

JOHANNES BRONKHORST

Jainism's first heretic and the origin of *anekānta-vāda*

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A number of canonical and non-canonical Jaina texts relate the story of Jamāli, a disciple of Mahāvīra who went on to become Jainism's first heretic. The passages concerned, especially in the older texts, make a strange, even bizarre impression. They remain unintelligible, as it seems to me, until one realises that the story of Jamāli was used in order to deal with a theoretical issue that occupied the minds of many thinkers for some time during the history of Indian thought.

The *Viyāhapannatti* (Skt. *Vyākhyāprajñapti*), canonical text of the Śvetāmbaras better known by the name *Bhagavatī*, contains no doubt the oldest surviving version of what Jamāli supposedly had to say.¹ He is here made to pronounce the following words: "Mahāvīra claims that what is moving, has moved; what is coming forth, has come forth; what is becoming perceptible, has become perceptible; what is decreasing, has decreased; what is being cut, has been cut; what is being broken, has been broken; what is being burned, has been burned; what is dying, is dead; what is being annihilated, has been annihilated. This is incorrect."² All the cases enumerated by Jamāli present a combination of a present participle and a past participle. The position here attributed to Mahāvīra is indeed put in his mouth elsewhere in the same text.³ We will consider in a minute how these words have to be interpreted in their different contexts.⁴ Jamāli interprets them in an altogether special way, which becomes clear from the sequel. He continues, referring to the bed which his companions are making: "It is clear that the bed is being made, but has not been made, that it is being spread, but has not

¹ On the schism provoked by Jamāli, see further Leumann 1885: 98 sq. The *Āvaśyaka-cūrṇi* "suit généralement avec fidélité le modèle canonique que constitue la *Viyāhapannatti* ... Seuls deux courts passages propres aux [Āvaśyaka] sont rédigés en *māhārāstrī*." (Balbir 1993: 146). Also a passage contained in Nemicandra's commentary on *Uttarādhyayana* 3.9 (Bombay, 1937, p. 69 f.) follows the *Viyāhapannatti*. Śāntisūri's commentary on this same passage was not accessible to me; cp. Jain 1975: 23.

² *Viy* 9.33.228 (p. 458), Ladnun edition (here cited); 9.33.96 (p. 477), Bombay edition; vol. 4 p. 102 in Lalwani's translation: *jaṇ ṇaṃ samaṇe bhagavaṃ mahāvīre evaṃ āikkhai, [evaṃ bhāsai, evaṃ paṇṇavei,] evaṃ parūei — evaṃ khalu calamāṇe calie, udrijjamāṇe udrie, vedijjamāṇe vedie, pahijjamāṇe pahīṇe, chijjamāṇe chinne, bhijjamāṇe bhīṇe, dajjhamāṇe daddhe, mijjamāṇe mae, nijjarijjamāṇe nijjīṇe, taṇ ṇaṃ micchā*. The part between hooks ([]) has been completed on the basis of *Viy* 1.9.420 (Ladnun). For a résumé of the story of Jamāli, see Deleu 1970: 163 sq. In translating the terms of this passage, I for the most part follow Deleu 1970: 73.

³ See below, note 32.

⁴ See notes 19 and 20 in Lalwani's translation, vol. 1 p. 226-228. Deleu (1970: 73) observes: "Abhay[adeva's *Vṛtti*] indeed explains the different words as technical terms applying to the course of *karman*. It should be noted, though, that some of his equations are rather improbable ... and that in other places ... still other words are used to illustrate rather than formulate the tenet."

been spread."⁵ Jamāli appears to take Mahāvīra's remarks literally, and considers them to be meant for all combinations of present and past participles. He himself uses here two verbs which had not been used by Mahāvīra. He uses the verbs 'to do' and 'to spread', which are used when one speaks of making a bed. More generally, Jamāli's complaint appears to be based on the impossibility that present and past coexist at the same time.

The problem here raised reminds us of another one which occupied the minds of many Indian thinkers — including Brahmanical and Buddhist thinkers — for a number of centuries. If one says "The potter makes a pot" is there then a pot in the situation described? In other words, is it justified to state that the pot that is being made has been made? Or is it correct to believe that a pot that is coming into being is already there, and has therefore already come into being? These and similar difficulties gave rise to a number of attempted solutions. Most thinkers agreed that there had to be something in the situation described in "The potter makes a pot" or "The pot comes into being" corresponding to the word 'pot'. But what? The Buddhist Nāgārjuna and his followers concluded from the fact that there is nothing corresponding to the word 'pot' in the situation described that production cannot take place.⁶ Others, most importantly the Buddhist Sarvāstivādins and the Brahmanical Sāṃkhyas, maintained that the pot is there, that things exist before they come into being; this position has come to be known by the name *satkāryavāda*. Others again, particularly the Naiyāyikas and Vaiśeṣikas, solved the puzzle by insisting that the word 'pot' can also refer to the universal that inheres in the individual pot, to potness; potness being eternal, it is there before the individual pot comes into being, and therefore present in the situation described by statements such as "he makes a pot". Other solutions had also been proposed, but this is not the occasion to discuss them.

Has the story of Jamāli as recounted in the *Viyāhapannatti* anything to do with this question as to how things can come into being? Jamāli protests against the notion that something that is being made has already been made. Does he here protest against the solution to this problem that the Jains had come to accept?

