). It is true that he claims on the same page that "the direct study of a small Hindu group led me to abstract certain principles which, it then appeared, could be more widely applied". But his main attention was focused on the past. It is even possible to be precise with regard to the period about which he thinks in the first place; he speaks "of that extraordinary post-vedic and pre-hindu development which goes on from the first Upanishads to the Bhagavadgita, the golden age of speculation in which emerge, from discovery to discovery, the dominant tendencies of Hindu thought" (1960: 49). It seems indeed that the theory of Dumont covers first of all the centuries which precede our era.

This impression is confirmed by what Dumont says about *bhakti*: love, or total devotion to the Lord. He considers this, as distinct from Tantrism, a sanyasic development, an invention of the renouncer: "This religion of love supposes two perfectly individualized terms; in order to conceive of a personal Lord there must also be a believer who sees himself as an individual" (1960: 57). On the next page Dumont

⁶ Dumont, 1975: 33. "The fact that nowadays one often gets a miserable impression of the mass of contemporary renouncers, beggars, yogis or sadhus, doesn't change the circumstance that Indian thought has found the roots of its existence in this condition."

continues: "The central point is that, thanks to love, renunciation is transcended by being internalized; in order to escape the determinism of actions, inactivity is no longer necessary, detachment and disinterestedness are sufficient: one can leave the world from within, and God himself is not bound by his acts, for he only acts out of love. ... By transferring his conquests from the plane of knowledge to that of affectivity, the renouncer makes a gift of them to everybody: by loving submission, by identifying themselves unreservedly with the Lord, everybody can become free individuals." (1960: 58). In other words, at least since the Bhagavadgītā there are individuals in Indian society itself, who are not renouncers. And their number must be considerable, for the Bhagavadgītā has exercised an enormous influence on Hinduism. Since the Bhagavadgītā dates from the beginning of our era or from even earlier, one must conclude that from that moment onward India has had a large number of individuals who were not renouncers, but lived in society. If, then, we look for the period [37] during which the theory of Dumont might have been applicable, we arrive at the centuries preceding the beginning of our era.⁷

Dumont's remarks about Tantrism — another religious development which becomes manifest after the beginning of our era — agree with this. He describes Tantrism as a large branch of Hinduism which presents us with the rejection of ascetic renunciation (1960: 52), or as "a truly fundamental variant of Hinduism, in which renunciation is replaced by reversal" (1960: 56). Tantrism constitutes therefore a religious innovation in India, which has not been created or invented by renouncers. This is possible, because Tantrism does not belong to the period preceding our era, which appears to interest Dumont more than any other period.

With regard to modern India, Dumont accepts the presence of individuals in society. He explains this as the result of a mixture of two mentalities, accentuated perhaps by European influence, but primarily due to the influence of the renouncer who often, as spiritual master (guru), has followers in society. One must, Dumont thinks, distinguish analytically these two mentalities, for logical, historical and comparative reasons. Only in this way can we, with the help of simple principles in an otherwise indecipherable whole, situate the society, the thought and, to some extent, the history of India with regard to ourselves.⁸ We may conclude that Dumont's theory is, for the

⁷ For an evaluation of the degree of individuality taught by the Bhagavadgītā, see Bronkhorst, 0000. It hardly corresponds to the ideas mentioned by Dumont, for which he used such expressions as "vraiment indépendants", "capables d'introduire des innovations religieuses", etc.

⁸ Dumont, 1975: 56-57: "Il faut ... répondre à une objection que la grande majorité des Hindous instruits ne manquent pas d'exprimer contre la distinction que j'ai proposée des deux mentalités. Pour eux, et fort légitimement, le désir de la délivrance (*mokṣa*) n'est pas incompatible avec la vie dans le monde - et en effet on la trouve de bonne heure associée à la triade des fins proprement mondaines: le devoir religieux, le profit économique-politique, et le plaisir immédiat. Ou encore ils se sentent comme des individus, reconnaissent une morale universelle et pensent qu'il y a à l'intérieur de l'hindouisme une moralité subjective. On répondra simplement que cela résulte du mélange de deux mentalités, accentué peut-être

present situation, at best an analytical instrument; it does not at all claim to be a correct description of it.

But even at the period before our era, at least certain renunciators (in the sense of Dumont) were hardly free from restricting relationships and completely independent. We are particularly well informed about the daily life of Buddhist monks at that period, and we know that they lived under very [38] elaborate rules.⁹ The different Buddhist schools preserved each their own (massive) collection of monastic rules with so much diligence, that the earliest schisms in the Buddhist church seem all of them to have been the results of differences concerning the form or interpretation of these rules.¹⁰ It would seem, therefore, that even in that remote past, the theory of Dumont is at best applicable to a small part of the renunciators.

To resume. Dumont's theory applies primarily (or even exclusively) to the ancient period, say the centuries preceding the beginning of our era. It is, moreover, based on the philological analysis of ancient documents,¹¹ rather than on the sociological study of Indian society. We are therefore entitled to ask: Does Dumont's theory satisfactorily explain the situation depicted in the early texts? Were the great religious discoveries he talks about — and Dumont thinks no doubt of the new ideas expressed in the Upaniṣads, of the origin of Buddhism and Jainism, etc. — enunciated by renunciators? And if yes, is it the fact that they were renunciators that allowed them to make these discoveries? Dumont's theory is by no means self-evident. Even if we were to assume that all original thinkers in ancient India were renunciators, is it not conceivable that they became renunciators because of their new ideas, and not vice-versa? Could it not be that there were other, non-Vedic, segments of the population where different ideas held sway, ideas which induced some of their members to choose the life of a renouncer? The existence at that period of such segments of the population might be obscured by the fact that they had no literature, or that their literature has not been preserved. This very possibility takes us, of course, back to the question of Aryan and non-Aryan.

par l'influence européenne, mais dû en premier lieu à l'influence du renonçant qui souvent, comme maître spirituel (*guru*), a fait des adeptes dans la société. Ces deux mentalités, il faut bien les distinguer analytiquement pour des raisons logiques, historiques et comparatives. C'est seulement en procédant de la sorte que nous pouvons, en dégagant des principes simples d'un ensemble autrement indéchiffrable, situer la société, la pensée et, dans une certaine mesure déjà, l'histoire de l'Inde par rapport à nous."

