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Ecole des sciences criminelles

'Security from below'

A qualitative analysis of Syrian and Iraqi refugees'

human (in)security

Master's Thesis

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Abstract

By including the voices of Syrian and Iraqi urban refugees in Jordan in the production of knowledge, this master's thesis aims to direct the criminological gaze to contexts that usually escape it and to explore what security looks like 'from below', based on the subjective understanding of individuals and their everyday security practices and experiences. This thesis analyses the (in)security of Syrian and Iraqi refugees through the framework of 'human security'. Using interviews conducted in Jordan between 2016 and 2017, it provides insights into the threats to refugees' security which pushed them to leave their home country and the challenges they are facing living in Jordanian urban areas. The results reveal that all respondents were seeking personal, community and political security, when they came to Jordan, and suggest that they found that 'narrow' kind of security. However, they are confronted with a different kind of human insecurity, which is 'broader' in nature. Threats to their security in exile emanate from economic, environmental, health and food-related difficulties. In light of these findings, the author of this thesis argues that a flexible, rather than restrictive, interpretation of security is better equipped to capture and explain the insecurity of individuals in difficult contexts. The feelings of insecurity of these individuals are inherently subjective and escape objective readings.

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List of acronyms

1994 HDR	Human Development Report 1994
3RP	Regional Refugee & Resilience Plan
ASC	Asylum Seeker Certificate
HS	Human Security
HSRG	Human Security Research Group
ILO	International Labour Organization
JD(s)	Jordanian Dinar(s), equals 1.36 CHF (Swiss Francs) and 1.41 USD (US Dollars)
NGO(s)	Non-governmental organisation(s)
NRC	Norwegian Refugee Council
RQDA	R package for Qualitative Data Analysis
UN	United Nations
UNDP	United Nations Development Programme
UNHCR	United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees
UNTFHS	United Nations Trust Fund for Human Security
WFP	World Food Program

'Refugees are doubly insecure:

they flee because they are afraid;

and in fleeing, they start a precarious existence.'

(Sadako Ogata, former UN High Commissioner for Refugees (1991-2000), 1999)

'We are not going back.

Because the most important thing is safety.

In a place with no safety, a human being cannot live.'

(Hayat, from Syria, living in Mafraq, Jordan)

'It's about more than just eating and drinking.

We are, in the end, human elements, not animals.

We need more than that. We have goals, dreams in life.'

(Burhan, from Iraq, living in Amman, Jordan)

1. Introduction

1.1 Context

Dangerous places

On March 20, 2003, American and British troops invaded Iraq with the objective of toppling Saddam Hussein. A short conventional war between allied and Iraqi troops ended in April 2003, but quickly morphed into a conflict between armed forces and insurgents and later into a full-blown sectarian civil war (Encyclopaedia Britannica Online, 2017). The number of casualties[1] was estimated at more than 7,000 during the initial phase of the invasion (March-April 2003); over 50,000 during the post-invasion period until July 2006; and almost 90,000 in the civil war between July 2006 and May 2014. In June 2014, so-called Islamic State militants entered and captured the northern city of Mosul. Since then, the fighting has led to another 60,000 civilian deaths. On 9 July 2017, Iraqi Prime Minister Haider Al-Abadi declared victory of the Iraqi armed forces over the 'Islamic State' (Reuters, 2017).

Throughout these different phases of fighting (invasion, insurgency, civil war) Iraq has become a 'dangerous place' (Green & Ward, 2004, p.610), pushing masses of Iraqis out of their country, many into neighbouring Jordan (Sirkeci, 2005). In 2007, their number in Jordan was estimated to be between 400,000 and 500,000 (Fafo, 2007). Latest numbers provided by UNHCR on 30 June 2017 indicate that 63,417 Iraqis are registered with UNHCR in Jordan[2] (UNHCR, 2017a).

In 2011, the so-called Arab Spring provoked unrest in several Arab countries. In Syria, the protests were quickly met with violent state suppression (Al Jazeera, 2016). Since then, various states and local and foreign insurgent groups have entered the civil war. The fighting has cost more than 250,000 civilian lives, produced more than 4.5 million refugees and led to the internal displacement of more than 6.5 million Syrians (BBC, 2016). As of 30 June 2017, 660,836 Syrians are registered with UNHCR in Jordan[3] (UNHCR, 2017a).

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[1] Based on numbers provided by Iraq Body Count (2017).

[2] Since not all refugees register with UNHCR, this number underestimates the actual number of refugees in Jordan.

[3] *idem*

Image 1: Artistic depiction of the war-torn countries Syria and Iraq (Signed by 'Marqi'; this picture was circulating on social media in 2014 (Shahedon, 2016))

Jordan: a haven for Arab refugees

Jordan has been a haven for Arab refugees long before the millennial turn. Since the occupation of Palestine in 1948, migration flows and populations have shaped the country's politics, economy and society (Chatelard, 2010). Iraqi refugees, too, have sought refuge in Jordan before 2003, namely after the 1991 Gulf War, reaching a number of over 100,000 before 1996 (CARE, 2016). Jordan is not signatory to the 1951 Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees, but has signed a Memorandum of Understanding[4] with UNHCR in 1998, guaranteeing the principle of *non-refoulement* (CARE, 2016; ILO, 2015b; Chatelard, 2010).

The presence of refugees is frequently framed as a burden by Jordanian officials in appeals for international solidarity[5]. Jordan's policies towards refugees cannot be said to foster integration. Rather, they tend to be based on the perception of refugees as 'guests' (Chatelard,

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[4] Copy of MoU available at http://carim-south.eu/databases/legal/Jordan/Bilateral%20Agreements/LE2JOR002_AREN.pdf

[5] See, for example, Queen Rania's speech at the UN Summit for Refugees and Migrants in 2016 (available at: https://www.queenrania.jo/en/media/speeches/queen-ranias-speech-un-summit-refugees-and-migrants-ny-usa) or the contribution of Saleh Al-Kilani, Refugee Affairs Coordinator in the Jordanian Ministry of Interior, to the FMR (2015) (http://www.fmreview.org/syria/alkilani.html)

2011, p.19). One Jordanian Minister[6] said in 2002, in anticipation of the Iraqi refugee influx, that Jordan 'simply can't absorb them' and that only those in transition to a third country would be allowed into the country (Sassoon, 2009, p.34). For refugees in Jordan, obtaining residence permits, let alone citizenship, is extremely difficult (Crisp et al., 2009). The extremely complicated process of securing a work permit has been dubbed the 'work permit maze'[7] (JIF, 2016).

Figure 1: Top 10 countries by number of refugees hosted in 2015 and 2016 (UNHCR, 2017b, p.15; UNHCR 2014b).

Some (Achilli, 2015; Turner, 2015) argue that Jordan has effectively adopted an 'encampment policy', a complex landscape of rules and legislations, which complicates leaving the five official refugee camps legally. The '14 July Legislation', for instance, was the instruction of UNHCR by the Jordanian government, on 14 July 2014, that no Asylum Seeker Certificates (ASCs) would be issued to people leaving the camp without a proper 'bailout' procedure (Achilli, 2015). Without an ASC, a refugee has no formal legal status in Jordan and is exposed to countless vulnerabilities ranging from non-eligibility for assistance by the UN, labour exploitation, victimisation to deportation to the camp or back to Syria (Turner, 2015; Chatelard, 2011).

1.2 Urban refugees

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[6] Mohammad Adwan, Jordan's Minister of State for Political Affairs and Information stated that his government 'won't allow huge floods of refugees. We simply can't absorb them.' (Human Rights Watch, 2003).

[7] The 'work permit maze' is illustrated and described here: https://data2.unhcr.org/en/documents/download/53371

This encampment policy can be understood as a way of managing and controlling refugees – which is easier when they remain inside the camps (Jacobsen, 1996) – and discouraging them from establishing themselves in urbanised areas (Achilli, 2015; Turner, 2015). Therein, Jordan is not an exception: Encampment policies can be found in most countries hosting large numbers of refugees (Crisp, 2003; Jacobsen, 1996). Still, most of the world's refugees (87.8%) in 2015 lived in private accommodation in the urban milieu (UNHCR, 2016b). Moreover, there seems to be a trend of people avoiding or leaving the camps: in 2013, 34.4% of refugees lived in camps; in 2015, this number decreased to 25.4% (UNHCR, 2016b). In Jordan, Iraqi Refugees tend to live in urban centres[8] (Sassoon, 2009), while that is the case for 78.7% of Syrian refugees (UNHCR, 2017a). The four Jordanian cities Amman, Irbid, Mafraq[9] and Zarqa host together 70% of refugees living outside camps (Achilli, 2015; UNHCR, 2017a).

Figure 2: Distribution of Syrians and Iraqis registered with UNHCR in Jordan (UNHCR, 2017a)

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[8] Our research has not yielded any information indicating that camps in Jordan host Iraqi refugees

[9] Syrians make up almost 90% of Mafraq's population (Anadolu Agency, 2015)

The motivations to move to the urban sphere, away from the support structures provided in camps, vary widely. Refugees who have grown up and lived in the city tend to encounter difficulties adapting to a rural way of life and prefer the urban habitat, which they can navigate more easily (Crisp, Morris & Refstie, 2012). Other factors include greater opportunities for economic activity, the availability of services such as banks and hospitals, more autonomy and freedom of movement (Kobia & Cranfield, 2009). Sassoon (2009) also argues that the memory of overcrowded and mismanaged Palestinian refugee camps, ingrained in the collective Arab consciousness, continues to act as a deterrent for Arab refugees specifically.

In recent years, awareness of the presence of urban refugees has grown. The *2009 UNHCR policy on refugee protection and solutions in urban areas* emerged as a paradigm shift (Refugee Studies Centre, 2010, p.22): it formalised the desire of the international community to devote more attention and resources to refugees outside camps. However, most existing literature on refugees still focuses on camps (Culbertson, Oliker, Baruch & Blum, 2016). Little is known about refugees in urban areas.

1.3 A matter of security

Topics related to migration and refugees have been discussed in disciplines ranging from international relations, political science, development studies, security studies, geography, over health studies, economics, psychology, criminology, to sociology, anthropology and ethnology. This wide range is testimony to the variety of perspectives that can be adopted when discussing phenomena related to refugee flows. There is, however, undeniably, a tendency to frame refugee issues in terms of 'security': 'refugees and asylum seekers are never far from international and domestic security discussions' (Edwards, 2009, p.774). Too often, the question that academics, policymakers, media and people seem to ask, when ontologically juggling with notions of refugees, threats and security (Turner, 2015; Barmaki, 2009; Türk, 2003), is

> *What security threats do refugees pose?*

This formulation is problematic. Aas' (2012) interrogation 'Who is the 'subject at risk' and who is the 'risky subject'?'[10] (p. 12) urges us to remain vigilant when faced with such formu-

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[10] 'The dilemmas of weighing security and justice may look substantially different depending on the geopolitical position of the participants in the debate and the affected subjects.' (Aas, 2012, p. 12)

lations. The above question, formulated this way, constructs refugees as 'risky subjects' and someone or something else (e.g. domestic population, the receiving nation-state, international security) as the referent and beneficiary of security. The consequence is an increasing 'securitisation of migration', which implies that transnational migrants are conceived as threats to security and confronted with measures intended to protect national security (Bigo, 2002; Mountz, 2011); measures that include the incrimination, detention and exclusion of refugees and the violation of fundamental human rights (Turner, 2015; Aas, 2011; Barmaki, 2009; Bosworth, 2008; Sirkeci, 2005).

This thesis would like to depart from this assumption and adopt a different perspective, by reformulating the question into:

> *What threatens the security of refugees?*

In so doing, this thesis, admittedly, enters the security discourse on refugees. It does so, however, from the opposite direction, namely by considering refugees as 'subjects at risk'. Using the concept of 'human security' and based on field research conducted between 2016 and 2017, this paper intends *to gain a better understanding of how Iraqi and Syrian urban refugees in Jordan themselves perceive and prioritise challenges to their security*.

The analysis of their personal narratives ought to yield answers to the following two *empirical* questions:

1.a. What insecurities *push* Syrians and Iraqis to flee their countries?

1.b. What insecurities do Syrian and Iraqi refugees living in urban areas in Jordan grapple with?

Based on the collected data and this empirical analysis, we shall address two *conceptual* questions:

2.a. What do these insecurities look like when expressed through the HS framework and how useful is HS as a framework of analysis?

2.b. What implications does this analysis have for understandings of (in)security across international relations, security studies and criminology?

1.4 Security from below

> 'If criminology aspires to an understanding of murder, rape, theft and the like that
> is not limited to the richest and most peaceable regions of the modern world, it

must understand them in relation to war and particularly civil war' (Green & Ward, 2009, p.609).

This thesis is intended to be part of an endeavour to draw the attention of criminologists to regions and locations that tend to escape their gaze. As Green & Ward (2009) argue, a true understanding of crime phenomena and security dynamics cannot limit its scope to developed and peaceful societies.

This thesis is also a response to criminologists' recent calls for the 'inclusion of other voices' (Aas, 2012) and for the analysis of 'security from below', i.e. designating the individual as the main referent for discussions on security, by focusing on 'everyday security', i.e. the security practices and experiences of individuals, in different cultural and social contexts (Crawford & Hutchison, 2016; Walklate & Mythen, 2016). It is within this triangulation of refugees, human security and criminology that this paper aspires to contribute to the production of knowledge[11].

Figure 3: The triangulation of refugees, human security and criminology

1. *Empirically*, by using the HS framework to qualitatively assess how the security of Syrian and Iraqi urban refugees in Jordan is compromised (before flight and during exile);

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[11] Each of the couples ('HS-criminology', 'refugees-criminology' and 'refugees-HS' (indicated by numbers on the edges of the above triangle) is explored either empirically, conceptually or methodologically, as explained in points 1-3.

2. *Conceptually*, by taking this understanding of 'security from below' to explore the pertinence of human security as a concept and in relation to security studies and criminology;

3. *Methodologically*, by adapting a qualitative research method to the urban refugee context and exploring challenges related thereto.

1.5 Clarification of concepts

The concepts of 'security' and 'human security' will be clarified in the two following chapters. At this point, we will therefore limit ourselves to defining the notion of 'urban refugees'.

Urban refugees

The UN Refugee Convention 1951 (art. 1) defines as a 'refugee' whoever,

> 'owing to a well-founded fear of being persecuted for reasons of race, religion, nationality, membership of a particular social group or political opinion, is outside the country of his nationality, and is unable to, or owing to such fear, is unwilling to avail himself of the protection of that country'.

It is important to note that the term 'refugee' remains vague, is frequently used to describe people who do not neatly fit the criteria of this definition (asylum seekers, displaced persons etc.) and has been amended several times by the UN itself (Barmaki, 2009).

We will consider as 'urban refugees' those refugees who establish themselves in the urban area, defined as a 'built-up area that accommodates large numbers of people living in close proximity to each other, and where the majority of people sustain themselves by means of formal and informal employment and the provision of goods and services' (UNHCR, 2009, p. 2).

2. Theoretical Framework: Human security explained

In this chapter, the foundation of the concept of human security, as defined by UN bodies and human security scholars, is outlined. The debates surrounding the way the concept has been received by academics and policymakers follow in the literature review.

2.1 Origin

From the 1990s onwards, Western countries started seeking a more active role in the resolution of conflicts worldwide (Christie, 2010). There seemed to be a broad consensus that the liberal world order and the spread of liberal democratic governance were the right response to ensure international security (Christie, 2010), but the international community was struggling to find the right approach. As former UN High Commissioner for Refugees Mrs. Ogata suggested in a speech in 1999:

> 'It is not surprising that the world, disoriented and frustrated by the difficult task to adapt to a new and yet unclear international system, often finds it easier to resort to tools and concepts developed during the Cold War, with which it is more familiar' (UNHCR 1999, p.6)

In the era of 'new wars' (Kaldor, 2013), however, these traditional 'Cold-War' understandings of security, focusing on the protection of nation-states against external threats, proved insufficient as frames of analysis and guidance for policy (Edwards, 2009).

'Human security' emerged as a more contemporary approach to security, by shifting the focus from states to individuals. The 1994 UNDP Report on Human Development first coined the concept. The report proposed a reconceptualisation of security as

a) safety from chronic threats such as hunger, disease and repression and

b) protection from sudden and hurtful disruptions in the patterns of daily life – whether in jobs, in homes or in communities (UNDP, 1994, p.23).

By transcending conventional distinctions between foreign and domestic issues (Gasper & Gómez, 2015), it provided 'a theoretical perspective and an operational framework for solving foreign policy problems in the post-Cold War era' (Hudson, Kreidenweis & Carpenter, 2013, p.24).

2.2 Definitions

Three freedoms

The UN General Assembly's resolution 66/290 (2012) on human security defines it in paragraph 3(a) as:

> 'The right of people to live in freedom and dignity, free from poverty and despair. All individuals, in particular vulnerable people, are entitled to freedom from fear and freedom from want, with an equal opportunity to enjoy all their rights and fully develop their human potential'

This definition – beyond highlighting the focus on individuals – mentions two types of freedoms, namely 'freedom from fear' and 'freedom from want'[12], but Tadjbakhsh (2013) suggests that, in its broadest form, HS actually pursues three freedoms:

- Freedom from *fear* (protection from threats to physical safety)
- Freedom from *want* (conditions that allow for the protection of basic needs, quality of life and human welfare)
- Freedom from *indignity* (protection of fundamental rights and possibility to make choices and take advantage of opportunities)

Figure 4: Three freedoms (GPPAC, 2016)

Characteristics

Mahbub El Haq, the special advisor of the 1994 report, ascribes four attributes to human security (UNDP, 1994, pp. 22-23):

- Human security is a *universal* concern (people everywhere in the world need human security)
- The components of human security are *interdependent* (e.g. low income affects food choices or water scarcity can lead to conflict)
- Human security is easier to ensure through early *prevention* than later intervention[13]

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[12]. The 1994 UNDP report, which inspired this definition, partly reiterated what Franklin D. Roosevelt had already said on 6 January 1941, in his State of the Union Address. Roosevelt said that he envisioned a world built on four freedoms: freedom of speech, of worship, *freedom from fear* and *from want* (Tadjbakhsh, 2013).

- Human security is *people-centred* (individuals, rather than states, are the main referent of security debates and measures)

Human security is also *policy-oriented* and *normative*, meaning its engagement with security is not amoral: The understanding of insecurities on the individual level should promote policies that improve the welfare of people (Newman, 2016; Tadjbakhsh, 2013).

2.3 Threats

Hence, human security considers a wide array of threats that menace different aspects of human life (HSRG, 2014), as illustrated below[14]:

Figure 5: The seven dimensions of human security (based on HSRG, 2014)

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[13] 'In the final analysis, human security is a child who did not die, a disease that did not spread, a job that was not cut, an ethnic tension that did not explode in violence, a dissident who was not silenced' (UNDP, 1994, p.22).

[14] Based on descriptions by UNDP (1994), summarised by Cao & Wyatt (2016)

It must be noted, however, that the 1994 HDR does not present this list as an exclusive or exhaustive way of understanding human security. It concedes that the categories overlap (e.g. food and economic insecurity) and that other categories may be included (Gasper & Gómez 2015).

Alkire (2003) suggests that the 'objective of human security is to safeguard the vital core of all human lives from critical pervasive *threats*, in a way that is consistent with long-term human fulfilment' (p.2). He describes these threats as follows:

- Threats are 'critical', i.e. they 'threaten to cut into the core activities and functions of human lives' (p.4) and 'pervasive', meaning they are large-scale and reoccurring in one way or another.

