

The True Citizen: Social Order and Intergroup Antagonisms in Political Lay Thinking

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The true citizen upholds the social order, through his morality and uprightness, the true citizen personifies and represents the desirable attributes of a society. The true citizen is for example a hard-working, religious, austere male, as the farmer in Grant Wood's iconic painting "American Gothic".

This normative idea of a true citizen, however, requires its counterpart to sustain itself, the antagonistic idea of the untrue, threatening citizen. Opposing the positive attributes of a true citizen to those of untrue citizens makes them stand out and reinforces their social value. Much like in dualist thinking in general (Marková, 2003), the differentiation between antagonistic category stereotypes affirms and highlights the positive nature of the desirable attributes, and the negative nature of the undesirable attributes. A hard-working person is seen as all the more hardworking when compared to a lazy, unmotivated hipster.

I want to highlight in this talk the dualist representations of social categories and groups to which I refer as "intergroup antagonisms". I believe that such intergroup antagonisms play a fundamental role in lay thinking in general, and in legitimizing of political thought and action in particular. They provide normative and counter-normative models of behaviour, thereby showing the kind of behaviours and attitudes that are likely to be rewarded in society and those that are

likely to be scoffed upon and eventually sanctioned. As normative signposts, intergroup antagonisms orient people's thinking towards socially acceptable and legitimate ways, and the opposition between the true and the untrue citizen is but one example of such a generic opposition.

The reason why I talk about intergroup antagonisms in a social representations conference is that I believe that they are a key category of social representations – widespread, organizing social behaviour and legitimizing political action. They combine the fundamentally dualist nature of social representations with social processes derived from intergroup relations theories, in particular social identity theory. They highlight the importance of stereotype content in intergroup relations, but emphasize at the same time that – as any social representation – they are not consensual. Rather, there is an ongoing struggle around the prevalence and meaning of intergroup antagonisms in the social and the political spheres, along with attempts by political pressure groups to impose certain antagonisms over others.

The public legitimacy of social order and of existing power relationships hinges upon the ideological values that uphold a social order (Staerklé, 2013). A stable and legitimate social order is based on dominant, hegemonic representations which are disseminated in society with the corresponding intergroup antagonisms. Indeed, hegemonic principles, values and ideologies underlying social order become *objectified* with intergroup antagonisms such that abstract values such as democracy, self-control, morality, self-reliance, and intergroup tolerance become associated with social categories, thereby putting flesh on the bare bones of values. In the following, I will exemplify some of the processes implied by intergroup antagonisms, starting with the opposition between democratic and nondemocratic groups.

DEMOCRATIC VS. NONDEMOCRATIC GROUPS

The opposition between democratic and nondemocratic groups has a long history in Western thinking. Edward Said, in his landmark book *Orientalism* (1978, p. 7), describes “Orientalism [as] a collective notion identifying ‘us’ Europeans as against all ‘those’ non-Europeans...” and as “the idea of European identity as a superior one in comparison with all the non-European peoples and cultures”. The intergroup antagonism between democratic and nondemocratic – or

between Western and non-Western countries – was, and to some extent still is, at the very heart of Western worldviews. According to this intergroup antagonism, savage, emotional, uncontrolled masses in the East are opposed to civilised, rational, and controlled citizens in the West. While such views were hardly contested during the heydays of Western colonialism, a series of studies has examined to what extent remnants of such thinking could still be found in a contemporary Western society, Switzerland, a country without a colonial past.

In a first series of studies (Staerklé, Clémence & Doise, 1998) we examined lay theories about the relationship between a country's government and its citizenry. We hypothesised that participants would expect a stereotypically democratic citizenry to live in a democratic country, and a nondemocratic citizenry in a nondemocratic country. If we find this association, it not only means that people follow the Enlightenment saying that "*The population gets the government it deserves*", but that the antagonism between Western-democratic and non-Western nondemocratic countries is anchored in representations of both governments and national populations, thereby reinforcing the antagonism between the West and the East.