The Viśeṣāvaśyaka Bhāṣya of Jinabhadra (6th - 7th cent. C.E.; Mahārāṣṭra)⁷ discusses the problem raised by Jamāli and situates it indeed in the context of the question whether

⁵ *Viy* 9.33.228 (p. 458)(Ladnun); 9.33.96 (p. 477)(Bombay); vol. 4 p. 102 in Lalwani's translation: *imaṃ ca ṇaṃ paccakkham eva disaī sejjāsaṃthārae kajjamāṇe akaḍe, saṃtharijjamāṇe asaṃtharie*.

⁶ Cp. MadhK(deJ) 7.17: *yadi kaścid anutpanno bhāvaḥ saṃvidyate kvacit/ utpadyeta sa kiṃ tasmin bhāve utpadyate 'sati*// There is a particularly close parallel to Jamāli's position in Nāgārjuna's *Mūlamadhyamakakārikā* 2.1, where Nāgārjuna, too, denies that a past and a present participle can characterise the same object: *gataṃ na gamyate tāvad agataṃ naiḥ gamyate/ gatāgatavinirmuktaṃ gamyamānaṃ na gamyate*// Jamāli would certainly agree with the beginning of this verse.

⁷ Balbir 1993: 75.

something existent or non-existent can be produced. The following are some extracts from Koṭyārya's (9th cent. or earlier) commentary:⁸

Jamāli, overcome by fever, instructed his pupils to make the bed. Seeing that what he had said had not been accomplished he got angry [and said:] "The sacred word (*siddhāntavacana*) to the extent that what is being done has been done is incorrect, because it goes against perception This bed is perceptibly being made, as a result of the instruction to spread the blanket; it has not been made at this [same] moment. ... For this reason everything that is being made, without exception, has not been made. ... Jamāli proves his own position: The claim (*pratijñā*) is that something that has been made is not being made, because it is [already] there, like an old pot. But if someone accepts that something, though made, is being made, then the state of being made would always be there, because [that thing] would be being made, like that which had been made during the first moment. And there would be no end to the activity of making ... For this reason [only] something that has not been made and is not there is being made.

Jamāli is subsequently refuted in the following passage:⁹

The opinion of the [ancient teachers is as follows:] Something that has not been made is not being made, because it is not there, just like a flower in the sky. But if one accepts that it comes into being, [saying] "that which initially was non-existent and had not been made is [now] being made", then one arrives at [the following] undesired consequence: also the horn of a donkey would then be being made; it must be being made, for it has not been made, just like the pot which you have accepted. ...

This passage closely paraphrases the words of Jinabhadra's verse,¹⁰ and shows that for Jinabhadra only something that has been made can be being made.

⁸ Jinabhadra, Viśeṣāvaśyaka Bhāṣya, Part II, p. 538 sq. (under verses 2789-93): *jamāliṛ dāhajvarābhībhūtaḥ 'saṃstāraḥ kuruta' ity ādiśya śiṣyān vāksamakam anīṣṇaṃ dṛṣṭvā ruṣitaḥ siddhāntavacanaṃ 'kriyamānaṃ kṛtam' ity etad vitatham, pratyakṣaviruddhatvāt, aśrāvaṇaśabdavacanavat/... saṃstāraḥ 'yaṃ pratyakṣaṃ kriyamānaś ca kambalaprastaraṇavyāpārādeśāt na cāsmiṇ samaye kṛtaḥ/ punar api vastuprastaraṇasāpekṣāt kriyamāna eva, na kṛtaḥ, tasmāt kriyamānasya dharmiṇaḥ kriyamānatvam eva pratyakṣam idam, na kṛtatvam, anīṣṇatvāt/ tataḥ kriyamānatvena pratyakṣasiddhena kṛtatvam dharmo 'paṇiyate iti pratyakṣaviruddhatvam/ tasmāt sarvam eva vastu kriyamānaṃ na kṛtam eva, kriyāparisamāptau naḥ kṛtam, nā'rāt/... svamataṃ tāvaj jamāliṛ darśayati: kṛtam vastu na kriyamānaṃ iti pratijñā, vidyamānatvāt, cīrantanaghaṭavat/ atha kṛtam api kriyamāna[m a]bhyupagamyate kenacit tataḥ sarvadā kriyamānāvasthaiva bhavatu, kriyamānatvāt, prathamasaṃmayakṛtatvāt/ na ca kriyāparisamāptiḥ, sarvadā kriyamānatvāt, ādisamayavat/... viphalā ca kriyā, sarvavastūnāṃ kṛtatvān niṣpannaghaṭavat/ tasmāt akṛtam avidyamānaṃ ca kriyate/*

⁹ Jinabhadra, Viśeṣāvaśyaka Bhāṣya, Part II, p. 539 (under verses 2795-96): *sthavirāḥ śrutajñānāptāḥ/ teṣāṃ matam: nākṛtam kriyate, abhāvatvāt, khapuṣpavat/ atha tasya janmābhyupagamaḥ: pūrvam abhūtam akṛtam eva kriyate/ tato 'niṣṭāpādanam: kharaviṣāṇam api kriyatām, kriyamānaṃ bhavatu, akṛtatvāt, tvadiṣṭaghaṭavat/ yac ca tvayā doṣajālam upakṣipyate vidyamānasya karaṇe, tat sarvam avidyamānakarane 'pi tadavastham: sarve tatṛpi doṣāḥ, asati avidyamāne kriyamāne kaṣṭatarā vā doṣā bhavyeyuḥ atyantāsambaddhatvādayaḥ/ dṛṣyatām vā: kriyate kharaviṣāṇam pūrvam abhūtatvād iṣṭakāryavat/*