- Threats can be 'direct' (e.g. genocide, targeted violence) or 'indirect/structural' (e.g. underinvestment in education) (Alkire, 2003).

- Finally, threats can be 'idiosyncratic', i.e. affecting a specific person or household (e.g. work accident), or 'covariant', i.e. affecting groups and communities (e.g. civil war) (Alkire, 2003).

The HS framework seems appropriate for the study of Syrian and Iraqi urban refugees' insecurities in Jordan, because of its broad and contemporary view on what security can and ought to mean. Furthermore, the lack of empirical exploration of the concept, on the one hand, and the heated discussions it provokes in security studies and criminology[15], on the other, warrant a thorough assessment of how pertinent the framework is when applied to a real-life situation.

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[15] It suffices to glance over the November 2016 issue of the British Journal of Criminology to realise how topical the debate on human security is.

3. Literature review

3.1 What is security?

Security for whom and from what?

Security has been called an 'essentially contested concept' (Smith, 2005; Buzan, 1984; Little, 1981), i.e. a concept for which no universal definition can be found (Gallie, 1955). It is therefore unsurprising to find various, contrasting views on what security means. Breaking the question down into sub-questions such as 'Whose security? Security as perceived by whom? Security of which values? Against which threats? Secured by whom? To what extent? By what instruments?' (Gasper & Gómez, 2015, p.103) can prove helpful in organising discussions on the meaning of security (Crawford & Hutchinson, 2016). For the purpose of this paper, we shall focus on the questions 'security for whom?' and 'security from what?'.

From the security of individuals to the security of the nation

There is no straightforward answer to the question 'security for whom?' (Baldwin 1997, p.13). Rothschild (1995), in her historical exploration of security ('What is security?') traces the term back to the Latin origin of 'securitas', which referred to a condition of *individuals*. It meant the 'absence of anxiety upon which the happy life depends [...] a feeling of being secure' ('*Sicherheitsgefühl*') (p.61). She found that it was the military period of the French Revolution that subsumed the security of individuals under the security of the *nation,* through the institution of the social contract. National security has since gained prominence and importance in security theory and practice in the 20th century. It has, however, not gained equally in clarity: Wolfers (1952) argues that the concept has little meaning, beyond the fact that it subordinates other interests to those of the nation. Baldwin (1997) and Buzan (1984) argue that a concept of security that does not specify a referent object[16] 'makes little sense' (Baldwin, 1997, p. 13), but designating one is already a source of contention: is security meant to protect individuals or nation-states (Türk, 2003)?

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[16] Referent objects being 'things that are seen to be existentially threatened and that have a legitimate claim to survival' (Buzan, Weaver & de Wilde, 1998, p. 36)

Security, a 'speech act'

A second point of contention arises when it comes to defining 'security from what threats?' (Baldwin 1997, p. 15). This is where the 'essentially contested nature' of the concept truly comes to the fore: there are diverging views on what should be *called* a security threat. The 'speech act' (Wæver, 1995, p.55) of naming something a 'security issue' is also known as the process of 'securitisation': 'when an issue is presented as posing an existential threat to a designated referent object' (Buzan et al., 1998, p. 21), it is attributed 'urgency, priority and gravity' (Tadjbakhsh, 2013, p.46) and moved from the realm of normal politics to the realm of 'extraordinary' politics, justifying extraordinary resources and measures (Floyd, 2011; Buzan, Wæver & Wilde, 1998, p.21). Hence, the act of 'speaking security' is likely to have tangible ramifications in real life (Crawford & Hutchinson, 2016). The choice over which objects are securitised is therefore crucial, and opposes two schools of thought: 'traditionalists', who understand security as freedom from objective military threats only, and 'wideners', who see security as also encompassing economic, societal and environmental factors (Šulović, 2010, p. 2).

Security and insecurity

The Oxford Dictionary defines security as (a) the state or condition of being or feeling secure and (b) freedom from danger or threat; safety (Oxford English Dictionary, 2017)[17]. This definition provides both an *objective* and a *subjective* understanding of security, which has also been highlighted by Tadjbakhsh (2013), to whom security is 'as much an objective notion that can be measured against quantitative indicators (i.e., crime, violence, employment, freedoms etc.) as a subjective factor that requires qualitative assessment of how people 'feel' secure' (p.45). It is important to bear this distinction in mind for the following discussions on the meaning of security.

The 'subjective vs. objective' distinction has also been maintained by scholars of 'insecurity'. Bauman (1999) suggests that the German term '*Unsicherheit*' conflates three experiences that have distinct names in English, namely uncertainty and insecurity (subjective) and unsafety

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[17] The Arabic counterparts are 'أمن' (*amn*) for security (things that are done to keep someone safe), often put in relation with national, internal or external security, and 'أمان' (*aman*) for safety (a state of being safe from harm or danger) (Cambridge Dictionary, 2017), also understood as شعور وإحساس الأشخاص والجماعات بالراحة والطمأنينة (people and communities' feeling of comfort and tranquillity) (Saleh, 2016).

(objective). He argues that the absence of any of the three ingredients of '*Unsicherheit*' essentially has the same effect, namely

> 'the loss of trust in one's own ability and other people's intentions, growing incapacitation, anxiety, cageyness, the tendency to fault-seeking and fault-finding, to scapegoating and aggression' (p.17).

Fighting '*Unsicherheit*', however, is not equally concerned with all three elements: Bauman argues that resources are disproportionately dedicated to one ingredient, namely 'safety, the only field in which something can be done and seen to be done' (Bauman, 1999, p.5). Tackling 'unsafety' by making people more 'secure' through enhanced 'security measures' can be seen, measured and evaluated. Reducing 'insecurity' and 'uncertainty' of people, on the other hand, has less political appeal, since its results are hard to evaluate, let alone demonstrate.

3.2 Criminology's engagement with security

Let's talk about security...

These preceding discussions around the notion of security have not escaped criminology. Zedner (2007) argues that criminology is undergoing a reformation concerning its object of study, in two respects: Temporally, criminologists have started shifting their attention from the 'post-crime' to the 'pre-crime' period; regarding its 'object', criminology's interest has extended beyond the restrictive understanding of 'crime' to also encompass issues only remotely related to crime. Criminology is now less concerned with 'reacting to, controlling or prosecuting crime than addressing the conditions precedent to it' (Zedner, 2007, p.265). This shift is a sign of criminology's growing preoccupation with ensuring security. The 'growing pervasiveness of 'security talk', the increasing articulation of 'crime' and 'security' and the shifting priorities of [...] policymakers and research-funding bodies' (Crawford & Hutchinson, 2016, p.1056) can hardly be understated.

...but just how much?

Within criminology, there are arguably two perspectives that dominate discussions revolving around the 'fear of crime' and the 'feeling of insecurity' (De Donder et al., 2009). Adherents of the 'rationalist perspective'[18] defend that feelings of insecurity are mainly the result of vulnerability, i.e. (objective or subjective) exposure to criminal victimisation (insecurity be-

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[18] E.g. Killias (1990)

ing 'unsafety' in Bauman's words). To them, it is via the situational prevention of crime (e.g. better street lightning) that such feelings can be reduced. Advocates of what may be called the 'symbolic perspective', in contrast, argue that 'fear of crime' is only part of a general feeling of malaise, that may well result from vulnerabilities as understood by 'rationalists' (Killias, 1990), but more often from difficulties such as 'illness, financial insecurity, general urban unease, social exclusion, etc.' (De Donder et al., 2009, p.5).

This debate about 'feelings of insecurity', what they mean and how they should be addressed, raises a more general question concerning the very object of criminology: Just how much can we talk about security before, as Valverde (2013) argues, we 'leave criminology altogether' (p.1)? Should criminology continue to focus on crime and crime only, lest it loses pertinence as a discipline, or should the focus of the discipline be 'widened', as Zedner (2007) proposes? Shearing (2015) advocates for challenging 'criminology's established boundaries [to] advance understandings of the governance of security' (p.264)[19] in order to live up to the demands of contemporary security challenges. One concept, which has recently attracted criminologists' attention, epitomises Shearing's call for broadening the criminological scope: human security.

3.3 Broadening and deepening the security discourse: Human Security

Essentially, Baldwin's (1997) questions 'security for whom?' and 'security from what?' are answered by HS as illustrated below:

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[19] Cao & Wyatt (2016) recently responded to Shearing's call by proposing an analysis of Green Criminology.

	What is the Source of the Security Threat?	
	Military	**Military, Non-military, or Both**
States	National security (conventional realist approach to security studies)	Redefined security (e.g., environmental and economic [cooperative or comprehensive] security)
Societies, Groups, and Individuals	Intrastate security (e.g., civil war, ethnic conflict, and democide)	Human security (e.g., environmental and economic threats to the survival of societies, groups, and individuals)

Figure 6: Human security in perspective[20]

Essentially, human security is concerned with both military and non-military threats to societies, groups and individuals (Paris, 2001). Conceived as such, human security 'is consistent with the broadening and deepening of security discourse'[21] (Wibben, 2008, p. 458), in the sense proposed by 'wideners' in security studies (Gasper & Gómez 2015; Šulović, 2010). The *deepening* is performed by shifting the referent object ('security for whom?') from states to individuals, somewhat reverting the historical evolution (see Rothschild, 1995[22]). The security discourse is *broadened* by acknowledging that threats to security ('security from what?') may emanate from non-military sources, such as economic or environmental ones (Paris, 2001; Tadjbakhsh, 2013).

How much attention each aspect of HS should receive is a question that divides human security scholars into those who advocate for a 'narrow' approach (e.g. HSRG, 2014; Muggah & Krause, 2006), i.e. one that focuses on threats to personal security (e.g. crime, targeted violence), and those who promote a 'broad' view of human security (e.g. Tadjbakhsh, 2013; Kaldor, Martin & Selchow, 2007), i.e. the recognition that threats compromising the security of individuals may stem from multiple and diverse sources (e.g. economic, social, health, etc.) (Owen, 2004).

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[20] Adapted from Alkire (2003, p.17) who based this illustration on Paris (2001, p.98).

[21] The arrows in the image have been added to illustrate the *deepening* (vertical arrow) and the *broadening* (horizontal arrow)

[22] see 3.1

Critique of human security

HS has been criticised for its vagueness, fuzziness and analytical weakness (Chandler, 2008; Paris, 2001) and for not living up to its critical aspiration of challenging the way security is thought and acted upon (Turner et al., 2010). Two points of criticism are frequently put forward: HS's hazardous securitisation of everyday life, a critical view on the *lexis* of HS, i.e. what is said and written about the security doctrine (Kaldor et al., 2007); and HS being institutionalised and co-opted into neo-liberal foreign policy, which is a criticism concerned with the *praxis* of HS, i.e. what HS means in terms of policy and action (Kaldor et al., 2007).

Chandler (2011) accuses HS of creating new enemies: 'In the absence of traditional enemies, human security approaches fill the gap with the securitization [sic] of every issue from health, to the economy, to the environment.' (p.124). Aspects of everyday life, usually perceived in terms of 'human development', are labelled 'security issues' and thereby elevated to the rank of extraordinary politics. Making development issues security issues can be hazardous: Pupavac (2005) claims that 'the broadening of security denotes expansion of security measures and contraction of the development agenda' (p.163) and Duffield (2010) warns that, in an era where underdevelopment comes to be seen as a security issue, the 'development-security nexus' mainly serves the containment and control of the global poor.

Others even argue that HS has been abused as an instrument of neo-liberal foreign policy. Turner et al. (2010) claim that the concept has been 'institutionalised and co-opted to work in the interests of global capitalism, militarism and neoliberal governance' (p. 83). Chandler (2012) accuses it of joining the ranks of paradigms such as 'responsibility to protect' (R2P) or 'resilience' in their promotion and justification of global interventionism.

These arguments are better understood in their historical context. With the end of the Cold War, under-development and global poverty came to be seen as threatening international security; therefore, Western countries started seeking a more active role in the resolution of conflicts worldwide (Christie, 2010; Pupavac, 2005; Duffield, 2010; Newman, 2016). Since the 1990s, military interventions in the 'global South' (e.g. Afghanistan, Iraq, Libya) conducted in the name of 'liberation', 'freedom' or 'democratisation' have cost tens of thousands of human lives. If HS emerged as a way of justifying this interventionist agenda, which is essentially what critics argue, it would defy its very *raison d'être,* namely the promotion of the security of individuals.

Defence of human security

Tadjbakhsh (2013), points out that critics fail to distinguish between the broad and the narrow conception of human security. The latter does indeed focus on 'hard security' ('Buzanian existential') threats and is likely to elicit traditional institutional responses. But if justice is done to the truly critical aspiration of HS, then not only the range of security threats is widened but also the range of possible responses. Securitisation, according to the broad view of HS, should 'not automatically raise alarms to send in the troops' (Tadjbakhsh, p.47). As Kaldor, (2011) points out compellingly[23], it 'is very difficult to protect civilians from the air' (p. 447). In a similar vein, Newman (2016) suggests that securitisation itself should not be considered the main issue. Rather, human security advocates should promote securitisation in a way that 'prioritizes [sic] the 'human good of security' as a public good' (Loader and Walker 2006, p. 166, quoted by Newman, 2016).

Newman further rejects the notion that human security is the 'dominant framework of international regulation', as Chandler (2008, p. 465) had suggested, on grounds that it simply has not had that much of an impact. Human security endeavours can hardly be said to change the political structure of the country or region they are operating in. Therefore, accusing human security policymakers of engaging in a neo-liberal project in the developing world 'does not stand up to scrutiny' (Newman, 2016, p.14). Also, although the HS framework, in its purest form, is indeed a 'critical' idea, its development and implementation have rather taken place within a 'problem-solving' perspective (Newman, 2016; Cox, 1981). Newman (2016) argues that it is precisely its respect of existing policy actors and structures that have enabled human security projects to positively impact on the lives of individuals. Activities funded by the UNTFHS[24] have 'undoubtedly improved the lives of many communities' (Newman, 2016, p.9). To refuse to acknowledge the benefits derived from these efforts, which benefited from the label of 'human security', would be 'morally questionable' (p.14), Newman suggests.

Vigilant optimism

Criminology has already begun critically examining the dangers of calling something 'security' or 'crime' (Aas, 2011; Zedner, 2009; Bosworth, 2008; Loader, 2002) and exposing 'the manner in which the governance of security does not necessarily serve human security'

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[23] In her analysis of 'Western' interventions in Libya (2011) and Kosovo (1999)

[24] United Nations Trust Fund for Human Security

(Newman, 2016, p. 4[25]). It should therefore remain attentive to both the *lexis* and *praxis* of HS.

Dismissing human security altogether, however, seems precipitate, especially since it is arguably more apt to respond to contemporary security challenges than traditional national security (Alkire, 2003): today's security is 'on the move' (Crawford, 2014), with borders – an essential component of the nation-state's sovereignty (Torpey, 2005) – getting ever more porous, the growing influence of non-state actors, the gradual erosion of the monopoly of the state and the blurring of distinctions between war, conflict and crime, rebels and criminals, army and police, the public and the private, and the global and the local (Kaldor, 2013; Crawford & Hutchinson, 2016; Walklate & Mythen, 2016). Human security may well be the 'cosmopolitan political response' envisaged by Kaldor (2013, p.14) for the development of new norms of conceiving the global governance of security.

3.4 Coupling refugees, human security and criminology

Refugees and the related migrations flows are a typical expression of the contemporary security environment: they are usually the consequence of civil conflicts and proof of states' failure to provide security to their people; they are transnational in nature, challenging states' sovereignty and their borders; they have local as well as global impacts and they are confronted by actors from all levels of governance: the national, international, the local, the public and the private. Kaldor (2013) even suggests that 'forcible [sic] displacement is a central methodology of new wars' (p. 10): modern conflicts have lower death rates, but produce more displacement, which may be due to new communications' ability to spread fear and panic.

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[25] referring to Johnston and Shearing (2003)

Human Security

The situation of refugees, their securities and insecurities, lend themselves to an analysis through the framework of human security: the referent object is clearly the individual and not the state; the panoply of threats that refugees face before, during and after their flight encompass not only direct attacks and prosecutions but also challenges related to financial, economic, social, health and environmental factors (Cheikh Diop, 2016; Barmaki, 2009; Türk, 2003). These elements notwithstanding, meagre efforts have been put forth to use the HS framework in relation to refugees. Examples include Berti's (2015) analysis of the impact of the Syrian refugee crisis on host communities in Jordan, Lebanon and Turkey and Sirkeci's (2005) conceptual essay on the nexus between human security and migration.

Criminology

As mentioned earlier, criminology has already started engaging with HS. It has been argued that criminology can benefit from and contribute to the concept, through its individual-based approach, its methods and its record of critically engaging with questions of security (Newman, 2016; Zedner, 2009). Also, HS is committed to understanding and tackling the root causes of insecurity to inform prevention-oriented policies. Criminology has long realised the need to focus on promoting social justice and inclusive policies and preventing delinquency and victimisation, rather than dealing with their consequences (Newman, 2016; Zedner, 2007).

Criminology's engagement with issues related to refugees and migration flows is not new either. Criminologists have explored the relationship between immigration and crime (e.g. Stowell & Martinez (2007); Reid, Weiss, Adelman & Jaret (2005)) and the increasing crimi-

nalisation of migration (Van der Woude & Van Berlo, 2015; Aas, 2011; Bosworth, 2008; Melossi, 2003). Research groups at universities are taking on these subjects specifically[26].

As mentioned in the introduction and as illustrated below, it is this coupling of refugees, criminology and human security that lays the groundwork for this paper and our interrogations concerning the meaning of security.

Figure 7: Coupling refugees, human security and criminology, based on the literature review

Who should we ask?

This literature review hardly brings us any closer to a consensual definition of what security means. If anything, it reinforces the argument that security is 'essentially contested', by bringing to the fore, we argue, a reoccurring cross-disciplinary dichotomy between scholars who advocate for a *restrictive* understanding of security and those who promote a *flexible* view on security matters. To 'restrictive' scholars, notions such as 'crime' and 'security' should only be used for phenomena that directly threaten the physical integrity of human beings. 'Flexible' scholars acknowledge a wider range of phenomena as 'crime' and 'security', including actions and conditions that affect the well-being of human beings in the broadest sense possible.

Object	Opposed understandings	
Interpretation	*Restrictive*	*Flexible*

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[26] e.g. 'Border Criminologies' at the University of Oxford

Insecurity, Bauman (1999)	Unsafety	Uncertainty, insecurity
Security studies (Šulović, 2010)	Traditionalists	Wideners
Human Security (Tadjbakhsh, 2013)	Narrow approach	Broad approach
Criminology (De Donder et al., 2009)	'Rationalist' perspective	'Symbolic' perspective
Security as a state (Tadjbakhsh, 2013)	Objective	Subjective

Table 1: Restrictive vs. flexible understandings of security

Whom, then, does one have to ask in order to understand what security means? Academics, Policymakers and Politicians? Or the people directly affected? Even though all these actors are relevant, we argue that the views of the latter are understudied and need to be given particular attention. Thereby, we are joining a range of security scholars and criminologists with aspirations to 'drill down to the lived experience of (in)security' (Walklate & Mythen, 2016, p.1111) and who have argued that 'any idea of security that disregards ordinary people is conceptually, empirically and ethically inadequate' (Newman, 2010, p. 80) and that 'security needs to be defined as a subjective experience at the micro level to gain meaning' (Tadjbakhsh, 2013, p. 44).

