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On Strong Citizens: A Sociological View on Cognitions and Contentious Participation

Monsch Gian-Andrea

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FACULTÉ DES SCIENCES SOCIALES ET POLITIQUES INSTITUT D'ÉTUDES POLITIQUES ET INTERNATIONALES

On Strong Citizens: A Sociological View on Cognitions and Contentious Participation

THÈSE DE DOCTORAT

présentée à la

Faculté des sciences sociales et politiques de l'Université de Lausanne

pour l'obtention du grade de

Docteur en science politique

par

Gian-Andrea Monsch

Directeurs de thèse

Professeure Florence Passy, Université de Lausanne Professeur Doug McAdam, Stanford University

Membres du jury

Professeur Dominique Joye, Université de Lausanne Professeur Bert Klandermans, Vrije Universiteit Amsterdam



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IMPRIMATUR

Le Conseil de la Faculté des sciences sociales et politiques de l'Université de Lausanne, sur proposition d'un jury formé des professeurs

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autorise, sans se prononcer sur les opinions de la candidate, l'impression de la thèse de Monsieur Gian-Andrea MONSCH, intitulée :

On Strong Citizens: A Sociological View on Cognitions and Contentious Participation

Lausanne, le 27 novembre 2013

Le Doyen de la Faculté

Professeur Fabien Ohl

Summary

The present thesis is about cognitions of left-wing activists and the role they play to better understand contentious participation. It compares activists of three post-industrial social movement organizations in Switzerland, i.e. Solidarity across Borders defending migrant's rights, the Society of Threatened People promoting collective human rights and Greenpeace protecting the environment. It makes use of an innovative mixed methods design combining survey and interview data.

The main theoretical contribution is to conceptualize an analytical tool enabling to grasp the cognitive map of these activists by putting forward the concept of strong citizen, summing up their relation to society and politics. The relation to society consists of an extensive relation to others and an interconnected vision of society. Consequently, their primary concerns include the handing of common goods and the equal treatment of individuals with regard to common goods. The relation to politics incorporates a critical and vigilant citizen. They are critical towards political authorities and they appreciate political action by organized groups of the civil society. The thesis states that only by having such worldviews activists are able to construct an injustice, agency and identity frame for the claims of their organizations. Thus, the present work delivers a parsimonious answer to the question of where an injustice, agency and identity frame comes from.

It does so by a systematic analysis of four specific arguments. First, it empirically demonstrates that these activists have – at the aggregate level – specific cognitive resources compared to the general population. Second, it describes the content of this specific cognitive outlook by evaluating the appropriateness of the strong citizen concept. Third, it looks at variations between activist's communities and shows that activists of more challenging protest issues are stronger citizens than activists of more mainstream protests. Finally, cognitions are not the only part of the story if one looks at contentious participation. Other factors, i.e. social networks and biographical availability, matter too. Therefore, I test if cognitions are able to contribute in explaining differences between activists' communities if one controls for other factors. In sum, this thesis is thus a first step to demonstrate why one should be concerned about activists' cognitions.

Résumé

Cette thèse s'intéresse aux cognitions des activistes de gauche et à leur rôle dans le phénomène de la participation contestataire. Des activistes de trois organisations post-industrielles en Suisse sont comparé, à savoir Solidarité sans Frontières qui défend les droits des migrants, la Société des Peuples menacés qui promeut les droits des collectivités minoritaires et Greenpeace qui œuvre pour la protection de l'environnement. Cette recherche utilise un « mixed methods design » en combinant de manière innovant des données de sondage et d'entretiens.

Ma principale contribution théorique réside dans la conceptualisation d'un outil analytique qui permet de saisir la « carte cognitive » des activistes, à travers le concept de « strong citizen » qui se réfère à la relation spécifique qu'entretiennent certains individus avec la société et la politique. Ces individus sont caractérisés par une vision inclusive et interconnectée de la société, ainsi que par une conception politique du citoyen comme critique et vigilant. Mon argument principal est celui selon lequel seuls les individus possédant ce type particulier de cognitions sont capable de construire un cadre d'injustice, d'« agency » et d'identité. Cette thèse apporte donc quelques éléments de réponse à la question de l'origine de ces cadres cognitifs qui sont cruciales pour la participation.

Pour ce faire, quatre aspects spécifiques sont analysés de manière systématique. Premièrement, je démontre empiriquement, au niveau agrégé, que ces activistes possèdent effectivement des ressources cognitives spécifiques – en comparaison avec la population générale. Deuxièmement, j'analyse le contenu de ces cognitions, ce qui me permet notamment d'évaluer la pertinence et l'adéquation du concept de « strong citizen ». Troisièmement, en m'intéressant cette fois aux variations entre communautés d'activistes, je démontre que ceux réunis autour d'enjeux protestataires très revendicatifs sont, d'un point de vue cognitif, plus proches de la figure du « strong citizen » que ceux mobilisés sur des enjeux plus consensuels. Finalement, d'autres facteurs, à savoir les réseaux sociaux et la disponibilité biographique, sont intégrés à l'analyse afin de mesurer le réel pouvoir explicatif des cognitions dans l'explication des différences observées entre communautés d'activistes. A travers ces analyses, cette thèse met en avant l'importance du rôle des cognitions dans l'étude de la participation contestataire.

To my parents, strong citizens but also best friends.

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As the front page of this thesis indicates, I am the only author of this manuscript and consequently, I am the only person that is responsible for its whole content. However, as any piece of scientific work should be, this thesis is essentially the result of a collective effort. It is a fruit of exchanges and help by many people around me. Without them, I would not have been able to write up this thesis. Therefore, the following lines are dedicated to these invisible minds.

This thesis is a part of the research output of the large research project Why Stand Up for Others? A Comparative Study of Political Altruism and Contentious Participation that I conducted together with Florence Passy. Florence initiated that project and she elaborated the general theoretical and empirical orientation of this project. Thanks to her initiative, an opportunity was thus born for this dissertation with Florence as my PhD supervisor. During the last five years, I collaborated intensively with her for the research project, for teaching and obviously also for the construction of my thesis. I have never seen or heart of anybody that instructs his PhD students as well and with such a big time investment then you do. I cannot count the times when we were still sitting in our office struggling with issues of the general research or my own work. Every time there was a problem, personal or professional, you always tried hard to give me precious advice. Florence, I don't know how to express my deep gratefulness. You not only were an excellent supervisor, I also see you today as a very good friend and I hope we can continue doing research together in the years to come.

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the participant organizations and the efforts of all the activists who responded to our questionnaires. The organization of SAB, STP and Greenpeace gave us access to a representative sample of their activists and facilitated the contact with committed individuals to conduct the interviews. A special thanks goes to all these activists who accepted to open their doors for us and told us their lives during hours and hours of interviews. We had the opportunity to listen to very impressive biographies and we learned a lot from them. Your answers, your thinking makes this research as rich as it has become. May your political struggle become equally successful as our research!

A special gratitude goes also to the institutions, which secured the financial coverage of this research and thereby made the realization of this research feasible. The Swiss National Science Foundation financed most of the whole research project and the University of Lausanne and in particular the Institute for Political and International Studies provided a magnificent work environment. This research also received a complementary support by the Faculty of Social and Political Science of the University of Lausanne and the Fondation du 450°.

I was thus lucky to be in a professional world that was very supportive. However, as my life and mind was quite monopolized by the work on my dissertation, I had to distance myself from my work again and again. Sometimes, this is easier said than done but a few good friends outside the academic world were incredible facilitators. Catherine and Antoine, thank you so much for the warm and uncomplicated reception in Lausanne. This made my first year in Lausanne really an easy one. Nicole and Alexander, I am not able to count the hours we spend together in skype, talking and laughing together, playing together or watching a game of Bayern München. Over the years, this relation has really turned into a very good friendship. Thank you for listening to all my worries during the last years. My family, too, played a tremendously supportive role during these years. Renato and Lea, mum and dad, thank you for being here the moment I mostly needed you and also for being here, while I did not need you! Family and best friends all in one allows me to look ahead in a very optimistic way.

Finally, I traveled a lot during the last years and the train was almost a home away from home. Consequently, a good deal of this thesis was written and thought about during these travels and I am really happy to have had such a flexible workplace all over the last years. As I said at the beginning of this section, science is a form of collective action and these acknowledgments show in a how multifaceted way this is the case.

1. How do activists become strong citizens? Questions and contributions

This dissertation is an in depth analysis of activists' cognitions or worldviews¹ and the role they play to better understand contentious participation. It compares activists of three post-industrial social movement organizations in Switzerland and uses an innovative mixed methods design combining survey and interview data. When I started this research project and the manuscript in hand five years ago, my father was highly skeptical about this endeavor. Not only was he skeptical about my idea of becoming a social scientist, but even more about my work on left-wing activists. As a businessman with a strong liberal worldview, he always was suspicious of people who were making political claims for more state responsibility. "They want the state to be responsible for everything. The economy cannot evolve if the state always intervene." In contrast, my father was not against civic and political activism. He has been, and still is, highly committed to political, social and cultural issues. For example, he was a member of the cantonal parliament, he regularly writes letters to the editor of the local newspaper if he is not happy with communal political decisions, he is highly committed to a regional project aiming at reintroducing former drug users in the society or he is annually organizing blues concerts in order to improve the cultural offer in our small village. One may ask why I start this thesis by telling you about the relation to my father and his personal commitments? I do this because, during our conversations flip-flopping between my work and his activities, I noticed that he justified his activities in a very similar way as these activists that I interviewed for this dissertation do. This justification could be summarized as one of a strong citizen, someone who pledges for an active and vigilant citizen, a citizen that is highly concerned by common goods and who is very inclusive in his definition of society.

While my father is certainly not a representative example of all the activists that are not included in this analysis, he illustrates well the most general problem that motivates the present work. Social movements, political mobilization and democratization processes are tightly knit together as the history of the Western world² as well as more recent events in

¹ In the present work, I use the word *cognition* and *worldview* as synonyms for everything that is linked to the mind and how individuals perceive the world around them. Cognitions are worldviews or mental representations that organize in a relatively structured way objects and situations, and allow people to make sense of themselves and their relation to others and the world around them (Fiske and Taylor 1991).

² For Europe, the most integrative example is probably Tilly (2004).

the Arab world have demonstrated. According to Almond and Verba (1963, in Rauschenbach 2012), "only a civic culture could guarantee the long-term survival of a democracy. A political culture provides the psychological basis for democracy. It represents the socially internalized cognitive, affective and evaluative orientations of an individual towards others, in particular in political contexts" (Rauschenbach 2012:477). While Almond and Verba describe a general cultural framework of a society, my contribution is a strong citizen conceptualization of cognitions that aims to look more in the mind of individuals and especially these activists in the presented work. Thus, yes, democracy needs a civic culture but on the basis of a civic culture are strong citizens, i.e. vigilant and active citizens that share an inclusive vision of society and are concerned about common goods.

As I learned from Shapiro (2004), research should always be problem oriented and it is for this reason that I wanted to start this dissertation with a very general claim that underlines the importance to work with cognitions in general and the concept of strong citizens specifically. Of course, this general problem is well beyond the scope of the analysis presented here. However, I hope that this work can once be seen as a starting step in this direction. Democracies need strong citizens and this thesis demonstrate that these activists are cognitively strong citizens, which could be interpreted as an outcome of interactive dynamics during contentious participation.

Beside this very general statement, this thesis also brings more substantial contributions to the floor. My main theoretical contribution states that cognitions are a crucial part in the understanding of contentious participation. My aim is to conceptualize an analytical tool that enables to grasp the cognitive map of these activists. In particular, I suggest looking at cognitive resources that sum up to worldviews that resemble Barber's idea of a strong citizen (1984). In addition to Gamson's action frames (1992), I argue that a broader cognitive baseline has to be taken into account if one want to better understand contentious participation as a cognitive socialization tool shaping activists' worldviews. In my conceptualization, two cognitive dimensions make up a strong citizens' perception: A specific relation to society and a specific relation to politics. Activists' relation to society consists of an extensive relation to others that makes them consider society as

interconnected and not as composed of competing individuals. Moreover, they develop an egalitarian premise that shapes their views of members of society. In addition, their primary concerns include the handing of common goods and the equal treatment of individuals with regard to common goods. Activists' relation to politics incorporates a critical and vigilant relation towards politics. They are critical towards political authorities and they appreciate political action by organized groups of the civil society. They are convinced that social change and the remediation of moral indignation happen through political action, moral voicing and claim making. While not every individual with such a specific worldview participates, it makes these activists cognitively available for protest and helps to sustain their commitment. I argue thus that the conceptualization of the strong citizen concept gives a delimitated analytical tool at hand that enables to go beyond the theoretically narrow view on injustice, agency³ and identity.

Why is it needed to go beyond the injustice, agency and identity frame? Are these three cognitive dimensions not sufficient to explain contentious participation? What does the concept of strong citizen contribute to the existing theory? I advance three arguments that try to justify adding the strong citizen concept to the literature on contentious participation. First of all, injustice, agency and identity frames are just proxies for protest action and it is not at all clear if the individual constructs these frames before or after he starts contentious participation⁴. Therefore, and second, individuals need to have broader worldviews in order to be able to construct an injustice, agency or an identity frame. For example, how can an individual come to the conclusion that the treatment of migrants is unfair if he does not have a very inclusive vision of society, one that is not delimited by frontiers between different groups? Or how can an individual construct the belief that a specific social movement organization can alter the current organization (agency frame) if he has not constructed before a more general idea of the importance of civil society

³

³ It is important to distinguish individual agency from the concept of an agency frame. The latter is related to social movement literature and empowers an activist to perceive opportunities to change a situation. Thereby, contentious actors frame the idea that activists can alter conditions or policies through collective action (Gamson 1992). The former refers to the capacity an individual has to choose how he perceives the world and, consequently, how he will act. Emirbayer and Mische (1998:962) define agency "as a temporally embedded process of social engagement, informed by the past (in its "iterational" or habitual aspect) but also oriented toward the future (as a "projective" capacity to imagine alternative possibilities) and toward the present (as a "practical-evaluative" capacity to contextualize past habits and future projects within the contingencies of the moment).

⁴ See for example Munson (2008) or McAdam (1982).

actors and protest to change existing injustices? Finally, the strong citizen concept is a more parsimonious concept than the three dimensions of Gamson.

On the empirical level, this thesis is based on new data from a large research project. Those data were collected for the project: Why Stand Up for Others? A Comparative Study of Political Altruism and Contentious Participation that aims to understand protest commitment on behalf of others. More specifically, this large research project analyzes the importance of individual's cognitive map in the understanding of political altruism protest as well as other types of contentious politics. All together, this project collected data on activists of five different organizations in Switzerland. In this dissertation, I report a share of the results of this research project by focusing on participation in social movement organizations. Accordingly, three out of five organization were selected for this contribution because the other two do not belong to the social movement sector:

- Solidarity Across Borders (SAB): An umbrella organization in the defense of migrant's rights domain in Switzerland.
- The Society for Threatened People (STP): The Swiss branch of this organization, which is active in the human right sector bringing social and political support to persecuted minorities in Europe but also other parts of the world.
- Greenpeace Switzerland (GP): The Swiss branch of Greenpeace.

While the general claim of this thesis is that cognitions matter to better understand contentious participation, four specific questions are the heart of the here presented research. Each of them tries to make a particular empirical contribution to the existing literature. First, do these activists have – at the aggregate level – specific cognitive resources compared to the general population? Given the lessons learnt from social psychology, I suggest that the answer to this question should be yes. This finding would point to the importance of cognitions for a more holistic understanding of protest participation because cognitions are something that discriminates between these activists and the general population. Second, what is the content of this specific cognitive outlook? Does it match the conceptualization of the strong citizen? While I think that injustice, agency and identity

⁵ The Swiss National Science Foundation financed this research project (100017-122246).

frames are really helpful to understand protest, I think that these dimensions suffer from empirical and theoretical overstretching and try to argue for a more delimited identification of contention-pertinent frames. Accordingly, I test the usefulness of the strong citizen concept with an in-depth analysis of twelve activists' narratives.

Third, do these cognitive resources vary between different types of activists? Are active members stronger citizens than sympathizers? Are activists of more challenging contentions stronger citizens than activists of more mainstream protests? I look within the diverse individual worlds of these activists assuming that their cognitions vary with different costs of action and between different movement communities. Fourth, do cognitive resources contribute to the explanation of differences between activists' communities even if one controls for other important elements like interactive processes, e.g. social networks, and biographical availability? While questions one to three focus exclusively on cognitions, the last tries to underline that cognitions are a part of a multifacetted story. By this last empirical question, I try to put 'cognitions in their place'; at least when it comes to activism in different contentious fields.

The methodological contribution, finally, is that this thesis is based on an innovative mix-methods design. I use a mix of survey and interview data in order to answer the four specific questions introduced above. Representative survey data were collected for activists of these three social movement organizations. They mainly fulfill two main tasks. On the one hand, survey data with standardized questions allow comparing systematically activists of different organizations among themselves and with the whole population. In order to compare activists' samples with the whole population, questions from the World Values Study (WVS 2007), the International Social Survey Programme (ISSP 2004) and the European Values Study (EVS 2008) questionnaires were used. In addition to that, a whole bunch of additional questions were asked in order to compare activists' cognitions more profoundly. Through these comparisons, I am able to assess systematically whether these activists have a specific cognitive outlook that can be summarized as a strong citizen worldview that delineates them from the general population.

On the other hand, *quantitative data aims to generalize the findings*. However, while generalization is important for theory building, one has to be cautious about its limits. This research focuses on activists of three particular social movement organizations belonging to the same family of social movements. They are all progressive or left-wing activists. As I label the cognitive content of these activists as one of a strong citizen, I implicitly exclude other types of activists to be cognitively strong citizens. This is not my ambition. Clearly, right-wing activists also engage in contentious participation and they are strong citizens in their own right. While it would be interesting (and should be done!) to compare their cognitive outlook with the activists of this research, the existing data does not allow me to do this comparison. Thus, the findings presented here enable me to say something about activists belonging to the new social movements family but nothing about other types of social movements.

In addition to the survey data, I also use *interview data* to encounter the limits of quantitative indicators, in particular the difficulty to grasp the content of meaning and worldviews of activists' cognitions. The life histories and in depth interviews I conducted resulted in detailed narratives that allow describing the complexity of activists' cognitions. In other words, they display how these activists perceive the world around them. Further on, while survey data are handy to reveal systematic differences between different types of activists, the interview data allow interpreting these variations.

In sum, the use of *this mixed methods design is very complementary* because the strength of one type of data enables to counter the weaknesses of the other and vice versa. While I want to praise here the data and the research design, I also have to point to one important limit of the data. They are collected at one specific point in time and do thus not allow to demonstrate the causal link between cognitions and (protest) action. In other words, the data presented here reflect cognitions somewhere during their activists' career but I can only assume and not show the time frame of the construction of these cognitions.

Questions about contentious participation have a long tradition and are a central preoccupation of social movement research (e.g. Piven and Cloward 1979; Gamson, Fireman et al. 1982; Oliver 1984; Snow, Rochford et al. 1986; della Porta 1988; Diani and

Lodi 1988; McAdam 1988; Melucci 1989; Eder 1993; Kriesi 1993; Oegema and Klandermans 1994; Jasper 1997; Klandermans 1997; Polletta 1997; Passy 1998; Simon, Loewy et al. 1998; Nepstad and Smith 1999; Guigni and Passy 2004; Munson 2008; Morales 2009). This, while only illustrative, long list of important contributions to questions about contentious participation pinpoints to the fact that there the social movement literature knows a lot about the subject of contentious participation. Above all, scholars stressed structural and objective conditions leading people to join contentious politics. Activists are equipped with a specific social anchorage and a particular values structure (Cotgrove and Duff 1980; Kriesi 1989; Eder 1993; Passy 1998). Thus, a specific structural and cultural context plays an important role so that individuals belong to the so-called mobilization potential (Klandermans 1997). Individuals are anchored in socio-cultural contexts structuring their scope of action (Passy 1998: 58). Whereas these are important findings, they help us little to understand why individuals participate in sustained contentious participation because only a small part of the mobilization potential actually joins contentious politics. Therefore, scholars have addressed the question of how people join protest politics. Thereby, biographical availability (McAdam 1988), social networks (Snow, Zurcher et al. 1980; McAdam and Paulsen 1993; Klandermans 1997; Passy 1998) and the calculus of costs and benefits (Klandermans 1997; Stürmer, Simon et al. 2003) play an important role in the process to join contentious politics. In short, activists need to have time to participate, they have dense and supportive networks and they benefit from their action. Obviously, these conditions are crucial to favor contentious participation and my contribution does in no way discredit these factors. However, how do individuals perceive their availability of time? What results from the interactions within those networks? More specifically, do these interactions – and especially interactions during contentious participation - shape activists' cognitions?

One reason, why scholars abandoned subjective dimensions and cognitions in particular, lies in the foundation of this research field (Goodwin and Jasper 2003). At its beginnings, protest was seen as an irrational act due to frustration or relative deprivation (Davies 1962; Gurr 1970). As scholars in the 60ties were sympathetic to the movements of their time, they showed the inadequacy of this psychological approach and came up with the above described synthesis. However, the notion of cognition experienced a revival. Given

the assumption that individuals are trying to make sense of the world implies that systems of meanings is at stake during contentious participation (Jasper 1997). In a similar vein, Piven and Cloward (1979) claimed that "the emergence of protest entails a transformation of both consciousness and behavior".

While there are thus strong claims in favor of the importance of cognitions, empirical research on interpretative processes in social movements looks frequently on the organizational level, most notably by the tool of frame analysis. Goffman (1974) argues that frames organize experience and guide action by enabling actors "to locate, perceive, identify, and label" events occurring in their life spaces. Elaborating on this contribution, Snow, Rochford et al. (1986) as well as Gamson (1992) have established an interpretative theory to make sense of how protest actors mobilize support and how they articulate their claims. Thereby, the most important tool is the concept of collective action frames being simplifying devices that help to understand and organize the complexity of the world. They are termed collective because it is through collective processes that organizations and groups construct those filtering lenses. And they are action frames as they enable collective action. Snow and Benford (1992) defined collective action frames as "action oriented sets of believes and meanings that inspire and legitimate social movement activities and campaigns". Collective action frames are thus essential to recruit contenders (Snow, Rochford et al. 1986). However, this implies that for joining protest as well as for sustained commitment, the individual needs to have a cognitive inner world that fits these protest frames: they have to resonate with individuals' salient cognitions. In order to recruit potential activists and to keep activists motivated, contentious actors need to perform strategies of frame alignment.

Whereas Snow and his collaborators specified framing processes in between collective actors and activists, Gamson's work deals more substantially with *the content of collective action frames*. Notably, three key collective action frames are essential for mobilization: Injustice, agency and identity frames. These three cognitive dimensions, which I will call the holy cognitive trinity in this research, are crucial in order to better understand contentious participation. However, I will argue that this focus is to narrow and thereby neglects other important cognitive dimensions.

While this brief summary thus impressively shows that much is known about contentious participation, two problems are deeply embedded in this literature that I want to address here. On the one hand, as I just stated, the literature on contentious participation has developed a too narrow view of activists' meanings that exclusively focuses on a holy cognitive trinity that does not cope with the complexity of activists' mind. Activists construct broader worldvisions and it is the ambition of this contribution to address these. On the other hand, as I will develop in the next chapter, research on contentious participation focuses on the start and the end of participation. Thereby, questions like what is going on during contentious participation are neglected. Looking at individuals during their activists' career can help us thus to understand relationships between their embeddedness in social networks and the construction of meanings.

Consequently, this thesis addresses these shortcomings. The central concern of this thesis are motivated by the following questions:

- What cognitive effects does contentious participation, i.e. ongoing interactions and the transmission of cultural meanings in such formal networks, have?

By conceptualizing contentious participation as not only a specific form of collective political action but also as a form of social interaction, I imply a shaping or even a transformation of activists' cognitions through contentious participation. It is thus of crucial importance to not limit contentious participation to a form of collective action. While this question suggests a process, I will not be able to trace this process with the data that are available. My interest here is in activists during participation, hence I can show their cognitions at a specific point in time but I am not able to show the process of how they constructed them.

- How do these activists sustain their activism?

While others have also worked on this question (see Chapter 2), this thesis puts forward that individuals protest and continue to do so because they have constructed and

continue to reinforce a specific worldview. And this specific worldviews are broader then the holy cognitive trinity, i.e. the notion of injustice, agency and identity frames.

I suggest that these activists are or became cognitively strong citizens through a socialization process shaped by their contentious participation. While the empirical part of this thesis is not able to demonstrate this process, the analyses show the effect of this process. However, I try to give the following theoretical suggestion that could explain this effect. Particularly, they become cognitively strong citizens through social interactions they experience in the social networks they are embedded in. Thereby, Barber's (1984) reflections on strong democracy inspired my concept of a strong citizen dimension. I will show how Barber's definition of strong democracy depicts a specific citizen who has, on the one hand, a specific perception of politics and, on the other, a specific relation to society. For their relation to politics, these activists should be critical towards political authorities, strongly legitimizing protest actors and stress the necessity of an active and vigilant citizen. For their relation to society, these activists should stress the importance to contribute to the production and maintenance of common goods and to an inclusive perception of society. These two dimensions together are what make these activists to cognitively strong citizens.

I put forward that it is this specific conception of the world that helps to better understand what is going on during participation in contentious acts. As the literature has shown, social networks and personal availabilities are necessary factors for contentious participation. Without the proper social networks and personal availabilities, contentious participation will not take place or cannot be sustained.

However, I argue here that *cognitions are another important underlying factor that has largely been absent from the study of contentious participation*. A detailed mapping and a comparison of activists' worldviews will thus help to better understand persistence of activism on the one hand and something about why SMOs are such powerful sources for socializing new recruits on the other.

I embed the central process of this thesis – meaning construction through movement socialization – in the integrated theoretical framework of Fligstein's and McAdam's (2012) theory of fields. This embedding allows situating my contribution in the more general sociological literature that seeks to explain social order and social change. Doing this thus allows questioning the ways in which activists contribute to social change through contentious participation and meaning construction. As "the essence of human sociability is collaborative meaning making" (Fligstein and McAdam 2012: 49), situating activists within a strategic action field puts them in relation with other actors and thereby specifies interactional patterns that are so important for cognitive construction. Consequently, embedding activists' mind in a larger theoretical picture leads to a better understanding of why they have constructed a strong citizen perception.

The imminent reading is structured in a very classical way. Chapter 2 reviews the existing literature that contributed to the current knowledge about the relevance of cognitions for social movements in general and especially for contentious participation. Notably, I point to four lacunae in the literature to which I would like to contribute. First, social movement studies mostly focus on macro and meso level processes ignoring thereby important underlying micro-sociological dynamics that intervene. Social networks are important meaning transmitters, the (re-)shape activists' cognitions. Social interactions are thus of crucial importance and in that sense, this thesis is a story told on the meso level. However, individuals are not imprisoned in social networks, they choose their social networks and are able to change networks if the social interactions they experienced therein do not longer resonate with their worldviews. Therefore, the meso level story makes only sense if one takes the individual level (agency) into account. Second, the narrower literature on contentious participation evolves in the same way as social movement studies in general: By a focus on mobilization and demobilization. Thereby, important (cognitive) processes during the life of an activist are undermined. Third, scholars know a lot about important structural factors contributing to social contentious participation while cultural factors get less attention. Fourth, some work on cognitions and contentious participation exist but it limits itself to a narrow view on the holy cognitive trinity of injustice, agency and identity frames.

Having outlined these gaps in the literature and specified how I will try to address them, Chapter 3 proceeds to outline the theory of the present work. I start by embedding my contribution in the integrated sociological framework of the "theory of fields" (Fligstein and McAdam 2012). A conceptualization of the crucial terms contentious participation and cognitions and how they are theoretically linked follows, before I qualify my emphasis on cognitions by presenting other important factors and by concluding that cognitions are a necessary and often ignored factor beside others. I conclude this chapter by the elaboration of the four main hypotheses that will guide my empirical analysis. Chapter 4 justifies the research design, methods and data I used for this research. I start by an elaboration of my mixed method design by arguing for the benefits of combining survey and interview data. In addition to the mixed method logic in order to capture the mind of these activists, a second logic is of a comparative nature. In particular, I contrast activists of three different social movement organizations with the general population in the same national context and present the scope and limits of such a comparison. This chapter continues with a specification of the data collection and analytical strategy of both the quantitative and the qualitative data. I bring then this chapter to a close by pointing to an important causality issue, which requires further research.

Chapter 5 is the first out of four empirical chapters. Consequently, it focuses on the first general hypothesis of my thesis: Activists' cognitions that belong to the strong citizen concept are specific with regard to the general population. Comparing these activists and the general population by the use of comparative quantitative indicators is a first step to point to the importance of cognitions if one wants to better understand contentious participation because it shows that some cognitive dimensions are specific for these activists. The idea behind this argument is that movement socialization could be one underlying process that fosters these specific cognitions.

Chapter 6 turns to the qualitative data. Its main aim is the description of the content of activists' perceptions with regard to the strong citizen dimensions, i.e. their relation to society and politics. Thereby, I address the second hypothesis that activists' cognitions resemble largely Barber's idea of a strong citizen. While quantitative measures fall short to describe the content of activists' cognitions, qualitative data are more apt to grasp the

content and to explore the cognitive relations these activists construct with many different objects.

While the first two empirical chapters stress the similarities of activists' cognitions, *Chapter* 7 concentrates on cognitive variations between different types of activists. Three hypotheses are developed in order to argue in favor of the main assumption of this chapter, which is that activists' cognitions vary according to the specific activists' communities and the particular strategic action field with which they interact. First, there is less contention in mainstream fields (environmental protection, human rights) than in challenging fields (migrant's rights) because the difference between the existing definition of shared meanings and the point of view of challengers is bigger for the latter fields. Accordingly, activists of SAB are stronger citizens in cognitive terms then activists of STP and GP respectively. Second, cognitions of active members and sympathizers of the same organization should be very similar. In fact, I do not expect cognitive variation for different levels of participation because I expect that the cognitive receptivity of these activists, especially for sympathizers, is so high that the frequency and the specific channel of interaction is of less importance. Third, there is more variation between activists of different organizations than between levels of participation. While this assumption is mostly a consequence of the first two hypotheses, it is important to discuss the implication of this result as it point to the importance to look more at the qualitative content of social interactions between actors and less at the frequencies and form of interactions taking place.

Finally, Chapter 8 combines quantitative and qualitative data most explicitly. By means of a discriminant analysis, I first test the assumption that cognitions contribute to the explanation of differences between activists' communities even if one controls for other challenging factors, i.e. interactive processes (e.g. social networks) and biographical availability. The main aim of this last empirical chapter is thus to broaden up the narrow focus on cognitions and to start looking at a bigger picture by taking other factors into account. In the second part of this chapter, I then contrast the narratives of two activists in order to explain how structural and cultural factors are deeply interwoven and why cognitive variations still exist despite of a rather similar cognitive map of activists in these

three social movement organizations. I conclude this dissertation by an overall evaluation of the leading questions of this research: Do cognitions matter for contentious participation? And why should one be concerned by activists' cognitions? While one may probably already anticipate my answers to these questions, it is the development of the argument that hopefully turns the subsequent chapters into a fascinating journey.

2. Cognitions and contentious participation - Where has the mind gone?

"Over time, however, a funny thing happened. The theory came to be identified almost exclusively with the structural components of the model — political opportunities and organizational capacity — while the key subjective/cultural dimension of the original formulation — cognitive liberation — was largely forgotten" (McAdam and Schaffer Boudet 2012:64).

This chapter is dedicated to review the existing literature that contributed to the current knowledge about the relevance of cognitions for contentious participation. This thesis points to the importance of activists' cognitions both for and as a product of contentious participation. The main purposes of this literature review are therefore to establish a solid theoretical base and to identify gaps in the literature, which can be addressed by this contribution. I will mainly address four points. First, I give a short overview on the general development of social movement studies. I think that this is useful because it helps us to point to a general shortcoming in this literature – a focus on processes that precede social movements or bring them to an end. Thereby, processes during the life of social movements have not become the attention they deserve. While it is a trademark of the social movement literature to underline the crucial importance of processes and mechanisms for theory building (e.g. McAdam, Tarrow et al. 2001; Tilly and Tarrow 2007), I will argue that most social movement research still circles around notions of emergence, success and decline as main explananda of their research agenda. This, in turn, prevents them to understand processes during the ongoing life of social movements and activists. Process tracing is not an easy endeavor and my work is also limited in this respect in the sense that I am not able to trace a process of cognitive transformation through social interactions. What I do, instead, is to show the outcome of these interactive dynamics by looking at activists' cognitions during participation and by trying to suggest a theoretical explanation to these findings.

Second, the same diagnosis applies to the narrower literature on contentious participation. In fact, the bulk of it focuses on the start point of participation or on dropouts. Processes of mobilization and demobilization are certainly crucial to understand, but they tend to

ignore that *important interactive processes take place during one's contentious life.*⁶ While social network scholars began to underline the cultural importance of social networks as "islands of meaning" (White 1992), empirical research has only spuriously been able to demonstrate the mental consequences of network socialization (Passy and Monsch forthcoming). In the second part of this chapter, I point thus to this parallel between social movement research in general and its subfield contentious participation by pointing to the need to study activists' cognitions, which is the main aim of this contribution.

Third, this chapter sums up the current state of the art on contentious participation. In other words, I try to answer the question of what social movement scholars know about activists. Thereby, I will underline the existence of a fairly well understanding of activists' social and cultural anchorage, the importance of social networks and the notion of biographical availability. In short, important structural factors are dominant in theoretical reflections on social movement participation while cultural factors like meaning construction get less attention. In my view, this is problematic because, as I will show throughout this contribution, activists' cognitions are crucial to understand contentious participation. The work presented here aims at shrinking this gap by looking systematically at activists' worldviews.

Fourth, this thesis argues that cognitions matter for contentious participation both as a necessary condition of and a product from it. *Social movement scholars are familiar with cognitive approaches.* I will recapitulate the work that has been done on collective action frames (Snow, Rochford et al. 1986; Snow and Benford 1992) and summarize the two main existing cognitive approaches to contentious participation (Gamson 1992; Klandermans 1997). While the collective action frame approach recognizes the crucial importance of cognitions, I will argue that the notion of collective action frames is mostly interested in meso level processes and that activists' cognitions do only play a minor role within this theoretical framework. As I focus on individual cognitions, these approaches are not really useful for my purposes here. In contrast, Gamson's and Klandermans' approaches really focus on the individual level. In my view, however, their focus on the holy trinity of

⁶ By interactive processes I understand forms of social interactions within an existing field, i.e. between governance units and challengers, between incumbents and challengers and between different challenging actors (both between individual activists and organizations).

injustice, agency and identity is to narrow and thereby neglects other important cognitive dimensions.

Why should one dedicate his full attention on activists' cognitions? The most fundamental ontological reason lies in the profoundly social nature of human beings themselves. Consequently, it is important to conceive individual and collective human action as acts that aim "to fashion shared identities and meanings" (Fligstein and McAdam 2012:38). Now, pointing to gaps in the social movement literature allows me to show that links between cognitions and actions has only been superficially addressed. This is very surprising given the relevance of meaning making for human action. Therefore, I see my full dedication on contentious participation and cognitions as justified. In order to accomplish this task, I have elaborated the following analytical strategy. I will successively compare the cognitive toolkit of various forms of activism with the general population, describe the content of activists' cognitions, interpret existing variations within the realm of these activists and evaluate the respective weight of cognitions for contentious participation. In my view, such an analytical strategy should bring me in a position to test my theoretical assumptions and thereby to contribute to the existing literature by bringing cognitions back in at the level of the activist. Once I have gone through this literature review, the next chapter will elaborate on what I see as the key components of my theoretical approach. But let me first return to the early beginnings of social movement studies.

2.1. Situating cognition in the history of social movement studies

Similar to the idea of cycles of protest, the place of cognitions in the social movement literature has had its ups and downs. Before the 1970s, cognitions, or more precisely psychological factors in general, were at the heart of the explanation of protest. Protestors were characterized as either defenselessly exposed to crowd dynamics, alienated from their society, or deemed to such abnormal behavior due to other irrational psychological dynamics (Adorno, Frenkel-Bunswik et al. 1950; Gusfield 1955; Kornhauser 1959a; Lipset 1959; Lipset 1960; Gusfield 1963). In a Freudian perspective, Smelser (1968) assumed that protest was a mean for young people to rebel against their fathers. Trying to

explain the emergence of movements in general, Hoffer (1951) established the notion of a "true believer" who identifies completely with the movement. In addition, Davies (1962) and Gurr (1970) tried to explain participation by the notion of relative deprivation, i.e. "... that individuals who experience status inconsistency or frustrated upward mobility are the most likely to become radicalized [or that] those groups who experience a decline in status relative to others – either because of another group's rise or their own decline – are the most likely to become radicalized" (Walder 2009:395). All these scholars had at least two things in common. On the one hand, they were all opposed to movements as a legitimate channel for politics. Given the historical context of this time with the Nazi Movement that just broke down, this perception is quite comprehensible. On the other, they all heavily relied on psychological factors to explain contentious participation. They were thus particularly interested in the mind of activists.

Around twenty years later, it came to the first decline of cognitions as explanation for contentious participation. The historical context for these scholars was different. They were part of the 1968 generation and experienced the emergence of and were mostly sympathetic to the claims of students and civil rights movements. Consequently, they rejected the existing psychological approach of irrationality and started to frame contentious participation as a rational action and a normal way to do politics. Protest action was thus just another channel to pursue their interests. With this turn, what activists have in their head, cognitions and meaning structures, was canceled from the research agenda (Goodwin and Jasper 2009). The respective argument to reject cognitions was that deprivation and frustration is always present and stable in a society whereas political opportunities and organizational resources vary. While this structuralist turn brought important insights to the fore, namely how structural conditions can facilitate or constrain mobilization, they neglected the intermediary variables between structures and action (McAdam, Tarrow et al. 2001; Tilly 2001; Koopmans 2005). Motivational clues for protest were ignored.

For around thirty years now, questions around the emergence, success and decline of social movements (Gamson 1975; Tilly 1978; McAdam 1982; McAdam, Tarrow et al. 2001) are at the heart of social movement research. This literature gives me three main explanatory concepts at hand to

analyze the 'dynamics of contention': Political opportunity structures (Tilly 1978; Tilly 1995; McAdam, Tarrow et al. 2001; Kriesi 2004), resources mobilization (McCarthy and Zald 1977) and cognitive liberation (McAdam 1982). These causes were prominently put together in McAdam's (1982) political process approach building up the current dominant theoretical focus.

While this theoretical approach brought important insights to the social movement literature, I also identify three main shortcomings. First, the bulk of current research focuses on the macro and meso level of social movements sweeping thereby micro-sociological processes often under the carpet. This is quite astonishing because without activists there is no protest. This is not to say, that one should exclusively focus on the individual level. Social interactions and networks are important transmitters of meaning and influence thereby activists' cognitions. However, activists are also able to select their social networks and thereby, they can choose social interactions that resonate with their worldviews. Second, while cognitive liberation figures as one of the main theoretical pillars in the original political process model, it has been largely marginalized by current social movement research. Recently, McAdam and Schaffer Boudet (2012:64) acknowledged this too: "Over time, a funny thing happened. The [political process] theory came to be identified almost exclusively with the structural components of the model - political opportunities and organizational capacity - while the key subjective/cultural dimension of the original formulation - cognitive liberation - was largely forgotten". Beside their importance, cognitive dimensions are thus neglected. Third, the consequence of this conceptual framework incited scholars to focus on cycles of contention (Tarrow 1998), i.e. on conditions for the emergence and the decline/success of social movements. Thereby, dynamics during the life of social movements are mostly ignored and therefore the social movement literature lacks knowledge about crucial (cognitive) processes in between the start and the end of social movements.

With this thesis, I try to address these shortcomings with three contributions. First, I concentrate on the individual level by focusing on activists of three different social movement organizations. Second, I suggest having a closer look at cognitive resources of activists in

specific movement communities that might sustain (or constrain) cognitive liberation and thereby contentious participation. Third, by focusing on 'activists in action', i.e. activists that are currently somewhere in between the start and the endpoint of their participatory life, the presented data enables to grasp the mind of these activists as an output of their social embeddings and agentic adaptation.⁷

As I argued above, research on social movements in general and research on contentious participation share a common focus in their research agenda: a concentration on the start and the end of contentious participation producing thereby a neglect of ongoing cognitive processes during participation. In the next section, I will thus turn my attention to the literature on contentious participation in order to illustrate this parallel. In addition, I point to further lacunae I want to address with this thesis, namely the need to study cognitions for a better understanding of protest participation.

2.2. Contentious participation – A focus on joiners and dropouts

Much theoretical and empirical work has been done to understand contentious participation. The bulk of this work, I will argue, has tried to explain the emergence or start of different forms of contentious participation. Some scholars (Klandermans 1997; Passy 1998; Klandermans 2007) use a time and an effort dimension as an analytical framework to differentiate contentious participation. All of these four cells⁸ have received some attention. Forms of participation that require neither a huge investment in time nor in effort were studied by Klandermans and Oegema (1987; 1994). Examples of short-time but demanding and risky participation are McAdam's study of participation in the Mississippi Freedom Summer (1988) or Nepstad and Smith's (1999) analysis of the Sanctuary movement. Participation can also be enduring but demanding little effort like for some forms of participation in the environmental movement (Pichardo, Heather Sullivan et al. 1998). At the upper end of this two dimensional framework are forms of participation that are demanding both in time and effort, like members in neighborhood committees (Oliver 1984), leaders in the civil rights struggles (Morris 1984), or members of underground organizations (della Porta 1988; della Porta 1992). Although few in

⁷ I develop this idea largely in the next chapter. The theoretical model in Figure 3.3 summarizes my approach.

⁸ The four cells are the following: 1) Neither time nor effort investment, 2) Either time or effort investment and 3) Both time and effort investment.

numbers, there are also studies that compare different forms of participation simultaneously (McAdam 1986; Kriesi 1993; Klandermans 1997; Passy and Guigni 2000; Passy 2001; Morales 2009).

Nowadays, it is generally accepted to conceptualize contentious participation, or more precisely the way towards it, as a process. Klandermans (1997:22-23) describes this process as a four-step model. As a starting condition, an individual has to develop a system of meanings that enables a person to become sensitized to a specific protest issue. Next, as a sympathizer is not automatically washed in a movement, one has to be a target of a mobilization attempt connecting thus the individual with a specific movement organization or mobilization opportunity. As a third step, a sympathizer has also to bring along the motivation to participate, and, finally, needs to overcome the barriers to participation. This theoretical modeling really pushed forward the understanding of mechanisms at work to join protest politics. By delineating different steps towards participation, scholars begun to realize how it comes that, for certain issues, many individuals may sympathize with a movement, but only a few finally participate. This understanding helped thus to underline the crucial importance of structural factors like social networks or biographical availability in the process towards participation. However, this focus on processes before participation has had as a drawback the risk that scholars tend to forget that participation itself is an ongoing process.

After having focused on processes to join or start contentious participation I will now turn to the other end of the participation cycle, i.e. in dropouts or *disengagement*. In much a similar way as different levels of participation imply different costs of action, different forms of leaving also imply different costs. Klandermans (2009) distinguishes between two different kinds of disengagement, i.e. neglect and exit. While neglect is a form of passive defection where it is sufficient to simply stay away, exit requires active defection and thus implies explicit steps that lead to an erosion of support (Oegema and Klandermans 1994). The important question, then, is of course what explains disengagement. Klandermans (2009:133) stresses three factors. First, "[...] lack of contact or negatively experienced contacts [...]" minimizes opportunities to make someone stay in a movement. Second, psychological overload and/or stressful experiences can lead to

burnout, which is a reason to quit. Third, movement decline can be another explanation of why people stop their commitment (Oberschall 1978; Duffhues and Felling 1989). In sum, with social networks and psychological factors, similar factors are at stake for contentious participation and disengagement.

Both, processes of getting involved in contentious participation and of disengagement are important to understand. However, they seem to be so central in the study of contentious participation that *processes during participation risk to be left behind*. This is quite surprising for at least two reasons: The first is that most existing empirical data are retrospective in nature and the second is that important socialization processes are at stake during participation. A vast majority of the empirical work has concentrated on current activists making it thus difficult to assess motivations to join a political protest, which quite often date back a fair amount of time. In other words, data on motivations for participation are collected retrospectively on the basis of surveys or interviews with current activists. While it is understandable that such research designs are the simplest to realize, retrospective designs are fundamentally flawed to assess motivations and mental states in general before participation.⁹

Trying to explain contentious participation through gathering information on motivational clues of current activists is problematic because cognitive transformation is going on all the time. This means that *cognitive transformation can and will happen before an individual participates and after having started participation*. In other words, it is still an open question if activists' cognitions are relevant for contentious participation as they have exogenous causes. Consequently, I could find explanations in the biography of individuals before they started participation. The opposite argument would be that activists' cognitions are relevant for contentious participation because endogenous processes are at stake, i.e. activists' cognitions are an effect of movement socialization.

Doug McAdam (1982) pointed already to this problem in his elaboration of the concept of "cognitive liberation". As he acknowledges, "[...] it is possible that people only develop or discover a sense of efficacy or empowerment after they have begun protesting

⁹ However, Doug McAdam's work on Freedom Summer activists (1988) and Dirk Oegema's and Bert Klanderman's work on the peace movement are two notable exceptions to this general trend.

with others. At first, and sometimes for a long time, people may be uncertain as to whether their protests will actually make a difference. In this sense, cognitive liberation is sometimes a product rather than a cause of protest." In other words, cognitive transformation is due to general life circumstances and is also an effect of movement socialization (Munson 2008). This causality issue is unresolved and certainly an important topic for future research. While this thesis is sensitive to this issue, I am unfortunately unable to resolve this puzzle due to the retrospective nature of my data. My ambition is more modest and more apt to the data I possess. Consequently, I look at cognitions of activists at a specific point in time, to assess if they are specific in contrast to the general population, to systematically compare different forms and types of activists and to estimate the relative importance of cognitions with respect to other challenging factors.

Theoretically, I argue therefore that it is important to elucidate cognitive processes during participation. While I do not pretend that mine is the first attempt to look at such processes during participation, I am convinced that, so far, they generally did not get the attention they deserve. I am especially interested in one specific mechanism: the effects of participation through movement interaction and socialization. I will theoretically specify and contextualize this mechanism in the next chapter. Here, I concentrate on the work that has been done on this topic until now.

One research field that focuses on *processes during participation* is the work looks at mechanisms to sustain contentious participation. Downton and Wehr (1991) discussed five mechanisms that foster social bonds between activists and the peace movement. First, they refer to a feeling of 'common devotion' that results through shared leadership. In fact, feeling responsible for success seems to be an important motivational factor to continue participation. Second, group pressure can amplify the barriers to leave. Third, taking on a role in an organization increases one's individual's commitment. Fourth, rituals strengthening core beliefs and the bond an individual have to the respective organization. Fifth, other members of an organization can become one's core circle of friends, which make disengagement especially difficult. Further on, selective incentives may not be sufficient to maintain participation but they lead to higher levels of participation (Klandermans 2009:128).

Looking at sustaining processes on an organizational level, Taylor (1989:761) identified three ways in her study on women's rights activism how movements build up and maintain "abeyance structures". "The term "abeyance" depicts a holding process by which movements sustain themselves in nonreceptive political environments and provide continuity from one stage of mobilization to another". First, by a preservation of activists' network, second, by sustaining a repertoire of goals and tactics, and third, by fostering a collective identity that offers a sense of mission and moral purpose (Taylor 1989:762). Additionally, social networks do not only play a role for joining and ending contentious participation, they sometimes also discourage leaving it. For example, McPherson et al. (1992) stressed that multiple ties to other organizational members sustain participation. Sandell (1999) showed that close links with activists refrain people from demobilizing.

In fine, Passy and Guigni (2000) described the process behind these phenomena. They argue that involvement in a dense relational context ensures that activists remain in constant contact with the protest movement and the contentious issue. This specific embedding, in turn, could trigger an interpretative process that shapes activists' cognitive toolkit in favor of commitment continuity. Thus, what all these accounts have in common is a focus on interaction processes during participation influencing in some way or another activists' worldviews. To better understand protest participation as a cognitive transformation process, in turn, is my main motivation to study activists' cognitions in a systematic way. As I want to show with this research, protest participation is an interactive process where it comes to cognitive transformation. I will elaborate on this process in the next chapter. For now, I turn my attention to the question of what the social movement literature knows about political activists.

2.3. What do social movement scholars know about political activists?

In this section, I want to review the existing literature about the process that turns individuals into political activists. To begin with, a specific *structural and cultural context* is necessary so that an individual belongs to the so-called sensitized "mobilization potential" (Klandermans 1997). Prospective activists are equipped with a specific social anchorage and a specific values structure (Cotgrove and Duff 1980; Kriesi 1989; Eder 1993; Passy

1998). Individuals are anchored in a socio-cultural context structuring their scope of action (Passy 1998:58). Social class and specific cultural resources influence both the probability to which an individual joins a SMO and the specific SMO an individual is favorable to. Kriesi (1993), for example, has shown that the emergence of the new middle class has forged the emergence of new social movements as channels to put these new political cleavages (Rokkan 1970; Bartolini and Mair 1990) on the political agenda. Passy (1998) has confirmed these findings by an exhaustive analysis of the Declaration of Bern, one of the most influential organizations within the Swiss solidarity movement. She showed that almost 80% of these activists belong to the new middle class, that 82% are highly educated and that most of them were born after the second World War (Passy 1998:88ff.). Beside social class, the individual values structure affects the probability to join a specific SMO. Sticking to the same example, Passy (1998:94ff.) has demonstrated that activists of the Declaration of Bern share to a high degree post-materialist values (Inglehart 1977), that they are leftwing oriented and highly progressive. In sum, both structural as well as cultural contexts allow describing well the mobilization potential of a specific SMO or even of a movement sector (McCarthy and Zald 1977). Yet, as Klandermans (1997:24) has argued "[h]owever large a movement's mobilization potential may be, if the movement lacks a networks for recruitment into action it will be unable to activate its potential." Beside the structural and cultural context of activist, thus, other factors have to be taken into account in order to understand how a "conscience constituency" (McCarthy and Zald 1973) can be turned into activists.

Social networks are one factor that plays a considerable role in order to connect an individual with a specific SMO or a mobilization opportunity. Oberschall (1973) pointed to the existence of "bloc-recruitment" where already existing organizations are recruited as a whole for a new protest issue. Many other scholars confirmed the thesis that existing networks facilitate individuals' participation in protest (della Porta 1988; Fernandez and McAdam 1988; Kriesi 1988; McAdam 1988; Melucci 1989; Diani 1995; Gould 1995; Mische 2003; Passy 2003). According to these studies, the process, that matters within these networks, is not one of social pressure or solidarities, but an identity-building process is at stake easing protest participation. Membership in an organization creates

thus shared "participatory identities" enabling individuals to join specific contentions (McAdam and Paulsen 1993; Gould 1995).