⁹ Dumont refers at several occasions to Buddhist monks, and includes them explicitly in the category of renunciators. Cp. Dumont, 1960: 44 n. 18: "... I have generalized the Brahmanic idea and have called renunciators, or even sanyasis, all those who have left the world in a manner analogous to that of the orthodox sanyasi including, for example, Buddhist monks." Tambiah (1982: 300) thinks that Dumont's article concerns first of all Buddhist monks; he describes in detail the rules to which they have to submit.

¹⁰ This point of view, first presented by Heinz Bechert in 1961, has recently been criticized by Shizuka Sasaki in a series of articles (1989, 1992, 1993, 1994, 1995, 1996).

¹¹ One suspects also the presence of a strong dose of "what Said calls 'Romantic Orientalism', with its fantasies of lost wisdom, ... and its degradation of the Oriental modern" (Lopez, 1995: 12).

First, however, we must briefly consider another possibility. Dumont offered the idea that certain individuals, for one reason or another, became renouncers, as a result of which they introduced new ideas and innovations into Indian thought and religion. He does not specify which segments of the population provided these renouncers, and we must assume that they came from various segments, perhaps including what we may call the Vedic population. The origin of these renouncers does not seem to matter all that much to Dumont, for the new ideas they produced have for him more to do with their state as renouncer than with the particular segment of the population which they left in order to become renouncers. One might however assume [39] the opposite. One might maintain that the Vedic tradition in particular developed in such a way that its adherents came to accept, or even invent, the karma theory, and were induced to become renouncers. This is the position of J.C. Heesterman, who articulates this point of view primarily in an article that was reprinted in a volume called *The Inner Conflict of Tradition* (1985). Heesterman, too, believes that a conflict is to be assumed to explain these and other developments in India. But contrary to Dumont and others, his conflict is a real "inner conflict". That is to say, it is not the expression of different groups in society which oppose and influence each other, but rather something inherent in single traditions, which stays with these traditions, and cannot be, or is in any case not normally, resolved. The introduction to the book just mentioned states this quite generally (p. 2): "Tradition is characterized by the inner conflict of atemporal order and temporal shift rather than by resilience and adaptiveness. It is this unresolved conflict that provides the motive force we perceive as the flexibility of tradition. Indian civilization offers a particularly clear case of this dynamic inner conflict." Note that these remarks apply to tradition in general, not only to Indian tradition, and even less to only one episode of Indian tradition. The conflict, moreover, is between "atemporal order and temporal shift", positions which can no doubt not be completely identified with different groups in society.

Let us now turn to Heesterman's article "Brahmin, ritual, and renouncer", which is chapter two of his book *The Inner Conflict of Tradition*, mentioned earlier. Heesterman derives the Upaniṣadic karma doctrine from certain postulated developments in the Vedic sacrifice (p. 34 f.). The interiorization of the ritual, moreover, is presented as the logical conclusion of its ongoing individualization (p. 38 f.). And here we touch the principle of world renunciation, the emergence of which, Heesterman maintains, has been of crucial importance in the development of Indian religious thinking. To substantiate this claim, which he does not further elaborate, Heesterman refers without comments in a note to Dumont's article "World renunciation in Indian religions", which we have discussed above. It would seem that Heesterman

agrees with Dumont's thesis to the extent that renouncers have been responsible for most of the discoveries and innovations in Indian religious life. He disagrees, however, with respect to the Brahmin, whom Dumont views as the opposite of the renouncer, while Heesterman puts him on a par with the renouncer.¹²

Renunciation, in Heesterman's opinion, can be understood as a development of Vedic thought. He expresses this in the following passage, which is worth quoting in full (p. 39-40):

It is often thought that the institution of renunciation emerged as a protest against brahminical orthodoxy or that it originated in non-brahmanical or even non-Aryan circles. The theory of the four āśramas, or stages of life, would then have been an attempt at legitimizing the renunciatory modes of life and drawing them within the orbit of brahminical orthodoxy. There is of course full scope for recognizing the influence of [40] extraneous beliefs and practices, for instance, in the matter of various forms of asceticism. But the important point is that these influences do not seem to have made a decisive irruption in the development of religious thought. They seem rather to have fitted themselves into the orthogenetic, internal development of Vedic thought. Or one might say that these extraneous beliefs and practices were not in principle dissimilar from those that obtained among the adherents of the preclassical ritual.

While elaborating this last remark, Heesterman draws attention to various renunciant features in Vedic rites and life, and comes to the conclusion that the institution of renunciation is already implied in classical ritual thinking. The difference between classical ritualism and renunciation, he continues, seems to be a matter rather of degree than of principle (p. 41).

The upshot of all this is, that the important religious developments of the centuries preceding the common era are, here too, caused by an opposition, by conflict. This conflict is however, for Heesterman, an inner conflict of the Vedic tradition, not a conflict between different opposed groups of people. Indeed, Heesterman concludes his article "Brahmin, ritual, and renouncer" with the following remark (p. 44): "The brahmin, then, is the exemplar of the irresolvable tension that is at the heart of Indian civilization."

Dumont explained the main religious developments in ancient India with the help of an opposition between two groups of people: the renouncer as against the man

¹² Heesterman, 1985: 231-32 n.32.

in the world. Heesterman postulated a similar opposition, but one present in one single group, or even in single individuals. If one goes along with these two scholars in thinking that an opposition, or oppositions, lie behind the major changes that become visible in Indian religion in the centuries preceding the common era, one has to take into consideration a third possibility: the opposition, or oppositions, may have been embodied in physically distinct groups of people. We have seen that similar hypotheses have been proposed to account for certain features of the Agnicayana and Pravargya rituals. But whereas in the case of these sacrifices the evidence was only indirect, we will see that there is far more explicit evidence in support of the hypothesis that the religious upheavals of the late-Vedic period had something to do with the non-Vedic population. Dumont and Heesterman may have overlooked this, partly because they worked with too simplistic ideas of renunciation, of liberation, and of the link between these two.¹³

[41]

Perhaps it is the sociological orientation of these two scholars which leads them to identify the aim of renunciation with "liberation from the fetters of life as commonly experienced in this world", as Dumont puts it; Heesterman describes the renouncer as "emancipated from the relations which govern [the world]" (p. 39). Descriptions like these tend to make one overlook the aims which the early texts ascribe to the renouncers. It turns out that not all renouncers pursue the same aim. What is more, the English term 'renouncer' is not the translation of any one single Sanskrit term. There are, on the contrary, a number of Sanskrit terms which are not treated as synonyms in the texts. As so often, the urge to translate Indian expressions into expressions which are meaningful to the modern investigator, is here responsible for a failure to understand the texts on their own terms.

