Anyone who has ever opened a book on Indian philosophy will have been struck by the sometimes strange doctrines that were held by the different schools, and may have wondered to what extent it is possible to really understand Indian philosophy. And what do we mean when we say that we understand this or that Indian thinker, or Indian philosophy in general? Indeed, to what extent did individual philosophers themselves understand the philosophies they wrote about? The Sāṃkhya philosophy, to take an example, proclaims the existence of twenty-five factors (which they call *tattvas*) which somehow evolve out of each other so as to create the phenomenal world. Did individual Sāṃkhya thinkers know why exactly these twenty-five factors had to be accepted, and not any others? Did they perhaps accept these factors simply because they had been sanctioned by their particular tradition, and because early exposure lent them a degree of plausibility which they are unlikely to acquire in the case of those who do not become acquainted with them until later in life? If this is the case, how much understanding can we, modern scholars, ever hope to attain? Are we condemned to merely record what the Indian thinkers thought, perhaps adding a historical dimension by investigating how some of these ideas succeed more or less similar earlier ones? Or a social one by pointing out that this or that position served the interests of this or that particular philosopher and those of his group? Such investigations, which put Indian philosophy in its historical and social contexts, are possible and extremely important, to be sure. Historical continuities have been studied and more will no doubt be discovered. But is this as far as we can go? If so, our understanding of Indian philosophy will not be very different from that of mythology: a number of just-so stories which we can study in their historical and social contexts.

Advocates of Indian philosophy will no doubt object that there is much more to Indian philosophy than just this. They will point out that some of the discussions and analyses resemble, sometimes anticipate, certain discussions and analyses found in
Western philosophy. Such advocates often have a tendency to take these discussions and analyses out of their original context and concentrate, say, on the development of logic in the Indian schools. There can be no doubt that logic underwent a remarkable development in India, which still draws far too little attention outside a limited group of experts. But this logic was used — and this is too easily overlooked — to defend the basic doctrinal positions of the schools concerned. These doctrinal positions themselves are often somehow taken for granted, or even played down, by modern investigators. If we wish to give these positions their due, we are back with our original question: To what extent can we understand the thought of an Indian philosopher, not merely those aspects of it which we choose (and remove from their original context) because they remind us of issues in Western philosophy?

I will argue that a deeper understanding, one that goes beyond mere historical and sociological analyses, is possible in the case of an important part of Indian philosophy. This is due to a factor which too rarely draws the attention of modern scholars. I am speaking of the presence of a tradition of rational debate and inquiry. I use this expression to refer to a tradition which came to establish itself in India — or at least in the main philosophical schools — and which obliged thinkers to listen to the criticism of often unfriendly critics, even where it concerned their most sacred convictions, such as those supposedly based on revelation, tradition or inspiration. Confrontations between thinkers so radically opposed to each other were no doubt facilitated by the debates organized from time to time by kings, about which we have some first-hand information from the pen of Chinese pilgrims visiting India in the middle centuries of the first millennium. Little is known about the reasons why, and the date at which, this tradition of critical debate came to establish itself in India. Its effects are however visible in the efforts made by Indian thinkers to systematize their positions, to make them coherent and immune against criticism.

These reflections allow us to identify a particularly important factor in the development of Indian philosophy. Under pressure from competitors, the Indian thinkers of the early classical period were forced to do more than just preserve the teachings they had received; they had to improve and refine them — perhaps in order to avoid becoming the laughing stock of those they might have to confront at a royal court or at some other occasion. In doing so, they created systems of philosophy that might deviate considerably from the pre-systematic teachings which they had inherited.

The history of Indian philosophy, seen in this way, becomes the story of the search for coherence and immunity against criticism, starting normally — but not
always, it seems — from some form of traditional teaching. This traditional teaching is usually of a non-philosophical nature. Buddhist philosophy in its various manifestations, for example, based itself ultimately on the teaching of the Buddha, which concerned the escape from suffering and rebirth and had no philosophical pretensions whatsoever. Several centuries separate the Buddha from the beginning of Buddhist systematic philosophy, centuries during which well-meaning monks had ordered and organized the original teaching in various ways. Buddhist systematic philosophy, when it finally arose, was based upon, and continued in a way, these attempts at ordering and organizing. It tried to introduce coherence and drew conclusions. In this way Buddhist philosophy arose out of the attempt to introduce order and coherence in the received teachings. Other schools of philosophy proceeded similarly.

A history of Indian philosophy worth the name will have to deal in detail with the ways in which various early teachings were transformed into coherent systems of thought. This is of necessity a somewhat technical endeavor, which I do not plan to undertake, at least not in this lecture. However, in their search for coherence and immunity against criticism Indian philosophers were also confronted with the question to what extent their doctrines were compatible with certain convictions shared by all, [476] or practically all, of them. Such shared convictions existed. Practically all philosophers of classical India, for example, believed in the doctrine of karma, and all believed in the close correspondence between language and reality. The reflective analysis of these two convictions exerted a profound influence on the doctrines of the various schools. Some of these doctrines can indeed be looked upon as the direct outcome of this intellectual confrontation. In this lecture I will concentrate on the second of these two convictions, the belief in the close correspondence between language and reality.

