ABHIDHARMA AND JAINISM

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It has been known for a long time that Buddhism and Jainism (the latter in the form preached by Mahāvīra) originated more or less at the same time and in the same region of India. The early Buddhist texts in particular describe various encounters between the Buddha and Jainas (called nirgrantha/nigantha in these texts), they know Mahāvīra (Nigantha Nath(h)aputta) and report his death. It is not therefore surprising that Jainism has exerted an influence on Buddhism in its early phases. The question whether and to what extent Buddhism has influenced Jainism has not so far received much attention. This question will be addressed in this paper.

We begin with a passage in Sūyagaḍa I, one of the oldest canonical texts of the Śvetāmbara Jainas, which shows familiarity with Buddhism. Sūyagaḍa I.1.1.17 speaks of the five Buddhist groups (skandha) which join up for a moment (khaṇa-joī = kṣanayogin). This passage clearly is not just acquainted with the early Buddhist notion of the five skandhas, it also knows the much more recent theory of momentariness. The chronological and other implications of this fact deserve attention.

Momentariness did not characterize Buddhism from its beginning. The earliest clear references to it appear to occur in the (Mahā-)Vibhaṣa of the Sarvāstivāda tradition, composed several centuries after the beginning of the common era. This does not necessarily imply that it did not exist before that date. Indeed, it seems likely that the theory of momentariness finds expression in the so-called saṃskṛtalakṣaṇas of the Pañcavastuka, which may go back to the middle of the second century before our era. The above-cited passage from the Sūyagaḍa must date from that period at the earliest.

This is not the only conclusion we can draw. Momentariness appears to be indissociably linked to the systematization of Buddhist doctrine carried out [14] in
Sarvāstivāda Abhidharma, and to the development of the Pañcavastuka in particular. Acquaintance of Śūyagaḍa I with Buddhist momentariness must therefore mean: acquaintance with Sarvāstivāda or related Abhidharma. It will be useful to recall some fundamental features of this important development in Buddhism.

The doctrine of momentariness is but one aspect of the general analytical approach that characterizes this form of Buddhism. Not only was time divided into its ultimate units, the same was done with regard to the world in general. Its ultimate constituents are the dharmas, fully enumerated and extensively discussed in the texts. And just as time is nothing beyond a succession of moments, composite objects are nothing beyond the dharmas they are constituted of. In the end only momentary dharmas really exist; the objects they may constitute do not really exist. The composite object par excellence is the person, often called *pudgala*: Its existence is denied by many Buddhists for this very reason.

When we now return to the Jaina canonical texts that are younger than the Śūyagaḍa, we are struck by their familiarity with the notion of a shortest unit of time. The moment (*samaya*) as the smallest unit of time appears to occur for the first time in the Uttarajjhayaṇa. It occurs in this sense in the late 36th chapter, probably in chapter 34 which is also known to be late, and in chapter 29. Utt 36.9 speaks of time as a succession (*santai* / Skt. *santati*), an idea and expression familiar from the Buddhist texts that accept momentariness. The idea that one thought occupies one moment is perhaps for the first time met with in Thāna 1. This same chapter enumerates *samaya*, *pradeśa* (the smallest unit of space) and *paramāṇu* (atom) and states that they are single. These three are characterized as indivisible, indestructable etc. in chapter 3. The same is said in Viyāhapanattī 5.8, where it is shown "that the atom (*paramāṇupoggala*) and the objects (*poggala*) that occupy one unit of space (*ega-paesa*ōgāḍha), last one unit of time (*ega-samaya-ṭhīya*) and possess one degree of one property resp. prove to be indivisible from the ... points of view [of substance, place, time and condition]."
Rospatt has pointed out that in Jainism the moment (samaya) is sometimes defined as the time taken for the movement from one spatial point to the next. This specification of the moment's dimension, he continues, can also be found in Buddhism (where the moment is called kṣaṇa), but has there most probably been adopted from Jainism. He argues that this determination of the moment fits better into the context of Jainism than in that of Buddhism, because it presupposes that empty space is subdivided into spatial atoms. This is indeed the Jainas' point of view, but not that of the Buddhists (with some exceptions pointed out by Rospatt). He further emphasizes that the specification of the moment's duration by movement is at odds with the Buddhist theory of momentariness according to which all conditioned things exist for too short a time to allow for any movement at all. Rospatt's argument is convincing and makes it probable that this particular way of defining the moment, and of linking up samaya and pradeśa, belonged to Jainism before they found their way into Buddhism. It has however no bearing on the question which of these two currents of thought developed the notion of a minimal unit of time first. This last question is answered by the acquaintance of the Sūyagaḍa with the Buddhist theory of momentariness, well before the idea of moments had been introduced into Jainism. It seems plausible to assume that Jainism borrowed this idea from Buddhist Abhidharma.