¹⁰ Jinabhadra, Viśeṣāvaśyaka Bhāṣya, Part II, p. 539, verse 2759: *therāṇa mataṃ nākatam abhāvato kīrate khapupphaṃ va/ ahava akataṃ pi kīrati kīratu to kharaviṣāṇam pi//*

How is this peculiar position to be understood? Koṭyārya, elaborating on Jinabhadra's verse text, offers the following explanation. Something is not being made until the last moment of its production, which is also the moment at which it has been made. The production of the pot, for example, passes through a large number of stages — Koṭyārya mentions *śivaka*, *sthāsaka*, and *kuśūla*, and indicates that there are many more — during each of which not the pot but one of its earlier stages is being produced. When can one say that the pot is being made? Not until the end can be seen, i.e., not until the pot has been made.¹¹

Jinabhadra's second explanation occurs elsewhere in the Viśeṣāvaśyaka Bhāṣya, where he criticises the Mādhyamikas, the followers of Nāgārjuna.¹² Jinabhadra's own commentary on verse 2149 presents Nāgārjuna's position on the production of things in the following manner:¹³

What has been produced is not being produced, because it is [already] there, like a pot. But if [you accept] that also what has been produced is being produced, you will have infinite regress. What has not been produced is not [being produced] either, because it is not there, like the horn of the donkey. And if [you accept] that also what has not been produced is being produced, you will have to accept that non-entities, such as the horn of a donkey etc., can be produced.

This position is subsequently criticised. The following passage clarifies Jinabhadra's position:¹⁴

In this world there are things that are being produced having been produced already, others [are being produced] not having been produced already, others [are being produced] having been produced and not having been produced, others again [are being produced] while being produced, and some are not being produced at all, according to what one wishes to express. ... For example, a pot is being produced having been produced in the form of clay etc., because it is made of that. That same [pot] is being

¹¹ Jinabhadra, Viśeṣāvaśyaka Bhāṣya, Part II, p. 539 sq. (under verses 2796-99): *yad abhūtaprādurbhāve bhavatopapattir ucyate kriyākāladrāghīyastvam, tan naivāsti dīrghakālakaraṇaṃ ghaṭasya, yasmād anyadiya evāsau dīrghakālo na ghaṭasyeti/ ... iha pratisamayam piṇḍa-sthāsaka-kuśūlādaya utpadyante parasparavilakṣaṇā bahavaś ca/ teṣāṃ bahutvād yadi kriyākālo dīrgho bhavati, tataḥ kim āyātaṃ kumbhasya? tadāsau naivārabdhā iti/ ... anyārambhe anyan na drśyate, anyatvāt, paṭārambha iva ghaṭaḥ/ katham anyatvam iti cet? śivakādīnāṃ kumbhasya cānyatvam, parasparavilakṣaṇatvāt, paṭavat/ tasmāc chivakādyavasthāyāṃ śivakādyārambhe katham iva ghaṭo drśyata iti? ata evāsau ārabdhō yady anta eva drśyate svārambhakāle/ tataḥ ko doṣaḥ? dīrghkālātāvābhāva ity arthaḥ/ tasmād ārambhakāla eva kriyamānaṃ tasminn eva ca vartamāne sampratīkāle kṛtaṃ tad bhavati/*

¹² See Butzenberger 1994.

¹³ Jinabhadra, Viśeṣāvaśyaka Bhāṣya, Part II, p. 378 (under vers 2149): *... na tāvaj jātaṃ jāyate, vidyamānatvāt ghaṭavat/ atha jātaṃ api jāyate 'navasthāprasaṅgaḥ/ tathā nājātam, avidyamānatvāt kharaviśāṇavat/ athājātam api jāyate kharaviśāṇādyabhāvajātikriyāprasaṅgaḥ/*

¹⁴ Jinabhadra, Viśeṣāvaśyaka Bhāṣya, Part II, p. 385 (under verses 2183-84): *iha kiñcit jātaṃ jāyate, kiñcid ajātam, kiñcij jātajātam, kiñcij jāyamānam, kiñcit sarvathā na jāyate, vivakṣātaḥ/ .../ yatheha ghaṭo mṛdrūpādibhir jāta eva jāyate, tanmayatvāt/ sa evākāravīṣeṣeṇājāto jāyate, prāgabhāvāt/ rūpādibhir ākāraviśeṣeṇa ca [jātā]jāto jāyate, tebhyo 'narthāntaratvāt/ atīānāgatakālayor vinaṣṭānutpannatvāt kriyānupapattir vartamānamātrasamaya eva kriyāsadbhāvāj jāyamāno jāyate/*

produced not having been produced concerning its particular shape, because that was not there before.

...

This explanation is of course typical of the so-called *anekāntavāda* of the Jainas.