Correspondence between language and reality means first of all that the objects in the phenomenal world correspond to the words of language. This may sound innocent enough, but was given quite amazing twists by certain thinkers. Many Buddhists, for example, had come to believe that the objects of our phenomenal world do not really exist. They do not exist, because they are composite, they consist of constituent parts. For reasons that cannot be dealt with at this moment these Buddhists maintained that only the constituent parts exist, but anything that is made up of them, that is macroscopic — that is to say: any of the things that fill phenomenal reality — does not. This led them to the following question: What are these macroscopic objects,
and why do we tend to think they exist? The answer is: they are nothing but words, or if you like: notions imposed upon reality by the words of language. Most Brahmanical thinkers disagreed with the imputed unreality of the phenomenal world, but agreed that there is a close correspondence between words and things. Some of them went to the extent of analyzing the use of words in order to arrive at a deeper understanding of objective reality.

All these developments, though important, cannot be dealt with in this lecture. However, the belief in the correspondence between language and reality was, during the early centuries of the common era, extended from a mere belief in the correspondence between words and things to something more encompassing which includes the conviction that also statements correspond to the situations they describe, or more precisely (but still not perfect): the words that make up a statement correspond to the "things" that constitute the situation described. Once again this conviction looks relatively harmless at first sight. After all, a statement like "John eats an apple" might be taken to describe a situation which is constituted of the three elements John, the apple, and the act of eating. Many, perhaps most, statements are such that they do not necessarily clash with this conviction, but some do. Take "John makes a pot". This statement describes a situation in which John and the act of making have their place, but the pot is not yet there. In other words, the words that make up the statement "John makes a pot" do not correspond to the "things" that constitute the situation described. The same difficulty arises whenever something is said about something coming into being. If we say "The pot comes into being" there is clearly nothing in the situation described corresponding to the word "pot".

I am sure that many people nowadays would conclude from statements like "John makes a pot" and "the pot comes into being", that apparently the words of a statement do not always correspond to the elements that make up the situation described. This would certainly be my reaction. Interestingly, to the best of my [477] knowledge all Indian thinkers of, say, the first five centuries of the common era did not draw this conclusion. I have studied the question in some detail and considered the writings of authors belonging to all currents of Indian philosophy, belonging to all the three major religions of that period: Brahmanism, Buddhism and Jainism. The results of this investigation have now come out in a small monograph.¹ To my growing surprise I found that all these thinkers held on to this position and tried in various ways to resolve

the difficulties it gave rise to. All of them believed that the words of a statement correspond to the elements that make up the situation described, also in the case of statements like "John makes a pot" and "the pot comes into being".

In a minute I will discuss some of the solutions that were offered to the problems that arise in this manner. First however I wish to deal with a question that may cross your minds at this point. Why did the Indian thinkers of that period, all of them, hold on to a conviction that is so obviously in contradiction with everyday experience? Is this another example of intellectuals accepting a position whose absurdity is visible to a child? Is this one more case of philosophers gone haywire?

I am not at all inclined to draw any such conclusions, and I would like to draw attention to two factors which no doubt encouraged the thinkers of that time not to give up their position simply because it seemed to contradict everyday experience. For one thing, a number of thinkers, most notably the Buddhists, had already for other reasons come to the conclusion that the phenomenal world is not ultimately real. A contradiction between phenomenal reality and the conviction they cherished could not, therefore, endanger this conviction. Equally important is the presence in India at that time of a tradition of rational inquiry, which I mentioned earlier. Philosophers had become convinced that their reasons and arguments were entitled to being taken seriously, as seriously or even more so than tradition, revelation, and insight. We know that in ancient Greece some thinkers, the Eleatics, did not hesitate to reject perceived reality on the basis — not of tradition, revelation, or special insight — but of mere argument. The early Indian thinkers, too, proceeded on the basis of their newly acquired confidence in the power of human reason. Those of us who feel superior to them might do well to recall that our phenomenal reality, too, hides a plethora of entities — molecules, atoms, subatomic particles — the existence of which we willingly accept on the basis of reasons provided and experiments carried out by others.

What solutions did the Indian thinkers offer to the difficulties they thus encountered, and which we might be tempted to consider to be of their own making? What does the word "pot" refer to in the sentences "John makes a pot" and "the pot comes into being"? The literature concerned contains a variety of answers, as I said earlier. Here I will concentrate on only a few of them.

Perhaps the simplest and in a way most obvious answer was adopted by the Sāṅkhya school of Brahmanical philosophy, mentioned earlier in this lecture. We are relatively well informed about the early history of this school. Most elements of its classical teachings figure in early works, such as the great epic of India, i.e. the
Mahābhārata, and other texts. One important element, however, is never mentioned in these earlier accounts, and must have been a rather recent innovation. I am speaking of satkāryavāda, [478] the doctrine according to which the effect exists before it is produced. Very concretely this means that the situation described by the statement "John makes a pot", or "the pot comes into being", contains already a pot, be it that the pot at that moment is still hidden in the clay from which it is being made.

Satkāryavāda becomes an essential part of classical Śāṅkhya philosophy, is taken over by some schools and vehemently combated by others. The scholastic debates about this issue in later texts make one easily forget how profoundly strange this doctrine really is (not only for modern Western readers!). They may have as a further effect that the doctrine becomes familiar, and that one stops being surprised by its extraordinary content. Familiarity is easily mistaken for understanding. A better understanding, I submit, can be obtained by becoming aware what specific problem the doctrine was meant to solve. In the case of satkāryavāda this problem was the direct consequence of certain ideas regarding the relationship between language and reality shared by all thinkers of that time.