It turns out that early post-Vedic literature knows, and acknowledges, two altogether different spiritual aims, which cannot both be heaped together under the heading 'liberation'. Some ascetics aspire for heaven (*svarga*), others seek to obtain final liberation (*mokṣa*; *apavarga*; *apunarbhava*). The two are occasionally explicitly

¹³ An interesting criticism of the orthogenetic point of view is to be found in Brian K. Smith's *Reflections on Resemblance, Ritual, and Religion*. Consider his following observations (1989: 195): "Perhaps the case for a certain discontinuity, for the Upanishads as emblematic not of an extension of Vedic ritualism but of its demise as the dominant worldview of ancient India, can be made on the basis of my work here. I have located the heart and soul of Vedic ritualism in a principle at odds with that underlying monism. In the Upanishads, one might be witnessing the conclusion of Vedism not in the sense of its culmination but in the sense of its destruction. In the proto-Vedāntic view, the universe and ritual order based on resemblance has collapsed, and a very different configuration based on identity (abhorred by the Vedic ritualists as the 'excess of resemblance', *jāmi*) has emerged. Upanishadic monism, one might say, blew the lid off a system contained, as well as regulated, by hierarchical resemblance." Also p. 210: "The Upanishadic redefinition of the 'true sacrifice' might be best seen not as the logical outcome of Vedic ritual thinking but rather as a valuable *objet trouvé* useful to assimilate the foreign to the traditional."

contrasted. In Aśvaghōṣa's *Buddhacarita*, for example, the Bodhisattva is described as trying out two different ascetic paths: in a penance grove, and as pupil of Arāḍa Kālāma respectively. The former path leads to heaven. The Bodhisattva rejects it because he does not want heaven, but freedom from rebirth (*Buddhacarita* 7.48). This path is described as *pravṛtti*. The path of Arāḍa, which aims at liberation from rebirth, is *nivṛtti*.¹⁴

The story of king Pāṇḍu in the *Mahābhārata* (1.110) is equally explicit. When Pāṇḍu decides to leave the world, two altogether different possibilities are open to him: either he becomes a shaven ascetic, bent on release (*mokṣa*), or he withdraws to the forest, striving for heaven.

I will not multiply examples of this kind, as I have published a small book dedicated to this and related questions.¹⁵ One thing seems however clear. Indians of the early post-Vedic period distinguished between two very different ascetic paths, with very different aims. One of these two — the one striving after heaven — is explicitly linked to the Vedic tradition. These ascetics normally keep the Vedic fire going, even in their huts in the forest. The other ascetics — those who look for the end of rebirth — do not, at least not in the earliest relevant texts, have anything to do with the Vedic sacrificial tradition.

[42]

Recall now that the ideas underlying the search for liberation from rebirth, i.e., the belief in rebirth, are a few times introduced in the *Upaniṣads* in a most remarkable manner. Several passages state in so many words that this knowledge (i.e., the knowledge of the doctrine of karma, or of the true nature of the self) had not so far been known to the Brahmins.¹⁶ They admit that the Brahmins have borrowed this knowledge from others. I find this highly significant, and I believe that it is obligatory upon us to take such passages very seriously. By the time Vedic texts themselves admit that they have borrowed certain ideas from others, we had better believe them. This does not necessarily mean that we have to also believe that these ideas were borrowed from Kṣatriyas. This part of the story is so easy to explain (should Brahmins admit to borrowing ideas from Vaiśyas, or Śūdras?), that we can take it with a grain of salt. But borrow they did, and that is the main thing.¹⁷

¹⁴ Bronkhorst, 1993: 73 f.

¹⁵ *The Two Sources of Indian Asceticism*, Bern: Peter Lang, 1993. An amusing story from the *Mūlasarvāstivāda Vinaya* — translated in Strong, 1992: 44-45 — may here be referred. A monkey first befriends a group of (Buddhist) *pratyekabuddhas*, whom it imitates. Subsequently it befriends a group of Brahmanical ascetics, in whose presence it still imitates the *pratyekabuddhas*. As a result the Brahmins abandon their own ascetic postures, imitate the monkey, and reach (Buddhist) enlightenment.

¹⁶ Bronkhorst, 1993: 55 f.

¹⁷ H.W. Bodewitz studies the possibility of outside influence on the Vedic ritualistic tradition in some recent publications (1992, 1993, 1996, 1996a). Gananath Obeyesekere (1996: 6) considers the strategy to

All this almost forces us to conclude that there existed, besides the Vedic Brahmins and those who followed their example and views, other groups of people in the period preceding our era, which had ideas and ideals that were significantly different from those connected with the Vedic tradition.¹⁸ These non-Vedic ideas and ideals were apparently more or less irresistible, for they found their way into late Vedic literature, as we have seen, and soon became basic to practically all the religious developments in India. These ideas and ideals belonged, at least originally, to people who were non-Vedic. Were they non-Aryan? I wouldn't know how to answer this question. Judging by the way in which the early Buddhists and the Jainas use the term *ārya* (pa. *ariya*, amg. *āriya*), it seems clear that 'Aryan' and 'non-Aryan' had almost completely lost their original senses at this time.¹⁹ But whatever the way these non-Vedic people referred to themselves, it is not inconceivable, though far from certain, that they continued traditions of people that were [43] once considered non-Aryan.²⁰ It seems certain that they cannot have been mere marginal inhabitants of the lands of the Vedic Indians. The enormous influence their ideas and ideals have exerted suggests rather that they constituted a far from negligible portion of the population.

At this point I would like to draw attention to some recent work done by Kenneth G. Zysk on early Indian medicine (1988, 1990, 1991). *Āyurveda*, Zysk argues, does not have its roots in Vedic medical practices.²¹ Quite on the contrary, for information about the early history of *Āyurveda* one has to look elsewhere, in the early surviving texts of the *Śramaṇa* tradition.²² Zysk concentrates on the text of the *Pāli* *Tiṭṭaka*, and finds there many striking parallels to classical *Āyurvedic* literature.

try to show incipient notions of karma in the early Vedic traditions and to accept a single line of development "methodologically flawed" because it assumes that the extant texts reflected the multiplicity of the religious traditions in early India, which is palpably not the case.