[Interestingly, authors more recent than Jinabhadra no longer make the connection between Jamāli and the problem of the production of things. This is true of Haribhadra (8th cent. C.E.), Śīlānka (9th cent. C.E.) and Abhayadeva (11th cent. C.E.).¹⁵ None of these three authors, where they deal with Jamāli, point out that the latter's position would not allow things to be produced. This may have to do with the circumstance that they lived in a time when the problem of production had lost the general interest that had been bestowed upon it during the early centuries of the common era. In Haribhadra's *Āvaśyaka-vṛtti* Jamāli's position is not refuted by pointing out that nothing would in that case come into being. It is refuted in an altogether different manner:¹⁶ "Oh teacher! the words of the holy one to the extent that what is being made has been made are not incorrect, and they are not against what is visible. Because the following reasoning would follow: if that which is being made, and which has [therefore] been entered by the action, is not accepted as having been made, then how can that (i.e., the state of having been made) be accepted even later when there is no action, like before when action had not yet undertaken [its work]. Because absence of action is not different [before and after the action]." Abhayadeva's commentary on the *Sthānāṅga* refutes Jamāli in almost identical words.¹⁷ Śīlānka's commentary on the *Sūtrakṛtāṅga* points out that that which is being made has been made according to the *vyavahāranaya*, the practical point of view. An example is the common usage "Devadatta has gone to Kānyakubja" even when Devadatta has only left today, and can therefore only be on his way to Kānyakubja; another one is the usage "this is a table (? , *prasthaka*)" in a situation where the wood for the table is just being cut.¹⁸]

¹⁵ Koṭyārya is an exception, no doubt because he comments upon Jinabhadra's words that do make this connection.

¹⁶ Haribhadra, *Āvaśyaka-vṛtti* on *Mūla Bhāṣya* 126, p. 209: *he ācārya! kriyamāṇam kṛtam ityādi bhagavadvacanam avitatham eva, nādhyakṣaviruddham, yadi kriyamāṇam kriyāviṣṭam kṛtam neṣyate tataḥ katham prak kriyānārambhasamaya iva paścād api kriyābhāve tad iṣyate iti sadā prasaṅgāt, kriyābhāvasyāviśiṣṭatvāt.*

¹⁷ Abhayadeva on *Sthānāṅga Sūtra* 587, p. 274: *he ācārya! kriyamāṇam kṛtam iti nādhyakṣaviruddham, yadi hi kriyamāṇam kriyāviṣṭam kṛtam neṣyate tataḥ kriyānārambhasamaya iva paścād api kriyābhāve katham tad iṣyate iti sadā prasaṅgāt, kriyābhāvasyāviśiṣṭatvāt.*

¹⁸ See Śīlānka on *Sūtrakṛtāṅga-Niryukti* 125, p. 154: *vyavahāranayābhiprāyena kriyamāṇam api kṛtam bhavati/ ... na cāsau jānāti varāko yathā ayam loko ghaṭārthāḥ kriyā mṛtkhananādyā ghata evopacarati, (tattvataḥ) tāsām ca kriyāṇām kriyākālaniṣṭhākālayor ekakālatvāt kriyamāṇam eva kṛtam bhavati, dṛśyate cāyam vyavahāro loka, tad yathā: adyaiva devadatte nirgate kānyakubjam devadatto gata iti vyapadeśaḥ, (lokoktyā) tathā dāruṇi chidyamāne prasthako 'yam (iti) vyapadeśa ityādi/. The expression *kriyākālaniṣṭhākālayor ekakālatvāt* resembles a vākya of the Vaiśeṣika Kaṇḍī cited by Mallavādin: *niṣṭhāsambandhayor ekakālatvāt* (Bronkhorst 1993:145). Is there a connection? The example of the journey to Kānyakubja makes of course only sense if we assume that Śīlānka lived more than a day's journey from that city.*

Other Jaina authors, often in contexts that do not mention Jamāli, confirm that there are different aspects to the process of coming into being. Something comes into being while it exists already from one point of view, whereas it does not yet exist from another point of view. Kundakunda, for example, states in his Pravacanasāra:¹⁹ "There is no production without destruction, nor destruction without production. Neither production nor destruction [are possible] without something that continues to be." Siddhasena Divākara distinguishes in his Saṃmatitarkaprakaraṇa (ca. 700) essentially two points of view, which he calls *dravyāstika* "the substance exists" and *pariyāyāstika* "the modification exists".²⁰ The result of this distinction becomes clear in verse 1.11:²¹ "Things are produced and disappear by force of the point of view of the modifications; everything is always without production and without destruction [by force of the point of view] according to which the substance exists." It is clear from all these passages that the aspectual approach, which is so typical of Jaina thinking, was used to solve the paradox of causality, as B.K. Matilal pointed out in 1981.²² We can be more concrete. The statement "the potter makes a pot" is not problematic for these Jaina thinkers, because the pot is already there "in a certain manner" while the potter is making it.

We must return to the story of Jamāli as told in the Viyāhapannatti. Is there reason to believe that this earliest surviving version of the story had already a connection with the question as to how things come into being? The sequel of the story provides a probable answer. Jamāli meets his old master, Mahāvīra, as well as Gautama, the latter's disciple. Gautama poses the following questions: "Is the world eternal or non-eternal? Is the soul eternal or non-eternal?"²³ Since Jamāli cannot respond, Mahāvīra explains: "Jamāli! The world is eternal. Never did it not exist, never does it not exist, never will it not exist. It existed, it exists, and it will exist. It is firm, perpetual, eternal, indestructible, imperishable, durable. Jamāli! The world is non-eternal. Having declined, it comes up, and vice versa."²⁴ Similar observations are made with regard to the soul.