The problem was shared by all thinkers, but they did not all propose the same solution. An altogether different solution was proposed by a particularly famous thinker, Nāgārjuna. In order to understand his solution we have to take into account that Nāgārjuna was a Buddhist. The Buddhists of his time, as I pointed out earlier, had come to believe that the phenomenal world does not really exist. This belief had not been part of the message taught by the historical Buddha. It was rather the result of subsequent elaborations and reinterpretations of the early teachings. Whatever the details of this development — with which we cannot deal at this moment — the Buddhists had come to believe, on the presumed authority of the Buddha, that the phenomenal world does not really exist; they could not prove this. This however changed with Nāgārjuna. Nāgārjuna could prove what many Buddhists of his time were convinced of in any case, viz., that the phenomenal world does not exist. It does not exist, because it cannot exist. And it cannot exist because it is self-contradictory.

The basic argument to prove this has already been sketched above. The statement "the pot comes into being" describes a situation which must contain a pot. It does not. The statement is therefore contradictory and nothing comes into being. I will cite one verse from Nāgārjuna's Mūlamadhyamakakārikā which deals with this
particular problem. It states:2 "If any unproduced entity is found anywhere it could be produced. Since that entity does not exist, what is produced?" In the case of our pot this means: if there is a pot at the time it is going to be produced, it can be produced. If there is no such pot, the subject of "the pot is produced" has nothing to refer to, and the statement is empty. This is true if we assume, as did apparently Nāgārjuna, that the terms of a statement have to refer to something that is there in the situation described.

Nāgārjuna proved, with this and similar arguments, what a number of Buddhists had already believed before and without him. He did however more. By introducing these rather nihilistic arguments into Buddhist philosophy he created an own school of philosophy which, known by the name Madhyamaka or Madhyamika, survived for a long time in India and to this day among Tibetan Buddhists.

My reflections so far have shown, I hope, that at least two crucially important doctrines held by different schools of Indian philosophy found their historical origin not in meditative experience or supernatural revelation but in the need to deal with difficulties arising from shared assumptions. The satkāryavāda of Sāmkhya and the nihilism of Madhyamaka are both to be understood as responses to a conviction, shared by all thinkers of that time, concerning the relationship between language and reality which at first view would barely seem to justify such encompassing metaphysical conclusions.

I will now turn to Bhartṛhari, a Brahmanical thinker of the 5th century of the common era who is best known, nowadays, as a "linguistic philosopher". Bhartṛhari owes this reputation to the fact that the Indian grammarians, who were and remained primarily linguists with few or no philosophical aspirations, came to accept him as a, or rather the, philosopher of grammar. They added his philosophy, or part of it, to their own rather technical and non-philosophical reflections, and now claimed that grammar, too, had a philosophical dimension. Also some modern scholars have concentrated on aspects of Bhartṛhari's thought which, they claim, shows similarities with modern linguistics.

But whatever we think of the reputation that Bhartṛhari acquired in later times, he was, first of all, a thinker of his own time, who thought about the problems that were around at that time. One of the problems he had to confront is the one we have just discussed, the problem as to how a pot can come into being if it is not yet there.

2 MadhK(deJ) 7.17: yadi kaścid anuppanno bhāvaḥ saṃvidyate kvacit/ utpadyeta sa kiṃ tasmin bhāve utpadyate 'sati//.
There can be no doubt that this problem played a central role in Bhartṛhari’s thinking. He formulates it most clearly in the following verse: 3 "If [something] exists [already], why does it come into being? But if it does not exist, how does it come into being?" What is more, he offers no less than four different solutions to this problem in four different parts of his Vākyapadiya. The challenge, as you will recall, is to find something that the word ‘pot’ in the statement "the pot comes into being" refers to and that is part of the situation described. Unlike the Sāṃkhya — who claimed that the pot already exists at the time it comes into being —, and unlike Nāgārjuna — who claimed that the very statement is self-contradictory —, Bhartṛhari presents objects that are present in the situation described and that are, he proposes, referred to by the word ‘pot’. His first suggestion is that the word ‘pot’ refers to the universal that inheres in all pots. He had borrowed this notion of universals from another school of philosophy, but gives it an interpretation that is uniquely his own. For him the universal is not just an eternal and unchangeable "thing" that inheres in all pots; no, from Bhartṛhari’s point of view the universal plays an active role in manifesting the pot.

His second solution to the problem at hand is that the word ‘pot’ refers to the substance of which the pot is made, or better: is going to be made. This substance is there while the pot is being made, so that the word ‘pot’ does refer to something, even at the time that the pot is being produced.

Bhartṛhari’s third solution is altogether different. He realizes that the demand that the words constituting a sentence have to refer to something in the situation described leads to major difficulties, for example in the case of negative existential statements. If I say "Martians do not exist", what does the word ‘Martians’ refer to? Not to anything out there, one would say. Bhartṛhari solves this problem by maintaining [480] that words refer to a metaphorical reality (aupacārikī sattā), which is different from absolute reality. He adds: 4 "Metaphorical reality shows the own form of all [things] in all their states." ‘In all their states’ probably means: in the past, present and future. In other words, the word ‘pot’ in "the pot comes into being" refers to the metaphorical existence of the pot, which shows it in its future state; or more simply, though perhaps less accurately, it refers to the future pot.