In fact, criminologists have recently called for the 'inclusion of other voices' with the aim of understanding 'security from below' by shifting 'the analysis of security away from states and public institutions, towards individuals and communities' (Crawford & Hutchinson, 2016, p. 1064). Crawford & Hutchinson (2016) argue that criminology's engagement with security should be enriched by a focus on 'everyday security', i.e. individual security practices and experiences, in order to transcend disciplinary boundaries and 'engage with the wide variety of inequalities, injustices, and harms that inform contemporary insecurities and the experiences of people in diverse cultural and social settings around the globe' (p. 1064).

Aas (2012) points out compellingly that criminology has evolved within a specific geography: knowledge is produced by scholars and researchers located in European and Anglo-American countries. She invites us to imagine what our understanding of crime, security and insecurity would look like if perspectives outside these parts of the world were given equal opportunities to influence criminology. In the same vein, criminologists have encouraged a broadening of criminology's scope beyond the peaceful regions in which most research has

been undertaken (Green & Ward, 2004; Aas, 2012). This paper's concern with how Syrian and Iraqi urban refugees perceive challenges to their own security should be seen as a step in this direction.

3.5 Why do people flee?

A complicated human movement

According to the theory of 'forced migration' (Barmaki, 2009), people are forced to migrate because of

> (1) globalization and the resulting global inequality, job scarcity and economic insecurity;

> (2) war, genocide, political persecution;

> (3) crime and exploitation (sex industry, cheap/forced labour, trafficking, etc.); and

> (4) development projects (dams, airports, luxury housing, etc.)' (p.254).

The UN definition[27] only covers the second point. 'Forced migrants' therefore seem to include 'refugees', but also encompass economic and environmental migrants[28]. Sirkeci (2005) argues that a broad definition is more apt to do justice to the complexity of international migration, which, to him, is

> 'better understood as a *complicated human movement*, involving different types of migrants, such as refugees, asylum seekers, family migrants, illegal migrants, migrant workers, and professionals. In most cases it is impossible to distinguish economic, political, or cultural reasons from each other, and [...] people often move with mixed, and overlapping, motivations' (p.200) [emphasis added]

Sirkeci (2005) further proposes an understanding of migration flows called 'opportunity frameworks'. According to this framework, people often harbour intentions of leaving their country before the eruption of a conflict. The conflict then serves as a justification for them to flee. Another question is whether people flee because of direct victimisation or because of the general environment of insecurity. Westermeyer & Williams (1998), based on interviews with 286 refugees, found that the majority (72.4%) had not experienced direct victimisation when they fled their country.

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[27] see 1.5

[28] UNHCR, however, clearly distinguishes between the terms 'forced migrants' and 'refugees'. They argue that the former is a term used in social sciences and the latter a legal concept, protected by international law (UNHCR 2016a).

It is not surprising to find various explanations of why people flee. The push-factors are likely to be interconnected and sometimes perhaps only remotely linked to the actual conflict situation. It is important to keep this complexity in mind when discussing refugees' experiences.

A 'relatively' safe haven

People who flee a conflict situation are often confronted with new threats to their security upon arrival in a host country, such as labour and sexual exploitation and different forms of criminality (Türk, 2003). As Mrs. Sadako Ogata (UNHCR 1999) pointed out cogently:

> 'Refugees are doubly insecure: they flee because they are afraid; and in fleeing they start a precarious existence.' (p. 4)

The security that refugees find in exile has therefore been described as 'relative': Even though they are objectively protected from the repercussions of the conflict, they tend to find themselves in a less favourable position than people in the host community, often struggling with socio-economic deprivation (Sirkeci, 2007). This precariousness is often particularly marked in the case of urban refugees. The failure of host countries to protect refugees also contributes to 'secondary onward movement' (Türk, 2003, p.115).

3.6 Insecurities of urban refugees

In 2012, UNHCR conducted a survey to evaluate the implementation of the 2009 UNHCR policy in 24 countries with an urban refugee population of at least 5'000[29]. The report's findings indicate promising developments in the protection of urban refugees by the local UNHCR offices (Morand et al., 2012). However, they also identify gaps such as refugees' difficulties to obtain documentation or legalise their status due to inaccessibility of the relevant offices, lacking awareness of their rights and livelihood opportunities, and insufficient self-reliance (Morand et al., 2012). These and other difficulties can also be identified in the case of urban refugees in Jordan.

Syrian and Iraqi urban refugees in Jordan

Humanitarian organisations such as UNHCR, CARE International and the Norwegian Refugee Council (NRC) conduct research in Jordan to evaluate the most pressing needs of urban

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[29] Jordan fits that criterion. It is also among the six most urbanised countries worldwide (with more than 70% of the population living in urban areas) (Morand et al., 2012).

refugees and whether the aid received helps meet those needs or not. Their research is based on so-called 'household surveys': teams of local volunteers are dispatched into areas densely populated by urban refugees, where they take residents through a structured questionnaire (CARE, 2016; UNHCR, 2013)[30]. The results are evaluated both qualitatively and quantitatively. The reports are usually descriptive and followed by policy recommendations, but they do not refer to the human security framework *per se*.

Main findings

Reports tend to focus on aspects such as food, tensions with the host community, shelter, health and livelihood opportunities. These aspects are often identified as the most pressing needs of urban refugees. Unfortunately, most recent reports focus on Syrian households and disregard the plight of Iraqi urban refugees. Consequently, there is a dearth of literature on Iraqi refugees since 2011, which explains the bias of the following section towards Syrian urban refugees.

Shelter

The primary needs identified across the urban refugee community are related to shelter, with 73% of households identifying shelter needs (CARE, 2014). They mainly lament the high and increasing rental prices. Reports on household spending vary from 91 JD[31] to 166 JD per month, depending on whether they live in the capital or in one of the more peripheral cities (UNHCR, 2013). All reports identify cash for rent as one of the primary needs. Moreover, shelter-related needs such as furniture, equipment and heating are prevailing. In fact, 18% of households report not having any heating at all (CARE, 2014). Overcrowding is also a serious concern, with 3.4 persons living in one room on average (NRC, 2015) and 51% of families sharing accommodation with other families (UNHCR, 2013).

One in five renting families has no rental contract, and is thus exposed to exploitation and eviction by landlords (UNHCR, 2014a). 10% of Syrian refugees are assessed as being under 'immediate threat of eviction' (NRC, 2015, p. 13), because they are informally housing with another family, because the landlord wants to raise the rent or because they are behind on rental payment. About 40% of households moved at least three times in the year preceding

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[30] Certain methodological challenges arise with this research method (e.g. neutrality of the researcher, biased research sample, etc.). A discussion of these will be omitted for brevity purposes. The reader of the following main findings should, however, bear in mind that they are influenced by several methodological flaws.

[31] 1 Jordanian Dinar (JD) equals 1.36 Swiss Franc (CHF) and 1.41 US Dollar (USD)

the survey conducted by NRC (2015). These frequent disruptions impact negatively upon families' mental health and feelings of security (NRC, 2015).

Livelihood: Work & Assistance

Most of Iraqis and Syrians who arrive in Jordan do so on their savings (Culbertson et al., 2016). Since many of them struggle to find a sustainable source of income and because Jordan is relatively expensive compared to their home country, these savings deplete rapidly, which increases their debt levels (CARE, 2014; Culbertson et al., 2016). Sources of income are humanitarian assistance (51.5%), earnings, mostly from informal work (13.2%) and remittances (8.1%) (Morand et al., 2013). Culbertson et al. (2016) also found that many Syrian refugees perceive aid distribution as biased and unjust. For Iraqis, assistance has been drastically reduced over recent years (IRIN, 2013).

Around 60% of refugee households in host communities receive earnings from informal work, while two thirds of them declare earning less than 200 JD per month (NRC, 2015). A legal work permit is expensive[32] and difficult to obtain[33], which leads many to engage in illegal work (Culbertson et al., 2016; ILO, 2015: NRC, 2015; CARE, 2014). Certain professions (e.g. medical, driving, telephone service) are closed to Non-Jordanians altogether (ILO 2015). UNHCR (2014) reports that in only 1% of interviewed households someone has a work permit (p.28).

Affected refugees are unable to pay the transportation costs to offices of humanitarian organisations, which prevents them from requesting support and engaging in social activities and further entrenches their invisibility and isolation (CARE, 2014). The struggle to ensure their livelihood incentivises adopting negative coping mechanisms, such as selling personal items or food vouchers, child labour, engaging in sexual exploitation and marrying out their girls at a young age (UNHCR, 2013; CARE, 2014).

Food

Food is not reported as one of the most pressing needs (UNHCR, 2013; CARE, 2014). Most households spend between 50 and 150 JD per month on food (CARE, 2014). For 89% of the families (CARE, 2014), most of this amount can be covered through food vouchers, which

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[32] Work permit fees range from 170 to 700 JD (ILO, 2015a). Iraqis have to prove residency, i.e. either deposit 25,000 JD at a local bank, marry a Jordanian citizen or get a special sponsorship by the employer (IRIN, 2013).

[33] Refugees apply for a permit through their employers, who need to prove that the position cannot be filled by a Jordanian worker (ILO, 2015a)

are distributed by UNHCR, WFP[34], Caritas or other NGOs[35]. It is problematic that most vouchers are reserved for Syrian refugees, while Jordanian households do not have access to them. Unsurprisingly, more Jordanian households (20%) than Syrian households (7%) report food as a primary need (CARE, 2014, p.24). This adds to frustrations of the host community with the arrival of refugees from Syria (Culbertson et al., 2016).

Tensions with host community

The increased competition over employment opportunities, mostly in the informal sector, housing and access to social support has engendered negative sentiments towards refugees (Achilli, 2015; CARE, 2014). Evidence suggests that the refugee instream into the Jordanian informal labour market has pushed down the wage for daily labour, since refugees tend to accept less favourable working conditions than Jordanians (CARE, 2014; Culbertson et al., 2016).

Health

73% of households report at least one person with a mild medical condition (UNHCR, 2013). Unfortunately, serious illnesses often remain unattended because their treatment is simply too costly and not covered by the public health care plan that is free to registered refugees (UNHCR, 2013; CARE, 2014). These would need to be treated by private health care, which only a minority of refugees (8%) can afford (UNHCR, 2013). On average, households report spending 59 JD per month on health-related expenses (CARE, 2014).

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[34] The World Food Program (WFP) food voucher program stepped up in August 2012 and provides 24 JD per person to a reported 98% of all refugees outside the camp (UNHCR, 2013). However, since October 2014, WFP has had to cut their support to host communities twice (NRC, 2015).

[35] e.g. www.collateralrepairproject.org

4. Methodology

4.1 Choice of research sample

The choice of focusing on Iraqi and Syrian urban refugees in Jordan can be justified on different grounds.

- *Syrians and Iraqis,* because of the Syrian and Iraqi conflicts' significant contribution to the rise in displacement levels worldwide (UNHCR, 2017b) and the considerable public interest in their human consequences. Iraqis and Syrians also share a common Arab language and culture and while each conflict has its particularities in how it causes displacement, the experience of Syrians and Iraqis in exile is likely to be comparable.

Figure 8: 'Forcibly displaced population and proportion of population forcibly displaced', end-2016 (UNHCR, 2017b, p.9)

- *Urban refugees*, because they vastly outweigh camp refugees, but receive comparably little attention by the media, humanitarian agencies and academics. Understanding of their living conditions and insecurities is lacking, also due to their relative invisibility in the urban context (Culbertson et al., 2016).

Figure 9: Proportion of urban vs. in-camp refugees (UNHCR 2016c)

- *Jordan,* because Iraqis and Syrians seek refuge in neighbouring countries, preferably Arab-speaking ones, such as Lebanon and Jordan (Sassoon, 2009). Also, Jordan has been among the ten major refugee-hosting countries for years and ranks second in terms of refugees per capita (UNHCR, 2017b, p.20).

Figure 10: Number of refugees per 1,000 inhabitants, end-2016 (UNHCR, 2017b, p.20)

Our human resources have also influenced this choice. Being arabophone and relatively well-acquainted with the Jordanian context, I disposed of the linguistic and cultural mobility to achieve the desired conversational depth in interactions with the respondents.

4.2 Respondents' characteristics

A total of 23 respondents were interviewed (20 male, 3 female[36]). On average, respondents were 32 years old. 16 of them were married and had 3 children on average. 12 had left school during or after primary school, 7 finished secondary school and 4 had a tertiary education degree.

Education	Primary	Secondary	Tertiary
	12	7	4

Origin	Iraq (N=7)		Syria (N=16)					Total
	Baghdad	Amara	Aleppo	Damascus	Homs	Daraa	Al-Salamiyah	
	6	1	8	2	3	2	1	23

Table 2: Respondents' city of origin and level of education

Respondents arrived in Jordan between 2009 and 2016, most of them (19) between 2012 and 2014. 7 came from Iraq (6 from Baghdad, 1 from the southern city of Amara) and 16 from Syria (8 from Aleppo, 3 from Homs, 2 from Damascus, 2 from Daraa and 1 from Al-Salamiyah, northeast of Homs).

Year of arrival	2009	2010	2011	**2012**	**2013**	**2014**	2015	2016
	2	0	1	**8**	**5**	**6**	0	1

Table 3: Year of respondents' arrival to Jordan

People were contacted directly or through 'gatekeepers' (Saunders, 2006): 2 local and 3 Swiss humanitarian workers as well as one local dentist. In four cases, the gatekeepers were present during the interview. The contact was established through phone calls, text (*WhatsApp*) or social media (*Facebook*)[37].

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[36] The initial objective was to interview men only, given that the interviewer is male and that creating mixed-gender interview situations in the socio-cultural context of the Levant is usually a delicate endeavour. However, gatekeepers sometimes offered to connect the interviewer to female respondents, which he gladly accepted. Also, during many interviews with male respondents, female family members were around and made valuable contributions. In those cases, they were, however, not counted as primary respondents.

[37] The respondents were chosen through personal connections of the interviewer, who had previously spent time working in Jordan.

4.3 Interviews

As McCracken (1998) elegantly suggested, interviews can 'take us into the lifeworld of an individual, to glimpse the categories and logic by which he or she sees the world' (p.9). Given our aspiration of gathering subjective experiences and understandings of security, interviews seemed appropriate for the data collection.

Interviews were semi-structured (Luna Reyes & Anderson, 2003) and conducted by me personally[38]. I used a mind map[39] to orient my questions, but adjusted them based on the respondent's narrative. Respondents were given space to speak freely, tell stories and anecdotes, which I considered crucial for the discovery of novel or counterintuitive aspects of their situation[40].

Each interview started with the observation and question: '*You are in a country different from your home country. What made you leave your home country?*'. This kick-off question prompted respondents to talk about the general and more specific circumstances that made them leave their country. From there, the interview transitioned to their situation in Jordan. For most interviews, it sufficed for me to listen and occasionally ask clarifying questions.

Interviews were conducted in vernacular Arabic, as opposed to literary or standard Arabic, which is officially used in newspapers, on television and in formal contexts. This created a familiar and informal space, which allowed respondents to answer in their mother tongue[41].

Before the interviews in Jordan, one exploratory interview was conducted with an Iraqi refugee in Istanbul[42]. It was used to test the mind map, the form of consent, the interview situation and to get a first impression of the type of narrative that would be provided.

A total of 17 interviews were conducted; 10 of them in July 2016 and 7 in April 2017. Eight interviews were conducted in the capital Amman; One in Marka, a few kilometres outside Amman; seven in the northern city of Mafraq; and one in Manshia, a village close to Mafraq.

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[38] Therefore, in this chapter, the first-person-narrative will be used.

[39] See annex I

[40] Also described by Luna Reyes & Anderson (2003)

[41] The Syrians from a more rural background used expressions that were sometimes unknown to the interviewer. Usually, they would become clear in context. Otherwise, he would ask for clarification or make a note in the transcription.

[42] Initially, interviews were planned in Turkey as well. It was later decided to focus on Jordan only. See annex VIII.

Most interviews (14) were conducted with one respondent only. Three interviews were conducted with two, three and four people respectively[43].

Image 2: Map of Jordan indicating locations of Amman and Mafraq[44]

Most of the interviews (13) were conducted at respondents' homes[45], 3 in public places (coffee place, public park) and 1 at the respondent's workplace. On average, interviews took one hour and 19 minutes. The transcribed interviews comprise over 100'000 words.

Interview city	Amman	Mafraq	Marka	Manshia	Total
	8	7	1	1	17

Table 4: Cities where interviews were conducted

4.4 Transcription and translation

Interviews were recorded using *Philips VoiceTracer*, a small, rather inconspicuous device. The transcription and translation into English were conducted by the interviewer, using *Microsoft Word* and *QuickTime Player*. Where an English translation was not possible, the Arabic expression used was noted. The translation was not literal, but faithful, i.e. attempting to 'produce the precise contextual meaning of the original within the constraints of grammatical

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[43] See full database in annex

[44] Source: http://acc.teachmideast.org/maps/jordan.gif

[45] Often, other family members, like children, were around during the interview.

structures' (Ordudari, 2007). The main objective was the reproduction of narrators' subjective views and feelings as expressed in their mother tongue.

4.5 Analysis

McCracken's (1998) 5-step method of analysis for long interviews, as described by Piercy (2015), is a common approach to make sense of large amounts of qualitative data and can contribute to ensuring that the final product is 'credible and confirmable' (Guba & Lincoln, 1989, pp. 242-243). Although the following steps do not exactly reflect the 5-step method, our analytical procedure was very similar in its essence.

- In a first step, each transcript was carefully read and coded (internal analysis) using *RQDA*[46]. The codes were created in line with the research questions, the existing literature and the content of the respondents' narrations[47]. Passages of text were attributed to codes such as 'work', 'housing' or 'authorities'. Several codes were attributed to the same passage when deemed necessary.

- In a second step, the code outputs (e.g. 'housing issues') across all transcripts were analysed (transversal analysis). This process allowed for the identification of patterns and themes, i.e. 'statement[s] of meaning that [run] through all or most of the pertinent data' (Ely et al., 1991, p. 150).

- In a third step, we proceeded to some basic quantitative assemblage of the collected data in order to gain a better overview of the vast amount of information. An excel sheet was created that assembled the answers of all respondents to recurring questions (e.g. 'why have you left your home country?'), in line with recommendations formulated by Basit (2003)[48].

- In a fourth step, two matrices were created to analyse the answers provided by respondents to the questions 'What made you flee your country?' and 'What are you struggling with in Jordan?'[49]. Two other matrices were built to code the information according to the human security framework (one for the decision to flee and one for the situation in exile. If the respondent mentioned difficulties or insecurities that fit

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[46] R package for Qualitative Data Analysis, http://rqda.r-forge.r-project.org. *RQDA* allows for the creation of codes and code categories, to which segments of texts can be assigned.

[47] See annex IV

[48] see annex V.I

[49] see annex V.II and V.III

into one of the seven aspects of human security, a '1' was inserted into the corresponding cell, otherwise a '0'[50]. The result was an overview[51] of which insecurities and which aspects of human security were most often addressed across all interviews[52]. The Syrians and Iraqis were grouped separately in order to identify differences between their answers.