Beside an identity-building process, another process that connects prospective activists with a mobilization opportunity was also taken under scrutiny. Thereby, personal ties to leaders or influential members play an important role for participation in protest action. For example, Snow et al. (1980) stressed that among 60% to 90% of adherents to religious groups were linked with activists before joining collective action. In a similar way, Diani and Lodi (1988) showed that 78% of activists had prior connections with ecologists before they started participation in the environmental movement in Milan (see also della Porta 1988; McAdam 1988; Kriesi 1993; Passy 1998).

In sum, three mechanisms (McAdam, Tarrow et al. 2001:26) work behind the observed structural connection between social networks and contentious participation. First, embeddings in social networks implies ongoing social interactions facilitating individuals' participation through sensitizing them to the issue causing problems (Passy and Monsch forthcoming). Second, social networks contribute or sometimes are even responsible for the construction of participatory identities motivating already sensitized people to participate in protest. Third, social networks bring about mobilization opportunities. These opportunities are connecting processes where, on the one hand, an individual is structurally connected to an opportunity to protest, but on the other hand still has to decide about his actual participation. While underlining the importance of social networks, this literature also makes clear that social networks are mostly a jar for mental processes that are pushing someone into protest or keep him away. In a nutshell, networks are a spatial concept wherein social interactions take place. These interactions, in turn, influence activists' worldviews. Through interactions, for example, cognitions can become more participation friendly: One can get aware of an injustice, confirm his point of view, get to know the reason for the existence of an injustice and perhaps even a narrative of a possible solution. In the same way, interactions can lead someone to become less movement friendly by changing a perceived injustice into something harmless. In sum, cognitions are thus crucial to explain why social networks matter for contentious participation.

While being sensitized, motivated and connected to a protest means that an individual has already passed a long way along the process towards contentious participation, this is still not sufficient. In order to decide if one participates or not, other factors come into play. The best-known version of this decision-making process is probably the rationalistic one where an individual evaluates his perceived costs and benefits that could result from taking part in protest action. Consequently, a positive cost-benefit evaluation increases the probability that an individual will participate, whereas a negative evaluation tends to prevent from participation. According to Mancur Olson (1965), negative evaluations predominate for collective action and that is why it is necessary to provide selective incentives. As Pamela Oliver (1980) and Bert Klandermans (2007) rightly pointed out, Olson's thesis is really powerful to explain why people do not participate in collective action but helps little to understand contentious participation. Nevertheless, Stürmer, Simon et al. (2003) demonstrated for the U.S. fat acceptance movement, that a calculation process contributes through an independent pathway to the prediction of willingness to participate. At least for some forms of collective action, selective incentives may thus contribute to a positive evaluation of the cost-benefit ratio.

How, then, does one calculate the costs implied by collective action? As I outlined above, most work focuses on the cost respective to the specific form of action. Consequently, high-risk or time-consuming forms of action are way more expensive than a one-time monetary contribution. In addition, factors relative to other life spheres can also constrain or facilitate participation, i.e. general life circumstances can contribute to one's evaluation of costs and benefits. Although not in a rational perspective, McAdam (1988) pinpointed these factors with the concept of *biographical availability*. "Many people are deterred or prevented from protesting by the responsibilities and constraints of daily life which are imposed by work, parents, spouses or partners, children, or friends. Not everyone, in other words, is "biographical available" for protest, even if they are sympathetic to the cause."

To sum up, the literature on social movement participation shows thus quite meticulously who (social and cultural context) and how (social networks) people participate. Activists tend to have a specific social anchorage and values structure and they tend do be sensitized and

motivated by the social networks they are embedded in. Again through social networks, prospective activists get connected with mobilization opportunities. Then, after all these several steps, they have to make a decision if they now will participate or not and this decision depends, as I just have called to mind, on the one hand on the evaluation of one's cost-benefit ratio and on one's level of biographical availability. What social movement scholars undermined, in contrast, is the question of why individuals participate in contentious politics. In other words, research on contentious participation produced until date important structural and objectivistic bias (Goodwin and Jasper 2003). However, there are some notable exceptions that have shown some interest in the role of cognitions.

2.4. Cognitions matter for social movements and for contentious participation

The theoretical approach in the social movement literature that takes cognitions most seriously is probably frame analysis. Goffman (1974:21) argues that frames organize experiences and guide action by enabling actors "to locate, perceive, identify, and label" events occurring in their life spaces. Elaborating on this contribution, Snow, Rochford et al. (1986) have established an interpretative theory to make sense of how protest actors mobilize support and how they articulate their claims. Thereby, the most important tool is the concept of collective action frames being simplifying devices that help to understand and organize the complexity of the world. They are termed collective because it is through collective processes that organizations and groups construct those filtering lenses. And they are action frames as they enable collective action. Snow and Benford (1992) defined collective action frames as "action oriented sets of believes and meanings that inspire and legitimate social movement activities and campaigns". Collective action frames are thus essential to recruit activists as well as to sustain commitment, mobilize bystander sympathy and to persuade authorities (Snow, Rochford et al. 1986). However, this implies that for contentious participation, the individual needs to have a cognitive inner world that fits protest frames: they have to resonate with individuals' salient cognitions. In order to recruit potential participators and to keep them motivated, contentious actors need to perform strategies of frame alignment. Snow, Rochford et al. (1986) specified three processes differing by their resonance magnitude between protest and individuals: Frame bridging, frame amplification and frame extension. Frame bridging stands for the

connection of two frames that are ideologically consistent but structurally separated. Frame bridging implies a single connection between the protest organization and individuals. Frame amplification means the exposition or the linkage of a particular interpretative frame with a particular issue. Frame extension, then, are socializing strategies to transform individual's cognitions in order to invite them to join protest.

The framing perspective brings thus important insights to understand how collective actors could effectively support to their cause. 10 But it also faces *several limits*. First, this approach focuses essentially on collective or organizational frames. Contentious actors elaborate these interpretative frames. They are thus mechanisms located at the organizational level. Consequently, individuals' cognitions are not studied in this approach. *The content of individuals' cognitive map is of no interest.* Therefore, this interpretative approach is of little help to understand individuals' cognitions of reality. Second, the framing perspective shares the same limits of the political opportunity approach and the resource mobilization perspective: individuals are passive actors. They play no active role; they align themselves with collective structures.

In contrast, a social psychological approach to contentious participation, adopted by Gamson (1992) and further developed by Klandermans (1997), addressed this missing piece of the puzzle by using the concept of frames on the individual level. William Gamson (1992) first put forward a coherent theoretical framework for political action that incorporates three cognitive dimensions. In his view, these "action frames" are essential for contention to develop. First, an injustice frame which is a collective definition of moral indignation. Contentious actors define a specific situation as unjust and intolerable. Second, an agency frame empowering to change the situation. Thereby, contentious actors frame the idea that activists can alter conditions or policies through collective action. Third, an identity frame, which defines a group identity: a "we" in opposition to some "they". This identity dimension allows developing solidarities with the group and shapes activists feelings to belong to a group sharing the same concerns, the same fate. Together, this is what one may call the *narrow cognitive baseline* necessary for protest. In

¹⁰ For a more extensive review of framing theory's contributions see Benford and Snow (2000), Johnston (1992), Polletta (1997), Snow (2004).

other words, without such a baseline, an individual would not be cognitively available for protest.

Klandermans (1997; 2004) advanced this theoretical framework on several dimensions. He suggests that the demand side of participation – "the potential in a society for protest" (2004:360) – has three dimensions: Instrumentality, identity, and ideology. "Instrumentality refers to contentious participation as an attempt to influence the social and political environment; identity refers to contentious participation as a manifestation of identification with a group; and ideology refers to contentious participation as a search for meaning and an expression of one's view" (Klandermans 2004:361). According to my interpretation, these dimensions echo Gamson's typology to a large degree. Instrumentality comes quite close to the concept of agency frame by stressing activist's perception of the possibilities for change. The identity dimension is more or less congruent with Gamson's identity frame. And even his notion of ideology, stressing the desire of activists to express their view, is at least somewhat linked to a perception of injustice. This becomes quite evident once Klandermans (2004:365) states: "Activists work hard to create moral outrage and anger and to provide a target against which these can be vented".

Beyond giving a far more precise theoretical framework at hand than Gamson's somewhat vague conceptualization of cognitive dimensions, Klandermans contributed even more to the field of contentious participation. I will stress here two crucial contributions.

On the one hand, to my knowledge, he was the first who specified the way towards participation as a four-step process. This theoretical insight allowed scholars of social movements understand to gain much leverage about the difficulties to convert a sympathetic constituency into actual activists. And on the other, Klandermans pointed to important interactions between injustice, agency and identity frames (van Stekelenburg and Klandermans 2010). Understanding these interactions allows understanding how these different cognitive dimensions work together in order to foster contentious participation. In sum, Gamson and Klandermans elaborated thus the bulk of the

theoretical tools concerning cognitions and contentious participation on the individual level.

Beside these contributions, many others contributed to further elaborate this social psychology of protest. Most of this work has been dedicated around the notion of *collective identity* (Snow and McAdam 2000; Polletta and Jasper 2001; Snow 2001; Hunt and Benford 2004). So much, that sometimes one gets the impression that it is sufficient to replenish the mind of activists. Thereby, all other stuff that might be in their heads gets eliminated. Advancing this critique is not to say that identity is unimportant. Quite the contrast, as it has been argued that collective identity is both a necessary cause and effect of protest action (Tilly 1978).

Polletta and Jasper (2001:284) define collective identity as "an individual's cognitive, moral, and emotional connections with a broader community, category, practice, or institution. It is a perception of a shared status or relation, which may be imagined rather than experienced directly, and it is distinct from personal identities, although it may form part of a personal identity. A collective identity may have been first constructed by outsiders (for example, as in the case of "Hispanics" in this country), who may still enforce it, but it depends on some acceptance by those to whom it is applied. Collective identities are expressed in cultural materials – names, narratives, symbols, verbal styles, rituals, clothing, and so on – but not all cultural materials express collective identities. Collective identity does not imply the rational calculus for evaluating choices that "interest" does. And unlike ideology, collective identity carries with it positive feelings for other members of the group." According to their definition, collective identity is thus a multidimensional concept that focuses on an individuals' perceived position in or relation with a group.

While collective identity is a broad concept, it is clearly delineated from concepts like personal identity or ideology. On the individual level, it is regarded as a motivation for participation (Klandermans 2004) as well as life-course outcomes (McAdam 1988; Whittier 1995). Consequently, research has focused on the construction and the effects of collective identity. For the *construction of collective identities*, Taylor and Whittier (1992)

pointed to the important processes of boundary making, conscious raising, and negotiation for the lesbian feminist mobilization. For what effects of collective identity are concerned, the literature offers only little empirical evidence (Hunt and Benford 2004:448). Nevertheless, it has been demonstrated that collective identity is able to sustain commitment (Downton and Wehr 1997; Passy and Guigni 2000), to have biographical consequences (e.g. McAdam 1988; Klandermans 1994; Downton and Wehr 1997) and lead to backlash dynamics (Jasper and Paulsen 1993; Jasper 1997; Polletta and Jasper 2001).

To sum up, collective identity seems thus to be a ubiquitous factor that is important for all processes regarding micromobilization. Collective identity seems to be everywhere at stake. While this thesis does not contest the importance of collective identity, it will stress that the mind of activists is not only made of identity by pointing to other cognitive dimensions relevant to sustain contentious participation.

Beside this focus on collective identity, I noted that social psychological approaches to social movements focuses mainly on three cognitive dimensions: Agency, injustice and identity. Taking the gay movement as an example, these activists perceive unequal treatment between gay and hetero couples as unfair, they judge their respective organization as capable to bring about the introduction of gay marriage and the possibility to adopt children and they constructed a group identity on the basis of the gay community. I agree. These are key components to join and to sustain participation in contentious politics. Protestors need to be morally outraged (injustice), to perceive themselves and their organization as politically efficacious (agency) and to identify with the contentious group (identity).

However, I argue that these three dimensions are not sufficient to grasp activists' cognitions. In other words, the focus on these three cognitive dimensions undermined other important cognitions. Protestors develop and construct holistic moral visions that go beyond identification with a specific group, a specific injustice and a perception to be able to overcome these problems. As James Jasper (1997:2) puts it, contentious participation is about "moral voicing". "Corporations and governments create new technologies,

products, and laws; protestors help to figure out what we feel and think about them." Protestors are thus one actor contributing to create cultural meanings or moral visions. According to this, *I hypothesize that the cognitive baseline to act is broader that it was until now emphasized.* This does not imply that all activists share the same cognitive baseline, but that activist's mind goes beyond the holy trinity of injustice, agency and identity and that theoretical reflection should also widen its scope in order to better understand contentious participation.

2.5. Concluding remarks

This literature review served four purposes. First, it pointed to general shortcomings in the research agenda of social movement studies. More precisely, it showed that social movement research in general focuses heavily on dynamics on the macro and meso level. Thereby, important processes at the individual level do not get the attention they deserve. This thesis tries to counter this unbalance a little bit by focusing on activists' cognitions at a specific point in time. Thereby, I cannot trace empirically a process on the individual level but I am able to show the outcome of interactive dynamics by looking at activists' cognitions during participation and by trying to suggest a theoretical explanation to these findings. In consequence, I share the critique of McAdam and Schaffer Boudet (2012) that it has come to a marginalization of cognitive liberation in the social movement's research agenda. By looking at cognitive resources that sustain participation, I try to call for a repositioning of cognitive liberation in the study of social movements. Scholars tend to focus on "cycles of protest" (Tarrow 1998), i.e. on the start and end point of movements. Instead, this contribution focuses on cognitive resources as an output of interactive dynamics taking place during the life of social movements.

A second purpose of this literature review was to point to existing congruencies between social movements studies in general and research on micromobilization. In other words, research on micromobilization is inspired by general trends in social movements studies. As such, the main objective of this research agenda is to understand the start and end of participation. Whereas much leverage has been gained on these processes, ongoing processes during participation did not get the attention they deserve. While some tried to

address the question of how participation can be sustained, the structural component of social networks are overemphasized and the theoretical development of contentious participation, as an ongoing process of social interactions that shapes activists' worldviews, got less attention. In other words, I assume constant cognitive transformation at work. It is quite surprising that these ongoing processes got so little attention, also due to the mostly retrospective nature of existing data. While the present work has to deal with this same methodological issue, it tries to acknowledge it by its theoretical approach. Specifically, it will argue that the data I present here are activists' cognitions in a specific point in time. Accordingly, they do not help me to understand the motivation or reason for someone to start participation or to drop out, but they tell me something about how activists' worldviews become shaped during (protest) action through ongoing social interactions.

A third purpose of this literature review was to collect the current state of the art on what social movement scholars actually know about activists. I have seen that a specific structural and cultural context delimits a social movement's potential. However, in order to activate at least a small share of this potential, social networks play a crucial role in sensitizing and motivation individuals. Important processes of meaning construction take place in social networks and I am especially interested here in the outcome of these processes. Social networks do not only sensitize and motivate prospective activists, they offer them also mobilization opportunities; they connect them with sites of contention. Thereby, people have to take the decision if they want to participate or not. While some work has interpreted this decision-making process as an evaluation of costs and benefits, others have pointed to the importance of one's level of biographical availability. In sum, current research has concentrated a lot on the questions of who and how individuals participate while forgetting to ask why individuals participate in protest politics. Critics pointed to this structural and objectivists bias. According to these critics, this work suggests to concentrate on activists' worldviews in order to better understand why activists continue to participate and how their cognitions are affected by contentious participation.

Finally, in order to justify this focus on cognitions, I have to demonstrate that cognitions are important. It was thus the last purpose of this review to do a first step in this

direction. The work of Gamson and Klandermans helped me thereby to conceptualize a cognitive 'holy trinity of participation'. In my view, the notion of injustice, identity and agency builds a kind of cognitive baseline for protest. However, I argued that *it is important* to take into account a broader worldview. The thesis will try to defend this argument.

3. Cognitions and contentious participation – interactive dynamics in strategic action fields

"First, good theory is so difficult to produce routinely, in part, because "goodness" is multidimensional: The best theory often combines approaches to theorizing, and the act of combination requires compromise between competing and mutually incompatible values. Second, theory construction is a cooperative venture between author and readers" (DiMaggio 1995:396)

In the previous chapter I pointed to four shortcomings in the social movement literature:

- 1) A way to strong focus on the macro and meso level of social movements.
- 2) An orientation towards the start and end point of participation.
- 3) A reliance on structural factors to explain contentious participation.
- 4) A narrow view on a cognitive holy trinity.

In this chapter, it is now my task to suggest a theoretical framework in order to address these flaws and to define the central concepts of my argument. I will start counterintuitively by situating the central process in which I am interested here - meaning construction through movement socialization – in an integrated sociological framework. For this task, I am heavily inspired by Neil Fligstein's and Doug McAdam's (2012) "theory of fields". I want to situate my work for mainly three reasons: On the one hand, I simply think that it is useful to situate one's own theoretical contribution in a more generic theoretical framework because this enables me to locate my work on activists' cognitions within a bigger picture. I locate thus my modest contribution in the more general sociological literature that seeks to explain social order and social change by questioning the ways in which these activists contribute to social change through movement participation and meaning construction. On the other hand, it is one of my main arguments that I have to look at activists' worldview in a broader way. In my view, this makes only sense if I acknowledge, both theoretically and empirically, that protest action does not take place in an insular space but has to be situated in a complex and interconnected world. Third, and most importantly, the field logic enables me to contextualize the three organizations in their respective fields and to take ongoing interactions within the specific field seriously. As I will explain in detail in the next chapter, activists that defend migrant's rights see

their worldviews more challenged than activists of GP or STP, who can rely on a rather consensual definition of shared meanings in within their respective field.

For this task, the notion of "strategic action fields" (SAF) (Fligstein and McAdam 2012) fits very well mainly for two reasons. On the one hand, my focus on these activists presents them in a very isolated space where one might get the impression that there are only activists out there in the world. This is obviously not the case. However, just acknowledging that the interaction pattern of activists is more diverse and complex is not sufficient. Situating activists in a field allows locating them as one actor among others and defining broader interactive patterns, which may influence activists' cognitions. On the other hand, the collective actions that are going on in strategic action fields are aiming to bring about social change through the construction and imposition of meaning. Activists work hard on these issues and my focus on activists' cognitions represent an output of meaning construction at a specific point in time. Therefore, situating my theoretical reflections within the concept of strategic action fields makes sense because of their strong emphasis on meaning construction and the possibility to contribute to their reflections by showing how specific challengers perceive their respective field.

In what follows, I will discuss the main concepts of this thesis, namely, contentions participation and cognitions. Having managed to clarify these two central notions, I will proceed to explain theoretically how cognitions are linked to action and how action is linked to cognitions. It is true, as I already admitted in the previous chapter, that I am unable to demonstrate these links in an empirical way. Nevertheless, I consider it important to reflect on the connections of action and cognitions as my data ultimately reflects an output of processes involved therein. Since the social movement literature has been poor in specifying these links, I consulted contributions in social psychology and cognitive sociology. I suggest relying on these contributions because these disciplines have elaborated empirically grounded theories where cognitions are central for the understanding of human action (Fiske and Levine 1980; Swidler 1986; Fiske and Taylor 1991; Schneider 1991; D'Andrade 1995; Monroe 1995; DiMaggio 1997; Strauss and Quinn 1997; Zerubavel 1997). My main task here will be to convince the interested reader

that, at least theoretically, cognitions are important for human action in general and particularly for contentious participation.

Of course, not all cognitive dimensions are important for contentious participation as this activity represents just one of several life spheres of an individual. In the previous chapter, I argued that the "holy trinity" of injustice, agency and identity are insufficient to capture the cognitive dimensions relevant for contentious participation. Consequently, I argued that I have to take into account broader worldviews. I will specify this argument in this chapter by referring to activists' relation to society and their relation to politics. I will explain why these two dimensions are central for contentious participation and I will suggest that I can sum up both dimensions under the label of "strong citizen" (Barber 1984).

As I am interested in the role cognitions play for protest politics, I am well aware that I cannot escape the pitfall of exaggerating the centrality of cognitions. However, I would like to make clear that it is not my intention to claim that cognitions are a sufficient condition for and/or the only product of contentious participation. Instead, I want to point to the importance of cognitions by demonstrating both in a theoretical and empirical way that they are one necessary factor to understand contentious participation. Cognitions are one necessary factor beside others. I therefore want to sketch out a theoretical framework of contentious action where I show how I see cognitions at work beside other, more structural, factors, namely, social and cultural anchorage, social networks and biographical availability.

Having put the importance of cognition in perspective, the final section of this chapter will then turn back to my central argument of the relevance of cognitions. I will do this by a brief sketch of *four main hypotheses that will guide my empirical analysis*. Here, I elaborate only concisely on them, as I will treat them more systematically in the empirical chapters that follow. The last section is thus dedicated to show why I argue that

1) Activists' cognitions are specific with regard to the general population.

- 2) The underlying notion that captures this specificity can best be described as a perception of strong citizen.
- 3) Activists' worldviews vary in reference to the type of protest action they are involved.
- 4) Cognitions are important to understand contentious participation even if one controls for other challenging factors.

Having outlined the ambitions of this chapter, I will now start by situating the process I am interested here, namely activists' meaning construction, in a general sociological framework for social change.

3.1 Meaning construction in strategic action fields

Recently, Neil Fligstein and Doug McAdam (2012) made an important contribution to neo-institutional thinking by the general elaboration of a theory of fields, which is in essence a synthesis of a dialogue between scholars of social movements and organizations. Their main aim it to "explicate an integrated theory that explains how stability and change are achieved by social actors in circumscribed social arenas" (2012:3). The basic idea of their theory is that social life is organized in "strategic action fields". They are "the fundamental unit of collective action in society. A strategic action field is a constructed meso-level social order in which actors (who can be individual or collective) are attuned to and interact with one another on the basis of shared (which is not to say consensual) understandings about the purposes of the field, relationships to others in the field (including who has power and why), and the rules governing legitimate action in the field (Fligstein and McAdam 2012:9). Action takes place within these strategic action fields, an insight that is borrowed from general institutional theory (DiMaggio and Powell 1983; Scott and Meyer 1983; Bourdieu and Waquant 1992; Scharpf 1997; Powell, White et al. 2005).

Before I will sketch their theoretical approach, I want to briefly discuss the reasons why this theory is useful for the present work and why it is better suited than other approaches. As this work is mainly situated in the social movement literature, I could

have taken the concept of "multi-organizational field" (Curtis and Zurcher 1973). According to this concept, a movement organization's multi-organizational field is defined "as the total possible number of organizations with which the movement might establish specific linkages (Klandermans 1992:28). While this approach brings along a field logic that allows situating specific social movement organizations in relation to other actors, namely allies and enemies, it is a simplified version of Fligstein's and McAdam's theory as it overemphasizes the role of social movement's therein. In the latter, social movement organizations are a more peripheral actor beside multiple actors that play a crucial role in the definition of shared meanings.

I could also qualify the importance of Fligstein's and McAdam's work by embedding it in a more general framework of neo-institutional thinking (White 1992; DiMaggio 1997; Tilly 1998; Mische 2003). While the approaches of these scholars also stress the importance of an interactive context and the importance of this context for the construction of cognitions, neo-institutionalism stresses isomorphism and therefore has problems to explain social change. In contrast, the notion of strategic action fields focuses on social change of which an important part is cognitive transformation. Therefore, this theoretical angle resonates well with my focus on activists embedded in different interactional contexts and a conceptualization of cognitions, which are constantly (re-)constructed. In that sense, it resonates well with Swidler's notion of individual's cultures (Swidler 2003), which are complex and contradictory as individuals are embedded in multiple (sub-)cultures that may sometimes contradict themselves. To sum up, Fligstein's and McAdam's theory of fields brings in a focus on social and cognitive change that, on the one hand, fits well with the conceptualization of fluid cognitions I use here and, on the other hand, creates room for agentic individuals who can choose which part of their multiple cultures they want to use in a specific situation. Conceptualized as interactive fields that are conflict-laden, the notion of strategic action fields allows thus taking the idea of clashing worldviews seriously. By this way, this theory also enables me to show how the micro and the meso level is linked in the present work. On the one hand, social interactions in specific context shape activists' cognitions. In that sense, cognitive transformation is a meso level story. However, activists, and individuals in general, are able to choose their networks and thereby, they are able to resist to at least a part of the

worldviews transmitted by social interactions. While thus the organizational or meso level is important to consider, the individual itself, through his agency to choose deliberatively from his available cultures, is also a crucial part of the story. Each of the three activists' communities of this research are embedded in a specific context and are thus equipped with specific cognitive resources. Fligstein's and McAdam's contribution enables me to theoretically explain why this is the case.

According to Fligstein and McAdam (2012:10), strategic action fields are defined as follows: "We see strategic action fields as socially constructed arenas within which actors with varying resource endowments vie for advantages (Bourdieu and Waquant 1992; Martin 2003; Emirbayer and Johnson 2008)". By socially constructed, the two authors refer to three important aspects. First, membership in fields depends on subjective interpretation. Second, frontiers of strategic action fields are continually shifting depending on (political) issues at stake. And third, these fields run on a series of shared understandings defined by the members of the respective field (idem). In opposition to most institutional approaches, however, Fligstein and McAdam (2012:11) contest the stable or taken for granted nature of strategic action fields. Instead, for them, "there is constant jockeying going on in fields as a result of their contentious nature". In other words, interactions between social actors in strategic fields is neither routine nor pacific in nature, there is always a certain degree of conflict about the distribution of power and about the definition of shared meanings in the field. That is not to say that one can expect to see revolution again and again, but "[c]onstant low-level contention and incremental change are the norm in fields rather than the image of routine reproduction that tends to define most versions of institutional theory" (Fligstein and McAdam 2012:12). In a nutshell, strategic action fields are thus spaces where collective and individual actors are consistently struggling for what is at stake. They are aiming to change or maintain the current definition of shared meaning in their field in order to gain in or maintain their power within their respective field. The phenomenon of general interest is thus collective strategic action as this is the main channel to influence the definition of shared meaning and to bring about social change within a field.

In this thesis, I am interested in a particular form of collective strategic action – protest politics – and, more specifically, I am interested in the minds of activists enabling this form of collective strategic action in particular fields, namely migration, environmental protection and collective human rights¹¹. I thus hope that I can stimulate further reflections on the microsociological foundations of this theory. *The underlying assumption here is that these activists, through social interactions happening during their participation, have developed a specific worldview, which they try to empower within the hierarchies of shared understandings in a specific field.* This assumption needs further clarification.

For this reason, I want to take up Fligstein's and McAdam's (2012:18) conceptualization of strategic action. They acknowledge that the notions of power and preferences have dominated reflections until date but they add to this famous duo an important cultural dimension: "However, we see strategic action as inextricably linked to the distinctive human capacity and need to fashion shared meanings and identities to ensure a viable existential ground for existence". In other words, *strategic action implies that there is constant meaning construction going on in strategic action field.* And the process of meaning construction happens through ongoing contentious social interactions between actors in this particular field. Tilly (1998:507) pointed out this idea too: "Conversation in general shapes social life by altering individual and collective understandings, by creating and transforming social ties, by generating cultural materials that are then available for subsequent social interchange, and by establishing, obliterating, or shifting commitments on the part of participants". Movement participation implies multiple conversations both between activists and between activists and their respective targets within a strategic action field. And these conservations are meant to alter individual and collective understandings.

Meaning construction through ongoing conversation between actors is thus an important process within a field because it is through altering or maintaining a shared definition of rules and understanding that social change can be induced or prevented. Now, *my thesis contributes an empirical example by focusing on cognitive resources as an outcome of these processes of meaning construction.* In my view, activists contribute an important share to these processes of meaning construction because activists are engaged in "moral voicing" (Jasper 1997:2).

¹¹ I will characterize these fields in the next chapter.

"Corporations and governments create new technologies, products, and laws; protestors help to figure out what we feel and think about them". The aim of protest action is thus moral voicing, or, in a field logic, moral voicing is what challengers do to influence the definition of common understandings in a field and to improve their respective position in the field.

Further on, the capacity to raise a moral voice implies that activists as collectivities have a say on the definition of shared understanding in a specific field. In other words, by contentious participation, activists transform their worldviews into action; they take part in meaning construction processes in their respective field. The purpose to conduct a detailed mapping and a systematic comparison of activists' worldviews in this thesis is thus a first step to grasp what kind of worldviews - trough persistent participation activists try to impose in their respective fields. While the mere existence of protest action implies that activists raise their moral voice and have thus the capacity to have a say on a contentious issue in their respective field, the strength of their input depends on their position in the field and on the stability of the existing settlement in the field. Activists and protest actors are, by definition, challengers in a field. They are thus certainly not the most powerful actor. In addition, "existing settlements represent an often imposing cognitive barrier to contentious action. (...) Fields are stable predictable worlds and sources of meaning and identity for all participants in the strategic action field. To overcome this barrier, challengers must fashion alternative conceptions of control that simultaneously undermine the existing settlement, while providing a new animating vision for the field" (Fligstein and McAdam 2012:107). Thus, if internal change¹² occurs, it will certainly happen through the contribution of challengers. Through protest action, activists do their share by raising consciousness and the elaboration of powerful "collective action frames" (Snow, Rochford et al. 1986; Snow and Benford 1992). While collective action frames are certainly not the simple aggregate of activists' worldviews, activists' worldviews will contribute significantly to their elaboration.


Below, Figure 3.1 tries to schematically sum up how social change and the definition of shared meanings come about. I represent a strategic action field by a dashed cloud to

¹² Change can also occur through external events (see Fligstein and McAdam 2012).

indicate its porous nature and the difficulty to define its frontiers. Within this dashed cloud, interactional dynamics take place between three types of actors, i.e. incumbents, challengers and governance units. "Incumbents are those actors who wield disproportionate influence within a field and whose interests and views tend to be heavily reflected in the dominant organization of the strategic action field" (Fligstein and McAdam 2012:13). In other words, the existing shared meanings in a field legitimize the privileged position of incumbents within a field. Therefore, challengers typically challenge this definition of shared meanings. "Challengers [...] occupy less privileged niches within the field and ordinarily wield little influence over its operation. While they recognize the nature of the field and the dominant logic of incumbent actors, they can usually articulate an alternative vision of the field and their position in it" (idem.). Consequently, activists and their respective protest organizations are thus typical challengers within a field and one of their main activities is to bring an "alternative vision of the field" to the fore. Finally, governance units represent a third set of actors "that are charged with overseeing compliance with the field rules and, in general, facilitating the overall smooth functioning and reproduction of the system" (idem.). Accordingly, they are generally defending the position of incumbents and should develop a more contentious relation with challengers.

Although very central in the thinking of Fligstein and McAdam, I ignore almost completely the positioning and interdependence of one strategic action field in relation with other fields and thus the general broader field environment. The reason for this is that relations between fields are neither central to the argument I make here nor to my thesis in general. This does not imply that the broader field environment is not important for activists' cognitions. Probably, quite the contrary is at stake but this research is not able to capture this topic. However, I am well aware of this shortcoming and the box at the top on the right indicates that the broader field environment can bring about change.

Figure 3.1: The role of activists' cognitions within the theory of strategic action fields



For my concerns here, the question of what is going on inside a strategic action field is more important. The left side of the cloud tries to represent how the major actors within a field are in constant interaction with one another. The nature of these interactions might be somehow different depending on which actors are interacting. In this thesis, I am mostly interested in the interaction between different challenging actors themselves, between challengers and incumbents and between challengers and governance units. What it going on in these interactions, is, according to Fligstein and McAdam (2012:12), "a constant jockeying" in order to enforce existing settlements or to shape existing shared meanings within the field. As an arrow pointing to the box of social change indicates it, it is expected that changes within a field happen through ongoing conversational dynamics between the relevant actors. Whereas incumbents try to prevent change because the settled definition of shared meanings legitimate their dominant position in a field, challengers try to induce change by making their worldviews visible through strategic collective action, which is, at least sometimes, protest action.

Whereas some interaction between incumbents, governance units and challengers is always going on, the level and form of interaction might vary significantly. In my view, the level and form of interaction depends on the status a challenger has both with regard to other relevant actors - i.e. incumbents and governance units - and with regard to the challengers' position relative to the current definition of shared meanings in a strategic action field. In Switzerland, for example, challengers in the field of environmental politics or human rights have an easier task to impose their worldviews then in the field of migration politics where challengers try to defend the rights of migrants. This is so because the struggle about the definition of shared meanings in the field of environmental politics has become less polarized than in the field of migration politics (Koopmans, Statham et al. 2005). Accordingly, the worldviews of challengers in the field of migrant's rights diverges stronger from existing rules and shared understandings in their field than this is the case for challengers in the field of environmental politics and of human rights. This implies that challengers in different fields can be situated along a continuum that goes from fields where challengers and incumbents agree on almost all aspects within their field to fields where these two actors disagree on almost everything. I label the extremes of this continuum mainstream and challenging contentious issues respectively.

This reflection bears on my thesis in the following way. One central assumption is that these activists have specific cognitions. Now, the level of specificity might vary depending on the place where a specific protest issue is situated on the continuum mentioned above. For example, if a set of challengers can be situated on a more mainstream side of this continuum, this would imply that activists share a considerable part of the existing shared meanings within this field. Accordingly, their cognitions will not be as specific as this is the case for activists in more challenging contentious issues where their meaning structures are in sharp contrast with those of other actors. I will return to this argument in more detail in the next chapter when I discuss the reason for the comparative nature of this research.

Fligstein's and McAdams field approach is thus of great help to position my research within a broader theoretical framework. In return, I hope my piece of work can contribute to the further development of this theory. Especially, I put forward that the

focus on activists' worldviews enables me to get a hint on the worldview of challengers in a respective field. This is important because without challenging worldviews within a field there would be no social change as incumbents could simply define the rules and understandings in a field to their advantage. Understanding the perceptions of challengers are thus a crucial step to understand something about social change, i.e. which worldviews, rules and understandings are contested. In addition, activists try not only to impose their worldviews, activists' cognitions are also fashioned by social interactions in a respective field. Consequently, a detailed and systematic mapping of activists' cognitions enables me to account for the "mental product" of challengers resulting from ongoing contentious conversations within a strategic action field.

To sum up, this thesis tries thus to contribute to the reflections about social change by looking at the challenging worldview of activists within specific strategic action fields. As I argue, it is fundamental to understand challengers' worldviews in order to better understand contentious participation both (1) as ongoing conversations within a field shaping activists' worldviews and (2) as the challenger's moral voices that try to induce social change. Having situated this thesis in a general theoretical framework, I will now turn to the discussion of the most important concepts of this thesis, i.e. cognitions and action, and how they are linked together. I will thus elaborate on the theoretical model central to this thesis.

3.1. Conceptualization of contentious participation

Contentious participation is the focus of my research. It is the essential activity that all respondents share and which, basically, makes them to activists. *Contentious participation* is principally a form of political participation "defined here as the acts by private citizens that are more or less directly aimed at influencing the selection of governmental personnel and the actions they take, including new issues on the agenda, and/or changing values and preferences directly linked to political decision-making" (Morales 2009:24). However, contentious participation is a specific kind of political participation. Not every kind of political participation qualifies thus as contentious participation. Contentious participation is a collective form of political participation, excluding thus any individual form of participation (as voting for example).

I label this form of participation as contentious because it refers to "interactions in which actors make claims bearing on someone else's interests, leading to coordinated efforts on behalf of shared interests or programs, in which governments are involved as targets, initiators of claims, or third parties" (Tilly and Tarrow 2007:4) and because it involves the use of at least some forms of non-institutional action repertoire. Contentious participation takes thus place outside of institutional channels. As the first word in Tilly's and Tarrow's definition of contentious politics explicitly acknowledges, contentious participation implies not only a specific form of political collective action but, mostly important for this thesis, social interaction. Typically, these interactions take place with all relevant actors within a strategic action field, i.e. with incumbents, governance units and with other individual and collective challengers. The nature of these interactions is mostly contentious as activists are challenging the shared meanings of the current settlement within a field. In addition, the nature of these interactions can also be strategic. This is the case whenever activists interact with other activists or with other challenging actors in a field in order to set up strategies or build alliances. I cannot stress enough the importance of the interactive nature of contentious participation as interaction implies a shaping or even a transformation of cognitions. It is thus of crucial importance to not reduce contentious participation to a form of collective action.

Before turning my attention to cognitions or to activists' cognitive toolkit in the next section, I would like to remind the reader that contentious participation is, of course, a multifaceted concept. For example, one can account for this heterogeneity by differentiating the degree of risk an activists is confronted with (McAdam 1986), by distinguishing different intensity levels of participation (Kriesi 1993; Klandermans 1997; Passy 1998), by being sensitive to the duration of participation (Klandermans 1997; Passy 1998) or by comparing beneficiaries of the outcome of contentious participation with conscience constituents (McCarthy and Zald 1977; Passy and Monsch 2012). Different forms of contentious participation imply different kinds of social interactions. In this thesis, I distinguish between two different levels of participation: Active members are activists who declare themselves as taking an active part in the organization, they are thus activists who spend their time for political protest. Sympathizers, in contrast, sustain their organization exclusively with their money. Whenever I refer to both categories, I label them activists. I think that this distinction makes sense as sympathizers engage in other – and most probably less – forms of social interactions than active members. Accordingly, the content of cognitive outlooks within the relevant strategic action field and the importance of different cognitive dimensions could vary between different forms of contentious participation.

Contentious participation does not only imply different levels of participation. In fact, the nature of the field and of the social movement sector in which contentious participation takes place will have an impact on the form and the content of the interactions activists will experience. Consequently, *activists' cognitions will not be the same for every type of social movements*. According to Tilly (2005:182-183) social movements have several distinctive characteristics:

- They are a specific form of contentious politics due to their combination of sustained campaigns of claim-making, a particular action repertoire, and concerted displays of supporters' worthiness, unity, numbers, and commitment.
- From their origin in the 18th century, social movements were always collective, and thus, interactive campaigns.

- These campaigns always have specific targets, mostly power holders, but also other political actors and general publics.
- Claims of social movements combine claims to identity, standing, and specific programs.
- The relative importance of these three types of claims varies between social movements, between activists and between phases of movements.
- Democratization fosters the emergence of social movements, but the contrary is not true. Not all social movements foster democracy.
- However, social movements vindicate popular sovereignty.
- Social movements depend on political entrepreneurs for their success.
- Social movements' forms vary historically. Nowadays, it is debatable if there is a split between national and international social movements.

This definition does not only give a clear idea of what constitute a social movement, it also points to the fact the types of social movement may vary substantially. Examples are the pro-life and pro-choice movement or the pro-civil rights movement and anti-civil rights movement. These variations have implications for my thesis because *activists of different movements do not share the same worldviews*. To reconsider the civil rights example again, nobody expects that activists of the National Association for the Advancement of Colored People have similar cognitions as activists of the Ku Klux Klan. My research focuses on activists in Switzerland participating in three protest organizations: Solidarity across borders (SAB) defending migrant's rights, the Society of threatened peoples (STP) defending collective human rights and Greenpeace (GP)¹³. Consequently, these activists in this research represent by far not a general picture of activists. They are activists in Switzerland and they all belong to the post-industrial movement sector. This reduces considerably the capacity for inference for the cognitive dimensions I suggest below and should be taken into account for the interpretation of the scope of my theoretical framework and the subsequent empirical analyses.

To sum up, I really understand contentious participation as a form of social interaction that influences activists' worldviews. The form, frequency and the content of these social

¹³ I discuss these organizations in more detail in the next chapter.

interactions vary and so do activists' cognitions as I have tried to make clear by distinguishing different forms of contentious participation and social movements.

3.2. Conceptualizing cognitions and theoretical links to action

Nowadays, social movement scholars tend to acknowledge that cognitions are important to understand contentious participation, that "we need to look at how protestors view the world [...]" (Goodwin and Jasper 2009:144). As aware as they seem to be of this importance as astonishing is the lack of conceptual clarity when it comes to cognitions. In order to cope with this conceptual lack, I suggest that insights of cognitive sociology (Fiske and Levine 1980; Swidler 1986; Schneider 1991; D'Andrade 1995; DiMaggio 1997; Strauss and Quinn 1997; Zerubavel 1997) can contribute fruitfully to my understanding of contentious participation. These literatures defines cognitions as worldviews or mental representations that organize in a relatively structured way objects and situations, and allow people to make sense of themselves and their relation to others and the world around them (Fiske and Taylor 1991). One's cognitions have a social as well as an agentic component. On the one hand, worldviews are shared with others as one relies on culture and interaction with others to construct them (Swidler 1986; Jasper 1997). On the other, cognitions stress agency as the mind actively constructs a reality that goes beyond the object itself (Fiske and Taylor 1991). The conceptualization of a cognitive toolkit below will make that clear. My focus here is this stock of activists' worldviews – their cognitive toolkit – and how cognitions are linked to action.

Swidler (1986) suggests that an agentic way to link cognitions and action. In her seminal paper "culture in action", she defines culture as a toolkit "of symbols, stories, rituals, and worldviews, which people may use in varying configurations to solve different kinds of problems" (idem: 273). Accordingly, "all people know more culture than they use (Swidler 1986:277). Culture is diverse and components of one's culture can be in dissonance; different conflicting symbols can be stocked at the same time and one needs perhaps to judge them differently and give prominence to one over another according to the situation one is confronted with. Thus, although one's cultural toolkit shapes the capacities from which action is constructed, one's complex and sometimes contradictory

cognitive toolkit stresses the role of agency. Thereby, actors are able to select deliberately different pieces of their toolkit for constructing their lines of action. Ann Swidler (1986:273) wrote about "strategies of actions [which are] persistent ways of ordering action through time". Action should therefore not be regarded as a unique event. Action is integrated into larger assemblages, so called "strategies of action", and it is by the help of one's cultural toolkit that one chooses strategies of action. This cognitive approach invites me thus to treat decision-making more as an ongoing and agentic process: As strategies of action congruent with our worldviews. In this scenario, cognitions are thus necessary: Without a cognitive toolkit, no strategies of action can be chosen.

In contrast to Swidler, stressing a deliberative process between cognition and action, Monroe's (1996) concept of cognitive resonance describes an automatic process. Challenging rational choice theory, where individuals' behavior ensues from the calculation of the best choice that satisfies its self-interests, Monroe opposes this single-rule of decision-making to an alternative accounting for the complexities of human nature. In her decision-making alternative, cognitions enter into play. In her study, she demonstrated that the decision to rescue Jews resonated with the core cognitions of the rescuers. "Certain kinds of political action emanate primarily from one's perception of self in relation to others: this perception effectively delineates and sets the domain of choice options perceived as available to an actor" (Monroe 1995:12). A cognitive perspective explains individuals' acts: cognitive resonance also constitutes a decision-making process. Whatever the process at stake, cognitive sociology and social psychology have shown that cognitions are key components to behave. Cognitions enable action and (inter-)action shapes cognitions.

Teske (1997) is a third example in order to demonstrate *how cognitions and actions are deeply interwoven*. By using interviews with activists from across the spectrum of American politics, he shows how activists are concerned by the question of "what kind of person they are and what kind of life they are living" (idem:1). Consequently, activists' cognitions are reflected in the actions they take, and thereby, contentious participation can become a "style of living" (Teske 1997). In this sense, individuals understand contentious participation as action that is "crucially about oneself, about who one is, what values and

principles area embodied in one's life, and what meaning one's life has" (Teske 1997:85). Contentious participation becomes thus an expression for one's "concern to act such that one lives the life of a certain kind of person" (Teske 1997:87). I assume that this is similar to what happens during contentious participation, i.e. I defend here the thesis that these activists live the life of what can be described as a strong citizen. While the retrospective nature of my data does not allow me to assess the causal link between cognitions and action, I can describe the content of activists' worldviews as an outcome of the life as activists.

3.3. The cognitive holy trinity – injustice, identity and agency frame

I describe this cognitive content in two steps. First, I turn now to a specification of what I have called the holy trinity, i.e. injustice, identity and agency frame. Second, I describe theoretically what I mean by activists' perception of strong citizen and why I see this cognitive dimension to be of crucial importance to better understand contentious participation.

As I have already mentioned in the previous chapter, Gamson (1992) differentiated three dimensions that are relevant for the individual level: injustice, agency and identity. First, contention entails the constitution of an injustice frame. According to Gamson, Fireman et al. (1982:14), "[a]n injustice involves the violation of some shared principle about what is fair – that is, it involves a violation of some moral code." An *injustice frame* is then a collective definition of moral indignation. Contentious collectivities define a specific situation as unjust and intolerable and activists need to accept this definition in order to be sensitized for a specific political issue. Accordingly, the individuals' relation to the contested issue is the link an actor weaves with the political issue he is struggling for.

Second, contentious actors are key agents for bringing about change within society (Crossley 2002:8). How do activists perceive the possibilities for social change? An *agency* frame makes one believe that we can change the situation. Thereby, contentious actors frame the idea that activists can alter conditions or policies through collective action. Again, without such a conviction it is hard to believe that an individual will engage in

contentious action. The individuals' relation to social change is thus the cognitive link an actor weaves with the possibility to change, to improve or to prevent a decline of the social situation for which he struggles. To complement this holy cognitive trinity, collective actors construct an *identity frame*, which defines a group identity: a "we" in opposition to some "they". It allows to identify with the concerned group and to delegitimize those who are responsible for the injustice. On the individual level, an identity frame is thus the individuals' relation to the mobilized group for which he is committed to.

In sum, activists need to be morally outraged (injustice), to perceive themselves and their organization as politically efficacious (agency) and to identify with the concerned group (identity). These three dimensions are certainly important to understand contentious participation but, as I argue, they are not sufficient and sometimes they are difficult to apply. For example, the identity frame is difficult to apply for defenders of migrant's rights. They are mostly citizens of their respective country and did not experience the harsh living conditions as migrants sometimes do. How can they then identify with the concerned group? An even clearer example for the problems associated with the identity frame is probably the environmental protection domain where it seems impossible to identify with the environment. In addition, to portray activists' mind as only composed of injustice, agency and identity frames seems highly reductionist. Activists, as every other actor too, construct a much more complex array of cognitions. While this does not imply that one has to look at every imaginable cognitive dimension, I argue that broader dimensions have to be taken into account. I suggest summing up these other dimensions with the concept of strong citizen to which I turn now.

3.4. The concept of strong citizen or how activists perceive themselves

Until now, all I said about cognitive dimensions relevant for contentious participation is that the injustice, agency and identity trinity are fairly well known, that they are very important, but that a single focus on them is too narrow. Instead, my assumption is that these activists are equipped with cognitive resources that resemble the one of a strong citizen. While I cannot demonstrate this empirically, I suggest on a theoretical level that

these activists have become cognitively strong citizens through social interactions they have had in the social networks they are embedded in. But how do I define a worldview of a strong citizen? What is the content of this strong citizen perception? How do these activists interpret their relation to the political sphere, to society and their role as citizens?

Barber's account on *strong democracy* (1984:117) inspired my concept of a strong citizen perception. "Strong democracy is a distinctively modern form of participatory democracy. It rests on the idea of a self-governing community of citizens who are united less by homogeneous interests than by civic education and who are made capable of common purpose and mutual action by virtue of their civic attitudes and participatory institutions rather than their altruism or their good nature. It challenges the politics of elite and masses that masquerades as democracy in the west and in doing so offers a relevant alternative to what I have called thin democracy – that is, to instrumental, representative, liberal democracy in its three dispositions." And his definition goes on as "politics in the participatory mode where conflict is resolved in the absence of an independent ground through a participatory process of ongoing proximate self-legislation and the creation of a political community capable of transforming dependent, private interests into public goods" (Barber 1984:132).

I interpret Barber's definition of strong democracy as depicting a *specific citizen* who has, on the one hand, a specific perception of politics and, on the other, a specific relation to society. For the former, Barber underlines their critical stands towards political authorities (challenges the politics of elites), a need of protest actors (participatory institutions that make common purpose and mutual action capable), and the necessity of an active citizen (politics in the participatory mode). For the latter, Barber points to two dimensions: to the importance of common goods (a strong democracy transforms partial and private interests into public goods) and to an inclusive perception of society (a community of citizens that is not united by common interests). The notion of strong democracy requires thus citizens with a specific relation to society and politics. In Barber's view (1984:216), this is what enables to transform a deficient human nature into one of a strong citizen: "We are born insufficient, we need cooperation; we are born with potential natures, we require society to realize them; we are born unequal, we need politics to make us equal;

we are born part slave, part free we can secure full liberty only through democratic community". I put thus forward that an important dimension of activists' worldview is what I call a perception of "strong citizen". I suggest thus that a strong citizen perspective is a two dimensional concept implying a specific relation to society and politics. Before I discuss these two dimensions in detail, I want to illustrate Barber's concept of a strong citizen with a narrative of one of my interviewee's¹⁴.

The thirty-two old Lisa¹⁵ looks back on an impressive activist career. At its beginnings, she engaged in student contentions protesting against an increase of student's taxes. These initial contentious experiences served as an engine for further mobilization. It allowed her to build a dense network of politically committed friends that brought here to other contentious sites, namely to the squatters' milieu and to anti-globalization demonstrations. Some years passed by before Lisa joined the pro-migrant's rights movement. Again, two friends from the student and squatters' milieu brought her to this contentious site where she conducted legal work to defend asylum seekers for eight years. This brief sketch on Lisa's activist career underscores thus the well-known *importance of social networks* (Snow, Zurcher et al. 1980; Morris 1984; Opp and Gern 1993; della Porta 1995; Passy 1998). In addition to this, she also serves as a good example for the constraining (or enabling) effects of *biographical availability* (McAdam 1986). Starting her activist career as a student, Lisa had two children when the interview was conducted. She admitted that her children are one important reason to strongly reduce her level of participation after eight years of high commitment.

Besides unveiling the role of structural factors, such as social networks and biographical availability, Lisa narrates essentially *about her inner life*, her moral vision that accompanied her throughout her activist career. While she was studying at the University, for example, student's contention emerged to protest against cantonal authorities deciding to increase student's taxes. Lisa judged this decision as extremely unjust. Coming out of an upper class family, she was not directly touched by this measure. However, discussions with

¹⁴ I chose Lisa to illustrate Barber's concept of strong citizen because she represents a sort of ideal type for this purpose. I want in no way use the case of Lisa to demonstrate something empirically. However, I believe that the example of Lisa makes the conceptualization of a strong citizen more comprehensible for the reader.

¹⁵ Lisa is one among 12 activists whose life history and in-depth interviews I use for this thesis (see chapter 4 for more details). The name of Lisa, as for every other activist in this thesis, is invented for the sake of anonymization.

involved friends and her self-identification as a student at this time allowed her to identify with protestors and to participate in an active way. Activists also convinced her that all together they could win and throw back state's decision. Thus, similar to the role of social networks and biographical availability, the importance of injustice, identity and agency (Gamson 1992; Klandermans 1997) as a narrow cognitive baseline for protest are clearly visible in Lisa's story.

Beyond that, Lisa gives elements that go far beyond this prototypical explanatory framework. Namely, *she constructed much broader worldviews during her activist career*. In fact, much of her narrative is about her general vision of politics and society. To her, democratic politics is a matter of (political) associations. They are the basis of a democracy as they establish the link between society and the state. A democracy exclusively built on representation is thus largely insufficient. In order to accomplish this vision of participatory democracy, citizens have to be active and evaluate the political elite in a critical way. As collective action is the main pillar of a democratic community, she perceives society as interconnected because it is through collective action that one is able to produce and maintain the commons and live in harmony. In addition to that, a society should be one where all humans share the same basic rights. All human beings should have a right of free movement, to have a family and to work. Her vision of society is thus very inclusive.