The second half of the verse from the Sūyagaḍa which shows familiarity with the Buddhist notion of skandhas and the theory of momentariness, studied above, has not received the attention it deserves. It betrays acquaintance with the Buddhist concept of the person. It reads, in Bollée's slightly adjusted translation: "[Die Seele] ist weder verschieden, noch — so lehren sie — nicht verschieden [von den skandhas], wohl und nicht aus einer Ursache entstanden." Bollée is no doubt correct — as was, before him, Jacobi; both follow in this respect Śīlāṅka — in thinking that this half of the verse concerns the soul, or the person, of the Buddhists. We can be more precise: the
characterisation of the soul/person as neither identical with nor different from the skandhas agrees in all details with what we know about the Buddhist Pudgalavādins.

Recall that Buddhism, as pointed out above, developed a concept of the person conceived of as a collection of skandhas which, because it is such a collection and therefore a composite entity, was not recognized to exist. No composite entities were considered to exist by these Buddhists, and the rejection of the person was but one example, even though the most significant one, of this attitude. Other Buddhists, the so-called Pudgalavādins, disagreed. [16] They did not reject the existence of the person, even though they, too, appear to have looked upon it as a collection of skandhas. Yet they believed that the person does not disappear when the skandhas disappear. They maintained that the person is neither identical with nor different from the skandhas.22 This, as we have seen, is the conception of the person which the Sūyagaṇa attributes to the Buddhists.

The chronological and other consequences of this fact, too, will have to be considered. The Vātsiputriyas, who represent the earliest form of Pudgalavāda, are supposed to have separated themselves from other Buddhists after a schism which took place some two hundred years after the death of the Buddha.23 This is not in conflict with our earlier conclusion, according to which this verse of the Sūyagaṇa must have been composed after the middle of the second century B.C.E.

The acquaintance of the Sūyagaṇa with the Buddhist concept of the person, and therefore with Buddhist ideas relating to composite entities, raises various questions. The first one concerns the subsequent Jaina attitude with regard to composite objects. Did the Jainas undergo Abhidharma influence in this respect? We have seen that the Sarvāstivādins rejected the existence of composite entities. What is the position of the later Jaina canonical texts with regard to this for the Buddhists important issue? Several passages show that they are aware of the distinction between composite entities and their parts, and that they accept the existence of both.
Uttarajjhāyā chapter 36 accepts the existence of wholes in v. 11:
"Compound things and atoms occur as individual things and apart (or different) [from each other]" (ekatteño puhatteño khandhā ya paramāṇuṇo). The Viyāhapannatti speaks repeatedly of aggregates (khandha) as existing things; aggregates are formed when atoms are united into one (egayao sāhaṇṇānti = ekataḥ saṃhanyante). Elsewhere the same text states that "aggregates occupying two space-units (dupaesiya khandha) ... [1] possess [dialectical] reality if they are considered from the point of view of their own [properties] ..., [2] do not possess that reality if they are considered from the point of view of [the properties] of another object ...; [3] one cannot say that they possess or do not possess reality if they are considered simultaneously from both these points of view ... [4] the aggregate simultaneously possesses and does not possess reality if part of it is considered from the point of view of its inherent [17] properties and the other part from the point of view of alien properties; and, in conditions the reader can easily deduce for himself, [5] the aggregate simultaneously possesses reality and one cannot say that it possesses or does not possess reality; or [6] it simultaneously does not possess reality and one cannot say etc." and similar things about larger aggregates. All these passages show that they were composed at a time when the philosophical issue of whether or not an aggregate exists besides its component parts was felt and discussed in Jainism. Since this issue is closely connected with the development of the Buddhist Abhidharma theory, there is a certain plausibility in the assumption that the Jainas had taken over this question from the Buddhists and then gave a diagonally opposite answer to it.