Most of the time, the aspect was easily identified[53]. For some information, however, the choice was more ambiguous (e.g. 'fearing presence of rebel groups' could be seen as a threat to personal, community or political security). We therefore adapted the definitions provided by UNDP (1994) and developed by (Cao & Wyatt 2016, p. 422) to the context of this research, based on the answers provided by the respondents. This guided and simplified our coding.

Aspect of human security	Definition
Economic Security	No work, unstable income, little or no humanitarian aid, labour exploitation
Food Security	No or little physical and economic access to food, worry about sufficient food, trading food for rent, no or little access to food coupons
Health Security	Difficulty of access to health care, medication, medical aid, treatment
Environmental Security	No or little protection from weather, bad housing, access to clean water, eviction from home, frequent displacement
Personal Security	Attacks on and threats to personal integrity, exposure to violence, fear for personal safety, unlawful detention

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[50] see annex V.IV and V.V

[51] Tables and pie charts were used to visualise the results (see chapter 5)

[52] see chapter 5

[53] e.g. 'difficulty of obtaining medical treatment' means that health security is compromised

Community Security	Feeling targeted or discriminated for being part of a racial, ethnic, national, religious group or sect[54]
Political Security	Fragile legal status, lack of faith in state and rule of law, presence of militias, compromised human rights, inequality before justice, fear of being recruited for military service

- In a fifth and final step, the three main themes for each situation (before flight and during exile) were explicated and illustrated with quotes. The results are presented in the next chapter.

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[54] The internal violence in Iraq has taken a sectarian dimension, opposing those who adhere to a Sunni interpretation of Islam and those who consider themselves as Shia. Iraq is one of the few Shia-majority countries in the world.

5. Results

5.1 Reasons for fleeing

What made you flee your country?

There are, obviously, individual thought processes and motives behind respondents' decision to leave their home country. Across the narratives, however, certain motives (push-factors) appear repeatedly and seem to capture the majority of the answers given to the question 'What made you leave your home country?', which was, as mentioned, the kick-off question in all interviews. What follows is an overview of the number of times each factor was mentioned:

What made you leave your country?	*Total (N=22[55])*	IRAQ 7	SYRIA 15
Loss of faith in rule of law, state authority	*22*	7	15
Crime, gangs, kidnappings, robbery	*19*	6	13
Conflict situation: Bombings, fighting	*15*	0	15
Discrimination based on religion, ethnicity or else	*14*	7	7
Price inflation, loss of work, difficulty to get food	*12*	0	12
Personal attacks and threats	*9*	6	3
Avoiding military service	*5*	0	5
Need for medical treatment or surgery	*2*	0	2

Table 5: Respondents' answers to the question 'What made you leave your country?'

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[55] One respondent did not intend to flee Syria, but came to Jordan for administrative issues.

REASONS FOR FLIGHT - TOTAL (N=22)

Figure 11: Reasons mentioned by respondents for fleeing their home country

REASONS FOR FLIGHT - IRAQIS (N=7)

Figure 12: Reasons Iraqis mention for fleeing their country

REASONS FOR FLIGHT - SYRIANS (N=15)

Figure 13: Reasons Syrians mention for fleeing their country

Internal violence & criminality

The most frequently mentioned reasons for their flight were linked to the threat posed by different forms of internal violence and criminality. Respondents could often not distinguish between the activities of militias or those of criminals. An Iraqi mother describes a situation where the family's car was stopped and controlled by unknown armed men in a market in Baghdad:

> 'In a situation like that [random control by armed men in public places], if they took down one of my kids for example, they could kill him in front of you. What would be your position? Your blood goes for nothing, in a country where you have spent all your life? Why should I give my blood and my son? To people who don't deserve it. After this situation, we got back home and I said, I won't be staying in Iraq anymore. [...] I won't stay in a country like this. If my country doesn't want me, I don't want it!' (Suhayla, Iraq)

Ragheed, a Syrian father of five, also mentions gang activities and criminality as a factor that pushed him to leave his country:

> 'Honestly, we were good there, living a beautiful life. But then, the gangs, and the crimes etc. and the weapons, so I had to flee, mostly because of my children' (Ragheed, Syria)

For Adel, a young Iraqi man, the constant fear and the threats directed at his brother were the tipping point which made them take the decision to leave Iraq in 2013:

> 'Look, if I left the house, after two minutes, my mother would call me and ask where I was. Anything could happen, bombings, kidnappings, a car stops and they arrest you. [...] They threatened Bakr [his brother] ... the gangs. They threatened him with killing him. Then we said, that's it.' (Adel, Iraq)

Finally, a Syrian woman, living in Mafraq with her family, describes a situation where a bus that she and her parents were travelling on, was kidnapped by unknown armed men:

> '15 February 2012. Until now, I remember that situation. Just like that, suddenly they came out of nowhere. And I knew that my country was safe. And suddenly, they told us that they had burned some trains and that there were shots. [...] And I didn't see anything until suddenly guys appeared, armed and carrying weapons [...] I was afraid that they would shoot my father and my mother in front of me. I couldn't imagine this happening in front of me. I died from fear. And they were afraid for me as well. So, they kidnapped the bus, told us to lower our heads. It was at night. [...] They took the guys out first. Whether they kidnapped them, killed them, I don't know [...] As soon as we got home, I told my parents that I would not come back to Syria anymore.' (Maryam, Syria)

Conflict and fighting

The conflict situation was the second most important push-factor. It is distinct from the internal violence and criminality in that it relates to the activities and consequences of the fighting between the parties participating in the conflict (e.g. combat situations, bombings, etc.). These activities usually don't target civilians, but cause 'collateral damage', i.e. the injuring and killing of people not participating in combat. The following quotes illustrate how living in a war zone was the main cause for leaving the country:

> 'Fear, because there were bombings and we wouldn't know where they come from. There were many bombings in the centre, where we were living. And once, the ceiling fell down on us. So, I was afraid for the kids.' (Hayat, Syria)

> 'In the first bombing, 45 people died. The gas station was bombed as well. Maybe 50 people died in our village, which is not next to the gas station. Imagine how many people died on the mountain and next to the gas station. The regime was like crazy, [bombing] until noon, from six in the morning. The planes came and the people started running. I went to the roof, with my brother. We were upset, but I told him 'laugh'. 'Laugh!'. We went to the roof and looked down on the people running. It was a saddening view.' (Laith, Syria)

> 'We were in Damascus, in safety. The revolution started in Daraa, but it was calm in Damascus. For a year maybe. We had friends and family coming over, and then all of a sudden, the bombing and fighting started. We got scared and everyone tried to hide somewhere, some under the bed, others inside. And then we had to leave – they got us a car and we left with it. We fled from our neighbourhood.' (Layla, Syria)

> 'It was the bombing. The bombing. The fear. Everything. Nothing was left. Syria was the mother of safety. We wouldn't lock the main door. Night and day, it was open. That was before. Now, there is horror and fear. Even, if you are neutral, anyone can come and fight you. There is no safety. The country was hit by bombing, destruction, robbery, exploitation…all of the difficulties of the world in Syria!' (Habeeb, Syria)

Loss of faith in rule of law

The third factor that was mentioned most often was a loss of faith in the rule of law and the protection by the state. Respondents explained that they became increasingly suspicious of uniformed men supposed to be representing the state.

> 'I told you that there was a situation where I felt threatened to death. And I thought to myself... I thought of my son, who was a year and a half. I would become one of those numbers that would be forgotten. Someone who is lost and people get up the next morning and eat breakfast. Another day passes. But I would leave a whole family destroyed, without a breadwinner. [...] I was going to a place, outside of Baghdad, in a military vehicle. [...] I mean, I rode with people who were supposed to be imposing the rule of law on others. But then, four or five people stopped us, armed, with long beards, and wearing military pants and asking for our identity! You are asking for my identity? Who are you to do that? Naturally, [...]…those were all militias! So, in that second, I remembered those videos that they show on youtube. I asked myself who they were, sunna, shia, Daesh, AQ? You don't know who they are![56] (Burhan, Iraq)

> 'If I could, I would go back tomorrow to Baghdad. But I can't. If I go back, I will be killed. Now the situation is very, very bad, you can't imagine. The one at the checkpoint himself, you don't know if he is with the army or with the militias. They are wearing the same things. [...] They stop you at the checkpoint, four men checking your trunk. You don't know!' (Maher, Iraq)

Avoiding conscription was mentioned by several Syrians (5) as a reason for fleeing the country[57]. A Syrian man explains that he fled because he was given information that he had been put on a list of men who had to serve in the army, which was distributed to checkpoints.

> 'Someone told me. Of course, he was against the regime, but he had to cooperate with them. He was from the same village. We were 24 men. He told us our names were at the checkpoint. So, we had to flee. Because as soon as your name is published, you can consider yourself killed. And whoever has children, tries to flee with them to the end of the world. So that nothing happens to them. [...] The security, and the regime and the militias that are with the regime. This is what made us flee our country.' (Usama, Syria)

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[56] This last sentence also reveals the difficulty of distinguishing between militias, criminals or government troops (see p.50)

[57] Although this factor is not immediately linked to the crumbling of the rule of law (it is also separate from it in table 5), the quote shows how fear of being conscripted has to do with a loss of faith in the regime and the army.

5.2 Human security: before flight

Read through the lens of human security, the answers provided by the respondents[58] indicate that certain dimensions of HS were more affected than others, when they took the decision to leave their home country. The following table is constructed by coding respondents' answers based on the definitions established in the methodology[59].

Which aspect of Human Security was affected?	Total (N=22[60])	IRAQ 7	SYRIA 15
Political Security	22	7	15
Personal Security	22	7	15
Community Security	14	7	7
Economic Security	8	2	6
Food Security	8	0	8
Environmental Security	6	0	6
Health Security	2	0	2

Table 6: Aspects of human security affected before flight

All respondents who fled their home country did so because of a threat to their political security, most notably a loss of faith in authorities and the state. Threats to or actual attacks on people's personal integrity and safety (i.e. death threats, bombings, criminality) – hence, dangers to personal security – were also mentioned by almost all respondents as reasons for departure. Community insecurity, most often the result of feeling targeted for being part of a religious group (e.g. Christians in Iraq) or for living close to an area where there is outspoken resistance against the government (e.g. Syrians living in the periphery of Aleppo), was the third most affected aspect of human security.

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[58] see 5.1

[59] see 4.5

[60] see footnote 55

HUMAN SECURITY - BEFORE FLIGHT - TOTAL (N=22)

Figure 14: Human security aspects affected before flight

HUMAN SECURITY - BEFORE FLIGHT - IRAQIS (N=7)

Figure 15: Human security aspects affected before flight (Iraqis)

HUMAN SECURITY - BEFORE FLIGHT - SYRIANS (N=15)

Figure 16: Human security aspects affected before flight (Syrians)

5.3 Difficulties in Jordan

What do you struggle with in Jordan?

Respondents answer to the question 'What do you struggle with in Jordan?' are summarised in the table below.

		IRAQ	SYRIA
	N=23	*7*	*16*
What do you struggle with in Jordan?			
Livelihood (Either Work / Humanitarian assistance affected)	*23*	7	16
Humanitarian assistance (insufficient or inexistent, corruption and injustice)	*22*	7	15
Housing (rent issues, (threat of) eviction, breach of contract, frequent displacement, insufficient protection, overcrowding, neighbours)	*21*	6	15
Work (No right to work, possibilities of work, low salary)	*19*	5	14

Health (need for/lack of access to medication, treatment, doctors, had unsuccessful surgery/treatment)	*15*	4	11
Discrimination (verbal harassment, exclusion, rejection, unequal treatment, hostilities)	*14*	2	12
Food (insufficient choice, trading food coupons for cash)	*14*	1	13
Authorities (lack of faith in justice system or authorities, hesitation to report incidents to police, fear of imprisonment, deportation)	*12*	1	11
Legal status (no authorisation, no residency, overstayed visa, fled camp illegally, no work contract, no registration with humanitarian organisation)	*11*	5	6
Exploitation (at work (e.g. non-payment of salary), unfair treatment, exploitation of ignorance or weakness)	*8*	2	6
Environment (access to clean water, protection from extreme conditions)	*4*	1	3
Victimisation (faced violent attack or threats, been detained unlawfully)	*3*	0	3

Table 7: Respondents' answers to the question 'What do you struggle with in Jordan?'

INSECURITIES IN JORDAN - TOTAL (N=23)

Figure 17: Aspects of life in Jordan affected by insecurities, as expressed by respondents

INSECURITIES IN JORDAN - IRAQIS (N=7)

Figure 18 : Aspects of life in Jordan affected by insecurities, as expressed by Iraqis

INSECURITIES IN JORDAN - SYRIANS (N=16)

Figure 19: Aspects of life in Jordan affected by insecurities, as expressed by Syrians

Livelihood

The answers provided indicate that ensuring their livelihood is a concern for all respondents. The livelihood indicator in the table above includes mention of difficulties to either work or humanitarian assistance or both, since they are mentioned in direct relation to insufficiency of financial means. It seemed appropriate to choose this indicator, because it is a concern shared by those who work and those who don't. In what follows, however, difficulties related to work and issues with humanitarian assistance are treated separately.

Work

> 'I was never looking for a place where I could sit down and be fed by others. I want to live in a society where I can get tired and work and sweat and do things. That's all I want.' (Burhan, Iraq)

In line with the quote above, the impression that most respondents gave was that they are willing and able to work. Work-related difficulties were mentioned by 19 of 23 respondents[61]. Especially young men who are willing to work, say that they are frustrated with the

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[61] It should be noted that of the 3 females in the sample, only one talked about work issues that affected her husband. Two male respondents said that they cannot work due to health issues. Hence, *all* respondents who were either working or looking for work expressed work-related concerns.

labour legislation. Iraqis need a residency permit to work and Syrians a work permit, which is difficult to obtain. Respondents lament being unable to look after themselves or provide for their families, which results in them being socially stuck and dependent upon humanitarian aid. Some respondents are working on a voluntary basis, to stay active or practice their skills, get in touch with society and feel useful, or because they hope to be remunerated after some time working for free.

> 'The idea that I cannot work, just because I am Iraqi, is difficult to accept. That's something that hurts. You are a young man, 28 years old, you want to work. I mean, also not to lose the medical skills that I have acquired. [...] So, that's what makes me want to leave Jordan. I don't have any freedom here, and no future.' (Muneer, Iraq)

> 'The most difficult country to live in! First of all, it's expensive. And then, forget about the work opportunities, forget about them! Unless you know someone, who can help you. And even then, they only give you the work permit if you have a frozen amount on the bank. [...] For the work permit, you need 15,000 dollars. And you have to freeze them. If I had that much, I would flee from this country No, the work thing is very difficult here.' (Maher, Iraq)

> 'So, the most difficult thing is the money. Work, you can't work, because they will tell you, you don't have a permit. A work permit, specific to each profession! I am a builder for example, you want to go work on the field, you need a specific permit!' (Omar, Syria)

> We don't want anything. Just let us work, so we can provide for ourselves. Just allow us to do that. Because it's a psychological suffering – it's like a prison! (Abdelrahman, Syria)

> 'All I want is to work in dignity. I don't want anyone to take care of me. I can work in anything. I don't want to take from anyone... 'can I have some cigarettes?', I want to take from myself.' (Samer, Syria)

Some have also faced discrimination when looking for work. As this Syrian teacher, living in Mafraq, reports:

> 'The most difficult thing is that I cannot work in my profession, as a teacher. Whenever I go apply for jobs, I swear, these people, [...] they are not qualified. The organisations are focusing on pretty girls! If she's pretty, she's employed. If she's good, they keep her. If not, they get someone else. (Laith, Syria)

Those who did work, reported difficult working conditions, low salaries and bad treatment:

> 'In the summer, we would work in the fields. We would leave at 6 AM and come back at 1 PM. They would give us 6 JD per day. Just two or three months in the summer. Then, I go out in the winter and collect bread. Hard bread that you find on the street, next to containers. I would sell bags of 'crispy' bread. For 1 JD or so. It was just enough to survive.' (Usama, Syria)

> 'Honestly, I won't find anything better than that. I have to keep it. Since I have to work. The work I do here [play station café] is great, but over there, in the factory,

> their treatment is bad, but I have to endure it.[62] [...] The employers are bad. The salary I get is less, but the pressure and the workload is higher. [...] I mean, I work the same, but my salary is less. Much less. It's about 275. They get 350 and more. At least 350! Some get 500, 600...' (Ameen, Syria)

Many respondents reported working illegally, which puts a lot of pressure on them at the workplace. They fear controls by the government, because they could lead to their deportation. Also, working illegally exposes them to various forms of exploitation, such as non-payment of salary, salary dumping and long working hours, and discourages them from reporting incidents to the police. Of the 10 respondents working, 8 had experienced some form of labour exploitation.

> 'Of course. When I work, I am vigilant. I am checking. As soon as they [inspectors] arrive, I have to run. [...] They've never caught me. Once they got really close, but I jumped the fence. They saw me leave through the door, so they followed me. But I escaped. The problem is that this makes you feel like you are doing something really wrong. Like you are here illegally. But the real problem is that you can't get a work permit.' (Ameen, Syria)

> 'For example, I want to go work. The work would be worth 100 or 150 JD for example. He would say, I will pay you afterwards. When you're done with the work, you tell him to give you the money, they say they can't. What can you do? You can't do anything. You can't report him.' (Omar, Syria)

> 'No, that time, the owner didn't pay me. He took the salary I was entitled to. But I can't say anything, because I don't have a work permit. Although, if I report him, he will be punished for employing me illegally.' (Ayman, Iraq)

Finally, some expressed frustration with the fact that their work is entrenching them in a position of immobility. They feel like they are spending their days working without getting anything in return beyond their salary. Ameen expresses this feeling persuasively:

> 'Here, my life... I would say, it's frozen, stopped. You are standing on the same spot, not moving. It's like they'd say…you are living every day to pay your day. Your rent, you have to pay it. Your food, you pay for it. There is nothing you can save. No way to develop. You're at the same spot. Your life is stuck. I don't feel like I can develop myself. I like sports, I like reading. But I don't feel like I can progress. For example, I like reading English. Had I had the chance, I would have studied English. And sports, I would be training. I am just turning in a circle. Work – Home. Work – home. As they say, you stay where you are. Not a single step forward.' (Ameen, Syria)

Humanitarian assistance

For Iraqi refugees, humanitarian aid is difficult to obtain. All Iraqi respondents are living on their savings or engage in informal work. Former beneficiaries reported that their support

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[62] Ameen was working two jobs at the same time: at the café in the evening and at the factory during the day.

from UNHCR was cut without proper justification. 12 respondents, all Syrians, reported re-
ceiving monthly assistance from UNHCR, between 40 and 190 JD, although it has been di-
minishing recently. Syrians in Mafraq further receive food coupons, which they depend upon
heavily. In contrast to the literature, food does seem to be a common preoccupation, since
food vouchers are considered insufficient. The Iraqi refugees in the sample do not receive any
coupons.

14 respondents think that the UN and other aid organisations are either corrupt (misuse of
funds, discrimination, etc.) or not sufficiently competent to distinguish between honest and
dishonest refugees (people providing inaccurate information about their possessions and fi-
nancial means).