In these experiments, participants read a short description of a democratic or a nondemocratic country: "*Think of a country where political, economic and military power is held by different [the same] persons, a country where the government takes its decisions by consulting the population and its representatives [without consulting neither the population nor its representatives]*". In addition, they are informed about two attributes stereotypically associated with [non-]democratic citizenry: "*Think of a country in which the inhabitants are quite orderly [disorderly] and resolve their conflicts often by discussion [clashes]*". Participants then wrote down names of countries that matched the description, and indicated the extent to which they thought various human rights (e.g., freedom of expression, of religion, of assembly) were respected in the country.

The results showed that human rights respect was perceived as highest in democratic-orderly conditions, whereas it was massively lower in democratic-disorderly contexts. In non-democratic contexts, human rights respect was still lower, and population attributes no longer mattered. Other findings demonstrated that in democratic-orderly contexts, citizens are seen as being more strongly opposed to human rights violations than in the other three contexts and therefore more politically active.

These findings suggest that the perceived human rights respect not only depends on the type of government people think of when representing the human rights situation in countries around the world, but also on the stereotypes associated with democratic and nondemocratic populations. Democratic citizens living in a Western country are seen as being at least in partial control of the political fate of their country and as strong enough to be able to speak up against potential human rights violations committed by their government. In non-democratic contexts, however, national populations are seen as weak and passive, unable to protest against the violations. Thereby, people may implicitly engage in a blaming the victim strategy: “*Human rights violations occur because those people do not speak up against the government*”.

STEREOTYPE CONTENT AND ANTAGONISTIC INTERGROUP RELATIONS

In order to have a more direct measure of stereotype content associated with democratic and non-democratic groups, another experimental study carried with young people in Switzerland asked one half of participants to write down attributes they associate with democratic groups, while the other half wrote down attributes associated with non-democratic groups (see Staerklé, 2005). Table 1 presents the proportion of these terms spontaneously used to describe democratic and non-democratic groups.

Table 1. Stereotypical attributes spontaneously associated with democratic and non-democratic groups

Democratic	Non-Democratic
<i>Free (60%)</i>	<i>Submissive (100%)</i>
<i>Independent (32%)</i>	<i>Unhappy (28%)</i>
<i>Democratic (29%)</i>	<i>Powerless (24%)</i>
<i>Open-minded (23%)</i>	<i>Not free (20%)</i>
<i>Egalitarian (18%)</i>	<i>Poor (20%)</i>
<i>Responsible (18%)</i>	<i>Dependent (17%)</i>
<i>Participating (18%)</i>	<i>Manipulated (15%)</i>
<i>Happy (14%)</i>	<i>Without rights (15%)</i>

Note: Adapted from Staerklé (2005)

Democratic populations are represented mostly as “free”, “independent”, “democratic” (used as a personality attribute), and to a lesser extent as “open-minded”, “egalitarian”, “responsible”, “participating” and “happy”. These attributes reflect the normative conception of a liberal democracy, with individual freedom and responsibility, tolerance and participation as key organising principles. These terms are the exact mirror image of the attributes making up the nondemocratic representation. A full 100% of participants in the relevant conditions associated “submissive” and closely related terms to nondemocratic populations, followed by “unhappy”, “powerless”, “not free”, “poor”, “dependent”, “manipulated” and “without rights”. Many of these terms are negatively formulated inversions of the democratic representation, thereby underscoring the antagonistic nature of this dual intergroup representation. A common, underlying theme of these dualist representations is the opposition between agency vs. lack of agency, that is, the capacity attributed to democratic populations to take their destiny in their own hands. One can surmise that the power attributed to democratic populations to exert control over their rulers goes beyond the strictly political sphere to cover more inclusive spheres of social life; being free and independent, for example, refers more generally to an individualistic and liberal way of life.