¹⁸ This is not to deny that there may have been real "inner conflicts", even within single individuals belonging to one single tradition. One could think here of the "major tension" which Stephanie W. Jamison "surmises" to be present in ancient Indian ideology, and which she describes as follows (1996: 16): "On the one hand, as is well known, a man must have sons (and his sons must have sons) in order to ensure not only the continuity of the line, but his own continuance in heaven, as is maintained after death by the ancestor (pitṛ) worship performed by his own male line. On the other hand, the idealization of asceticism so characteristic of later Hinduism is present, in one form or another, from the earliest period, and one of the most powerful forms of ascetic practice is the control of sexuality, the retention of semen. So males are confronted with a conundrum: they do not want sex but they need its products."

¹⁹ For a discussion of the meaning of 'Aryan' in early Jainism, see Deshpande, 1993: 9 ff.

²⁰ Olivelle (1993: 68 f.) rightly criticizes some authors who too easily jumped to conclusions regarding the supposedly non-Aryan origin of Indian asceticism.

²¹ So already Zysk, 1985: 1, 10-11. Cp. Wujastyk, 1995: 20 f.

²² It is not impossible, but far from certain, that the term *śramaṇa* did not originally refer to an identifiable class of people, as is maintained by Olivelle (1993: 16); the Vedic evidence in support of this is however meagre and perhaps of doubtful value. The term soon came to refer to identifiable groups of ascetics, as is clear from various passages, among them the ones to be considered below.

Zysk tries to explain these facts with the help of a hypothesis that is reminiscent of the views of Dumont, which we discussed earlier. Medical specialists, he points out, were avoided in the Vedic age. This, he continues, pushed them into the direction of the Śramaṇas. As he puts it himself (1991: 26): "The shunned medical specialists — wandering the countryside, administering cures to all who required (and could pay for) them, and closely studying the world around them while exchanging valuable information with their fellow healers — understandably gravitated toward those sharing a similar alienation and outlook: the orthodox mendicants and the heterodox wandering ascetics who had abandoned society to seek liberation from the endless cycle of birth, death, and rebirth, and who were quite indifferent or even antagonistic to the brāhmanic orthodoxy of class and ritualism based on sacrifice to gods of the Vedic pantheon." And again (p. 37): "The healers, like the ascetics, were seekers of knowledge and outcasts, shunned by the orthodox Hindus. They wandered about, performing their cures and acquiring new medicine, treatments, and medical knowledge, and eventually become indistinguishable from the other *śramaṇas* with whom they were in close contact." He then adds: "The healers were not necessarily ascetics, but many ascetics — for instance, the Buddhist monk-healers — might well have been physicians."

The development of medicine of which we find evidence in the Buddhist texts is therefore, in Zysk's opinion, something of a revolution. He cites in this connection the name of Thomas Kuhn, and speaks of a paradigm shift. To cite his own words (p. 26): "During the centuries intervening between Vedic medicine and the absorption of Indian medicine into brāhmanic orthodoxy (ca. eighth century B.C.E. to early centuries C.E.), the medical [44] paradigm dramatically shifted from a magico-religious to an empirico-rational approach to healing." Ascetic traditions, he further maintains (p. 20), played a crucial role in facilitating this transition. It occurred "largely because of close associations between medicine and the heterodox ascetic traditions of ancient India" (p. 26).

It is true that Zysk does not refer to the work of Louis Dumont. It is however hard to deny that he makes a very similar point. It is the ascetics that made the intellectual revolution possible which supposedly took place in Indian medicine during the late-Vedic period. And the suggestion is that both the healers and the ascetics originally belonged to the same, more or less Vedic, society. Their break with that society, we are given to understand, was due to the fact that both the ascetics and the healers chose a way of life that was in some way opposed to Vedic society.

As in the case of the theories of Dumont, we have to ask here too the question whether the ascetics concerned were linked to the new medical ideas because they were ascetics, or because they came from a social background where such ideas held sway. In

the first case we have to assume that both the healers and the ascetics broke away from Vedic society; in the second case they didn't have to, because they did not really belong to it. In both cases we should expect the heterodox ascetics to be acquainted with the non-Vedic forms of medicine. If the healers had broken away from Vedic society, these non-Vedic forms of medicine must be looked upon as new, and revolutionary. If not, we must consider the possibility that these non-Vedic forms of medicine were not necessarily new, and may have been around for a while, but then of course in what I will call the non-Vedic segments of society. How can we, on the basis of the available evidence, choose between these two possibilities?

The fact that there were both Vedic and non-Vedic ascetics may allow us to reach a solution. The Vedic ascetics, we might expect, were somehow linked to Vedic forms of medicine; the non-Vedic ascetics to the non-Vedic forms of medicine. Is there a way to test this hypothesis?

There is, and Zysk provides us with the evidence. He refers to two Greek passages preserved by the historian and geographer Strabo. The first one is a well-known account by Megasthenes, who was sent around 300 B.C.E. as an ambassador by the first Seleucus to the court of Candragupta Maurya at Pāṭaliputra. This account describes one kind of Brahmanical ascetic, and two kinds of Śramaṇas. In an earlier publication I have been able to show that these altogether three kinds of ascetics agree in many details with a similar division found in the Āpastamba Dharma Sūtra.²³ The second kind of Śramaṇa, in particular, is described as surviving by begging, and as remaining motionless for long periods of time. Interestingly, this second kind of Śramaṇa are here called 'physicians' (*Īatrikoī*). The passage further specifies (I use Zysk's translation, p. 28): "and [he says that] they are able to bring about multiple offspring, male offspring and female offspring, through [45] the art of preparing and using drugs; but they accomplish healing through grains for the most part, not through drugs; and of the drugs [he says that] the most highly esteemed are the ointments and the plasters".

Zysk's comments on this passage are worth quoting (p. 28-29): "The śramaṇic healers are said to effect their cures mostly through grain foods (*sītīā*), and when they employ drugs (*fārmaka*), the most esteemed are ointments (*ϕίξριστα*) and poultices (*kataplāsmata*). Inherent in this distinction is the internal dietary use of foods and the external application of drugs, both of which are fundamental to the rational therapy (*yuktivyapāśraya*) of āyurvedic medicine. The former helps to sustain and regulate the internal functions of the human organism by restoring a balance to the bodily elements, while the latter eradicates afflictions located on the body's surface. Medical passages

²³ Bronkhorst, 1993: ch. 1.

contained both in the Buddhist monastic code (Vinaya) and in the early āyurvedic treatises are replete with illustrations of the medicinal use of foods and the therapeutic application of remedies such as ointments and poultices."