We recognise in this little sermon an early expression of the aspectual approach to reality which is so common in later Jaina authors. And I submit that it is no coincidence that Mahāvīra is made to preach precisely this sermon to Jamāli. It shows that Jamāli is presented

¹⁹ Pravacanasāra 2.8: *na bhavo bhaṅgavihīṇo bhaṅgo vā atthi saṃbhavavihīṇo/ uppādo vi ya bhaṅgo na viṇā dhovveṇa attheṇa//*. Cp. Matilal 1981: 38.

²⁰ Saṃmatitarkaprakaraṇa 1.3 (p. 271) with the commentary of Abhayadeva.

²¹ Saṃmatitarkaprakaraṇa 1.11 (p. 409): *uppajjamti viyaṃti ya bhāvā niyameṇa pajjavāyassa/ davvaṭṭhiyassa savvaṃ sayā anuppannam aviṇaṭṭham//*. Abhayadeva explains *davvaṭṭhi(y)a* as *dravyārthika*, and not as *dravyāstika* as he had done under 1.3.

²² Matilal 1981: 26 f. ("Anekānta as a resolution of the paradox of causality").

²³ Viy 9.33.231 (p. 459)(Ladnun); Viy 9.33.99 (p. 478)(Bombay); tr. Lalwani vol. 4 p. 104: *sāsac loc jamālī? asāsac loc jamālī? sāsac jīve jamālī? asāsac jīve jamālī?*

²⁴ Viy 9.33.233 (p. 459)(Ladnun); Viy 9.33.101 (p. 479)(Bombay); tr. Lalwani vol. 4 p. 104-105: *sāsac loc jamālī! jam na kayāi nāsī, na kayāi na bhavāi, na kayāi na bhavissāi. bhuvim ca, bhavāi ya, bhavissāi ya. dhuve, nitic, sāsac, akkhac, avvac, avatṭhic nicce. asāsac loc jamālī! jam osappiṇī bhavittā ussappiṇī bhavāi, ussappiṇī bhavittā osappiṇī bhavāi.*

as demurring against the orthodox Jaina position which maintained that something that has already been made is being made. To be sure, Mahāvīra is not only made to say **this**. He is also presented as holding that the world, or the soul, or other things we may assume, are non-eternal. But the fact that all these things are also eternal makes it possible for them to come into being. For only something that is already there can come into being.²⁵

It is time to draw some conclusions. To begin with, there can be no question that the historical Mahāvīra and his disciple Jamāli really discussed the issue of the production of objects. The question as to how a pot can come into being becomes a major and widely discussed problem at a rather precise moment in history and then occupies the minds of practically all Indian thinkers for a number of centuries. One of the earliest thinkers who deals with it is the Buddhist Nāgārjuna. Probably already before him the Sarvāstivādins were aware of it, for they discuss it in their Vibhāṣā and in both versions of the Mahāvibhāṣā. Brahmanical thinkers appear to have been confronted with it later: the Sāṃkhyas not until a relatively later development of their school, probably after Nāgārjuna, the Vaiśeṣikas after the Vaiśeṣika Sūtra, etc. I have tried to document all this in another study,²⁶ and it would take too much time to review all the relevant evidence here at present. The conclusion seems however clear: the question how things can come into being became an issue in the early centuries of the common era, not before that time.

It will be hard not to draw the conclusion that the story of Jamāli as told in the Viyāhapannatti cannot be older than these same early centuries of the common era. This should not surprise us. The Śvetāmbara tradition itself gives a late date (5th cent.) to the final redaction of its canon; the Digambaras altogether refuse to accept it as authentic. Linguistic features confirm that the Śvetāmbara canon in its surviving form is indeed late, considerably

²⁵ Note that the idea of an eternal world in which nothing disappears and nothing comes into being was not unknown to the Jains. Already Sūyagada I, supposedly one of the oldest texts of the Jains canon, criticizes this position in the following two verses: "Eš gibt in der Welt nach der Lehre Einiger fünf grosse Elemente. Der Atman is das sechste. Ferner sagen sie: Atman und Welt sind ewig. In zweifacher Weise gehen sie nicht zugrunde. Auch entsteht nicht, was nicht schon da ist. Alle Dinge, die es überhaupt gibt, ohne Ausnahme, sind ihrer Wesensart nach ewig."^a If we assume that the position here criticized is itself a response to the problem of the production of things, it will be difficult to argue against a late date (roughly contemporaneous with Nāgārjuna or the Vibhāṣā of the Sarvāstivādins) for this part of the text, as late, therefore, as the date normally assigned to the Nijjutti which comments it (1st cent. CE; cp. Balbir 1993: 39). One can avoid this conclusion by assuming that these verses refer to Sarvāstivāda doctrine, partly distorting it in the process. Such an assumption is to some extent supported by the fact that the very next verse of this text is familiar with the Buddhist theory of momentariness, and appears to show acquaintance with the position of the Pudgalavādins. This issue will be explored in a separate study.