An important further argument supporting the idea that the Jainas were influenced by the Buddhist notion of the person as a composite entity is their peculiar use of the word pudgala. This is the word which the Buddhists used to refer to the person conceived of in that manner. The Jainas came to use it in the sense of "material object (including atoms)" (MW). How did they arrive at this peculiar meaning?
Note to begin with that *pudgala* (Pkt. *puggala / poggala*) does not always have this sense in the oldest Jaina canonical texts. The Sûyagâda has the following verse:\(^{29}\)

\[ paññamadât ceva tavomadat ca paññâme goyamadat ca bhikkhu/a/jivâga ceva caûthlam âhu se paûndie uttampoggale se/. \]

Jacobi translates:\(^{30}\) "A monk should combat pride of genius, pride of sanctity, pride of birth, and (pride of good) living, which is enumerated as the fourth; such a man is wise and of the right stuff." The phrase *uttampoggale se* is, no doubt in an effort to stick to the meaning ‘material object’ for *poggala*, translated as "[he is] of the right stuff". But obviously the translation "he is the best person" is to be preferred.\(^{31}\) This shows that the meaning ‘person’ was not yet lost at this early period.

We know that the Sarvâstivâda and Pudgalavâda Buddhists looked upon both the person and other macroscopic objects as aggregates, but that they used the word *pudgala* only for the aggregate which is the person, not for other aggregates. Yet the Sarvâstivâdins in particular had a tendency to treat all aggregates in the same manner: they denied the existence of all of them. In some of the early Jaina texts we find the word *pudgala* used for aggregates other than the person. Consider the following passage from Òyåra II:\(^{32}\)

\[ abhikaûkhasi [18] me dåûm jâvaïyaû, tâvaïyam poggalaû dalayâhi, mâ aûthiyâû. \]

Jacobi translates (p. 115): "if you want to give me a portion of whatever size, give it me; but not the bones", and this is no doubt correct. *Poggala* here means ‘portion, quantity’ and refers therefore to a composite entity, an aggregate (of meat, in this case).

All other passages in the Òyåra\(^{33}\) and Sûyaga that use the word *puggala / poggala* are ambiguous as to its precise meaning. Yet the above two passages show that a development of the meaning from ‘person’ to ‘material object’ is conceivable if we take as point of departure the Buddhist use of *pudgala*. Passages in later canonical Jaina texts show that *pudgala* (or its Prakrit equivalents) went on referring to macroscopic material objects, and therefore to aggregates, besides acquiring the meaning ‘material atom’, sometimes called *paramûnpoggala*. Thâna 2 recognizes, for example, two
sources for the production of sound, the second of which is breaking *poggalas*;\(^{34}\) no need to explain that atoms cannot be broken. Viy 5.8 uses the word for both atoms and aggregates. It here states that "Objects (*poggala*, JB) ... are either divisible (*sa-paesa*), indivisible (*a-p.*) or infinite (*ananta*). Moreover, ... they may be at the same time [indivisible] from one and [divisible] (or [indivisible]) from another point of view. There is, however, one restriction: *poggalas* that are [indivisible] as to substance (scil. atoms) always are [indivisible] as to place, and *poggalas* that are [divisible] as to place always are [divisible] as to substance (scil. aggregates)."\(^{35}\) The Śhāṅka refers to the same distinction where it states that there are two kinds of pudgalas, the atomic and the non-atomic, the subtle and the coarse ones.\(^{36}\) We must assume that the semantic development has passed through the following phases: ‘bodily aggregate’ ‘material aggregate in general’ ‘material object / matter’ ‘the ultimate constituent of matter, material atom’. The end point of this development (which never replaced the preceding element) is, ironically, the exact opposite of its beginning, because atoms are precisely not aggregates.

At this point we must address a particularly important question: has the classical Jaina concept of the soul been created under the influence of Buddhist Abhidharma?