Zysk is also no doubt right when he states (p. 28): "The passage clearly points to a connection between the physicians ... and the *śramaṇas* ..., recognizing the former as a subgroup of the latter." One may have doubts as to whether healers in the time of Megasthenes were really a subgroups of the Śramaṇas, and whether they really all survived by begging, and remained motionless for long periods of time. Perhaps Megasthenes' testimony is not reliable in all these details. It must however be admitted that these kinds of healers are here said to be connected (in one way or another) with the Śramaṇas.

More interesting for our present purposes is another passage from Strabo's *Geography* (15.1.70), also referred to by Zysk. Zysk offers the following translation:²⁴

In classifying philosophers, [the writers on India] set the Pramnai (i.e., *śramaṇas*) in opposition to the Brachmanes (i.e., Brāhmaṇs). [The Pramnai] are captious and fond of cross-questioning; and [they say that] the Brachmanes practice natural philosophy and astronomy, but they are derided by the Pramnai as charlatans and fools. And [they say that] some are called mountain dwelling, others naked, and others urban and neighbouring, and [the] mountain-dwelling [Pramnai] use (i.e., wear) hides of deer and have leather pouches, full of roots and drugs, claiming to practice medicine with sorcery, spells, and amulets.

This passage causes Zysk some problems. He comments (p. 32): "The mountain-dwelling Pramnai in this passage differ from the [46] *śramaṇa*-physicians described by Megasthenes. The healing of the Pramnai *ś[r]amaṇas* is magico-religious, using sorcery, spells, and amulets, and reminiscent of the early Vedic medical tradition reflected in the *Atharvaveda*. This form of healing is, on the whole, contrary to the empirical and rational medicine of the early Buddhist and āyurvedic literature, in which references to magical techniques are rare." This goes, of course, against Zysk's general thesis, according to which the Śramaṇas are to be connected with a new kind of medicine, not with the old Vedic one.

The problem can however easily be solved. Nothing in the original Greek says that the Śramaṇas practise medicine with sorcery, spells, and amulets.²⁵ The agent of the last sentence of this passage is not specified, and there is no compelling reason to

²⁴ Zysk, 1991: 32; cp. McCrindle, 1901: 76; Jones, 1930: 122-125. For the original Greek, see Jones, 1930: 122-124; Meineke, 1877: 1001).

²⁵ I thank my doctoral student Bogdan Diaconescu for helping me with the interpretation of this passage.

think that it concerns Śramaṇas rather than philosophers in general, or even only Brahmins. Indeed, there are some rather clear indications to show that the Brahmins are decidedly not excluded in the latter half of this passage. The mountain-dwellers here discussed are said to wear hides of deer. Deer skins are exactly what, according to Megasthenes, Brahmins use. We may assume that our Greek authors here refer to the antelope-skin, which is a special feature of Vedic ascetics.²⁶

The immediately following sentences, not quoted by Zysk, confirm that Brahmins are not excluded in this passage. Indeed, one gets the impression that specific features of certain groups are to some extent confused; some of these features, at any rate, are typically Brahmanical. We read, for example, in connection with the naked [philosophers]:²⁷ "Women live in their society without sexual commerce." This is typical for the Vedic *vānaprastha*, who withdraws with his wife into the forest. The Vedic *vānaprastha* needs a wife in order to fulfil his sacrificial obligations. About the so-called 'urban' [philosophers] we read (15.1.71) that some live "out in the country, and go clad in the skins of fawns or antelopes".²⁸ Again the antelope skin, a Brahmanical feature which we discussed above. If, moreover, the statement to the effect "that they all wear long hair and long beards, and that they braid their hair and surround it with a head-band"²⁹ refers to the same 'urban' philosophers, we have here another feature referring to Brahmins rather than to the Śramaṇas, who had a tendency to be bald.

[47]

The second passage from Strabo's *Geography* suggests, therefore, that also Brahmanical ascetics were known to offer their services as healers, but that they, contrary to the non-Vedic ascetics, practised a different kind of healing, the kind of healing namely, which we also find in Vedic texts.

We may, in view of the above, agree with Zysk that some, perhaps many, ascetics in ancient India also worked as healers. But there is no reason to think that the association of healers with ascetics was responsible for the "paradigm shift" which supposedly took place at that time. The evidence we have is limited, but it suggests something quite different. It suggests that Vedic ascetics practised Vedic healing, and that non-Vedic ascetics practised non-Vedic healing. This, in its turn, only makes sense on the assumption that the social background of the healers concerned determined the

²⁶ Bronkhorst, 1993: 51 with n. 12.

²⁷ Tr. McCrindle, 1901: 76. Cp. Jones, 1930: 124; Meineke, 1877: 1001.

²⁸ Jones, 1930: 124; Meineke, 1877: 1001.

²⁹ *Geography* 15.1.71 (Jones, 1930: 124; Meineke, 1877: 1002; tr. Jones.) McCrindle (1901: 77) translates this passage in a manner which suggests that all Indians wear long hair and long beards.

type of healing they would practise.³⁰ And this suggests that there were two traditions of healing which existed side by side, in different segments of society.

Let me not fail to point out here that Zysk does not reject the possibility of different traditions existing side by side. He reminds us on p. 24 that the frequent travels of Vedic healers beyond the frontiers of Aryan society in order to acquire the rich pharmacopoeia mentioned in the Atharvaveda brought them into frequent contact with non-Aryan peoples. They obtained from these outsiders, Zysk continues, much new and valuable knowledge pertaining to their special craft. "Their contact with non-Āryans might well have given rise to an empirical orientation that became ... antagonistic to brāhmaṇic orthodoxy in the later Vedic period." (p. 24). Zysk does not however elaborate this theme of the presence of an empirical orientation outside what he calls Aryan society.