^aSūy I.1.1.15-16: *santi panca mahabbhūyā iha-m-egesim āhiyā/āya cchattho puṇo āhu āyā loge ya sāsac// duhao na viṇassanti no ya uppajjae asam/savve vi savvahā bhāvā nīya-bhāvam āgayā//*. The translation and edition is Bollée's (1977: 15, 69), who explains (p. 72) the variant *niyatībhāvam* as follows: "Die einfachste Deutung der Überlieferung scheint mir die paläographisch leicht erklärbare Verschreibung von *niya(t)ī* für *nīya* ~ sa. *nīya*, wobei das lange *-ī* entweder analog zu anderen Zusammensetzungen mit *bhāva* entstanden sein oder auf ein ursprüngliches *nīyam bhāvam* hinweisen kann."

²⁶ *Langage et réalité: sur un épisode de la pensée indienne*, Paris: École Pratique des Hautes Études, Section des Sciences Religieuses (in press).

later than the Pāli canon of the Buddhists.²⁷ Herman Tieken suggests, on the basis of a study of vocabulary, that the Vivāgasūya (Vipākaśruta) in its present form — i.e., one of the Aṅgas — hails from Gujarat, and must therefore be relatively late. The same is a fortiori true, still according to Tieken, for the Paṇhāvāgaraṇa (Prašnavyākaraṇa), another Aṅga, and for the Dasaveyāliya-Nijjutti (Daśavaikālika-Niryukti).²⁸ Morphological considerations lead him to think that the Uttarajjhāyā (Uttarādhyayana) is late.²⁹ The canonical Aṇugaddāra (Anuyogadvāra) refers to the Vaiśeṣika, Sāṃkhya and Lokāyata systems, and perhaps even to the Yoga-Bhāṣya, and cannot therefore be anything but very young indeed.³⁰

Do we have to conclude that the Viyāhapannatti as a whole dates from the early centuries of the common era at the earliest? Here various factors have to be taken into consideration. Jozef Deleu (1970: Introduction), following Albrecht Weber, has drawn attention to the fact that the Viyāhapannatti consists of a nucleus and accretions. The story of Jamāli clearly belongs to the old nucleus. According to Bansidhar Bhatt (1983), it belongs to the oldest one of three layers (Category I) within that old nucleus; unfortunately Bhatt gives no justification for this position.³¹ Second, Jamāli protests against a claim by Mahāvīra that is described in the following terms: "what is moving, has moved; what is coming forth, has come forth; what is becoming perceptible, has become perceptible; what is decreasing, has decreased; what is being cut, has been cut; what is being broken, has been broken; what is being burned, has been burned; what is dying, is dead; what is being annihilated, has been annihilated". This claim (sometimes expressed with the help of different verbs) occurs at least nine times in the nucleus of the Viyāhapannatti,³² the first time at its very beginning. Deleu comments (1970: 25): "Probably the antique character and the importance of this tenet are the

²⁷ Cp. Hinüber 1990: 22, 34-35, 50; Tieken 1997.

²⁸ Tieken 1997a.

²⁹ Tieken 1998.

³⁰ Cp. Bronkhorst 1995. [Added in proofs:] Paul Dundas (1998: 33) reports that "the Aupapātika Sūtra ... describes Mahāvīra's senior ascetic followers as being versed in magic spells and mantras (*vijjāppahāṇā maṃtappahāṇā*)" but discounts this evidence for the early use of mantras in some shape or form to gain supernatural or soteriological ends "on the grounds that this scripture probably dates from around the beginning of the common era", and is therefore too early. It goes without saying that this evidence might indicate that a more recent date has to be assigned to the Aupapātika Sūtra.

³¹ [Added in proofs:] Suzuko Ohira (1994) assigns the Jamāli story in the Viyāhapannatti to the 4th cent. C.E. (pp. 58 & 148 with 2). The oldest nucleus of the text, on the other hand, she assigns to the period 1st cent. B.C.E./1st cent. C.E. - 3rd cent. C.E. (p. 1).

³² Deleu (1970: 25) enumerates Viy 1.1.1 [1.1.11-12 (p. 5)(Ladnun), 1.1.5 (p. 3)(Bombay), vol. 1 p. 5-6 (Lalwani)]; 1.6.1 (*phu/s/samāne putthe*) [1.6.268 (p. 46)(Ladnun), 1.6.4 (p. 43)(Bombay), vol. 1 p. 87-88 (Lalwani)]; 1.7.3 (*āhārijjamāne āhārie pariṇāmijjamāne pariṇāmie*) [1.7.339 (p. 55)(Ladnun), 1.7.9 (p. 52)(Bombay), vol. 1 p. 104 (Lalwani)]; 1.8.2 (*kajjamāne kaḍe samdhijjamāne samdhitte nivattijjamāne nisarijjamāne nisithe*) [1.8.371 (p. 63)(Ladnun), 1.8.7 (p. 59)(Bombay), vol. 1 p. 119-20 (Lalwani)]; 1.10.1 [1.10.442 (p. 74)(Ladnun), 1.10.1 (p. 69)(Bombay), vol. 1 p. 139-40 (Lalwani)]; 8.6.3 (*chijjamāne chinne pakkhipamāne pakkhitte dajjamāne daddhe; ukkhipamāne ukkhitte pakkhipamāne pakkhitte rajjamāne ratte*) [8.6.255 (p. 358)(Ladnun), 8.6.11 (p. 364)(Bombay), vol. 3 p. 199-200 (Lalwani)]; 8.7.1 (*dijjamāne dinne, padigahcjjamāne padiggahie, nisirijjamāne nisatthe*) [8.7.280 (p. 361)(Ladnun), 8.7.11 (p. 368)(Bombay), vol. 3 p. 209 (Lalwani)] (*gammamāne gae, vītikkamijjamāne vītikkamte*) [8.7.291 (p. 363)(Ladnun), 8.7.23 (p. 370)(Bombay), vol. 3 p. 212 (Lalwani)]; 9.33.2 (story of Jamāli, see above); 16.5 (*pariṇamamāṇā ... pariṇayā, ṇo aparīṇayā*) [16.5.55-57 (p. 721-22)(Ladnun), 16.5.8 & 10-11 (p. 756-57)(Bombay)].