Note to begin with that the texts that are, mainly on linguistic and metrical grounds, looked upon as the oldest ones of the canon — primarily the [19] Āyāra and the Sūyagaḍa — contain little information about the soul. Dalsukh D. Malvania rightly pointed out that "[f]rom the very first sentences of the Ācārāṅga it is clear that the migration of the soul is accepted".\(^{37}\) He draws in this connection also attention to Āyāra 176, which describes the soul in the following terms:\(^{38}\) "It is not long nor small nor round nor triangular nor quadrangular nor circular; it is not black nor blue nor red nor green nor white; neither of good nor bad smell; not bitter nor pungent nor astringent nor sweet; neither rough nor soft; neither heavy nor light; neither cold nor hot; neither harsh nor smooth. It does not have a body, is not born again, has no attachment and is without
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sexual gender. While having knowledge and sentience, there is nonetheless nothing with which it can be compared. Its being is without form, there is no condition of the unconditioned. It is not sound nor form nor smell nor flavour nor touch or anything like that."

Citing the phrase "neither long nor short" (se ṇa dihe ṇa hrasse), Malvania comments: "this goes against the Jaina theory, found in the later texts, that the soul is the size of the body in its mundane existence, and occupies, when liberated, two thirds of the extent of the last body". This ancient concept of the soul, be it noted, was apparently still held at the time of Sūyagaḍa II, for it is there criticized by others, who maintain that body and soul are identical, as characterizing the position of those who believe that body and soul are different. The passage is important enough to be cited at some length: "Those who maintain that the soul is different from the body, cannot tell whether the soul (as separated from the body) is long or small, whether globular or circular or triangular or square or sexagonal or octagonal or long, whether black or blue or red or yellow or white, whether of sweet smell or of bad smell, whether bitter or pungent or astringent or sour or sweet, whether hard or soft or heavy or light or cold or hot or smooth or rough.' ... Thus I have treated of the first man (as one who believes that) soul and body are one and the same thing."

Malvania and following him Paul Dundas are of the opinion that the soul at that early period was defined under the influence of the Upaniṣads, and Malvania cites in support of this view Āyāra 171: "That which is the soul is that which knows, that which is the knower is the soul, that by which one knows is the soul." This opinion may or may not be correct. Malvania certainly appears to be right in suggesting that much of what came to be known as Jaina philosophy was developed later, and was not created in the [20] days of Mahāvīra. This looks like a plausible assumption, all the more so since we know that something quite similar happened in the case of Buddhism: much of what came to be known as Buddhist philosophy was created long after the Buddha. It does however raise the question how and why new ideas were developed after the time of
Mahāvīra. We will consider the somewhat more recent, but still canonical, Jaina conception of the soul in some detail.

The notion of a body-sized soul may for the first time be presented as an orthodox position in a verse of Uttarajjhayana chapter 36 which states: "The dimension of perfected [souls] is two-thirds of the height which the individual had in his last existence". Since this verse occurs in a section dealing with various kinds of souls (jīva; vv. 47-48), we must assume that "the height which the individual had in his last existence" also belonged to his soul. The Viyāhapannatti is more elaborate: soul (jīva) and matter (poggala) are tied to each other, touched by each other, etc. Viy 7.8, referring to the Rāyapaseṇājīja, compares the soul, which may cover the volume of an elephant or of a louse, with a lamp that lights up the space in which it is placed, sometimes a hut, sometimes the space determined by a cover. A short reference to the body-like size of the soul is also found in one of the concluding stanzas of the Uvavāïya.

The Jaina notion of a body-sized soul is far from identical with the Buddhist concept of a person as a composite entity consisting of the five skandhas, yet they have one important point in common: both have a spatial extension that coincides with that of the physical body. In the case of the Buddhist pudgala this does not cause surprise, for that is how it is conceived. The body-like size of the Jaina soul is more puzzling. It cannot be explained as being "primitive"; anthropological literature provides many examples of concepts of a soul that is far smaller than the body, but few, if any, of souls that are coextensive with it. Moreover, we have seen that early Jainism appears not to have held such a concept of the soul. The classical concept is therefore in need of explanation, and the fact that the Jaina soul comes to have the same size as the Buddhist pudgala, combined with the fact that the Jainas are known to have been acquainted with this latter concept, invites the conclusion that the Buddhist concept has influenced the classical Jaina one.
It is however obvious that the Jainas cannot simply have borrowed the Buddhist concept of the person. The Buddhist pudgala did not become the Jaina soul. Jainism has maintained right from the beginning that there is a soul that transmigrates, and that is therefore presumably different from the body. Accepting the existence of aggregates, even such as unite bodily and psychological factors, would not be enough for the Jainas to account for the soul. Indeed, by insisting that there is a soul besides the bodily aggregate, what was left for the latter was nothing but being a material aggregate, with all the consequences which we have seen for the word pudgala. Yet it can be argued that in an important way the Jaina soul was, in spite of this, modeled on the Buddhist concept of the pudgala.