Bhartṛhari’s fourth solution, finally, is as simple as it is obvious: the word ‘pot’ refers to a mental reality, i.e., to the pot that is in my mind (that I have in mind) when I

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3 Vkp 3.3.43cd: yadi saj jāyate kasmād athāsa jāyate katham.
4 Vkp 3.3.39: vyapadeśe padārthānāṁ anyā sautaupacārikī/ sarvāvasthāsu sarvesām ātmarūpasya darśikā//
pronounce the statement "the pot comes into being". This final solution is so obvious, one would think, that one wonders why Bhartṛhari has not offered it right from the beginning, and indeed, why others before him had not hit upon this solution much earlier. This peculiar absence may have to be explained by the fact that the thinkers I have mentioned so far were very concerned to distinguish themselves from the idealistic ideas that were gaining influence at that time in some schools of Indian philosophy.

Having briefly considered the four solutions offered by Bhartṛhari to the problem connected with the coming into being of a pot, you may wish to know which of these four is Bhartṛhari's own. To my knowledge the Vākyapadiya contains no indications that would allow us to make such a choice. And indeed, it seems that Bhartṛhari did not express, and may not have had, any preference. This is the peculiar feature of his philosophical writings which the Dutch scholar Jan Houben has called Bhartṛhari's "perspectivism": different positions are correct from different points of view.

This should not be taken to imply that Bhartṛhari had no philosophy of his own, and that all he does is present various points of view without choosing between them. It seems quite clear that Bhartṛhari has drawn at least one very clear, and important, conclusion from his various lucubrations about pots that do or do not come into being, viz., that phenomenal reality is unreal, and different from absolute reality. Bhartṛhari's conclusion is in one important respect different from the one drawn by Nāgārjuna. The latter, if Claus Oetke's analyses are correct, had come to the conclusion that nothing exists, nothing is absolutely real. Bhartṛhari agrees that phenomenal reality is unreal, but differs from Nāgārjuna in claiming that there is another reality that is real. After our reflections about the coming into being of the pot, it goes without saying that absolute reality for Bhartṛhari does not come into being, and indeed does not change.

Bhartṛhari's concept of absolute reality is interesting, especially if one contrasts it with the position of many Buddhists at his time and before him. Those Buddhists claimed that the objects of the phenomenal world cannot be real, because they are composite. These composite objects are in the end nothing but words, that is to say, phenomenal reality is in the end nothing but a trick played upon us by language. Bhartṛhari agrees with the last statement. Phenomenal reality is indeed the result of language, but language does not combine the ultimately real constituents (as some Buddhists believed). On the contrary, it divides the ultimately real totality of all there is, which is absolute reality.
Bhartṛhari here introduces the notion that a whole, a totality, can be more real than its parts. This sounds at first rather strange, but here his background in grammar and linguistics came to his help. It is a well-known fact, noted by thinkers long before Bhartṛhari, that a word in language is more than the mere accumulation of the sounds that constitute it. Some Buddhist thinkers had, perhaps for this very reason, postulated, already before the beginning of the common era, that words are entities that are different from their constituent sounds. They had claimed the same for whole sentences, which are more than the combination of the words that constitute them. The important grammarian Patañjali (ca. 150 B.C.E), too, had made similar claims with regard to words. Here, then, Bhartṛhari found examples of objects that are more than their combined constituents. Words are more than their constituent sounds, and sentences are more than the words in them. Strictly speaking, sounds are not parts of words, because the latter are altogether different entities; and words are not parts of sentences which, once again, are different entities. It is in this context that Bhartṛhari brings in the example of the peacock’s egg mentioned in the title of this lecture. The word, which in itself has no parts and no sequence, unfolds itself so as to give rise to something that appears to have both, just as the vital essence (rasa) of a peacock's egg, which does not possess the variety of colors of a peacock, unfolds itself so as to give rise to a peacock that does. Bhartṛhari generalizes this idea, and claims, for example, that pots, too, have no parts.

For Bhartṛhari, then, the world, and each object in it, has two aspects: the one real, the other unreal. VP 3.1.32, for example, speaks of "the real and the unreal parts which are present in each thing". The phenomenal world is unreal. It is the result of an (unreal) division of the undivided absolute. The essential reality of things, we read elsewhere in the Vākyapadya, is beyond differentiation. "With regard to things (bhāva), whose reality is beyond differentiation (vikalpātīta), the world is followed in linguistic expressions (vyavahāra) which are based on conventions (saṃketa)." Here it is stated that linguistic expressions correspond to the unreal divisions of reality.

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5 Vkp 1.52: āndabhāvam ivāpanno vaḥ kruṭah śabdasantākāh/ vṛttis tasya kriyārūpā bhāgaśo bhajate kramam/. Thē Vṛtti explains: ... bhāyo vyāvahārīkaḥ śabdāv ́nāṭkaraṇe mayūradyaḍaṇḍarāsavat ... pratiṣayate.