When Lisa talks like this about society and politics and at the same time explains how far reaching these moral standards are violated, her activism comes at no surprise. Indeed, her moral standards do not fit the perceived reality. She perceives the current Swiss society as "the place where the contradiction between the image I have from Switzerland and the practices I observe is most obvious." To her, migrants are subject to institutional violence. They cannot choose where they want to live, they have to live in detention centers. They have to wait for five years until they get a decision about a right to stay and, during this time, they have to live in inhuman conditions. The Swiss state is the main culprit for this situation: They created hard laws that are applied in a very restrictive manner.


In sum, Lisa's de-legitimization of political authorities, her perceived need of an active and vigilant civil society and her vision of an interconnected and inclusive society allows me to better understand why she chose such "strategies of action" (Swidler 1986) and why contentious participation in the defense of migrant's rights field has become her "style of living" (Teske 1997). In other words, her cognitive inner world seems to reflect, to justify and to orient her decisions to act. Her "constructed perceptions [...] furnish the necessary motivation for action" (McAdam and Schaffer Boudet 2012:64). Additionally, her moral vision or cognitive toolkit resonates well with the quotation of Benjamin Barber's (1984) definition of human nature and his normative statement on how a strong citizen should perceive the world: "We are born part slave, part free we can secure full liberty only through democratic community" - a strong citizen does not believe in "thin" or representative democracy. Accordingly, he criticizes political authorities and favors instead an active and vigilant civil society. "We are born insufficient, we need cooperation" – a strong citizen legitimizes thus collective action. "We are born unequal, we need politics to make us equal" – a strong citizen participates actively in politics. "We are born with potential natures, we require society to realize them" - a strong citizen perceives society as an interconnected and inclusive one.

Having illustrated Barber's idea of a strong citizen with Lisa's worldviews, I will now clarify on a conceptual level how I intend to use this concept. To say it first, while Barber had a very normative posture in his book on strong democracy, my use of the term has not the same intention. While one cannot prevent this term to have a strong normative connotation, my purpose with the label of "strong citizen" is to give a clear delimitation of what I include in this concept and what not. I think that the strong citizen label is well suited for this purpose, as it illustrates neatly activists' worldviews of the post-industrial social movement sector.

As illustrated in figure 3.2, two dimensions make up a strong citizen perception: a specific relation to society and to politics. I define one's relation to society as the cognitive link an actor weaves with his society. I identify two sub-dimensions therein. On the one hand, as Barber (1984:133) notes, "the creation of community here becomes a concomitant of the creation of public goods and public ends". Strong citizen's perception of society, or

"community", should thus be one that is concerned by the creation and maintenance of *public goods*. Indeed, contention in the post-industrial social movement sector is a matter of collective good production. Those goods are either restricted to specific groups such as wages increase in the watch-making sector, or could be shared by the whole population such as the improvement of water quality. For this reason, I assume these activists are strong citizens in the sense that they are concerned about the provision of common goods making them cognitively available to give their share to their production.

Figure 3.2: The Concept of Strong Citizen



On the other hand, "a [strong] citizen confronts the [o]ther and adjusts his own life plans to the dictates of a shared world" (Barber 1984:224). Strong citizens' perception of society is thus also one that is *concerned by others* or, more specifically, that is not restricted to his own cultural group but to a more inclusive perception of society. As Monroe (1995:12) has shown for Jews rescuers: "Certain kinds of political action emanate primarily from one's perception of self in relation to others: this perception effectively delineates and sets the domain of choice options perceived as available to an actor." In this thesis, I suggest thus to test the argument that these activists have constructed a meaning system of self in relation to others that is extensive; they include them and others in the same human community. To sum up, activists' relation to society is composed of two dimensions, one

that relates the activists self-understanding to common goods and one that relates him to other categories of society.

The second dimension of the strong citizen concept consists of one's relation to politics. Admittedly, to find this dimension in a paper on cognitions and contentious participation seems quite obvious. The definition of contentious politics, already, leads me to take politics into account. The classical definition of contentious politics is an "episodic, public, collective interaction among makers of claims and their objects when (a) at least one government is a claimant, an object of claims, or a party to the claims and (b) the claims would, if realized, affect the interest of at least one of the claimants" (McAdam, Tarrow et al. 2001:5). Contention is thus not only about common goods production but also about challenging state actors in order to redress an unjust situation or to avoid a loss of political or social advantages. Protest is a sustained interaction between organized contenders and state actors. Other scholars mentioned this dimension too. So did Piven and Cloward (1979) putting forward that people underwent a process of conscious transformation. In particular, they did not accept anymore the authority of rulers. Three years later, Gamson, Fireman et al. (1982) pointed in the same direction. In their theory of micro-mobilization, they describe how a given legitimacy of authorities can be undermined during encounters with unjust authorities. 16 These contributions encourage me to explore activists' relation to politics. I define this cognitive dimension as a link an actor weaves with the strategic action field and to its composing actors (incumbents and governance units) who manage the political interests and ongoing conflicts in this specific field. In addition, an actor weaves also a link with collective actors who enter in this field in order to articulate their political interests (challengers).

I identify three cognitive sub-dimensions within activists' relation to politics. First, I assume that these activists, incorporating an idea of strong citizen, de-legitimize or at least *criticize political authorities*. According to Barber, political authorities, as actors of a representative democratic system, limit the possibilities of self-legislation and thereby establish a lack of "participatory institutions". To perceive political authorities like this implies thus a need to challenge the "politics of elites". Thus, these activists do not accept

¹⁶ In their experiments, the authority was a major oil company. However, they put forward that the institutional setup of the authority is not important and that this process can be observed in any encounters with unjust authorities.

anymore the authority of rules. This "transformation of consciousness" (Piven and Cloward 1979) is not an easy process. As Gamson, Fireman et al. (1982:6) explain, "political socialization that encourages obedience to authority and supporting cultural belief systems may make the bonds of authority a major obstacle to unauthorized collective action. To succeed, challengers must loosen the bonds by de-legitimizing the authority that is the target of their challenge." Thus, de-legitimization of authorities occurs, but not forcefully a complete de-legitimization of political authorities in general. However, these activists should at least de-legitimize political authorities in their respective field, as they are, in still most of the cases, the main actors they challenge.

Second, I assume that these activists, incorporating an idea of strong citizen, *legitimize protest actors*. Protest actors can be understood as a formal incorporation of Barber's participatory institutions. Thus, protest actors are (small) worlds of "participatory democracy" establishing one realm of "self-governing community". Activists channel thus their protest action through collective actors, they should thus develop a meaning of the social movement in general or, at least, of the specific organization they are part of. Piven and Cloward (1979) stressed that activists do not only undergo a process of delegitimization of the authority of rulers, but also a process of understanding organized protest as a change to change their own situation. Gamson, Fireman et al. (1982:95) call this process "loyalty-building to the challenger." Consequently, these activists should legitimize protest actors. Again, as it was the case for political authorities, I do not assume that activists do legitimize political challengers in general. There are different kinds of political challengers, some of it being political enemies¹⁷ and others are using a repertoire of action that is perceived as illegitimate.

Third, I assume that these activists, incorporating an idea of strong citizen, perceive one's *civic role* as one of a civic watchdog that is vigilant, critical and active. This is what I call activists' perception of their role as political citizens. In a very explicit way, Barber (1984:133) points also to this dimension. "In a strong democracy, politics is something done by, not to citizens. Activity is its chief virtue, and involvement, commitment, obligation, and service – common deliberation, common decision, and common work –

¹⁷ The literature refers to them as so called countermovement (Peckham 1998). An example would be the relation between pro-life and pro-choice movements.

are its hallmarks". For these activists, citizens' have to incorporate the idea of a "self-governing community", they have to challenge the "politics of elite" and they have to perceive "politics in the participatory mode", that is a process of "ongoing, proximate self-legislation". These activists perceive themselves thus as political critical and vigilant citizens and as citizens being (politically) active.

To sum up, I assume that activists' self-perception towards society and politics should be close to Barber's concept of strong citizen. Additionally, this perception should be specific for these activists and as such, different to the general population. The specificity of this dimension is what it makes part of the broad cognitive framework that should develop from interaction through participation and enables these activists to sustain their form of participation. I will assess this claim empirically in the fifth chapter. The strong citizen dimension should thus be added to the notions of injustice, identity and agency. Injustice, agency and identity frames do certainly play a role to engage and pursue protest action at the individual level. However, activists do not only elaborate cognitions in connection with the specific protest issue at stake and contentious participation itself. They also have to make sense of other dimensions of the world around them.

I now have intensely elaborated on the cognitive dimensions that I assume to be linked to contentious participation. I am well aware that such an account leaves the impression of an almighty explanatory power of cognitions. However, this is not my intention but I see cognitions as one (too often neglected) of several factors to understand contentious participation. They are *one necessary factor beside others* to which I now will turn. The combination with this other, more structural, factors, will allow me to draw a more adequate theoretical model of contentious participation.

3.5. A more integral theoretical framework of movement participation

If I want to situate the role of cognitions for contentious participation, I have to situate this factor within a more integral theoretical framework. This means that I have to argue about how other challenging factors interact with cognitions and how they contribute to contentious participation in general. I will focus on three factors that are prominent in the

literature, namely (1) a specific socio-cultural anchorage, (2) the embeddedness in social networks and (3) the role of biographical availability.

Activists of a specific stance in each strategic action field are equipped with a particular social anchorage and values structure (Cotgrove and Duff 1980; Kriesi 1989; Eder 1993; Passy 1998). Thus, I know that a specific socio-cultural anchorage plays an important role so that an individual belongs to the so-called mobilization potential (Klandermans 1997). Individuals are anchored in a socio-cultural context structuring their scope of action (Passy 1998:58). Social class, education and a specific values structure influence both the probability to which an individual joins a SMO and the specific SMO an individual is favorable to. Kriesi (1993), for example, has shown that the emergence of the new middle class has forged the emergence of new social movements putting the new political cleavages (Rokkan 1970; Bartolini and Mair 1990) on the political agenda. Concerning the values structure, Passy (1998:94ff.) has shown that protestors of the Swiss solidarity movement share to a high degree post-materialist values (Inglehart 1977), that they are left-wing oriented and highly progressive. Of course, the social as well as values structure vary according to the nature of the social movement. However, as this thesis deals only with SMOs that belong to the so-called post-industrial social movement sector, I expect that activists in my data show up with a similar social and cultural background. In my conceptualization, values are expected to be deeply rooted, they are characterized through their long-term stability, resistance to change (Kinder and Sears 1985) and their high degree of abstraction. In contrast, cognitions are mental relations an individual construct with a specific object and these relations are more influenceable than values through interactive processes. Theoretically, this specific anchorage is important as it allows individuals to be generally sympathetic to the organization's causes. However, only small parts of this sympathetic group will eventually start and sustain contentious participation. They are still far away.

Social networks are one factor that can bridge or at least shrink the gap between a sympathetic crowd and a SMO. They play thus a pivotal role for contentious participation (e.g. Snow, Zurcher et al. 1980; Morris 1984; Opp and Gern 1993; della Porta 1995; Whittier 1995; Passy 1998). Networks are important for three reasons. First, social

networks socialize the individuals embedded within, that is, they play a role in the definition of the individual identities leading to an ideological convergence between the individual and the movement. Thus, the socialization process influences an actor's mental predisposition and thereby establishes the conditions by which a cognitive mobilization process between the individual and the SMOs emerges. Second, social networks play a role in the recruitment process by influencing the probability of an individual's opportunity to participate (Passy 1998:62). Third, social networks imply regular interaction influencing thus the ongoing process of cognitive construction (Passy and Monsch forthcoming). Beside the fact that social networks play a role in crucial processes both before and during contentious participation, I distinguish further two types of social networks: On the one hand formal networks, which are organizations individuals are in interaction with, i.e. by being a member of this organization. On the other hand, there are informal networks, which are interpersonal relations individuals are embedded in. These informal networks can be either achieved or ascribed. "Ascribed differ from achieved ones in that they are not the result of a person's own choosing" (Kriesi 1993:86).

A last crucial factor that needs to be taken into consideration is *biographical availability* being a central component of McAdams' understanding of contentious participation. "Many people are deterred or prevented from protesting by the responsibilities and constrains of daily life which are imposed by work, parents, spouses or partners, children, or friends. Not everyone, in other words, is "biographical available" for protest, even if they are sympathetic to the cause" (McAdam 1988).

Social anchorage, values structures, social networks, biographical availability and cognitions are thus all factors that I need to grasp if I want to better understand contentious participation. Schematically, I have tried to illustrate this process and how it relates to activists' cognitive toolkits in the figure below.

Figure 3.3: The shaping of an individuals' cognitive toolkit by contentious participation




Figure 3.3 takes up the recruitment process for one individual as it was originally developed by Bert Klandermans (1997) and puts this process in relation to the shaping or transformation of activists' cognitive toolkit. This process evolutes from left to right in the figure starting with some composition of a cognitive toolkit at t0 which then gradually shifts towards a cognitive toolkit that has incorporated the idea of a strong citizen at t3. As it is indicated by the dashed arrows connecting one cognitive toolkit with the other, this theoretical framework does not definitely determinate at which point the individual has developed and incorporated a strong citizen perception. It might well be the case that some individuals already start this process with a fully developed version while some others only develop it at the very end of this process of cognitive (trans-)formation. In any case, as the double-bordered box on the right side indicates, all I can describe with the data at my disposal is the final product at t3. Theoretically, however, this figure shows that cognitions are in constant flux. In fact, most scholars agree with the statement that activists do not come from nowhere, neither socially, in terms of values, or cognitively.

In Klandermans (1997:23) contribution, the first step toward participation is the creation

of a movement potential by gaining "the sympathy of some segment of the population". In my scenario, an individual belongs to the movement potential once he is sensitized, i.e. they should develop an injustice and an agency frame in their cognitive toolkit (t1). In a next step, an individual has to be motivated to join the respective movement. This may happen through the influencing of "the perceived costs and benefits of participation" (Klandermans 1997:24) or through an identification process (cognitive toolkit at t2). "They should identify with the protest actor and develop an agency frame, which enables them to perceive their contribution and that of the collective protest actor as able to bring about social changes" (Passy and Monsch forthcoming). Finally, individuals have to decide if they decide to participate or not. Thereby, biographical availability comes into play which can impose important "barriers to participation" (Klandermans 1997:25).

Once an individual starts contentious participation in a specific social movement organization, a new dynamic relevant for the individual's cognitive toolkit (at t3) comes into play. Now, the individual has become an activist or a challenger in a strategic action field. Accordingly, new avenues for social interactions open up. The arrows that link the boxes of contentious participation and actors within a strategic action field (SAF) with the cognitive toolkit at t3 indicate this. As activists, these individuals are now interacting with other actors – incumbents and governance units – as well as with other challengers – both other individuals and collective actors - in their strategic action field. This in turn leads to a process to which the literature refers to as "movement socialization" (e.g. McAdam 1988; Munson 2008).

I modeled all four processes of cognitive transformation – sensitization, motivating, decision to participate and movement socialization – as a two-step process. First, individuals engage in social interaction with their respective social network (Interactive meaning construction). Second, individuals then step back and reflect and evaluate on the new meaning they gained through conversations within their social networks. This, of course, is a very simplified version of the reality that I use in order to make clear my main statements: The *development of cognitions is a long process that goes through several steps* and, due to the nature of my data, all I can observe is a temporary cognitive outcome at a specific point in time (t3). Nevertheless, I want to make clear that these processes are not only

influenced by interactions within one's social networks and by self-reflection. As I have shown in the previous chapter, "social interactions are not the main process at work, rather they constitute one process among others. Self-interactions (individuals own experiences, personal reading, and the search for information), and external processes (above all framing strategies led by collective protest actors themselves) are also, and for certain types of protest, key processes leading individuals toward contentious politics. Network's impact must thus not be reified" (Passy and Monsch forthcoming). It is not my intention here to reify the importance of social networks. However, I overemphasize their role here because I want to reorient the debate about the importance of social networks for contentious participation towards an acknowledgement that *social networks are important because they are meaning transmitters* or "islands of meanings" (White 1992). Thereby, they point to the importance of cognitions for contentious participation. In other words, contentious participation is, in its essence, about meaning construction.

3.6. Four hypotheses to test my theoretical argument

After this discussion of the main theoretical framework that motivates this research, I will now develop *four hypotheses that will guide my empirical analysis*. Within this chapter I have elaborated on why I see cognitions as so fundamentally important to understand contentious participation. In the next chapter, I will give an overview on the nature of my data and on how I will treat this data methodologically, which gives an opportunity to address the weaknesses as well as the strengths of them. After this data and methods chapter, I start with the empirical evaluation of this theoretical framework. Four main assumptions guide this empirical evaluation. While I dedicate one chapter to each of them, I will now briefly comment on them. Taking these four arguments together, in fine, allows me to demonstrate the cognitions are important for contentious participation.

My first assumption states that activists' cognitions are specific with regard to the general population. My theory suggests that activists' worldviews are constantly shaped or even transformed by social interactions in social networks and during contentious participation. And, the theory goes on, this ongoing zigzagging between social interactions and cognitive transformation looks schematically like a funnel wherein activists' cognitions become

evermore "participation friendly" which in turn raises the probability for an activist to sustain his participation. In other words, activist's worldviews resonate with one's form of participation. In contrast, the general population, which I use as a proxy for nonmembers in my research, lives *and interacts* in other strategic action fields leading to another cognitive modeling. My data is unable to follow these processes but they should reflect their outcome, i.e. specific cognitions for particular actors in a specific strategic action field. In other words, if I am able to demonstrate that activists' worldviews are different from those of the general population than I could at least not falsify my first assumption.

As these activists are embedded in a specific cultural setting, there are inevitably overlapping zones of social interactions between them and the rest of the population. The outcome of which is what Swidler called the cultural toolkit of an individual. If these activists share a cultural toolkit with the general population but at the same time show up specific worldviews, than I would like to know, in a next step, which cognitive dimensions are touched by contentious participation. For this reason, my second assumption suggests that this specific perception can best be described as a perception of strong citizen. A strong citizen is concerned by the commons, has an inclusive perception of society, delegitimizes political authorities in his respective field and legitimizes civil society actors. In addition to this, a strong citizen sees one's own role as a citizen to be one of vigilance, criticism and socio-political activity. I constructed the strong citizen concept because I believe that these are the cognitive dimensions, which are mostly touched during social interactions in contentious politics.

While I assume that all activists in my sample share a common cognitive nature, I do not argue that these activists are all the same. In different strategic action fields, organizations interact differently with their members and diffuse particular cultural messages to them. Activists differ from each other too. They participate in different ways, some more intensive then others. Therefore, my third hypothesis assumes that *activists' worldviews vary*

¹⁸ Of course, this form of theoretical reflection reflects a positive outcome of this cognitive shaping process. However, it is very well possible that the exact contrary is happening, i.e. that an individual's cognitive toolkit thus not resonate with social interaction favorable to contentious participation in a specific strategic action field. If this negative scenario is happening, I expect that the individual will look for other networks to interact with, which will consequently lead to a different shaping of his cognitive toolkit. I labeled this scenario "dropout" in figure 3.3.

in reference to the type of protest action they are involved in. This assumption is consonant with my general thesis as I assume that cognitive transformation happens through interaction. As different types of activists' experiences different interactions with various intensities, the conclusion can only be variation within activists' worldviews. In short, these activists remain strong citizens but different types of strong citizens exist.

Finally, my fourth assumption, maintains that *cognitions are important even if one controls for other challenging factors*. This last postulation will then be a kind of ultimate test for my general thesis. The multivariate analysis I conduct there has as its main aim to balance the role of cognition with other important factors, namely social networks and biographical availability. If I am able to confirm these four assumptions, then, I am in a good position to defend my thesis that cognitions matter to understand contentious participation.

3.7. Concluding remarks

In this chapter, I have showed how I intend to address the four shortcomings identified in the previous chapter. First, I have situated my theoretical framework in the general sociological endeavor to explain social order and change. By this, I want to stimulate further reflection on the sociological foundations of these processes. This is something that is generally missing in the social movement literature. For this purpose, I borrowed Fligstein's and McAdam's framework of strategic action fields and suggested that my microsociological approach helps to understand two important processes. On the one hand, I argue to understand my systematic description of activists' worldviews as one outcome of ongoing conversation within a strategic action field. On the other hand, activists are typical challengers within strategic action fields. Therefore, their cognitions are in a contentious relation with the dominant definition of shared meanings within a specific strategic action field. To understand these contentious cognitions, I argue, helps to better understand internal processes for social change within one strategic action field.

Second, I addressed the second problem in the social movement literature, namely the focus on the start and end point of participation. I did this by a more detailed conceptualization of my main argument. I started by a definition of my main concepts,

namely contentious participation and cognitions. By underlining the interactive nature of contentious participation and by the help of accounts in social psychology and cognitive sociology I was able to demonstrate theoretically how intimately cognitions and action are linked. In particular, I argued that cognitions are shaped and transformed by social interactions — and thereby also by contentious participation — and that cognitions delineates my scope of action which leads to a kind of funnel effect between cognitions and action whereby are either approaching each other or, in the case of non resonance, dislodging from each other. Consequently, I showed on a theoretical level that *it is important to look at processes that take place during contentious participation*. While I cannot trace this process empirically, I show the outcome of these interactive dynamics by looking at activists' cognitions during participation.

Third, I argued in the previous chapter that theories of movement participation are flawed by structural and objectivistic bias (Goodwin and Jasper 2003). As this thesis focuses on the role of cognitions or cognitive toolkit, I want to *bring back to the fore a cultural and agentic dimension*. Therefore, I delineated the cognitive dimensions, which I see as important for and shaped by contentious participation.

Fourth and contrary to the literature demonstrating the role of injustice, agency and identity frames, I suggested that the relevant cognitive spectrum is much broader. Namely, I introduced the notion of strong citizen, which emphasizes activists' cognitive relation to society and politics and argued that this dimension must not be neglected if I want to better understand contentious participation. As this thesis focuses exclusively on post-industrial or left wing activists, the strong citizen concept I present here applies only to these types of activists. Activists who try to defend migrant's rights, to empower minorities' rights and to protect the environment are typically cases for new social movements ignoring thus a large part of the whole, and especially of the right wing, spectrum of social movements. Consequently, this does not imply that other activists and citizens cannot be cognitively strong citizens in their own right. While this is a topic of future research, my guess is that right wing activists differ a lot on their relation to society, especially on their relation to others. In contrast, I think that their relation of politics should be fairly similar to the one presented here.

Finally, being aware of the fact that contentious participation – as any socio-political phenomenon – is a complex and multifaceted process, I showed how other factors are also important. As the literature has already underlined, an individuals' social and cultural anchorage, his social networks and his biographical availability are relevant for contentious participation. Taken these factors together allowed me to situate an ongoing cognitive construction processes alongside contentious participation. Towards the end of this chapter, I then sketched out four working assumptions that will guide my empirical analysis. But before I turn my attention to these four guidelines, I will discuss in the next chapter how I constructed my data set and how I suggest analyzing this data.

4. Methods and Data – A comparative mixed methods design

"Mixed methods design is able to provide an alternative to mono method designs, which [...] is not only one of the most exciting (and oldest!) research designs in the social sciences, but also an invitation to revisit well-established but obsolete assumptions about the possibilities and limits of qualitative and quantitative methods" (Bergmann 2008:19).

Having outlined the theoretical background and framework in the previous chapters, this one is dedicated to describe how I proceeded to collect and analyze the data. This discussion is very central for the general argument about the importance of activists' cognitions as the collecting of such data involves several challenges. The first challenge was to produce a dataset that provides a measurement as precise as possible of what is going on in the mind of these activists and at the same time, the dataset should allow making inferences that are as broadly generalizable as possible. In order to come close to these ambitious aims, I opted for a mixed methods design that combines quantitative survey and qualitative interview data. Methodologically, this approach is very complementary as the strength of one kind of data is able to address the weaknesses of the other (Bryman 2008). Epistemologically, however, I face the challenging critic of combining different, or even contradictory, assumptions. In response to this point of view, I argue that mixed methods has overcome the mixing of incompatible positions and therefore opens up a new fruitful epistemological position. For this reason, I will comment in the first section of this chapter why I think that the complementary advantages outweigh by far the risk of mixing incompatible epistemologies and how current scholars using mixed methods position themselves in epistemological terms.

A second challenge to demonstrate the importance of activists' cognitions is to produce generalizable results. A typical way to do this would be to focus on a representative sample of activists of one SMO. This, in turn, would allow a generalization of the argument on the level of this specific SMO. The single case design is the prototypical approach in social movement studies and has been very useful for theoretical development (see Snow and Trom 2002). However, it has been and will always been criticized for its inability to generalize beyond the specific case (McAdam and Schaffer

Boudet 2012:29). For this reason, I compare here activists of three different SMOs, i.e. activists from Solidarity across borders, from the Society of Threatened People and from Greenpeace. All three protest organizations belong to the same social movement family; they are all so called new social movements (Kriesi 1995). What, then, is the usefulness of comparing three SMOs of the same movement family in relation to the issue of generalizing activists' cognitions? What are the limits of this comparative framework? By seeking answers to these questions, the second section of this chapter will thus describe the comparative design of this thesis.

The *third and fourth challenges* to demonstrate the importance of activists' cognitions concern the collection of both qualitative and quantitative data collection and analysis. The main challenge thereby is different for each of the two methods. For the survey research, it is really hard to develop valid indicators that manage to measure what individuals – and more specifically activists in this case – really have in their mind. In other words, survey data are strongly limited when it comes to a description of the content of individuals' cognitions. On the other hand, while qualitative interviews are better suited to grasp activists' cognitions, the interviewer always faces the difficult task to limit his influence on the interviewee. As these examples just have shown, both methods come along with some challenges (but also with their strengths), which I will discuss in detail in this chapter.

Fifth, while I think that the methodological approach is able to dodge all these challenges, it is by far not perfect, of course. In the last part of this chapter, I want to address one methodological drawback that this methodological approach cannot overcome. In the development of the theoretical framework during the previous chapter, I elaborated on the relationship between cognitions and (protest) action. Thereby, I underlined, that theoretically, I assume that cognitions are both a cause and a product of protest action. Unfortunately, the data does not allow testing this assumption, as it was collected at one point in time. At the end of this chapter, I will thus clarify this causality issue.

Is Combining Interviews and Survey data complementary or contradictory?

Although mixed methods designs have gained in popularity over the last decades, there is still an important need to discuss if designs that combine epistemologically different positions – for example postpositivist and social constructivist worldviews – are compatible or not (Tashakkori and Teddlie 2003; Bergmann 2008). Specifically, proponents of the incompatibility thesis (see Lincoln and Guba 1985) state that it is impossible to *combine methodologies that are based on different epistemological assumptions*. While qualitative research is often characterized to assume constructed or multiple realities and the notion of subjectivity, quantitative research is described as a worldview that believes in objectivity and one single reality (Bergmann 2008:13). However, as Bergmann (2008:14) rightly points out, qualitative and quantitative methods are both so heterogeneous that it becomes difficult to define a set of characteristics that is present in every methodological approach of one or the other family. Additionally, there is neither any discrete element that differentiates qualitative from quantitative methods. Consequently, it is difficult to understand the enduring presence of this division.

Moreover, to rely on several sources of information –to confirm one's own interpretation or to receive additional information – is something that belongs to everyone's daily routines and that is incorporated in scientific work long before it was labeled triangulation or even mixed methods (Hammersley 2008:31). In a similar vein as the introductory quotation of this chapter, Langlois and Seignobos (1898:196) already stated more than a hundred years ago: "It is a principle common to all sciences of observation not to base a scientific conclusion on a single observation; the fact must have been corroborated by several independent observations before it is affirmed categorically." Nevertheless, it remains a difficult task to get several independent observations and thus to conduct mixed methods research neatly.

That said, it is not my intention to avoid this debate with the argument that the differentiation between quantitative and qualitative methods has become obsolete. Precisely because I am engaged in a mixed methods design, it is important to position myself in this debate both in epistemological and methodological terms. By this, I hope to accomplish two aims. On the one hand, I explain to the benevolent reader why I opted to use two methods and to specify how I see them as complementary. On the other hand, I

hope to convince the doubting reader that both methods I use base on the same epistemological grounds and therefore, that the combination of *both datasets contribute in a complementary way* to the thesis about the importance of cognitions for contentious participation.

Epistemologically, I situate myself broadly in the *realm of postpositivism or critical realism* (Toulmin 1953; Hanson 1958; Popper 1963; Kuhn 1970). Generally, this position can be described as somewhat of a pragmatic compromise between positivistic and relativistic perspectives. Three postulates define this position (Tashakkori and Teddlie 2003:6). First, while positivism argues for a single and objective reality, relativists take quite a contradictory position and insist on the constructed – and therefore subjective – nature of reality. To some extent, I agree with both positions. I share with the positivists a belief in the existence of an objective reality although I am convinced that one can only try to approach oneself as close as possible to this reality. The use of multiple methods and systematic research is therefore of great help. In contrast, I strongly advocate that what matters most is what individuals perceive as their reality. Consequently, I agree with relativists about the existence and the importance of a constructed reality. Worldviews are thus constructed on the basis of how one perceives them. In addition, as perceptions and observations are always biased, data from multiple methodological sources are the best I can do in the pursuit to approach objectivity.

Second, a typical positivistic stance is that one has to disconnect the researcher from the object of research. In other words, a scientific should be objective and not be influenced by his values. Relativists, in contrast, put forward that this is impossible to achieve, as one's values will always influence one's research. I clearly share the position of relativists; the research is influenced by one's own values. An obvious example is the selection of the cases as I look at activists that defend migrants' rights, human rights, and activists who try to protect the environment. These political struggles are typically struggles that I am sympathetic to. However, to acknowledge this value-ladenness does not imply that I reject a rigorous scientific procedure that is mostly associated with positivism.

Third, and in a similar vein, not only the researcher's values but also the literature used influences his theory. Theory-ladenness of facts is indeed present in every research. But multiple methods can decrease these biases by testing the theory by more than one kind of data, i.e. by some sort of triangulation. In addition, theoretical production is a collective endeavor, which may reduce the subjectively introduced bias by theory and one's own values too. As Trochim (2006) puts it: "Our best hope for achieving objectivity is to triangulate across multiple fallible perspectives! Thus, objectivity is not the characteristic of an individual, it is inherently a social phenomenon. It is what multiple individuals are trying to achieve when they criticize each other's work."

Epistemological incompatibility is not the only reason for opposition to mixed methods. Over the years, mixed methods have become so fancy that scholars used this approach not so much because their research questions required it but because of a belief that mixed methods approaches are generally superior to mono method approaches (Bryman 2008:96). This, of course, is not the case. Therefore, *justification of the use of mixed methods is indispensable*. According to Bryman (2008:87f.), scholars who use mixed methods do justify their approach insufficiently because there is a lack of a common language to discuss mixed methods studies. In his article, Bryman (2008) then goes on to suggest a list of 16 rationales for doing mixed methods based on a content analysis of 232 articles using mixed methods research. In order to avoid a lack of justification of the mixed methods design, I try to accomplish this task by the help of Bryman's list. Four rationales are of importance here.

The *first rationale* is what he calls "offset". This implies that "both quantitative and qualitative research have their own strength and weaknesses so that combining them allows the researcher to offset their weaknesses and to draw on the strengths of both" (Bryman 2008:91). I will specify the strengths and weaknesses of the survey and interview data later on in this chapter in order to illustrate their complementary character. A *second rationale* is "completeness", which implies that the combination of different methods allows constructing a more comprehensive account of the research field. I believe that the research became more complete through the application of a mixed methods design because the resulting data allowed me answering different angles of the research

questions. Through the combination of the two datasets I got a deeper understanding of activists' cognitions and contentious participation. The quantitative data permit to look if activists' cognitions are significantly different from cognitions of the general population and to systematically analyze variations between activists' of different protest organizations and between different levels of participation. In contrast, the qualitative data allows getting inside the heads of activists, describing thereby the content of activists' cognitions.

"Enhancement" is a *third justification* for the mixed methods design applied here. This refers to the possibility of making more of a multivariate quantitative analysis by complementing the interpretation of the correlations found by the help of qualitative findings (Diani 2003). In fact, the last empirical chapter of this thesis will test the importance of activists' cognitions related to contentious participation with regard to other challenging factors. This analysis will use both qualitative and quantitative data in order to demonstrate how interactive processes and cognitions are deeply interwoven and how these connections both help to sustain and how they are a direct product of contentious participation. Thereby, the aim is to show empirically that cognitions are somehow related to contentious participation as I put forward in the previous chapter. Finally, a *fourth rationale* is "illustration". The qualitative material helps to illustrate quantitative findings, to put "meat on the bones of dry quantitative findings" (Bryman 2008:92).

In sum, the research design has thus some *strength*. First and foremost, the use of both, qualitative and quantitative data, helps to offset each other's weaknesses. It is thus a research design based on complementarity. Second, the results of this research are more complete than a mono method design would have allowed. For example, I manage to produce both a rather detailed description of the content of activists' cognitions and at the same time to compare systematically representative samples of these activists with the general population. In my view, only the answering of several such research questions allows me to make, in fine, a strong argument about the importance of activists' cognitions. Third, qualitative data allow enhancing the results of the quantitative analysis

(and vice versa), and fourth, both datasets enrich each other as they can be used to illustrate a specific finding.

This enumeration of strengths serves thus as a justification for the use of a mixed methods design. In an ideal world, I could even go one step further and argue that the two datasets are fully integrated within each other. However, as the structuring of the empirical chapters already shows, this is not realized here. Two out of four chapters are exclusively based on quantitative data, one chapter only uses the qualitative data and only the last empirical chapter uses both, qualitative and quantitative data. As Bryman (2008:99) concludes, integration remains often unachieved and is difficult to accomplish. According to him, this weakness results from a lack of general understanding of how "good" mixed methods studies should be done. In other words, mixed methods research has still to mature. I believe that this is not the only explanation and that it should not be necessarily be required to fully integrate both data because, perhaps more often than not, different data allows answering different aspects of a research question. In this case, for example, where I try to demonstrate the importance of cognitions for contentious participation, quantitative data allow testing if activists' cognitions are specific for them. This is something that small n qualitative data is unable to do. In contrast, measuring the complexity and interrelatedness of cognitions by quantitative data is rather limited, as questionnaires do not give the possibility to fully express one's own worldviews. This is where qualitative data shines.

4.1. Comparative Research Design – Activists of three different contentious actors

To test the hypotheses, I mobilize a comparative research design contrasting activists of three different contentious actors with the general population in the same national context. I compare two mainstream protest domains with a highly challenging contentious issue. In terms of field logic, this implies that even if all three of them are challengers, they (and other allied actors) managed to impose their worldviews with differential success in their respective field. Consequently, these challengers vary regarding the power to participate in the definition of shared meanings. Thus, individuals who have joined these three protest

domains were not facing similar conditions in terms of cognitive costs of entry in those contentions as the gap between current definitions of shared meanings and challengers' worldviews differ to a larger degree in challenging protest domains than in mainstream ones.

The two mainstream cases are *Greenpeace-Switzerland* (GP) and the Society of Threatened People (STP). Activists of GP represent the environmental protection domain. GP activists are mobilizing on one of the most consensual protest issue in Switzerland. Even on energy politics, which is one of the most challenging subfields in environmental politics nowadays, the Swiss authorities support alternative energies (solar, wind energy, etc.) and have rejected nuclear plants (Swiss Federal Office of Energy 2013). Thus, governance units are quite supportive with respect to challenging actors. As opinion surveys underline¹⁹, the Swiss population is in favor of environmental protection too. Activists who have joined this protest are mobilizing on a mainstream issue implying few harsh political conflicts with the public and power holders. Finally, long-standing incumbents from the Swiss energy economy have currently a hard stance after the events in Fukushima and the general support of challenger's worldviews by governance units and the general population.

Individuals joining the *Society of Threatened People* in the human right sector are in a similar position. Activists of STP represent the human rights sector and bring social and political support to persecuted minorities in Europe but also in other parts of the world. Given the importance of the public discourse on the Swiss humanitarian tradition (Fanzun 2003), it is not surprising to observe that STP activists are mobilizing on a mainstream issue that is in most cases supported by the national public and power holders. One obvious reason for this is also that they mostly challenge other power holders than the national ones. As it was the case for GP activists, governance units are quite supportive with respect to challenging actors like the STP. Like it was the case for GP activists, activists who have joined this protest are mobilizing on a mainstream issue implying few harsh political conflicts with the public and power holders.

¹⁹ For example, more than 70% of the Swiss population is rather anxious about environmental problems in general and almost 60% think that there is nothing more important in their life than to protect the environment (Stähli et al. 2011).

This is different for individuals who get involved in *Solidarity across borders* (SAB). Solidarity across borders is the umbrella organization in the defense of migrant's rights domain in Switzerland; a domain that is otherwise composed of small groups that are very active in their respective region. People who engage to defend migrant's rights are mobilizing in one of the most challenging protest in Switzerland in present time (Guigni and Passy 2004). During the last years, migrant's rights were cut several times, the only political party that puts migration issues on the political agenda comes from the right of the political spectrum, is the strongest party in the country and the public opinion is very harsh²⁰. Thus, challengers' interactions with governance units and incumbents in the field of migration rights are of a more challenging nature than it is the case for activists of the other two organizations. I assume this to be the case because in the field of migration politics, the worldviews of the important actors differ to a stronger degree than it is the case for actors in the field of environmental or human rights politics.

Thanks to the comparative nature of this research project, the following two hypotheses can be tested. On the one hand, activists of all three organizations share a rather similar cognitive outlook of a strong citizen that is specific with regard to the general population. All three organizations are part of the same movement family; they all belong to the new social movement sector. Putting this in a field logic, all these organizations are challengers in the same meta-field around rights extension that has developed about 50 years ago after the so called post-materialist turn in the values structure in western societies (Inglehart 1977; Kriesi 1993). Due to this constellation, all these activists are supposed to evolve in somewhat similar interactive patterns that led to a certain degree of cognitive homogeneity between activists in related fields.

On the other, I put forward that activists of SAB are cognitively stronger citizens than activists of GP and STP. Although the first hypothesis expects to see a rather similar cognitive constellation between all these activists, I have to take ongoing interactions within the specific field seriously. As I explained above, activists that defend migrant's rights see their worldviews more challenged than activists of GP or STP, who can rely on a rather

²⁰ For example, more then 50% of the Swiss population thinks that we have too much immigration from former Yugoslavia and Albania and that young immigrants contribute to an increase of violence and vandalism in Switzerland (Lutz and Pekari 2011).

consensual definition of shared meanings within their respective field. As the theoretical framework suggests, I expect that interactions within the field influence activists' cognitions. Thus, activists' cognitions should represent something like a cognitive output of a specific protest community. As the worldviews of activists of SAB differ most dramatically from the current dominating definition of meanings, I expect that these field internal interactions lead to a radicalization process of activists' cognitions. In contrast, activists of GP and STP experience more consensual interactions with other actors in their field, which has a moderating effect on their worldviews. The combination of these two processes should then, as I expect, lead to a result in which activists of SAB show up as the cognitively strongest citizens.

To what extent, then, are activists of these three organizations comparable? Or, how can me make activists from these three organizations comparable? These questions may surprise one or another reader as I am talking here about three protest organizations in the same country that are even embedded in the same movement family. However, every organization organizes his activists' structure in different ways and also the organizations itself are constructed with different logics. For this reason, I judge it important to explain how I set up the comparison. I use the last part of this section to describe what different forms of activism I encounter in these three organizations and how the respective organizational structures influenced the operationalization of one of the dependant variables: the *level of participation*. By the end of this section, then, I clarify how I chose to compare them.

To begin with, I describe the forms of activities that exist in all three organizations. SAB activists can be participating through monetary means and pay an annual membership fee. Activists of SAB can also give their time by participating in demonstrations or campaigns organized by SAB, by participating in the organizations of demonstrations and campaigns, by participating in working groups, in the general assembly or they can even become a part of the strategic committee. Activists of STP have less choice as this organization is highly professionalized and only asks its members to pay a fee²¹. Consequently, I only have sympathizers in my sample of STP activists. Activists of GP have similar choices as

²¹ Recently, STP Switzerland developed a structure for activists who are interested to give their time for their organization. They can become volunteers (www.gfbv.ch). However, at the time when the survey was passed, this structure was not yet in place.

activists of SAB. Beside the possibility to contribute by monetary means, they also suggest different possibilities to give one's time for the organization. In contrast to SAB, however, they differentiate between "activists" and "volunteers". There are two types of activists. One the one hand, there are the "normal" activists who are part of a regional GP group engaging in low-risk protest activities like demonstrations and organizes stalls in his or her town to sensitize the population on a specific issue. On the other, there are the "famous" activists who are part of the national or international organization of GP. They take part in risky and sometimes illegal protest activities like those who try to block whale hunters or those who climb up a cooling tower of a nuclear power plant. Although this latter group is small in numbers, they are probably the ones who made GP so famous around the world. Finally, there are volunteers who are principally engaging in activities that tend to sensitize the population. For instance, they give lectures in primary schools.

Every organization has its specific manner to organize its activists. I suggest the following operationalization to make a comparison of these activists possible. The main aim thereby was to differentiate activists according to their level of participation. Active members are all activists who declared themselves as taking an active part in the organization, they are thus activists who spend their time for political protest. Sympathizers, in contrast, sustain their organization exclusively with their money. For SAB I opted for a slightly different operationalization than for the other two organizations. As SAB is an umbrella organization, large shares of their sympathizers are actually active members of more local organizations. Consequently, I coded all sympathizers of SAB as active members if they are active in another organization that defends migrants' rights (see also table 4.1 below).²²

The reason for differentiating levels of participation has to do with the general argument about cognitive transformation through ongoing interaction. It is a fact that active members have different and usually more channels of interaction than sympathizers. Due to that, one might expect that active members are cognitively stronger citizens than

²² Following this operationalization technique, the share of active members rose from 23% to 43% of activists of SAB. Initially, I wanted to do the same procedure for the two other organizations too. However, I obtained changes of less then one percent. In addition, such an operationalization would have important consequences as the division between active members and sympathizers would no longer be representative for something. This is not the case for SAB as this organization is the only umbrella organization of the defense of migrant's rights in Switzerland.

sympathizers. I assume that this is not the case because in my view, it is the receptivity of the content transmitted through the interaction that is important while the frequency and the specific channel of interaction is of less importance. As I have stated in the theoretical chapter, I believe in this argument because I expect activists to be cognitively very receptive for the messages transmitted by the organization. Therefore, *activists' cognitions should more strongly vary between organizations than within organizations*. I will test this argument in chapter 7.

To sum up, this section gave the rationales for the use of a comparative research design in this thesis. As it was the case for the choice of a mixed methods design, the comparative perspective allows answering specific research questions about expected communalities and variations between activists of different organizations. However, the possibility to compare is always limited and depends on choices of the researcher. I showed this by the detailed description of the operationalization of the level of participation within an organization. To me, this operationalization is important because I want to demonstrate that cognitions do not discriminate active members from sympathizers. In order to avoid a comparison between apple and pears, I opted for a specific operationalization for the activists of SAB.

4.2. Quantitative data collection and analytical strategy

To analyze activists' cognitions I use *survey data* that were collected between 2009 and 2010. Although activists were invited to fill out the questionnaire online, they also had the possibility of asking to send them a printed version. I passed to activists of the three organizations a standardized questionnaire with comparative indicators allowing testing the hypothesis of a specific cognitive socialization process per organization. In addition to that, the questionnaire used standardized questions from the World Values Survey (WVS 2007), the International Social Survey Programme (ISSP 2004) and the European Values Study (EVS 2008) questionnaires allowing me to compare these activists with representative samples of the Swiss population and thus to test the assumption of a specific cognitive outlook of these activists.

As table 4.1 illustrates, I *stratified the sample on a regional dimension* to overestimate the French speaking part of Switzerland. I split Switzerland in two strata – French and German parts – where each represents 50% of the whole sample. For SAB, this strategy was not manageable due to the small number of French speaking activists. For the sampling of the activists of this organization, I tried to approach the sampling strategy as close as possible by selecting all French speaking activists. For GP and STP, the two activists' samples are evenly distributed.

Table 4.1: Sampling and response rate

·	SAB	-	STP	_	GP
	Active	Sympathizers	Sympathizers	Active	Sympathizers
	members			members	
	n (%)	n (%)	n (%)	n (%)	n (%)
Population size ¹			· ·		
French speaking	138 (4)	523 (16)	2'848 (24)	76 (.1)	25'047 (15)
German speaking	422 (13)	2'221 (67)	9'020 (76)	355 (.2)	138'591 (84)
Population Total	, ,	3'304	11'868		164'069
Sample size					
French speaking	138 (7)	523 (26)	2'250 (50)	76 (3)	1'424 (47)
German speaking	422 (21)	916 (46)	2'250 (50)	355 (12)	1'145 (38)
Sample Total	. ,	1'999	4'500	, ,	3'000
Response rate					
French speaking	101 (73)	119 (23)	226 (10)	47 (62)	289 (20)
German speaking	207 (49)	282 (31)	208 (9)	99 (28)	250 (22)
Response rate Total	,	709 (35)	434 (10)	,	685 (23)

NOTE: The population size is derived from the official data from SAB (2009), STP (2009) and Greenpeace (2009). Italian speaking population excluded. Percentages are calculated on the basis of the respective total. For example, 4% of the total population size of SAB are French speaking and active members. In contrast, the percentage of the total response rate (bold brackets) is calculated from the sample total.

This research does not profit from this stratification, as I did not expect regional differences between these activists. However, this stratification became necessary because of the intense collaboration with the participating organizations and the willingness to organize this research as useful as possible for them. As Switzerland is a multi-language nation with a political system that strongly relies on federalism as an organizational principle, the organizational structure of any collective actor is affected by it. For the three organizations, this implies that they are organized around a French- and a German-speaking center. Accordingly, they asked me to look at regional differences because these could influence their work. Once I compared French- and German-speaking activists, I actually came across variation on some cognitive dimensions²³. Although I could not

²³ In the appendix, I show this finding more in detail.

detect any systematic variation, I introduced a weighting for language in order to correct for the overrepresentation of French-speaking activists.

To analyze active members who are always in small numbers, I introduced a *second stratification layer* to overestimate this category of activists. I did this for the sample of SAB and GP but not for STP, as this highly professional organization mobilizes only activists who support financially their political struggles. I planned a stratification of the sample on the level of protest activism by dividing active members and sympathizers in two blocs representing 50% of the sampling of each stratum. However, the effectively existing numbers of activists did not allow a proper execution of this strategy. SAB has a total population size of 3304 activists whereof only 560 (about 17%) are active members. Things become quite extreme when it comes to GP, where less then 1% are active members. I proceeded the same way as I did for the regional stratification, resulting in the inclusion of all active members in the sample for both organizations.

A last point of the sampling strategy that needs to be addressed is the variation between the sample sizes and the resulting *response rates*. Whereas I sampled 2'000 activists for SAB, I selected 3'000 activists for GP and even 4'500 for STP. Originally, I sampled 2000 individuals for each organization. I started the data collection process with the activists of SAB as a pilot project. Although I received quite a lot of critical reactions by respondents²⁴, I managed to obtain an acceptable response rate of 35%²⁵. Contrary to my expectations, however, things went worse with the two other organizations. When I did the first mailing to activists of STP, there was almost no reaction at all coupled with a very low response rate. As most STP activists were recruited in the street, I interpreted this as a sign for a low rate of identification of activists with the organization²⁶. Below, I will discuss the implications of this for the representativeness of the sample. The strategy to counter this problem was to enlarge the sample size from 2'000 to 4'500. With this

²⁴ There seems to be a tendency among SAB activists to mistrust the University as an institution and to have low confidence in the utility of surveys. It is probable that things were even worse at the time of the data collection as activists defending migrant's rights in France were infiltrated by the police through a similar tactic. However, I did not encounter the same level of skepticism for the activists of the two other organizations.

²⁵ In general, a response rate of about 30% is expected for self-administrated questionnaires. However, the response rate for activists is usually higher (between 60 and 70%, see Oegema and Klandermans 1994, Passy 1998). Thus, I had no reason to expect that the response rate will not improve for the other SMOs.

²⁶ In fact, the only phone calls I got from activists of STP were individuals who did not even know that they are members of this organization.

strategy, I ended up with a response rate of 10%, which ensured that I could integrate this case in the analysis. Things started worst for GP, as I had a server crash the day activists of GP received the invitation letter to complete the questionnaire. Unfortunately, the first days after respondents gets the invitation letter are crucial for obtaining a good response rate. Despite the effort to write a letter to apology, the response rate remained quite low. Consequently, I applied the same strategy as I did for STP by enlarging the sample size from 1'500 to 3'000 sympathizers²⁷. Overall, GP activists were more willing to respond to the questionnaire than activists of STP resulting in a response rate of 23%.

Different problems during the data collection procedure affected thus the response rate for the three organizations. While I had to deal with a very skeptical membership base for SAB, STP activists were, on the contrary, were very indifferent towards the survey and GP activists did respond but the server crash prevented the saving of the responses on the very first day of data collection. In addition to these organizational differences, some further elements during the data collection process could have lowered the response rate. I opted for an online survey in order to lower the costs of the data collection. Respondents received an invitational letter²⁸ where they were invited to fill out a survey in the Internet. They had also the possibility to contact me and ask for a paper version of the questionnaire, which I send them with a stamped return envelope. While this procedure was cheap, it complicated the respondents' action considerably as they had to pass from the letter to the Internet in order to fill out the questionnaire. Finally, the questionnaire included 56 questions from the research and an additional section with about 10 questions was reserved for the respective organization. This result of this was a rather long questionnaire, which took about half an hour to fill out.

All these points together contribute to the explanation of the response rate I am confronted with. While it is important to discuss the occurrence of the response rate, the most important question I have to address here is the following: What effects did this data collection procedure have had for the representativeness of the data? I try to answer this question with

 $^{^{27}}$ I could not enlarge the sample size of active members as I already had selected all active members. Differences between STP and GP in the extent in which I enlarged the sample size have had budgetary reasons.

²⁸ An example of an invitation letter is attached in the appendix.

the data I got from the organization. Table 4.2 below gives an overview on the representativeness of the quantitative data.

For SAB and STP, I got important differences in terms of regional representation due to the stratification strategy. As I stated above, I introduced a weighting in order to control for these differences between the population and the final sample. I am in a similar position for the variable level of participation, where I am confronted with important differences between SAB and GP. Again, the reason for this is linked to the stratification strategy. The choice to overrepresent active members allows being representative of the two activists groups: Active members on the one hand and sympathizers on the other. For this reason, all the analyses control for differences between active members and sympathizers. For STP differences between active members and sympathizers are not an issue, as STP does not have a structure of active members.