The notion of a body-sized soul owed no doubt part of its attraction to the convenient way it allowed to visualize its relationship to karma. Note first, as already pointed out by K.K. Dixit, that Āyāra I and Sūyagaḍa I — presumably the oldest texts of the Jaina canon — do not tell us "how the Karmic physical particles get attached to a soul and how they get loose from it". Dixit continues: "As a matter of fact, on this question our texts hardly say a thing that would not be endorsed by the Brahmin or Buddhist theoreticians." Is seems indeed likely that the classical karma doctrine of Jainism, which conceives of karma as atomic particles, is a later innovation, which may have come into being at the same time as that of the atomic nature of time and space, and that of the body-sized soul. Uttarajjhayaṇa chapter 33 may contain the earliest mention of karma as being atomic (provided Jacobi is right in translating paṣeṣaṇa = pradesāgra as ‘number of atoms’).

The expression "karma body" occurs already in Āyāra I, but it is doubtful whether it has here the technical meaning it acquires later. Later canonical texts distinguish five kinds of bodies, among them the karma body, without giving much information as to their nature. Schubring observes: "The established list leading from orāḷ[iya (earthly)] over veuvv[iya (of transformation)], āhār[aga (of transposition)], tey[aga (fiery)] to kamm[aga] sarīra suggests the gradual increase in
fineness and, simultaneously, in density of material units”. The karma body may therefore be the finest of the five. More important for our present purposes is that living beings — specified are hell-beings, elementary beings and animals, human beings, and gods and goddesses — attract particles to build their bodies. Deleu summarises in the following words the way the Viyāhappannatti describes the formation of the body:

"The discussion starts with the paoga-bandha (junction effected by an impulse, JB) of the earthly body (specification for the different kinds of beings). Each of these bandhas arises with the appearance (udaya) of the karman of the same name. ... The same questions regarding the bodies of transformation and transposition, the fiery body and the karmic body." This means, as becomes clear from the text, that the junction that gives rise to the earthly body arises with the appearance of the karma called orāliyasarārappaoga (orāliyasarārappaoganamakamma), and similarly for the other junctions. The particles concerned are attracted by the soul, and fill up the space it occupies.

The net result of this way of conceptualising soul and body (or rather: bodies) combined is much closer to the Buddhist notion of the pudgala than the Jaina concept of the soul by itself. All functions, both bodily and mental/spiritual, are in this way united in the space of the body, as they are in the case of the Buddhist pudgala.

The assumption that the Jainas adopted their body-sized soul and the existence of aggregates in response and opposition to Buddhist Abhidharma has the advantage of explaining why they accepted these beliefs, and why they accepted both of them together. We have already seen that chronology constitutes no obstacle to this assumption. The Buddhist theory of momentariness, which may not have come into existence before the second century B.C.E., is already known to the Sūyagaḍa, as is the notion of the Buddhist pudgala. The Buddhist theory of momentariness was but one aspect of the tendency, which initially may have been strongest in the Sarvāstivāda school, to reject the existence of all composite objects, whether extended in space or in
time. The Buddhist notion of the person as a composite entity dates at least from that same period, and therefore pre-dates, as far as we can tell, the Jaina notion of a body-sized soul.

Editions referred to:


Notes:

* I thank Paul Dundas for comments and encouragement. The following abbreviations are used in this article:

AAWL Abhandlungen der Akademie der Wissenschaften und der Literatur, Mainz, Geistes- und Sozialwissenschaftliche Klasse

ANISt Alt- und Neu-Indische Studien, Hamburg

AS Asiatische Studien, Études Asiatiques, Bern

B Bombay edition

Bareau, SBPV André Bareau, Les sectes bouddhiques du Petit Véhicule, Saigon 1955 (PEFEO 38)