6 Vkp 3.6.15ab: nirbhāgaṁmakatā tulyā paramāṇor ghatasya ca.


8 Vkp 3.3.72: yatra draṣṭā ca dṛśyān ca darśanaṁ ca vikalpitam/ tasyāvārthasya satyatvam śritis trayyantavedināḥ/

9 Vkp 3.6.25: vikalpātītatattveṣu saṃketopaniṣṭhanāḥ/ bhāvesu vyavahārā ye lokas tatrāṇugamyate//
Another verse tells us more about the division here at stake:10 "Heaven, earth, wind, sun, oceans, rivers, the directions, these are divisions of the reality belonging to the inner organ, [even though] they are situated outside it." Note that this verse does not prove that Bhartṛhari was an idealist, that he denied the existence of the outside world. It rather states that the divisions of the outside world are produced by the inner organ, and therefore by words, as we will see.

Words separate things from each other:11 "By force of the [fact that understanding has the form of words], every produced thing is distinguished [from other things]." "Words are the only basis of the nature of things and of their use."12 It follows that "those who know the nature of things see the power of words".13 Bhartṛhari elaborates on the power of words in the following verses:14 "The power residing in words is the basis of this whole universe. ... Since the difference between śaḍja and other [musical notes] is perceived [only] when explained by words, all categories of objects are based on the measures of words." The creative power of language is exemplified by the illusion of a circle created by a firebrand turned round:15 "It is observed in the case of a torch-wheel etc., that the form of an object is perceived on account of words (śruti), even though the basis [of the perception] is entirely different." "There is no cognition in the world that does not follow words. All knowledge appears as if permeated by words."16 "It is from words that things proceed; [words] create the distinctions [in the phenomenal world]."17 One might be tempted to think that this last line speaks about meanings rather than things; both are called artha in Sanskrit. Bhartṛhari speaks however about things in the objective world. This is particularly clear from a passage of his commentary on the Mahābhāṣya, often called Mahābhāṣyadipikā, where the perception of words such as ‘heaven’, apūrva, and

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10 Vkp 3.7.41: dyauḥ kṣamā vāyur adityah sāgarāh sarito disāh/ antaḥkaraṇatattvasya bhāga bahir avasthitah/
11 Vkp 1.133cd: tadvaśād abhinispannaṁ sarvaṁ vastu vibhajyate. tad- refers back to vāgrūpata avabodhaya in verse 132.
12 Vkp 1.13ab: arthapravṛttitattvānāṁ śabdā eva nibandhanam.
13 Vkp 1.171cd: svabhāvajñais tu bhāvānāṁ drṣṭyan te śabdāsaktayaḥ.
14 Vkp 1.122-23: śabdēsv evāśīrāḥ ṣaktir viśvasyasya nibandhanī/ ... sadja dibhedāḥ śabdena vyākhyāto rūpyate yataḥ/ tasmad arthaśvadhaḥ sarvāḥ śabdāmāraśa su nāśīrāḥ/. On the exact reading of this verse, see Bronkhorst, 1988: 124.
15 Vkp 1.142: atyantam atathābhūte nimitte śrutyaśravīśravī/ drṣṭye 'lātacakrādau vastvākārānirūpaṇā//. Tr. Houben.
16 Vkp 1.131: na so 'sti prayayayo loke yah śabdānugamād rte/ anuviddham iva jñānaṁ sarvaṁ śabdena bhāsate//
‘divinity’ are presented as means to infer (anumāna) the existence of the corresponding objects:18 "Just as the words ‘heaven’, apūrva and ‘divinity’, when perceived, are the means to infer the existence of objects never observed, ..." The same three objects — ‘heaven’, apūrva and ‘divinity’ — are mentioned in the following, slightly obscure, verse of the Vākyapadiya:19 "The sign of the thing denoted is, that there is an object corresponding to all words. In the case of words like ‘cow’, they say, it is similar to ‘heaven’, apūrva and ‘divinity’.”

It will be clear from these quotations, that the connection between language and phenomenal reality is close. And the language concerned is Sanskrit. But Bhartṛhari goes further. The fundamental unit of language is the sentence; this is equally true of the Vedic sentence.20 This is important. It shows that Bhartṛhari does not merely postulate a correspondence between individual words and elements of the phenomenal world. The link between statements, in particular Vedic statements, and the phenomenal world is as important, or even more important. We'll return to this point in a minute. First we consider some of Bhartṛhari’s observations with regard to the role of the Veda in the unfolding of phenomenal reality:21 "Different sciences unfold, based on the primary and secondary limbs of that [Veda] which is the organizing principle (vidhātr) of the worlds, [sciences] which are the causes of the mental traces (saṃskāra) of knowledge." The context of this verse leaves no doubt that it actually concerns the Veda, and that therefore the Veda is the organizing principle, or perhaps one is entitled to translate: creator, of the worlds. A comparison with VP 3.14.198ab, cited above ("It is from words that things proceed; [words] create the distinctions [in the phenomenal world]"), and which, too, uses the verb vi-dhā, shows that the creation of the world is essentially a division, a differentiation, of the undivided absolute. Another verse explains the relationship between the Veda and the world in the following terms:22

18 Mahābhāṣyadipikā. Manuscript p. 11a l. 11; ‘Critical edition’ Āhnikā I p. 28 l. 8-9; ed. Abhyankar-Limaye p. 33 l. 24 - p. 34 l. 1; ed. Swaminathan p. 40 l. 11: tatra yathaiva svaṁapūrvadavatāsablabhā upalabhya satya antāyantārayitaḥ antānāṁ astitvānumānam ... Bhavya’s Madhyamakahrdayakārikā 9.5 ascribes to a ‘Mimāṃsaka’ the position according to which the existence of such objects is known from the Veda; see Kawasaki, 1976: 6-7.