> 'If you want me to tell you the biggest problems? It's the housing problem and the
> problem with the charity organisations! So, these things you should write about.
> The charity organisations are thieves! The only organisation that is respectful and
> that helps the people, is the charity *Bshara*. […] In the other charities, there is
> fraud and cheating and theft.' (Yassin, Syria)

> 'They are Syrians, they were employed to work there, because the one who is
> building is a Syrian from Saudi Arabia. What annoys me is that they all get sup-
> port and assistance. That's what I have seen with my own eyes. And they get way
> more than me. Although they have enough.' (Laith, Syria)

> 'Why does a person get 10 JD and another 20 JD? What's the difference between
> them? For example, we have two kids. Me and my wife, we get 40JD. There are
> two people who get 40 JD. But the 40 JD [...] are never enough for milk and pam-
> pers!' (Yasser, Syria)

Housing

5 respondents, all Syrians, reported spending between 2 days and 3 months in the Zaatari
camp when they first arrived in Jordan. Because of the difficult living conditions and crimi-
nality there, they decided to leave the camp. Apart from one person who got bailed out legal-
ly by a Jordanian relative, all did so illegally. Housing-related difficulties also take different
forms. The most frequently mentioned problem were expensive rents.

> 'The most difficult thing is finding a place to live. The rents are very high, you
> can't find homes. It's the most difficult thing. For them also, it got more expen-
> sive, for the Jordanians. It's not like in Syria, here it is very expensive.' (Layla,
> Syria)

> 'The problem here was the rent. It was really expensive. A house like this, you
> couldn't have it for less than 150 JD. And the assistance is 120 JD. So, it's not
> enough.' (Habeeb, Syria)

> 'Once you make sure you have the amount needed for the rent, you can say
> *alhamdillah*. Because you can eat for 1JD or 20 JD. But as to the rent, there is no

mercy. When the time comes, you have to pay. And you have to go ask people for money. This one 5, this one 10. I always indebt myself.' (Usama, Syria)

Respondents reported that landlords are relentless when it comes to payment of the rent. They are continuously worrying about being able to pay the rent at the end of each month.

'But here, 27th or 28th of the month, he will be knocking on your door. For the rent of the next month. He doesn't wait. It's a big problem. That, we suffer from most. It's the rent. The house that was 50, is 150 now. [...] you tell them you can't pay and they say, 'I don't care'. If I tell you, I can give you 50 now, but will pay the rest. He says 'now'. He wants the whole amount at once.' (Usama, Syria)

'If the rent is 200 JD, and you get 100 JD. What can you do with them? And your food and water? You want to go buy a biscuit, and you have 10 kids, each biscuit is 1 JD. And after half an hour, an hour, they say they want a juice. I have 7,8…this one wants a biscuit, this one a juice…can I buy for everyone? It doesn't work! Then go to the bakery get bread, for 1 JD, you get home, it is finished. And I mean 3,4 JD…and then the gas, the electricity, the water…and the landlord. At the beginning of the month, he is at your doorstep! Before you even put your foot inside the house, he asks for the rent.' (Abdelrahman, Syria)

'And then the house, you need to manage to pay the rent before food and water. We could live on anything, but the landlord comes at the beginning of the month and wants the rent. And the landlord is not generous, he doesn't let a piaster go through.' (Hayat, Syria)

Seven respondents have been forced to leave their homes, either for being unable to pay the rent in due time or because the landlord breached the contract.

'The weather was cold, it was snowing. Then he said he wanted the house back. I said, our contract was one year. Then I said, ok, but give me at least 15 days. He said, 'no, I won't wait for 15 days'. The neighbours were saying 'don't leave, he doesn't have the right to throw you out'. I said, 'I am not a son of this country'. I mean, I can't report him, if I report him, maybe he'll send some people for me. I mean what should I do? It's better to leave in dignity.' (Ragheed, Syria)

'I overran the rent by 5 days. He was a good man to let me stay a bit longer. But then he said, that if I wanted to pay the rest of the month I could stay, otherwise I had to leave. I said, you have my ID, wait a month or two, as soon as God eases the situation, I will pay you. But then I left. I mean, he let us at least 5 days more. Then I came here, to live with my parents.' (Yasser, Syria)

Another reason that made me leave, because at the beginning I had agreed with the landlord on a certain rent. We had agreed on 110, but then he wanted 130. (Laith, Syria)

Respondents also reported that their homes were in a bad state and that landlords refused to do anything about it and pressured them to stay and pay the rent. Problems with neighbours seem to be common as well.

'So, I rented that small place for 150 JD, I had to when I came here. I couldn't stay with nobody else. It was a bakery! So, a lot of insects, full of them. I put up with it for two or three months.' (Hayat, Syria)

> 'Even here, this was a big hall. Not made to be lived in anyway. The height is 5 meters. There are insects and big rats. Because of the canals. So, life is bad here.' (Usama, Syria)

> 'He took a 3 months advance payment. In the winter, everything started rotting. And insects ... so after 2 months, I said I had to leave. 'Please give me back the month I've paid already'. He said 'find me a lessee and you'll get your month back. If you don't find anyone, I can't reimburse you.' (Nasser, Iraq)

> 'My neighbours are loud; the street is close. The neighbours play loud music. My mother is annoyed by this a lot. You tell them to please turn it down. They would do so for a while and then turn it up again. And then we stopped asking them. We got fed up.' (Ameen, Syria)

> 'I wanted to leave and the landlord said that I had to stay for a year. I had told him to come fix some things and he didn't. How could I stay in a rotting flat? Why? After a month or two, I couldn't take it anymore and left. That's the worst thing. And even in the end, he insisted. Finally, I consoled him with a small amount.' (Burhan, Iraq)

The various issues with housing force respondents to move frequently, which causes additional stress.

> 'In the beginning, it was very hard. I found it difficult to move around all the time. And even from one workplace to another, it always takes you about one month to learn how everything works. I suffered a lot in the beginning. And who wants a house, with five children, is refused.' (Ragheed, Syria)

> It's annoying to change a lot. Because there is nowhere you can relax really. And you are not in your country. Back home, I could go out and laugh with everyone. Here, I cannot do this. Here, we have to change from one place to another. (Hayat, Syria)

Discrimination and hostilities

Even though 'only' half of the respondents expressed concerns related to this aspect, we think it is worth being highlighted, particularly because of the strong negative impact it has on those affected. 14 respondents said that they experienced discrimination: 13 because of their nationality (apart from 1 Iraqi and 1 Syrian-Palestinian, all Syrians) and 1 because of his religion (Christian Iraqi).

> 'The mere fact that they call you out for being Syrian all the time... [...] clients and the employer as well. The Jordanian people don't accept you among them, because you're not doing anything for them. But I think we're doing something for them. When I see someone, I greet them warmly. But they respond coldly, they treat you in a bad way.' (Ameen, Syria)

Many respondents reported being subjected to verbal harassments on the street or in the neighbourhood, being discriminated against when asking for housing and tricked by taxi

drivers or landlords. One respondent was tricked by a member of the landlord's family who offered him a ride to the mall, just to take advantage of his food coupon.

> 'He came up to me and asked whether I wanted to go to the mall. I said, there is not much left, maybe 60 JD, on the coupon. [We went] and he entered the mall before me! Although he said he would stay in the car. He took bags of sugar, [...] bags of rice [...] He said, 'one more or less doesn't change much, right, brother?'. [...] We left and he had used about 16 JDs! [Then] he asked me to offer him that amount, for driving me to the mall. The taxi to the mall and back is 1 JD! [...] I said, in my whole lifetime, I will not repeat this mistake! I mean, he took 16 JD of the 60 JD I had [...] This is called exploitation! The control over the poor and the needy. Just because you can control me, you do this? This is humiliation. He undressed me publically, so to say! I didn't say anything. But I was exploding.' (Abdelrahman, Syria)

These hostilities are a major source of insecurity. Physical abuse or attacks were reported in three cases. Two respondents reported arbitrary and unjustified detentions.

> 'They imprisoned him for seven days. We went to find out where he was. They made us pay to see him. Although they don't need the money. We left Syria for this? To lose him again? We had never been to a court in Syria. Here we went to court, to prison. And we saw him, it was obviously injustice.' (Layla, Syria)

> 'They told me they had someone. I went and there was no one there. I was imprisoned for twelve days. It felt like 12 or 13 years. My whole life in Syria I didn't go to prison. Even inside the prison, there is a lot of racism. They made me work in the toilet, clean the beds, under the beds. Because I am Syrian. So, I would have to do everything. They are racist. The Jordanian prisoner doesn't work. He would get razor blades, the Syrians wouldn't. Nothing. Most of the food they get it for free and we have to pay for it. Twelve days were like twelve years.' (Omar, Syria)

However, actual victimisation is no prerequisite for generating feelings of insecurity. The hostile treatment is enough for these refugees to feel unsafe.

> *'Alhamdillah*, there are not too many pressures in the sense that someone would attack me. But at the same time, you don't feel safe, because the people here don't accept you. Nobody likes you here. So, you feel unsafe, in a way. Because the people don't want you. That's why you go from home to work and back. So, I don't mingle with people on the street. I come here and go back home. If I go out on the street, it's when it's empty. Just like that, I wouldn't go out. We don't like to mingle.' (Ameen, Syria)

Only 8 of 23 respondents said that they would report a violent incident. Many assume that Jordanians would be treated more favourably by the law anyway and that legal entanglements could jeopardise their eligibility for resettlement or lead to their deportation.

> 'No, we can't [report them]. I think they will send us away, deport us immediately. And my husband, if he goes back to Syria, he will be arrested as well. They are looking for him there.' (Layla, Syria)

> 'They asked why [their resettlement offer was withdrawn] and the UN told them that their name was registered with the police. That was the problem. I mean, ok, she was the one who was harmed! But because she reported, she was registered with the police. So, from hearing this, we started to be afraid [to report to the police].' (Nasser, Iraq)

The resulting feeling of injustice is metaphorically summarised by Omar:

> 'No, there is no justice. You know, on the courts buildings, there is the scale [Libra]. You look at it, the two platforms are at the same height. It would be better if one side was lower! Because there is no justice here.' (Omar, Syria)

5.4 Human security: in exile

Respondents' answers coded according to our definitions of the different aspects of HS[63] provide the following overview:

	Total (N=23)	IRAQ 7	SYRIA 16
Which aspect of Human Security is affected in Jordan?			
Economic Security	*23*	7	16
Political Security	*20*	4	16
Health Security	*17*	5	12
Environmental Security	*15*	2	13
Food Security	*14*	1	13
Community Security	*14*	2	12
Personal Security	*3*	0	3

Table 8: Human security in exile

Respondents' narratives indicate that the most affected aspect of human security of their lives in Jordan is economic security. This insecurity is mainly due to the absence of a stable source of income linked to an inability to work, an insufficient salary or no to little humanitarian aid received. Political security is the second most affected aspect, mainly because of respondents' fragile legal status and little faith in authorities and the justice system. Third, the difficulty of accessing health care (e.g. medication, treatment, surgery) and the experience of failed surgeries[64] are common threats to health security.

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[63] see 4.5

[64] For instance, one respondent said that she lost her husband to a wrong blood transfusion at the hospital.

HUMAN SECURITY - IN EXILE - TOTAL (N=23)

Personal Security, 3
Community Security, 14
Economic Security, 23
Food Security, 14
Political Security, 20
Environmental Security, 15
Health Security, 17

Figure 20: Human security in exile

HUMAN SECURITY - IN EXILE - IRAQIS (N=7)

Community Security, 2
Food Security, 1
Environmental Security, 2
Economic Security, 7
Health Security, 5
Political Security, 6

Figure 21: Human security in exile (Iraqis)

HUMAN SECURITY - IN EXILE - SYRIANS (N=16)

Figure 22: Human security in exile (Syrians)

6. Discussion

6.1 Reasons for flight

Respondents' reasons for fleeing are diverse and rarely due to one single factor, which corresponds to Sirkeci's (2005) point of refugee flows being a 'complicated human movement'. Reading the motivations through the framework of 'forced migration' (Barmaki, 2009)[65] shows that all factors apart from the last one (development projects) have, at least partial, explanatory value. The predominant factor is, however, 'war, genocide, political persecution'. This is not surprising, since all of our respondents fit the UN definition of 'refugees' which requires a 'well-founded fear of persecution'. It is important to note that direct victimisation, i.e. physical harm, as a reason for flight has been mentioned by one respondent only. This is in line with what Westermeyer & Williams (1998) have observed.

The Iraqi and Syrian conflict being different in nature today (Syria being in an ongoing conflict and Iraq more in a post-conflict situation), it is not surprising to find differences between respondents' answers. All Syrians left, at least partly, because of the conflict situation, while this did not apply to Iraqis. On the other hand, all Iraqis expressed loss of faith in the rule of law and the authority of the state, which is likely to be due to Iraq's civil war and post-conflict situation, where the activities of state and those of non-state actors are increasingly blurred and where there is popular disenchantment with the state's failure to provide security (Green & Ward, 2009). This applied to half of the Syrian respondents only. And while almost all (6) Iraqis fled because of a threat or attack targeting them personally, this was the case for only 3 Syrian respondents. On the other hand, fear of being conscripted, inflation and the unavailability of work were motivations specific to the Syrian situation. In sum, Syrians fled from a more heterogeneous and general insecurity, while Iraqis fled mainly because of personal attacks by gangs, criminals or militias, discrimination and the loss of faith in the rule of law[66].

6.2 Insecurities in exile

In exile, a salient challenge to refugees' security is their hampered ability to ensure their livelihood. The difficulties related to the legal restrictions placed upon refugees correspond to the

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[65] See 3.5

[66] The reader is invited to compare figures 12 and 13 (see 5.1), which illustrate this difference well.

results provided by UNHCR, the different NGOs, the ILO and Achilli (2015). However, certain aspects, such as discrimination when looking for work and at the workplace, different forms of labour exploitation[67] and the extent of psychological suffering (e.g. feeling 'stuck'), are not mentioned in those reports. This lacuna could be due to those organisations' preoccupation with the provision of humanitarian assistance and livelihood opportunities to the *most* vulnerable. Those who have been able to find work are likely to be considered less vulnerable and their work-related struggles less urgent. Given the weight of these struggles in respondents' narratives, however, we suggest that there is space and need to conduct research in this area.

The extent of humanitarian assistance that respondents receive mirrors the results provided by the literature. Allegations of corruption and inequality of distribution are also frequently mentioned, which is in line with what Culbertson et al. (2016) have suggested. One important aspect, however, is not mentioned *per se*, but reveals itself manifestly in the bias of the discussed reports, which focus almost exclusively on Syrian refugees: Iraqi urban refugees are neglected when it comes to financial assistance. They depend entirely on savings, remittances and the earnings from illegal work (IRIN, 2013).

The literature's highlighting of shelter issues (NRC, 2015; CARE, 2014) seems justified in light of our research findings. Shelter-related difficulties are a common feature of the lived experience of our respondents; expensive rents, pressure by the landlord, bad housing conditions and the stress of frequent displacement are all factors that make it difficult for urban refugees to find a safe home where they can be at peace.

While the literature mentions tensions between refugees and the host community, it does not develop how they translate into the everyday experience of urban refugees. Our results show that negative sentiments held by the host community have tangible ramifications for refugees' well-being and impact negatively on their feelings of security. It would be worthwhile to dedicate more attention to this aspect of urban refugees' lived experience, especially because a hostile attitude may be indirectly or inherently supportive of various forms of discrimination, violence and injustice that target refugees. It is further worrisome that refugees fear reporting to the authorities and that they accept their predicament: several respondents said that they were not a 'son of this country' (*ibn al balad*) and, therefore, not entitled to the

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[67] Labour exploitation is usually discussed in relation to child labour.

same rights as Jordanians[68]. These tensions also push them to isolate themselves (19 of 23 respondents indicate that they 'don't mingle' with Jordanians), which is likely to exacerbate, rather than alleviate, frictions between urban refugees and the host community.

Relative security

In sum, Sirkeci's (2007) suggestion that refugees' security in exile is 'relative' becomes all too clear from our results. While the respondents are, in principle, glad to benefit from the rule of law and a functioning state, they all express different forms of insecurity related to their living situation in Jordan. The following quote captures this dimension of 'relative security' well:

> '[The situation in Jordan] is *not bad*, because I can go and come back home and find my children safe. You can go out at night, buy groceries. Nobody bothers you. That's the first thing. Then, if you look at Lebanon and Syria, Turkey in the camps…here, there are possibilities to breathe, to go to Amman, Mafraq…nobody bothers you. If you don't cause problems, nobody hurts you. If you are a young respectful man, respect yourself, you will impose your respect on others. ...
>
> Why *not good*? Because the kids don't have a future. I want to put them in kindergarten, it's 900 JD per year. In a private kindergarten. At school, they take 1000 JD. Public school, they can go there in the afternoon. So, their future is bad here.' (Habeeb, Syria)

Also, the insecurity of these urban refugees comprises elements reminiscent of Bauman's (1999) definition of 'insecurity'[69]: 'the loss of trust in one's own ability and other people's intentions' (p.17) shows in respondents' mistrust towards authorities and humanitarian organisations; and 'anxiety' and 'cageyness' manifest themselves, for example, in respondents' tendency to isolate themselves and their reluctance to contact the police.

6.3 Human security

Analysing the insecurities of these urban refugees, including the aspects that made them become refugees in the first place, through the lens of HS leads to the following observations.

To begin with, refugees' human *in*security is all-encompassing. The diagrams[70] illustrate clearly how 'generalised' the insecurity of urban refugees in our sample is. All aspects of

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[68] 'It's not your country! You are a foreigner, a stranger. We have a saying: 'You stranger, be polite' (*Ya ghareeb, koon adeeb*). You are stranger, whatever happens.' (011AMMI)

[69] see 3.1

[70] see 5.2 and 5.4

human security, apart from personal security, concern most respondents, when they are in exile. At the moment of departure, it is the human security of Syrians that is affected more globally. Iraqis all left their country, almost exclusively, because of threats to political, personal and community security. It becomes clear that, depending on the stage of respondents' journey, different aspects of HS are affected.

Context-specific

At the source of respondents' desire to flee their country were mainly challenges to their personal, political and community security. These are aspects that are associated with notions of 'hard security', such as threats to physical integrity and fear from violence. Threats to environmental, economic, health or food security were present, but did not seem to be dominating respondents' ultimate decision to flee.

When it comes to their human *in*security in Jordan, one can observe an inversion in respondents' prioritisation of security aspects. Personal and community security fade into the background. Syrians and Iraqis who leave their countries seeking security from the conflicts and their repercussions, seem to *find that kind of security* in Jordan. However, beyond that 'narrow' human security, economic, environmental, health and food insecurity become overriding concerns in their situation in exile.

From this, we can deduce that HS before exile corresponds more closely to the 'narrow' understanding of HS, while it is a 'broad' understanding of HS that imposes itself when it comes to respondents' situation in Jordan[71].

Interrelatedness

The HS lens further highlights the interrelatedness of security aspects. Urban refugees' economic insecurity, e.g. their inability to obtain a reasonable income, has immediate repercussions on other components of human security such as health security (inability to afford proper treatment), environmental security (inability to afford safe accommodation), and food security (inability to buy sufficient and healthy food and temptation to sell food vouchers for non-food items or services or rent). This corresponds to an earlier mentioned attribute of human security: 'The components of human security are interdependent' (UNDP, 1994, p.