How were these two traditions distinct from each other? Zysk characterizes the Vedic tradition of healing as "magico-religious", the non-Vedic tradition as "empirico-rational".³¹ "Vedic medicine," he points out on p. 15, "was fundamentally a system of healing based on magic. Disease was believed to be produced by demonic or malevolent forces when they attacked and entered the bodies of their victims, causing the manifestation of morbid bodily conditions. These assaults were occasioned by the breach of certain taboos, by imprecations against the gods, or by witchcraft and sorcery."³² [48] With regard to the non-Vedic tradition of medicine Zysk has the following to say (p. 29-30): "Indian medical theoreticians placed paramount emphasis on direct observation as the proper means to know everything about mankind. ... Complete knowledge of humans and their relationship to their environment included an understanding of the causes of mankind's ailments. Indian medicine's inherent philosophical orientation led to theories about causes for mankind's afflictions. Although its exact origin cannot be determined, the etiology particular to Indian medicine is the three-humor (*tridoṣa*) theory. Nearly all the maladies plaguing humans are explained by means of three 'peccant' humors, or *doṣas* — wind, bile, and phlegm — either singly or in combination. The *doṣas* are really specific waste products of

³⁰ Wolz-Gottwald (1990) draws attention to features of classical Āyurveda that are hard to reconcile with both a Brahmanical and an ascetic origin; the empirico-rational approach may therefore have originated in more world-oriented circles. This, of course, supports our argument.

³¹ Wezler (1995: 222) looks upon the stark contrast between the 'magico-religious healing' of the Veda and the later 'empirico-rational medicine' as "acceptable as rhetorical exaggeration". After severe criticism of a number of passages in Zysk's book, Wezler comes none the less to the conclusion that "[i]ronically Zysk may nevertheless ultimately be right" (p. 228).

³² Cp. Zysk, 1985: 8: "In this work ... the concept of magico-religious medicine is understood to be as follows: Causes of diseases are not attributed to physiological functions, but rather to external beings or forces of a demonic nature who enter the body of their victim and produce sickness. The removal of such malevolent entities usually involved an elaborate ritual, often drawing on aspects of the dominant local religion and nearly always necessitating spiritually potent and efficacious words, actions and devices."

digested food, occurring in quantities greater or lesser than need to maintain normal health. They act as vitiators by disrupting the normal balance of the bodily elements (*dhātus*), which in turn are modifications of the five basic elements (earth, air, fire, water, and ether) found in all of nature, and the resulting disequilibrium of the bodily elements produce disease. Their empirical orientation also led the medical theoreticians to include environmental factors, daily regimen, and external factors in their overall consideration of the causes of diseases."³³

These observations about the early history of Indian medicine seem to confirm our impression that there existed, in the late-Vedic period, (at least) two segments of society which independently preserved rather radically different traditions and approaches to reality. In this connection I would like to cite the words of an archaeologist. George Erdosy, in an article called "The archaeology of early Buddhism", arrives at the following conclusion (1993: 46):

[I]t would be a great mistake to derive classical Indian civilisation solely from its Vedic antecedents. Such an approach may be criticised on two counts: to begin with, recent surveys of the "Aryan" problem ... suggest that far from being an invading race, the *Āryas* of the Rigveda were a locally emerging ethnic group of northwestern India, distinguished by a set of social and religious institutions. Secondly, ... many regions of northern India, previously thought to have been colonised only by the Aryans of the first millennium BC, had in fact been populated for at least 1000 years previously, and reveal a gradual progress of civilisation which need not assume anything so drastic as foreign invasions. The "Aryanisation" of the Indian Subcontinent, therefore, is best seen as the selective adoption of an attractive ideology — first associated with an ethnic group of northwestern India that called itself *Ārya* — by local elites, who strove to justify expanding and increasingly inegalitarian social systems, whose presence in the archaeological record we have just traced through the emergence of settlement hierarchies.

[49]

Archaeology therefore seems to provide some measure of support for the position I have presented.

The same author warns, in another publication (Erdosy, 1995: 3), against confusing "Aryans" with "Indo-Aryans". The first term — he explains — is based on

³³ Filliozat (1949: 157 f.) mentions the presence of the theory of breaths/winds in the Upaniṣads as proof for the continuity of Vedic medicine and classical Āyurveda. However, the same evidence might be interpreted as resulting from non-Vedic influence, as in the case of the belief in rebirth. Various afflictions of wind mentioned in the Pāli canon are discussed in Zysk, 1991: 92 f.

the self-designation of the Vedic poets and denotes a multitude of ethnic groups subscribing to a newly emerging ideology, whereas the second term identifies speakers of a subgroup of languages within the Indo-Iranian branch of the Indo-European family. The implication is, of course, that there may have been Indo-Aryans who were not Aryans.

Let us return to Zysk. I do not know to what extent his use of the expression "empirico-rational" is appropriate with regard to the non-Vedic traditions we have been considering. It does however raise the question whether the roots of Indian philosophy are to be looked for in the opposition between Vedic and non-Vedic traditions.³⁴

Here we have to turn to Erich Frauwallner. Frauwallner believed that the development of Indian philosophy is to be explained with the help of a basic opposition. In the pre-war years he maintained that this opposition was a racial one: the Aryan invaders dominated the first, purely philosophical period, whereas the second, theistic and dogmatic period betrayed the increased influence of the original non-Aryans.³⁵ In later years he changed his views,³⁶ without however abandoning the idea that a basic opposition was at work in the history of Indian philosophy. He now believed that two currents of thought were at work. One of these had originated in the early Upaniṣads and is at the basis of early Upaniṣadic philosophy; it is characterized by the doctrine of a 'world-soul', Brahma. This current later gave rise to Sāṃkhya and Buddhism, according to Frauwallner (1953: [50] 192f., 268). The other current is characterized by the acceptance of a multitude of individual souls, and by a strong natural philosophical orientation (Frauwallner, 1953: 268). It is this current which gave rise to the natural philosophy underlying classical Vaiśeṣika. These two currents later influenced each other to the extent that the original scientific spirit of the second current got lost, and ideas about God and liberation entered into it.

Frauwallner has correctly been criticized for his overall vision of the development of Indian philosophy. His idea of a period of strong natural philosophical

³⁴ Ruben (1979: 37), after referring to physiological thought, concludes: "So lässt sich schon andeuten, dass es neben der uns literarisch einzig erhaltenen Theologie dieser Zeiten noch Wissen und anderes Glauben gab, aus dem sich Philosophie entwickeln konnte." He does not introduce the notion of two opposing traditions, but observes on p. 40, "dass im Grund nur die Medizin und die Staatslehre sich später von der Theologie weitgehend lösen konnten".