19 Vkp 2.119: asty arthāḥ sarvaśabdāṇām iti pratyāyyalakṣaṇām/ apūrvadavatāsvargaiḥ samam āhur gavaḍiṣu//


22 Vkp 1.124: śabdasya pariṇāmō yam ity āmnāyavido viduḥ/ chandobhya eva prathamam etad viśvam pravartate//
Those who know the sacred tradition know that this [universe] is a transformation of the word. In the beginning this universe proceeds exclusively from Vedic verses.

The world having been created, or organized, by the Veda, tradition (āgama / smṛti) bases itself on the Veda:23 "The texts of tradition (smṛti), which are multiform and have visible as well as invisible aims, have been arranged by knowers of the Veda on the basis of the [Veda] with the help of indicators." This implies, for Bhartrhari, that the link between tradition and the world is close, too. The world follows the rules of the word:24 "Even if [all] philosophies had disappeared, and there would not be other authors, the world would not deviate from the rules expressed by the Veda (śruti) and by the tradition (smṛti)." This implies, among other things, that the rules of behavior are in a way inherent in the world:25 "All duties (itikartavyatā) in [483] the world are based on words; even a child knows them because of the mental impressions (saṃskāra) acquired earlier." The intuition (pratibhā) which is called "meaning of the sentence", and which makes us know our duties, can either be the result of verbal instruction, or it can be inborn:26 "Whether the [intuition] is directly produced by the word or by the result of impulsions (bhāvanā), no one deviates from it where duties (itikartavyatā) are concerned." Even animals are guided by this intuition:27 "Under the influence of that [intuition] even the animals act. ... Who changes the sound of the male cuckoo in spring? How have animals learnt to build nests and the like? Who induces wild animals and birds to eat, love, hate, swim, and so on, activities well known among the descendants of each species?"

These verses have been interpreted to mean that the hereditary knowledge one finds among animals and in children is the result of the use of language in an earlier existence.28 Nothing in the text supports this point of view. It is true that living beings are born with impulsions (bhāvanā) or mental traces (saṃskāra) which are linguistic by nature, but it would appear that these linguistic impulsions are not, or not always, the

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23 Vkp 1.7: smṛtya bahūpāś ca dṛṣṭāṇḍaprayojanāh/ tam evāsṛtya liṅgebhya vedavidbhīḥ prakalpitāḥ//
24 Vkp 1.149: astam yāteṣu vādeṣu kartṛṣv anyeṣv asatsv api/ śrutismṛtyuditam dharmam loko na vyatītarte//
25 Vkp 1.129: itikartavyatā loke sarvā śābdavyapāśrayā/ yāṁ pūrṇāhitasaṃskāro bālo 'pi pratipadyate//
26 Vkp 2.146: sāskāc chadbena janītam bhāvanangamena vā/ itikartavyayām tam na kaścid ativartate//
27 Vkp 2.147cd & 149-150: samārambhāḥ pratāyante tirascām api tadvāsatāḥ/ ... svarvṛttim vi kurute madhau pumskokilasya kah/ jantvadayah kulayā dikarane śikṣitāh katham//
results of instructions in an earlier life. One could here repeat Bhartrhari's question: What verbal impulses would change the sound of the male cuckoo in spring? Bhartrhari himself answers this question, and the others that accompany it, in the following verses: "It comes from tradition (āgama) only, which follows the impulses (bhāvanā). As for the tradition, it is different [for each individual] depending on the proximity or distance. Six forms of intuition (pratibhā) are known, depending on whether they are produced by the own nature, the Vedic school, practice, Yoga, by the invisible (adṛṣṭa), or by a special [cause]." It follows that there is natural knowledge: "Since knowledge is natural, the traditional religious and scientific treatises (śāstra) serve no purpose whatsoever." This also applies to morality: "With regard to the two positions 'this is virtuous' or 'this is sinful', there is little use for religious and scientific treatises (śāstra) right down to the untouchables."

Bhartrhari uses the word bhāvanā "impulsion" at several other occasions in the Vākyapadīya. The "impulsion of the word" (śabdabhāvanā) is required to set the speech organs in motion, to emit an upward breath, and to make the points of articulation strike each other. The impulses, moreover, cause the imaginary divisions of the sentence which has, in reality, no parts: "Although the meaning of the sentence is without divisions, the imagined divisions are based on bhāvanā."

The direct link between words and things explains the effects words can have on things: "Just as it is observed that colors etc. have well-defined capacities with regard to certain things, in the same way one observes that words [have well-defined capacities] to remove snake poison etc. Just as they have a capacity to do this (to remove snake poison etc.) it should be understood that they also [have a capacity] to...