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[71] see 3.3

22)[72]. This interrelatedness is an argument against rigid categorisation and in line with what Gasper & Gómez (2015) say about HS:

> 'Except for bureaucratic or academic ease, there is little reason to consider any value area in isolation. Indeed, the 1994 HDR did not present the list of seven[73] as the sole or sufficient way to think about human security. It warned that the categories link, overlap and do not cover all relevant issues. (p.102)

Threats

Alkire (2003) ascribed various characteristics to HS threats: they are 'critical' and 'pervasive'; direct or indirect; idiosyncratic or covariant[74]. The threats that are mentioned by respondents can all be regarded as 'critical' and 'pervasive'. Whether it is the conflict or post-conflict situation, the pressure of ensuring the money for the rental payment, food or medical treatment, the threats are severely affecting respondents' lives and shaping their everyday struggles (i.e. critical) as well as recurring in nature (i.e. pervasive).

At both stages of analysis, the threats faced by Syrians tend to be indirect and covariant, rather than direct and idiosyncratic. In very few cases, respondents mentioned threats that targeted them or their household personally, but generally speaking, they were affected by the consequences of actions that were producing a general environment of insecurity. For instance, the conflict situation and the state's belligerent activities were not directed at them, but were inherent to their decision to flee. Similarly, the lack of humanitarian assistance, restrictive labour laws, and the hostile attitude of the host community contribute to creating an exasperating living situation, from which respondents suffer, albeit indirectly. Rarely, however, they seem to be targeted specifically and personally. The threats that Iraqis face are of similar nature, i.e. indirect and covariant, in their situation in exile. Their decision to flee, however, seems to have been strongly influenced by threats that were direct and idiosyncratic: 6 of 7 received death threats and experienced direct discrimination and attacks.

Practicality of HS

Using HS as a framework of analysis for the collected data proved to be vague in some respects. If one compares the HS analysis before flight and during exile[75], it can be observed

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[72] see 2.2

[73] see 2.3

[74] see 2.3

[75] Compare 5.2 and 5.4

that political security remains among the top three aspects most affected. It is, however, not the same political insecurity that affects respondents. In their home country, political insecurity was created by suspicion towards the state – because of its belligerent activities directed at citizens – and the blurring of state and non-state actors engaged in the conflict or random controls of citizens. In exile, however, political insecurity is mostly due to their fragile legal status and their lack of faith in authorities and the justice system. Clumping such diverse aspects under the label of 'political insecurity' obscures the subtleties and complexities of the threats to political security.

More importantly, conflating such subtleties is likely to hamper effective policymaking, since different policies are appropriate for different threats. For instance, struggling to earn a livelihood because of restrictive labour laws necessitates policies improving urban refugees' legal situation, while such policies are unlikely to be an effective way of addressing the consequences of price inflation caused by conflict, or the discriminatory practices of humanitarian organisations. Ensuring economic security, in this case, should take different forms in terms of policy. When using the HS framework, it is therefore vital to consider the context and find ways of highlighting hidden subtleties. If necessary, the list of seven should be expanded to include aspects that are relevant to a specific situation. Otherwise, HS risks being of little pertinence to policymakers who are looking for ways to improve the situation of urban refugees.

Nevertheless, the framework is appropriate for bringing the analysis of security down to the individual level. In fact, it becomes clear from our results that living in a secure country, which Jordan is, does not mean that individuals living in this country *are,* themselves, secure. The various struggles of urban refugees in Jordan clearly reveal a situation of human *in*security, despite the country's strong security apparatus, which respondents themselves acknowledge[76]. The broadening of security performed by HS captures the diversity of this human insecurity, by acknowledging aspects that go beyond threats to urban refugees' physical integrity. It is important to distinguish here between the 'narrow' and 'broad' views on human security (Tadjbakhsh, 2013): While a narrow understanding (i.e. focusing on personal security) would lead to the conclusion that Syrian and Iraqi urban refugees in Jordan are safe,

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[76] For example: 'It's nice, better than Iraq! They have order, they have security. Something we have been missing for over 10, 11, 12 years! We have lost it. Here there is security, rule of law that protects you. If you are a citizen of this country, the law protects you.' (Ayman, Iraq); 'Yes, security there is. More than there.' (Ragheed, Syria); 'Yes, security, there is security. And other than that, nothing.' (Khalid, Syria); 'Here, the situation is much better. Here, we are safe.' (Hayat, Syria)

a broad understanding (i.e. considering all aspects of HS as being of equal importance) shows that they are clearly unsafe.

In sum, HS provides a useful and multifaceted lens for the analysis of the situation of Iraqi and Syrian urban refugees in Jordan, including the reasons that caused them to flee their country, provided that the context and subtleties are taken into account and the categories understood as being flexible and interrelated.

6.4 Implications for our understanding of security

What implications does this analysis of HS in the case of Syrian and Iraqi urban refugees have for our understanding, or conceptualisation, of security?

First, the human insecurity of urban refugees in Jordan is better understood as 'uncertainty' and 'insecurity', going back to Bauman's (1999) trilogy. While 'unsafety' was the reason why respondents fled their country, their situation in Jordan can be considered as 'safe'. However, their narratives reveal that despite being safe from existential threats to their physical integrity, they suffer from *insecurity* 'of position, entitlements, and livelihood' (Jacobsen, 2016, p.105) and from *uncertainty* 'as to their continuation and future stability' (p.105). Hence, their situation in exile is clearly shaped by 'Unsicherheit' in Bauman's words. In fact, Bauman's trilogy might offer a more convincing tool to grasp the insecurity of our respondents than the concept of human security.

Second, this implies that *objectively*, these urban refugees are secure (i.e. 'safe') in Jordan, while *subjectively*, they are not (i.e. 'insecure' and 'uncertain'). Their feelings of insecurity are not produced by a fear of physical victimisation: respondents express faith in the security that the Jordanian state provides in this respect. Their feelings of insecurity can be captured in subjective terms only, which, to reiterate Tadjbakhsh's (2013) suggestion, 'requires qualitative assessment of how people 'feel' secure' (p.45). It is precisely the qualitative approach adopted in this paper that allowed for these insecurities to surface.

Third, as mentioned before, the insecurities of urban refugees invite us to think human security in a *broad,* rather than a *narrow* sense. The threats to their security touch on all aspects of HS and reducing it to a narrow understanding would mean choosing to be oblivious to the reality of urban refugees' everyday security experiences.

Consequently, this analysis invites us to 'securitise', i.e. answer the question 'security from what?', the way 'wideners' do, rather than 'traditionalists'[77] (Šulović, 2010). The threats to respondents' security in Jordan do not emanate from military sources, but from their struggle with economic, environmental and societal factors. 'Traditionalists'' focus on hard security is ill-suited to understand threats to the security of individuals affected by the repercussions of 'new wars' (Kaldor, 2013).

Finally, when it comes to criminology's engagement with security, the preceding observations lead us to conclude that 'fear of crime' is not merely 'fear' of 'crime' (De Donder et al., 2009, p.14). Individuals feel insecure even though they, generally speaking, feel protected from crime.

By including the voices of human beings, who are directly affected by perilous security environments, concerning their everyday security practices and experiences, we aimed to gain a better understanding of what security looks like from 'below'. The insights derived from our analysis of 'security from below' impose a *flexible*, rather than *restrictive*, understanding of security on all levels of the dichotomous understandings mentioned earlier[78].

6.5 Limitations

The reader is advised to keep the following limitations in mind when analysing the results and discussions in this paper.

Sample-related limitations

The people who referred me to urban refugees were working in Jordan and having personal connections to refugees, some through their work in the humanitarian field. I did attempt randomly contacting people, in urban areas where refugees are known to reside, e.g. North Hashem in Amman. After these attempts proved unsuccessful, he decided to stick to contacting people through gatekeepers[79]. Some respondents also connected us to other refugees. The unfortunate consequence of this method was that there were similarities between some of our respondents regarding their socio-economic background and trajectory. Given the limited timeframe, in which interviews took place and the difficulties of recruiting respondents, it was difficult to fully guarantee internal diversification of the sample (Michelat, 1975). Also,

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[77] see 3.1

[78] see 3.4

[79] see annex VII

the weather in Jordan during both interview rounds was warm. It is likely that conducting these interviews in the winter would have influenced our results (e.g. more frequent mention of shelter-related insecurities or issues with overcrowding).

Interview-related limitations

Conducting field research with refugees requires a thorough moral, ethical and methodological awareness on the researcher's side. It has been noted that the research process in a delicate environment has the potential to transform the very phenomenon it is meant to study (Block, Carr, Ribbs & Gibbs, 2013). The research should therefore be conducted in a way that is as least disruptive of the everyday life of the participants as possible. I made sure to engage in a continuous and documented process of self-reflection about my position as a researcher in the field[80]. I also tried to conduct the interviews in a way that made respondents feel at ease and allowed them to freely express their opinions.

When conducting research with potentially vulnerable people, there is a risk of a power dynamic setting in, especially because the researcher is likely to dictate the framework and the course of the encounter (Block et al., 2013). By adopting a semi-directed approach and creating a conversational environment, I believe that I managed to limit this asymmetry of power. Furthermore, by adopting a posture of a student who is eager to learn more about the situation of urban refugees, I was actually on the receiving end, and felt like they were 'teaching' me about their experiences[81].

Obtaining informed consent has been identified as a methodological challenge specific to so-called 'developing' regions, particularly with regards to interviewee's literacy (Block et al., 2013). Several respondents in our sample, especially those living in poorer parts of the urban setting, were unable to read the consent form[82]. Aware that this may arise as an issue, I asked in the beginning whether the person could read or not, making it clear that the ability to read was not taken for granted. When the respondent answered negatively, I would explain the consent form in detail or ask another member of the family to read it out loud. While the form was written in formal Arabic, the oral explanation was in vernacular Arabic.

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[80] see annex III

[81] It is hard to tell how respondents felt about this particular aspect, but the interviewer got the impression, based on their confident attitude and openness in sharing their stories, that respondents did indeed assume the role of 'teachers'.

[82] see annex II

Researchers agree that the research process should be beneficial to the participant. Some go as far as advocating that it is immoral not to provide help and assistance to the interviewee merely for the sake of scientific objectivity (Block et al., 2013). Several participants pointed out that talking about their experiences and having someone listening to them felt 'therapeutic'. If anything, this was the benefit that I could provide. I made clear to each participant that I was an independent student and not a potential source of aid.

Since most gatekeepers had helped interviewees one way or another during their stay in Jordan, their participation in the interview was seen by some as a way of returning a favour, which could have compromised the quality of the interaction with the interviewer. Generally speaking, however, participants who were contacted through gatekeepers were engaged and ready to share their experiences. During some interviews, gatekeepers were present. It is likely that their presence affected the behaviour and answers of the interviewee. Fortunately, the gatekeepers remained very low-key and did not disturb the interview.

Despite the above-mentioned efforts, it is possible that respondents' narratives were partially biased by inhibition or by a desire to present themselves in a particular light[83]. Narratives should, anyway, not be expected to always accurately mirror the reality of the narrator's experience, but ought to be understood as an instrument providing a window into his or her subjective worldview.

Analysis-related limitations

In our analysis, we pursued a thorough and rigorous system in order to do justice to the wealth and depth of the collected data[84]. During the coding process, we developed labels based on our reading of the data and the literature available. However, attributing codes to certain text segments is an inherently subjective process and therefore likely to yield different results depending on who is coding (Chi, 1997). We continuously resorted back to the original narratives and adjusted the coding wherever necessary. At different moments, however, analysing the data required us to take decisions that undeniably influenced our results.

The different aspects of human security not being consensually nor clearly defined, we had to define them to a certain degree ourselves and adapt them to the context of our research[85].

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[83] Whether positively (by downplaying struggles) or negatively (by highlighting and amplifying difficulties).

[84] see 4.5

[85] see 4.5

That a 'fragile legal status' is understood as a threat to 'political security' was our own decision, as a direct consequence of which 'political insecurity' became such a dominant aspect of respondents' insecurity in Jordan. Defining the aspects of HS differently would have yielded different results. This should be taken into account when reading the results.

7. Conclusion

We set out to enter the security discourse on refugees by reformulating the question 'What security threats do refugees pose?' into 'What threatens the security of refugees?'. More specifically, we aimed to gain insights into how Syrian and Iraqi urban refugees in Jordan understand their own security. We analysed interviews conducted with urban refugees between 2016 and 2017 in Amman and Mafraq and their peripheries regarding, on the one hand, the factors that pushed them to leave their home country and, on the other hand, the insecurities they are struggling with in their exile situation in Jordan. We used the framework of 'human security' (HS) – which has been scarcely explored empirically, yet vividly discussed conceptually – as a lens through which we read refugees' insecurity.

Our results indicate that threats to their personal, community and political security were at the origin of both Syrians' and Iraqis' decision to flee. However, while they shared a similar form of human *in*security before their flight to Jordan, the threats that led to this insecurity were different in nature. Syrians fled because of general environment of insecurity caused by the ongoing conflict, the bombings and the fighting. Urban refugees from Iraq – which is in a post-conflict situation, where open fighting has generally ceased – fled primarily because of a loss of faith in the rule of law, personal attacks and discrimination based on religion.

In our literature review, we found that discussions on 'security from what?' oppose two different interpretations of security: a *restrictive* one, focusing on 'hard' security threats to physical safety and a *flexible* interpretation, which conceives security as being defined by a variety of factors, ranging from economic to environmental ones. Our results suggest that Syrian and Iraqi refugees' search for security in a 'narrow' sense, i.e. relating to personal, community and political security, is successfully concluded when they arrive in Jordan. However, in exile, a new form of insecurity sets in. It is a generalised insecurity which touches on all aspects of HS and, hence, calls for a 'broad' reading of HS. In light of these findings, we are led to conclude that a flexible interpretation of security is better equipped to capture and explain the insecurities of individuals in difficult contexts. The feelings of insecurity of these individuals are inherently subjective and escape objective readings.

HS has revealed itself as an appropriate framework for the focus on individuals' security and for the analysis of a wide range of potential security threats. Certain weaknesses in its applicability persist, especially because definitions of the seven aspects of HS are not sufficient-

ly precise. We have adapted the definitions to the context of Syrian and Iraqi refugees[86], but further research is required to test, develop and refine these definitions.

The qualitative approach chosen for this study bore certain challenges (e.g. managing gatekeepers, avoiding power imbalance, obtaining informed consent). However, we would argue that the semi-structured 'long interview' (McCracken, 1998) was probably the most appropriate method to achieve both wealth and depth of information while focusing on aspects related to security and insecurity.

As mentioned earlier, this thesis set itself the ambition of shifting the criminological 'gaze' to regions and contexts which tend to escape it. It also inscribed itself in an endeavour to include the voices of people from these contexts in the production of knowledge, in order to work toward a truly 'universal' understanding of phenomena related to crime and security (Aas, 2012). Finally, it was through its concern with the everyday lived experience of security that this paper intended to explore the dimensions of security 'from below' (Crawford & Hutchinson, 2016). We would argue that it has succeeded in doing so. *Empirically*, it has examined the applicability of the HS framework in the case of Syrian and Iraq urban refugees; *conceptually*, it has provided insights that argue for a flexible interpretation of security; and *methodologically*, it has applied qualitative methods used in criminology in a challenging context and explored the benefits they bring and the difficulties that arise therewith.

As it ought to be, this paper has provided less answers than it has evoked questions. Addressing all of them would go beyond the scope of this paper. We therefore encourage further research into questions such as 'What explains refugees' resilience in coping with these insecurities[87]?'; 'How do urban refugees see their future?'[88]; 'What resettlement aspirations do refugees hold and how are they related to their insecurity in Jordan[89]?'; 'How are socio-economic characteristics related to urban refugees' feelings of insecurity?'; 'How does the host community perceive the presence of refugees and how is *their* human security chal-

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[86] see 4.5

[87] Aspects such as religion, acceptance of one's legal inferiority and hopes for resettlement could be among the factors explaining refugees' resilience, but further research is encouraged.

[88] Human Security aspires to include 'the excluded' in order to allow the widest possible range of people to have 'enough confidence that they can actually think about the next day, the next week, the next year' (Commission on Human Security, 2003, p.1). The respondents in our sample unanimously expressed their inability to think beyond the present day.

[89] In our sample, 12 of 23 respondents wished to be resettled to a third country. The other 11 want to return to Syria. No Iraqi would go back. It would be interesting to explore these differences when it comes to resettlement aspirations.

lenged by it?'; and 'How can qualitative research with urban refugees inform methods in criminology and other disciplines?'. Finally, in order to do justice to the policy-oriented aspiration of human security, it is crucial that the findings of the present study are translated into policy recommendations for stakeholders in the field. Otherwise, HS will always risk being, as Chandler (2008) writes, the 'dog that didn't bark'.

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9. Annex

All the files listed here in the annex may be downloaded, together with the transcripts and other relevant documents, using the following link:

https://www.dropbox.com/sh/vaebafbg4cvblwz/AABWJ5yn86aavMGPIxPA51fZa?dl=0

I. Interview mind map

I.I English, version 1.0

Interview guideline

Introduction
- Explain research interest
- Explain Form of Consent and sign
- Inform about recording
- Personal Information:
  - Age, Education, Origin, Family

Departure & Arrival
- When did you leave your country?
- What made you leave?
- How was life before you had or wanted to leave?
- How did you get here? When?

Current living situation
- Are you living alone? If not, with whom? Family, friends?
- What does a typical day look like for you here?
- Do you have access to education? Are you able to work?
- Do you feel safe? accepted? integrated?
- Do you have access to health care? other forms of support?
- Are you receiving funds from UNHCR or other services from other organisations? Which ones?
- How do you like life here? How do you feel?

Prospects
- What makes you want to leave this country?
- Where would you like to go from here?
- What do you imagine life would be like there?
- Do you have family members there that you would like to join?
- What are your plans for the future?

Wrap-up
- Thank the interviewee
- Explain what will happen with the information
- Provide contact details
- End the recording

"Victimisation"
- Have you had negative experiences here? If yes, would you mind telling me more?
- Have you been confronted with aggressive, hateful behaviour? Do you know why?
- Have you experienced racism, discrimination?
- Have you been subjected to violence?
- Consequences & Reaction
  - How have you reacted?
  - Do you still suffer from those events?
  - Do you feel treated unjustly?
  - Were you able to seek help? Contact the police?
  - If not, why not?

I.II English, version 2.0

Interview guideline

Introduction
- Presentation & Explain research interest
- Explain Informed Consent Agreement and sign
- Inform about recording
- Personal Information:
  - Age, Education, Origin, Family

Seeking Refuge
- **Kick-off question: What made you leave your country?**
- Would you mind telling me about the circumstances of your departure?
- Why did you come to Jordan?
- How was life before you had or wanted to leave?
- How did you get here? When?
  - With the help of someone?
  - How long was the journey?

Human Security I
- Are you living alone? If not, with whom? Family, friends?
- How do you like life here? How do you feel?
- Do you have enough to eat and to feed your family?
- Do you have access to education? Are you able to work?
- Are you receiving funds or support from UNHCR or other services from other organisations?
- How well equipped is your home? Do you feel like it protects you and your family?
- Do you have access to health care? Are there any medical issues?

Wrap-up
- Thank the interviewee
- Explain what will happen with the information
- Provide contact details
- Ask for follow-up, record contact
- End the recording

Prospects
- What makes you want to leave this country?
- Where would you like to go from here?
- What do you imagine life would be like there?
- Do you have family members there that you would like to join?
- What are your plans for the future?
- **What does 'security' mean to you? What do you need to feel safe?**

Human Security II
- Do you feel safe? accepted? integrated?
- Have you had negative experiences here? If yes, would you mind telling me more?
- Have you been faced with aggressive, hateful behaviour? If yes, do you know why?
- Have you experienced racism, discrimination?
- Have you been subjected to violence?
- Do you feel like there is justice here? Do you ever feel treated unjustly?
- Do you feel like you can contact the police if anything happens?
- Do you feel like you have a voice here?
- Of all those difficulties, which one do you struggle with most?