We cannot exclude that this liberal-democratic view of western and non-western countries reflects to some extent the normative environment of Switzerland where these studies have been carried out. Switzerland has indeed a strong liberal tradition (its political system was built in the 19th century on the basis of the American two-chamber system) which may explain why references to other (e.g., conservative, social-democratic or republican) normative models of democracy are virtually absent.

Nevertheless, through these attributes, participants implicitly express and affirm the key values that organise Western liberal democracies. They view democratic populations as conforming to liberal values of self-reliance and independence, while constructing an antagonistic mirror image of remote and unfamiliar populations on the basis of the colonialist principle that “*they are not like us*”. More generally, social and ideological values such as discipline, work ethic or self-control implicitly incorporate, on the one hand, normative stereotypes of groups constructed to conform to key values and, on the other hand, counter-normative stereotypes of groups who are thought to violate these same values. This antagonistic

process highlights the legitimising role of such values that is reinforced when value conformity is associated with high status groups (e.g., responsible and hard-working managers), and perceived non-respect is associated with low status groups (e.g., the irresponsible and lazy poor).

THE CASE OF SELF-CONTROL

Individualism and its central component self-control are prime examples of values which are expressed, communicated and asserted with antagonistic stereotypes (Joffe & Staerklé, 2007). Thinking about subordinate and minority groups often pivots around the violation of the self-control ethos, and by associating outgroups with a paucity of self-control, dominant thinking transforms the self-control ethos into an instrument of exclusion and derogation. In this study, Joffe and Staerklé differentiate between three forms of self-control, related to mind, body and destiny:

Perceived body control refers to values of morality, civility and discipline, thought to underpin an orderly and well-behaved society. Concomitantly, lack of body control yields stereotype content of immorality, decadence, dirt and ‘uncivilised behaviour’ which threaten the social order. Perceived control of the mind relates to the values of competence and rationality which are associated with high status positions in society. Lack of such control, in turn, elicits representations of incompetence, emotionality and irrationality associated with low status positions. Finally, perceived destiny control applies to achievement, self-sustainability and entrepreneurship which are seen as essential qualities for the economic development of a society. Failure to control one’s destiny generates images of laziness, undeservingness and parasitism (p. 409).

This analysis of stereotype content as reflecting lacking control on these three dimensions accounts for a considerable part of variance of common stereotype content and can be applied to most commonly derogated groups. Apart from the people from non-western cultural contexts who may be construed by westerners as lacking the essential cultural attributes of self-control and individual autonomy (Said, 1978; Staerklé, 2005), the analysis may also cover aspersions ascribed to crowds, women, children and mentally ill people. Other instantiations of lacking self-control are seen in the association of gay men with immorality and promiscuity, obese people

with weakness of will power, drug users and smokers with connotations of addiction as well as welfare beneficiaries and poor people in general with lacking self-sufficiency and control over destiny (Gilens, 1999).

INTERGROUP CONFLICT AND ANTAGONISTIC INTERGROUP RELATIONS

I now wish to extend the analysis of antagonistic intergroup relations to conflict between democratic and nondemocratic groups, that is, to a situation of conflict between a value-conforming and a value-violating group. In such a situation, one could expect that hostile actions perpetrated by a group seen as conforming to the value of democracy may be judged as more legitimate than those carried out by the counter-normative non democratic group, in particular when the conflict opposes antagonistic groups. In the “real” world, this situation is present when Western nations engage in hostile military actions against non-Western nations, as was repeatedly the case during the last two decades, for example during the first Gulf war in 1991 or in Iraq in 2003.