Table 4.2: Representativeness of survey data

	SAB			STP			GP		
	Population	Difference	Sample	Population	Difference	Sample	Population	Difference	Sample
	%	%	%	%	%	%	0/0	%	%
Level of particip	ation								
Active member	18	25	43*	0.1	0.9	1	0.3	20	21
Sympathizers	82	-25	57	99.9	-0.9	99	99.7	-20	80
Sex		!			!				
Women	43	-7	36	52	-17	35	46	-5	41
Men	38	-4	34	46	7	52	48	-1	47
Unknown	19	11	30	2	10	12	6	6	12
Language		;							
German	84	-19	65	76	-33	44	83	-4	79
French	16	19	35	24	28	52	15	5	20
Italien		! ! !			! ! !		2	-2	0
Unknown	0	0	0	0	4	4	0	1	1
Age		,							
<18	-	! ! !	-	0	0	0	0.1	0.3	0.4
18 - 24	-	!	-	40	-19	21	10	-3	7
25 - 34	-	i i	-	32	-7	25	20	-5	15
35 - 44	-	! ! ! !	-	11	2	13	20	-2	18
45 - 54	-	! !	-	7	9	16	19	4	23
55 - 64	-	; ;	-	3	4	7	11	2	13
65+	-	! ! ! !	-	2	4	6	11	0	11
Unknown	-	! !	-	5	7	12	10	2	12
Total	3193	; ; ; ;	709	11868	! ! !	434	166'927		736

For activists of SAB, I have had the best response rate with more than a third of contacted individuals that responded favorably to the query. In contrast, I have only very

limited information at my disposal to profoundly test the representativeness of the respondents. Nevertheless, given the rather high response rate and the information I have on the variable sex, I can assume a representative sample.

For STP, I contacted most people and got the fewest of all responses. This led to a rather low response rate of only 10% of the whole sample. With such a low response rate one runs the risk to have important issues with representativeness. As table 4.2 illustrates, I obtained a biased sample regarding the main characteristics of activists, i.e. sex and age. On the one hand, women are underrepresented by 17 percentage points and on the other, the young activists responded less than older ones (19 percentage points). What does this analysis of representativeness imply for the empirical chapters that follow? In a previous phase of analysis, I have compared the social profile, values structure and social networks of STP activists with activists who belong to the same movement sector (Passy and Monsch 2010abc). As these analyses show, the responses I got from STP are comparable to activists of other postindustrial organizations in terms of their sociological profile. The conclusion of this result is that the sample is representative for these activists who identify themselves with the organization.

For GP, I got a moderate response rate of 23%. As it was also the case for SAB, active members were more inclined to respond (35%) than sympathizers (21%). Am I representative of the whole population of GP activists when it comes to the main characteristics of sex and age? Based on these characteristics, I can say that the sample has a good representativeness.

However, controlling for sex, language and age does not give us much information on the representativeness of the samples in terms of their cognitive profiles. In that sense, it could be the case that respondents are stronger citizens than non-respondents. While I cannot give a final answer to this question, there are some elements that seem to confirm this tendency. For STP for example, I assume to be representative of all sympathizers that identify with the organization. In order to increase the numbers of their activists as much as possible, STP makes extensive use of street recruitment, where they advertise their organization through specific political campaigns. While this resulted in a tremendous

increase of their activists' base, the downside of this strategy seems to be that an important part of their activists (especially younger people), do not even know which organization they are member of. Furthermore, I see a general tendency across all respondents of the three organizations that active members are more willing to respond than sympathizers. Consequently, I am confident to say that the samples I use here are representative for activists who identify with their organization. In contrast, I probably have a slight bias for members who pay only a small annual fee. While it is thus possible that the respondents are "stronger citizens" than non-respondents, I see no way to assess if this is really the case. However, by introducing a weighting to control for regional differences and by always analyzing active members and sympathizers separately, I opted for a very conservative strategy in my analytical approach.

Advantages to collect quantitative and representative data are twofold. On the one hand, survey data with standardized questions allow comparing systematically activists of different organizations with the whole population. Through this comparison I am able to assess whether these activists have a specific self-perception as strong citizen that delineates them from the general population. On the other hand, quantitative data aims to generalize the findings. This is something that qualitative data are unable to do. While quantitative measures are useful to perform systematic analyses and allow for generalization, they also face some *shortcomings*.

First, it is difficult to grasp the content of meanings and worldviews with such data and indicators. Similarly, to highlight effects of cognitive toolkits on contentious participation and to observe constructions, modifications, or changes of meanings and worldviews are difficult with survey data. To analyze more accurately social mechanisms at stake, as well as the content and the construction of individuals' cognitive toolkits I need qualitative data (McAdam 2003; Mische 2003; Siegel 2009).

Second, one-shot surveys raise the problem of not being able to trace participation process taking place over a rather long-lasting period. In other words, the nature of the data makes it impossible to assess if cognitions causally precede or follow contentious participation.

Third, asking individuals about their perceptions of common goods, their self-extension towards other social and cultural groups or their perceptions of politics and the role of citizens entail a risk of producing social desirability bias. While it is possible that I slightly overestimate for example the level to which individuals are concerned by common goods, I am confident that these overestimations affect all groups to the same level. Whereas I am aware of these limits and therefore comment the results in line of these shortcomings, they do not prevent me from assessing the main hypotheses here, namely: the specificity of activists' cognitions as well as the description of variations between different types of activists. In addition, the use of qualitative data allows not only complementing some of the shortcomings of quantitative data but also going beyond the results of the survey data. For this reason, I turn now to the description of the interview data.

4.3. Qualitative data collection and analytical strategy

In this section, I introduce the *qualitative data* collected through in-depth interviews with 12 interviewees. I will proceed in the reverse sense as I did in the quantitative section before. First, I will discuss the strength and weaknesses of the interview data. By this, I show how they are complementary and able to enhance the quantitative findings. I then discuss the selection of the interviewees and present them briefly. Further on, I discuss how I conducted the interviews and how I subsequently analyzed them.

While it is impossible to infer from qualitative data, they have other *advantages* that compensate this shortcoming. As I said in the previous section, quantitative data are not well suited to describe the complexity of activists' cognitions. This is exactly one of the strengths of the interview material. I want to describe the content of activists' perception as strong citizens in order to put some flesh on the rather limited quantitative bones. In other words, qualitative data allows answering another, complementary question: How do individuals really perceive the world around them?

Further on, while survey data are handy to find systematic differences between different kinds of activists, they are not really helpful to understand, and consequently, to *interpret these variations*. The interview data can help here. Accordingly, I illustrate variations found

in the quantitative data by comparing activists of different types of organizations and with various levels of participation. In a similar way, qualitative data are useful to complement quantitative multivariate analyses. Specifically, I use the qualitative data to assess how cognitions interact with more structural factors, such as social networks and biographical availability. This is something I can model in quantitative multivariate analyses but the qualitative data helps a lot both for the construction and for the interpretation of these results.

As just outlined, this technique has its strengths but confronts also some *limits*, of course. What are thus these weaknesses and how do I intend to overcome them? First, I have to confront a problem of retrospectivity. "Narrativization tells not only about past actions but how individuals understand those actions, that is, meaning" (Kohler Riessman 1993: 232). As the quote of Kohler Riessmann already underlines, individuals reinterpret their experiences from their current standpoint. This makes it impossible to assess a causal relationship between cognition and action. However, I do not think that this is really a problem here, as I do not want to assess their cognitive outlook at different points in time. Second, qualitative data does not allow for generalizations. It should have become obvious by now that I use the survey data for that. A last weakness of the qualitative data is that not everybody talks of everything. There is the possibility that individuals do not speak about cognitions, which are just evident for them. For example, some interviewees did speak very little about their relation to others because it was just normal for them to include culturally others in the same conception of humanity they perceive themselves. The consequence of this would be that I fail to incorporate central aspects of activists' worldviews. At least for theoretically important cognitive dimensions, I tried to limit such a void during the second interview where questions were asked about every single cognitive dimension included in the theory.

To sum up, whereas the result of this mixed methods design provide great synergies, I cannot eliminate all weaknesses. Foremost, I am unable to study social mechanisms at stake. Especially, cognitive construction processes remain empirically unobservable, which brings along an important causality issue. I turn to this problem at the end of this chapter. While I have theoretically defined an ongoing cognitive construction process in

the previous chapter, other research designs are required to test empirically these assumptions.

4.4. Case selections for interviews

To select interview partners I tried to maximize differences between activists. I asked each involved organization for a list of about 20 to 30 activists that I may contact for conducting the interviews. Then, I successively contacted activists on this list by a trial and error principle. Having introduced me as a member of a university research group, I explained the aim of my call and asked for a superficial description of the kind and intensity of movement participation of these persons²⁹. This procedure helped selecting as different activists as possible. Especially, I looked for differences in the form and level of participation and for differences in age and gender. When I got an acceptance, I made a first appointment.

Table 4.3 below introduces the 12 interviewes of SAB and GP I use in this thesis. I restricted myself to these cases for several reasons and I will argue in the following why I believe that these 12 cases are sufficient to conduct the analysis. First of all, restricting myself to twelve cases was a decision in terms of feasibility as the analysis of one interviewee takes about one week. Second and consequently, this choice allowed a deeper and more detailed analysis. If I opted for 18 cases, including thereby the 6 interviews of STP, I would have limited the amount spent on one interview considerably. While the quantitative data provide representativeness, this is not the job of the qualitative data. Third, an evaluation of all 18 interviews resulted in the conclusion that the six interviews conducted with STP activists are mostly redundant. This is not to say that the interviews with STP activists are not interesting but there was no specific case that did not resemble at all to one of the interviews of the other two organizations. Finally, having activists of SAB and GP in the sample, I still can compare them in terms of variations in their

²⁹ I only knew in advance whether they were sympathizers or active members. As I wanted to maximize the variations between the few cases, I asked them how they really participate, if they participate on a regular basis or only sporadically and if they are more participating in volunteer or protest action.

cognitive outlook between challenging and mainstream protest domains. Together, these four arguments show that 12 cases are sufficient for the qualitative analysis.

Obviously, all the names I use here are invented for the sake of anonymization. I have both women (8) and men (4) in the sample and I cover a rather large spectrum in terms of age as the youngest activist, Pierette, has just become 18 at the moment of the interview and the oldest one, Willhelm, had 87 ans. One could argue that the interviewees I picked for SAB are generally older then those I selected for GP. I agree with that but this is also a reality if one looks at the average age of activists of these organizations. For my purpose, more important than variation in terms of sex and age is *variation in terms of movement socialization* because this is what the research is all about. This was something difficult to control for in advance, as I obtained this information only during the interview. Table 4.3 represents this with four columns. The first is labeled SMO and indicates if the individual is an active member (A) or a sympathizers (S) in the respective SMO, i.e. SAB or GP. This is something I knew in advance. I managed to choose the same numbers for active members and sympathizers.

Table 4.3: Selected activists for interviews

Names	Movement socialization Active members vs. sympathizers (A/S)					Sex
	SMO	Postind.	Time	Cross-		
		sector		sectoral		
	A/S	A/S	L(ong)/S	A/S		
Solidarity across borders (SAB)			, ,			
Adriana	A	$^{(b)}A_{(a)}$	LL	(b)A	63	W
Simone	A	$^{(b)}A_{(a)}$	L	(b)A	65	W
Lisa	A	(b)A	LL	-	35	W
Willhelm	S	(b)S	LL	(b)A	87	M
Yan	S	(b)S	L	(b)A(a)	45	M
Colette	S	S	L	(b)A	62	W
Greenpeace (GP)				, ,		
Pierette	A	-	SS	-	18	W
Christian	A	(b)S	S	$A_{(a)}$	27	M
Margot	A	(b)A	LL	(b)A	70	W
Maria	S	-	L	(b)S	22	W
Eveline	S	(b)A	LL	(b)A	44	W
Yves	S	-	L	-	38	M

The second column indicates if the interview is or was an active member or sympathizer of another postindustrial organization. In addition, the (b) and (a) in brackets indicate if they

³⁰ 60.8 for SAB (standard error= 12.3, n=614) and 45.6 for GP (15.2, 645).

became activists of this organization before or after they became an activist of SAB or GP respectively. Theoretically, I want to be aware of these activities in other postindustrial organizations because I assume all SMOs within this field shape and reinforce activists' cognitions in a similar vein: Towards a strong citizen worldview. The overall picture is very diverse. While three activists are not participating at all in other postindustrial organizations, the other activists were all engaged in other political struggles before they committed themselves to SAB or GP. While some of them seem to find the time to be an active member of several SMOs, others are consistently sympathizers and some mix active membership and financial support. Finally, a last group of three activists are exclusively supporting Greenpeace. Unfortunately, I did not grab an individual where participation in one of the three organizations was followed by protest participation in other postindustrial organizations.

The third column reflects the *time since an activist is engaged* in some form of political struggle. It ranges from a double L to indicate that this individual is participating for a very long time to a double S, which means that the individual has just started protest participation. The large majority (10) participates for at least more than one year, which is indicated by a capital L However, I managed to grasp two for whom activism is something new. However, in terms of the development of cognitions, this indicator is not helpful at all because I do not see time as necessarily correlated with the development of a strong citizen worldview. In other words, in order to change someone's cognitions, one important personal experience may be sufficient. In addition, a strong citizen worldview may have been acquired through other means then exclusively social movement participation. Thus, this column is only an indicator to describe the diversity of participation patterns among the interviewees.

The fourth column states if an individual is an activist in at least one organization that is not part of the postindustrial movement sector. This is the case for the majority of the interviewees. In contrast to the time dimension I discussed before, this indicator has a theoretical implication. Participation in other movement sectors may shape their cognitions in a different way or may strengthen some particular dimension more than others.

To sum up, table 4.3 illustrated that I am confronted with 12 very different cases. They vary in terms of age, sex and, most importantly, in terms of their activist career. This diversity brings me in a good position to assess the research questions, namely to describe the content of activists' cognitions, to account for variations found between different forms of activism and to compare the importance of social networks, biographical availability and cognitions for protest participation. However, a good case selection is only one step to gather qualitatively good data. Other important steps are the manner how I conducted the interviews and how I analyzed them. For this reason, I turn now to a description of the interview strategy.

4.5. Doing and analyzing interviews

In most of the cases, I *conducted the interview* at the home of interviewees in order to assure that they feel as comfortable as possible. With each interviewee I conducted two sessions to gather their biographical narratives. Each interview lasted about two hours, so I ended up at talking around four hours with each of the interviewees. Generally speaking, both interviews were open conversations with minimal intervention from the interviewer. This strategy intended to let emerge activists' worldviews as freely as possible and to limit the influence of the interviewer to frame the cognitive components.

The main task of the first interview was to collect a *life history*. Activists had to narrate their life in relation to their political commitment (Denzin 1989; Bertaux 1997). The instruction provided to the interviewee was a typical life history one: "In this first meeting I wish to get to know you and your own personal history. Who are you? Where are you from? How did you come to your political commitment? Could you tell me all you think is important to better know you and your life (your experiences, key events of your life, your relationships, etc.)?" Three main questions motivated this first interview. How do they make sense of the world around them? Do the theoretically assumed cognitive dimensions emerge without the intervention of the interviewer? Do other cognitive dimensions emerge?

The second interview, then, was an *in-depth interview* and took place about a week after the first interview. It was a more structured interview with mainly two purposes. On the one hand, I wanted to elaborate on relevant points that emerged during the first interview. On the other hand, I asked open questions related to the research questions and specifically on various cognitive dimensions. I tried thus to get more information for the analysis of individuals' cognitive outlook. To split the interview into two encounters was very useful as interviewees became more accustomed to the interview situation and the interviewer. Consequently, I obtained mostly a richer and more precise account during the second interview.

To analyze these interviews, I used a *classical interpretative approach* (Denzin 1989; Paillé and Mucchelli 2005). The interpretative process started with activists' words and statements to progressively reach abstract categories, such as cognitions of self in relation to politics. I proceeded by five distinctive steps in order to progressively rise in abstraction scale. First, I transcribed the recorded interview material. I used a rather simple technique by transcribing only the content of the interviews. Consequently, the transcript lacks such things like intonations, pauses or emotional conduct.³¹ Second, I coded the transcriptions by the help of a theoretically inspired codebook. Thereby, the coding strategy was to always code large parts of the narration including always the question of the interviewer (if there was one) and by coding some sentences before and after the part of interest. I applied this strategy because I did not want to loose the context by which interviewees talked about a particular theme. For the coding procedure, I used Atlas-tiTM software allowing me to organize the qualitative material according to themes. This step provided narrative outputs where interviewees' statements are linked with each theme.

Third, I elaborated a descriptive summary of activists' statements for each theme by using my own words but in staying closely linked to what they said. Fourth, I wrote a more abstract interpretative summary. I organized different sub-themes in a coherent framework and labeled it with short titles. This was the first step toward more abstraction. Finally, I created abstract categories and sub-categories allowing me to compare and describe the content of activists' cognitive outlook. All in all, I tried thus to modify as

³¹ If there was a heavy emotional reaction – for example, if someone started crying – or if there was a longer break interrupting the interview, a comment was made in the transcription.

little as possible the words of activists during the different interpretative steps. Only during the last two steps, I added an interpretative layer that helped to compare activists with each other.³²

All in all, I possess a rich and detailed dataset to describe activists' cognitive dimensions that are related to contentious participation. As I relied on an interview technique where the interviewee can freely talk, I got an output with few interactions. While every interviewer inevitably exerts some influences on the interviewee, this technique allowed limiting the influence of the interviewer. Only two interviewers³³ conducted all the interviews and an inductive technique was elaborated to standardize as effectively as possible the interview situation. This inductive technique allowed an interpretative process that remained deeply connected to interviewees' statements. On the one hand, it prevented the analysis from deviating from what people said and, on the other, it avoids interpretative distortions or over-interpretation from the analyst. This systematic interview and analysis technique together allow understanding how these activists actually make sense of themselves in relation to the world and to others around them (description), how activists' narratives differ from each other (variation) and how other factors beside cognitions intervene when it comes to contentious participation (complexity).

In sum, "narrative analysis allows for a systematic study of personal experiences and meaning: how events have been constructed by active subjects" (Kohler Riessman 1993). When Kohler Riessman writes about the (re-)construction of events, she is well aware of the limits of such accounts. In fact, individuals will always reinterpret their experiences in terms of their present situation. Things get even worse, if not impossible, when individuals should describe their cognitions they had several years before the moment of the interview. This has important implication for the work I present here. The last section of this chapter will thus sketch out this causality issue.

³² In the appendix, I have included a transcription as well as a documentary of all the analytical work for one interview as an illustrative example.

³³ The interviewers are Florence Passy and myself.

4.6. Dealing with causality

"Relationships assumed to be causal involve at least two elements, a cause and an effect. Causes are factors that raise the (prior) probabilities of an event occurring" (Gerring 2001:129). For my purpose, the term in brackets in Gerring's quotation is probably the most important one. In order to assess a *causal relationship between two variables*, the research has to be designed in such a way that it allows to demonstrate that the explanatory variable comes chronologically before the theoretically predicted outcome. In other words, if one assumes a causal effect from X to Y, one is always well advised to demonstrate that X (cause) happens prior to Y (effect). Thus, if a research design has no time dimension, or relies only on retrospective data, then it is impossible to assess a causal relationship. Although the research design has many qualities as I have outlined before, causality is an issue that needs to be addressed.

In terms of causality, the core problem of the research design is that I am not in a position to measure activists' cognitions before they started participation. As I stated in the theoretical chapter, I conceive cognitive transformation as an ongoing process. This means that cognitive transformation can and will happen before an individual participates and after having started participation. In other words, do activists' cognitions at the moment of data collection have exogenous causes and can I hence find explanations in the biography of individuals before they started participation? Or does it have endogenous reasons, are these observed cognitions an effect of movement socialization? McAdam (1982) pointed already to this problem when he elaborated his concept of cognitive liberation. As he acknowledges, "it is possible that people only develop or discover a sense of efficacy or empowerment after they have begun protesting with others. At first, and sometimes for a long time, people may be uncertain as to whether their protests will actually make a difference. In this sense, cognitive liberation is sometimes a product rather than a cause of protest." In other words, cognitive transformation can be due to general life circumstances but it can also be an effect of movement socialization (Munson 2008).

Disentangling the *relationship between cognitions and action* is both a crucial and fascinating research agenda. Unfortunately, I cannot answer this question due to the retrospective nature of the data. Individuals reinterpret their experiences from their current standpoint. However, I do not think that this is really a problem for my purposes, as I do not want to assess their cognitive outlook at different points in time. Instead, my aim here is to assess the cognitions of these activists at a specific point in time, their specificity in contrast to the general population and the variations within activists' strong citizen perceptions.

"If we want to understand a real thing, be it natural, social, biosocial, or artifical, we must find out how it works" (Bunge 1997:410). Following the suggestion of Mario Bunge, this implies that in order to explain a social phenomenon, I need to unveil its underlying mechanisms. However, before I can pass on to explanation, I need first to know: what is it? A description of the content of activists' strong citizen perception allows me therefore to better understand why they choose such "strategies of action" (Swidler 1986). Does their sense-making of politics and of society resemble the one of a strong citizen? Does their sense-making fit their activists' career? In other words, do they perceive the world around them in a way that actually matches their form of contentious participation and consequently, does one's cognitive outlook translate into one's lifestyle (Teske 1997)? Of course, I do not pretend here to fully explain contentious participation. Not anywhere near. I have a more modest aim that is to contribute to a better understanding of contentious participation by looking at activists' cognitions. That is, I describe a specific point during the ongoing mechanism of cognitive construction and assess its importance by looking at the specificity of activists' cognitions and by comparing it with challenging factors. While the bulk of the social movement literature on protest participation looks either at the start or the end of participation, my research focuses on activists at work, i.e. activists somewhere in between the beginning and the finish of their activist' career. Thereby, I look at contentious participation through a new and innovative angle.

4.7. Concluding summary

This chapter had more to offer than a simple description of the nature of the data and how I will proceed during the analysis. Accordingly, this chapter has demonstrated what the work presented here has to offer and, equally important, has located its limits. I split the argument in five steps.

First, I introduced and justified the use of a mixed methods design. In this thesis, I combine quantitative survey data with qualitative life histories of 12 activists. While critics may argue that these two methods rely on incompatible epistemologies, I argued that debates about mixed methods designs have evolved towards a new epistemological standpoint that is able to fruitfully combine constructionist and positivistic worldviews. A second criticism, that opponents of mixed methods designs often mention, is a lack of justification for the use of mixed methods. With the help of Bryman's (2008) typology, I identified four justifications for the use of a mixed methods design: offset, completeness, enhancement and illustration. Offset refers to the unique strengths of the quantitative and qualitative data. The combination of these strengths leads to a more complete picture about the central research questions. Thus, I am able to construct a more comprehensive account due to the specific nature of the two datasets that allows answering different research questions. Further on, enhancement implies that both data complement each other. As such, the qualitative data help to interpret variations found in the quantitative data. Inversely, the quantitative data make it possible to generalize the qualitative description of activists' cognitions. Finally, the qualitative material helps to illustrate quantitative findings. In sum, the mixed methods design is thus very complementary because each kind of data counterbalances the weaknesses of the other.

Second, I presented the comparative nature of the research design. Thereby, I justified why I want to compare activists of three protest organizations and different levels of participation. Three hypotheses are at the core of these comparisons. To begin with, Solidarity across Borders defending migrant's rights, the Society of Threatened People struggling for the allocation of collective human rights for minority groups and Greenpeace engaged in environmental protection do all belong to the same movement sector. As part of the new

social movement sector, they are all challengers in their respective strategic action field. Accordingly, I assume that activist's of these three organizations are exposed to a similar content in the interactions they experience while they are participating. Thus, these activists should share a rather homogeneous cognitive outlook that resembles one of a strong citizen. This comparative design allows me further to test the assumption of no cognitive differences between active members and sympathizers. I justified theoretically this assumption by arguing that it is crucial that specific cognitive worldviews get transmitted and the receiving individual is cognitively responsive for these messages. Consequently, the frequency and the respective channel for the transmission of cognitions are of less importance.

While I assume no difference between different levels of participation, I assume *cognitions* to vary between activists of different organizations. This assumption is in no way in contradiction with the first assumption about the existence of a common cognitive outlook of a strong citizen of activists in the new social movement sector. However, I assume that the degree of "radicality" of this cognitive outlook varies with regard to the degree of political challenge that is involved. Consequently, activists of SAB should be cognitively stronger citizens than activists of GP and STP respectively.

Third, I presented the nature of the survey data by presenting the sampling strategy, the resulting response rate and how both influence the representativeness of the data. I concluded that I managed to obtain representative samples for active members and sympathizers of SAB and GP while for STP I am only representative for sympathizers who identify with the organization. I further described the analytical strategy and underlined the specific strength of survey data, namely, their capacity for systematic comparison and generalization.

Fourth, I proceeded in a similar way for the *interview data*. I argued that the interview material I collected is very helpful to describe the content of activist's cognitions and thereby to assess a further assumption: That activists of new social movements develop a specific worldview that resembles one of a strong citizen. The interview data are further helpful to interpret variations found in the quantitative analysis and to understand more

comprehensively the complex interaction between cognitions and other factors like social networks or biographical availability. In a next step, I justified how I selected the 12 cases by maximizing the diversity of these cases in terms of their activists' careers and explained how I conducted the interviews and how I analyzed the resulting data.

While the survey and interview data complement each other very well in general, there is one common problem that should be pointed out. In fact, the subjects of the survey and interview data are mostly experienced activists. As I say all along of my thesis, movement socialization has shaped their worldviews as a strong citizen but has probably also shaped a value based account of why they are participating. For example, one has just to open one page of a newspaper of one of these organizations in order to get many arguments of why one should participate in this organization. A similar process should be at work in interaction between active members where they motivate each other to sustain participation. The consequence of these mental processes for the methods I used here is the following. While they do certainly a good job in illuminating the cognitive account of activists' participation motives, they risks failing poor on other dimensions that also account for sustained participation. Both the questionnaire and the interview guideline were sensitive to this issue as there were many questions that pointed to the role of social networks or cost-benefit evaluations for example. Wherever this does not prevent the production of slightly biased data, I tried at least to control as good as possible for this problem.

Finally, I pointed to the *impossibility to assess a causal relationship between cognitions and action with such a research design.* While this is an important drawback, it is not my aim here to assess this relationship. Instead, I want to contribute to a better understanding of contentious participation by looking at activists' cognitions at a specific point in time. However, when I now turn to the empirical evaluation of the central assumptions during the next chapters, I have to be aware of this circumstance.

5. Do activists have a specific cognitive outlook?

In this chapter, I begin to empirically demonstrate that activists' cognitive outlook is relevant for contentious participation. If this is the case, activists' cognitions should be specific with regard to the Swiss population. I test this assumption by going into the first of four questions that are part of this thesis. Do these activists have a specific cognitive outlook in comparison with the Swiss population? Activists' cognitive dimensions that should be specific are those belonging to the strong citizen concept. In the theoretical chapter, I interpreted Barber's definition of strong democracy as depicting, among others, a specific citizen that perceives political authorities in a critical way, underlines the importance of protest actors, and values an active and critical citizen. This is what I described as the relation to politics that I assume to find in activists' mind. As for the second cognitive dimension, the relation to society, a strong citizen perceives it as important to contribute and maintain common goods and has an inclusive notion of society. Activists' cognitions should be specific on these two dimensions in order to label this worldview as one of a strong citizen. Further on, the specificity of these cognitions would point to the importance of cognitive dimensions for protest participation because they are something that differentiates these activists from the rest of the population.

Consequently, I suggest that activists' specific relation to society and politics is a result of protest action. This in turn constitutes a broader cognitive baseline then the one usually put forward in the literature insisting on the importance of injustice, agency and identity frames. Of course, a specific cognitive constellation is not a final proof of the relevance of cognitions for protest participation as there remain many individuals with similar worldviews that are not protesting. However, if it becomes apparent that, at the aggregate level, the strong citizen dimensions are specific for these activists with regard to the general population than I managed to do a first step to point to the necessity of activists' cognitions for sustained protest participation.

In this chapter, I compare activists of SAB, STP and GP with representative samples of the general population of Switzerland. This was made possible through the use of standardized questions from the World Values Study, the International Social Survey

Programme and the European Values Study. While these indicators allow me thus comparing these activists with the general population, they were originally not constructed to measure exactly the variables I intend to represent here. Generally, they serve me well as proxies for my cognitive dimensions but are not always the most valid indicator. Consequently, these indicators are not always ideal in terms of their *validity*. However, I have other, more tailor-made, indicators that were constructed exclusively for this research and exactly to measure the cognitive dimensions mentioned above. These indicators confirm the result I got for the comparative indicators, which make me confident to use them. I do not use the non-comparative indicators here because the main aim of this chapter is to show the specificity of activists' cognitions with regard to the Swiss population. Instead, I try to address this weakness in the next two chapters both by confronting critically my arguments with the interview data (chapter 6) and by other indicators that were exclusively developed for this research (chapter 7).

How do these activists perceive the world? Do they develop, at some point in their life, a cognitive outlook that is specific for them with regard to the general population? In other words, do these activists have a specific cognitive toolkit? Starting to construct answers to these questions is the main aim of this chapter.

5.1. What are activists' main motivations to sustain contentious participation?

The literature has demonstrated that structural factors (i.e. values, social class), interaction variables (i.e. social networks) and personal availabilities are crucial to understand contentious participation. What is the role of cognitions within this theoretical framework? Do they enter into play for protesting? For Jasper (1997) this is certainly the case as he often reminded us that individuals protest because their worldviews are at stake. Is this empirically demonstrable?

Before I start to compare activists' cognitions with those of the Swiss population, I want to begin my analysis with an indicator from an open question that asked respondents to reveal their *main motivations* that lead them into the defense of migrant's rights (SAB),

autochthonous minorities (STP), and environmental protection (GP). As Table 5.1 shows, activists' cognitions are of central importance. Motives related to political issue considered as an injustice, to their perception of their own society or of political authorities responsible for the injustices are the main these activists mentioned to explain their protest participation. This indicator points thus to the importance of activists' cognitions in order to motivate them to become and stay politically active. However, as the input of the question stresses the word motivation, it is possible that respondents overemphasized the role of cognitions that motivated them to take part in protest. Therefore, I judge this result as indicative for the importance of cognitions and, more importantly, as a first confirmation of the relevance of the theoretically developed dimensions.

Table 5.1: Activists' main motives for protesting

	SAB	STP	GP
Cognitions	93	95	99
Relation of self to the political issue (injustice frame)	40	51	50
Relation of self to society	44	46	67
Self-extension	34	38	49
Common goods provision	14	12	30
Relation of self to political authorities	31	44	16
My commitment is an evidence	30	26	25
Other	20	15	7
Personal experiences	19	13	6
Personal incentives	1	2	1
n	534	346	552

<u>NOTE:</u> "Can you please give us your main motives that are most important to you?" No significant differences between active members and sympathizers of neither SAB nor GP do exist.

As William Gamson would have foreseen, activists of all three organizations cite the perception of an injustice frame as an important motivation. However, they also mentioned cognitive dimensions that go beyond that. Other cognitive dimensions are thus of crucial importance too. Between a third (for SAB), 38% (for STP) and half (for GP) of all activists explain their activism by their self-extension to other members living in their society, they consider that they should be active in order to develop common goods and they identify political authorities as a problematic actor in their protest field. In addition, a lot of these activists stress that their commitment is self-evident. They wrote: "I could not do otherwise in front of such injustices", "we need to be active, it's self-evident, we could not cross our arms", etc. At least those activists for whom their protest

participation is self-evident seem to act in a way that profoundly resonates with cognitions that are deeply anchored in their mind. Cognitions constitute a large share of activists' motivational constellation and other factors seem to be less important. While personal experiences, especially for activists of SAB and STP, also contribute to motivate them to sustain their participation, personal incentives play a minor role for protest participation in these three organizations. Again, I judge this result as only indicative of the importance of cognitions. As the question asks about personal motivations, it is reasonable to expect an overestimation of a value based account and a underestimation of more structural and rational motivations.

In sum, this table demonstrated that, according to activists' statements, cognitions are fundamentally linked to or constitute the main motives to participate in protest action. In addition, all cognitive dimensions are present for activists of the three organizations although to some different degrees. For example, the provision of common goods seems to be more important for activists of GP than for activists of SAB and STP respectively. Thus, while all these activists seem to share worldviews that are, according to their own statements, important motivations for protest participation, the importance of these cognitive dimensions seem to vary between activists of different organizations. I will focus on these organizational differences in chapter 7. For now, I concentrate on cognitive differences between these activists and the general population. The guiding questions of this chapter are thus: Are these cognitions specific for these activists? Or, in contrast, are these worldviews part of the general cultural toolkit of Switzerland?

5.2. Activists' relation to society

For activists' relation towards society, I assume that these activists differ significantly from the general population. As elaborated above, I test two sub-dimensions of their relation towards society. On the one hand, I look at their relation to common goods and, on the other, at their relation towards others. For the former, I assume that activists tend to be more concerned by and feel more responsible for common goods whereas for the latter, I examine if these activists have a more inclusive perception of society than the general population. As I said above, I only use comparative indicators in order to

minimize the possibility that differences found do not stem from the indicator but are really an indication of different worldviews.

Table 5.2: The importance of responsible consumption

	CH	SAB	STP	GP
	%	%	%	%
Responsible consumption	40	79	68	79
\overline{n}	1052	429	542	511
Diff. to Swiss population (χ^2)		189.60***	109.80***	214.50***
Diff. within organization (ϕ)		ns	-	.09*

NOTE: "How important is it for a good citizen to choose products for political, ethical, or environmental reasons, even if they cost a bit more?" Responses were originally coded 1= not important at all to 7 = very important. The item has been recoded into a dummy where 1 "important" = 6 or 7. ISSP 2004. *p < 0.05, **p < 0.01, ***p < 0.001.

A first comparative indicator for activists' relation to common goods is presented in Table 5.2. The indicator, measuring the importance of responsible consumption, confirms that I am confronted with a specific perception. Whereas this is important for around 40% of the Swiss population, responsible consumption is important for nearly twice as many activists. Responsible consumption is certainly not the only mean to contribute to the maintenance of common goods, but it is an important way of individual behavior to protect the commons. It is not surprising that activists, and slightly more active members, of GP shine on this indicator, as responsible consumption is at least a part of their protest issue. In contrast, the protest issue of activists of SAB and STP is not concerned with responsible consumption. Nevertheless, activists of SAB judge responsible consumption as important as GP activists do, while only activists of STP are somewhat less concerned. This may be due to the fact that activists of STP are all sympathizers where a large part of them was recruited in the street and consequently, may have less developed worldviews with respect to responsible consumption. In sum however, all three protest groups clearly depart from the Swiss population in general and they value responsible consumption to a similar extent, as this is the case for activists of GP.

Of course, common goods are not only about responsible consumption. Another important element of the definition of common goods is that they have to be shared with others. For this reason, respondents were asked to what extent they feel concerned about the living conditions of others. In my view, being concerned by the living condition of

others implies that one is aware that everyone should share common goods. In Table 5.3, I split answers to the items of this question in two dimensions, differentiating thereby unknown but "near others" from unknown but "distant others". Being concerned by unknown others implies that one is concerned by the living conditions of neighbors, people living in the same region or compatriots. For this indicator, the Swiss population is only slightly less concerned than these activists. In fact, activists defending migrant's rights (SAB) seem to be the only group that clearly departs from the Swiss population. While activists of GP are still significantly more concerned, activists of STP do not differ from the Swiss population. There are two possible explanations to these rather small differences for this indicator. One is that the general population is simply concerned by unknown others to a similar level like this is the case for activists of post-industrial protest organizations. Another explanation is more linked to the indicator itself. In fact, one item is labeled compatriots, which might contain some bias in term of social desirability and thus may have artificially increased the level of concern of the Swiss population.

Table 5.3: To be concerned by others

		CH	SAB	STP	GP
		%	%	%	%
Unknown others		35	49	38	41
	n	1268	419	537	516
Diff. to Swiss population (χ^2)			24.5***	ns	4.2*
Diff. within organization (ϕ)			ns	-	ns
Distant others		33	52	41	42
	n	1265	418	537	513
Diff. to Swiss population (χ^2)			50.6***	11.7**	14.6***
Diff. within organization (φ)			ns	-	ns

NOTE: "To what extent do you feel concerned about the living conditions of: People in your neighborhood, The people in the region you live in, Compatriots, Europeans, All humans all over the world?" I regrouped all respondents into two categories: Unknown others for the first three items, Distant others for the last two items. The Table shows percentages for respondents who checked "very much" or "much" for at least one item. EVS 2008. *p<0.05, **p<0.01, ***p<0.001.

Differences increase if I look at the category of distant others, implying people living in Europe and the entire humanity. Whereas a third of the Swiss population is highly concerned, 40% and more of these activists are concerned by distant others. Their perception of common goods is thus one of responsibility, active contribution and an important notion of their collective nature. Common goods have to be shared with others, and these activists feel concerned if this is not the case, especially for others who

live in other world regions. In addition, and most importantly to me right now, this perception is specific for these activists. On the first sub-dimension, their relation to common goods, these activists clearly depart thus from the rest of the population.

Let me turn now to the second dimension of activists' perception towards society. Here, I assume that these activists have generally a self-extensive understanding of themselves that includes them and others in the same space. Do they perceive the world as shared with others by a common humanity? In general, similar evidence results as for the common goods dimension. Again, I am confronted with a specific cognitive outlook. However, these activists do not have specific worldviews on every imaginable cognitive dimension. Only a very small part does not raise any borders between themselves and other people. Thus, there is no such thing as a total self-extension towards others. Neither the Swiss population nor these activists do blindly open the door to any individual of other groups.

Most importantly, these activists distance themselves clearly from *right-wing extremists*. In fact, around 80% of all activists do not want to live next to a right-wing extremist. While also a majority of the Swiss population would dislike living next to such individuals (around two third), they are significantly less exclusive than these activists I analyze here. Thus, these activists show less self-extension towards right-wing groups than the Swiss population. This result is not surprising as activists of right-wing groups are the first and strongest enemies of activists included in this research, especially for activists defending migrants' and human rights.

These activists not only erect frontiers towards political minorities, they are neither very tolerant towards *social deviant minorities*, such as alcoholics, drug-addicts, people in depression, or individuals having criminal records. Activists, especially those of STP, are a little bit less exclusionist than the general population. However, still more than half of all these activists rejects social deviant minorities as a neighbor. These groups belong to the so called "scorned groups", which are psychologically most difficult to accept because they are perceived as neither well intentioned nor competent (Fiske 2009; Fiske 2011).

Things become very different if one looks at *cultural minorities*. The categories I used for this indicator were Muslims, Jews, Sinti people and migrants. While the Swiss population excludes cultural minorities to a similar level than the other two categories, very few activists erect frontiers between them and cultural minorities. Thus, these activists have a more self-extensive perception of the society they are part of, but only when it comes to cultural minorities. In contrast, these activists do not differentiate from the Swiss population when it comes to social deviant minorities and are even more exclusionist for political minorities, especially when it comes to right-wing extremists.

Table 5.4: Social frontiers

		СН	SAB	STP	GP
		%	%	%	0/0
No frontiers at all		13	9	16	15
	n	1'272	416	540	516
Diff. to Swiss population (χ^2)			ns	ns	ns
Diff. within organization (ϕ)			ns	-	.09*
Towards political minorities		63	84	80	78
	n	1'272	417	540	516
Diff. to Swiss population (χ^2)			-64.3***	-48.6***	-37.50***
Diff. within organization (ϕ)			ns	-	ns
Towards social deviant minorities		68	67	54	65
	n	1'272	417	540	516
Diff. to Swiss population (χ^2)			ns	32.6***	ns
Diff. within organization (ϕ)			ns	-	ns
Towards cultural minorities		56	6	11	18
	n	1'272	417	539	517
Diff. to Swiss population (χ^2)			316.7***	312.3***	219.70***
Diff. within organization (ϕ)			ns	-	.13**

NOTE: "On this list are various groups of people. Could you please sort out any that you would not like as neighbors?" No frontiers: Swiss respondents belong to this category if they crossed any item at all. Activists belong to this category of they crossed "No group of people disturbs me as a neighbor". Political minorities: "Right-wing extremists" or "Left-wing extremists". Social deviant minorities: "Heavy drinkers, Drug addicts, Emotionally unstable people, People with a criminal record, People who have AIDS". Cultural minorities: "Muslims, Gypsies, Jews, Christians, Homosexuals, immigrants/foreign workers." EVS 2008. *p<0.05, **p<0.01, ***p<0.001.

In sum, the analysis of this indicator hint to the way how activists' worldviews get reshaped or reinforced through their embeddings in networks in a particular strategic action field. In particular, contentious participation is one process where meaning construction is going on in these protest networks. The existence of differences for the cultural dimension but not for the other dimensions supports this argument. This is especially true for activists of SAB and STP as their protest issues are often related to cultural minorities. Cultural minorities are more distant for activists of GP, which is also reflected in a significant difference between active members and sympathizers of this

organization. However, as we will learn in the next chapter, activists of GP are also well aware that those who suffer most from environmental pollution are people living in other world regions.

Similar results dwell on the analysis of *trust towards others* (Table 5.5). These activists trust others to a larger extent than the Swiss population. This is the case for unknown others, where I included trust in neighbors and people one meet for the first time. While the Swiss population has more trust towards culturally distant others (people from other religions and other nationalities) than towards unknown others, cognitive differences between these activists and the Swiss population remain significant.

Table 5.5: Trusting others

		CH	SAB	STP	GP
		%	%	%	%
Towards unknown others		45	73	58	53
	n	1'214	369	484	462
Diff. to Swiss population (χ^2)			84.1***	20.8***	8.3**
Diff. within organization (ϕ)			ns	-	ns
Towards cultural distant others		68	96	83	78
	n	1'161	355	438	412
Diff. to Swiss population (χ^2)			109.7***	36.2***	16.0***
Diff. within organization (ϕ)			ns	-	ns

NOTE: "Could you tell us whether you trust [neighbors/people you meet for the first time/people of another religion/people of another nationality]?" Responses were originally coded 1 = not at all; 2 = not very much; 3 = somewhat; 4 = completely. The item has been recoded into two dummies, one for unknown others (neighbors, people you meet for the first time) where 1 "trustworthy" = 3 or 4 for both items; and one for culturally distant others where 1 "trustworthy" = 3 or 4 for both items. WVS 2007. *p<0.05, *p<0.01, ***p<0.001.

As last set of indicators for the cognitive dimension related to others tested if one judges it as important to *respect others opinions*, and to *help others* in Switzerland and the world (Table 5.6). Respecting others opinions implies that one is aware of the existence of different standpoints in a society and that one is willing to accept them as valuable. I do not want to interpret too much this indicator, as it is certainly sensitive to social desirability bias. In other words, respondents are tempted to confirm their willingness to respect others opinions. Fortunately, this reliability issue does not affect the testing of my hypothesis, as this temptation should be equal across all respondents. For example, the indicator in Table 5.4 that measured frontiers towards political minorities demonstrated that these activists do not respect opinions of every (political) color. This indicator also

confirms my initial hypothesis according to which these activists have a more self-extensive perception of society than the general population. In addition, this indicator shows that these activists are more self-extensive not only by integrating more groups in their view of society but also by accepting a more diverse set of opinions to exist.

Table 5.6: The civic importance to respect others opinions and to help others

		CH	SAB	STP	GP
		%	%	%	%
To respect others opinions		62	80	79	77
	n	1070	429	541	510
Diff. to Swiss population (χ^2)			46.5***	45.3***	35.7***
Diff. within organization (ϕ)			ns	-	ns
To help others in Switzerland		56	77	64	57
	n	1'069	428	538	511
Diff. to Swiss population (χ^2)			59.1***	9.6**	ns
Diff. within organization (ϕ)			ns	-	ns
To help others in the world		44	73	69	57
	n	1'067	423	537	507
Diff. to Swiss population (χ^2)			105.1***	91.1***	23.8***
Diff. within organization (φ)			ns	-	ns

NOTE: Respecting others opinion: "How important is it for a good citizen to respect others opinions?" Helping others: "How important is it for a good citizen to help others [in Switzerland, in the world]?" Responses were originally coded 1= not important at all to 7 = very important. The item has been recoded into a dummy where 1 "important" 0= 6 or 7. ISSP 2004. *p<0.05, **p<0.01, ***p<0.001.

Finally, helping others in Switzerland and in the rest of the world implies that one is not only cognitively available to accept others in one's perception of society but that this self-extensive view is a form of active integration in the way that one is cognitively ready to help others if they need it. Here again, activists of SAB, STP and GP depart clearly from the Swiss population. A significantly larger share judges it as important to help others than the Swiss population.

In sum, the analysis of these indicators confirms my theoretical claim. It shows that *these activists have constructed a perception of themselves towards (culturally) others that is highly inclusive.* They do not raise social frontiers between them and individuals belonging to other cultures and they trust unknown others and culturally distant others far more than the Swiss population does. In addition, they are not only more self-extensive when it comes to accepting culturally other groups within their perception of society, they are also more tolerant towards others' opinions and they are more ready to help these other out.

As it was the case for their perception of common goods, self-extension is a specific feature of activists' cognitive toolkit accounting for and stemming from contentious participation. As activists' perception of society is specific to them, it seems thus reasonable to take this cognitive dimension into account to better understand protest participation. These activists are concerned by the production and maintenance of common goods and they cognitively include a (at least culturally) larger part of the entire humanity in the society. On an aggregate level, these activists perceive themselves clearly as strong citizens with regard to their perception of society. Is this also the case for their perception of politics? Are these activists typical contenders, i.e. do they de-legitimize state authorities and simultaneously legitimize contentious actors as I suggested theoretically? And what about their perception of citizens' role, do these activists value vigilance and commitment? I turn to this question in the next section.

5.3. Activists' relation towards politics

Does activists' perception of politics differ in a similar way from the Swiss population as it was the case for their relation to society? Theoretically, three dimensions make up their perception of politics and I will go through these dimensions step by step. I begin by looking at their perception of political authorities. My assumption here is that these activists de-legitimize political authorities because they are, in still most of the cases, the main actors they challenge. In other words, activists interact³⁴ with political authorities about the definition of shared meanings in their respective field. Consequently, these activists should de-legitimize political authorities more then the Swiss population.

To evaluate the degree of respondents' de-legitimization, I used a question that asked about their *level of confidence in specific political authorities*. Of course, political authorities are diverse and perceptions of a specific political actor vary according to the implication of this political actor in the respective political issue. In Table 5.7, I differentiate between four different actors where two of them are situated on the national and the other two are situated on the international level. I judge this divide an important one because

³⁴ Of course, not every activist is engaged in direct interaction with political authorities. By interaction, I mean that they are at least aware of the interaction between the protest actor they are part of and the political actor being the target of their claim.

contentions about environmental protection, human rights and the defense of migrants' rights take place either more on the national or more on the international level.³⁵

Table 5.7: Activists' de-legitimization of political authorities

		СН	SAB	STP	GP
		%	%	%	%
		National le	evel		
Federal council		31	59	46	55
	n	1'200	421	513	493
Diff. to Swiss population (χ^2)			103.8***	38.0***	89.3***
Diff. within organization (φ)			.18***		.11*
Federal parliament		43	64	50	63
	n	1'180	414	512	486
Diff. to Swiss population (χ^2)			56.1***	8.3**	58.1***
Diff. within organization (ϕ)			.12*		ns
		International	level		
European Union		57	61	65	76
	n	1'191	395	506	476
Diff. to Swiss population (χ^2)			ns	11.1**	56.4***
Diff. within organization (φ)			.14**		ns
United Nations		47	40	40	54
	n	1'192	403	512	473
Diff. to Swiss population (χ^2)			- 6.0*	- 8.3**	6.4*
Diff. within organization (φ)			.14**		11*

NOTE: "How much confidence do you have in [the Federal Council, the Federal parliament, the European Union, the United Nations]?" Responses were originally coded from 1= "a great deal" to 4= "not at all". The item has been recoded into a dummy where 1 "no confidence" = 3 or 4. WVS 2007. *p<0.05, **p<0.01, ***p<0.01, ***p<0.01.

On the national level, these activists have less confidence both in the Federal council as well as in the Federal parliament than the Swiss population. However, and in contrast to their relation to society, these activists differ in their level of confidence according to their level of participation. While about two third of all active members of SAB and GP delegitimize the Federal council, this is only the case for about 50% of the sympathizers of all three organizations.³⁶ One interpretation of this result could be that active members are engaged in more direct forms of interactions, like for example during a demonstration with political authorities, allowing them to perceive concretely the role of political authorities. In contrast, this cognitive task seems to be more difficult for sympathizers. Nevertheless and of most importance here, differences between sympathizers and the Swiss population are still significant.

³⁵ Whereas I do have indicators for the regional and local level for activists, these indicators do not show up in the item list of the WVS 2007.

³⁶ For the perception of the Federal parliament, active members of SAB still differ significantly from their fellow sympathizers (71% of SAB's active members delegitimize the Federal parliament whereas only 60% of SAB's sympathizers do so). In contrast, active members and sympathizers of GP do not differ on this indicator.

In addition, if I look at the specific level of de-legitimization of national political authorities, one cannot speak about a complete de-legitimization of these political actors as percentages vary between roughly 50% to a maximum of 64%. Thus, by far not all activists de-legitimize political authorities on the national level. Probably, these results points to the fact that these two national political institutions are both composed by multiple parties and thus are of a quite heterogeneous nature. Additionally, as Swidler (1986) reminds me, they grab from the same cultural toolkit as the Swiss population as the results clearly demonstrate. While the nature of these indicators does not allow me going further into these details, I will come back to this issue in the next chapter. Besides these variations, I was nevertheless able to demonstrate the active members as well as sympathizers clearly depart from the Swiss population where a great majority legitimizes both the Federal council as well as the National parliament. This is not the case for activists who are way more critical than the population in general.

What about the *international level?* Do I observe a similar pattern as for the national one? Looking at the level of confidence towards political authorities of the European Union, the Swiss population is way more critical than it was the case for national political authorities. This is not really surprising given the critical stance of Switzerland towards European integration and in particular the European Union. However, these activists are still more critical than the Swiss population. Sympathizers of SAB are an exception here as only 55% of them de-legitimize political authorities of the European Union. For what the perception of the UN is concerned, only activists of GP de-legitimize more this kind of political authorities while activists of SAB and STP have more confidence in these political authorities than the Swiss population.³⁷ For the international level, I thus cannot say that these activists generally de-legitimize political authorities more then the Swiss population. On the one hand, the Swiss population has less confidence in international political authorities than in national ones. On the other, activists' level of confidence seems to vary according to the respective international political institution.

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³⁷ For the perception of political authorities of the UN, active members and sympathizers of SAB and GP differ significantly. Only 47% and 45% of active members of SAB and GP delegitimize political authorities of the UN, while this is the case for 34% and 57% of sympathizers of SAB and GP respectively.

In sum, I could thus confirm my general assumption of this chapter for political authorities on the national level. These activists clearly de-legitimize the Federal council as well as the Federal parliament more than this is the case for the general population. In contrast, I got inconsistent results for the international level where activists' perceptions seem to depend on the specific political institution. These inconsistencies for the international level give me the room to address a final point. While it is true that migration, human rights and environmental protection are political issues of an international scale, contentious politics still takes mostly place on a national or even regional level (McAdam, Tarrow et al. 2001:331-332). Consequently, it is not surprising that I detected the most flagrant cognitive differences between these activists and the general population for political authorities on the national level.