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29 One is of course reminded of the abhilāpavāsanā of the Yogācāras, which is responsible for a number of percepts (vijñapti) besides the one of linguistic usage (vyavahāravijñapti). Cf. Lamotte, 1973: 88-89, 108 (= Mahāyānasamgraha II, 2; II, 16).
30 Vkp 2.151-52: bhāvanānyaugatadv tad āgama eva jāyate/ āsattiviprakāraśābhyaṃ āgamas tu viśiṣyate// svabhāvacaraṇābhyaḥ āsya yogārṣṭaṇāpātātām/ viśiṣṭopahitāṃ ceti pratibhāma śadvidhāṃ viduh/. The reading caraṇa instead of varaṇa is here accepted, with Rau's hyparchetype n and the Vṛtī.
31 The commentator Punyaratīja explains: the tradition is sometimes acquired in this life, sometimes in another life.
32 Vkp 1.150ab: jñāne svabhāvike nārthāḥ śastraḥ kaścana vidyate.
33 Vkp 1.40: idam punyam idam pāpam ity etasmin padadvaye/ ācandālamanusyaṃśāṃ alpaṃ śastraprayojanam/. This verse belongs to the Vṛtī according to Aklujkar, 1971: 512.
34 Vkp 1.130: ādyāḥ karaṇavinyāsah prāṇasyordhiṃ samīraṇam/ sthānāṃ abhīghāśa ca na vinā śabdabhāvanām/
35 Vkp 2.116: avikalpitavākyārthe vikalpā bhāvanāstrayaḥ.
[produce] merit. Therefore, good people desiring elevation (abhyudaya), should use correct words." The capacity to produce merit belongs to correct words only: On the basis of traditional knowledge [received] from the well-educated, correct words are established as a means towards merit. While there is no difference in expressing the meaning, incorrect words are the opposite (i.e., not a means towards merit).

The link between words and things having been established, the study of language, and of Sanskrit in particular, enables one to reach conclusions about the world. Bhartrhari uses the words of Patañjali, who says in his Mahābhāṣya: "We accept the word as authority. What the word says is authoritative for us." Exactly the same phrase can be found in the Śābara Bhāṣya, but Bhartrhari clearly gives it a wider interpretation. His Vākyapadīya observes: "People accept the word as authority; they are followed [in this] by the religious and scientific treatises (śāstra)."

We return to Bhartrhari's acceptance as the sentence as primary linguistic unit. This implies that the phenomenal world corresponds to statements, first of all Vedic statements. This explains that, according to Bhartrhari, injunctions and other rules are somehow built into the phenomenal world. Individual words do not constitute injunctions, or śāstras, or rules of behavior for animals and men. And it is through its sentences that the Veda becomes what it is. If the world is created, or organized, in accordance with the Veda, Vedic sentences must be meant, not just individual Vedic words.

I hope that what I have said so far shows the extent to which Bhartrhari was both a philosopher who dealt with current problems and challenges, and a traditionalist. In fact, his writings are quite specific about his respect for tradition. We read here, for example: "Without tradition, logic cannot establish virtue (dharma); even the knowledge of seers derives from tradition." And again: "He who bases himself on..."

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37 Vkp 1.27: śīstebhya āgamāṃ siddhāḥ sādhaṃ dharmaṃ sādhanam/ arthapratyāyānabhede viparitāś tv asādhatvāḥ// tr. Houben.
38 Mahā-bh I p. 11 l. 1-2; p. 366 l. 12-13: śabdapramāṇakā vayam/ yac chabda āha tad asmākaṃ pramāṇam/.
39 ŚabBh 3.1.36 (p. 184); cp. 6.1.3 (p. 183), 6.2.6 (p. 228), 10.5.73 (p. 431).
40 Vkp 3.7.38ed: śabdapramāṇako lokaḥ sa śāstremāṇugamyate.
41 Vkp 1.30: na cāgamād rte dharmas tarkeṇa vyavatisthate/ṛṣīm api yaj jñānāṃ tad api āgamapūrvakam//
tradition ... is not hindered by logical arguments." His grammatical writing represents a change of attitude which Madhav Deshpande (1998: 20), from the University of Michigan, does not hesitate to characterize as a paradigm-shift. Unlike his main predecessors who lived a number of centuries earlier, with Bhartrihari "an entirely new tone has set in. There is a strong feeling that the current times are decadent, and that there are no truly authoritative persons around. Grammarians in this decadent period must look back to the golden age of the great ancient grammarians and seek authority in their statements."

One might be tempted to accuse Bhartrihari of using the philosophical debate of his time to try to gain respectability for the Vedic tradition to which he belonged, and one might very well be right in this. Let us not forget that philosophical debate during the first half of the first millennium was almost totally confined to Nyāya, Vaiśeṣika, Śāṅkhyā and a number of Buddhist schools. None of these schools had any direct link with the Vedic textual corpus or with its ritual traditions. The opposition of Śāṅkhyā to the Vedic tradition is testified to by texts from various periods, some as old as the Mahābhārata, others much younger. And the early texts of Nyāya and Vaiśeṣika — though later categorized as orthodox, i.e. "Vedic" — show little evidence of having any particular link with Vedic texts and rites; the evidence we have rather points to a link with the worship of Śiva. The most orthodox schools of philosophy are, of course,

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42 Vkp 1.41: cañtanyam iva yaś cāyam avicchedena vartate/ āgamas tam upāsīno hetuvađair na bāḍhyyate/