This reasoning gave rise to the “democracy-as-value hypothesis” according to which “Democracy provides value to democratic individuals, groups, and institutions, therefore granting legitimacy to their actions, whatever that action actually may be.” (Falomir, Staerklé, Pereira & Butera, 2012, p. 324). We experimentally tested this prediction in a number of studies in order to evidence the social psychological processes responsible for legitimizing conflict between democratic and non-democratic groups (e.g., Falomir, Staerklé, Depuiset & Butera, 2005, 2007). In order to prevent participants of thinking of specific countries and existing international conflicts, we created an experimental paradigm inspired by Sherif’s summer camp studies. Based on the assumption that a key component of a democratic organization was the way decisions were taken in a group, we operationalised the value of democracy with decision making procedures in groups: Democratic groups were described with egalitarian decision making where all members of an adolescent group in a summer camp have their say, whereas nondemocratic groups were defined by hierarchical decision making where one leader would take decisions and the other members would follow. Participants then read an experimental scenario of a conflict about perceived mistreatment and resulting retaliation occurring between adolescent groups in a

summer camp. In this conflict, the perpetrator and the victim group were described as either egalitarian-democratic or as hierarchical-nondemocratic, resulting in four intergroup conflict configurations.

In a first study, we showed that aggressions perpetrated by an egalitarian group against a hierarchical group were judged as the least illegitimate, compared to other three configurations (Falomir et al., 2005). A similar pattern of results was found with respect to the perceived legitimacy of collective punishment: punishing democratic groups for their misdeeds against nondemocratic groups was less acceptable than punishment resulting from the other three conflict configurations (Falomir et al., 2007). Put otherwise, when democratic groups attack nondemocratic groups, people more easily find ways to condone such hostility than when a democratic group attacks another democratic group, or when nondemocratic groups initiate conflicts. This finding provides support for the democracy-as-value hypothesis, and reveals the legitimizing power of social representations of democracy, and of representations associated with antagonistic intergroup relations more generally.

In a more recent study, we extended this paradigm to include public opinion in fictitious countries as an additional factor to account for perceived legitimacy of intergroup conflict (Falomir et al., 2012). Here, the results showed that when public opinion in a democratic country was either perceived (Study 1) or manipulated (Study 2) as being in favour of hostile acts against a non-democratic country, the aggression was deemed more acceptable than in any other conflict configuration. In particular, public opinion in non-democratic countries did not play any role in these justificatory judgements, providing support for the idea described above that nondemocratic populations are represented as lacking agency and political decision power. In short, democratic public opinion justifies aggression against non-democratic countries, suggesting a powerful justificatory function of perceived democratic public opinion when it comes to legitimise military aggression and other reprehensible acts. More generally, this line of research demonstrates that even today, the value of democracy provides the basis of a powerful and versatile antagonism: Democratic legitimacy is fundamentally based on nondemocratic illegitimacy.

SOCIAL ORDER REPRESENTATIONS MODEL

The focus on the role of social representations in intergroup relations has led me to attempt to formalise how social values and political belief systems intervene in organising social relations. The result is a heuristic model called “Social order representations model” (SORM) that organises representations of antagonistic intergroup relations into four broad categories, termed *Moral order*, *Free Market*, *Social diversity* and *Structural inequality*. These four conceptions of social order determine as many ways of constructing a “true citizen” against its counterpart, since each antagonism opposes a positive to a negative stereotype. In this talk, I will only give a short overview of the model; more detailed information can be found elsewhere (Scheidegger & Staerklé, 2011; Staerklé, 2009; Staerklé, Delay, Gianettoni & Roux, 2007a; Staerklé, Likki & Scheidegger, 2012).

This model assumes that political beliefs and the associated stereotype content dualisms are organised as a function of two fundamental criteria: the first one refers to whether the representation intervenes in regulating relations *within* or *between* groups, and the second one differentiates between representations related to *belongingness* and those associated with *social position*. The crossing of these two polarities gives rise to the four normative models of social order (Table 2).

Within-group regulation is typically enacted to legitimise moral order and free market forms of social organisation. It is based on *normative differentiation* that establishes boundaries between norm-conforming, prototypical and norm-violating, non-prototypical individuals. Between-group regulation, in turn, is the process through which social diversity and structural inequality forms of social order are justified. The process of *categorical differentiation* creates and affirms boundaries between groups (Duckitt, 2001; Kreindler, 2005).