³⁵ Frauwallner, 1938; 1939. de Jong (1997: 171) draws attention to a conference contribution by Frauwallner published in 1944, in which he quotes with approval W. v. Soden's words "dass Wissenschaft im strengen Sinn des Wortes etwas ist, das nur von den durch die nordische Rasse bestimmten Indogermanen geschaffen werden konnte".

³⁶ Oberhammer, 1976: 9-10; cp. Houben, 1995: 713 f. Walter Ruben maintained still in 1979 that philosophy in India was due to the Aryans: "Erst mit den Āryas begann Philosophie in Indien, etwa sechs Jahrhunderte nach ihrer Einwanderung, noch nicht, solange sie ihr Nomadisieren im Panjab und Gangesgebiet fortsetzten ..., sondern erst, als sie dort allmählich sesshaft geworden waren." (Ruben, 1979: 13); cp. p. 15-16: "Vorbbedingungen des Beginns der indischen und griechischen Philosophie waren schliesslich die beiden ... Völker. Kurz, man muss von der sich allseitig entwickelnden Menschheitsgeschichte und dem Platz der alten Inder und Griechen in ihr ausgehen, will man verstehen, warum gerade bei ihnen ungefähr gleichzeitig Philosophie begann."

orientation in early Vaiśeṣika, for example, does not appear to stand the test of historical research. The earliest form of this philosophy reachable to us has already a number of features that do not fit in well with Frauwallner's natural philosophical orientation, such as yogic perception, and an omnipresent soul.³⁷ Moreover, there are reasons to think that this school of thought arose under the influence of, and in opposition to, certain developments within Buddhism.³⁸ Seen in this way, Vaiśeṣika continues right from the beginning the rationalistic tendency which makes its appearance in Buddhist scholastic literature, without abandoning the search for liberation which would seem to be central to it. Sāṃkhya has not been so profoundly touched by this rationalistic virus, but Sāṃkhya, too, is centred on the quest for liberation. Sāṃkhya and Yoga have always constituted a natural pair, even though these terms meant something different in the Mahābhārata than in the period of the philosophical systems.

Seen in this light, all important schools of Indian philosophy have one common origin. They all derive, ultimately, from those parts of the population where karma and rebirth held sway, i.e., from the non-Vedic population. We have already seen that even the Upaniṣadic passages that show acquaintance with these ideas appear to have been influenced by these same non-Vedic portions of the population. This does not mean that the history of Indian philosophy is free from oppositions. There is, for example, the ongoing battle between Buddhism and the schools of thought that came to be looked upon as Brahmanical. More important for our present purposes is the incorporation of currents such as Sāṃkhya into the Brahmanical fold. The opposition between these two has left a number of traces in early literature.³⁹ [51] I can only mention here the passage in the Mahābhārata (12.260-262) which records a discussion between Kapila, the supernatural "founder" of Sāṃkhya, and the Vedic ṛṣi Syūmarāśmi. Syūmarāśmi rejects

³⁷ Isaacson, 1993; Bronkhorst, 1993a: 87 f.; 1993b; Houben, 1995. Cp. also Miyamoto, 1996: 19-33 ("Dimension of soul").

³⁸ Bronkhorst, 1992.

³⁹ Not only in early literature. The Tattvasamāsa, for example, refers — according to the commentary Sarvopakāriṇī — to "bondage by sacrificial gift" (*dākṣiṇa bandha*); Keith (1924: 103) comments: "This curious form of bondage arises when men through misconception give gifts to the priests, and is a distinct sign of hostility to the sacrifice, which is not seen in the Kārikā". And Guṇaratnasūri's Tarkarahasyadīpikā on Haribhadra's Śaddarśanasamuccaya (14th cent.) says the following about the Sāṃkhyas (Mahendra Kumar Jain, 1969: 141): "They are numerous in Vārāṇasī. Many Brahmins, fasting for a month, follow the way of smoke which is opposed to the way of light. But the Sāṃkhyas follow the way of light. For that very reason the Brahmins, to whom the Veda is dear, follow the way of sacrifice. The Sāṃkhyas, on the other hand, turning away from the Veda which is rich in violence, proclaim the self." (*vārāṇasyām teṣāṃ prācuryam/ bahavo māsoṣavāsikā brāhmaṇā arcirmārgaviruddhadhūmamārgānugāminah/ sāmkyās tv arcirmārgānugāḥ/ tata eva brāhmaṇā vedapriyā yajñamārgānugāḥ/ sāmkyās tu hiṃsādhyavedaviratā adhyātmaṣṭadīnāḥ*)

the possibility of liberation and exhorts to action; Kapila preaches liberation through restraint and abstention from activity.⁴⁰

Note that in the discussion of the development of Indian philosophy it becomes more and more difficult to assign the different positions to different segments of the population. In this period ideas begin to cross over from one segment of the population to another. Even if certain Upaniṣadic passages appear to have been influenced by non-Vedic ideas, they remain Vedic texts, belonging primarily to Vedic Brahmins. And if, as I think is the case, Vaiśeṣika originated under the influence of certain developments within Buddhism, this school of thought yet appears to have been Brahmanical from the beginning.⁴¹ In other words, lines of descent are less and less limited to single segments of the population.

Yet it appears that during the late-Vedic period such a division still did exist in Indian society. This division appears to be behind the fundamental [52] oppositions that make themselves felt in the early texts of the Śramaṇic religions, in the late-Vedic texts, and to some extent in the Mahābhārata. This division *may* continue an opposition that at one time opposed Aryans and non-Aryans. How to decide whether this is actually the case, I do not know.⁴²

To conclude, I would like to cite a short passage from a recent article by G. Fussman (1989: 529):

⁴⁰ Compare the discussion on "Kapila, Sāṃkhya, and the Āśramas" in Olivelle, 1993: 98-99. Surprisingly, Wilhelm Halbfass expresses the following opinion with regard to Sāṃkhya (1995: 85): "Historisch gesehen dürfen wir wohl davon ausgehen, dass die Lehre vom Karma gar nicht Teil des ältesten Sāṃkhya war und erst nachträglich im Laufe späterer Entwicklungen eingeführt wurde; dies geschah dann zuweilen in der Form, dass es als Auslöser für das Strömen und scheinbar bewusste Agieren der Urmaterie (*prakṛti*) ausgelegt wurde. Voll integriert wurde das Karma, was das klassische Sāṃkhya betrifft, freilich nicht; das war wohl auch angesichts der Tatsache, dass es sich hier um eine in fundamentalem Sinne auf Transzendenz und Quietismus ausgerichtete Weise des Denkens handelt, nicht zu erwarten. Im Yoga ist die Rolle des Karma allerdings — möglicherweise unter buddhistischem Einfluss — relevanter und erheblich deutlicher ausgeprägt." This statement is utterly surprising, and not based on any textual evidence that I know of. Most probably Halbfass is here a victim of the linear approach to Indian intellectual history, which assumes that all post-Vedic developments must somehow derive from Vedic thought and religion.