reasons why it was chosen as an appropriate exordium of the whole work."³³ This tenet therefore appears to be as old as the oldest parts of the *Viyāhapannatti*. Does this mean that the problem connected with the production of things is as old as these oldest parts?

Not necessarily. It is true that the tenet according to which something that is being done has been done is used, in the story about *Jamāli*, to solve this particular problem. This, at any rate, is what I have argued so far. This does not however imply that the tenet had always been associated with this particular problem. It is at least conceivable that an old and obscure tenet came to be used to deal with a new problem in the story of *Jamāli*, viz., to deal with the problem of the production of things.

None of the other passages expressing the tenet that something that is being done has been done links it to the problem of production. Some give no clear context at all. Others however use the tenet for an altogether different purpose. Consider e.g. *Viy* 8.6.3, abbreviated by Deleu in the following manner (1970: 150):³⁴

A monk ... or a nun ... commits some fault during his/her begging-tour, peregrination or sojourn in a village and immediately feels regret and penitence about it and sets out to confess it to his/her superior ... The superiors, however, or the monk/nun become unable to speak ... or die before or when they meet; consequently confession is impossible. In such cases of *vis major* the monk/nun still is loyal ..., because "the action that is being performed equals the completed action".

Here the tenet is invoked in defence of monks or nuns who have not been able to carry out their intention to confess. In this context the tenet is obviously interpreted to mean something like "an action that is being performed is as good as the completed action", without metaphysical or ontological implications. Other passages (e.g. *Viy* 8.7.1) use the tenet similarly, to justify some form of behaviour on the part of the followers of *Mahāvīra*.

What about *Mahāvīra*'s sermon to *Jamāli* to the extent that the world is eternal and non-eternal? Does this position occur for the first time in this story? And is it indissolubly linked to the problem of production? The situation may be somewhat more complicated than appears at first sight. *Mahāvīra*'s sermon to the extent that the world is eternal and non-eternal cannot be separated from other passages in the *Viyāhapannatti*. Of particular interest is *Viy*

³³ See also Schubring 1926: 24 f. Deleu observes elsewhere (1977: 192) that "the tenet of the uncheckable process of action (E. Leumann's 'irrevocabile factum'), which from of old the Jainas have held in such high esteem that its solemn enunciation was given the honour of opening the *Viy[āhapannatti]* itself ..., apparently was one of the greatest stumbling blocks to *Mahāvīra*'s contemporaries. Not only was it flatly rejected by the *anyatīrthikas* (I 10¹ ...), the same even denied the *Theras* to draw the most self-evident conclusions from it, e.g. (VIII 7¹ ...) to regard as their property something that had been given to them but did not reach them by some cause or other Even ... the gods in heaven quarrelled about the validity of its implications (XVI 5 ...)."

³⁴ For detailed references to editions see note 32.

2.1.6 which contains the following teaching (Deleu's paraphrase; 1970: 89):³⁵ "The world, the [single] soul, liberation and the [single] liberated being are finite, viz. single, from the material point of view and finite, scil. limited, from the point of view of (the) place (they occupy), but they are infinite from the point of view of time and condition." And Viy 7.2.6 teaches (Deleu 1970: 135):³⁶ "Beings in general (*jīva*) ... are eternal from the material point of view, not eternal in respect of their conditions." Mahāvīra's sermon to Jamāli is therefore an example of a type also found elsewhere in the same text and in other canonical texts,³⁷ and may — like the position criticised by Jamāli — be little more than a repetition of an old theme.

Here two further observations have to be made. First of all, it is practically impossible to decide the chronological relation between the various passages that express what came to be known as *anekāntavāda*. Some of them may be very young. Viy 2.1.6,³⁸ for example, though belonging to the nucleus of the work, contains a reference to *ṣaṣṭitantra*, the doctrine of sixty concepts that characterise Sāṃkhya in one of its forms. While the early history of Sāṃkhya may be too obscure to allow us to derive precise chronological conclusions from references to this school, the same is not true of *ṣaṣṭitantra*. This aspect of Sāṃkhya is closely linked to the name of Vārṣaganya and his school, and was apparently a relatively late innovation.³⁹ Second, Mahāvīra's sermon to Jamāli distinguishes itself in one essential respect from parallel passages. Unlike those other passages, this sermon does not state that the world, or the soul, is eternal from one point of view, and non-eternal from another point of view. It simply states that the world is eternal, and then continues by stating that it is non-eternal. It is conceivable that this is no coincidence. Qualifications might be felt to weaken the position that the world, or the soul, is eternal, and therefore weaken the connection with the statement to the extent that what is being made, has already been made.