Activists' relation to politics is not only composed of their critical perception towards political authorities. In addition to that, these activists should also develop a meaning of the collective actors through which they channel their protest. Thus, in terms of political worldviews, individuals relate themselves not only to political authorities but also to the movement or, more precisely, to protest organizations in general. Piven and Cloward (1979) stressed in their study that activists do not only undergo a process of state delegitimization, but also a process of understanding organized protest as a chance to change their own situation. Consequently, *activists should legitimize protest actors*. Do I observe such a pattern when looking at activists' level of confidence with regard to ecological associations, humanitarian association and unions? And is this perception specific with regard to the general population? Table 5.8 gives me some clues.

Activists of SAB, STP and GP strongly legitimize ecological and humanitarian associations. In fact, more than 90% of all these activists have confidence in these types of organizations. While also a majority of the Swiss population (around 70%) has confidence in humanitarian and ecological associations, the level of confidence is significantly lower than it is for activists of SAB, STP and GP. Further on, this high degree of legitimization seems to exist even beyond their movement family. A third indicator that measured the level of confidence towards unions demonstrates this. Activists of SAB, STP and GP as well as the general population have generally lower

confidence in unions than in ecological and humanitarian associations. However, these activists still legitimize unions more than the general population does. Thus, activists' perception of unions is a first indication how far reaching their legitimatization of "participatory institution" (Barber 1984) is. As strong citizens, they are thus well aware of the importance of organized protest in order to challenge the existing definition of shared meanings and to increase the chance to induce social change.

Table 5.8: Activists' legitimatization of civil society actors

		CH	SAB	STP	GP
		%	%	%	%
Ecological associations		69	94	90	94
	n	1'208	415	534	502
Diff. to Swiss population (χ^2)			98.3***	87.4***	123.6***
Diff. within organization (ϕ)			ns	-	ns
Humanitarian associations		70	95	92	84
	n	1'210	420	518	485
Diff. to Swiss population (χ^2)			113.6***	102.2***	34.9***
Diff. within organization (ϕ)			ns	-	ns
Unions		43	78	66	55
	n	1'149	384	481	469
Diff. to Swiss population (χ^2)			135.3***	67.8***	19.6***
Diff. within organization (ϕ)			ns	-	ns

NOTE: "How much confidence do you have in [ecological associations, humanitarian associations, unions]?" Responses were originally coded from 1= "a great deal" to 4 = "not at all". The item has been recoded into a dummy where 1 "no confidence" = 3 or 4. WVS 2007. *p<0.05, **p<0.01, ***p<0.001.

As cognitions are not neatly split in different dimensions in the mind as I present it here conceptually, I can assume that some cognitive dimensions are deeply connected with each other. Therefore, I do not only analyze the de-legitimization of state authorities and the legitimization of civil society actors separately, I am also interested whether the *de-legitimization of state-holders parallels the legitimization of contentious actors* for these activists resulting in a specific contentious perception of the political sphere and its composing actors.

As illustrated in Figure 5.1 below, the combination of the degree of legitimization of state authorities as well as that of collective actors leads theoretically to four possible options. First, the combination of a de-legitimization of state authorities and the legitimization of civil society actors is what I label a contentious perception of the political sphere. I assume to encounter most of these activists in this field as it is a cognitive constellation

that fits most with the idea of a strong citizen. In this view, an activist is a *resisting citizen* who has low confidence in state authorities and relies on the power of civil society actors to bring about social change. A second option would be the legitimization of both, protest actors and state authorities. If activists should show up with such a perception, then they perceive protest action as an institutionalized means of political participation. In this worldview, the actions of protest actors and state authorities are perceived as complementary and not as challenging. Citizens with such a perception can be labeled *opportunistic* as they opt for the political channel they see as most promising to bring about change. Such a finding would thus go in the direction of Meyer's and Tarrow's idea of a movement society (1998). I assume that most of the Swiss population will show up such a complementary perception because the political system as well as an associative culture is well rooted in the Swiss society. Resisting and opportunistic citizens should thus represent the bulk of all respondents.

Figure 5.1: A theoretical framework of the perception of the political sphere

	Perception of	state authorities
	Delegitimation	Legitimation
Legitimation Perception of	(1) Resisting	(2) Opportunistic
civil society actors Delegitimation	(4) Anarchistic	(3) Compliant

The remaining two combinations presuppose a de-legitimization of protest actors. As I have seen above, a small minority only shares this perception³⁸. A de-legitimization of protest actors but a legitimization of political authorities, the third possible combination, is what I call a representative perception of the political sphere. Respondent in this category are *compliant citizens* as they blindly follow the orders of political representatives without considering alternative worldviews advocated by civil society actors. Finally, respondents who de-legitimize both protest actors and political authorities could be interpreted as *anarchistic citizen*. In fact, individuals who neither legitimize political authorities nor civil society actors dismiss every mean of organized collective action. Are activists resisting citizens or do they perceive the political sphere in another way? Do they have a specific worldview with regard to the general population? And are there any differences when I compare the perception of political authorities on the national and the international level? I turn now to these questions by applying the theoretical framework elaborated above.

Are these activists resisting citizens? According to Table 5.9, I can affirm this assumption. A majority of all activists are resisting citizen, i.e. they de-legitimize political authorities while simultaneously legitimizing civil society actors. 55% and more activists clearly delegitimize political authorities and strongly legitimize contentious actors. Especially within active member of SAB (77% for the national level and 69% for the international level) I identify the largest share of resisting citizens while activists of STP (55% and 59% respectively) have the fewest resisting citizens within their ranks. Consequently, by far not every activist is a resisting citizen implying a contentious perception of the political sphere. Between 25 to 42% of activists are opportunistic citizens. They show up with a complementary perception of the political sphere implying a legitimization of both, political authorities and protest actors. One reason why an important part of activists perceives the political sphere similar to the majority of the Swiss population may be due to the existence of direct democratic institutions in Switzerland. In fact, Switzerland is a

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³⁸ Of course, the general population as well as activists both delegitimize some and legitimize other protest actors. But the items I use here to measure this dimension are very general measures of confidence in union, environmental and humanitarian organization (See the note in Table 5.8 for the exact question wording). On the one hand, I am forced to use these items in order to have comparative measures at my disposal. On the other hand, I think that these two indicators are quite valid as they measure in a rather vague and broad way the respondents' confidence in quite institutionalized protest sectors. To me, this seems to be a good proxy to measure a general degree of legitimization of protest actors.

country with comparatively few protest action (Kriesi 1995) as there are, in contrast to France for example, opportunities to influence the political agenda in a much more institutionalized way.

Table 5.9: Perception of the political sphere

		CH	SAB	STP	GP
		%	%	%	%
		National le	evel		
Resisting citizen		33	67	55	62
Opportunistic citizen		58	30	42	34
Compliant citizen		9	3	3	3
Anarchistic citizen		1	1	0	1
	n	1'230	432	540	508
Diff. to Swiss population (χ^2)			156.9***	83.5***	126.0***
Diff. within organization (φ)			.17*	-	ns
		International	level		
Resisting citizen		45	59	59	71
Opportunistic citizen		39	38	37	25
Compliant citizen		15	2	4	4
Anarchistic citizen		1	1	1	1
	n	1'229	429	537	504
Diff. to Swiss population (χ^2)			57.8***	59.1***	107.0***
Diff. within organization (ϕ)			.15*	-	ns

NOTE: The calculation of these percentages is based on the same items than for the Tables 5.7 and 5.8 (Federal council and Federal parliament for the national level, European Union and United Nations for the international level. The recoding strategy is based on an "or" logic. For example, it is sufficient to de-legitimize the Federal council and to legitimize humanitarian association in order to be categorized as a resisting citizen. I opted for this coding strategy to prevent an accumulation of missing values. I also calculated these categories with a strategy based on "and", i.e. respondents had to delegitimize both the Federal council and the Federal parliament and to legitimize ecological and humanitarian associations. I got a very similar distribution but with the drawback of losing many responses. I did not include unions because they do not belong in the same strategic action field. WVS 2007. *p<0.05, **p<0.01, ***p<0.001.

Nevertheless, differences between these activists and the general population are striking. They are significantly more resisting citizens than this is the case within the general population. 50% and more activists clearly de-legitimize political authorities and strongly legitimize contentious actors. This is only the case for about a third of the Swiss population on the national level and for 45% on the international level. Therefore, I affirm also the second question about the cognitive specificity of activists and conclude that these activists also depart on this cognitive dimension. They are strong citizens with a perception tending to de-legitimize political authorities and to strongly legitimize protest actors.

The last question I want to address is about the existence of differences between the national and the international level? While these activists depart from the general population on both levels, I have identified much more resisting citizen within the Swiss population for the

international level. This finding is not surprising given the general critical perception of the European Union by the Swiss population.³⁹ With the exception of STP-activists, these activists also perceive the political sphere differently on the national and international level. On the national level, I find most of the resisting citizens within activists of SAB, especially within active members. On the international level, in contrast, activists of GP outnumber activists of SAB and STP in this regard. This finding is quite interesting in terms of the effects of social interactions within a strategic action field logic. Basically, all three protest issues (defense of migrants' rights, minority rights and environmental protection) are problems on an international scale. Therefore, the differences I detected between activists' perceptions of the national and international level may surprise one or another. However, if I think more in a field logic, these results makes actually sense because it urges me to look for the actors between which interactions take place in order to define shared meanings within a field. That said, the targets of political claims in the domain of migrants' rights are primarily national state authorities whereas this is not the case for environmental protection where international companies and organizations are important political enemies. Thus, it seems logic that activists of SAB are more national resisting citizens whereas activists of GP are rather international resisting citizens. Slightly more than half of STP activists are resisting citizens on both levels. Accordingly, they do not differ with respect to the national or the international level. While I am conscious that I did neither test these differences systematically nor statistically here, I will come back to these interesting questions about cognitive differences between activists of different organizations in more detail in chapter 7. For now, the task of this chapter is to test the specificity of activists' cognitions with regard to the Swiss population, which I have demonstrated so far.

Activists' relation to politics is thus marked by a specific perception of state authorities and civil society actors. Do they also perceive *the role of citizens* in different terms than the Swiss population? The third dimension of one's relation to politics is activists' perception of their role as political citizens. In a very explicit way, Barber (1984:133) points also to this dimension: "In a strong democracy, politics is something done by, not to citizens. Activity is its chief virtue, and involvement, commitment, obligation, and service –

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³⁹ See also Table 5.7 on page 114.

common deliberation, common decision, and common work – are its hallmarks." These activists should thus consider that individuals, as political citizens, have to be implemented in the political sphere. More specifically, I suggest that these activists perceive themselves, on the one hand, as politically critical and vigilant citizens and, on the other hand, as citizens being (politically) active.

Table 5.10 shows two indicators confirming the specificity of activists' perception as vigilant and active citizens. Overall, these activists perceive these two civic dimensions significantly more relevant than the population in general. For these activists, citizens should thus be watchdogs of political elites and, as their name already implies, it is important for them to contribute actively to society and politics. To be active in social and political associations is especially important for active members. This is not really surprising because the wording of the question implies an active contribution, which is something that sympathizers do not.

Table 5.10: Activists' perception of their citizens' role

	CH	SAB	STP	GP
	%	%	%	%
To keep watch on government	37	63	39	43
\overline{n}	1'063	426	537	506
Diff. to Swiss population (χ^2)		81.3***	ns	4.9*
Diff. within organization (ϕ)		ns	-	Ns
To be active in social and political assoc.	22	58	35	31
\overline{n}	1'059	425	522	504
Diff. to Swiss population (χ^2)		177.5***	27.8***	13.1***
Diff. within organization (φ)		.19***	-	.19***

NOTE: Responses were originally coded 1 = not important at all to 7= very important. The item has been recoded into a dummy where 1 "important" = 6 or 7. ISSP 2004. *p<0.05, **p<0.01, ***p<0.001.

Looking more in detail into Table 5.11, however, I detect that the most important gap is situated between activists of SAB and the other groups. Whereas activists of STP and GP perceive a citizen's role as only slightly different⁴⁰ than the Swiss population does, activists of SAB seem to have constructed in their mind a civic worldview that is radically different from both, the Swiss population and the one of activists of STP and GP. In the theoretical chapter, I assumed that cognitive differences between activists of different organizations exist and that they can be explained in terms of the degree of political challenge implied in

⁴⁰ The first dimension is an exception for activists of STP.

a specific contention. Consequently, activists of SAB should show up as more radical strong citizens in terms of their cognitive outlook. Whereas I look into this hypothesis more in detail in chapter 7, I would like to use the opportunity to briefly comment on these differences by comparing these two indicators, measuring the respective civic ideal, between these activists and the general population, and especially between activists of SAB and activists of STP and GP. In fact, activists of SAB, due to their exposition to a very challenging protest issue, seem to have developed a more radical conception of their role as citizens than activists of more consensual protest fields. Consequently, a larger share takes it for granted to be a vigilant and active citizen.

5.4. Concluding summary

The most important conclusion of this chapter is the confirmation of the introducing question about the specificity of activists' cognitions with regard to the general population. The presented indicators corroborated largely my main assumption of a broad cognitive baseline that differentiates, on the aggregate level, these activists from the general population. Beside injustice, identity and agency, activists' relation towards society and politics constitutes clearly a specific cognitive resource. Therefore, a perception as strong citizen belongs to the cognitive baseline. These activists are strong citizens in a cognitive sense, i.e. they want to contribute to produce and maintain common goods, and they have a very inclusive perception of society. In addition, they are resisting citizens as they de-legitimize political authorities and legitimize civil society actors. Citizens have thus to be vigilant and active. These cognitive resources are specific for these activists if I compare it with the general population. Due to this specificity, it seems thus reasonable to suggest that these cognitive resources need to be activated in order to participate and to maintain participation in contentious politics. At least, this empirical description has shown that non-participation would violate their moral visions. Perceiving oneself as strong citizen makes thus these activists cognitively available to continue contentious participation.

This chapter made a first step to show that *cognitions matter for participation in protest politics*. Activists, belonging to these types of social movement families, share a broad cognitive baseline that clearly separates them from the Swiss population. They became specific

citizens in terms of their world visions. They perceive the world in a way that resonates with Barber's understanding of what a strong citizen is. One the one hand, these activists have thus a specific perception of society: They are highly concerned by the production and maintenance of common goods and they include more culturally diverse groups in their understanding of society. For them, humans live in a shared humanity struggling together for the commons. On the other hand, these activists share their understanding of the political sphere. As such, they perceive this sphere as a contentious one where political authorities are delegitimized and protest actors are legitimized. These activists are resisting citizens, they do not blindly trust power-holders; they are ready to contend power-abuses and discriminative or polluting practices. Consequently, actions of civil society actors are perceived as essential to address their political claims. Accordingly, they perceive their role as citizens as critical, vigilant, and active. They are rebellious citizens in the sense underlined by Ralf Waldo Emersion: "Good men must not only obey the law to well" (quoted in Jasper (1997:130)). They see the world around them through specific mental lenses. They are thus particular citizens and their cognitive outlook is coherent with their protest action.

However, the results did not only reveal commonalities between activists. For example, their perception of one's civic role differed quite substantially between activists of SAB and activists of STP and GP. Moreover, active members and sympathizers do not always share their perception of the world. As a matter of fact, these activists experienced different experiences and social interactions during their life and during their contentious participation. They participate in different ways and they participate in different strategic action fields. Thus, while these activists generally display a rather homogeneous cognitive outlook, there seems to be variations at stake. I will turn to these in chapter 7, where I will systematically compare activists participating in different organizations and in different levels.

This chapter can thus be read as a first call for more attention to the mind of activists. Activists' cognitive map delineates possibilities for acting within the world around them. It thus defines behavioral options available to them. It allows people to act. In other words, activists' understanding of the political sphere and of society offers facilitating mental or cognitive

resource. And these activists clearly depart from the Swiss population on these resources. They possess thus a specific cognitive outlook and this outlook is favorable to participation or at least constrains non-participation. Therefore, a cognitive approach should help me to better understand why individuals protest and why others do not. While it is neat to show the specificity of activists' cognitions, this chapter is insufficient as the description of activists' cognitions only rely on quantitative indicators. For example, it is very doubtable that activists of SAB, STP and GP associate common goods exclusively with responsible consumption. Fortunately, this limit can be wiped out by turning in the next chapter to the interview data and by listening to the accounts of twelve activists.

6. Narratives of strong citizens embedded in strategic action fields

"If by politics we mean what Alexis de Toqueville meant, a devotion to the local spirit of liberty manifested as continuous and noisy activity in and on behalf of the local community, then she is a model citizen" (Barber 1984:xiii).

"It is extremely important that politics is everywhere: at the work place and beyond. It is not something that one is doing and forgetting afterwards. One has to live it because it sets finally our living conditions." (Adriana).

"I realized that I exist in something more global, I need to be within this to live. This means to exist through the other; this means to exchange continuously, to communicate, to transform things." (Margot).

This chapter describes the content of activists' relation to society and politics. I address here thus the second set of questions of my general thesis. How do they perceive the commons and others? How do they perceive political authorities, how do they relate to protest actors and how do they describe the role of citizen's in a democracy? My answers to these questions are based on the interpretation of the narratives of six defenders of migrant's rights and six environmentalists. They told me their histories; histories of citizens who decided to protest against political authorities and official polities in order to improve migrant's rights and to protect the environment. These narratives are embedded in their experiences and interactions within their respective strategic action fields. Accordingly, I learned a lot from their histories. Their biographies left a deep mark upon me. It was the occasion to get to know bulwarks of democracy. They are citizens for whom democracy cannot be reduced to voting. For them, political life is about ongoing political decision-making and the implementation of laws where they – as citizens – want to be involved. I met protestors who organize themselves to raise their voice, who are a countervailing power to political representatives. In short, I had the impression of encountering individuals living their idea of strong citizens as illustrated by the quotations of Adriana and Margot above. These activists are something like a cognitive product of their specific position as challengers in their respective fields of migrant's rights and environmental protection.

At the same time, listening to these stories also taught me that these activists are not a kind of unattainable superheroes. They are ordinary people like you or me and, as finally every individual is specific, they also are very different one from another. Thus, while I was and still am deeply impressed, I also came back from these interviews with several questions. What do these activists cognitively share given the specific stories they told me? Why do they protest (and other do not)? What are their motivations? And more specifically, what is the role of their perception as strong citizens to understand their political commitment?

As I already elaborated in the literature review chapter, social movement studies provide several classical answers to these questions. Activists are equipped with a specific social anchorage and values structure (Cotgrove and Duff 1980; Kriesi 1989; Eder 1993; Passy 1998). Activists are, or make themselves, biographically available (McAdam 1988). They are exempted from a heavy workload or family obligations. They are embedded in formal and informal social networks close to their political commitments (McAdam 1988; Passy 1998). And finally, they possess the necessary perceptions of injustice, identity and agency (Gamson 1992; Klandermans 1997).

All these elements are present in their stories. These are necessary elements in the processes leading to and sustaining contentious participation. Yet, other elements of their narratives remain theoretically unexplained. As I tried to illustrate with the introductory quotations, a large part of their narrative was about much broader worldviews: About the manner like they perceive the world around them and about how they position themselves within it. Social psychology and sociology (Fiske and Levine 1980; Swidler 1986; Schneider 1991; D'Andrade 1995; DiMaggio 1997; Strauss and Quinn 1997; Zerubavel 1997) point to the importance of cognitions for action. Social movement studies, especially the work of Gamson and Klandermans, make us aware of the centrality of cognitions. However, as this thesis suggests, Gamson's action frames are too narrow. Broader worldviews are touched by activists' commitment.

In the previous chapter, I demonstrated that these activists have a specific perception of the world around them. I described this specific perception as one of a strong citizen.

However, quantitative measures fall short to describe the content of activists' cognitions. Qualitative data are more apt to grasp the content and explore the cognitive relations activists construct with a plethora of different objects. This is why I mobilize interview data here.

6.1. Activists' as specific individuals: A cognitive map that varies

In the previous chapter, I described a rather homogeneous, or more precisely aggregate, picture of these activists. In this chapter, I will start to discover a more divergent representation of these activists. This is quite understandable as I describe the content of twelve activists. While I will conclude that the concept of strong citizen is analytically useful to grasp activists' cognitions, I will also demonstrate that not all activists have the same understanding of, for example, political authorities. I am convinced that it is the merit of this description that helps to better understand the following: It will become tangible what a strong citizen perception really implies, i.e. the strong citizen concept is not a rigid one. Rather it has to be seen as a continuum where one can place these activists at the more radical or at the more moderate end. As the differentiation between the perception of national and international political authorities in the previous chapter already indicated, activists of SAB and GP do not de-legitimize political authorities in the same way as they act in different strategic action fields with specific incarnations of incumbents, governance units and challengers resulting in a particular set of shared meanings. Consequently, only if I pass through the description of the content of activists' cognitions, it becomes understandable why these activists, through specific social interactions and experiences or through movement socialization as others may call it, are equipped with specific cognitive resources and how far reaching the strong citizen continuum really is.

I will start my description with the end of the actual analytical process. Table 6.1 below shows an *overview of the cognitive maps* of the twelve narratives I analyzed. Thereby, I separated in the left column the different cognitive dimensions I discuss and indicated for each of the twelve activists if I came to the conclusion that the respective cognitive dimension was present (P), central (C) or evident (E) in their account. This is a

straightforward hierarchical typology. If a cognitive dimension is characterized as present, this implies that the respective individual did talk about this dimension but that I did not interpret it as an important or structuring perception. In contrast, if a cognitive dimension is qualified as central, then this implies that this respective cognitive dimension was consistently present and that their importance was underlined in his or her narrative again and again. In other words, this cognitive dimension structured in a way the account I got from the interviewee. Finally, an evident cognitive dimension implies that a perception is so deeply rooted that sometimes, the interviewee does not even talk much about it. Two pathways allowed me to differentiate a central from an evident cognition. On the one hand, if an interviewee did not talked about a respective cognitive dimension during the first interview but when asked about this dimension during the second, he or she would just state that this was so obvious to him or her that he or she did not think that it is worth to talk about it. On the other hand, if an interviewee himself defined a specific cognitive dimension as evident.

Table 6.1: The content of activists' cognitions: Presence, centrality and evidence

						Socie	ety A	cross	Bord	ers								
Strong citizen				Activ	e mer	nbers							Syn	npathi	zers			
dimensions																		
	1	\drian	a	5	Simon	.e	į	Lisa		,	Wilheln	1	į	Yan		į	Colette	2
	P	C	Е	P	C	Е	P	С	Е	P	С	Е	P	С	Е	P	C	Е
Relation to society				i I			i !						!			! !		
Common Goods				P	C	E		C					P	C		P	C	
Self-extension	Р	С	Е	P	С	Е	Р	С	Е	Р	С	Е	Р	С		P	С	Е
Relation to politics							! !						! ! !			! ! !		
Political authorities	Р	C		P	C		P			P			P			P		
Civil society actors	Р	C		Р	С		Р	С		P			P			P		
Citizen's role	Р	С		Р	С		Р	С					Р			Р	С	
								npea	ce									
					e mer									npathi				
		ierret		1	hristia			Margo			Maria		ı	Evelin		!	Yves	
	P	С	Е	P	С	Е	P	С	Е	P	С	Е	P	С	Е	P	С	Е
Relation to society							<u>.</u> !						! !			!		
Common Goods	Р			P			Р	C		P			Р			į		
Self-extension	Р	С		Р	С		Р	С		Р	С		Р			! ! !		
Relation to politics				!			! ! !						1 ! !			! ! !		
Political authorities	P			P			P			P			P			P		
Civil society actors	P			P			P			P			P	C		P		
Citizen's role	P			P			:			Р			Р			! !		

NOTE: A summary table of my interpretation of activists' cognitions as strong citizen. It shows if a specific cognitive dimension is present, central or evident in the respective narrative. If P = P, the respective cognition is present, if C = C, the respective cognition is not only present but is central in the narrative, and if E = E, the cognition is an evidence, deeply rooted.

What insights do I take with me from this table? First of all, almost all cognitive dimensions are present in every single interview, which is again a sign of the importance of these cognitive dimensions. However, Yves, a sympathizer of Greenpeace, is an exception. As such, he is an important case because he reminds us that cognitions are not deterministic at all. Therefore, I will come back to him at several times. Second, the strong citizen dimensions seem to be more central for activists of SAB than for activists of GP. More specifically, while the relation to society has a certain importance for these six activists of GP, both dimensions are central for the six activists of SAB. Having realized this, I have to qualify this interpretation, as there is not only a remarkable difference between the membership of SAB and GP respectively, but also in the level of participation. A third point is thus that more cognitive dimensions are central for active members than for sympathizers. Finally, cognitions are evident for only a few members.

After having given a general overview about the presence and centrality of activists' cognitions as strong citizens, I would like to briefly introduce the twelve interviewees I use for this analysis. Six of them are activists of Solidarity Across Borders, while the other six are activists of Greenpeace. As I have already explained in the methodological chapter, I concentrate in the qualitative parts of this thesis on activists from these two SMOs as they represent the most challenging and most consensual contention respectively.

Starting with active members from SAB, *Adriana* was 64 years old at the time of the first interview. Besides being a housewife, she is a fulltime activist since several decades. She was an active member in pacifist, poverty and human rights movements. Nowadays, she is mainly an active member of a local SMO defending migrants' rights. In addition to her active commitment, she supports financially Amnesty International where she was a very active member before moving on to the migration field. Adriana is something like an ideal type of an activist, a true believer who commits most of her lifetime to defend the rights of migrants. As such, she comes closest to what can be defined as an ideal type of a strong citizen. *Lisa* is about 35 years old. As a student, she was committed in students' protest and an active member in the squatter milieu. Today, she works half time for a human rights NGO and she has two young children. She stopped active commitment a year before the interview. As an active member, she was highly committed during eight

years to the legal defense of asylum seekers and to a local SMO defending migrant's rights. *Simone* is 65 years old. She grew up in Paris. She married a Swiss in her early twenties. Since then, she lives in Switzerland. Like Adriana, she is a housewife. Her activist career swayed to and fro between political commitment and volunteering. She taught in Chad, gave French lessons in Switzerland and she was an active member of the antinuclear movement. Since about 10 years, her main activity is to explain the registration procedure to arriving migrants for an ecumenical organization. Beside this, she participates on a regular basis in demonstrations and the collection of signatures.

The first sympathizer presented, *Colette*, is 62 years old. She was a laboratory assistant and is now retired since two years. She was an active union member both in France and in Switzerland. Today, she supports financially various political organizations. She is supporting the defense of migrant's rights for more than twenty years now. *Wilhelm*, a retired pastor, is 87 years old. All his life, he was very active in religious movements. Notably, he helped Jewish children to cross the borders between France and Switzerland during the Second World War and he was also very active in the anti-Apartheid movement. Nowadays and already for a long time, he financially supports many political organizations, including the field of defense of migrant's rights. Finally, there is *Yan*. He is about 45 years old and is working as a nurse. He voluntary visits prisoners. Beside of this, he also supports a couple of political organizations since several years.

The three active members of Greenpeace are Pierrette, Christian and Margot. Being 18 years old at the time of the first interview, *Pierrette* is the youngest of all twelve activists. She is currently doing an apprenticeship in a jewelry store but dreams of reorienting her professional career toward the agricultural sector. She just started her activist career for Greenpeace and also supports financially an organization that protects animal rights. *Christian* was 27 years old at the time of the interview. Like Simone, he also grew up in France but moved to Switzerland when he found his first job as a computer engineer in the video surveillance industry. After a collective dismissal, he was unemployed for some months. He decided to reorient himself professionally and started just recently an apprenticeship to become a train engineer. For one year now, he is an active member of the local Greenpeace organization. In addition to that, he is a sympathizer of several

environmental protection and development organizations. He also supports a national union where he took part in one demonstration. *Margot* is about 70 years old. During her professional career, she was a social worker and later became a teacher at a University for Applied Sciences. Parallel to that, she took further education in environmental studies. Since about 20 years, Margot is a highly active member for GP. Similarly to Adriana, Margot is a typical member of the 1968-generation and has been active all along her lifetime. Her commitments can be summarized in four blocs being the radical left, unions and professional organizations, the solidarity and the environmental protection movement.

The three sympathizers of Greenpeace are Eveline, Maria and Yves. Eveline is 41 years old. She was working in a contact center that legally protects immigrants. At that time, she was also actively committed to the defense of migrant's rights that culminated in a church occupation. As she reports herself, she also experienced the bad sides of an activists' life when she suffered a burnout after a period of intensive activism. When she became pregnant for the first time, she interrupted both her working as well as her activist career. Today, she is a mother of three kids and works part-time as a lecturer at the University. She also resumed her activism in the defense of migrant's rights focusing now on medical assurance for sex trade workers and migrant health politics in general. Since ten years, she supports financially GP and the WWF, which is thus only a sideline in her activist career. Also for Maria, the second GP sympathizer I analyze her, commitment to GP does not dominate her life. In contrast to Eveline, however, Maria cannot yet show up an impressive activist career. Maria is 22 years old. She works as a selling operator and is just about to finish an apprenticeship as a Travel agent. She grew up in a charismatic movement. She is still a devout person but recently left this charismatic church and, parallel to that, home. Maria does not show up a strong sensitiveness to environmental protection. Thus, it comes not as a surprise, that she was recruited in the street for both her passive membership to Greenpeace and Save the Children several years ago. Finally, there is Yves. He is 38 years old, is a trained mechanician but is currently unemployed. He is actively committed to the local soccer club and the communal fire service. About 8 years ago, he became a GP sympathizer, which is his only political commitment. He became sensitized to GP through the media and became a member through street

recruitment. Thus, it comes at no surprise that he values GP mostly for their most known actions like whale or fishing protection in general.

All in all, this brief introduction shows thus that these twelve interviewees have a highly heterogeneous background. It will be the task of the following sections to show what they share and how they differ in terms of their cognitive resources. As in the chapter before, I will first describe the content of their relation to society before moving on to their relation to politics.

6.2. Activists' relation to society

In the previous chapter, I have demonstrated that these activists have a specific relation to society. I split this cognitive dimension in two categories, i.e. their relation to common goods and their relation towards others. For the former, I observed that activists' perception is specific with regard to the general population and – on the basis of quantitative indicators – I described their perception of common goods as one of responsibility, active contribution and the importance of their collective nature. I came to a similar conclusion for the latter dimension. These activists have constructed an inclusive perception of society. I described their perception as inclusive not because they blindly accept everyone but because the quantitative indicators demonstrated that these activists tend to be way more open towards culturally distant others. Do I find similar results in the analysis of the twelve narratives introduced above? *How do they describe common goods and their perception of otherness?* And how do they relate to them? Did they also talk about the importance of responsible consumption and how do they relate themselves to culturally distant others? In this section, my first task will thus be to describe the content of activists' relation to society.

Further on, the selection of these twelve interviewees allows me to pursue my comparative approach. My aim is thus to not only describe activists' cognitive outlook in aggregate terms but also to describe the differences between defenders of migrant's rights and environmentalists and between different levels of participation on the basis of these

twelve interviewees. Thereby, I already do a first step towards the next chapter where I will look more systematically into these variations.

6.2.1. Activists' relation to common goods

In the previous chapter, I have shown that activists of SAB, STP and GP tend to have a specific cognitive outlook with regards to common goods. More specifically, they tend to perceive common goods as something to which one should take care of by responsible individual consumption and something that should be shared with others. In other words, besides the fact that these activists are specific on these two quantitative indicators in comparison to the general population, I was not able to learn much about activists' perception of common goods. How do they talk about common goods? It is an important dimension? Do defenders of migrant's rights talk differently about common goods than environmentalists because their political issue is less directly related to common goods than environmental protection? And is this cognitive dimension less relevant for sympathizers than for active members?

Table 6.2: Activist's perception of common goods

Society Across Borders							
	Active members			Sympathizers			
	Adriana	Simone	Lisa	Wilhelm	Yan	Colette	
Perception of commons							
An important dimension	-	X	X	-	X	X	
Environmental concern	-	X	-	-	-	-	
Vital needs	-	-	-	-	_	-	
Responsibility to protect	-	: -	X	-	X	<u> </u>	
Live together	X	X	X	-	X	X	
Thread	-	X	i i –	-	X	-	
State's responsibility	-	X	X	-	X	X	
Citizen's responsibility	X	X	X	-	X	X	

-		Active members	npeace	Sympathizers		
	Pierrette	Christian	Margot	Maria	Eveline	Yves
Perception of commons					i	
An important dimension	X	X	X	X	X	-
Environmental concern	X	X	X	-	i - i	X
Vital needs	X	-	-	-	! ! ! - !	-
Responsibility to protect	X	-	X	-	X	X
Live together	-	X	X	X	X	X
Thread	X	X	X	X		X
State's responsibility	X	X	-	X	X	X
Citizen's responsibility	X	-	X	-	X	X

NOTE: The main perception of common goods is highlighted with a capital "X", the less important ones with "x" in small letters. Finally, a "-" implies that the interviewee did not talk about this dimension.

Table 6.2 gives a summary of different topics the interviewees were talking about. Thereby, this table (and all the following table for the other cognitive dimensions) not only gives us a general impression about which topic each activist spoke but also helps to justify the quotations I selected to underpin my arguments.

First of all, common goods are perceived as something important by most of these activists. They are the kit that holds a society together. For example, Simone perceives common goods as something that is essential for her. "For my family, as well as for me, it always have been, to me voting is important, the common goods is actually something really essential." This is also the case for Colette, who experienced the utility of common goods by a proper life experience. "I am grateful that my life has been improved by social laws that allowed me to break out of my social milieu. They allowed me actually to study, already this, for me, is an important criteria to get along his life." But common goods are not only important for SAB activists, also GP activists stress the importance of common goods: "I think we need to have common goods that are shared by everyone like food, drinks, energy, all the vital stuff" (Pierrette). Thus, even if common goods are not central cognitive dimensions for all twelve activists as table 6.1 and 6.2 illustrated, the majority of the interviewees judge it as something important. Common goods are perceived as something really essential, as improving someone's life changes or as vital necessities.

However, not every activist talks spontaneously about common goods or has a very tight perception of common goods. Adriana only talks about social relations and its importance to not break these relations. Implicitly, one could understand that in her narrative, common goods are something like the glue that constructs these relationships and holds them together. However, she never really talked explicitly about common goods. It is similar with Yves who does not come up himself with the notion of common goods. In fact, for Yves common goods are all about the environment and especially the preservation of bio diversity for the next generation. "I want that my children can enjoy the taste of tuna meat like I did." While common goods are thus important for the majority of the interviewees, this is not a ubiquitous perception.

In addition, common goods are perceived very individualistically. Everyone who approached this thematic did it from his proper angle. As just stated, Yves has a really reductionist vision of common goods, he reduces it mainly to the environment or more specifically to biological diversity. Pierrette, a young and new active member of GP, has also a tight vision of common goods. In fact, common goods are reduced to our vital needs as she said in the citation above. In a sharp contrast, Simone has a much more broader vision of common goods when she defines it as an organizing principle of a society's living together. "When I say the common goods, I mean really living together" (Simone). Perhaps it is not a coincidence that Lisa, also an SAB activist, comes up with a fairly similar perception: "I live next to the train station and we have a house which is really active, which suggests plenty of things where people can participate, where they can make things together. This can be sport, or..., everything. This makes life interesting. As long as people make things together, this is really good" (Lisa). In this broad vision of common goods, it is thus important to act for the society and to improve and to enrich the society by these collective actions. Collective action is the basis to construct common goods and it is perhaps because of this that most of the interviewees perceive common goods as something really important. Yet, Margot and Yves, both GP activists, cover another angle by stressing their responsibility, as individuals, to protect common goods. "We have inherited a planet with many living elements on it. We have used a part of it, we have massacred other parts, but these are all common goods. The future generations will say that all that has disappeared and all other stuff is going to disappear. The ice bear will cease to exist. If someone tells you that and there is no effect that happens, this is a really disturbing observation for our sense of responsibility" (Margot). "Why do I take care of children? Because it's our future. Why am I a part of the volunteer fire service? Because one can save people and stuff like that. One has to see more than just the bellybutton" (Yves). Thus, the importance of common goods is constructed through various prisms: Through the prism of vital need, through the glue for social relations or through individual responsibility for future generations to name just a few examples that emerged in the conversations with these twelve interviewees. While this is certainly not an exhaustive list, it gives an impression of how rich and diverse the notion of common goods manifest itself within the mind of these twelve activists.

Next, a quite widespread element within the narratives was a notion of thread with regards to common goods. "Despite education, I don't see any...It is nevertheless really individualistic in Switzerland. No, I don't think..." (Maria). According to Maria, common goods are thus threatened because of a widespread individualism that is present in the Swiss society. Christian shared this opinion but identifies privatization as the main mechanism that undermines common goods. "The state de-solidarizes itself from the main problems, I don't know how to say it, but he gives more and more to privates. Whatever it is...ok, schools are still public but the hospitals, there are more and more private clinics, the whole health system, or the health insurance. In Switzerland, this is private. I disagree with this idea to privatize certain domains that have to be public and belong to everyone...be that health, water, or electricity" (Christian). Whereas it is quite obvious that environmentalists have integrated a notion of thread to common goods, some SAB activists share this perception. "There is an individualism, I mean an individual liberty where that individual occupies such an important part of...I mean we arrive at a horrible individualism" (Simone). Thus, common goods are threatened because of a widespread individualism and because of an ongoing process of privatization.

In sum, SAB and GP activists share a rather similar notion of common goods. They stress their importance and many of them perceive common goods as something that is threatened. While there are thus no clear differences within this small sample of activists who defend migrant's rights and activists who protect the environment, there are important variations how these activists understand the notion of common goods and how they relate to this notion of common goods. For the understanding of the notion of common goods, I see *SAB activists to have a more general view of common goods* that is strongly linked to their vision of society. Therein, common goods are produced through collaborative efforts between the members of a society and it is for this reason that they stress the importance of the relation to others and the necessity to do everything to not break these links. I will tell you more about this perception in the next section. GP activists, in contrast, have a narrower view on common goods, which is mainly reduced to the environment.

A last point in this section is the question about differences between active members and sympathizers. According to the quantitative analysis, no differences have been found for the level of participation. In the interviews, however, I observed a specific approach, for active members and sympathizers respectively, how to face the threat of vanishing common goods. For sympathizers, the cure seems to be the state. In fact, for many of them (Yan, Colette, Maria, Eveline) it is the responsibility of the state to take care of the commons. In contrast, active members (Lisa, Simone, Margot) see active commitment, i.e. citizen's participation, as the way to protect and maintain the commons. Despite these tendencies, activists' perception of common goods remains quite similar as quantitative indicators demonstrate. I will return to these questions about variations I identified here in the next chapter. For now, I will have a closer look at their perception of others and otherness, the second dimension of activists' relation to society, in the next section.

6.2.2. Activists' relation to others

As for activists' relation to common goods, I have shown in chapter 5 that these activists have a specific cognitive outlook when it comes to their relation towards others. I assume that they possess in their cognitive toolkit a self-extensive understanding of themselves that include others and themselves within the same universe. They do not construct mental frontiers between them and members of other cultural groups. In this section, I examine thus what an extensive self in relation to others actually means. How do they interpret their relation to others and otherness? How are they able to include others and themselves within the same conception of society? Quantitative indicators supported my assumption of activists' extensive relation towards others. But how are these quantitative measures translated in words and meanings in activists' mind? How do these twelve activists perceive their relation to other and otherness? As it was the case for the previous section, Table 6.3 summarizes activists' perception of others and thereby justifies the selection of quotations.

All six SAB activists framed their perception of others, and in particular migrants, clandestine people, asylum seekers or refugees, in a similar way. Of course, the wording is different but it refers to a similar understanding of others: "We are all the same"

(Adriana), "We are human being above all" (Lisa), "we are so close to each other" (Simone). They describe migrants not with specific identity traits or social and cultural characteristics. Above all, they consider them like themselves as simple human beings with their strengths and flaws. They are defined in a universalistic category where social and cultural diversities are blurred. Some defenders of migrants' rights, such as Simone and Wilhelm, add other qualifiers to define others. However, it is striking how everyone defined others through the same subjective lenses: as human beings.

Table 6.3: Activist's perception of others

			cross Borders	C		
	Active members			Sympathizers Wilhelm Yan Colette		
D : 6.4	Adriana	Simone	Lisa	Wilneim	Yan	Colette
Perception of others						
Human beings	X	X	X	X	X	X
Other qualifying	-	X	<u>-</u>	X		-
Environmental dimension	-	-	1 1 1	-	-	- !
Relation to others						
Relation without frontiers	X	X	X	X	X	X
Relation of tolerance	X	-	-	X	-	X
Relation of empathy	X	X	; ; –	X	X	X
Relation of help	-	-	: : -	-	X	- -
Relation of solidarity	-	-	-	-	-	X
Relation of difficulties	X	X	X	X	-	-
Pathway						
Intellectual	X	-	X	X	-	-
Empathic	-	X	-	-	X	X
Ad hoc	-	-	-	-	-	-

		Gree	npeace				
	Active members			Sympathizers			
	Pierrette	Christian	Margot	Maria	Eveline	Yves	
Perception of others							
Human beings	X	X	X	X	X	- -	
Other qualifying	-	-	-	X	X	X	
Environmental dimension	X	X	X	-	-	-	
		1	1 1 1		1 1 1	1 1	
Relation to others		;				ļ	
Relation without frontiers	X	_	X	-	X	_	
Relation of tolerance	X	-	-	-	-	X	
Relation of empathy	-	-	X	X	X	; -	
Relation of help	X	X	-	X	-	X	
Relation of solidarity	X	X	X	X	X	<u> </u>	
Relation of difficulties	-	-	X	X	-	<u>-</u>	
		1]] 	1 1 1	
Pathway							
Intellectual	X	-	-	X	-	-	
Empathic	-	-	X	-	X		
Ad hoc	-	X	i i –	-	i -	X	
		•	1		1	•	

NOTE: The main perception of common goods is highlighted with a capital "X", the less important ones with "x" in small letters. Finally, a "-" implies that this dimension is not present for the specific interviewee.

SAB activists do not coldly describe human beings. They constructed their universalistic understanding of others through intimate individuals' characteristics. They describe others in a way by using core human feelings. "We have the same joys, the same suffering" (Lisa), "we are all looking for happiness" (Yan), and this happiness is defined as having a job, a family, or a place to live. SAB activists' conception of humanity is thus one that perceives all people as driven by similar personal quests. Additionally, they see others as they see themselves: We have good and bad sites: Individuals can be violent, liars or fearful for example. It is thus through an essentialist understanding of human beings that they include others and themselves in the same community. Consequently, all human beings have the same value, and for all interviewees no distinction between people should be made.

The evaluation of the content of SAB activists' perception of others is thus straightforward. They have a very inclusive perception because they perceive others as human beings, exactly like they do it for members of their own cultural or social group. And it is this specific perception of others that allows them to include others – migrants, asylum seekers, refugees or clandestine people – within their own world, their own society. Further on, one essential cognitive mechanism that enters into play for such a perception is that they relate to others by identifying them as having the same intimate individuals' characteristics; Others have the same individual needs, they have good and bad sides as everyone else. Thus, they have mentally constructed the idea that they and others are humans sharing a common fate. Does this also pertain to GP activists as they are, in contrast to SAB activists, not directly committed to others?

GP activists do not share such a common perception of others and otherness. Instead, they have constructed more heterogeneous perceptions than this was the case for SAB activists. Most radically, Yves has a completely different perception of others. "It will be difficult to change human beings. There will always be wars, power struggles; there always will be lies. In fact, human beings are far from being perfect." In this quotation and elsewhere, Yves demonstrates that he has a negative conception of human beings: They are unchangeable, they are only power-oriented and they are not perfect at all. This negative evaluation of human beings is coupled with clear cultural frontiers: Switzerland is better than others. "In India, for example, they have still cars that need more oil than petrol, it's

all black behind these cars, it is infernal. India, this has always be my opinion, we gave them modernity but not the user manual" (Yves). While Yves is the case that contrasts most extremely with the perception of SAB activists, other interviews share this notion of difference. "Once in my life, I arrived in Manchester in a poor suburb. It was strange, everyone was nasty and everyone made me anxious. It was disastrous" (Maria). Eveline too stresses this notion of difference. However, she is somewhat in between Yves and Maria and the SAB activists. "I think we are all human beings, we all have the right to have some rights, respect, a certain wellbeing, the right for freedom of expression. But I also think that there are differences between us, the religion already...hmm, let's say the culture and the religion make us having different world visions" (Eveline). Thus, Eveline shares with SAB activists this idea of a common human nature, which is probably no surprise given that she is herself active in the migrant's rights protest field. At the same time, she acknowledges that differences exist due to another cultural and religious background.

In contrast, Pierrette, Christian and Margot are somewhat closer to the perception of SAB activists. They stress the sameness of humans' nature, they stress solidarity, the respect towards others and they reject categories. Margot stresses that one has to encounter the other always like a human being. "I educate people who work in prisons, I tell them how to encounter others. The prisoner has to be respected. He pays, he was judged but you have to encounter him as a human being." "I think there is less and less solidarity. But we need some solidarity, we need to share existing resources or common goods" (Christian). Thus, the cognitive spectrum regarding the perception of others that I encountered while analyzing the six GP activists was far broader than the one of the six SAB activists.

Finally, GP activists add a specific dimension in their perception of others by including an environmental dimension. Thereby, they come up with their specific sensitiveness towards others by linking their own personal actions with the consequences this may have towards other groups or species. "I see it like that: If we destroy the planet here, this also has an impact for development countries. They will suffer most" (Christian). "I exist in something more global, I need this to live, to construct with it and to do with it" (Margot). "We have to stop [polluting] so that others can do it in order to develop" (Pierrette). One plausible

explanation for this result might be that their political struggle is not as closely related to others than this is the case for defenders of migrants' rights. In other words, GP activists are missing a similar type of movement socialization, they are acting in the strategic action field of environmental protection and consequently, one way to relate to other is through the prism of environmental concern. In addition, they have to rely on other socialization processes like personal experiences or other social networks outside of their own contentious field to construct their perception of others. This variety is clearly reflected in the interviews presented here.

These activists did not only talked about the content of their relation to others, they also revealed that their relation to otherness goes through various meaning channels. By meaning channels, I refer here to the way these activists cognitively relate themselves with a specific object. While social psychologists (Batson 1991; Eisenberg, Losoya et al. 2003) stress the importance of empathy to relate to others, these activists constructed several meaning channels. From the six interviews with SAB activists, several different ways to be in relation with others emerged: A relation without frontiers emphasizing that we are all interconnected to each other (all six SAB activists), a relation of tolerance (Adriana, Willhelm, Colette), a relation of empathy (Adriana, Willhelm, Simone, Colette, Yan), a relation of help that stresses the necessity to bring support to others (Yan), a relation of solidarity (Colette) and, finally, a relation to others made of difficulties underlying that unconditional love to others is impossible (Adriana, Lisa, Willhelm, Simone).

What all SAB activists share is a conception of self in relation to others where frontiers between them and otherness are banished. Some activists emphasize the necessity to keep bounds between people and not breaking links between human beings (Adriana, Simone) and others stress the importance to not live in a closed world but to welcome others in our world (Lisa). Then, there is a framing of this relation by mentioning that they belong to the same humanity and live in an interconnected world (Simone, Collette, Willhelm) and still others underline that we should be open and listen to others without any distinction (Yan). "It is important to listen to somebody who experienced something different. It is important that somebody listen to what he has experienced so that he is accompanied" (Yan). "My commitments for children, development, migrants and

environmental protection reflect my vision of our co-humanity. These are all brothers and sisters, also the animals which one should not destroy. You have to love the planet" (Willhelm). Thus, I note a specific wording from one activist to another but it refers to the same cognitive category: a clear refusal of frontiers between people, and between themselves and others. This manner of relating to otherness is closely linked to their perception of others as human beings. Others are humans like us, they live in the same world and consequently, real and symbolic frontiers should be banished. In addition to this emphasis on illimitability shared by all SAB activists, the other types of subjective construction of their relation to others vary from one individual to the other.

However, within this multiple ways to relate to others, three main pathways can be distinguished. One way is to relate through an intellectual openness to culturally diverse others. This openness is stimulated by a deep personal curiosity. These individuals are fascinated about other people and cultures and this fascination provides them with crucial cognitive resources to be connected to others. They perceive diversity as a wealth for society and themselves, both are enriched by others' diversity, they can learn and thereby profit from each other. This conception is deeply rooted in Adriana's, Lisa's and Willhelm's mind. For them, personal experiences with otherness deeply anchored this relation of themselves with others. For Adriana, it was a stay of a few years abroad (in Algeria and Indonesia). For Lisa, long lasting travels around the world anchored this conception in her self. Such epiphanic experiences developed or strengthened their relation to others and nowadays, this curiosity for distant others is still vivid and important for them.

However, a stay abroad is not a guarantee to construct such a relation to otherness. For instance, Simone also spent a few years in Africa but she does not construct a similar intellectual curiosity. For her, as for Colette and Yan, the main connection to others is made through an emotional link: *empathy*. Thereby, identification with others suffering is the core connection to otherness. Simone is highly sensitive to the suffering of others; she cannot support it. "It is impossible to stay indifferent to extreme misery, to injustice, to...whatever! We are interconnected, we are part of the same humanity" (Simone). These empathic feelings parallel those of Colette who deeply love people and strongly identify with human sufferings. "They didn't do anything wrong. They are imprisoned,

their papers are taken away. They are put into camps. They didn't do anything wrong. They just tried to live less bad, that's all" (Colette). Other's suffering also affected Yan. In addition, he also relates to others through a deep concern towards others and their wellbeing. In these three narratives, empathic feelings highly shape their relation to others.

For GP activists too, both an intellectual and an empathic pathway to relate to others exist. Pierrette and Maria narratives are full of intellectual curiosity when they talk about others. "My holidays with my parents have shown me other thing than Switzerland. There are other things elsewhere, this is really interesting. I am an extremely open person, I accept all cultures, everything that people can offer, I take it and then I decide whether I like it or not" (Pierrette). "I think by going to get to know others which can happen through helping them or through travelling, one learns always something" (Maria). Thus, both are curious to get to know others and are very aware about the existing possibility to learn something from them. On the other hand, Margot and Eveline relate themselves to others more through an empathic channel. "I reject inequalities, unequal treatment between individuals. We have to change this society. This cannot stay like this. We have to change polities. We have to struggle for all of those who don't have any privileges" (Margot). Margot develops thus a strong feeling of injustice when others do not get equal treatment. Thus, those four activists relate towards others through similar means than SAB activists.