This distinction between normative and categorical differentiation processes is important for a fuller understanding of the nature of intergroup antagonisms: Through normative differentiation, antagonisms are understood as the result of wilful individual actions. The meaning of normative categories is derived from perceived conformity of actions with important ingroup values; the work ethic, for example, is used to oppose lazy and hard-working people, and a conservative morality is at the roots of the antagonism between “good” and “bad” citizens. In

normative differentiation, boundaries are therefore represented as permeable (anyone can work hard if one truly wants to). The process of categorical differentiation, in turn, underlies normative beliefs that pit groups defined by ascribed membership against each another. It typically refers to “classical” intergroup processes between ethnocultural minorities and majorities (as in ethnocentric beliefs) or between subordinate and dominant groups (as in beliefs of social dominance). Boundaries are therefore considered as impermeable.

Table 2. Social order representations model (SORM)

	<i>Belongingness</i>	<i>Social position</i>
<i>Normative (within-group) differentiation</i>		
	MORAL ORDER	FREE MARKET
Antagonism	“Good” & “Bad”	“Winners” & “Losers”
Regulatory principle	Conformism	Equity principle
Political belief	Authoritarianism	Meritocracy
<i>Categorical (between-group) differentiation</i>		
	SOCIAL DIVERSITY	STRUCTURAL INEQUALITY
Antagonism	Ingroup vs. outgroup	Dominants & Subordinates
Regulatory principle	Intergroup differentiation	Inequality management
Political beliefs	MAJORITY: Ethnocentrism vs. MINORITY: Multiculturalism	DOMINANTS: Social dominance vs. SUBORDINATES: Egalitarianism

The second dimension opposes, on the one side, representations related to *belongingness* and social identities, and, on the other side, representations associated with *social position*, social hierarchy, and instrumentality. Group representations and stereotype content in the belongingness forms of social order (Moral order and Social diversity) rely on non-quantifiable criteria that allow for a positive intergroup differentiation such as “morality”, whereas group representations in the social position forms of social order (Free market and Structural inequality) are based on material and quantifiable attributes.

Let us now briefly describe the specificities of each of the four resulting cells of social order and the social psychological processes associated with it. In the conception of *moral order*,

social order is upheld through representations of morality and conformity (as in conservative forms of communitarianism, Etzioni, 1994). Social order is upheld by consensual endorsement of conservative values such as morality, self-reliance, and discipline: The good and true citizen is the one who best represents “our” values, whereas the one who disrespects and transgresses them, with deviant and disorderly behavior, is represented as a “bad” citizen. Typically, this form of social order is legitimized with authoritarian modes of thinking, characterized by intolerance of deviance and submissiveness to authorities (see Duckitt, 1989).

The *free market* conception of social order consists of representations associated with competitive motivations, productivity and individual performance. On grounds of economically liberal principles, free market thinking assumes that the basic human motivation is self-interest (see Miller, 1999). Meritocratic beliefs differentiate lazy “losers” from productive “winners”, and individuals are expected to engage in market-based, competitive relations with one another. Alleged welfare dependency – the idea that government support makes people lazy and irresponsible – is an example of a core belief in the free market conception.

The conception of *social diversity* features representations concerning subgroup identities in a society, and thereby includes conceptions of cultural diversity and multiculturalism. It relies upon ascribed group membership and is based on an a priori distinction between social groups – in particular between ethno-cultural groups. This conception is more complex than the conceptions of moral order and free market because social order representations of social diversity may depict group differences as either positive (as in multicultural thinking and identity politics defending rights of particular groups) or as negative (as in racist, nationalist and ethnocentric thinking).

In the final *structural inequality* conception, representations are structured by perceived group-based social hierarchies of status and power. In this conception, antagonisms are defined between rather impermeable subordinate and dominant social categories. These categories are seen as being in competition with each other: The claims by subordinate groups threaten the well-being of the dominant groups. As in the social diversity conception, social order representations can either portray structural inequalities as legitimate, fair and “normal”, or as illegitimate and unfair. In order to justify structural inequality antagonisms, individuals may for example endorse beliefs that point to the moral, social, and intellectual superiority of those in privileged positions,

or they may see inequality as the illegitimate result of social reproduction and inherited privileges and therefore support egalitarian policies destined to correct inequality beliefs.