Mention must here be made of Matilal's proposal (who follows in this respect Malvania) to look upon the *anekāntavāda* which expresses itself in the passages of the Viyāhapannatti just considered as a development of an earlier *vibhajyavāda* attributed to Mahāvīra in the Sūyagaḍa (Sūtrakṛtāṅga).⁴⁰ The precise meaning of *vibhajyavāda* is object of speculation, but we may assume that an old tradition looked upon Mahāvīra as considering questions from various points of view.

³⁵ Viy 2.1.6 [2.1.26-48 (p. 83-89)(Ladnun), 2.1.13-24 (p. 77-84)(Bombay), vol. 1 p. 153-163 (Lalwani)]. Cp. Matilal 1981: 20 f.; Weber 1867: 242 ff.

³⁶ Viy 7.2.6 [7.2.59 (p. 282)(Ladnun), 7.2.36 (p. 284)(Bombay), vol. 3 p. 26 (Lalwani)]

³⁷ For an exhaustive enumeration and discussion of such passages in the Jaina canon, see Bhatt 1978.

³⁸ Viy 2.1.6 [2.1.24 (p. 83)(Ladnun), 2.1.12 (p. 77)(Bombay), vol. 1 p. 152 (Lalwani)].

³⁹ Frauwallner 1953: 319 f.

⁴⁰ Matilal 1981: 7; 19.

Returning now to the story of Jamāli, it seems justified to conclude that this story brought together two kinds of statements that had been separately attributed to Mahāvīra by earlier tradition, and that the specific combination we find here, along with Jamāli's literal interpretation of one of these statements, provided a solution to the problem of production (or causality) that had come to occupy the minds of virtually all Indian thinkers. The statement to the effect that what is being made has been made was here, perhaps for the first time, taken literally, and provided a solution to the problem of production. However, the undesired consequence that this way a completely static picture of the world would arise, in which nothing would ever change, could be avoided by recalling Mahāvīra's habit to approach questions from various sides.

It is from this point onward that *anekāntavāda*, in the words of B.K. Matilal, becomes "a resolution of the paradox of causality". Perhaps we can go one step further, and maintain that the story of Jamāli in the *Viyāhapannatti* is the first expression (even though the term is not used) of *anekāntavāda* as a doctrinal position on a par with positions held by other schools such as *satkāryavāda*, *sarvāstivāda*, *ajātivāda*, *sūnyavāda* etc. Here for the first time, it would seem, *anekāntavāda* is used to solve a concrete and pressing philosophical problem, the same one which also those other positions were believed to solve by their respective followers. And even though the canonical texts of the Śvetāmbaras can hardly be called 'philosophical' in a more technical sense, it is in the story of Jamāli that one philosophical issue that occupied many non-Jaina thinkers is seen to find its way into the Jaina texts.

One final observation has to be made. We have seen that the story of Jamāli as told in the *Viyāhapannatti* brings together two elements which both had existed independently beforehand, but which only together provide an answer to the problem of production. Most probably a third element will have to be added. This is the element of Jamāli himself. It is likely that an earlier story about this first schismatic once existed, for the name of Jamāli occurs in some apparently old enumerations in the *Ṭhāṇaṅga*.⁴¹ According to the latter of these two, Jamāli was the name of the sixth chapter of the *Aṃtagaḍadasāo* (*Antakṛddasāh*), now lost. Deleu (1970: 41 n. 43) concluded from this: "Probably the Jamāli episode originally belonged to *Antag[aḍadasāo]* 6 ... and was inserted in the *Viy[āhapannatti]* ...".⁴² This is certainly possible. It seems however unlikely that the earliest version of the story of Jamāli, supposing that an older version once existed, was in all details identical with the one we find

⁴¹ *Ṭhāṇa* 7.141 (p. 754)(Ladnun), 7.587 (p. 241)(Bombay) and 10.113.1 (p. 813)(Ladnun), 10.755 (p. 310)(Bombay). References to the Jamāli story occur also elsewhere in the canon; see *Āgama Śabdakośa* vol. I p. 301-02 s.v. Jamāli.

⁴² See also Mehta and Chandra 1970: 275 s.v. "2. Jamāli".

in the *Viyāhapannatti*.⁴³ It is especially improbable that it dealt with, and offered a solution to, the classical problem of origination.

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⁴³ Leumann (1885: 106 n. 1) characterises the story in the *Viyāhapannatti* as "eine durch solenne Uebersetzung mannigfach getrübe Quelle".

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Abbreviations:

AAWL	Abhandlungen der Akademie der Wissenschaften und der Literatur, Mainz, Geistes- und Sozialwissenschaftliche Klasse
ABORI	Annals of the Bhandarkar Oriental Research Institute, Poona
ANISt	Alt- und Neu-Indische Studien, Hamburg
AS	Asiatische Studien, Études Asiatiques, Bern
BEI	Bulletin d'Études Indiennes, Paris
IS	Indische Studien, Beiträge für die Kunde des indischen Altertums, ed. A. Weber, vol. 1-18, Berlin, Leipzig, 1850-1898
Jg.	Jahrgang
MadhK(deJ)	Nāgārjuna, Mūlamadhyamakakārikāḥ, ed. J.W. de Jong, The Adyar Library and Research Centre, Madras 1977
SSAI	Schriftenreihe des Südasien-Instituts der Universität Heidelberg, Wiesbaden, Stuttgart
Viy	Viyāhapannatti