BORI Bhandarkar Oriental Research Institute, Poona

C ed. Charpentier

D Delhi edition


J tr. Jacobi

Jg. Jahrgang

KathUp Katha Upaniṣad

L Ladnun edition

Lalw ed. tr. Lalwani

Mahā-bh Patañjali, (Vyākaraṇa-)Mahābāṣya, ed. F. Kielhorn, Bombay 1880-1885


MW Monier Monier-Williams, A Sanskrit-English Dictionary, Oxford 1899

P. Pāṇinian śūtra

PEFEO Publications de l'École Française d'Extrême-Orient, Paris

Pkt. Prakrit

PTS Pali Text Society, London

S ed. Schubring

Sam Samavāya

Skt. Sanskrit

SSAI Schriftenreihe des Südasien-Instituts der Universität Heidelberg, Wiesbaden, Stuttgart

StII Studien zur Indologie und Iranistik

Sūy Śuyagada

ŚAsUp Śvetāṣṭara Upaniṣad

Utt Uttarajjhayaṇa / Uttarajjhāya

Viy Viyāhapannatti
vt. Vārttika

1 DPPN s.v. Nigaṇṭha-Nāṭa(Nātha-)putta and Nigaṇṭhā.
2 See, e.g., Johannes Bronkhorst, The Two Traditions of Meditation in Ancient India, second edition, Motilal Banarsidass, Delhi, 1993, p. 78 f., where the influence of Jain-like practices and ideas is described.
3 This question is to be distinguished from the one about common elements in the two traditions, which receives a fair amount of attention in the secondary literature.
9 W.B. Bollée ("Buddhists and Buddhism in the earlier literature of the Śvetāmbara Jains," Buddhist Studies in Honour of I. B. Horner, D. Reidel, Dordrecht - Boston, 1974, pp. 27-39), too, is of the opinion that "the early contacts of the Jains must have mainly been with that current of interpretatio which was represented by the Sarvāstvādins" (p. 28); see below.
10 Utt 36.14-15 (C p. 250) / 36.13-14 (L p. 227) / 36.1465-66 (B p. 297-98). Since references to Jaina canonical texts are often hard to trace for non-specialists, I will regularly give references to all the editions (and occasionally translations and summaries) to which I have had access.
12 Utt 29.71 (C p. 211) / 29.72 (L p. 201) / 29.1173 (B p. 257), 29.73 (C p. 211) / 29.74 (L p. 201) / 29.1175 (B p. 258).
13 Utt 36.9 (C p. 250) / 36.9 (L p. 226) / 36.1461 (B p. 297).
14 Thāna 1.31 (B p. 4) / 1.41 (D p. 13, L p. 490): ege mane devåsuramaṇuṇånän taṁsi taṁsi śamaṇyamsi.
15 Thāna 1.36 (B p. 4) / 1.44.45 (D p. 16) / 1.48-50 (L p. 491): ege samaec ege paese/ ege paramānū/.
16 Thāna 3.2.173 (B p. 67) / 3.2.165 (D p. 90) / 3.2.328-335 (L p. 568): tato acchejjā pannattā, taṃ jahā: samaye, paramāṇu/ evam abhejjā, adajjhā, agijjhā, añaddhā, amajjhā, apaesā, avibhātimā./

17 Viy 5.8.5 (B p. 220-21) / 5.8.203 (L p. 224-25) / 5.8.144 (Lalw II p. 212); Jozef Deleu, Viyāhapannatti (Bhagavati): The Fifth Anga of the Jaina Canon. Introduction, critical analysis, commentary & indexes. Brugge, 1970 (reprint: Motilal Banarsidass, Delhi, 1996 (Lala Sundar Lal Jain Research Series, 10)), p. 116. Note Jozef Deleu’s (“Lord Mahāvira and the anyaṭṭhikas,” A. N. Upadhye et al. (eds.), Mahāvira and His Teachings, Bhagavān Mahāvira 2500th Nirvāṇa Mahotsava Samiti, Bombay, 1977, pp. 187-193) observation to the extent that "the Buddhists have not been mentioned by name in the Viyāhapannatti and it is rather difficult to decide whether any of the dissident views exposed in that work may be pinned on them" (p. 191).

18 Rospatt, The Buddhist Doctrine of Momentariness, p. 103 with note 233.

19 Even without Sāy I.1.1.17 it would be possible to argue that the theory of momentariness originated in Buddhism, on the basis of the structural development of Buddhist thought. Sāy I.1.1.17 saves us the trouble of having to work out this argument here.