43 Cp. the passage in the Mahābhārata (12.260-262) which records a discussion between Kapila, the supernatural "founder" of Śāṅkhyā, and the Vedic rśi Śyūmarāśmi. Śyūmarāśmi rejects the possibility of liberation and exhorts to action; Kapila preaches liberation through restraint and abstention from activity. A late example is Guṇaratnasūri's Tarkarasyadīpika on Haribhadra's Śaddārśanasamuccaya (14th cent.), which states the following about the Śāṅkhyās (Mahendra Kumar Jain, 1969: 141): "They are numerous in Vārāṇasi. Many Brāhmīns, fasting for a month, follow the way of smoke which is opposed to the way of light. But the Śāṅkhyās follow the way of light. For that very reason the Brāhmīns, to whom the Veda is dear, follow the way of sacrifice. The Śāṅkhyās, on the other hand, turning away from the Veda which is rich in violence, proclaim the self." (vārāṇasyāṁ taśāṁ prācaryam/ bahavo māsopavāsikā brāhmaṇā arcīrmaraviruddhadhvāmaṁganugāmināḥ/ sāṁkhyās tv arcīrmarauṅgāḥ/ tata eva brāhmaṇā vedapriya yajñamārgaṁ uḍānāḥ/ sāṁkhyās tu hṁsaḥdyavedavitrā adhyātmavādānaḥ)

44 Here one could draw attention to the 'proof' in the Vaiśeṣika Śūtra of the existence of seers (ṛṣi) responsible for the composition of the Veda (VS 6.1.1-2, ed. Jambuvijaya; Wezler, 1985), as well as to the occurrence, still in Praśastapāda's Padārthadharmasāṅgraha, of Vedic cosmographical concepts (varunaloka 'the world of Varuṇa', adityaloka 'the world of Aditya', marutān loka 'the world of the Maruts'; see WI under these expressions). These or related terms occur in the Vedic Brāhmaṇas (see Kirfel, 1920: 5–6), a few times in these expressions. These or related terms occur in the Vedic Brāhmaṇas (Sorensen, 1904: s.v. Varunaloka, Vaiśaloka), but apparently only rarely, some of them perhaps not at all, in the later Purānic literature. The Padārthadharmasāṅgraha does use Purānic, i.e. non-Vedic, material in the context of God's creation of the world, but this appears to be new material brought into the school by Praśastapāda himself (Bronkhorst, 1996).

45 A number of thinkers of the 'old' school of Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika — viz. Praśastapāda (probably), Uddyotakara, Bhāṣavarāja, Vādi Vāgiśvara — were Śaivites, or more specifically Pāṣupatas. See Bronkhorst, 1996 (Praśastapāda); final colophon of the Nyāyavārttika (Uddyotakara); Ingalls, 1962: 284;
Pūrva- and Uttara-Mīmāṃsā. The former does not really join the philosophical debate until Kumārila Bhaṭṭa, one or two centuries after Bhartṛhari. The latter, better known by the name Vedānta (or Vedāntism), is perspicuous by its absence in listings of philosophical schools during this early period. This does not necessarily mean that there were no Vedāntins during the early centuries of the first millennium, but it does strongly suggest that they did not yet participate in the philosophical debate, that they did not yet expose, and improve, their positions in the light of criticism received (and perhaps even solicited) from others. Bhartṛhari may have been one of the first truly "Vedic" philosophers. He joined the philosophical debate, took up the challenges that occupied the other thinkers of his time, and constructed a system that gave a place of honor to the Veda and to the way of life it represented to its followers. Indeed, Bhartṛhari maintains that the world has been created in accordance with the Veda, including the Vedic injunctions. Correct Brahmanical behavior is therefore anchored in the nature of the world itself, no less than the song of the cuckoo.

Bhartṛhari did not take his task lightly. In his effort to find a place for the Veda in the philosophical debate of his time, he read everything he could lay his hands on, and borrowed elements from practically all his sources (without acknowledgments, unfortunately). Vaiśeṣika elements are particularly abundant, Buddhist elements are important, but scholars have also traced elements from Sāṃkhya and even from Jainism in Bhartṛhari’s work. No doubt from Buddhist sources Bhartṛhari took the idea that the phenomenal world is not ultimately real. This allowed him to postulate a highest reality, which he calls on one occasion Brahmaṇ. He might in this way have claimed highest reality for the Vedic tradition, and leave ordinary reality (which is ultimately unreal) to the various philosophical schools that existed in his day. He does not do so. He accepts the relative validity of those schools of thought in the realm of the phenomenal world (this is his perspectivism), but adds an important element of his own: Phenomenal reality is determined by the Veda. The Veda is its creator (or organizer), and this means, in the end, that only the Vedic Brahmins know its nature and are really in a position to influence it. Seen in this way, Bhartṛhari’s ideas on language and reality, and

Sarma, 1934 (Bhāsarvajña); Raghavan, 1942 (Vādi Vāgīśvara). The Jaina doxographer Haribhadra, in his Śaddarśanasamuccaya, attributes the devatā Śiva to the adherents of Nyāya and Vaiśeṣika (Qvarnström, 1999: 181).

46 When e.g. Kālidāsa (Vikramorvaṣṭa 1.1) states vedānteṣu yam āhur ekapuruṣam, he refers to the Upaniṣads, but by doing so he may reveal the existence of people who looked upon the Upaniṣads with reverence.
on the relationship between these two, are really the result of a Brahmanical twist given to ideas that had been around for a while.

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Abbreviations:

- **Mahā-bh**: Patañjali, (Vyākaraṇa-)Mahābhāṣya, ed. F. Kielhorn, Bombay 1880-1885
- **ŚābBh**: Śābara Bhāṣya
- **Vkp**: Bhartrhari, Vākyapadiya, ed. W. Rau, Wiesbaden 1977
- **VS**: Vaiśeṣika Sūtra