⁴¹ Here one could draw attention to the 'proof' in the Vaiśeṣika Sūtra of the existence of seers (*ṛṣi*) responsible for the composition of the Veda (VS 6.1.1-2, ed. Jambuvijaya; Wezler, 1985), as well as to the occurrence, still in Praśastapāda's Padārthadharmasaṅgraha, of Vedic cosmographical concepts (*varuṇaloka* 'the world of Varuṇa', *ādityaloka* 'the world of Āditya', *marutām loka* 'the world of the Maruts'; see WI under these expressions). These or related terms occur in the Vedic Brāhmaṇas (see Kirfel, 1920: 5-6), a few times in the Mahābhārata (Sörensen, 1904: s.v. Varuṇaloka, Vāyuloka), but apparently only rarely, some of them perhaps not at all, in the later Purāṇic literature. The Padārthadharmasaṅgraha does use Purāṇic, i.e. non-Vedic, material in the context of God's creation of the world, but this appears to be new material brought into the school by Praśastapāda himself (Bronkhorst, 1996).

⁴² If one accepts, with Sergent (1997: 355 ff.), that the similarities between Greek medicine and Āyurveda must be explained by assuming that they both go back to Indo-European roots, one is almost obliged to think that the non-Vedic traditions identified in this paper have Aryan roots. However, these similarities are explained by others as due to early contacts between the two cultures; so Filliozat, 1949: 161 ff.; Zimmermann, 1989: 177 ff.

... l'on peut légitimement se demander ce que les Āryas ont apporté à l'Inde, outre leur langue.

Leur apport est certain en matière de religion, même si le RV ne rend pas compte de l'ensemble de l'idéologie Ārya aux moments de l'entrée des Āryas en Inde: l'unification culturelle, si elle a jamais été réalisée, est un phénomène beaucoup plus tardif (constitution de la *saṃhitā* et plus encore Brāhmaṇas). Ceci dit, autant qu'on puisse en juger, les cultes védiques doivent peu à l'Inde pré-aryenne: aucun des emprunts supposés n'est prouvable, et beaucoup sont plus que douteux (par exemple, le proto-Śiva des sceaux de l'Indus, D. Meth-Srinivasan). Les réels bouleversements que l'on constate (généralisation de l'incinération, par exemple) et qui semblent s'être produits en Inde même ne semblent pas explicables en termes de substrat.

If the opposition between Vedic and non-Vedic which I have discussed continues an old opposition between Aryan and non-Aryan, then the non-Aryan element in post-Vedic developments becomes very visible indeed. This, however, is far from certain, as I have already repeatedly emphasized. Less uncertain is, I submit, that real and fundamental differences existed at the late-Vedic period between at least two, perhaps more, segments of the population. The nature of these differences justifies, as it seems to me, some other conclusion, which may or may not have anything to do with Aryans and non-Aryans. The magical, or magico-religious, nature of Vedic thought, as it expresses itself primarily in the Brāhmaṇas and Upaniṣads, has often been commented upon. One might be tempted to think that this way of thinking is characteristic of early human societies, that we find it in the Veda because the Veda is very old. The evidence discussed in this paper suggests something different. It suggests that, at least in late-Vedic times, there were other segments of society where this kind of thought was not at all prevalent. The so-called magical, or magico-religious, way of thinking of the Vedic segments of society may therefore have been consciously cultivated, not because people didn't know how to think otherwise, but because they believed that only this way of thinking enabled them to enter into contact with the true nature of things, with mythological reality which is hidden behind ordinary reality. The late-Vedic Indians, seen this way, were in contact with others who did not think like them. They distinguished themselves from those others [53] by hanging on to their own ways of magical thinking. The question whether this way of thinking is one of the contributions of the Aryans to India may have to remain unanswered.

Abbreviations

AAWL	Abhandlungen der Akademie der Wissenschaften und der Literatur, Mainz, Geistes- und Sozialwissenschaftliche Klasse
ABORI	Annals of the Bhandarkar Oriental Research Institute, Poona
amg.	Ardhamāgadhī
AS	Asiatische Studien, Études Asiatiques, Bern
BK	Bukkyō Kenkyū, Buddhist Studies, Hamamatsu
BORI	Bhandarkar Oriental Research Institute, Poona
BOS	Bhandarkar Oriental Series, Poona
ChSS	Chowkhamba Sanskrit Series, Varanasi
ContrIndSoc	Contributions to Indian Sociology, New Delhi
HR	History of Religions, Chicago
IJ	Indo-Iranian Journal, Den Haag, Dordrecht
JBBAS	Journal of the Asiatic Society of Bombay, Bombay
JIP	Journal of Indian Philosophy, Dordrecht
MKNAWL	Mededelingen der Koninklijke Nederlandse Akademie van Wetenschappen, Afdeling Letterkunde, Amsterdam
ÖAW	Österreichische Akademie der Wissenschaften, Wien
pa.	Pāli
PEFEO	Publications de l'École Française d'Extrême-Orient, Paris
PICI	Publications de l'Institut de Civilisation Indienne, Paris
SAWW	Sitzungsberichte der Akademie der Wissenschaften in Wien, Phil.-hist. Kl., Wien
StII	Studien zur Indologie und Iranistik
Suppl.	Supplement
WI	Word Index to the Praśastapādabhāṣya: a complete word index to the printed editions of the Praśastapādabhāṣya, by Johannes Bronkhorst & Yves Ramseier, Delhi: Motilal Banarsidass, 1994
WZKS	Wiener Zeitschrift für die Kunde Südasiens, Wien
WZKSO	Wiener Zeitschrift für die Kunde Süd- und Ostasiens, Wien
WZKM	Wiener Zeitschrift für die Kunde des Morgenlandes, Wien
ZDMG	Zeitschrift der Deutschen Morgenländischen Gesellschaft, Leipzig, later Wiesbaden

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