22 Cp. on all this Bronkhorst, "Die Buddhistische Lehre," p. ??? f.

23 Bareau, SBPV p. 114 f.


28 Padmanabh S. Jaini (The Jaina Path of Purification, Motilal Banarsidass, Delhi, 1979, p. 101) refers to the traditional explanation of this term ("The Jaina term puggala is traditionally said to be derived from pum- (joining) plus -gala (breaking)"); but this can no more be accepted as a historical explanation than the one offered in the Sarvadārasanāsanāgra (p. 72, ch. 3 l. 254): pūrayanti galantyti pūdgalā.

29 Sāy I.13.571 (B p. 103) / I.13.15 (D p. 158; L p. 334; J). This may be the oldest [28] attestation of puggala/poggala in the Jaina canon.

30 Jacobī, Jaina Sūtras II, p. 322.

31 IAMD s.v. poggala gives for this passage the meaning "soul".

32 Āyāra II.1.1.10.404 (B p. 140) / II.1.10.58 (D, p. 236) / II.1.10.135 (L p. 115) / II.1.10.6 (J); the reading follows the Ladnun ed. Note that Āyāra II is considered to be younger than Āyāra I.

33 None in Āyāra I; cp. Moriichi Yamazaki and Yumi Ousaka, Āyāraṅga. Word Index and Reverse Word Index, Chūō Academic Research Institute, Tokyo, 1996 (Philologica Asiatica, Monograph Series 8).

34 Thāna 2.3.73 (B p. 23) / 2.3.81 (D p. 42) / 2.3.220 (L p. 516): bhījantānam ceva poggalānam sadduppādi sīyā.

35 Viy 5.8.205 (L p. 225) / 5.8.7 (B p. 221) / 5.8.144 (Lalw II p. 212); Deleu, Viyāhapannatti, p. 116.

36 Thāna 2.3.75 (B p. 24) / 2.3.82 (D p. 42) / 2.3.228-29 (L p. 517): duvihā poggalā pannattā, paramāṇupoggalā ceva, nopoggalā ceva; duvihā poggalā paṇntattā, taṃ jahā: suhumā ceva, bāyāra ceva.

38 Āyāra I.5.6.176 (B p. 56-57) / I.5.6.170 (D, p. 153 f.) / I.5.6.4 (S p. 26) / I.5.6.127 f. (L p. 47): se na dihe na hasse na vaṭṭe na tamse na caïramse na parimāndale na kinhe na nile na lohie na hālidde na sakkile na surabhi-gandhe na durabhi-gandhe na titte na kađue na kāsāc na amble na mahure na kakkađe na muie na garue na luhue na śe na unhe na niddhe na lukkhe na kāi na ruhe na sānge na ittih na purise na annahā parinne sanne uvamañā na vijjāi, arīvi sattā, apayassa payañ n'atthi, se na sadde na rūve na gandhe na rase na phāse icc-eyāvanti. (the reading follows ed. Schubring).


42 Āyāra I.5.5.171 (B p. 55) / I.5.5.165 (D p. 151) / I.5.5.5 (S p. 25) / I.5.5.104 (L p. 45): jē ayā se vinnāyā, je vinnāyā se āya, jena vijānae se ayā (the reading follows ed. Schubring). Tr. Dundas, The Jains, p. 38.

43 Utt 14.19 (L p. 133; C p. 121; J) / 14.460 (B p. 150) is not clear in this respect, but suggests that the notion of a body-sized soul may not yet have existed at that time: "[The soul] cannot be apprehended by the senses, because it possesses no corporeal form, and since it possesses no corporeal form it is eternal. Its binding is determined because of the things connected with the soul, and this binding is called the cause of worldly existence" (no indiya-ggejha amuttabhāvā, amuttabhāvā vi ya hoi nicco/ ajjhattheheun niyay'assa bandho, samsāraheun ca vayanti bandhañ//. Tr. Jacobi, Jaina Sūtras II, p. 64, modified in accordance with K.R. Normān, "Kriyāvāda and the existence of the soul," originally published in: Harish Chandra Das (ed.), Buddhism and Jainism, Part II, Cuttack, 1976, pp. 4-12, reprint: Collected Papers II, PTS, Oxford, 1991, pp. 99-112, esp. p. 104 f.; "Utarajjhaya-sutta XIV: Usuyārijjaṁ," Aspects of Jainology, Pt. Dalsukh Bhai Malvania Felicitation Volume, Vol. 3, Varanasi 1991, pp. 16-26, reprint: Collected Papers III, PTS, Oxford, 1992, pp. 244-256, esp. p. 249 f. The reappearance of elements of this verse in later Jaina works such as the Paramātmaprakāśa (Normān, "Kriyāvāda and the existence of the soul," p. 105 f.) will be dealt with in a future study.