Now that you have a general idea about the social order representations model, I want to highlight in the remainder of this talk three ways to apply the model, namely opinion formation, differential meanings associated with social order concepts, and the historical development of conceptions of social order.

OPINION FORMATION: THE EXAMPLE OF MATERIAL VULNERABILITY

In studies on the formation of political attitudes and public opinion, the role of political and ideological beliefs has long been recognized. Often, however, studies lack a rationale to link opinions to more general belief systems and the social conditions that produce endorsement or rejection of these belief systems. The Social order representations model may help in conceptualizing these relationships. The basic idea is that objective (e.g., education and income level) and subjective (perceived vulnerability) social conditions shape social order representations which in turn give rise to more clearly defined positionings towards specific social issues, that is, opinions and policy attitudes. We have thus a mediation model in which the independent variable is social position, the mediating variables are social order representations and the outcome variables are political opinions. In terms of the familiar concepts of anchoring, organizing principles and positioning (Doise, Clémence & Lorenzi-Cioldi, 1993), social position represents the anchoring variable (understood specifically as social or sociological anchoring), while social order representations are analysed as organizing principles of positionings towards social issues. This analytic scheme has been applied to account for attitudes towards social welfare and government intervention in the Swiss context (Staerklé et al., 2007a) and in international comparisons (Staerklé et al., 2012) as well as to examine trust towards political institutions from a social representations perspective (Scheidegger & Staerklé, 2011).

In order to give a concrete example of such an analysis, let us have a look at some results of a study based on representative samples of four Swiss cities. This study aimed at evidencing two representational pathways resulting from perceived material vulnerability and leading to differential attitudes towards disciplinary and social government intervention (Staerklé, Delay,

Gianettoni & Roux, 2007b). We carried out a path analysis that treats perceived material vulnerability (e.g., “not having enough money to make ends meet”) as an anchoring variable. Two measures were used as mediating variables: disorder perception (e.g., “there will be more and more civil unrest”) as an indicator of moral order representations and awareness of inequality (e.g., “the rich get richer, the poor get poorer”) as an indicator of structural inequality representations. Finally, two policy attitudes were used as positioning variables, support for disciplinary state intervention (e.g., “strengthen police force in the streets”) and support for redistributive (social) government intervention (e.g., “increase taxes for the rich in order to decrease inequality”).



Note: Adapted from Staerklé et al., 2007b

* = $p < .05$, ** = $p < .01$

$\chi^2(2) 4.02$, $p = .13$, RMSEA = .04, CFI = 1.00, GFI = 1.00, AGFI = .98

Figure 1. Path analysis of two representational consequences of perceived material vulnerability

The findings (Figure 1) show, first, that perceived material vulnerability has two contrasting consequences in terms of representations of social order. On the one hand it increases perceptions of a morally corrupt, disorderly society, and on the other hand it strengthens awareness of social inequalities. Endorsing these representations has important consequences for

the support of specific roles of government: Individuals who perceive disorder as a result of their precarious social position are much more likely to support disciplinary, repressive government intervention, whereas individuals who instead have developed a heightened awareness of inequality are more likely to support social, redistributive government intervention (while opposing at the same time disciplinary government intervention). Moreover, material vulnerability has also direct (albeit weaker) effects on these two fundamental policy orientations. This study thus illustrates the heuristic value of the social order representations model, as it shows how similar social conditions can lead to the endorsement of very different representations of social order and of the corresponding policy attitudes.

DIFFERENTIAL MEANINGS OF SOCIAL ORDER CONCEPTS

A second way to apply the Social order representations model is to provide a structured account of the differential meanings that can be associated to broad and general concepts related to social order. I will exemplify this idea with two examples of such notions, namely *immigrants* and *equality*.