In addition to this empathic or intellectual pathway, the narratives of Christian and Yves imply a third option, which I call an *ad hoc mean to relate to others*. In other words, their perception of otherness is constructed more through an application of their general values system then through personal experiences like it was the case for the other activists. As they do not have saved any experiences linked to this cognitive dimension, the result is a far more vague relation to others constructed right away during the interview. "I think about solidarity in opposition to an ever increasing individualism. One should not only be concerned about oneself, there are also things that happen to others. Thus, one should be concerned by others and help people who have had less opportunities than we had because they have grown up in a poor family or in a poor country" (Christian). "Recently,

they talked about sans papiers and of similar things, migrants... I am not racist but we are too social...It is already problematic in Switzerland to help our poor without also consecrating ourselves to people who do not have any reason to come here besides the hope for benefiting from ours social services" (Yves). Thus, the outcome of this ad hoc construction may or may not correspond to the cognitive content of the other activists. While Christian's values system allows him to present himself as a person that is selfextensive, Yves values system clearly emphasizes social frontiers. In Yves' quotation, he relates himself to migrants through his ideological background, which perceives migrants as profiteers of the Swiss social system. Even if he does not at all share a similar perception of others than all the other activists, he relates to others through a similar pathway like Christian, i.e. he uses his values structure to relate with others and accordingly, constructs his relation to other ad hoc when he is asked about. Christian and Yves tell thus something important: Not every activist has constructed a relation to others during their life. For some, others do not show up concretely in their social embeddings. This implies that a cognitive relation to others is linked to an empirical relation to others. In other words, this points to the importance of social networks and personal experiences for the construction of one's cognitive outlook.

Finally, the narratives of the six defenders of migrant's rights reveal that the relation of them with others is not an easy one. The difficulty of this relation is emphasized through different wordings and various statements. Adriana and Lisa admit that we could not love everybody. There are individuals that they profoundly dislike because of their political positions, their behaviors regarding members of their own family, etc. Simone confirms this: "It is a process that need to be learned that did not come up naturally." Also Willhelm emphasizes difficulties towards others. He experienced racist feelings when he was in South Africa under the Apartheid and he provided many other examples to highlight that his relation to others is a difficult one that often requires courage. Also GP activists mentioned these difficulties. For Christian, it is difficult to be tolerant towards others political ideas. Maria also stressed difficulties to understand and accept cultural differences: "When I was in Ghana, at the beginning I really loved their culture but later on, there were many thing that I really disliked, I didn't understand them, I didn't understand their attitudes, their manner to talk, I found them so disrespectful." Thus,

these activists do not have a naïve or idealized understanding of others. They are conscious of the difficulties of the relation to others, they know about prejudices that are unwillingly anchored in their mind and they admit that universal love is merely impossible.

To sum up, the perception of others and otherness is not the same for activist of SAB and GP. While all SAB activists share a relation to others where frontiers between them and others do not exist, I found a much more heterogeneous picture for GP activists. In addition, there is more than only one pathway to relate to others. I identified three main meaning channels that constructed their relation to others: an intellectual, an emotional and an ad hoc channel. While some activists construct an inclusive perception of others through an intellectual curiosity, others used a more emotional, empathic pathway and still others constructed their perception towards others through an ad hoc pathway, i.e. through their existing values structure. Those finding put under discussion social psychologists accounts that stress that empathy is the main channel allowing to relate to others (e.g. Batson 1991; Eisenberg, Losoya et al. 2003). While this channel is not absent in my analysis, my findings stress that an intellectual channel based on curiosity and an ad hoc construction also enter into play. Empathy is thus not the exclusive channel. In addition, the relation to others is not an easy one, it has to be elaborated, even learned or shaped throughout individuals' life: it does not emerge naturally. Finally, there are no differences between sympathizers and active members. Having described the content of activists' relation to society, i.e. their perception of common goods and of others, I will now turn to the second dimension of the strong citizen concept: activists' relation to politics.

6.3. Activists' relation to politics

The previous chapter not only demonstrated that these activists have a specific relation to politics with regard to the general population, it was also – although limited by the use of quantitative indicators – the beginning of the description of activists' relation to politics. For activists' relation to political authorities, I could show that activists of SAB, STP and GP have significantly less confidence in political authorities than the Swiss population in general. Hence, I concluded that these activists delegitimize political authorities in a

specific way. Do the narratives of my twelve activists confirm this evidence? Do they delegitimize political authorities, and if yes, how do they do it? Further on, the results presented in the previous chapter pointed to differences in the perception of political authorities between activists of SAB and GP. Mainly, activists of GP showed up with a stronger de-legitimation of international authorities, i.e. they had a lower level of confidence in the European Union and the United Nations than activists of SAB. In contrast, levels of confidence for national authorities were fairly similar. Did I find similar findings in the interviews? What are the similarities, and perhaps more interestingly, how differ SAB from GP activists in their perception of political authorities? And finally, analysis of variance between active member and sympathizers revealed differences, such that active members have a tendency to delegitimize political authorities in a stronger way. Does this difference also emerge in the narratives of my twelve interviewees? Through a detailed description of the content of activists' cognitive outlook, this chapter is thus not only enhancing the findings of the previous chapter but also paving the way to the next chapter where I analyze differences between various types of activists in a more systematic way. Finally, Table 6.4 does the same job as the previous two tables by summarizing activists' perceptions and justifying the quotations used to underpin my arguments.

6.3.1. Activists' relation to political authorities

Generally, I could find evidence for de-legitimization in the narratives of all six defenders of migrant's nights. However, each activist does it from its proper angle that can be linked either to his specific commitment, to his general living conditions or to both. Yan gets regularly in touch with asylum seekers due to his job as a nurse in the asylum domain. He criticizes thus political authorities through the prism of migrant's medical treatment: "I have seen an asylum seeker arriving at the gynecological urgency for a bleeding uttering cancer. She was told that her tumor would be removed once she holds another permit. You do not have the financial means, you do not have a settlement permit...you can keep your tumor." Yan's prism to delegitimize political authorities is thus to criticize political authorities that do not support medical support in case of urgent need and medical care for asylum seekers in general. Simone does also delegitimize political authorities but quite

in a different way. Her main commitment is to support migrants on their way to get a right to stay. As she tells us, this is a very hard and sometimes arbitrary struggle due to very harsh laws and a long procedure. "Asylum seekers have to pass all along an extremely difficult system of procedures and there is a lot of arbitrariness in it, I think. I have an Iranian woman in mind, she is here since six years now, and she has had several refusals. We asked for a humanitarian permit, she is independent. For her, it would be extremely hard to return to Iran, for a divorced woman. Why do we close the door although she is financially independent and she speaks French? In fact, people are suffering enormously because of us."

Both, Yan and Simone illustrate what all interviewees share: A de-legitimization of political authorities. However, the two examples also show that everyone de-legitimize political authorities in a personal way that can be very distinct from one person to another. While Yan is focusing on migrant's medical care, Simone focuses on migrant's registration procedure. But the cognitive resource constructed by these personal experiences point in a similar direction: A perception that political authorities behave in a wrong way that must be challenged.

Additionally, this challenging perception is strengthened through a negative evaluation of the recent past and the near future. In the migrant's rights field, the interviewees fear that the situation – or more theoretically, the definition of shared meanings – is worsening. "Our politicians let silently die the asylum right, without intervening", says Adriana and Simone share this impression: "Recently, the situation has deteriorated. We have removed them the right to work, we have reduced the help, the money that we actually gave them and there aren't any nurses anymore. It is evident that it has clearly worsened, a tightening of the law." It is this combination of a de-legitimization of political authorities and the negative evaluation of the political development that makes this cognitive resource important in the choice to take further political action.

Table 6.4: Activists' perception of politics

			cross Borders				
		Active members	3	Sympathizers			
	Adriana	Simone	Lisa	Wilhelm	Yan	Colette	
Political authorities							
De-legitimization	X	X	X	X	X	X	
Negative development	X	X	X	_	- !	-	
Swiss democracy positive	_	X	X	_	X	X	
Other enemies than state	_	-	-	_		X	
		i	; i		; ;		
Challenging actors							
Legitimization	X	X	X	X	X	X	
Different point of view	X	X	X	_	i i	X	
Collective efficacy	X	X	X	X	X	X	
Critical	-	1 _	X	X	X	-	
Complementary actors	_		-	X	X	_	
Indispensable actor	X	X	X	Λ	- -	X	
muispensable actor	Λ	Α.	Α	-	: - :	X	
Citizen's role							
Activity	X	X	X	-	X	X	
Vigilance	X	X	X	_	_	X	
Local activity	X	X	X	_	X	X	
Individual responsibility	-	X	-	_	_	_	
		Gree	enpeace				
		Active members	3	Sympathizers			
	Pierrette	Christian	Margot	Maria	Eveline	Yves	
Relation to pol. authorities							
De-legitimization	X	X	X	X	- 1	-	
Negative development	-	-	-	-	! !	-	
Swiss democracy positive	X	-	X	X	X	X	
Other enemies than state	X	X	X		1 1 1 1	X	
	X	X	X			X	
Other enemies than state Challenging actors	X	X	X			X	
	X	X	X X	X	X	X	
Other enemies than state Challenging actors Legitimization					X X	-	
Other enemies than state Challenging actors Legitimization Different point of view	X	X	X	X		-	
Other enemies than state Challenging actors Legitimization Different point of view Collective efficacy	X X X	X X	X X x	X x	X	X -	
Other enemies than state Challenging actors Legitimization Different point of view Collective efficacy Critical	X X X X	X X X	X X X	X x x	X x	X x	
Other enemies than state Challenging actors Legitimization Different point of view Collective efficacy Critical Complementary actors	X X X X	X X X	X X x x	X x x - x	X x - -	X -	
Other enemies than state Challenging actors Legitimization Different point of view Collective efficacy Critical Complementary actors	X X X X	X X X	X X X	X x x	X x	X x	
Other enemies than state Challenging actors Legitimization Different point of view Collective efficacy Critical Complementary actors Indispensable actor	X X X X	X X X	X X x x	X x x - x	X x - -	X x	
Other enemies than state Challenging actors Legitimization Different point of view Collective efficacy Critical Complementary actors Indispensable actor Citizen's role	X X X X	X X X	X X x x	X x x - x	X x - -	X x	
Other enemies than state Challenging actors Legitimization Different point of view Collective efficacy Critical Complementary actors Indispensable actor Citizen's role Activity	X X X X X	X X X - - X	X X x x	X x x - x -	X x - - x	X - x x - x	
Other enemies than state Challenging actors Legitimization Different point of view Collective efficacy Critical Complementary actors Indispensable actor Citizen's role	X X X X X	X X X - - X	X X x x	X x x - x	X x - - x	X - x x	

NOTE: The main perception of common goods is highlighted with a capital "X", the less important ones with "x" in small letters. Finally, a "-" implies that this dimension is not present for the specific interviewee.

However, SAB activists do not always delegitimize political authorities. They are clearly aware of existing complexities and are capable to distinguish between different actors. In other words, they constructed a *nuanced and realistic critique* in their narratives as illustrated by the reasoning of Colette on democracy in Switzerland: "Nevertheless, there are certainly people who are proper. I am neither positive nor negative; it [political institutions] is made by humans that have their flaws and their qualities. But it is still a

democracy. One does not go to prison because one has said something that does not please. At the same time, it's a democracy of elites where one is not well represented. And further on, they make the laws. One has always to make a tradeoff...tradeoffs are good. But these tradeoffs always go in the wrong direction." When Colette tries to evaluate Swiss democracy, I clearly see two perceptions in conflict. On the one hand, talking about democracy in general clearly activates a positive perception of this political system, as there exists the possibility to raise one's voice and as there are negotiations to find political compromises. But besides these positive aspects there are also negative points. Especially, she perceives to be badly represented. As Colette, Lisa is also in an ambivalent position. During the interview, she used to harshly criticize migration policies. But when she was asked to reflect in a more general way about the role of the state in Switzerland, she comes to a nuanced conclusion: "I am pretty ambivalent about the state. If there would be a state that suits me, I would be ok that he is strong. But I am not ok with the laws that he dictates. I think that he has an enormous role to play, I mean it's his responsibility to take people in charge." Like Colette, Lisa struggles between a perception that a strong state is a necessity whereas she also want to see clear improvements in states' activities. It is this ambiguity, as Lisa called it, this is characteristically for all six SAB activists.

The six SAB activists I interviewed here are all involved in one of the most challenging protest in Switzerland in present time (Guigni and Passy 2004). They face a Federal state, which produced restrictive laws on migration and asylum, and a population who are not in favor of an enlargement of migrant's rights but who largely supports xenophobic referenda from the Populist Party. It comes thus not as a surprise that all six activists have quite a critical stance to political authorities. They delegitimize these authorities and the state in general for their harsh laws, a long and painful procedure and for arbitrary decisions. In addition to this, they fear that the situation is worsening. At the same time however, they are aware that they live in a democracy where they – as political activists – are not oppressed: They legitimize political authorities because they perceive opportunities to raise their voice and influence politics. To have thus a challenging perception of political authorities does not mean blind de-legitimization. The six interviewees, at least, have constructed a nuanced critique, they built up a complex perception stressing positive and

negative points through which political activism becomes both; an urgent necessity and a promising way!

Regarding democracy in Switzerland in general, the six GP activists largely echo the perception of SAB activists. "I am happy to be in Switzerland, one can vote, it is really the choice of the people. In other countries, they vote to elect a president but they do not vote like us" (Maria). "I think that a democracy is good because we have seen that a monarchy does not perform well. You have 5% who live with luxury and the rest is starving. In Switzerland, nobody has to starve in the streets, even if you have a mental problem, you can life a normal live" (Pierrette). "One can talk with a political representative in order to take a political decision. Politics is sometimes the only mean to change unjust laws" (Eveline). Thus, GP activists also have constructed a rather positive perception of Swiss democracy in general. Perhaps, they are even more sympathetic to the state than SAB activists.

This conclusion is confirmed if one looks more specifically on their perception of political authorities with an exclusive regard to environmental protection where the six GP activists are a sharp contrast to the critical stance of SAB activists. In fact, they perceive political authorities in a different, far less de-legitimizing, way. Political authorities and political parties can be convinced, they are sometimes even allies on environmental issues. "In Switzerland, we are nonetheless really proper. There isn't any littering and it is just unparalleled in comparison to other countries like France" (Maria). "I think it is good that the Green Party tries to reduces CO2 emissions" (Pierrette). "Fortunately, we have Leuenberger in the Federal council. Having an environmental minister who is sensitive to environmental questions can help to maintain certain things like the fact that on weekends, trucks cannot move and that one tries to favor collective transports. And he should also have a sympathetic ear for some claims of pro-environmental associations" (Eveline). The statements of Maria, Pierrette and Eveline echo the general perception of all six environmentalists. They do not generally refuse the behavior of political authorities and they even identified strong political allies within the institutional political arena like the environmental minister or the Green Party. Switzerland is a proper country and consequently, national political authorities are not one of the main opponents like this is

the case for activists who defend migrant's rights. Comparing these statements of GP activists with the ones before thus clearly illustrates why I call the political issue of migrant's rights a more challenging one than the one of environmental protection. In addition, these descriptions of activists' perceptions of political authorities also demonstrate how they are constructed through their experienced interactions with government units within their respective strategic action fields.

However, stating that political authorities do a better job for environmental protection than for migrant's rights does not imply that GP activists blindly trust political authorities regarding environmental issues. I also identified a demanding call for more action on behalf of environmental protection. "The garbage cans system in the cities. I think waste separation is more difficult for someone who lives in a city, thus, there has to be a control system" (Maria). "During the night, they could intercept all the electric advertising and the lightings in the stores. This is a huge waste" (Pierrette). Thus, there are still specific environmental issues than can be improved. Christian neatly sums up this intermediate position of GP activists with regard to national political authorities, who are taking action in the right direction but who still could do more. "I don't know if they are really an opponent. One has to put pressure on the state, they have to take the good decisions. It is not an opponent but they have a tendency to take environmental claims not as a priority."

This last quotation also implied that there are other priorities for political authorities than just environmental protection. Another, perhaps the most important difference to SAB activists is thus a perception where not national political authorities are the main opponents but other important and potent challengers. Namely, these are economical actors whose interests are in contradiction with the one of GP activists. "Unfortunately, political authorities do not do that much because they always oppose environmental interest with economic ones so they come to the conclusion that the costs are too high. They have a tendency to contrast the economy with the environment" (Christian). "Political authorities...hmm, difficult, very difficult because they have contradictory interests. It is evident that their interests are linked to profit" (Margot). "There is a worldwide conspiracy behind all this. All the big oil companies want to sell all their oil before they let the state bail out of that business" (Pierrette). What these illustrations clearly show is that

the strategic action field for environmental protection is composed of different actors and a different starting situation than the one for the defense of migrants' rights. And this is clearly reflected in the narratives of these activists who have developed particular perceptions of political authorities.

In sum, GP activists do not differ from SAB activists when it comes to their general perception of political authorities. They legitimize the direct democratic system in Switzerland and perceive it as one that gives them, as activists and as citizens, opportunities to influence politics and thereby to influence the definition of shared meanings. In contrast, GP activists perceive political authorities very different than SAB activists when it comes to the actual political issue involved. Where SAB activists talked about opposition and resistance, GP activists see opportunities to build alliances. Where defenders of migrants' rights perceive deterioration, environmentalists perceive progress. And finally, the main opposing actors are different for members of these two organizations. While SAB activists clearly challenge mainly the state, GP activists are more opposed to economical actors.

There are not only differences between activists of these two organizations, differences also exist between active members and sympathizers. I identify the main difference in the level of generality where the de-legitimization takes place. In other words, the three active members of SAB (Adriana, Lisa and Simone) tend to delegitimize political authorities stronger than SAB sympathizers (Yan, Colette, Willhelm). To illustrate the range of these differences, I look at the two most extreme: Adriana and Yan. Adriana develops a really harsh critique of political authorities of every color. "In the asylum domain, you have to attack the government." "I think that the traditional left does not have any courage, they do absolutely nothing." Yan is critical too, but far less than Adriana. "There is not an insignificant amount of waste separation, glasses, paper, this is the minimum. In Switzerland, we are not so bad for what recycling is concerned. However, what makes me upset is that the state just asked for money, there is no other suggestion. For example, one could suggest the following: Listen, we will collect a tax if you do not use solar energy." The other four interviewees can be situated somewhere in between Yan and Adriana. While the two other active members – Simone and Lisa – are somewhat closer

to Adriana's position, the two remaining sympathizers would probably more agree with Yan's position.

A similar conclusion can be drawn for GP activists. Whereas sympathizers (Maria, Eveline and Yves) perceive political authorities generally favorable to environmental protection, active members develop a more critical stance (Pierette, Christian, Margot). These cognitive positions seem also to make sense in terms of their level of participation. A harsher critique of political authorities fits closer with a need of active commitment instead of "only" financial support. However, as I will show in the next chapter, quantitative indicators do not reveal systematic significant differences between levels of participation. Two explanations could account for this discrepancy between quantitative and qualitative data. First, the twelve interviewees are not representative of all activists of SAB and GP. Thus, it is possible that the qualitative data overemphasize differences between sympathizers and active members due to the selection of extreme cases. While some cases are certainly special, like for example Adriana and Simone for SAB or Margot and Yves for GP, the others are not. Therefore, I have more confidence in the second explanation. Qualitative data reveals activists' worldviews in far more details than crude quantitative indicators are capable of. Consequently, this analysis of the content of activists' cognitions point to cognitive differences, which are not demonstrable otherwise.

6.3.2. Activists' relation to challenging actors

In terms of activists' perception of challenging actors, the previous chapter showed that almost every activist tends to have a huge amount of confidence in challenging actors. While this indicator helped me to demonstrate that these activists have a specific perception of civil society actors with regard to the general population, I could not respond to another important question: *How do these activists make sense of civil society actors?* What is the content of their relation towards civil society actors? The six defenders of migrant's rights as well as the six environmentalists give us some insights. As it was the case for their relation towards political authorities, they share some points and diverge on others.

Starting with SAB activists, all six interviewees clearly legitimized protest actors, not only for their proper social movement sector - the defense of migrant's rights - but also for the maintenance of a vital democracy in general. "I hope that certain laws will change and for this reason, we need protest", says Willhelm. And all the other five echo his opinion. "We need to have organizations like these" (Collette), "it is important to have every kind of organizations" (Simone), "it is very rich, and without it there would be more suffering" (Yan), "everywhere, I think, in every domain, we have to protest to make changes happen" (Adriana), "I think a vibrant civil society is necessary" (Lisa). These short quotations show that they all come to a common conclusion: Protest actors allow them to raise their voices and to become visible. "I think they [protest actors] are a necessity because we have a role of testimony, to witness." For Simone, protest actors can alter the social perception of asylum seekers through testimonies. Thereby, real people become visible and asylum seekers are not only portrayed in the public discourse by stereotypes of criminality and economical profiteers. Indeed, the idea to bring another standpoint in the public discourse is shared by all interviewees. Through their actions, collective actors can bring another, a contending, point of view in the contest about the definition of shared meaning in a respective field. Colette gives us another illustration of this common perception: "It helps to make known the problem. If nobody speaks about them, we wouldn't know of them."

The six GP activists do not differ from this perception of challenging actors as channels through which a different point of view can be raised and becomes visible. "They are essential for having a countervailing power to all these other economic or nuclear lobbies, there has to be opposing associations who bring in an ecological point of view" (Christian). "[Protest organizations] are a world full of bringers of ideas that are different then the one's of many other groups. They are very important to me" (Margot). Not only active members stress this importance of challenging actors by bringing different ideas to the floor and by opposing the dominant view. Sympathizers too have a similar perception as the examples of Yves and Eveline underline. "It is absolutely necessary that they exist because they are extremists as I told you. They are going to the extremes in order to make things change a little bit" (Yves). And Eveline confirms this perception: "Greenpeace is known and I have to say that I admire their style to mediatize a thematic. I admire their

capacity to communicate, to pass an original message" (Eveline). In sum, protest actors are necessary actors for a vibrant democracy as they allow introducing different viewpoints in the public discourse. That is why these activists perceive them as legitimate actors. By being active citizens, protest is their channel to express their opinion during political campaigns and in political decision-making processes. In my view, activists' emphasis on the functioning of democracy and visibility broadens up the usual theoretical focus on collective efficacy.

This is not to say that a notion of collective efficacy is absent from activists' perception of protest actors. "They are effective in the long run", states Pierrette and Maria agrees: "I do not know exactly but it happens that I read an article where one can see that it was Greenpeace that has changed something. So yes, I think they are effective." Thus, while Maria does not know a whole bunch about the activities of Greenpeace, her occasional readings are sufficient to construct a perception of collective efficacy. Others have developed more elaborated perceptions as the following quotation of Eveline illustrates: "Greenpeace, they educate activists, they have the time to elaborate a documentation and to do surveys." This perception is very similar to the one of SAB activists. In Yan's words: "By lobbying, I mean to discuss with members of the parliament, to give them arguments, to give them a documentation or to try to convince them. I think this is really important, it is more effective because it is the place where decisions are taken." And Adriana joins in: "I have to be in a group to be able to work. Thereby, people can tell me: "no, this is wrong, you cannot make it like this." So, we can discuss together, we can have an exchange. It is very important to create a force with a group because I cannot do it alone."

All quotations clearly illustrate that a notion of efficacy is activated when they talk about their perception of protest actors. However, activists' perception of protest actors is much broader as they perceive them as crucial actors in a democratic political regime. Additionally, these activists have developed a plural understanding of collective efficacy. While Yan is linking collective efficacy to different forms of political actions, Adriana understands collective efficacy more as a means to overcome the limits of what she can accomplish alone. Yet the mentioned GP activists also have their own point of view where Pierrette is

linking collective efficacy to something that is only achieved in the long run and Maria and Eveline are pointing to the powerful and professional organization that makes Greenpeace so effective. As shown with the notion of collective efficacy, a critique of the cognitive holy trinity does not imply that these cognitive dimensions are irrelevant. Quite the contrary is the case: Injustice, agency and identity frames show up all the times in activists' narratives. However, a focus on broader world visions allow me to portray a more complex, and thereby a more adequate, picture of activists' perceptions. Consequently, it allows me to establish a more detailed account for the meaning of agency, identity and injustice frames. In a nutshell, it allows for a better understanding of how contentious participation shapes activists's worldviews.

Doing such a detailed mapping ends thus up in a more realistic picture. An important illustration that sustains this point is that activists' legitimization of protest actors is not as blind and homogeneous as I presented it until now. These activists make a realistic portray and they are able to criticize protest actors or to raise doubts about their efficacy. For example, Wilhelm, who supports many organizations financially, criticizes the number and the manner of fundraising. "I can understand that they send people to collect money, they have to do it, but it happens way to often." Or Lisa who manifested her straightforward opposition to demonstrations: "I participated at an infinite number of demonstrations. It is completely useless." And Pierrette and Margot illustrate this realistic and nuanced perception for GP activists. "One can send letters to the stores that ask them to switch off the lights during nights...but these actions are wasted energy...if they do not get a letter with pretty state stamps, they will not even read the letter" (Pierrette). "On the Swiss level, I think their efficacy is quite humble. The work of GP does not get where they like it to be" (Margot). Though, as it was the case for their perception of political authorities, these activists construct a far more nuanced perception of protest actors than quantitative indicators imply. Protest actors have their limits too, neither defenders of migrant's rights nor environmentalists do idealize their organizations and civil society actors in general.

Further on, active members and sympathizers are again distributed along a whole spectrum of legitimization.⁴¹ It goes from a perception of protest actors as temporary substitutes for missing state action to an absolute necessity for the functioning of democracy. Yan is an example for the former extreme: "If the state would make his work as he should, we would perhaps not need the help of associations." He uses the word "palliative" to explain that protest actors are not an equivalent substitute for state action. On the other extreme, Lisa tells us that protest actors "are the basis of democracy. If they do not influence politics, political decision-making is completely cut off from the society and its preoccupations. Political decision-making isn't anymore democratic." For some, protest actors have thus a fundamental role to play for the functioning of a democracy while for others, protest actors have to jump in there where the state is not doing his work as he should. For active members, protest actors have to be constantly active. This is a necessity for democracies. Sympathizers, in contrast, tend more to a complementary perception. Civil society actors stick "patches on all kinds of problems but they cannot solve them" (Eveline). Thereby, protest action is not continuously but occasionally necessary and can even be substituted by appropriate state action.

As all interviewees are activists, it comes at no surprise that all twelve interviewees clearly legitimized protest actors. They do so not only in their respective field but also for protest actors in general. However, their perception of protest actors is not the same for everyone. Their perceptions range from a substitute for missing state action, as a place of opposition or countervailing power to arbitrary state decisions, or as means to raise their voice during processes of political decision-making. Despite these differences, these perceptions show us two things. On the one hand, *legitimating protest actors is cognitively linked to their perception of political authorities.* It is through a de-legitimization of political authorities that they can legitimize protest actors. It is through this cognitive link that they can become political contenders or a part of a challenging actor in their respective strategic action field. On the other hand, the description of their perceptions of protest actors helps us to understand why they participate in contentious politics. Their cognitive

⁴¹ This finding contradicts the quantitative results where I did not find any significant differences in the level of confidence in protest and humanitarian organizations for the level of participation (see Table 5.8 on page 117). Again, I put forward that it is the precision of the qualitative data that allows me pointing to these differences. This is something that quantitative indicator cannot capture.

outlook fits their strategies of action, protest action is needed to become visible and to bring other opinions to the floor.

6.3.3. Activist's relation to one's citizen role

These activists do not only have to cognitively relate themselves to other actors, they also have to position themselves – as citizens – within the realm of politics. In other words, they should develop a *perception of citizen's role*. In the previous chapter, I showed by the help of quantitative measures, that these activists tend to perceive their role as citizens in a specific way with regard to the general population. More specifically, they have a perception of an ideal citizen, which is marked by political and social activity and by their vigilance and ability to critically observe politics.

These notions of activity and critique showed up in activists' narratives. In Colette's view, political activity starts with voting: "First, you have to be a citizen." However, political activity is not limited to the act of voting. "And then, there is also associational life, I think this is also a civic duty, one can demonstrate, one can strike, one can defend his ideas, one can write in journals, one can..." (Colette). Thus, while voting is generally the starting point when these activists reflected on their role as citizens, there are various other kinds of political activities that should be of importance too. Simone also starts with the notion of voting as a primary activity of citizens, but then she goes on to other types of activities. "I think voting is an important civic act. It can change the result. If I do not vote, I feel off-color. It's an obligation. Otherwise, consumption, for me, is also a part of citizen's role. To struggle a little bit against, to criticize certain slogans...". And finally, she adds: "In our democracies, it is important to resist. This is evident, on the level of political ideas, we have to resist and to suggest..." GP activists do not differ from SAB activists on these general lines. As Eveline states: "Now that we have all these citizen's rights, we have to use them at least. There is not only voting which is one possibility to participate. But there are others like the participation in unions. A citizen has to write, to demonstrate. We have the possibility to change things." And Christian agrees with this: "Voting is essential to express one's point of view and to change things...and taking part in demonstrations for issues by which I am touched is important. This shows to

politicians that we disagree with certain things." To sum up, the interviewees share a perception of 'ideal' citizens that are active both by various kinds of social and political activities, especially collectively by being active in associational life.

Besides of this valuation of political activity, it is important that citizens are not blindly active. Therefore, *critical vigilance is at least as important than political activity* as such. "It is very important to keep up with actuality" (Collette). "A citizen should not tolerate, he has to be interested a little bit in political actuality because this has a bearing on him" (Adriana). "A citizen has to be touched by those who are around him, by the people who are around him, by the place where he lives and then, he should ask himself questions" (Lisa). It is thus a citizen's responsibility to always stay informed, as Lisa says, "to ask himself questions" and, with the words of Colette, "to keep up with actuality". And Adriana gives us the reason why a citizen should be critical: Politics is something by which one is affected. Some GP activists point to the importance of being vigilant too. "I think it is important to keep watching the actions of the state and to be interested in politics and in the decisions that are taken" (Christian). "We need to be vigilant. I think it is the least to know a little bit about politics in one's country" (Maria).

The interviewees do not only confirm what quantitative measures already demonstrated, they add other elements to their concept of an ideal citizen. A specific topic that I found in every interview of the SAB activists was the *valuation of local activity*. "Everyone has to do what he can or want to do on his level. For me, for example, I once thought to participate in the local council" (Yan). "I really believe in what one can make in his environment, in his quarter, in his school, or in his milieu where one lives. I think it is extremely important that politics is everywhere: at the work place and beyond. It is not something that one is doing and forgetting afterwards. One has to live it because it finally sets our living conditions" (Adriana). So, for them, citizens do not have to be aware of everything, they do not have to be active in or to support hundreds of political organizations. They simply cannot. To them, citizen's role starts where one lives, in one's town, in one's quarter. This can be the local council, which was once Yan's idea to participate. And, as Adriana suggests, a citizen's role is not something abstract or completely detached from one's daily life. Quite the contrary, daily life should be politics. "He should have an active role

on a local level, on the level of an association, on the level...whatever!" Lisa, as a third illustration, stresses this notion of activity on a daily and local basis, too.

Whereas SAB activists stress the importance of local activities, GP activists tend more to underline the necessity of appropriate individual behavior. This idea taps on two dimensions. On the one hand, it is a citizen's role to adopt an ecological lifestyle. "After a party, we collect all bottles and our chaos, contrary to others who leave everything. It is better to change the world on his personal level than to change nothing at all" (Pierrette). "Separating the waste, economizing energy, not adjusting the heating on 22 degrees, there are plenty of actions that everyone should do" (Christian). "My contribution to the environment is mostly waste separation. It think this is crucial. Batteries in the garbage can? I think this is regrettable. Glasses are 100% recyclable, aluminum, iron, paper, this is the strict minimum. These are simple things" (Yves). These illustrations show that for GP activists, collective activity is not the exclusive citizen's role. There is also an appropriate individual behavior that a citizen should heed. For Pierrette, this means to be a good example and for Christian and Yves, these are rather easy daily practices that everyone should adopt in his style of living. On the other hand, GP activists also stress that a citizen should follow state guidelines. This is quite interesting because this is probably a dimension where they are in a strong opposition to SAB activists. In Maria's view, one should comply with the law. Pierrette also mentions that one has the duty to respect the laws and Christian says that each citizen should accept to pay more taxes so that the state can fulfill his obligation. Citizen's relation to the state is thus another one compared to SAB activists who perceive themselves in a more resisting relation to the state.

While there is thus a general consensus that it is the citizen's role to be active, interested in politics and critical and vigilant, SAB and GP activists differ on others, subtler, aspects of their perception of one's citizen's role. For SAB activists, a citizen's role is situated at a local level, one has to discuss with neighbors and to be concerned by what happens in his quarter, in his city. The narratives of these interviewees really resonate with the quotation at the beginning of this chapter: "[A] devotion to the local spirit of liberty manifested as continuous and noisy activity in and on behalf of the local community" (Barber 1984:xiii). In contrast, GP activists have less developed this idea of a model citizen in Barber's sense.

They perceive an ideal citizen in more individualistic terms and therefore stress the importance of individual responsibility by the adoption of an appropriate ecological behavior. Finally, and consonant to their perception of political authorities, GP activists stress the importance to comply with the state whereas SAB activists tend more to be resisting citizens. This confirms the quantitative results from the previous chapter where activists of SAB showed up to stress way more the importance of being active and vigilant citizens.

A last point that I want to address here concerns one aspect in which active members and sympathizers differ. Whereas both types of activists stress the importance of activity, the meaning of this term is not the same for both groups. While active members really stress personal commitment, sympathizers tend more to a representative notion of activity. Active members talk about being active and personal investment. In contrast, sympathizers develop a more supportive idea allowing thereby organizations – as their representatives – to take further action. In other words, their activity consist in supporting protest actors who than become active for them. If one compares this perception with the political behavior of these activists, it seems reasonable to suggest that they have incorporated their ideals of citizen's role. In this sense, these findings do confirm Teske's results (1997); Activists have translated their cognitive outlook into their lifestyles: "It is extremely important that politics is everywhere: at the work place and beyond. It is not something that one is doing and forgetting afterwards. One has to live it because it sets finally our living conditions" (Adriana).

6.4. Concluding remarks

The analysis of the content of activists' cognitive outlook allows me to come up with three major points. First, the interpretation generally confirmed my theoretical assumptions and the preliminary empirical evidence based on quantitative data in the previous chapter. These activists are strong citizens, or more correctly, they have a perception of a strong citizen. They perceive common goods as something fundamentally important that holds a society together and creates links between members of this society. However, they also perceive common goods to be threatened and this perception seems to confirm them to continue

their activism. They also perceive others like themselves: as simple human beings where social and cultural diversities are blurred. Others have the same intimate individual characteristics, everyone has the same core human feelings. This general confirmation of a strong citizen perception was not only found for activists' relation to society but also for their relation to politics. These activists delegitimize political authorities, they strongly legitimize protest actors and they perceive their citizen's role as one of activity, political interest and critical vigilance.

Whereas this conclusion is appropriate in general terms, the analysis of this qualitative material also demonstrated that one cannot throw every activists in the same bucket. As Table 6.1 at the beginning of this chapter already illustrated, some activists have developed some dimensions more and others less. While Adriana is probably an ideal type of what I have theoretically defined as a cognitive strong citizen, Yves is her most radical counterpart in a rather broad spectrum of what it cognitively means to be a strong citizen. This point enables me to come to the second substantial contribution of this chapter. In fact, the qualitative material allowed nuancing activists' perceptions. In other words, I was able to put flesh on the quantitative bones. During this chapter, I have passed by several such examples. When these activists talk about common goods, they mean different things. Some understand common goods as vital necessities whereas others have a really broad understanding of common goods. Some activists relate to others by empathy: they stress their individual sufferings. Then, there are activists who relate to others through an intellectual pathway, they are curious to explore and learn from cultural and social diversities. And perhaps specifically for GP activists, they relate to others by stressing the consequences that their own actions have for others.

Further on, these activists do not de-legitimize all power holders. Quite the contrary is true. They are aware of the qualities of the Swiss political system. And it is this combination of de-legitimization of certain actors and the legitimization of others that makes them cognitively available for protest. Similar conclusions can be made for their perception of protest actors and the role of citizens. The legitimization of protest actors does only make sense if it is linked with activists' perception of political authorities. To put it in another way, it is a combination of de-legitimization of political authorities and a

legitimization of protest actors that makes individuals to political contenders. It is both, a feeling about political authorities that do not their share and a feeling of protest actors that can resolve or at least address these problems. And citizens do not have to be blindly active and critical. They should connect these values with their life, in their local community or by appropriate individual behavior. It is the description of the content of these twelve testimonies of activists that enabled me to understand how these three dimensions are intimately linked to each other. Even if everyone has talked about these perceptions from his own standpoints, they developed a similar cognitive resource: One that can be summed up by a notion of strong citizen.

Third, the analysis of these interviews not only revealed similarities but also differences between activists of SAB and GP and between different levels of participation. For example, sympathizers perceive the state as the main responsible actor to fight against threatened common goods whereas active members also see their own commitment as an important mean for the production and maintenance of common goods. Or regarding political authorities where SAB activists negatively evaluate the recent past and the prospects for the near future whereas GP activists perceive a rather positive development. While I cannot infer on the basis of these twelve interviews, it helps me for a starting point to the next chapter where I will return to my quantitative indicators to evaluate if there really are systematic differences between various kinds of activists. A suggestive interpretation of these variations would be that the level of participation as well as the organizational affiliation of activists is visible in the analysis of the content of activists' cognitions. Activists' cognitions are shaped in a way that reflects their type of activism and one mechanism that could be at stake is movement socialization. Consequently, the portrait of these cognitive dimensions fits with their protest action, with their life as active members or sympathizers respectively. As Bunge (1997) learned me, to describe what it is, is thus a first step to understand how it works. In other words, the stories of these activists really showed how interactions and experiences within their respective strategic action field shaped their cognitions.

VARIATIONS IN ACTIVISTS' COGNITIONS

7. Are there worldviews of specific activists' communities?

I the previous two chapters, I gave answers to the first two questions of my thesis. In chapter 5, I demonstrated that these activists have specific worldviews with regard to the general population. Specifically, they share a particular perception of society and politics. I labeled this specific worldview as one of a strong citizen. These results were thus a first hint that pointed to the importance to consider broader worldviews than the usual tight focus on injustice, agency and identity frames for a better understanding of sustained movement participation. In chapter 6, I looked deeper inside the mind of activists and described the content of activists' perceptions as a strong citizen by looking at the narratives of 12 activists from defenders of migrants' rights and environmentalists respectively. This interpretative approach allowed me to confirm the main assumption that these activists are cognitively strong citizens. In addition to these main conclusions, both the analysis of the comparative indicators in chapter 5 and the qualitative analysis in chapter 6 pointed to existing differences between activists of different organizations and between active members and sympathizers. It seems thus reasonable to suggest that, while sharing a common cognitive baseline of a strong citizen, not all activists share exactly the same worldviews. As the analysis of activists' narratives in the previous chapter has demonstrated, cognitions that are related to their life as activists are constructed by interactions and experiences within their specific strategic action fields. The main task of this chapter is thus to test if cognitive variations between different forms of activism exist systematically. In other words, this chapter treats the third specific question of my main thesis: Do types of activists systematically differ in terms of their cognitions?

As I stated in the theoretical chapter, activists are challenging actors, or at least, they are part of a challenging collective actor within strategic action fields. Therefore, their cognitions are in a contentious relation with the dominant definition of shared meanings within their specific strategic action field. Consequently, organizations interact differently with their members and diffuse particular cultural messages to them. In addition, activists' contentious interactions with their respective targets of their political claims vary. And finally, activists themselves differ from each other. They participate in different ways, some more intensive then others. In a nutshell, different actions imply variations in terms of social

interactions resulting in specific cognitions for specific types of activism. In order to test this argument, the focus of this chapter is on the following questions: Do activists' cognitions represent the worldview of specific activists' communities? Are there variations between activists' communities and between activists of different levels of participation?

In the theoretical chapter, cognitive toolkits were conceptualized as fluid. This means that they are steadily transformed, refined, and even can be changed. Theoretically, I should thus expect variations. But how does activists' cognitive baseline vary? In what follows, I will develop *three assumptions*. First, I assume to come across variations in activists' cognitions between protests in different strategic action fields. Second, and in contrast, I put forward that there is only few variation for activists of different levels of participation. Third, and consequently, less variation exists between active members and sympathizers than between activists engaged in different strategic action fields. How do I come to these assumptions?

Commitment to the defense of migrant's rights is not the same as commitment to environmental protection or collective minorities' rights. The nature and level of conflict for the definition of shared meanings varies and, therefore, different protest issues imply different costs in terms of the degree of political challenge entailed. Overall, in established democracies, like in my case Switzerland, protest action is mostly routine politics; it is thus a legitimate form of action. Nevertheless, in every country, some protests are more challenging than others. This implies that the definition of shared meanings in a "consensual" field like environmental protection or human rights is less contested through challengers than in highly controversial fields as for example the defense of migrant's rights. There is less contention in mainstream fields (environmental protection, human rights) than in challenging fields (migrant's rights) because the difference between the existing definition of shared meanings and the point of view of challengers is bigger for the latter fields. The public discourse on immigration and migrant's rights is largely dominated by a Federal state producing restrictive laws on migration and asylum, and a population who is not in favor of an enlargement of migrant's rights but who largely supports xenophobic referenda from the Populist Party. In short, the cognitive hurdles for taking part in more challenging protests is higher than for mainstream contentions as the existing and dominant set of shared

meanings diverge more from the worldviews of challengers than this is the case for mainstream fields. Therefore, I assume that a strong citizen perception for protest is more deeply rooted for activists committed to more challenging protests. Activists participating in more challenging protests should therefore be cognitively 'stronger citizens' than activists of mainstream protests.

With regard to my cases, I assume thus that activists of SAB are stronger citizens than activists of GP and SAB. Later in this chapter, I will thus check empirically if activists of SAB are cognitively more radical or homogeneous on my two main dimensions: their relation to society and their relation to politics. In addition to this, I will test if this argument also holds for the cognitive dimensions I have called the holy trinity, i.e. for activists' injustice, agency and identity frame.

Different levels of participation also imply variations in terms of costs of action, especially with regard to time and effort spent for a cause. To be a highly active member, that is an activist who is actively participating in protest events, involves more costs than to be a sympathizer who sustains political protest exclusively with monetary means. I differentiate levels of participation because I assume theoretically that cognitive transformation takes place through ongoing social interactions. As active members have generally different and more channels of interaction than sympathizers, I test if this diverging exposition to different interactive patterns result in cognitive variations between active members and sympathizers. In fact, one might expect that active members are cognitively stronger citizens than sympathizers. However, I assume that this is not the case for the following reason. In my view, it is the receptivity of activists and the content transmitted through the interactions that is important while the frequency and the specific channel of interaction is of less importance. I defend this argument here because I expect activists, both active members and sympathizers to be cognitively very receptive for the worldviews transmitted by the organization. For example, reading the SMO's newspaper is able to fashion cognitions in a similar way then taking part in a demonstration because the content of the worldview that is transmitted is the same and both, active members and sympathizers, are receptive to these messages. Therefore, cognitions of active members and sympathizers of the same organization should be very similar.

Finally, I expect to find more variation between activists of different organizations than between different levels of participation. It is important to test this hypothesis because it tells me something about the mechanisms behind cognitive transformation. If I am able to confirm these three hypotheses, then, I have collected evidence that points to the importance to look more at the qualitative content of social interactions between actors within a strategic action field and less at the frequencies and forms of interactions that take place. In other words, the mere existence and form of social networks these activists are embedded in is less important then the quest to understand what is going on in these networks. Starting to look systematically at cognitive variations between different forms of activism is thus a first step in this direction.

7.1. Variations within the holy cognitive trinity?

Writing much about broad world-visions about society and politics carries the danger to omit well-known cognitive dimensions, i.e. injustice, agency and identity frames. While broader worldviews remain the focus of this thesis, I turn now to a brief *evaluation of the boly cognitive trinity* in the social movement literature. What about dimensions of injustice, agency and identity? Is activist's perception as a strong citizen touched by actual policies and discourses in the public sphere, i.e. have these activists constructed an injustice frame? Do these activists perceive opportunities to change these injustices towards realities fitting more their cognitive ideals? Do they thus possess an agency frame? Do these activists identify with the populations touched by these injustices? Further on, concerning variations between activists, are active members more outraged and more convinced of possibilities to change than sympathizers? And is this similar for activists of more challenging contentious issues? I try to suggest some answers to these questions in this section.

In the theoretical chapter, I defined an *injustice* as one's perceived relation to the contested issue, which is the link an actor constructs with the political issue he is struggling for. First, it relates to the transformation of a social issue to an issue causing problems. An actor has thus to frame this specific issue as an unjust one. Second, the cognitive link an activist constructs with the contested issue relates to the salience of this specific injustice

in the daily life of the individual. After all, it is oversimplified to assume that activists, as well as any other individual, perceive only one injustice in the world around them.

Table 7.1: Centrality of the issue for the daily life of an activist

		SAB	STP	GP
		%	%	%
The most important		9	5	30
Very important		53	22	52
Rather important		33	38	18
Not very important		5	22	1
Of secondary order		1	14	0
•	Total	100%	100%	100%
	n	471	562	546
SAB vs STP/GP (χ^2)			180.6***	- 105.8***
STP vs. GP (χ^2)				- 397.6***
Diff. within organization (Cramer's V)		.22***	-	.22***

NOTE: "How important is [the defense of migrant's rights, defense of persecuted minorities, environmental protection] in your daily life?" *p<0.05, **p<0.01, ***p<0.001.

Therefore, the indicator in Table 7.1 measures the *importance of the contested issue* in one's daily life. Overall, only a very small part of these activists perceive the contested issue as not very important or of secondary order (6% for SAB, 36% for STP and 1% for GP). This could be expected, as they became activists in order to challenge this specific political issue. However, activist of different organizations vary considerably. In fact, the contested issue is most central for environmentalists while activists of more challenging issues give less priority to their contention. Quite impressively, 30% of environmentalists note that environmental protection is the most important thing in their daily life. For defenders of migrant's and minorities' rights, in contrast, less than 10% report that their respective contentious issue is a top priority. Thus in contrary to the hypothesis formulated for the strong citizen dimensions at the beginning of this chapter, the level of political challenge is not positively linked with the importance one attributes to the issue. An alternative explanation could be that migration as well as minority rights are more distant issues than environmental protection. Indeed, the environment is a realm with which one is in touch on a regular basis. Environmental concerns are activated on a regular basis during one's daily life: One faces garbage during a walk through the forest, one has to decide whether one buys the biological banana or the cheap one or if one takes the train or the plane for the upcoming conference. In contrast, defenders of migrant's rights and of minorities' rights are rarely migrants or minorities themselves, i.e. they are

not personally touched by the contested problem.⁴² They are thus mainly confronted with the issue when they are protesting. Consequently, more distant issues are less central in the mind of these activists than closer issues like environmental protection. While this argument helps to understand the gap between activists of SAB (62% at least very important) and of GP (82%), there remains a large gap to activists of STP where only 27% of them perceive the contested issue as very important at least and more than a third (36%) perceive the contested issue as not very important or of secondary order. This result is quite dramatic for the organization because it implies that a majority of their activists do not view the defense of collective minorities rights as important. While there is clearly some sensitization work to do for the organization regarding their activists' base, one has to keep in mind that STP activist's are exclusively sympathizers whereof a large majority was recruited in the street (about 80%).

That there is in fact a significant difference between active members and sympathizers is confirmed if one looks at existing variations for the level of participation of SAB and GP. Therein, active members clearly differ from sympathizers such that the contested issue is more central for the former. For 73% of SAB's active members the contested issue is at least very important while this is only for 54% of SAB's sympathizers the case. Similarly, 94% of GP's active members and 78% of GP's sympathizers judged environmental protection as very important in their daily life. As active members spend their time for protest, i.e. they spend a significant amount of their lifetime in direct interactions with the contested issue, this result surprises little. In other words, active members are in direct contact with the results these injustices produce whereas sympathizers are more passive observers. This argument may sound in contradiction with the hypothesis for the level of participation formulated above, stating that the frequency of cognitive activation is not important. However, one has to differentiate between the salience and the content of cognitions. While my thesis focuses mostly on the content of activists' cognitions, the indicator for the injustice frame clearly taps on the salience of the contested issue. As active members spend a bigger amount of their daily life with contentious participation, this result appears reasonable.

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⁴² In fact, 97% of SAB activists and 91% of STP activists are Swiss citizens.

In sum, these activists perceive the contested issue as a problem; an injustice frame is thus part of their worldview. However, the centrality of this injustice varies quite importantly. Thereby, movement socialization could explain a part of this variation as theses differences are correlated with the frequency these problems are cognitively activated for active members and sympathizers respectively. But of course, movement socialization is by far not the only process able to shape perceptions. As I have seen for differences between activists of different organizations, cognitions can be activated in multiple life spheres. Nevertheless, this indicator clearly confirms the existing theoretical claim that an injustice frame is a fundamental cognitive toolkit required to take part in contentious participation.

What about activists' perception of opportunities to change for the better, or at least, to prevent a worsening of the situation? The literature on contentious participation has demonstrated that the cognitive link an actor maintains with the possibilities to change, to improve or even to prevent a deterioration of a social situation is essential for taking part and for sustaining contentious participation (e.g. Gamson 1992; Passy 1998). I defined activists' relation to social change as the link an actor constructs with the capacity to change, to improve or to prevent a decline of the social situation for which he struggles. In addition, I differentiated between two links. One that relates to the perceived collective efficacy of the protest actor the activist is a member of and another that relates to the perceived utility of the individual for the organization, which is his contribution to change the contested situation or to limit a further decline of the situation.

Table 7.2 presents a measure of the perception of collective agency by asking activists on a Likert scale if they think that the action of the organization is effective to defend the contested issue. In general, these activists believe that their organization does a good job. Two third and more think that their organization is at least rather effective to defend the cause. However, improvement is still possible as only a small share thinks that their organization is completely effective. In addition, *collective agency varies between activists of different levels of challenge a contested issue entails*. As a matter of fact, it is really hard to contribute to the defense of migrant's rights. Accordingly, activists of this more challenging issue perceive — in quite a realistic manner — their organization as less

effective than environmentalists. STP activists too are more skeptical than environmentalists. Whereas minorities' rights in general are by far not as challenging as the defense of migrant's rights, it remains difficult to put these claims on the Swiss political agenda. While political claims for collective minority rights in foreign countries are not as challenging as claims for migrant's rights in Switzerland, STP has to face another problem regarding the perception of collective efficacy. In fact, their political issues are merely visible. For example, one has to quarry for a long time in order to find out about the actions they took in order to close refugee camps for Roma in the Kosovo (STP 2013).

Table 7.2: Activists' perception of collective efficacy

		SAB	STP	GP
		%	%	0/0
Completely effective		4	10	32
Rather effective		62	76	62
Rather not effective		34	14	7
Not effective at all		1	1	0
Tc	otal	100%	100%	100%
	n	432	442	558
SAB vs STP/GP (χ^2)			- 53.2***	- 197.9***
STP vs. GP (χ^2)				- 80.1***
Diff. within organization (Cramer's V)		ns	-	ns

NOTE: "Do you think that the action of organizations [who defend migrant's rights, human rights, protect the environment] and for which you are committed to is effective to [reinforce migrant's rights, human rights, to protect the environment] in Switzerland?" *p<0.05, **p<0.01, ***p<0.001.

While activists of different organizations vary thus in the level they perceive their respective organization as effective, active members and sympathizers do not differ in terms of their perception of collective agency. As the literature has repeatedly demonstrated, this dimension belongs thus to the typical cognitive outlook of an activist. In fact, the literature (e.g. (Gecas 1989)) has shown repeatedly, that in order to act, I need to have a sense that I could bring about change, either individually or collectively. Otherwise, it would be difficult to understand why one should support an ineffective organization.