44 Utt 36.65 (C p. 255; J) / 36.64 (B p. 303): usseho jassa jo hoi bhavammi carimammi u/ tibhāhāhanā tatto ya siddhānāhanā bhave/. Tr. Jacobi, Jaina Sūtras II, p. 212, modified

45 Viy 1.6.26 (B p. 48-49) / 1.6.312-13 (L p. 52) / 1.6.226-227 (Lalw I p. 98-99); cf. Deleu, Viyāhapanatti, p. 81 (1.6.6).


Uvavāya 171: *dhiham vā hussam vā jāṁ carima-bhave havejja samṭhānaṁ,atto ti-bhāga-hiṇam siddhāṅgōghanā bhaniya.*

The notion of a soul having the size of the thumb is not unknown to early Indian literature either; cp. Ka†hUp 4.12-13; 6.17; ŚAŚUp 3.13; 5.8-9; Mhbh 3.281.16; 5.45.24 (aṅgusthamātra puruṣa/a jīva). Note however that Patañjali’s Mahābhāṣya distinguishes between a bodily self and an inner self: *śārāmaṇaṁ tat karma karoti yenāntarāmaṁ sukhaduhkhe anubhavati* (Mahā-bh II p. 68 f. 21-22, on P. 3.1.87 vt. 10). The view that early Vaiśeṣika accepted a body-sized soul is far from certain, and may indeed be mistaken; cp. Johannes Bronkhorst, "Studies on Bhartṛhari, 5: Bhartṛhari and Vaiśeṣika," AS 47(1), 1993, pp. 75-94, esp. p. 87 f.


Utt 33.16-17 (L p. 218; J p. 194-95) / 33.1361-62 (B p. 283).

Āyāra I.2.6.99 (B p. 29) / I.2.6.99 (D p. 95) / I.2.6.163 & 5.3.59 (L p. 27 & 43) / I.2.6.3 & 5.3.5 (S p. 12, 23; J): *muni monaṁ sānāyāya/yāe dhune kammasarāraṇam* (the Bombay and Delhi editions have at the second occurrence of this line I.5.3.161 (B p. 51) / I.5.3.155 (D p. 142)) *sāraṇaṁ* instead of *kammasarāraṇaṁ*. Jacobi simply translated ‘body’: "A sage, acquiring sagedom, should subdue his *body*" or "A sage adopting a life of wisdom, should treat his *body* roughly". The Jaina tradition itself, by reading the second time *sāraṇa* (unacceptable for metrical reasons), appears to have accepted this interpretation.

So Ṣaṁ 5.1.23-31 (L p. 684) / 5.1.395 (B p. 175; D p. 196); Ṣaṁ 6.11 (L p. 719) / 6.483 (B p. 206; D p. 236); Sam 152 (B p. 457; D p. 94) / Prakṛṭakā 158-171 (L p. 934).

Schubring, *The Doctrine of the Jainas,* p. 137.


According to the Tattvārtha Sūtra (2.42) two types of body — the karma body and the fiery body — accompany the soul from beginningless times, also between births. Interestingly, the Yoga Bhāṣya on sūtra 4.10 (cp. Johannes Bronkhorst, "Patañjali and the Yoga sūtras," StII 10, 1984, 191-212, esp. p. 207) refers to "others" who ascribe a similar function to the mind-complex (*citta*). The fact that this mind-complex is said to have the size and the form of the body and is in this connection compared to a lamp which fills the space in which it is placed, just like the soul according to Viy 7.8 and the Rāyapaseṇājīja referred to above, suggests that this notion did not arise independently of the Jaina notion of the soul.