Table 3 uses the same structure of the social order representations models as Table 2, but shows how stereotypes of immigrants and conceptions of equality vary as a function of the four conceptions of social order. When immigrants are represented through the lens of *moral order*, they are likely to be constructed as norm-transgressing group members, as deviant, “non-adapted” and in case of severe norm violation as immoral, dangerous and criminal group members. In this view, immigrants first of all represent a symbolic threat to “moral” ingroup values, and they are seen as being individually responsible for this state of affairs. In a *free market* conception, however, the image of immigrants changes: given the principle of normative differentiation at work in both moral order and free market conceptions, they are also seen as transgressing ingroup norms, but in the case of a free market conception of social order, these values are self-reliance and hard work rather than moral values of decent and civilised behaviour. As a result, immigrants are constructed as lazy and profiteering, and suspected of being first of all motivated to take advantage of the social welfare system. In the *social diversity* conception, immigrants are perceived in a more categorical way determined by their group membership. This

is the realm of cultural essentialism whereby entire immigrant groups are constructed as “culturally” different and as fundamentally “other” in relation to the host population. In the *structural inequality* conception, entire immigrant groups are constructed as being (legitimately) subordinate in relation to the dominant host population, for example in contexts where certain ethnic groups occupy low status positions and are exploited by members of the dominant group (e.g., newly arrived Mexicans in the U.S.). Overall, this conceptual analysis of immigrant stereotypes suggests that negative views of immigrants are anchored in different social order representations, which in turn implies that measures to address negative views of immigrants need to take into account their representational foundations.

A similar analysis can be done for the abstract and polysemic concept of “equality”. In a *moral order* conception, equality refers to expected similarity among ingroup members who are held to endorse a common set of values and norms. In the *free market* conception, equality is understood as a normative form of fundamental equality between individuals, that is, as equality of opportunities: everyone has the same chances to succeed in life and consequently inequalities are seen as the outcome of individual differences in motivations and efforts. In the *social diversity* conception, equality refers to a normative principle of intergroup equality in terms of equal treatment and procedural justice. This equality principle proscribes unequal and discriminatory treatment on behalf of institutions and authorities as a function of social group membership. The *structural inequality* representation, finally, implies a social-democratic view of intergroup equality that seeks to correct and therefore to minimise inequality in terms of the actual distribution of wealth and material resources.

Table 3. Social order representations model applied to immigrant stereotypes and conceptions of equality

	MORAL ORDER	FREE MARKET
Regulatory principle	Conformism (Assimilation)	Equity principle (Individual responsibility)
Immigrant stereotype	Deviant, dangerous, criminal immigrants	Lazy, profiteering immigrants
Equality conception	Ingroup equality (similarity)	Equality of opportunities

	SOCIAL DIVERSITY	STRUCTURAL INEQUALITY
Regulatory principle	Intergroup differentiation (Cultural essentialism)	Inequality management (Intergroup dominance)
Immigrant stereotype	Immigrant groups as the “Other”	Immigrant groups as subordinates
Equality conception	Equality of intergroup treatment	Equality of intergroup resources

These two examples illustrate that the social order representations model is useful in organising different meanings associated with general categories and concepts which are open to debate and interpretation. It thereby provides the conceptual tools to examine how specific meanings associated with general notions actually condition the psychological processes at work, for example processes of normative and categorical differentiation and the ensuing definition of who is a true citizen and who is not. Such an undertaking is in line with a social representations approach, since the theory has always emphasised the importance of a proper understanding of the relationship between thought content and thought process in a given domain.

HISTORICAL DEVELOPMENT OF SOCIAL ORDER REPRESENTATIONS

As a last example of application of the model, I would like to mention a more societal analysis of the development of broad and widespread representations that structure the sociocultural development of contemporary societies. This last example is necessarily very fragmentary and incomplete, and is only intended to show the feasibility of a more comprehensive analysis.