Turning to the second dimension of activists' stance towards social change, Table 7.3 presents an indicator measuring activists' perception of *individual agency*. Here, respondents were asked on a Likert scale to evaluate their personal contribution for the organization. Again I see a general trend that these activists tend to perceive their contribution as rather

useful. More than half of them have such a perception. However, these activists are less convinced by their own contribution then by the possibilities of their collective effort. By the way, this is an interesting finding in terms of collective action; for these activists, collective action is thus a necessity, as it seems to be more effective than individual action. Regarding differences between organizations, GP activists perceive their contribution slightly more useful than activists of STP and SAB. This is probably a residue for the differences found for collective efficacy. On the one hand, it is catchier to induce social change in the field of migrant's rights and on the other hand, STP activists are composed of only sympathizers, which results in a lower level of confidence in one's own utility.

Table 7.3: Activists' perception of individual utility

		SAB	STP	GP
		%	%	%
Completely useful		3	5	13
Rather useful		53	48	58
Rather not useful		42	42	28
Not useful at all		2	5	1
Tota	tal	100%	100%	100%
	n	394	504	550
SAB vs STP/GP (χ^2)			ns	- 42.10***
STP vs. GP (χ^2)				- 48.50***
Diff. within organization (Cramer's V)		.19**	-	.16**

NOTE: "How do you evaluate the contribution of your commitment for the organization? Do you evaluate it as..." *p<0.05, **p<0.01, ***p<0.001.

Again, this argument regarding the lower perception of agency for sympathizers is confirmed if one looks at different levels of participation for activists of SAB and GP. In fact, 64% of SAB's active members evaluate their contribution as rather useful while this is only the case for 46% of SAB's sympathizers. For GP, 81% of active members and 67% of all sympathizers perceive their contribution as at least rather useful. It does not come as a surprise that active members judge their own contribution in a more optimistic way than sympathizers. As it was the case for the centrality of the contested issue, movement socialization could be one underlying process. In fact, active members face an easier task to link cognitively their contribution with the success of the organization than sympathizers. Active members adapt their cognitions by taking part in protest action, sympathizers cannot. Active members actually do something to induce social change, while sympathizers have to rely on the organization that they are able to convert their monetary support into victories. In addition, the theory of cognitive dissonance (Festinger

1957) puts forward that activists will believe that their actions are useful in order to justify the time and effort they spent for the cause.

Table 7.4: Identification with the group for whom they mobilize

	SAB	STP	GP
	%	%	%
We belong to the same world, the same humanity	46	48	-
We belong to the same world, even if we are very different people	51	49	-
We are very different people	3	4	-
Total	100%	100%	100%
n	460	511	-
SAB vs STP (χ^2)		ns	-
STP vs. GP (x ²)			-
Diff. within organization (Cramer's V)	ns	-	-

NOTE: "You are committed to defend [migrant's rights, minority rights] in Switzerland. To what extent do you identify with the individuals for whom you mobilize?" *p<0.05, **p<0.01, ***p<0.001.

The last dimension of the cognitive holy trinity is activist's identity frame. The indicator presented in Table 7.4 aims to assess whereas these activists identify with the population for whom they are politically engaged – that is migrants and autochthonous minorities.⁴³ Many social movement scholars emphasize that contentious politics is based on an identification process. Activists need to identify with the social group for whom they mobilize or an identity frame that defines a we-group (Gamson 1992). Without such a cognitive construction, activists are unlikely to mobilize. But is identification possible when activists do not belong to the group they are struggling for (like this is the case for activists of SAB and STP)? I asked activists to what extend they identify with the people for whom they are politically active, and their responses clearly emphasize an identity frame constructed on a universal basis. As Table 7.4 stresses, almost any activist perceives people for whom they mobilize as very different people, having no connection with them. About 50% of SAB and STP activists perceive them as belonging to the same humanity as theirs, erecting no frontier between them and people for whom they are committed for. In contrast, another 50% of contenders state that migrants and autochthonous people are different from them but nonetheless they are sharing the same humanity as them. Qualitative data allow to better grasping this position, which seems to mix selfextension and borders erection between them and others. Many of the interviewees raise no frontiers between them and others because they conceive that we are all sharing the

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⁴³ I did not include this question for GP activists.

same humanity. However, they distinguish themselves from the people for whom they mobilize because they never faced so dramatic injustices or harsh living conditions. For this reason, they could not say: "we are the same and we share similar life". They articulate the idea of a common humanity shared by all the human beings, but within this shared humanity people do not face the same fate: some people are better off than others.

To sum up this section on the holy cognitive trinity, I can conclude that these activists have constructed an injustice, an agency and an identity frame. As the literature suggests, these are basic cognitive tools crucially important for protest. It is thus essential to take these dimensions into account. With regard to the assumptions concerning variations between different kinds of activists, injustice, agency and identity frames do not vary in a similar logic than I expect for the strong citizen dimensions. First of all, activists' cognitions of different organizations do vary but in the opposite direction. Accordingly, SAB activists did not develop the strongest perception for injustice, agency and identity frames. As I have explained, other mechanisms seem to be at stake then for the strong citizen dimensions. GP activists the most mainstream community, perceive their political issue as more central, evaluate their organization as more effective and see their own participation as more useful than activists of SAB and STP. And there are good reasons for these results. Environmental concerns are omnipresent in one's daily life leading thus to a higher salience of this protest issue than for more distant issues like the defense of migrant's and political minorities rights. Further on, Greenpeace as an organization and environmental protection in general has achieved tremendous success in the last decades. In fact, environmental protection has become always more important on the national but also the international political agenda. Second, active members and sympathizers do vary on certain dimensions, especially on those who are directly related to their form of participation. Thus, the political issue is more central for active members and they perceive themselves as more useful than sympathizers do. Finally, I expected to see more variation between activists of different organizations than between active members and sympathizers. This cannot be confirmed for the holy cognitive trinity dimensions. That said, I have to keep in mind that I developed these hypotheses in terms of broader worldviews like those dimensions that belong to the strong citizen concept to which I turn now.

7.2. Are all activists cognitively strong citizens?

In the previous chapters, I showed these activists highly value responsible consumption and that they are more concerned by the living conditions of distant others implying that they are willing to broadly share common goods⁴⁴. Many activists do thus perceive common goods as something to which one should take care of and actively contribute to it. In what follows, I will now have a closer look if this perception varies between activists of different kinds. Do they all share a similar worldview or, through different interaction patterns due to differential embeddings in social networks and strategic action fields, do activists' perceptions of common goods vary?

The two indicators in Table 7.5 below show that these activists have a fairly similar perception of common goods. The first indicator assesses if it is only the state or if citizens are also responsible for the production and maintenance of common goods. More than 90% of all activists share the perception that citizens have to contribute their share for the production and maintenance of common goods. In terms of their cultural toolkit, this perception should thus constrain these activists from free riding.

The second indicator on the sense of living in a society confirms this evidence. Again, nearly all activists think that to live in a society necessitates caring about common goods. Both indicators point thus in a similar direction stressing the importance and central value of common goods. However, I get more nuanced results for the second indicator. In fact, about half of the respondents do not perceive a contradiction between their own interests and taking care of common goods. Thus, in activists' perception, personal and collective interests seem to be merged in one common cognitive framework. Also in Barbers' view (1984:171), this perception is important for strong citizens: "It is a kind of 'we' thinking that compels individuals to reformulate their interests, purposes, norms, and plans on a mutualistic language of public goods." In other words, personal interests get adapted in order to fit with the common interests of a society making them cognitively available to overcome the costs of these actions. These activists are concerned by and feel responsible for common goods without neglecting their own interest. Moreover, their personal

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⁴⁴ See Tables 5.2 and 5.3 on pages 107 and 108.

interests seem to be compatible with societal interests. This cognitive constellation should though remove, or at least downscale, the option to free ride from their choice options.

Table 7.5: Activists' perception of common goods

		SAB	STP	GP
		%	%	%
Responsibility for common goods				
Only the state is responsible		3	11	11
Citizens are also responsible		97	90	89
	Total	100%	100%	100%
	n	421	523	503
SAB vs STP (χ^2)			19.3***	19.9***
STP vs. GP (\chi^2)				ns
Diff. within organization (Cramer's V)		ns		ns
Sense of living in a society				
Take care of common goods		47	39	47
Take care of both		51	57	45
Take care of oneself		2	4	8
	Total	100%	100%	100%
	n	423	535	428
SAB vs STP (χ^2)			7.7*	14.9**
STP vs. GP (χ^2)				- 16.4***
Diff. within organization (Cramer's V)		ns		ns

NOTE: Responsibility for the commons: "In our society, it is the task of the state to take care of common goods. Some people think that it is also the task of citizens to take care of common goods. What do you think?" This item was measured on an interval scale ranging from 1(only the task of the state) to 10 (also a citizen's task). Percentages for responses from 1-5: "only state" and 6-10 "also citizen's task".

Importance to take care of whom: "Some think that to life in a society requires to be concerned by common goods. Common goods are goods that we all share and that are all useful for us (e.g. education, health, housing, accommodation) Others, in contrast, think that one have first of all to care about oneself? What do you think personally?" Respondents had to situate themselves on a interval scale ranging from 1 (to take care about oneself) to 10 (to take care about the commons). Additionally, respondents could cross 11 (both, there is no contradiction between the two). Percentages for responses from 1-4 as "Oneself", 5,6,11 as "both", and 7-10 as "common goods". *p<0.05, **p<0.01, ***p<0.001.

What about differences within the realm of activists? Differences between activists of different organizations are small but systematic. As χ^2 -tests in Table 7.5 demonstrate, activists of SAB tend to be a little, but significant, bit more homogeneous when it comes to concern about common goods than activists of STP and GP. On this dimension, activists of SAB are thus a little bit stronger citizens than activists of the two other organizations. It might thus be that activists struggling for more challenging issues need to cross more challenging cognitive hurdles. Or, if these results reflect more an effect of participation, this cognitive dimension is more strengthened in more challenging movements. In contrast, different levels of participation are not related to activists' perception of common

goods. Neither activists of SAB nor activists of GP show up internal cognitive differences between active members and sympathizers.

Table 7.6: Activists with a self-extensive understanding of others

	SAB	STP	GP
	%	0/0	%
Self-extension	31	62	61
Self-extension and frontiers	49	30	29
Frontiers and self-extension	17	7	10
Frontiers	3	1	0
Total	100%	100%	100%
n	409	486	499
SAB vs STP/GP (χ^2)		- 87.9***	- 86.5***
STP vs. GP (χ^2)			ns
Diff. within organization (Cramer's V)	ns	-	ns

NOTE: "Several motivations may characterize your commitment to [defend migrant's rights, minority rights, protect the environment]. Perhaps, all of the motivations listed below characterize partly your commitment. Nevertheless, could you please indicate which one constitutes your main motivation of your commitment and which motivation would come at the second place?" Responses were originally coded 1 = We live on the same planet, it is normal to act for others (SAB, GP, STP); 2 = I defend migrants because myself (or my family) was migrant (SAB), I defend minorities because myself (or my family), I have a minority background (STP), Myself, my nest of kin, or ma family, we are directly touched by environmental problems (GP); 3 = I want everyone, migrants and non-migrants to have the same rights (SAB,STP), I want to protect the planet, its environment and its biodiversity (GP), 4 =I want to improve the society in which I live, i.e. Switzerland (SAB), I want to improve the society in which I live, i.e. Switzerland. Offering better rights/conditions for minorities in Switzerland allows us living in harmony and peace (STP), I want to improve the environmental quality of the society in which I live, i.e. Switzerland (GP). The items have been recoded into an Inglehart-type scale such that 4 = "Self-extension" = main motive (1,3), second motive (1,3); 3 "Self-extension and frontiers" = (1,3), (2.4); 2 "Frontiers and self-extension" = (2,4), (1,3); 1 "Frontiers" = (2,4), (2,4). *p<0.05, **p<0.01, ***p<0.001.

Let us turn now to the second dimension of activists' perception towards society. Here, I assumed that these activists have generally a *self-extensive understanding* of themselves that includes them and others in the same space. Do they perceive the world as shared with others by a common humanity? In general, I confront similar evidence as for the common goods dimension. Results presented in Table 7.6 are clear-cut. For the self-extension scale, these activists rely on a perception of self in relation to others that is highly extensive. Between 80% and 92% invoke either both motivations on self-extension, or by a mixed position where self-extension is the first priority while items taping on frontiers is a second one. *SAB activists have a less extensive self compared to those of STP and GP*. While this result contradicts the interpretation of the interview data in the previous chapter, this variation is explainable by one of the items measuring frontiers between social groups or individuals, which is: "I want above all to improve the society were I am living, namely Switzerland." Almost half of SAB activists selected this item.

Qualitative interviews provide insights to understand the selection of this item. Many interviewees declare that they feel ashamed to live in this country because the situation in humanely unacceptable. Active members and sympathizers do not differ on this dimension.

With Table 7.7 below, I return to two indicators I already presented in chapter 5. As it was the case for their perception of common goods, self-extension is a specific feature of activists' cognitive toolkit and, as such, constitutes a part of the cognitive baseline necessary for sustained contentious participation. Both indicators, one that measures *social* frontiers to other groups and another that looks at the level of trust to others, show that these activists have constructed a perception of themselves towards (culturally) others that is highly inclusive. They do not raise social frontiers between them and individuals belonging to other cultures. They perceive others like themselves: as simple human beings where social and cultural diversities are blurred.

Turning my attention to differences between activists of different organizations, I can observe that activists of Greenpeace are somewhat less self-extensive than activists of the two other organizations. SAB activists are the most self-extensive whereas STP activists are somewhere in between. As it was the case for the perception of common goods, activist of more challenging contentious issues are stronger citizens than activists of mainstream organizations, especially if one looks at the two items measuring social frontiers towards cultural minorities and trust towards culturally distant others. These two indicators measure the groups to which migrants belong, which explain why one finds the strongest variation here. However, it is surprising to note the STP activists seem to be somewhat closer to GP activists than to the defenders of migrant's rights. One explication of this result could be the composition of activists within the organization. Activists of SAB contain a large share of active members and even a large share of sympathizers is recruited through events organized by the SMO. Individuals who participate at such events or who follow the campaigns of SAB are already highly sensitized to the cause. This is not necessarily the case for activists of STP where a large share is recruited in the streets. For what the level of participation is concerned, active members as well as

sympathizers share the conception of otherness. Both perceive themselves as individuals strongly bond to others.

Table 7.7: Social frontiers and trusting others

		SAB	STP	GP
		%	0/0	%
No frontiers at all		9	16	15
	n	416	540	516
SAB vs STP/GP (x²)			- 8.9**	- 5.70*
STP vs. GP (χ²)				ns
Diff. within organization (ϕ)		ns	-	.09*
Towards political minorities		84	80	78
	n	417	540	516
SAB vs STP/GP (x ²)			ns	- 5.50*
STP vs. GP (χ^2)				ns
Diff. within organization (ϕ)		ns	-	ns
Towards social deviant minorities		67	54	65
	n	417	540	516
SAB vs STP/GP (χ^2)			- 16.9***	ns
STP vs. GP (χ^2)				12.00**
Diff. within organization (ϕ)		ns	-	ns
Towards cultural minorities		6	11	18
	n	417	539	517
SAB vs STP/GP (x ²)			6.9**	27.20***
STP vs. GP (χ^2)				9.00**
Diff. within organization (φ)		ns	-	.13**
Unknown others		73	58	53
	n	369	484	462
SAB vs STP/GP (x ²)			20.4***	32.7***
STP vs. GP (χ²)				ns
Diff. within organization (ϕ)		ns	-	ns
Culturally distant others		96	83	78
	n	355	438	412
SAB vs STP/GP (x ²)			30.7***	48.1***
STP vs. GP (χ^2)				ns
Diff. within organization (ϕ)		ns	-	ns

NOTE: Social frontiers: "On this list are various groups of people. Could you please sort out any that you would not like as neighbors?" No frontiers: Swiss respondents belong to this category if they crossed any item at all. Activists belong to this category of they crossed "No group of people disturbs me as a neighbor". Political minorities: "Right-wing extremists" or "Left-wing extremists". Social deviant minorities: "Heavy drinkers, Drug addicts, Emotionally unstable people, People with a criminal record, People who have AIDS". Cultural minorities: "Muslims, Gypsies, Jews, Christians, Homosexuals, immigrants/foreign workers." EVS 2008.

Trusting others: "Could you tell us whether you trust [neighbors/people you meet for the first time/people of another religion/people of another nationality]?" Responses were originally coded 1 = not at all; 2 = not very much; 3 = somewhat; 4 = completely. The item has been recoded into two dummies, one for unknown others (neighbors, people you meet for the first time) where 1 "trustworthy" = 3 or 4 for both items; and one for culturally distant others where 1 "trustworthy" = 3 or 4 for both items. WVS 2007. *p<0.05, *p<0.01, **p<0.001.

Similar to the common goods dimension, distinct costs of different levels of participation are not correlated with activists' perception of otherness. Being a sympathizer or an active member of SAB or GP does not imply that one has a more self-extensive understanding of others. This dimension seems thus to be a result of contentious participation

independently of the level to which one takes part. For activists' relation to society, the three assumptions formulated in the introduction of this chapter can thus be confirmed: Activists of challenging issues are cognitively stronger citizens than activists of mainstream issues, there is few variation between active members and sympathizers and, consequently, there is less variation between levels of participation than between different activists' communities.

7.3. Activists' relation towards politics

Is this also the case for my second dimension of strong citizen, i.e. their relation towards politics? Are these activists typical contenders, i.e. do they delegitimize state authorities and simultaneously legitimize contentious actors? What about their perception of citizen's role, do these activists value vigilance and commitment? And most importantly for this chapter, are there differences between types of activists? Are activists of more challenging issue stronger citizens than activists of more mainstream ones?

In Table 7.8, I start with a close look to activists' perception of political authorities. Thereby, I differentiate between a perception of political authorities concerning the respective political issue these activists are struggling for and a perception of political authorities in general. After all, these activists should at least de-legitimize political authorities in their strategic action field as they contribute to define and to protect the definition of shared meanings in their respective field. Or, do these activists delegitimize political authorities more generally?

If I look at Table 7.8 in general terms, three patterns are observable. First of all, activists of my three SMOs do not completely delegitimize political authorities. I did not get percentages above 80% indicating that political authorities are fully delegitimized. Even when it comes to general mistrust about political authorities of the EU for GP activists (76%) or the perception of a lack of the Federal Council's political willingness to improve migrant's rights for SAB activists (75%), still a quarter of these activists are optimistic about political authorities. As I have showed in the previous chapter, this result is certainly

context depend in the sense that national authorities in Switzerland are basically legitimized and perceived as well-working institutions.

Table 7.8: De-legitimization of political authorities⁴⁵

	SA	ΛB	ST	P	G	P
	Issue	In general	Issue	In general	Issue	In general
	%	%	%	%	%	%
International organizations / UN	30	40	23	40	51	54
Total	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%
n	407	403	512	512	491	473
SAB vs STP/GP (x ²)			6.3*	ns	- 40.2***	- 16.9***
STP vs. GP (χ^2)					- 86.4***	- 20.7***
Diff. within organization (φ)	.17**	.14**	-	-	ns	11*
European Union	62	61	55	65	69	76
Total	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%
n	402	395	481	506	483	476
SAB vs STP/GP (x ²)			4.4*	ns	- 5.4*	- 25.1***
STP vs. GP (χ^2)					- 21.4***	- 14.4***
Diff. within organization (φ)	ns	.14**	-	-	ns	ns
National authorities / Federal council	75	59	62	46	64	55
Total	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%
n	436	421	500	513	523	493
SAB vs STP/GP (χ ²)			18.6***	14.4***	14.2***	ns
STP vs. GP (χ^2)					ns	- 8.1**
Diff. within organization (φ)	ns	.18***	-	-	ns	.11*
Cantonal authorities	69	51	74	51	61	62
Total	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%
n	428	412	487	490	521	483
SAB vs STP/GP (χ²)			ns	ns	6.5*	- 13.3**
STP vs. GP (χ^2)					20.0***	- 13.1***
Diff. within organization (φ)	ns	ns	-	-	ns	ns
Communal authorities	59	39	75	44	53	50
Total	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%
n	420	409	492	488	520	486
SAB vs STP/GP (x²)			- 28.5***	ns	ns	- 12.0**
STP vs. GP (χ^2)					53.3***	ns
Diff. within organization (φ)	ns	ns	-	-	ns	ns

NOTE: For the contested issue: "In the following lost you have political authorities, associations and citizen groups who tend (or should tend) [to defend migrant's rights, the rights of political minorities, to protect the environment]." Please can you state to which degree, according to you, these authorities, associations and citizen groups have the willingness to improve [the rights of migrants, minorities rights, environmental protection] in Switzerland?" The item was measured on an ordinal scale from 1 "completely" to 4 "not at all". Answers of 1 or 2 were coded as "legitimization" whereas 3 or 4 as "de-legitimization".

For the perception of authorities in general: "How much confidence do you have in the [United Nations, European Union, Federal Council, Cantonal authorities, Communal authorities]?" The item was measured on an ordinal scale from 1 "a great deal" to 4 "not at all". Answers of 1 or 2 were coded as "legitimization" whereas 3 or 4 as "de-legitimization". *p<0.05, **p<0.01, ***p<0.001.

In other words, while I get generally higher levels of de-legitimization among these activists than among the Swiss population, these activists have not abandoned the "Swissway" to perceive political authorities. This is well reflected by the general high delegitimization of political authorities of the EU and an overall rather low de-legitimization

⁴⁵ I did not integrate activists trust regarding the national parliament as correlation between activists' perception of the Federal Council and of the national parliament are very high: Gamma for SAB .87***, for STP .90*** and .91*** for GP.

of political authorities. In other words, the general cultural toolkit (Swidler 1986) is also a part of activists' cognitions.

Second, I observe *considerable variation according to the political authority in question*. Percentages vary between 23% and 76%. This result demonstrates impressively that these activists perceive different political authorities in different ways. This is reasonable because some political authorities are more implied than others in the struggle about one specific political issue. Additionally, some political authorities can be sympathetic to a specific activists' cause while others can be fiercely against it. For example, activists of STP (23%) seem to take virtually for granted the political willingness of international organizations to protect and improve minority rights while most of them (75%) doubt that communal authorities will contribute to this issue in any way.

Third, these activists tend to delegitimize political authorities more for the political issue they are struggling for then in general terms. As expected, activists' understanding of shared meanings differs most of the understanding of political authorities in the field where they are participating. The perception of national authorities is probably the most striking example for this. 75% (SAB), 62% (STP) and 64% (GP) of activists delegitimize the Federal Council for the contested issue. With 59%, 46% and 55%, in contrast, they have constructed a milder perception of the Federal Council in general. With this example, one can see that national authorities are more perceived as a political enemies for what the field is concerned while they are less challenged in general terms.

On the organizational level, SAB activists delegitimize most political authorities of the national (75%) and cantonal level (69%). While they remain skeptical about the political authorities of the EU (62%), they are de-legitimizing less political authorities on the international level, especially when it comes to international organizations like the UN where only around a third of all SAB activists delegitimize political authorities. The high level of de-legitimization of national political authorities is understandable because the political debates about migrant's rights are almost exclusively situated on a national level.

The pattern for STP activists is similar. Again, de-legitimization for national authorities is higher than for international authorities. The unexpected high values for the issue specific de-legitimization of cantonal (74%) and communal (75%) authorities can probably be explained by the complete absence of political debates about collective minorities' rights. Asking STP activists if cantonal or communal authorities are politically willing to improve those rights results thus in a big refusal. This interpretation is further corroborated by the considerably lower de-legitimization for these political authorities in general.

GP activists are generally more ambiguous in their perception of political authorities tending more to a fifty-fifty split between legitimization and de-legitimization. Nowadays, political authorities are more concerned about environmental protection than some decades ago and they have integrated a pro-environmental discourse in the political messages they diffuse. However, more than 50% of all GP activists still are skeptical with regard to political authorities. For these environmentalists, this is especially striking for the international level where they clearly outnumber the de-legitimization of activists of the other two organizations. Today, the debate about environmental protection has clearly become a global issue and consequently, international political authorities are more carefully put under the microscope than this is the case with more national centered political struggles.

Looking specifically on differences between organizations reveals more clearly what I have described above. Activists of GP tend to delegitimize far more international political authorities than activists of SAB and STP. These, in turn, hardly differ in terms of their evaluation of international political authorities like those of the EU or UN. Activists of SAB are taking the lead on national authorities, they are clearly their most dominant opponent in terms of the definition of shared meaning in the field of migrants' rights. For cantonal and communal authorities, finally, STP activists are the fewest to perceive these actors as having a political willingness to improve minorities' rights. In contrast, activists of GP are more generally skeptical in these political authorities. Concerning cognitive differences between levels of participation, active members of SAB delegitimize political authorities on the international level and national authorities stronger than sympathizers.

For activists of GP, there is very little variation between active members and sympathizers.

These activists not only de-legitimize political authorities, they also strongly legitimize civil society actors as Table 7.9 impressively demonstrates. In fact, these activists do not only undergo a process of state de-legitimization, but also a process of understanding organized protest as a chance to change their own situation (Piven and Cloward 1979). If political authorities fail, then other collective actors have to take up their democratic responsibility to strive for social change, i.e. trying to influence the definition of shared meanings in a given field. A large majority of all activists strongly legitimizes social movement organizations. If it is the political willingness of civil society actors for the political issue concerned or general trust in ecological or humanitarian associations, all activists agree on the legitimate value of these actors. For contentious actors that are farer away from their respective struggle, activists still tend to legitimize these actors but to a lesser extent. Still more then 50% legitimize unions, for example. Consequently, differences between activists of different organizations are small and become only visible if I look at their perception of civil society actors that are further away from their field of action. No significant differences with regard to the level of participation are identifiable.

In sum, these activists have thus shown a tendency to de-legitimize political authorities and legitimize civil society actors. In other words, these activists tend to be resisting citizens with a specific *contentions perception of the political sphere*. A last analysis combines the indicators for the (de-)legitimization of political authorities and civil society actors in order to test this argument and to look at differences between these activists. The combination of the degree of legitimization of state authorities as well as that of collective actors leads theoretically to four possible options. Beside a resisting citizen implying a delegitimization of political authorities paired with a legitimization of civil society actors, a second option would be the legitimization of both, protest actors and state authorities. Activists in this category are opportunistic citizens, as they perceive protest action as an institutionalized means of political participation, which implies that they can choose the political strategies, which seems most promising to them. In other words, the interaction of protest actors and state authorities are seen as complementary politics and not as

contention. Such a finding would thus go in the direction of Meyer's and Tarrow's idea of a movement society (1998). The remaining two combinations presuppose a delegitimization of protest actors. This is a perception that I did only rarely got from activists' responses. A de-legitimization of protest actors but a legitimization of political authorities, the third possible combination, is what I would call a compliant citizen whereas a de-legitimization of both, protest actors and political authorities would describe an anarchistic citizen.

Table 7.9: Legitimization of civil society actors within one's field and beyond

		SAB	STP	GP
		%	%	%
Civil society actors for the issue concerned		100	97	98
·	Total	100%	100%	100%
	n	456	537	544
SAB vs STP/GP (χ^2)			7.3**	4.1*
STP vs. GP (χ^2)				ns
Diff. within organization (φ)		ns	-	11*
Ecological associations in general		94	90	94
	Total	100%	100%	100%
	n	415	534	502
SAB vs STP/GP (χ^2)			ns	ns
STP vs. GP (χ^2)				- 6.1*
Diff. within organization (φ)		ns	-	ns
Humanitarian and charitable associations in general		95	92	84
	Total	100%	100%	100%
	n	420	518	485
SAB vs STP/GP (χ^2)			ns	31.5***
STP vs. GP (χ^2)				17.4***
Diff. within organization (φ)		ns	-	ns
Unions in general		78	66	55
	Total	100%	100%	100%
	n	384	481	469
SAB vs STP/GP (χ^2)			14.7***	45.9***
STP vs. GP (χ^2)				10.5**
Diff. within organization (φ)		ns	-	ns

NOTE: For civil society actors "In the following lost you have political authorities, associations and citizen groups who tend (or should tend) [to defend migrant's rights, the rights of political minorities, to protect the environment]." Please can you state to which degree, according to you, these authorities, associations and citizen groups have the willingness to improve [the rights of migrants, minorities rights, environmental protection] in Switzerland?" The item was measured on an ordinal scale from 1 "completely" to 4 "not at all". Answers of 1 or 2 were coded as "legitimization" whereas 3 or 4 as "de-legitimization".

For the perception of ecological associations, humanitarian associations and unions: "How much confidence do you have in the [ecological associations, humanitarian or charitable associations, Unions]?" The item was measured on an ordinal scale from 1 " a great deal" to 4 "not at all". Answers of 1 or 2 were coded as "legitimization" whereas 3 or 4 as "de-legitimization". *p<0.05, **p<0.01. *p<0.05, **p<0.01. *p<0.001.

While resisting citizens represent the majority of all activists, by far not every activist has such a contentious perception of the political sphere (Table 7.10). Between 32 to 76% of activists are resisting citizen while 24 to 64% are opportunistic citizens, legitimizing thus both political authorities and civil society actors. Together these two categories account

for the vast majority of all activists. One reason why an important part of these activists are opportunistic citizens may be due to the existence of direct democratic institutions in Switzerland. In fact, Switzerland is a country with comparatively few protest action (Kriesi 1995) as there are, in contrast to France for example, opportunities to influence the political agenda in a much more institutionalized way.

Table 7.10: Perception of the political sphere

		S	AB	ST	'P	G	P
		Issue	In general	Issue	In general	Issue	In general
		%	%	%	%	%	%
]	National authorit	ies			
Resisting citizen		76	60	62	45	63	56
Opportunistic citizen		24	34	35	48	36	37
Compliant citizen		0	1	3	4	1	2
Anarchistic citizen		0	4	0	4	1	5
	Total	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%
	n	429	316	488	373	520	393
SAB vs STP/GP (χ^2)				23.7***	19.5***	20.3***	ns
STP vs. GP (χ^2)						- 11.1*	- 13.0**
Diff. within organization (V)		ns	.19*	-	-	.16**	.16*
		In	ternational autho	rities			
Resisting citizen		43	44	32	49	62	66
Opportunistic citizen		56	49	64	44	35	26
Compliant citizen		1	1	3	2	0	3
Anarchistic citizen		0	7	0	6	2	6
	Total	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%
	n	235	255	293	356	328	333
SAB vs STP/GP (χ^2)				9.6*	ns	- 27.6***	- 37.6***
STP vs. GP (χ^2)						- 65.9***	- 26.0***
Diff. within organization (V)		ns	.22**	-	-	ns	ns

NOTE: Combined indicators from Table 7.8 and 7.9. If a respondent delegitimizes political authorities and legitimizes civil society organizations, he was recoded as a resisting citizen. Legitimizing both, political authorities and civil society organizations was recoded as a opportunistic citizen. Legitimizing authorities and delegitimizing organizations was recoded as a compliant citizen and, finally, delegitimizing both types of actors was recoded as an anarchistic perception. For national authorities, I used the following indicators: National authorities and civil society actors for the issue, Federal council, national parliament, ecological associations, humanitarian associations and civil society actors for the issue, the European Union, the United Nations, ecological associations, humanitarian associations and unions for their general perception. Perception of political authorities were combined with and "and" while combination of civil society actors were combined with an "or". *p<0.05, **p<0.01, ***p<0.001.

I separated activists' perception of the political sphere between the national and international level in order to illustrate again differences between the two levels. In fact, I want to pinpoint to the manner how activists' perception of the political sphere is influenced by the respective political issue they are struggling for. Consequently, activists of SAB tends more to the resisting citizen on the national level while GP activists takes the lead on the international level. Significantly fewer activists of STP are resisting citizen. Interestingly, an opportunistic perception is represented mostly for STP and SAB activists on the international level. This is an interesting finding because collective actors have far less

institutionalized means to influence the international political level than they have for national political authorities.

The last dimension of activists' relation to politics is activists' perception of their *role as political citizens*. In a very explicit way, (Barber 1984:133) points also to this dimension: "In a strong democracy, politics is something done by not to citizens. Activity is its chief virtue, and involvement, commitment, obligation and service – common deliberation, common decision, and common work – are its hallmarks". These activists should thus consider that individuals, as political citizens have to be implicated in the political sphere. More specifically, my theory puts forward that activists perceive themselves, on the one hand, as politically critical and vigilant citizens and, on the other hand, as citizens being politically active.

Table 7.11: Citizen's duties

	SAB	STP	GP
	%	%	%
To keep watch on government	63	39	43
n	426	537	506
SAB vs STP/GP (χ^2)		54.9***	36.6***
STP vs GP (χ^2)			ns
Diff. within organization (ϕ)	ns		ns
To be active in social and political assoc.	58	35	31
n	425	522	504
SAB vs STP/GP (χ^2)		51.8***	70.2***
STP vs GP (χ^2)			ns
Diff. within organization (φ)	.19***		.19***

NOTE: "How important is it for a good citizen [to keep watch on the action of government, to be active in social and political associations]?" Responses were originally coded 1 = not important at all to 7 = very important. The item has been recoded into a dummy where 1 "important" = 6 or 7. *p<0.05, **p<0.01, ***p<0.001.

As Table 7.11 demonstrates, however, activists of different organizations differ from each other. In fact, activists of SAB tend to perceive the citizens' role most extremely. Activists of more challenging contentious issues are far more vigilant and active citizens then those of STP and GP. Thus, SAB activists are stronger citizens on this dimension. I also find differences for different levels of participation. While active members and sympathizers agree on their role as vigilant citizens, they diverge heavily on the active dimension. This difference suits well their actual form of participation: Active participation is thus more

important for active members than for sympathizers. Meanwhile both types of activists can express their vigilance through their form of participation.

7.4. Concluding remarks

To conclude this chapter, I first of all want to resume one main statement of chapter 5. Whereas this chapter focused on cognitive variations between these activists, which exist to a considerable degree, these activists display overall *a rather homogeneous cognitive outlook*. By far not all cognitions are subject of change. As my theory suggested, some cognitions are rather stable like for example the legitimization of civil society actors. The empirical evidence of this chapter showed this again in an impressive way.

Having said this, I want to focus here on the three hypotheses developed in the introduction of this chapter. In the Table 7.12 I summed up the variations for different types of organizations and levels of participation in order to give a general overview. Therein, I emphasized existing variation with a grey color. The first column lists the indicator I used to test my assumptions. The second column summarizes the variations between different levels of political challenge, i.e. between challenging and mainstream contentions, whereas the third column shows variations between different levels of participation, i.e. between active members (A) and sympathizers.

The first hypothesis stated that SAB activists are stronger citizens than activists of GP and STP due to their implication in a more challenging political protest. The evidence for the strong citizen dimensions demonstrated that activists of SAB are systematically stronger citizens than activists of STP and GP. SAB activists tend to value more citizens' contribution to common goods, the put less social frontiers between themselves and culturally others, they de-legitimize more national political authorities and they value more an active and vigilant citizen. Exceptions are the indicators measuring the self-extension scale and the perception of international political authorities. Nevertheless, on an aggregate level, SAB activists tend thus to be stronger citizens concerning their relation to society and politics. In contrast, the same thesis does not apply to the holy cognitive trinity. In fact, GP

activists perceive their political issue as more central and see themselves, as well as the SMO they are member of, as more effective than SAB activists. Thus, for the holy cognitive trinity, other mechanisms seem to be at stake than for the strong citizen dimensions.

Table 7.12: Summary table for variations of activists' cognitions

	Level of pol. challenge SAB vs. STP vs. GP	Level of participation Active memb. vs. Symp
Holy cognitive trinity		, ,
Injustice frame	GP > SAB > STP	A > S
Collective efficacy	GP > STP > SAB	No
Individual utility	GP > SAB = STP	A > S
Identity frame	No	No
Strong citizen		
Relation to society: Common goods		
Responsibility for the commons	SAB > STP = GP	No
Sense of living in a society	SAB > GP > STP	No
Relation to society: Self-extension		
Self-extension scale	STP = GP > SAB	No
Social frontiers: Cultural minorities	SAB > STP > GP	A > S (GP)
Trust towards others: Unknown others	SAB > STP = GP	No
Trust towards others: Distant others	SAB > STP = GP	No
Relation to politics: Political authorities		
International authorities (issue)	GP > SAB > STP	A > S (SAB)
EU (issue)	GP > SAB > STP	No
National authorities (issue)	SAB > STP = GP	No
International authorities (in general)	GP > SAB = STP	A > S
EU (in general)	GP > SAB = STP	A > S (SAB)
Federal Council (in general)	SAB = GP > STP	A > S
Relation to politics: Civil society actors		
Civil society actors (issue)	SAB > STP = GP	S > A (GP)
Ecological associations (in general)	No	No
Humanitarian associations (in general)	SAB = STP > GP	No
Unions (in general)	SAB > STP > GP	No
Relation to politics: Citizen's role		
Vigilance	SAB > STP = GP	No
Activity	SAB > STP = GP	A > S

The second hypothesis stated that I would come across few variations for different levels of participation. In fact, levels of participation are less correlated with activists' perception of a strong citizen then different types of activists. Active members show up a more challenging perception of political authorities, they are resisting citizens and it is more central to them to be an active citizen. The analysis of the holy cognitive trinity revealed similar findings. For active members, their political issue is more central in their daily life and they perceive themselves as more useful than sympathizers. I come thus to the conclusion that the level

of participation seems to be correlated with activists' perception that are directly linked to their form of action.

In consequence, the third hypothesis, which stated that I come across more variations between members of different organizations than between different levels of participation, can also be confirmed. For the strong citizen dimensions, the evidence demonstrates that activists of SAB are systematically stronger citizens than activists of STP and GP. To be an activist in such a challenging field like the defense of migrant's rights requires thus more consolidated cognitive resources than for more mainstream issues. Activists of more challenging organizations seem thus to be stronger citizens than activists of more mainstream issues. Where do these differences come from? What is the role of other, more structural factors for movement participation? These questions will be the task of the next and last empirical chapter.

8. Cognitions matter, but what about other factors?

In the previous chapters, I have exclusively focused on cognitive variances between these activists and the general population on the one hand and between different types of activists on the other. Thereby, I was able to demonstrate that activists' cognitions are specific with regard to the general population, i.e. their aggregated worldviews really delimitate them from the Swiss population. Subsequently, I analyzed the content of activists' cognitions by the help of 12 narratives of defenders of migrants' rights and environmentalists. On the basis of the elaborated theoretical framework, this material pointed to the existence of a specific cognitive outlook that can be labeled as one of a strong citizen. This implies that these activists did not construct specific cognitions on every imaginable dimension but merely on two dimensions that I labeled activists' relation to society and to politics respectively. These two cognitive dimensions together are what I described as their cognitive outlook as a strong citizen. However, activists are not like lemmings. While they share a rather similar cognitive worldview with respect to the strong citizen dimensions, they constructed theses perceptions subjectively through their own experiences during their lifetime and an important one of these experiences is movement participation. Consequently, I proceeded then to a comparison between different types of activists. During this analysis, I could show that cognitions barely vary between different levels of participation, i.e. between active members and sympathizers while there is more substantial variations between more challenging protest issues (the defense of migrant's rights) and more consensual protest issues (environmental protection, collective minorities rights). However, cognitions are not the only relevant factor. Consequently, I wonder if these cognitive differences are able to explain membership at a specific point in time in different SMOs while controlling for other challenging factors? The main aim of this last empirical chapter is thus to broaden up the narrow focus on cognitions and to start looking at a bigger picture by taking other factors into account.

In the course of this chapter, I will first present the statistical tool I use to conduct this multivariate analysis, i.e. discriminant analysis. I will briefly discuss why I prefer disciminant analysis with respect to a regression analysis and I discuss the main assumption of this type of analysis. I then present the challenging factors I take into

consideration, namely interactive processes, biographical availability and the holy cognitive trinity. I will refresh the considerations of the theoretical chapter and of the literature review that made me take these factors into account and discuss the indicators I use to measure these theoretical concepts. I then present the analysis and my interpretation. In a last step, I will then return to two of the interviews in order to illustrate how these various factors could possibly interact. In other words, I try to show two examples in order to demonstrate how structural and cognitive factors, i.e. the micro and the meso level, together allow us to better understand movement participation and differences between activists.

8.1. What is discriminant analysis and why do I use it?

I have conducted a discriminant analysis in order to test if the strong citizen concept is a substantial discriminant factor for activists of SAB, STP and GP. "Discriminant analysis is a statistical technique which allows the researcher to study the differences between two or more groups of objects with respect to several variables simultaneously" (Klecka 1980:7). While regressions are probably the main tool to do a multivariate analysis in social sciences in general, I prefer discriminant analysis for two reasons. On the one hand, discriminant analysis is a simple and straightforward tool to compare more than two groups simultaneously. On the other hand, and more importantly, discriminant analysis does not have such a strong causal baseline assumption like regression analysis. As Klecka's quotations underlines, it is an analysis that allows studying the differences between groups without a clear statistical fixation of cause and effect. It is such a kind of statistical tool that is closer to both, the nature of my data and my theoretical framework. Discriminant analysis analyzes differences between groups and allows us to classify every activist into the group that he or she most closely resembles (Klecka 1980:8). In other words, discriminant analysis tests if I am able to correctly classify these activists to their respective organization by the help of the discriminative factors I suggest. In addition to that, discriminant analysis allows me to plot these activists on the basis of two discriminative functions, which is a final opportunity to judge the differences between activists of SAB, STP and GP.

As discriminant analysis is not used very often, I briefly want to discuss the major assumptions, which are the following: "The observations are a random sample; each predictor variable is normally distributed; each of the allocations for the dependent categories in the initial classification are correctly classified; there must be at least two groups of categories, with each case belonging to only one group so that the groups are mutually exclusive and collectively exhaustive; each group or category must be well defined, clearly differentiated from any other group(s) and natural [...]; the groups or categories should be defined before collecting the data; the attribute(s) used to separate the groups should discriminate clearly between the groups so that group or category overlap is clearly non-existent or minimal; group size of the dependent should not be grossly different and should be at least five times the number of independent variables" (Burns and Burns 2009:590-91).

While my activists' sample fulfills these major assumptions, I want to briefly discuss four points. The first point refers to the assumption of normal distribution. While most of my discriminating variables are normally distributed, I also use many dummy variables. However, this is not problematic as dummies can be used for discriminant analysis (Burns and Burns 2009:590). Second, another major assumption states that the groups have to be mutually exclusive. Technically, this is the case because the indicators used for this analysis allocate every activist to one exclusive group (either SAB, STP or GP). In reality, however, this might not be true. In fact, as other indicators show, activists of STP, GP and especially SAB are heavily embedded in several SMOs. Before they joined the defense of migrant's rights, for example, 68% of all SAB activists were members of at least one postindustrial organization, and still 44% of an organization defending environmental protection, (Passy and Monsch 2011:12). It is thus highly probable that some of these activists are not exclusively member of the organization they are allocated to. While it is just normal that natural persons do not behave, as one would like it technically to be, this should not be too much of an issue. As William Klecka (1980:61) argues with reference to the violence of some major assumptions: "Several authors (see in particular Lachenbruch 1975) have shown that discriminant analysis is a rather robust technique which can tolerate some deviation from these assumptions." This does not imply that I can just ignore these problems. However, I still can have confidence in my results, especially there

where I find big differences between groups. In contrast, I will be more prudent with the interpretation of results that are only borderline significant.

A third point that I want to address is the weighting of the respondents. In the previous empirical chapters, I introduced a weighting because of the issues I raised in the methodological chapter. In addition, the previous chapters aimed to compare representative samples of groups of activists and the whole population. For this analytical task weighting is important in order to give the most representative picture possible. In contrast, in this chapter weighting is less important as I am interested in the relation between variables. I therefore calculated this discriminant analysis without weightings.⁴⁶ Finally, a last issue is the rather high number of missing information. In fact, my full model is calculated on the basis of only 779 out of 2048 respondents (38%). I run this analysis many times with every imaginable combination of indicators and I was able to pull out for some combination some more valid cases. The best I could get was something around 1000 valid cases, which would include about the half of all respondents in the analysis. As I already discussed in the methodological chapter, the combination of the length of the questionnaire with the technique to use the Internet to fill it out resulted in this rather high amount of missing data. If one starts then to do multivariate analysis the missing data logically gets multiplied due to listwise exclusion. At the end, I decided not to take the model with the most valid cases but to stick with the, in my view, most appropriate indicators for my variables of interest for two main reasons. On the one hand, I did not get different results at all by inserting different indicators. And on the other, I judged the validity of my indicators more important than the number of my valid cases. In other words, I prefer to remain faithful to my theoretical model than to deviate from it for statistical reasons. This is also the reason why I refrained from any imputation technique.

Being so highly transparent with the limits of one's data involves the risk that one starts to doubt *the credibility of the results*. Why should one have confidence in these results? First, being aware of the limits of one's analysis allows me to interpret the results with more prudence. Thanks to the robustness of the analysis, I am convinced that strong differences can be interpreted as such while I have to be more conservative in the

⁴⁶ Actually, I run the analysis once with and once without weighting and I received the same results.

interpretation of small difference. Second, the results I present below strongly resonate with the theoretical reflections I elaborated so far. Thus, there are very interesting, but no revolutionary, results in what follows below.

8.2. Challenging factors

Before I start to discuss the analysis I briefly discuss the discriminative variables I introduced in the analysis. Three main concepts are at the basis of these variables: Cognitions, interactive processes and biographical availability.

McAdam (1988:44) described the aggregate Freedom Summer activist as someone who is biographical available: "Students, especially those drawn from privileged classes, are simply free, to a unique degree, of constraints that tend to make activism too time consuming or risky for other groups to engage in. Often freed from the demands of family, marriage, and full-time employment, students are uniquely available to express their political values through action." What McAdam described here is one important piece of information that separated the applicants of Freedom Summer from the general US population. Why, thus, does it make sense to integrate this concept to compare activists of three different organizations? After all, they are all activists and, consequently, should all, in the aggregate, be biographical available. However, the Freedom Summer experience was a highly challenging form of activism and it is on this dimension that my three groups of activists vary. Consequently, I assume that activists of more challenging protests, i.e. SAB activists, should be more biographical available than activists of STP and GP. I use two indicators to test this argument. The first indicator "children at home" is dichotomous and assesses if the respondent still has any children at home to which he is responsible for (coded as 1).⁴⁷ The second indicator "work full time" is dichotomous too and assesses if the respondent works full time (1) or not.48

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⁴⁷ The following question was used: "Do you have any children?" If the respondent checked "Yes, they live with me" he was considered as still having children at home (=1). If the respondent checked "Yes, but they do not live with me" or "no, I don't have any children" than he was coded zero on this indicator.

⁴⁸ The following questions were used: "Do you currently have a job?" and "Does your work correspond to a full time job (80 to 100%) (1) or to a part time job, 50 to less then 80% (2), 30 to less then 50% (3) or less then 30% (4). " If the respondent (1) for the second question, he was coded as 1. If he respondent checked "no" for the first question or 2,3,4 for the second question, he was coded as 0.

The second concept I use in this analysis are social interactive processes. According to Passy and Monsch (forthcoming), taking part in protest is not a decision an individual takes at one single moment but it is a dynamic process occurring in a rather long-lasting period of time (Opp and Gern 1993; Klandermans 1997; Passy 2001; McAdam 2003). Relying on the work of Klandermans (1997), the process towards movement participation can be split into three main sequences⁴⁹. First and before committing in a protest action, individuals need to be sensitized to a specific protest issue. In other words, they develop in their cognitive toolkit a frame of moral indignation and start to perceive contention as a valuable action repertoire to influence politics. People should develop a system of meanings that allow them to sympathize with a movement. Second, to join protest, individuals need to be motivated to participate. Moral indignation and the acceptance of protest as a valuable action repertoire are not sufficient to be motivated to participate to a contentious action. Activists have to identify with the protest actor and develop an agency frame, which allow them to perceive their contribution and that of the collective protest actor as able to bring about social and political changes. Finally, sensitized and motivated individuals need an opportunity to protest. In other words, they need to be connected to a specific protest actor. To sum up, sensitizing, motivating and connecting processes are the three main interactive processes that lead - if successful - towards movement participation.

In order to operationalize these processes in a smart way, one has to think about how these interactions come about. I differentiate between three spaces of interactions. First, social networks are probably the most prominent locus in the literature where social interaction takes place. Discussions with actors close to the protest issue and the contentious repertoires favor the development or strengthening of political concern toward the protest issue and to consider a specific contentious repertoire as a valuable mean of political action. They thus led individuals to be sensitized to a specific contention. Conversational interactions can provide actors with other action frames too, like identity and agency frames that motivated them to join protest action.

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⁴⁹ See also Figure 3.3 on page 65.

I distinguish two other processes that also contribute in enriching actors' cognitive map and who are able to connect the individual with a protest opportunity. Individuals do not only interact with others but also with themselves, as Herbert Blumer (1969) taught us. People are, through their own life experiences, developing and transforming their mind map. They also enrich it through their quest of knowledge on the world around them through their personal readings and their search of information⁵⁰. I label this process as *self-interaction* where, without interactions with other but through one's own mental activities, people enlarge and modify their cognitive toolkit.

Individuals' mind map is also created and transformed by the external world that does not necessarily imply social interactions. Sociopolitical events, or sudden imposed grievances, such as wars, nuclear accidents or massive deportation of "sans-papiers" participate in developing and modifying individuals' cognitive toolkit by provoking moral shocks (Jasper 1997). Similarly, collective protest actors enrich and modify individuals' cognitive map through their public actions (campaigns, advertisement). This is what the literature calls framing strategies (Snow, Zurcher et al. 1980). Thus, individuals' cognitive toolkit are also enlarged and transformed by what I call *external processes* (Passy and Monsch forthcoming). Thus, beside interactions in social networks, self-interactions and external processes contribute to the creation and transformation of cognitive elements within individuals' cognitive map and help to connect individuals with protest opportunities.

I assume that activists of SAB, STP and GP can be differentiated through the level of complexity of sensitizing, motivating and connecting processes. Consequently, to become sensitized to the defense of migrant's rights for example, appropriate social networks, self-interactions and external processes are necessary while for the defense of human rights it is sufficient to interact for five minutes with a street recruiter. This is certainly an exaggerated example but should reflect the general idea behind this assumption: SAB activists need more interactive processes than activists of GP and STP to become an activist of their respective field. Accordingly, I operationalized the number of processes taking place for

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⁵⁰ I follow the thesis of selective exposure to media and information (Sears and Freedman 1967).

sensitizing⁵¹ (0 to 2), motivating⁵² (0 to 3) and connecting⁵³ (0 to 4) respondents to the protest issue.