I.III Arabic, version 1.0

توجيه المقابلة

مقدمة
- عرض و شرح الاهتمام بدراسة الوضع
- توضيح الموافقة و توقيعها
- اعلام المشارك بيدأ التسجيل
- المعلومات الشخصية: العمر، الجنسية الوظيفة او الدراسة البلد و المدينة الحالية

الحاضر و الترحيب
السؤال الأول: أنت غادرت بلدك معروفاً يمكنك شرح ظروف مغادرتك
- كيف كانت حياتك قبل ان تضطر للمغادرة
- متى غادرت بلدك؟
- مالذي دعاك لمغادرة بلدك
- كيف وصلت الى هنا؟ متى؟
- على اي البلدان مررت؟
- كم كانت مدة رحلتك

الحاضر
- هل انت تسكن بمفردك؟
- كيف تقضي أوقاتك عادتاً هنا
- هل تضطر بالانتظام او لايجاد عمل
- هل عندك امكانية للاجتماع بالانتظام بالدراسة او الاندماج مع المجتمع
- هل عندك امكانية للحصول على رعاية صحية؟ هل تحصل على مساعدة في مجالات اخرى؟
- هل تتلقى دعم من الوظيفة او من خدمات او مؤسسات اخرى؟ من هم؟
- كيف تقيّم حياتك هنا
- هل مثال أمكانية الحصول على رعاية صحيّة او مع علاقتك
- هل تشعر بالامان بالتنقل مع سكنك مع أصدقاء او مع عائلتك
- في حالة الإجابة بالنفي مع سكنك من سكنك مع أصدقاء او مع عائلتك

"الظلم"
- هل كانت لديك تجارب سلبية هنا هل بالإمكان سرد تفاصيلها
- هل تعرضت لتصرف جبوري أو حقوق:هل تعرف لماذا؟
- هل تعرضت لمشاكل ذات طابع عنصري أو طائفي:هل تعرضت للتمييز؟
- هل تعرضت للعنف؟
- المواقف و ردود افعال
  - ماذا كان رد فعلك؟
  - هل تعاني من هذه التجارب لحد الآن؟
  - هل تشعر بالظلم (بعد التجربة)؟
  - هل استطعت على طلب مساعدة؟ هل استخدمت على الاتصال بالشرطة؟
  - في حالة الاجابة بالنفي لماذا؟
  - مالذي يمنعك من القيام بتصرفات غير قانونية؟ ما هو مصدر ايمانك بالسبيل الشرعي؟

مفاهيم
- ما هو معنى مفهوم "صحيّ" بالنسبة اليك
- حسب فهمك للمشاكل الصحيّة هل تعتبر نفسك؟ ما هو تعريف الجريمة حسب رأيك؟ ما هو تعريف الجريمة حسب رأيك؟
- ما تعريف الجريمة حسب رأيك؟ ما هو تعريف "الظلم" بالنسبة اليك؟

المستقبل
- ما سبب عدم رضاك في الوقت هنا
- الى اين ترغب الذهاب؟
- ماهي مخاوفك عن الحياة هنا؟
- هل لديك اقارب في البلد الذي ترغب الذهاب اليه
- ما هي خططك او ما هي خطط للمستقبل؟

نهاية
- الشكر
- اعلام المشارك عن كيفية التعامل مع المعلومات التي قدمها
- تبادل معلومات الاتصال (هاتف غير بريد)
- الاستفسار عن امكانية اجراء مقابلات لاحقة
- أوقات التسجيل

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I.IV Arabic, version 2.0

توجيه المقابلة

مقدمة
- عرض و شرح الهدف من دراسة الوضع
- توضيح الموافقة و توقيعها
- اعلام المشارك ببدأ التسجيل
- المعلومات الشخصية: العمر، الجنسية، الوظيفة، الدراسة، البلد، البيئة العائلية

المقابلة
السؤال الأول: ماذي دعاك لمغادرة بلدك
- يمكنك شرح ظروف مغادرتك؟
- متى غادرت بلدك؟
- كيف كانت حياتك قبل أن تضطر للمغادرة؟
- كيف وصلت إلى هنا؟
- كم كانت مدة رحلتك
- بمساعدة أحد؟

الأمن البشري (١)
- هل هناك إمكانية للحصول على رعاية صحية؟
- هل هناك إمكانية للالتحاق بالدراسة أو لإيجاد عمل؟
- هل تتلقى دعم من القومية أو من خدمات أو مؤسسات أخرى؟
- كيف تقيم حياتك هنا بشكل عام؟
- هل أنت تسكن بمفردك؟
- هل أنت تسكن بمفردك مع أصدقاء أو مع عائلتك
- هل تشعر بحماية صحية؟ هل تحصل على مساعدة في مجالات أخرى؟

الأمن البشري (٢)
- هل تشعر بالأمان؟ بالنسبة على سلامتك هل بالإمكان سرد تفاصيلها؟
- هل كانت لديك تجارب سلبية هنا؟
- هل تعرضت لتجربة هجومي أو خوف؟ هل تعرف أحد؟
- هل تعرضت لمشاكل ذات طابع عنصري أو طائفي؟
- هل تعرضت للتمييز؟
- برأيك هل هناك عدالة؟ هل تشعر بالظلم والنظام الشرطة؟
- اذا حدث أي شيء هل يستمع الله هل ستلجأ الشرطة؟
- هل تشعر بأن لديك صوت هنا؟
- بين كل هذه الصعوبات أي صعوبة تعاني منها أكثر من غيرها؟

المستقبل
- ما هو معنى الأمان بالنسبة لك؟ ماذا تحتاج لتكن آمن؟
- ما هي خطط أو ما هي حلمك للمستقبل؟
- هل لديك أقارب في البلد الذي ترغب الذهاب إليه؟
- ماهي فكرتك عن الحياة هناك؟
- إلى أين ترغب الذهاب؟
- ما سبب عدم رغبتك في البقاء هنا؟

نهاية
- إيقاف التسجيل
- الاستفسار عن إمكانية إجراء مقابلات لاحقة
- تبادل معلومات الاتصال (هاتف، بريد)
- إعلام المشارك عن كيفية التعامل مع المعلومات التي قدمها
- الشكر

II. Informed Consent Agreement

II.I Version 1.0

UNIL | Université de Lausanne
Faculté de droit
et des sciences criminelles

INFORMED CONSENT AGREEMENT

الموافقة الصادرة عن وعي وأدراك

RESEARCH TITLE

Exposed – The Victimisation Endured by Iraqi and Syrian Refugees in Transition Countries

UNDER THE SUPERVISION OF:

Manon JENDLY, Claudia CAMPISTOL MAS

<u>عنوان البحث</u>

مُعَرَّض – الظلم والأعمال الذي يؤدون إلى ضحايا كما يتحملونهم اللاجئين العراقيين والسوريين في البلدان الانتقالية

<u>تحت إشراف:</u>

مانون يندلي و كلاوديا كامبيستول ماس

A) INFORMATION FOR THE PARTICIPANT

1. AIM OF THE STUDY

The aim of this research project is to gain a more thorough understanding of the victimisation endured by refugees in transition countries, based on their personal and collective narratives.

أ) معلومات للمشترك

١) غاية الدراسة

غاية هذا المشروع البحثي هي الحصول على فهم أعمق لتحمل اللاجئين ما يواجهونه من عمليات التجني والإيذاء خلال تواجدهم في بلدان انتقالية، من خلال دراسة قصصهم التي يسردونها شخصياً

2. PARTICIPATION IN THE RESEARCH

Your contribution to this research will consist of your participation in an interview that takes between one and two hours.

٢) المساهمة في هذا المشروع

مساهمتك في هذا المشروع تكون عن طريق مقابلة تستمر من ساعة إلى ساعتين تقريباً.

Contact :
Ahmed.ajil@unil.ch
+41 (0) 76 381 29 69

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Faculté de droit
et des sciences criminelles

3. CONFIDENTIALITY

The interview will be recorded on a notebook or a dictaphone in order to facilitate the transcription of the information you provided. The information provided will be anonymised.

٣) سرية المعلومات

ستُسجل المقابلة باستخدام مسجل صوت أو حاسوب محمول، ثم تُنقل على الورق. يتم المحافظة على سرية المعلومات المقدمة ومصادرها.

4. VOLUNTEERED PARTICIPATION AND RIGHT TO WITHDRAW

Your participation is voluntary and will not be remunerated. You are free to withdraw your participation at any time during the interview. You also have the right to demand the deletion of the information provided until *31 may 2017* using the contact details below. You do not have to justify your withdrawal in any case.

٤) الاشتراك الحر و حق الانسحاب

اشتراكك بهذه الدراسة يتم بشكل طوعي و ليس هناك تعويض ما. من حقك ان تنسحب في أي لحظة خلال المقابلة، كما من حقك أيضاً طلب حذف كل المعلومات التي قدمتها لحد ٣١ مايو ٢٠١٧ عبر أحد وسائل الاتصال المتوفرة في هذه الوثيقة، ولن يُطلب منك ذكر الأسباب.

B) CONSENT

I confirm that I have been informed about the content, the aim and the nature of this study and that I have understood the information provided by the researcher. I further confirm that my questions have been answered by the researcher.

I hereby consent to the participation in this study:

Signature: _____   Date: _____

First Name: _____   Last Name: _____

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et des sciences criminelles

ب) الموافقة

أنا أؤكد أن الباحث أوضح محتوى وغاية ونوع الدراسة وانني فهمت التعليمات التي قدمها. أؤكد أيضاً أن الباحث أجاب على
كل اسئلتي.

أوافق على انضمامي للمشاركة بهذه الدراسة:

الاسم: _____   التاريخ: _____   الاسم: _____

التوقيع: _____

C) DECLARATION OF TRANSPARENCY

I confirm that I have explained the aim and the nature of this study to the participant. I further confirm that I have answered his or her questions to the best of my knowledge.

Signature: _____   Date: _____

First Name: _____   Last Name: _____

ت) تصريح الشفافية

أؤكد أنني شرحت غاية و محتوى هذه الدراسة للمشترك و أؤكد أيضاً أنني أجبت على قدر علمي على كل الأسئلة التي قام بطرحها.

For any questions or further information, you are free to contact Ahmed Ajil, using the following contact details:

E-Mail: ahmed.ajil@unil.ch
Telephone: +41 (0) 76 381 29 69

يستطيع المشترك أن يتصل بالباحث أحمد عاجل في أي وقت عن طريق المعلومات التالية:

بريد الكتروني: ahmed.ajil@unil.ch

الهاتف: ٠٠٤١٧٦٣٨١٢٩٦٩

A copy of this agreement will be signed and provided to the participant.

ستُقدم نسخة موقعة من هذه الوثيقة للمشترك.

Contact :
Ahmed.ajil@unil.ch
+41 (0) 76 381 29 69

II.II Version 2.0 (front page changed only)

UNIL | Université de Lausanne
Faculté de droit
et des sciences criminelles

INFORMED CONSENT AGREEMENT

الموافقة الصادرة عن وعي وإدراك

RESEARCH TITLE

Seeking refuge – seeking security.

UNDER THE SUPERVISION OF:

Manon JENDLY, Claudia CAMPISTOL MAS

عنوان البحث

البحث عن ملجأ – البحث عن أمان

تحت إشراف:

مانون يندلي وكلاوديا كامبيستول ماس

A) INFORMATION FOR THE PARTICIPANT

1. AIM OF THE STUDY

The aim of this research project is to explore the perceptions that Syrian and Iraqi refugees in Jordan have of their security and insecurity, based on their personal and collective narratives.

أ) معلومات للمشترك

١) غاية الدراسة

غاية هذا المشروع البحثي هي استكشاف تصورات اللاجئين العراقيين والسوريين المتواجدين في الأردن عن أمانهم وعدم أمانهم، استناداً إلى قصصهم الشخصية والجماعية.

2. PARTICIPATION IN THE RESEARCH

Your contribution to this research will consist of your participation in an interview that lasts one to two hours.

٢) المساهمة في هذا المشروع

مساهمتك في هذا المشروع تكون عن طريق مقابلة تستمر من ساعة إلى ساعتين تقريباً.

Contact :
Ahmed.ajil@unil.ch
+41 (0) 76 381 29 69

II.III Example of used consent form

UNIL | Université de Lausanne
Faculté de droit
et des sciences criminelles

ب) الموافقة

أنا أؤكد أن الباحث أوضح محتوى وغاية ونوع الدراسة وانني فهمت التعليمات التي قدمها. أؤكد أيضاً أن الباحث أجاب على كل اسئلتي. أوافق على انضمامي للمشاركة بهذه الدراسة:

الاسم: عبد الله الخلاق   التاريخ: C.N /٤/١٦

التوقيع: Abd

C) DECLARATION OF TRANSPARENCY

I confirm that I have explained the aim and the nature of this study to the participant. I further confirm that I have answered his or her questions to the best of my knowledge.

Signature: _____   Date: _____

First Name: _____   Last Name: _____

ت) تصريح الشفافية

أؤكد أنني شرحت غاية ومحتوى هذه الدراسة للمشترك و أؤكد أيضاً أنني أجبت على قدر علمي على كل الأسئلة التي قام بطرحها.

For any questions or further information, you are free to contact Ahmed Ajil, using the following contact details:

E-Mail: ahmed.ajil@unil.ch
Telephone: +41 (0) 76 381 29 69

يستطيع المشترك أن يتصل بالباحث أحمد عاجل في أي وقت عن طريق المعلومات التالية:

بريد الكتروني: ahmed.ajil@unil.ch

الهاتف: ٠٠٤١٧٦٣٨١٢٩٦٩

A copy of this agreement will be signed and provided to the participant.

ستُقدم نسخة موقعة من هذه الوثيقة للمشترك.

Contact :
Ahmed.ajil@unil.ch
+41 (0) 76 381 29 69

III.   Report form

III.I Example (Samer)

Interview ID	001_AMKS
Time and location of report	This report is being written on 19h30PM on 11 July 2016, shortly after the interview. I am sitting in the café Tche, on Mecca Street.
Subject and short information	Samer is 28 years old and in Amman since 2011. He left Syria to get a Jordanian national number and was unable to leave after that. He lost his father in Syria and had to care for his brother and sister, for whom he arranged to follow him to Amman. He lives currently on his own with his aunt near 7th circle. Samer is originally Palestinian, but was born and bred in Salamiah, Syria.
Contact method and short description	I got in touch with Samer through a friend, Y., I knew from my time in Amman who was granted asylum in Germany. I asked Y. whether he knew someone in Amman who was wishing to leave and he referred me to Samer. I informed Y. about the research and asked him to ask Samer, whether he'd be fine with me contacting him. He then gave me his number and I got in touch with Samer through *WhatsApp*. This was at 11 AM on 11 July 2016, and SAMER was ready to receive me at his place around 1.30 PM the same day. I left for his place at 1PM from Gardens by taxi.
Location and reach	Samer is living close to 7th circle which is one of the outer parts of the busy circle of Amman. His place is in a very calm neighbourhood. It is his aunt's apartment where he is allowed to stay. The flat is very big, but old, almost empty and very modestly equipped. His room is spacious and has a small bed, a closet, a couch and a tiny desk on it. When we go into his room, he quickly makes his bed and asks me to sit down on it. The window was big and the sun was shining into his room. On the small desk there was a laptop, a couple of *playstation* controllers and some other stuff. The small furniture next to his bed was covered with medication and a pack of cigarettes. On the other side of the room there was a small dresser with a television on it and a

	couple of 'dr.dre beats' headphones inside. The floor was mostly covered with a large Persian carpet, the window was partly hidden with beige curtains, that might have been originally white. Fairuz music was playing when I arrived and the room felt cosy and welcoming.
Emotions & Thoughts before	Before the interview I was slightly exhausted from the scarce rest of the past days and the early training. I also felt a bit nervous as often before an interview, uncertain who and what was expecting me. Over WA, Samer seemed very open and eager to meet up with me, which comforted me. Y. had told me that he had suffered a lot and I was expecting to find out more about that.
Emotions & Thoughts during	I was surprised when I met Samer, when he received me on the street in front of his flat. He seemed older than I expected and he looked worn out and sick. His lips had black stains on them and his middle two teeth were dark-coloured. He greeted me with kisses and we went up to his flat. The street was empty, the building he lived in as well. He made some funny comments concerning my posture, saying 'Y. did not tell me you had 'boobs''. His aunt was home, he announced me and asked me to follow him into his room.
	First thing I noticed was his tendency to make pessimistic, cynical comments. When I responded per WA with 'good', when he told me where he lived (because it was close to my place), he answered with 'yes, that's about the only good thing about my life'.
	This general pessimism then became the thread that ran through his narrative. His openness to tell me about his experience was exceptional, he couldn't wait to sign the consent agreement to start the interview. He liked sharing what he went through and on several occasions, he told me he was happy to vent to someone, to get things off his chest.
	During the interview, he smoked about five to six cigarettes in total. He stated he found smoking relieving. He talked mostly without me intervening, simple nodding and eye contact sufficed to keep him talking. Actually, not much seemed to make him stop talking. His way

of speaking was almost theatrical, and it became clear he had time to order his ideas and that it was not the first time he shared them. The images he conveyed were very clear, powerful and his narrative persona charismatic and expressive (facial expressions, changes in tone and speed, gesture).

He started off with his narrative in a way that covered different topics I was interested in. When I intervened after a while I made sure to go more or less back to the order I had in mind to be sure I had everything covered. I also made sure to ask for the sequential order of the episodes and their location in time, since he often talked back and forth, including different episodes in a time span of about five years. He spoke quickly and I missed some words, some I asked for, others not. His dialect was Palestinian-Syrian, some mixed form due to his upbringing and origin. I understood him well, but he sometimes lowered his voice and I had to focus more intensely. A ratio of 1/500 for my word count compared to his would probably not be an exaggeration.

His narrative was moving, emotionally charged and he broke down into tears himself at some point, when he said that 'this is not a life here'. The most painful episodes were his paternal care for his brother and sister, the difficulties and humiliation he faced by the authorities when trying to issue his national ID, and the struggles and exploitation related to work and the emptiness he felt now in his state of solitude.

His aunt seems to play a central role in his current situation. She is the only one who is providing support – as he said repeatedly 'if it was not for her, I would be on the streets'. She came in and brought, coffee, tea and food several times.

The interview consumed a lot of my focus. The eye contact was intense and the moments of silence often long. He has a habit of asking rhetorical questions followed by long silences and constant eye contact. After about 2h20 we had a first break. The way I was seated was

	not ideal and I switched from sitting on the floor to sitting on the bed several times. I couldn't help feeling like a therapeutic tool for him that he could simply vent to. He did not ask me a single question about who I was, what I did and I am sure Y. did not tell him much more about me either. I don't think his constant eye contact with me was conscious – at some point I said to myself that he must be imagining the people he was talking about and not seeing me as a person. Methodologically, this seemed like a good position for me to be in, because most of his narrative was undirected, prompt and natural.
	When he broke down in tears, I teared up as well. I felt the anger and frustration in his words, the injustice and the humiliation he was subjected to and the pain he was in. The longer the interview took, the less it was charged with emotions, the more the concepts and ideas became repetitive and some sort of predictability set in. The more I felt like I was simply acting as a therapeutic tool. I think the last hour (I had already switched off the recorder) I was there exclusively to listen to him.
Emotions & Thoughts after	Towards the end, it became clear he did not want me to leave. He told me to stay a bit longer whenever I told him that I was going to leave (about three to four times). At the end, it became suffocating and I had to insist that I was going to leave. We agreed that we would meet soon again (he wanted me to tell him exactly when, but I told him we'd talk and see).
Follow-up situation	Samer is ready to follow-up anytime. Channels of contact are established through WhatsApp and Facebook.
Methodological adjustments	The IV mind map should be completed with questions on the 'criminal coping', something I touched on with Samer, because he firmly affirmed that he was upright and just. Otherwise, the guide worked well.