This societal view of the model also highlights the discursive and rhetorical nature of social order representations. These representations are disseminated in society through a number of communication channels, in particular political discourse selected, relayed, reframed and often distorted by mass media. In line with social theorists (e.g., Young, 1999), one can assume that contemporary societies are defined by hegemonic representations that attempt to provide legitimacy to dominant forms of policy making. Following WW2 and until the late 1960's, this dominant narrative was one of similarity, conformity and consensus, that is, an era of inclusion (see also Israel & Tajfel, 1972). The epochal turn in societal representations during the 1960's is

well documented. During the early 1970's, Western societies witnessed the rise of both a neo-conservative (moral order) doctrine, based on a punitive vision of dealing with social problems, and a neo-liberal (free market) doctrine that promotes the idea of a self-sufficient and self-interested individual who is responsible for his or her own destiny. While such discourses were first put forward by powerful majority groups and as such represent the *propagation* mode of communication, they quickly gave rise to a new hegemonic representation of social exclusion: suddenly, it became legitimate to push marginal and minority groups outside of mainstream society (Garland, 2001). As a result, social exclusion has become the new "default" representation organising Western countries, a new common sense that no longer needs to be asserted by majority groups in order to sustain itself and legitimise social order. Exclusion has become so commonplace that its principles are disseminated through an undifferentiated communication process of *diffusion* (see Figure 2).

Insert Figure 2

But these attempts to impose hegemonic representations of social order have been met by fierce resistance, as epitomised by the various minority movements that have put forward alternative representations since the 1960's. Civil rights protests in the U.S. claim rights for Blacks, and feminist movements denounce a male-centred social order; both put forward claims of recognition of their respective social categories. Environmental movements criticize the ideological bases of growth-oriented capitalism, homosexuals seek rights for alternative forms of sexuality and close relationships, and the student movements of the late 1960's condemn the conformism and the authoritarianism of the post-war period. Eventually, many of these early *propaganda* minority claims have been taken up by mainstream society, and have thereby become emancipated representations, defended not only by minorities, but also by majority movements. This is certainly the case for the politics of recognition that express a far greater awareness and sensitivity for the needs and specificities of various minority and subordinate groups than was the case in earlier decades, but also for "green" environment movements that have become part of standard political programmes of all major political parties. More recent developments, starting in the late 1990's, finally, show a powerful backlash against the

hegemony of the neo-liberal free market conception of social order. Minority movements of anti-neoliberalism and anti-globalisation have rippled through many countries in the last decade, proposing again alternative forms of social order. If anything, a thorough analysis of these developments demonstrates the close relationship between the two major theoretical frameworks put forward by Serge Moscovici, social representations theory and minority influence theory (see Staerklé, 2013).

CONCLUSION

In this talk, I wanted to highlight the idea of antagonistic intergroup relations. I have done so by presenting an ongoing research programme on representations of democratic and nondemocratic countries, and on the perceived legitimacy of conflict between democratic-egalitarian and nondemocratic-hierarchical groups. The second part of my talk featured the social order representations model and its possible applications. This model tries to formalise the regulatory principles and the representational processes underlying different types of social antagonisms.

To conclude, I wish to highlight the social functions of intergroup antagonisms. These antagonisms enhance ingroup similarity, highlight the positive features of the ingroup by contrasting them to the negative ones of the outgroup, and polarise, essentialise and instrumentalise intergroup differences by defining relevant dimensions of comparison between antagonistic categories.

With respect to the theory of social representations, this approach places the *group* at the centre of representational processes, as objectified objects of representation and as instances of struggles of classification and categorisation. It also establishes links with more traditional domains of intergroup psychology, in particular social identity, stereotype content and prejudice.

By integrating social dynamics centred on both similarity and difference between individuals and groups, this approach could help to further our understanding of social change and social stability, a dual problem that has preoccupied and eluded social psychologists for decades. In order to do so, it is necessary to forge a clear conceptual and operational relationship between processes of intergroup influence on the one hand, and different types of social

representations on the other. This seems to be a promising avenue to tackle issues of diversity, pluralism and inequality which are at the heart of contemporary societies.

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