IV. RQDA

IV.I Codes

IV.II Code categories

IV.III Coding output

● ● ●   ⊠ 12 Retrieved codings: "work & education" from 3 files

004_AMAS [1705:1872]^{Back}

Yes, for the kids, their future. They lost two years of school. This one (pointing at one of his kids), what grade are you in now? ("5th"), he should be in 7th grade.

004_AMAS [1901:2146]^{Back}

Yes, because in Syria, because of the problems, we could not send them to school. When I came here, I registered them at school, the grade that they let me. Now four of them are at school. One is in first grade, one going to 7th and one to 5th.

004_AMAS [2225:2459]^{Back}

I was in Tafeilah first (north-west of the country). My brother was there. There was no work, I stayed there one year without work. I started getting depressed. There was no possibility to work with someone. So I came here, for work.

004_AMAS [3836:4114]^{Back}

In the beginning it was very hard. I found it difficult to move around all the time. And even from one workplace to another, it always takes you about one month to learn how everyting works. I suffered a lot in the beginning. And who wants a house, with 5 children, is refused.

004_AMAS [6643:6874]^{Back}

Wallahi, there is someone working for me in the city centre, and I get a percentage of the profit. So if he gets 20, I get 7. I get a third. So, depending on the work, I sometimes get 30, or 50, sometimes 400. Depends on the work.

005_AMFI [12173:12759]^{Back}

But you know, I don't have freedom here. Because, first of all, I don't get citizenship. The Jordanian will always have more rights and more freedom than you. Secondly, I can't work, because I am Iraqi. I cant work in the hospitals. I mean, something official, I cant work it. I can't get

V. Matrices

V.I Overview answers

	Nasser	Muneer	Adel	Burhan	Maher	Ayman	Suhayla	7	16	Samer	Ragheed	Khalid	Noor	Hassan	Hayat	Yasser	Yassin	Abdelrahm
What made you leave your country?	Discrimination, threats & personal attack	Terrorism, killings, bombings, violence & sectarianism	Displacement, security, sectarianism, killings and kidnappings	Disillusionment, loss of hope & loss of faith in institutions	Personal threats, insecurity	Sectarianism, criminality, personal targeting	Sectarianism, criminality, personal targeting, security for the			Administrative issues & insecurity caused by war	Criminality in conflict	No security, inflation	No security & no work		Conflict, bombings & surgery for husband	War, bombings	Avoid service in the army	Child inju during wa no food
When did you leave your country / enter Jordan?	2012	23-Sep-14	2013	Sep-14	Feb-16	2009	2009			2012	16-Sep-13	Jul-12	Jul-12	Jul-12	2013	17/02/14	06/01/11	
	2012	2014	2013	2014	2016	2009	2009			2012	2013	2012	2012	2012	2013	2014	2011	
Routes/means of transport used	Plane	Plane	Plane	Plane	Plane	Plane	Plane	All plane	Car (12)	Car	Car	Car	Car	Car	Bus & on foot	Traffickers, 10 days of walking	Car	Car
Went to camp?	No	No	No	No	No	No	No	0	5	No	No	No	No	No	Yes	Yes	No	No
Stayed for how long?															20 days			
How did they leave camp?										Stateless, but Palestinian					Guarantor			
Legal status?	UN	UN	UN	UN	UN	UN	UN	All UN		Passport	UN	UN	UN	UN	UN	UN	UN	UN
Getting support from UN? other organisations?	UN Until 2015	No	No	No	No	No	No	0	12	No	UN	Yes	Yes	Yes	UN	Yes	Yes	Yes
How much support per month?	190 JDs										70 JD	150 JD	150 JD	150 JD	100 JD	100 JD	100 JD	100 JD
Other support? How much?	Family: 200-300 JD											Sometimes donations, 50 JD	Sometimes donations, 50 JD	Sometimes donations, 50 JD				
How much is the rent per month?	150 JD		300 JD		300 JD	300 JD	300 JD			Lives with aunt or sister	250 JD							200 JD
Been forced to leave house?	Yes			Yes				2	5	Yes					Yes	Yes		Yes

(full version on file)

V.II 'What made you flee your country?'

		Nasser	Muneer	Adel	Burhan	Maher	Ayman	Suhayla	IRAQ	SYRIA	Samer	Ragheed	Khalid	Noor	Hassan	Hayat	Yasser	Yassin	Abdelrahman	Tamer	Ameen	Layla	Omar	Habeeb	Laith	Usama
What made you leave your country?	N=22								7	15																
Loss of faith in rule of law, state authority	22	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	7	15	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1
Crime, gangs, kidnappings, robbery	19	1	1	1	0	1	1	1	6	13	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	0	0	1	1			
Conflict situation: Bombings, fighting	15	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	15	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1			
Discrimination based on religion, ethnicity or else	14	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	7	7	0	0	0	0	1	1	0	0	0	1	1	1	1			
Price inflation, loss of work, difficulty to get food	12	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	12	0	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	0	0	1	1			
Personal attacks and threats	9	1	1	1	0	1	1	1	6	3	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	0	0	1	1		
Avoiding military service	5	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	5	0	0	0	0	1	1	0	0	1	0	1	0	0	1		
Need for medical treatment or surgery	2	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	2	0	0	0	1	0	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0			

V.III 'What struggles are you facing in Jordan?'

			Nasser	Muneer	Burhan	Adel	Maher	Ayman	Suhayla	IRAQ	SYRIA	Samer	Ragheed	Khalid	Noor	Hassan	Hayat	Yasser	Yassin	Abdelrahm	Tamer	Ameen	Layla	Omar	Habeeb	Laith	Usama
		N=23								7	16																
Livelihood	Livelihood (either Work / Humanitarian assistance affected)	23	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	7	16	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1
Humanitarian assistance	Humanitarian assistance (insufficient or inexistent, corruption and injustice)	22	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	7	15	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	0	1	1	
Housing	Housing (rent issues, (threat of) eviction, breach of contract, frequent displacement, insufficient protection, overcrowding, neighbours)	21	1	0	1	1	1	1	1	6	15	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	0	1	1	
Work	Work (no right to work, possibilities of work, low salary)	19	0	1	1	1	1	1	0	5	14	1	1	1	1	1	0	0	1	1	1	1	1	1	1		
Health	Health (need for/lack of access to medication, treatment, doctors, had unsuccessful surgery/treatment)	15	1	0	0	1	0	1	1	4	11	1	0	0	0	0	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	0	1		
Discrimination	Discrimination (verbal harrassment, exclusion, rejection, unequal treatment, hostilities)	14	1	1	0	0	0	0	0	2	12	1	1	0	0	0	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1		
Food	Food (insufficient choice, trading food coupons for cash)	14	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	13	1	0	1	1	1	1	1	1	0	1	1	0	1	1		
Authorities	Authorities (lack of faith in justice system or authorities, hesitation to report incidents to police, fear of imprisonment)	12	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	11	1	1	0	0	0	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	0		
Legal status	Legal status (no authorisation, no residency, overstayed visa, fled camp illegally, no work contract, no registration with humanitarian organisation)	11	1	0	1	0	1	1	1	5	6	1	0	0	0	0	1	0	0	0	0	1	1	0	1	1	
Exploitation	Exploitation (at work (e.g. non payment of salary), unfair treatment, exploitation of ignorance or weakness)	8	1	0	0	0	0	1	0	2	6	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	0	1	1	1	0	1	0	
Environment	Environment (access to clean water, protection from extreme conditions)	4	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	3	0	0	0	0	1	0	0	0	0	1	0	0	0	1		
Victimisation	Victimisation (faced violent attack or threats, been detained unlawfully)	3	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	3	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	1	0	0	0		

V.IV Human security before flight

Aspect of Human Security	Examples	Total	Nasser	Muneer	Burhan	Adel	Maher	Ayman	Suhayla	IRAQ	SYRIA	Samer	Ragheed	Khalid	Noor	Hassan	Hayat	Yasser	Yassin	Abdelrahman	Tamer	Ameen	Layla	Omar	Habeeb	Laith	Usama
		N=22								7	15																
Political Security	Fragile legal status, lack of faith in state and rule of law, presence of militias, compromised human rights, inequality before justice, fear of being recruited for military service	22	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	7	15	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1
Personal Security	Attacks on and threats to personal integrity, exposure to violence, fear for personal safety, unlawful detention	22	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	7	15	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1
Community Security	Feeling targeted or discriminated for being part of a racial, ethnic, national, religious group	14	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	7	7	0	0	0	0	0	1	1	1	0	0	0	0	1	1	1	1
Economic Security	No work, unstable income, little or no humanitarian aid, labour exploitation	8	1	0	0	1	0	0	0	2	6	0	1	1	1	0	1	0	0	0	1	0	0	0	0	0	1
Food Security	No or little physical and economic access to food, worry about sufficient food, trading food for rent, no or little access to food coupons	8	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	8	0	1	1	1	1	1	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	1
Environmental Security	No or little protection from weather, bad housing, access to clean water, eviction from home, frequent displacement	6	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	6	0	1	1	1	0	1	1	0	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Health Security	Difficulty of access to health care, medication, medical aid, treatment	2	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	2	0	0	0	0	1	0	0	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0

V.V Human security in exile

Aspect of Human Security	Examples	Total	Nasser	Muneer	Burhan	Adel	Maher	Ayman	Suhayla	IRAQ	SYRIA	Samer	Ragheed	Khalid	Noor	Hassan	Hayat	Yasser	Yassin	Abdelrahman	Tamer	Ameen	Layla	Omar	Habeeb	Laith	Usama
		N=23								7	16																
Economic Security	No work, unstable income, little or no humanitarian aid, labour exploitation	23	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	7	16	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1
Political Security	Fragile legal status, lack of faith in state and rule of law, presence of militias, compromised human rights, inequality before justice, fear of being recruited for military service	20	1	0	1	1	1	1	1	6	14	1	1	1	0	0	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1
Health Security	Difficulty of access to health care, medication, medical aid, treatment	17	1	0	1	1	0	1	1	5	12	1	0	0	0	0	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1
Environmental Security	No or little protection from weather, bad housing, access to clean water, eviction from home, frequent displacement	15	1	0	1	0	0	0	0	2	13	1	1	1	0	0	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	0	1	1
Food Security	No or little physical and economic access to food, worry about sufficient food, trading food for rent, no or little access to food coupons	14	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	13	1	0	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	0	1	0	1	1	1
Community Security	Feeling targeted or discriminated for being part of a racial, ethnic, national, religious group	14	1	1	0	0	0	0	0	2	12	1	1	0	0	0	0	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1
Personal Security	Attacks on and threats to personal integrity, exposure to violence, fear for personal safety, unlawful detention	3	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	3	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	1	0	0	0

VI.   Database overview

	Interview information			Duration IV	Words		Participants			Personal information				Childre	
Code	Date	City	Location			Main	Secondary	Other	Origin	Sex	Age	Married	n	Education
010_MAFS	18/07/16	Mafraq (JO)	Home	100	9881	Yasser			Aleppo (SYR)	M	24	Yes	2	Primary
						Yassin			Aleppo (SYR)	M	23	No		Primary
						Abdelrahman			Aleppo (SYR)	M	37	Yes	8	Primary
						Tamer			Aleppo (SYR)	M		Yes	2	Primary
								Mother of Firas and Bassim						
								Humeidi's son						
011_AMMI	20/07/16	Amman (JO)	Home	111	7753	Ayman			Baghdad (IRQ)	M	30	No		Secondary
								Adel (later)						
012_MAKS	16/04/17	Marka (JO)	Playstation Café	65	4672	Ameen			Damascus (SYR)	M	23	No		Secondary
013_MANS	20/04/17	Manshia (JO)	Home	64	4871	Layla			Daraa (SYR)	F	27	Yes	3	Secondary
							Mother							
								Kids						
014_MAJS	20/04/17	Mafraq (JO)	Home	77	4568	Omar			Aleppo (SYR)	M	28	Yes	2	Primary
							Wife							
								Kids						
015_MAHS	20/04/17	Mafraq (JO)	Home	39	3403	Habeeb	Wife		Damascus (SYR)	M	36	Yes	3	Primary
							Mother							
								Kids						
016_MAAS	20/04/17	Mafraq (JO)	Home	130	7147	Laith			Homs (SYR)	M	36	Yes	3	Tertiary
017_MANKS	20/04/17	Mafraq (JO)	Home	62	3184	Usama			Daraa (SYR)	M	35	Yes	3	Primary
							Wife							
								Kids						
018_AMMAI	22/04/17	Amman (JO)	Home	98	5402	Ayman			Baghdad (IRQ)	M	24	No		Secondary
						Suhayla			Baghdad (IRQ)	F	50	Yes	2	Secondary
Total				13	79 102119	23	5			20	32.4	16	3.1	
										3		6		

(full version on file)

VII.   Field note: Gatekeepers or not?

Amman, 22 April 2017

I tried to reach Hashimi el Shimali, a peripheral district of Amman, where many Iraqis are known to be settled temporarily. I had met a respondent last year here as well. To get there, first, I had a hard time. I stopped in the Al Nuzha neighbourhood a couple of times to ask 'whether there were young Iraqis I could talk to for an interview'. There was no smarter way to open the subject that I could think of. Some people said 'go to that street and ask there, I know there are many'. Others asked why I was looking for them, to which I responded that I was doing research on the situation of Iraqis in Jordan. Then they would say they couldn't help me. After Al Nuzha I went to Hashemi Al Shimali, it took me a while to get there and I had to ask several people. When I finally got there, a somewhat busy shopping street, I asked at a furniture shop, whether they knew where most Iraqis where living. The old man laughed and said it was full of Iraqis here. He then kindly took me to his neighbourhood and pointed to a couple of Iraqis in the street.

We walked up to one guy in a white *jallaba*, and I asked him whether he knew someone, or whether he himself, had time to talk about their living situation in Jordan. He said he was

busy, but that in the building behind him, there were many Iraqis and that at the mosque I could meet many of them as well. He then told me to note his number, and then said I should know one thing: 'You shouldn't ask Shia, because they are all liars, they will tell you only lies'. And he continued bashing them. Then he asked me whether I was Jordanian, in a tone that revealed his suspicion that I might be Iraqi. I then said so, and he asked where I am from. Then I said from Baghdad, and told him the neighbourhood. Then he said: 'Ah, so you are Shii!' And then he continued talking badly about Shia and lecturing me on why I should find the right faith and stop insulting Sunna etc. This went on for about two minutes, until he shook my hand and then left. I didn't say anything nor object – not that this would have made much of a difference. His mind was set and his lecture was prepared. The old man and I left and continued down the street.

He said, having stood next to me while the first guy was talking down on me, 'you should talk to some Christians, they are less complicated'. He pointed to a man in the street and said that in that building, there were many Iraqi Christians, and in the one in front as well. I thanked him a lot. He invited me into his house, I refused thankfully and went to see the man he pointed me out to.

The man was looking into my direction and it looked like he was waving me towards him. He was actually telling the vegetable and fruit pick-up to drive back towards his building to check out the melons. While he was looking at them and talking to the young vendor, I approached the building, greeted him. He looked at me and asked whether I wanted to see Abu Salma. I said 'no, I am looking for Iraqis in the neighbourhood for an interview'. His facial expression changed immediately, indicating that he was not going to help me. He said he didn't know whether there were any in the area and that nobody was mingling much.

After a few more attempts, I gave up and left the area. At least I gave it a try. But being pointed out to people by gatekeepers is definitely the better approach.

VIII. Update on change of sample in April 2017

From 14 to 25 April, a second round of interviews will be conducted in Amman, Jordan. Several conceptual and methodological changes have taken place in concert with the supervisors. This document is meant to provide an overview over these changes and the expectations regarding the second round of interviews.

Change of sample

For logistical reasons and due to time constraints, it was decided that the sample would be modified. Originally, the idea was to conduct interviews in three different 'transition countries', namely Jordan, Lebanon and Turkey. Now, interviews will be conducted in Jordan only. On the one hand, this allows to narrow the scope and look at one country more specifically. Having three different countries would incite the adoption of a comparative perspective, which could risk inflating the research ambitions. Also, since a first round of interviews has already been conducted and the researchers have established a network of connections that they can resort back to, finding respondents and organising the interviews is likely to be less complicated. Hence, the interviews of the first round of interviews (July 2016) and the second round (April 2017) will be included in the sample. The only interview conducted in Istanbul, Turkey (May 2016), will be declared as an exploratory interview.

Adaptation of mind map

During the preparations for the presentation of the thesis seminar (February 2017), the mind map has already been adjusted to reflect the conceptual changes. A refined version is accompanying this document.

The new version contains the following dimensions:

- Personal information
- **Past & Trajectory**
    - o The aim of this question is to find out *what insecurities* have pushed the respondent to take the decision of leaving his country
- **Human Security I**
    - o This section focuses on *economic, health, environmental, food security*
    - o Questions relate to life in Jordan
- **Human Security II**
    - o This section focuses on *personal, community and political security*
    - o The first round has shown that these threats are less prevalent than the ones tackled in Human Security II
- **Prospects**
    - o This dimension is meant to capture plans for the future
    - o Through these questions, it should also become evident *what kind of security* the person seeks through resettlement or return to the home country

o In this section, a conceptual question will be introduced: *What does 'security' mean to you? What do you need to feel safe?*

- Wrap-up

Adjustments to objectives and research questions

Through our analysis, it has become clear that the wealth of information provided regarding the motivations to leave their original country provides insights into the *different types of security that these human beings were lacking* most and that they, consequently, sought when leaving their country. Therefore, it seems reasonable to expand the scope of the analysis to those earlier phases of their journey. The adjusted research questions would look as follows:

- What are the *insecurities* that push Syrians and Iraqis to leave their countries and seek refuge in Jordan?

- What are the main *difficulties and insecurities* Syrian and Iraqi urban refugees are facing in Jordan in their daily lives? What are the sources of these insecurities?

- Which *aspects of human security* are most affected? Is it the traditional 'personal security', or do urban refugees attribute more weight to threats to other components of 'human security'?

- What *coping mechanisms* do urban refugees adopt? What explains their *resilience*?

- In wanting to leave Jordan, *what type of security* are Syrian and Iraqi urban refugees seeking?

Furthermore, a few conceptual questions will be considered:

- In the light of the research findings, is *human security a useful framework* to analyse the insecurities of urban refugees and their sources? Are there threats to security that escape the lens of 'human security'?

- What *relevance* does the concept of human security have for criminological research? Conversely, how can criminology benefit from human security research?

Since the focus on human security aspects is a clear departure from the initial victimological perspective that was dominating the first round of interviews, we are hoping that this second round of interviews will be better adapted to the reality of the respondents' experiences and that it will yield valuable insights into the above-mentioned research questions.

AA, 6 April 2017