The third concept is obviously *cognition*. For this analysis in this chapter, I separated cognitions into two blocs: One that reflects the holy cognitive trinity and the other that reflects the strong citizen concept. Thus, I remain coherent with the general theoretical framework elaborated so far. For the holy cognitive trinity concept, I used three indicators. I created dummies for the centrality of the issue (injustice frame, see Table 7.1), for collective efficacy (see Table 7.2) and for individual utility (see Table 7.3). I did not integrate the identification indicator, as this question was not asked to GP activists. For the strong citizen concept, I used five indicators⁵⁴. For activists' relation to society, I used the indicator responsibility for common goods (see Table 7.5) for the common goods dimensions, and the social frontiers towards cultural minorities indicator for activists' self-extension (see Table 7.7). For activists' relation to politics, I used the resisting citizen dummy for the national level (see Table 7.10) for activists' relation to

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⁵¹ Sensitizing processes were measured by two questions. The first is related to informal networks and asked if "before joining SAB/STP/GP, close friend, acquaintances and family members were sensitized or attentive to the problem of migrant's rights/autochthonous population' rights/ environmental protection?" I recoded this item into a dummy where 1 signifies that at least 1 member of the informal network was sensitized. The second question was related to the respondents' formal network and asked if they "could tell if they were a member or already committed to the following list of associations before joining SAB/STP/GP?" They were presented with an exhaustive list of organizations (feminist, human rights, religious, etc.). I recoded this item into a dummy where 1 signifies that the respondent was member of at least 1 post-industrial organization. These two indicators where then combined into a scale where 0 signifies that they were neither sensitized through their informal nor through their formal network, 1 signifies that they were either sensitized through their informal or their formal network and 2 signifies that they were sensitized through their informal as well as through their formal network.

⁵² Motivating processes were measured by the following question: "What did encourage you to participate in the defense of migrant's rights/autochthonous population' rights/environmental protection? (Many responses are possible please cross all items in the list below that induced you to participate)." Respondents were presented with an exhaustive list that I recoded as follows: (1) Always motivated (I always wanted to participate), (2) Social networks (A good friend, An acquaintance/neighbor/colleague, A member of my family, An organization I was member of, A religious community), (3) Inner interaction (A personal experience, My work, Personal readings, The media) and (4) External processes (A political, social or humanitarian event, Publications/information from SAB/STP/GP, Campaigns, demonstrations, actions of SAB/STP/GP). I then computed a scale counting the number of processes that were necessary to motivate the respondent where 0 signifies that the respondent always was motivated and 3 signifies that the respondent was motivated through all three processes.

⁵³ Connecting processes were measured by the following question: "Could you tell us how you entered into contact with SAB/STP/GP? It is by means of...(3 responses at maximum)." Respondents were presented with an exhaustive list that I recoded as follows: (1) Social networks (A friend/neighbor/colleague, A member of my family, An organization I was a member of), (2) Actions of SAB/STP/GP (Publication/information from SAB/STP/GP, Campaigns/ demonstrations of SAB/STP/GP), (3) Media (Report in the media/internet about SAB/STP/GP), (4) Other channels (Other). I then computed a scale counting the number of processes that were necessary to connect the respondent with the SMO where 0 signifies that the respondent did not need any of these channels and 4 signifies that the respondent needed all four channels.

⁵⁴ In the elaboration of this model, I tried itineration with every single indicator available. The selection of the indicators that are finally integrated is based on the amount of valid cases and on the amount of existing variance between activists of different organizations.

political authorities and the two indicators for their perception of citizen's role (see Table 7.11).

The main interest of the analysis that follows now is to see what the strong citizen concept can contribute as a discriminative factor between activists of SAB, STP and GP in the light of other seriously challenging factors. The main assumption remains the same, that is, activists of SAB are stronger citizens that activists of STP and GP.

8.3. Does the strong citizen concept discriminate activists' communities?

To start with, I want to assess the *general quality of the model* I suggested. Several indicators of the output of the discriminant analysis help me to do this task. First, one step of discriminant analysis is to classify the cases according to the functions that were calculated by the help of the discriminant variables introduced in the model (i.e. biographical availability, interactive processes and cognitions). The full model⁵⁵ manages to correctly classify 70.1% of original grouped cases and 68.7% of cross-validated grouped cases. The latter estimation is a more reliable classification as "it successively classifies all cases but one to develop a discriminant function and then categorizes the case that was left out. This process is repeated with each case left out in turn. [...] The argument behind it is that one should not use the case you are trying to predict as part of the categorization process" (Burns and Burns 2009:602). 69 to 70% correctly classified cases is an improve to the 47% chance of correct classification for a model without information⁵⁶. This is, however, not a magnificent result. Below, I will come back to the reasons why this is the case.

⁵⁵ The full model means that all 12 indicators are used.

⁵⁶ If there is no information for classification, all cases would be attributed to the largest group, i.e. activists of GP. They represent roughly 47% of all cases.

Table 8.1: Tests of equality for all discriminant variables

TV/2	Model
IV's	F
Social networks	
Sensitizing processes (0-3)	78.1***
Motivating processes (0-3)	9.0***
Contacting processes (0-4)	26.9***
Biographical availability	
Child at home	26.0***
Work full time	8.9***
Holy cognitive trinity	
Injustice frame (0-1)	78.7***
Collective efficacy (0-1)	40.7***
Individual utility (0-1)	1.5
Strong citizen	
Common goods (0-1)	3.2*
Self-extension (0-1)	7.9***
Resisting citizen (0-1)	11.8***
Vigilant citizen (0-1)	16.6***
Active citizen (0-1)	36.0***
n	779

Table 8.1 provides statistical evidence of *significant differences between the means of the three groups for most of the discriminant variables.* Accordingly, the suggested variables are able to explain a part of the differences between the activists' groups. Activists of GP, STP and SAB differ most on their perceptions of the injustice frame (F-Test: 78.7***) and the number of sensitizing processes (78.1***) they have experienced. I also identify important differences for their perception of collective efficacy (40.7***), for the importance of active citizens (36.0***), for the number of contacting processes (26.9***) and for children at home (26.0***). In contrast, activists' perception of common goods (3.2*) and of individual utility (1.5) does not discriminate between the three groups. In addition, calculating pooled within-group matrices also supports the use of these variables, as *intercorrelations are low*. While most of the correlations are below 0.1, I found the strongest correlations between activists' perception of collective efficacy and individual utility (Pearson's r of 0.28) and between motivating and contacting processes (0.22).

Table 8.2: Log determinants for each group and Box's M test

Model's							
Log Determinar							
-22.4							
-20.0							
-20.6							
-20.0							
704.7							
3.8***							

While the assumption for ANOVA is that the variances were equivalent for each group, the basic assumption of discriminant analysis is that the variance-co-variance matrices are equivalent. The Box's M test in Table 8.2 tested the null hypothesis that the covariance matrix does not differ for the dependent variable, which is in my case organizational affiliation of the respondents. (Burns and Burns 2009:598). Accordingly, we are aiming for equal log determinants. While the log determinants in my model are fairly similar (-22.4 for SAB activists, -20.0 for GP activists and -20.6 for STP activists), Box's M test resulted in a high value (704.7) with an F of 3.8 which is highly significant. While this analysis confirms does the attributed moderate value of the model by the evaluation of correct classification, significant Box's M tests are not so important with large samples (idem.).

The last "goodness of fit" tests for a discriminant analysis are eigenvalues and Wilks' Lambda tests for the produced discriminant functions (Table 8.3). The maximum number of calculated discriminant functions is the number of groups minus 1 (Burns and Burns 2009:598). Therefore, two functions results from my analysis of three groups. The canonical correlations⁵⁷ of .60 and .46 indicate that the two functions explain 36.12% and 21.34% respectively of the variation in the grouping variables. Thus, the two functions explain a neat amount of the differences between activists of SAB, STP and GP. Overall, the evaluation of the model reveals that it contributes a significant amount of the explanation of the differences between groups. After having tested a huge number of models in order

⁵⁷ "The canonical correlation is the multiple correlation between the predictors and the discriminant function". The squared canonical correlation provides an index of overall model fit, which is interpreted as being the proportion of variance explained. This is thus similar as the r² for multiple regressions (Burns and Burns 2009:598).

to come up with the one presented here, I suggest that these is the best I can get with the indicators at my disposition. However, a bunch of questions are still unanswered.

Table 8.3: Eigenvalues and Wilks' Lambda tests

Function	Eigenvalue	% of var	Canonical correlation	Wilks' Lambda	Chi ²		
1	.566	67.6	.60	.50	529.6**		
2	.271	32.4	.46	.79	184.5***		

What do these functions represent? And which variables do contribute the most to account for the differences between these activists' groups? I will answer these questions now as I come to the interpretation of the coefficients for the functions produced. Table 8.4 gives a general overview. The structure matrix indicates the relative importance of the predictors. The structure matrix shows the correlations of each variable with each discriminate function. They are thus the functional equivalent of factor loading in a factorial analysis. Standardized coefficients fulfill a similar function like the values in the structure matrix. The standardized coefficients are interpreted in the same way as beta's in a regression model (Burns and Burns 2009:599-600).

Finally, Table 8.4 also accounts for the undstandardized coefficients, which are used to create the discriminant function. Again, this is very similar to the regression equation (Burns and Burns 2009:600). At this stage of the analysis, I will spend more time to interpret the structural variables, i.e. interactive processes and biographical availability, as these factors were only briefly discussed in the previous chapters. In contrast, I will spend less time to discuss the differences for the cognitive variables as I discussed them at length during the previous chapter.

Table 8.4: Standardized, unstandardized coefficients and the structure matrix

	Structure		Standardized		Unstandardized	
	matrix					
	Function 1	Function 2	Function 1	Function 2	Function 1	Function 2
Model 7						
Social interacti	ive processes					
Sensitizing	583 (1)	.184 (7)	565	.073	634	.081
Motivating	045 (10)	.285 (3)	090	.142	114	.181
Contacting	.112 (9)	.480 (2)	.153	.413	.258	.697
Bio. Ava	ilability					
Child at home	.343 (4)	040 (10)	.407	045	1.007	111
Work	.183 (6)	121 (12)	.198	043	.404	087
Holy cognit	tive trinity					
Injustice	.277 (8)	.767 (1)	.328	.772	.756	1.778
Coll. efficacy	.426 (2)	096 (8)	.468	161	1.330	456
Ind. utility	.073 (7)	058 (13)	085	225	174	462
Stuana	citizen					
Com. goods	094 (13)	.109 (6)	061	.013	237	.052
Self-extension	` '		001 .147	.060	2 <i>51</i> .444	.183
	.190 (5)	018 (11)	.147 089	.060	. 444 194	.183 .407
Resisting cit.	177 (12)	.215 (5)				
Vigilant cit.	204 (11)	.267 (4)	064	.229	131	.467
Active citizen	379 (3)	.207 (9)	335	.090	709	.190
Constant					.014	-2.554

According to the values of the structure matrix, the first function is mainly composed of four discriminant variables: The number of sensitizing processes (-.583), the perception of collective efficacy (.426), the perception of one's civic role as an active citizen (-.379) and the fact of having at least one child at home (.343). Usually, 0.3 is a cut-off between important and less important variables (Burns and Burns 2009:600). While the perception of the injustice frame also correlates moderately well with the first function (.277), this variable clearly belongs to the second function as the very high correlation (.767) in the second column indicates. The standardized and unstandardized values confirm this interpretation. But what do these values mean? To begin with, sensitizing processes are the most discriminative factor in a rather complex array of processes and perceptions that distinguish SAB, STP and GP activists. The negative sign indicates that SAB activists need more sensitizing processes then activists of the other two organizations. This is also what is revealed if we compare the means for these groups: SAB activists needed on average 2.8 sensitizing process (standard deviation of 0.6), while activists of STP (mean=2.3, std. dev.=1.0) and activists of GP (1.9,1.0) needed significantly less channels to become sensitized to the protest issue. This confirms what I expected; it is way more

difficult to become sensitized to a challenging protest issue like the defense of migrant's rights than to become sensitized to a mainstream issue. STP activists are located exactly in the middle of SAB and GP. This result for STP activists is understandable because their political claims for collective human rights are rather mainstream issues in comparison with the one's of SAB. However, their claims are way less visible than the one of Greenpeace.

Not only sensitizing processes account for the differences between the groups of activists, their perception of collective efficacy (.426) is also an important element in this story. The positive sign indicates that SAB activists perceive their organization as less effective than the other two groups of activists. A comparison of means confirms this result (SAB activists: 0.7, 0.5, STP activists: 0.8, 0.4, GP activists: 0.9, 0.2). The third important discriminant variable is the perception of one's civic role as an active citizen (-.379). SAB activists (0.6, 0.5) judge thus political activity as more important than the other two groups (GP: 0.3, 0.5. STP: 0.4, 0,5). Finally, biographical availability, and more concretely the fact of having a child at home (.343), also discriminates between the three groups such that GP activists (0.3, 0.5) have generally more children at home then activists of the other two organizations (STP: 0.2, 0.4, SAB: 0.1, 0.3). Challenging issues like the defense of migrant's rights are more risky and children provide therefore an additional hurdle that has to be overcome if one is willing to engage in this protest. An additional explanation is that the environmental issue is very salient for parents as they are concerned about their children's future. To sum up the first function, the results for sensitizing processes and children at home underline the importance of structural factors, biographical availability and interactive processes. These factors become more important with an increase of the degree of challenge a political issue implies. In addition, cognitive dimensions are of some importance too like the perception of collective efficacy and the perception of one's civic role as an active citizen demonstrate. Of my five indicators for the strong citizen concept, however, only these variables contribute to the first function. Sensitizing processes, collective efficacy, active citizen, and a child at home explain thus differences between SAB activists and the other two groups. In addition, the discriminators of this first function represent well what it means to be an activist in a challenging strategic action field. As such, an activist in such a harsh environment has typically a long sensitizing

process behind himself, for example by already having an impressive activists' career behind him. He has to work hard to win something for his cause, thus his notion of collective efficacy is more realistic then the one of other, more mainstream, activists' communities. Through this inurement during the intensive sensitizing process, he also values the importance of active commitment more and for this active commitment he needs time, which is more difficult to spend with young children at home.

In contrast, the second function differentiates more STP activists from the other two groups and is composed of five discriminant variables: Activists' injustice frame (.767), contacting process (.480), mobilizing processes (.285), the perception of one's role as a vigilant citizen (.267) and the degree to which one is a resisting citizen (.215). For the second function, I was a little bit less restrictive with the cut-off line of 0.3, in order to include more then only two indicators in the second function. Nevertheless, one should keep in mind that the injustice frame and contacting processes contribute the biggest part of the explication of the second function. The perception of the injustice frame, or more precisely the perception of the centrality of the protest issue (.767), reveals that the political issue is more central for GP and SAB activists (GP: 0.8, 0.4. SAB: 0.7, 0.5) than for STP activists (STP: 0.3, 0.5). For contacting processes (.480), STP activists (1.1, 0.4) needed fewer contacts than activists of SAB (1.5, 0.7) and GP (1.5, 0.7). While the higher number of contacting processes was expectable for SAB activists, the fact the GP activists need an equal number of contacting processes is a surprise. However, an evaluation of the basis indicator reveals that GP activists have two main channels that connected them with their organization: Greenpeace, thus the protest actor itself (66%) and the media (46%). In contrast, STP activists mostly pass through one exclusive channel: the protest actor itself (88%) who massively invested in street recruitment. Together, the perception of the injustice frame and contacting processes are thus important to distinguish STP activists from the other two groups.

Not only sensitizing and contacting process are important, also the third interactive process, mobilizing processes, contributed to discriminate between different group of activists. In fact, SAB activists (1.6, 0.8) and GP activists (1.5, 0.8) needed somewhat more motivating processes than activists of STP (1.3, 0.7). While these differences are not

huge for a scale from 0 to 3, the fact the activists of GP are almost on the same level as activists of SAB requires some further explanation as I expected them to be closer to STP activists. GP and STP activists do neither differentiate on social interaction processes (formal and informal networks: 23% of GP activists and 15% of STP activists were motivated through this channel) nor on external processes (protest organization itself and sociopolitical events: 64% of GP activists, 60% of STP activists). In contrast, they largely differ in terms of self-interaction processes (personal experiences and information, personal readings: 63% of GP activists, 43% of STP activist). I think there is a similar explanation at stake as it was the case for contacting processes where GP activists also scored similarly high as SAB activists. In fact, for GP activists as well as for STP activists, social interaction processes are less important. For SAB activists, they play an important role (45% of all respondents were motivated through these processes). The main difference between STP and GP activists is located in the category personal readings and information (45% for GP, 28% for STP). I see this again as a result that demonstrates the effect of the massive media presence of GP, which is neither the case for activists of SAB (24%) nor for those of STP (28%). While SAB activists catch thus up to GP activists by their use of social interaction processes, less motivating processes are required for STP activists. Finally, two variables belonging to the strong citizen concept are also contributing to differentiate between the three groups. For both variables, SAB activists (vigilant citizen: 0.7, 0.5; resisting citizen: 0.8, 0.4) are somewhat stronger citizens than activists of GP (0.5, 0.5; 0.6, 0.5) and activists of STP (0.4, 0.5; 0.6, 0.5). While the first function represented thus challenging activist, the second function is more a reflection of the mainstream activist or a sympathizer who was recruited in the street. This function describes at least a looser connection between the activist and the organization then this was the case for the first one. This type of activist does not perceive the political issue as very central in his life. He did not go through complicated motivating and contacting processes and he perceives it as less important to be a vigilant and resisting citizen.

To put these numbers in a more general picture, I want to point to three mains results of this discriminant analysis. First, while cognitions do contribute to explain differences between activists' communities, other factors are also an important part of the story. Especially, interactive processes play an important role and contributed an essential explanatory piece to explain


differences between activists of various groups. This is not very surprising as this result largely confirms what the literature claims since ages. However, my results could be read as one step forward for two reasons. On the one hand, my operationalization of interactive processes included not only social networks but also other processes⁵⁸. Thereby, they demonstrate that other processes beyond such that are linked to social networks are important for bringing these activists closer to movement participation. On the other hand, the functions produced by these analyses clearly point to the importance to take both, structural processes and cognitions, into consideration if one aims to better understand movement participation.


Second, not the whole strong citizen concept discriminates between different types of activists. In fact, activists' relation to politics varies whereas activists' relation to society seems to be very similar for all three types of activists. This confirms what I already saw in the previous chapter where I compared these indicators by means of a bivariate analysis. According to that, one may conclude that, on an aggregate level, activists of all three organizations are strong citizen for what their relation to society is concerned. In contrast, activists of more challenging issues are stronger citizens in terms of their relation to politics. Cognitively speaking, they tend to be more active, challenging and vigilant citizens than activists of mainstream political challenges.

Third, while the structure of the analysis leads me to insist on the differences between these activists, the most interesting point of this analysis is perhaps the discovered similarity between them. As the goodness of fit indicators at the beginning of this analysis already have demonstrated, the discriminant model I calculated here does a good, but by far not a magnificent job, in separating these three groups of activists. One explanation might be that the variables introduced in the model are not the most pertinent ones. While there might be such a phenomena, I think that another explanation is way more apt. These activists I compare here are all participating in the same social movement sector, i.e. they are sharing the master frame of the postindustrial social movement family. Consequently, the cognitive similarities I found in all my analysis point to the strong socialization effect participation in these fields may have. In the Figure 8.1 below, I plotted all valid

⁵⁸ To read more about the importance of social networks relative to other processes, check my contribution in Passy and Monsch (forthcoming).

responses along the two functions that resulted from the discriminant analysis in order to illustrate this.





In this Figure, the blue squares represent SAB activists, the red rhombi STP activists and the green triangles GP activists. The three black circles represent the centroids for each group, which are the aggregated means of all discriminant variables. Whether one looks at the distance between the group centroids or at the degree of overlap between the three groups, the conclusion is the same. There is a rather small distance between the group centroids and there is a considerable overlap between activists of SAB, STP and GP. While this is perhaps a poor result in the light of the usual purpose of this analytical tool aiming to discriminate groups as good as possible, this is a highly valid result in terms of my theoretical claim. Activists who defend migrant's rights, who claim for better implementation of human rights and who protect the environment are all participating in the same social movement sector. Consequently, the definition of shared meanings in their respective strategic action field

overlaps to a considerable degree. In other words, they share the same master frame. Thus, they cannot be very different in terms of the cognitive outlook.

However, this is not to say that all activists are the same as the red rhombus in the bottom right corner compared to the blue square in the top left corner indicate. Two interpretations are therefore appropriate. First, on an aggregate level, activists of the same movement family share to a large degree the same cognitive outlook as a strong citizen due to the fact that they get in touch with similar cognitive tools during their movement participation. This first interpretation applies to the bulk of activists. However, and second, if one compares the most extreme cases, there is still considerable variation at stake due to different levels of intensity these cognitive tools are shaped through interactive processes. To explain and better understand these differences, one has to look at the biographies of specific activists. This is exactly what I will do in the last section of this chapter.

8.4. Why Adriana has become a strong citizen and why Yves did not

I selected Adriana, a highly active member of SAB, and Yves, a sympathizer of GP, for this comparative analysis because *they differ most in cognitive terms*. With Table 8.5, which is a copy of Table 6.1, I try to visualize this choice. Therein, one can clearly see that Adriana is one of these activists who developed most of the strong citizen dimensions, while Yves only developed a few of them. In the following, I will summarize the biographies of both in order to better understanding why some activists become cognitively stronger citizens than others. I start with Adriana in order to get first an idea of why she developed all these cognitions and then I continue with Yves by illustrating which kind of experiences and interactive processes he missed out. At the end, this analysis should help me to better understand how cognitions and interactive processes interact and why cognitive differences between these activists exist despite this strong cognitive confluence described above.

Table 8.5: The content of activists' cognitions: Presence, centrality and evidence

								cross	Bord	ers								
Strong citizen		Active members								Sympathizers								
dimensions																		
	1101111111		Simone		Lisa		Wilhelm		Yan			Colette						
	Р	С	Е	P	С	Е	P	С	Е	P	С	Е	P	С	Е	P	С	Е
Relation to society				!			!						!			!		
Common Goods				P	С		P	C					P	C		P	C	
Self-extension	Р	С	Е	Р	С	Е	Р	С	Е	Р	С	Е	Р	С		Р	С	Е
Relation to politics				: : : :			! !						! !			: : :		
Political authorities	P	С		P	С		P			P			P			P		
Civil society actors	P	С		P	С		P	C		P			P			Р		
Citizen's role	P	C		Р	C		P	C					P			P	C	
							Can											
				Activ	re mer	nbers		enpea	.ce				Svr	npathi	zers			
	Pierrette Christian					Margo	t	Maria			Eveline			Yves				
	Р	С	Е		C		Р	C	E	Р	С	Е	Р	С		Р	С	Е
Relation to society							:									:		
Common Goods	P			P			P	C		P			P			! !		
Self-extension	P	C		P	С		Р	C		Р	С		Р			!		
Relation to politics							! !						! ! !			: :		
Political authorities	Р			Р			Р			Р			Р			P		
Civil society actors	Р			Р			P			P			Р	C		P		
Citizen's role	Р			P						P			P	0				

NOTE: A summary table of my interpretation of activists' cognitions as strong citizen. It shows if a specific cognitive dimension is present, central or evident in the respective narrative. If P = P, the respective cognition is present, if C = C, the respective cognition is not only present but is central in the narrative, and if E = E, the cognition is an evidence, deeply rooted.

Adriana grew up as one of four children in the Italian speaking part of Switzerland. Her father and, after his decease, her mother were manager of her own company. Adriana grew thus up in an upper class environment. During her childhood already, Adriana was in more or less regular interaction and came to appreciate people of other cultural and social milieus. One such an experience for her was the regular contact with workers of her parents' enterprise coming from the South of Italy. They were different, they spoke another language and they were handsome. She was fascinated by these encounters with others and she even fell in love with one or two of them. They could not read, they did not speak well but they were very generous and they yielded her a lot. For example, they showed her mozzarella cheese and olive oil. Another example was the humanist commitment of her grandfather who supported missionaries in Africa. Thus, her grandfather told here a lot of stories linked to this commitment. All these histories about poverty in Africa made her think a lot. Why should one help them? Why are they so poor? The answers she gets are not satisfying and, more and more, she starts to detect injustices as the main reason for Africa's poverty. Thus, as a child already, Adriana has

had very rich and formative experiences with others and she started already to understand the injustices that were connected with their misery.

Adriana's youth can be summarized as a period of revolt and mobilization. At the age of 16, she left her parental home in order to get her independence and joined a catholic boarding school. This school was very devout and there were masses every morning. She characterized her stay in this school as a period of refusal to accept (religious) constraints and silly rules. With one of the sisters, however, she developed a good relationship. This sister was questioning the existence of God and inflamed Adriana's curiosity for philosophy. This encounter was important for Adriana's decision to study at the University. She wanted to understand society and, consequently, she started to study sociology. While she never managed to finish her studies, the importance of this period stem from other events. Notably, the entry in the University was the beginning of her activist career.

Adriana is a member of the 1968 generation. Accordingly, she describes her experiences as a student as a flush of idea, discussions and readings with friends. She starts to commit herself to pacifism. This is her first political protest. She fights against the army and against violence by becoming an activist of an organization that wanted to abolish the compulsory military service. She also becomes a volunteer in international camps where she meets and exchanges with a lot of different people. Next to pacifism, feminism was also a political issue that was near and dear to her. It was a movement in construction. She supported their claims, she took part in demonstrations and she signed petitions. She also joined the Trotskyists. Not so much because she was favorable to their cause but she felt in love with one of their leaders. Unsurprisingly, she stopped this participation quickly as she did not share the same ideas. *An explosion of social networks in the postindustrial field and thereby plenty of interactive opportunities thus marked her youth*.

Nowadays, Adriana describes herself as a feminist who stays at home. She loves to take care of her children and she enjoys the fact of having neither a boss nor to have any constraints. As her husband is a doctor, she does not have to work for money, which is clearly reflected in her professional career. After she stopped her studies, she worked as a

secretary. But this lasted only two month and then she dropped this job by banging the door of the corrupt director. She decided to incorporate an alternative library. She worked there for a year, not for the money as she was not able to pay here sufficiently, but because she liked that kind of work. She also worked for a short time in the theatre where she prepared dinners on stage. Her real occupation, however, is her activist career, which she describes as a real work and a real career. In her view, one does not have to earn a lot of money in order to make a career. A career can also be fun!

As an adult, one of her first commitment was for a religious organization striving for the eradication of poverty. She was helping to renovate a building in order to accommodate people from the "bidonvilles" of Paris. However, she stopped this activity after a short time for several reasons. She disliked the religious touch of the organization and the associated humanitarian idea of helping others. She then became a part of the *human rights movement*. More specifically, she became a member of Amnesty International for about ten years. She was a highly active member of this organization. She was the president of a regional group, she became a member of the national board and finally, she was president of Amnesty International Switzerland. She wanted to discuss, exchange and to be open to other activists. She wanted to be solidary with others who live in worse conditions than we do in Switzerland. She wanted to be committed to human rights, which is the only universal value. Those who have the rights have to fight for those who do not have rights. Adriana evaluates this stage of commitment as one where she learned a lot, notably she learned how to defend rights.

However, she had to stop her commitment to Amnesty because it came into conflict with her activity for the *defense of migrants' rights*. While Amnesty, at least in Switzerland, tried to work with the government, the defense of migrant's rights implies to fight against the government. And as migration has become the political issue most central to her, she stopped her active commitment for human rights. Since twenty years now, she is highly active in order to defend migrants' rights, she took part in illegal but nonviolent actions like an occupation of a church. She defines her commitment as one for human beings and the relation with others who have to suffer from terrible injustices. If she can, she will probably stay committed to the migration issue for another twenty years.

While this short biography of Adriana demonstrates how dense she always have been embedded in relational settings that certainly have contributed in some way or another to develop a strong citizen perception, the *biography of Yves* proceeds differently.

During the interview, Yves did not talk much about his *childhood*. All I know is that he comes out of a modest milieu. His parents have been really poor to the point that they did not know what they will eat the next day. His parents divorced and his father even passed away when he was still young. At some point, he said that they had so many family problems that the rest of the world always was secondary. While these first sentences give a very difficult overall impression of Yves's childhood, he also had some positive experiences. This was mostly the case when he was able to spend some time with his grandmother in the countryside where he learned to *respect the nature*.

During his youth, Yves completes an apprenticeship as a mechanist and also gets over the obligatory military service. The military made him to think a lot about the sense of war and he was not sure at that time if he wants to get children. In terms of commitments, he was very active in the local soccer club but is in no way connected to some kind of political commitment. His activity in the soccer club, however, motivated him to become active in the sports and youth realm later on. He also read some books, mostly adventure stories like Robin Crusoe. In addition, he loved to watch movies of the well-known oceanographer Jacques Cousteau and both his readings and these movies sensitized him further for the importance to conserve the nature. He also remembers to have been very touched by environmental catastrophes like the chemical accident in Bhopal or the nuclear disaster in Chernobyl.

At this time, he also developed a *strong nationalist identity*. He described himself as racist and xenophobe. For him, it was stupid to perceive the world like this and thanks to his life experiences he has now changed. However, when he talked about immigrants during the interview, he still criticizes them heavily and blames them to profit from social welfare. At the same time, he is a very proud to live in Switzerland. For him, Switzerland is beautiful, secure and we have an excellent social assurance system. Switzerland is better then other countries. For example, when he talked about India he said: "We gave them modernity but not the user manual."

Yves worked as a mechanist for several years. *Currently*, he is unemployed. He has two children and married a woman with a Thai background. *He is not and never has been committed to some form of collective political participation*. He is neither member of a union, nor of a professional association nor of a political party. He defines himself as a non-activist. However, his is active in other sectors. He is still active in the local soccer club and he is a member of the local volunteer fire department. He likes to do sports and to help others by these activities.

The summary of Adriana's and Yves' biography makes one point very clear: *They cannot have the same cognitive outlook*. They grew up in completely different milieus; they were embedded in diametrically opposed networks during their youth and their activist career could not have been more distinct. And thereby, interactive processes seem to have played an important role in the construction of cognitions. *For the relation towards others*, for example, Adriana grew up in a very liberal and outwards oriented environment. Her mother was a business owner and she was in regular contact with people from other milieus (south Italian workers). Her grandfather told her stories about missionaries in Africa, which further increased her curiosity towards others. All in all, this looks like a very fertile soil to construct a perception with few frontiers between groups. Yves was confronted with a completely different starting situation. Nobody was there to inform him about the living conditions of Africans. His family had to struggle with its own difficulties and, consequently, they were not able to think outside the box as this was the case for Adriana and the Italian workers.

For the relation to politics, Adriana's whole life was full of political activity. Starting with the histories of her grandfather, she then studied at the University during the heyday of the 1968-generation and joined this movement with heart and soul. Since then, she is a fulltime activist, who had the big chance to marry a husband who, on the one hand supports her political activity and, on the other hand, earns enough money to make ends meet. Again, Yves has gone a completely different pathway. Nobody in his environment was or is politically active nor is he. He even describes himself as a non-activist. So, what then, did connect him with Greenpeace? One could see in his biography that he has been, to some degree, sensitized to the importance of the nature through the time he passed on

the countryside with his grandmother and through the readings and movies he has seen. He is thus sensitized to environmental protection and he knew GP thanks to their strong media presence. This was enough to recruit him in the street about eight years ago. Since then, he financially supports Greenpeace and reads regularly their journal, which socialized him on a few strong citizen dimensions but not on all as Table 8.5 illustrated.

All in all, many experiences and interactive processes of Adriana can be described as puzzle pieces for developing a cognitive outlook as a strong citizen. Yves' experiences and interactive processes, in turn, while being sufficient to become a sympathizer of GP for a rather long time, did not pave the way in the same cognitive direction. To conclude, interactive processes such as social networks, inner interaction and external processes are thus crucial elements when it comes to the construction of cognitions.

8.5. Concluding remarks

This chapter has pursued to demonstrate the importance of cognitions to better understand movement participation by testing if cognitions contribute to the explanation of differences between activists' communities even if I control for challenging factors. By the help of a discriminant analysis and the comparison of two biographies, I could reveal several points.

First, cognitions are important discriminators. The discriminant analysis has clearly demonstrated these activists differ on some cognitive dimensions. For the holy cognitive trinity, injustice and agency frames, or more precisely the centrality of the issue and collective efficacy, are clearly two perceptions that discriminate activists of SAB, STP and GP. These perceptions are thus not only a requirement for movement participation as the literature always suggest. As cognitive transformation goes on during movement participation, these perceptions become specific between activists. Cognitions belonging to the strong citizen dimension are also important. However, these activists tend to share a common perception of society, they do not differ on this dimension. In contrast, when it comes to their relation to politics, activists of more challenging issues like the defense of migrant's rights tend to be stronger citizens than activists of more mainstream issues. I

tend to interpret this result as an effect of movement socialization. SAB activists are more critical and vigilant about political authorities because only for them, the state is the major opponent.

Second, cognitions are not everything. Other factors are of crucial importance too. On the one hand, biographical availability, especially the fact to have a child at home, discriminates between different types of activists such that activists committed in more challenging protest issues are less able to combine activism and taking care of children. This finding might have several explanations. Perhaps challenging protests are simply more time consuming, which makes it difficult to commit time to this protest if one has still children at home. Or, social pressure might be at stake. Defending migrants' rights implies that a large share of the population is very critical about your activism. And this could have negative consequences for one's children that one might prefer to prevent. While I can here only speculate about these processes, further reflections about theses processes at stake would certainly enrich the notion of biographical availability. Beside biographical availability, interactive processes are of outmost importance too. Sensitizing, motivating and contacting processes differ between activists of SAB, STP and GP in such a way that activists of more challenging protest issues need more such processes than activists of less challenging ones. A deeper analysis has demonstrated, that SAB activists rely especially on social networks while for activists of STP and GP inner interaction or external processes can be sufficient. In order to discriminate between different types of activism, it seems that cognitions matter less than other factors. However, one should not forget that I compare here activists of three organizations of the same social movement family and consequently, it comes not as a surprise that other factors are relevant as they are sharing the same, or at least a similar, master frame.

Third, two main functions resulted from the discriminant analysis. Both of them combined interactive processes and cognitive dimensions in order to separate types of activism. The first function resembled sensitizing processes, collective efficacy, active citizen and children at home, which I summed about as depicting an activist in a challenging action field. In contrast, the second function, sketching a mainstream activist, emerged through the combination of activists' injustice frame, mobilizing and contacting processes, vigilant

and resisting citizen. Both functions are thus complex combinations of several factors, and notably a combination of cognitive and structural factors, that account for differences between groups of activists.

Fourth, activists of SAB, STP and GP resemble each other as they all belong to the same social movement sector. The interactions they experience during their movement participation are under the banner of the same master frame. Thus, similar cognitive tools are transmitted to them, which result in a fairly similar cognitive outlook. And this might be the process, which explains why these activists become strong citizens. However, and finally, some differences between activists still exist. I have tried to explain these differences in terms of their cognitive outlook by pointing to existing variations in activists' biographies and social embeddings. For this purpose, I took the two extreme examples of Adriana and Yves in order to illustrate why one is a true strong citizen while the other is not.

All in all, this chapter made clear that interaction processes and cognitions are both important to understand movement participation. Moreover, they are highly interconnected and only if one understands how they are linked, one can go a step further to explain how the strong citizen dimension is linked to movement participation or more generally, how cognitions are linked to action.

9. On Strong Citizens: An Evaluation

This thesis has tried to theoretically and empirically demonstrate that cognitions play an important role in the understanding of contentious participation. More specifically, I have argued that activists' cognitive outlooks resemble the one of a strong citizens and that interactional dynamics during contentious participation contributes in an important way to the construction of these particular worldviews. While I put a heavy emphasis on cognitions in this contribution, I do not pretend that cognitions are the only relevant factor. Instead, the integration of other factors like personal availabilities and interactive processes, such as social networks, personal experiences or self-interaction, is an absolute must. However, this thesis has demonstrated that specific cognitive worldviews are also an important element in this story and should become the attention they deserve in future research.

In the introduction of this thesis, I argued why I think the strong citizen is needed and therefore for an integration of the strong citizen concept in the existing theoretical framework. I understand the *strong citizen as a necessary condition* because without such cognitive resources available, I do not see how one can become an activist in this social movement family. For example, how can an individual defend migrant's rights if he does not have an inclusive version of society? Why should an individual commit to contentious politics if he does not perceive protest actors as a legitimate actor in a democracy for social change? Without cognitions an individual cannot act and the strong citizen concept sums up cognitive resources that allow an individual to become an activist in the post-industrial social movement family. Of course, further empirical work is needed to demonstrate the necessity of cognitions. While the importance of some sub-dimensions of the strong citizen concept may vary according to the type of strategic action field and the type of activist, this work has shown that the relation to politics and to society are important.

This general thesis about the importance of activists' cognitions was split in four questions about the specificity, the content, the variation and the relative importance of activists' cognitions. The question regarding the *specificity of activists' cognitions* could be confirmed. I found a broad cognitive baseline that differentiates, on the aggregate level,

these activists from the general population. These activists do not only construct injustice, agency and identity frame, they also have a specific relation towards society and politics. A perception of strong citizen seems thus to be particularly developed or strengthened within the mind of these activists. They are strong citizens in a cognitive way. They want to contribute to the production and maintenance of common goods and they have an inclusive perception of society. In addition, a majority of them are resisting citizens as they simultaneously de-legitimize political authorities and legitimize civil society actors. Accordingly, one's citizen's role is one of active and vigilant commitment. In the aggregate, these cognitive resources are specific for these activists if I compare it with the general population. Due to this specificity, it is thus reasonable to suggest that these cognitive resources need to exist for sustained contentious participation. At least, the interpretation of the content of these cognitive dimensions lead to the conclusion that non-participation contradicts their moral visions. Perceiving oneself as a strong citizen makes thus these activists cognitively available for ongoing contentious participation.

The comparison of activists' cognition with those of the whole population suggests thus that cognitions matter for participation in protest politics. Activists, belonging to the post-industrial movements family, share a broad cognitive baseline that delimitates them from the population. They constructed specific worldviews, which delineate possibilities for acting within the world around them. It allows people to protest. In other words, activists' cognitive relation to society and politics offers facilitating mental or cognitive resources for taking part in contentious participation. And these activists clearly depart from the Swiss population on these resources.

The second set of questions was concerned with the *content of activists' cognitions*. More precisely, I analyzed by means of narratives of twelve activists if their cognitive outlook resembles the theoretically defined dimensions of a strong citizen. This evaluation revealed three major results. First, the interpretation generally confirmed the theoretical assumptions. These activists perceive the world like a strong citizen. They perceive common goods as something fundamentally important holding a society together and creating links between members of the society. In addition, common goods are threatened and this point of view facilitates to sustain their activism. They also perceive others like themselves: as simple human beings where social and cultural diversities are

blurred. This confirmation of a strong citizen perception was not only found for activists' relation to society but also for their relation to politics. These activists de-legitimize political authorities that are direct enemies for their political claims, they strongly legitimize protest actors and they perceive their citizen's role as one of activity, political interest and critical vigilance.

Second, the analysis of this qualitative material demonstrated that the strong citizen concept is not a consistent category where every activist has exactly the same cognition but rather a concept useful to think as a continuum where these activists can be placed on a rather broad range. Accordingly, the qualitative material allowed giving subtle nuances to activists' perceptions by bringing up substantial meaning to the theoretical defined dimensions. For example, activists' understanding of common goods varies. Some associate common goods exclusively with vital necessities whereas others have a really broad understanding of common goods. Another illustration would be their perception of civil society actors. Whereas these activists cognitively share a strong legitimization of these actors, the meaning by this legitimization varies. Namely, it goes from a perception of protest actors as temporary substitutes for missing state action to an absolute necessity for the functioning of democracy. What is important with these nuances is that it shows that every individual constructed similar cognitive resources through multiple pathways during their life. What they all share in their life is contentious participation and perhaps it is this interactive mechanism that strengthened these cognitive similarities. To sum up, even if everyone has talked about these perceptions from his own standpoints and personal experiences, they developed a similar cognitive resource: One that can be synthesized by a notion of strong citizen.

Third, the analysis of these interviews not only revealed similarities but also differences between activists of different organizations and for different levels of participation. While I looked systematically in these variations during the third empirical chapter, a qualitative comparison revealed differences in the content that could not be shown by means of quantitative indicators. For political authorities, for example, SAB activists negatively evaluate the recent past and the prospects for the near future whereas GP activists

perceive a rather positive development. While I cannot generalize such a finding on the basis of these twelve interviews, no quantitative indicator exists to evaluate such a finding.

The third specific question of this thesis focused mainly on variations between activists' cognitions. While there are some systematic cognitive differences between types of activists, one important conclusion is that these activists display overall a rather homogeneous cognitive outlook. Three hypotheses were at the center of this analysis of variance. The first hypothesis stated that activists of SAB are stronger citizens than activists of STP and GP due to their implication in a more challenging political protest. Whereas this hypothesis could be confirmed for the strong citizen dimensions, other mechanisms seem to be at stake for the holy cognitive trinity. In fact, GP activists perceive their political issue as more central and see themselves, as well as the SMO they are member of, as more effective than SAB and STP activists. The second hypothesis stated that levels of participation are barely correlated with activists' perception of a strong citizen. This is generally the case. My assumption is that this is due to the high cognitive receptivity of activists for the cultural messages transmitted from their respective organization. In other words, this is a result where frame alignment was very successful. Only a few dimensions are correlated with the level of participation. For active members, it is more important to be an active citizen, they show up a more challenging perception of political authorities and consequently, there are more resisting citizens among active members than among sympathizers. For the holy cognitive trinity dimensions, the political issue is more central in the daily life of active members and they perceive themselves as more useful than sympathizers. While there are thus generally few cognitive variations for the level of participation, differences exist where activists' perceptions are directly linked to their form of action. Active members actually do something, so it comes not as a surprise that they perceive themselves as more useful than sympathizers for example. The third hypothesis suggested coming across more variations between members of different organizations than between different levels of participation. This, in fact, is more a conclusion from the confirmation of the other two hypotheses than a hypothesis on its own. However, it is important to underline this finding because it says something about the mechanisms behind cognitive transformation. Namely, it points to the importance to look more at the

qualitative content of social interactions between actors within strategic field and less at the frequencies and forms of interaction taking place.

The last empirically evaluated question asked if cognitions contribute to the explanation of differences between activists' communities with regard to other challenging factors. More specifically, I evaluated if activists' cognitions can contribute to explain membership in the three different organizations. I addressed four points by the help of a discriminant analysis and the comparison of two activists' biographies. First, cognitions do explain differences between activists' communities even if one controls for other factors. For what cognitions of the strong citizen dimension are concerned, the analysis revealed that these activists tend to share a common perception of society; they do not differ on this dimension. In contrast, when it comes to their relation to politics, activists of more challenging issues tend to be stronger citizens than activists of more mainstream issues. Second, cognitions are not a sufficient explanation. By far not. Other factors are of crucial importance too. Especially, interactive processes are of outmost importance. Sensitizing, motivating and contacting processes differ between activists of SAB, STP and GP in such a way that activists of more challenging protest issues need more such processes that activists of less challenging ones. Third, two main functions resulted from the discriminant analysis. Both of them combined interactive processes and cognitive dimensions in order to separate types of activism, a more challenging and a more mainstream one. Both functions are thus complex combinations of several factors, and notably a combination of cognitive and structural factors accounting for differences between groups of activists. Finally, activists of SAB, STP and GP resemble each other as they all belong to the same social movement sector and consequently are sharing the same master frame.

In sum, the analysis of the specificity, the content, variations and the relative importance of activists constitute *four angles through which I analyzed activists' cognitions*. They all point to the importance to put more emphasis in scientific research on the role they play for contentious participation. Post-industrial activists are concerned by common goods and others; they do not blindly trust power-holders; they are ready to contend power-abuses and discriminative or polluting practices; actions of civil society actors are perceived as essential to address their political claims; they are critical, vigilant, and active as well as

they are rebellious citizens. They see the world around them through specific mental lenses. They are thus particular citizens (Jasper 1997).

In addition, activists' cognitive map delineates possibilities for acting within the world around them. It thus defines behavioral options available to them. It allows people to act. In other words, activists' understanding of society and politics offers facilitating and motivating mental resources to sustain contentious participation. Social movement scholars bring to light the importance of biographical availability for protest, such as having specific values, social anchorage, or social ties. Here, I emphasized "cognitive availability" for protest as an additional necessary factor that not received the attention it deserved so far. Through an innovative combination of two originally collected data sets, I tried to defense the thesis that cognitions are a crucial factor if one wants to understand contentious participation. Cognitions matter because movement communities are sustained through an ongoing elaboration of specific worldviews shared by those who raise their voice to fight for a cause. I suggested that this specific worldview could best be grasped by the concept of strong citizen uniting a perception of politics involving contention and engagement with an extended and interdependent perception of society. Of course, cognitions are not the only factor accounting for contentious participation but the time has come to give them the theoretical and empirical attention they deserve!

I embedded my theoretical contribution within the broad theoretical framework of *strategic action fields* (Fligstein and McAdam 2012). The reason for this choice was to show theoretically how activists' cognitions are influenced by interactional dynamics within their strategic action field. In fact, contentious participation implies multiple conversations both between activists and between activists and their respective targets within a strategic action field. And these conversations are meant to alter individual and collective understandings. Consequently, this theoretical embedding allowed interpreting the empirical findings. More specifically, it explains why the protest communities of the defense of migrant's rights, minorities' rights and environmental protection have elaborated such similar worldviews as they all belong to the same movement family and thus experience similar interactions and share the same master frame. This thesis has thus profited from the theory of fields. However, I neglected two central points of the theory.

While this is a direct result of this research focusing exclusively on activists' cognitions, I do not want to pretend that I am not aware of this. On the one hand, I ignore the positioning and interdependence of one strategic action field in relation with other fields and thus the general broader field environment. This does not imply that the broader field environment is not important for activists' cognitions. Probably, quite the contrary is at stake but this research was not able to capture this topic. On the other, social movements and SMOs themselves are fields with incumbents and challengers. I decided to simplify this empirical research because I wanted to stress cognitive similarities between these activists. In addition, in order to capture the dynamics of, for example, the fields of the defense of migrants' rights, one should compare several actors of the same specific field.

Meaning construction through ongoing conversation between actors is thus an important process within a field because it is through altering or maintaining a shared definition of rules and understandings that social change can be induced or prevented. As a modest "service in return", I see *this thesis as an empirical example of one process of meaning construction*. In my view, activists contribute an important share to these processes of meaning construction because activists are engaged in "moral voicing" (Jasper 1997) and moral voicing is what challengers do to influence the definition of common understandings in a field and to improve their respective position in the field. It is thus fundamental to understand challengers' worldviews in order to better understand contentious participation both as ongoing conversations within a field shaping activists' worldviews and as the challenger's moral voices that try to induce social change.

While this dissertation tried thus to make empirical and theoretical contributions, it also has, as any piece of work, some limitations. In what follows, I will discuss the problems that I conceive as the most important ones and try to show how these problems open the door for new research avenues.

To begin with, the scope of this research is clearly limited to the world of the post-industrial social movement sector. While it is reasonable to compare activists of three protest organizations that vary in their level of political challenge, these results are clearly not generalizable beyond this specific movement sector. The strong citizen concept I present here applies

thus only to these types of activists. This thesis should be tested with other cases. Activists who try to defend migrant's rights, to empower minorities' rights and to protect the environment are typically cases for new social movements ignoring thus a large part of the whole, and especially of the right-wing, spectrum of social movements. Any generalization beyond these three cases should thus be taken with care as other types of activism could spur strong citizens. In consequence, I would like to stress again that this does not mean that other activists and citizens cannot be cognitively strong citizens in their own right. Future research should empirically test, for example with a sample of right wing activists, how their worldviews differ from and if there are also communalities with the cognitions of left wing activists presented here. My guess is that right wing activists differ a lot on their relation to society, especially on their relation to others. In contrast, I think that their relation of politics is fairly similar to the one presented here.

Next, the problems associated to establish a *cansal link between cognitions and action* has been discussed at length during this thesis. While the data I have used for this thesis brought important insights, they have one serious flaw. They are collected at one point in time, which prevents me to test any causal assumption. While the life histories tried to take the notion of time into account, the worldviews the interviewees shared are constructed at the moment of the interview, which hinders to trace cognitive construction. While I put forward a social process at stake, namely movement socialization through ongoing contentious participation, I could not empirically demonstrate the existence of this process. Other methods, like ethnographies or experimental designs, are required in order to grasp the link between cognitions and actions.

In fact, another possibility to look at the relation between cognitions of activists and the collective worldviews of movements or specific social movement organizations would be to take the organizational level into account. In other words, a content analysis of the communication channels (journals, newsletter, homepage, campaigns etc.) of an organization and a comparison of these organizational cultures with activists' worldviews would allow at least assessing to what degree these two levels are close to each other. While taking the organizational level into account will certainly be a promising way for future research, it was simply not feasible to integrate this in the work presented here.

On a more theoretical level, trying to explain the *underlying processes of cognitive variation* is highly speculative with the research design presented here. In other words, the data does not allow disentangling if activists' cognitions are a product of or rather a condition for participation. While I argued in this thesis that movement socialization is an important process, I could not show if this is really the case and probably, there are processes both before and after the start of contentious participation that matter.

Just remind the example of Adriana. Her narratives revealed several interactive processes shaping her cognitions both before and after she started contentious participation. She grew up in a family where the living conditions of others were omnipresent; just think at the Italian workers who called in sick in order to visit her family in the South of Italy or her grandfather who told her stories about poverty in Africa. After the compulsory school, she then went to the university at the peak of the 68-generation. Consequently, contentious participation was everywhere, i.e. social networks where movement friendly interaction was taking place, and it comes not as a surprise that she joined several movements during this time. She had thus the necessary cognitive and structural embeddings in other to become both cognitively and agentically a strong citizen. Nowadays, her whole life is embedded in contentious participation (rather than the other way around), which certainly continues to shape her worldviews.

The problem with Adriana's story is that it is constructed retrospectively. In other words, one cannot know if her narrative is constructed in such movement friendly ways as a consequence of her identity as a model activist or if her life course really pushed her to develop such a cognitive outlook. In order to get more firm evidence about processes at stake, longitudinal and experimental based research designs that take time into account are necessary.

Another methodological problem is associated with the relation between the method and the respondents. In fact, the subjects of the survey and interview data are mostly experienced activists. As I say all along of my thesis, movement socialization has shaped their worldviews as a strong citizen but has probably also shaped a value based account of why they are participating. For example, one has just to open one page of a newspaper of one

of these organizations in order to get many arguments of why one should participate in this organization. A similar process should be at work in interaction between active members where they motivate each other to sustain participation. The consequence of these mental processes for the methods I used here is the following. While they do certainly a good job in illuminating the cognitive account of activists' participation motives, they risks failing poor on other dimensions that also account for sustained participation. Both the questionnaire and the interview guideline were sensitive to this issue as there were many questions that pointed to the role of social networks or cost-benefit evaluations for example. Wherever this does not prevent the production of slightly biased data, I tried at least to control as good as possible for this problem.

A consequence of this problem is a call for ongoing work on the *construction of solid indicators*. While I think that the question I used here do a good job, there is room for improvement left. Many dimensions of the strong citizen concept are subject of social desirability bias, which probably results in an overall too optimistic assessment of activists' cognitions. Any improvement in the construction of reliable and valid measure is thus welcome. Fortunately, however, the effect of this social desirability bias should not vary across groups and it is for this reason that I see the application of my comparisons as justified.

Finally, processes of construction of cognitive resources are also important to analyze. How do activists build up their cognitive frameworks? What are the processes at stake? This type of analysis is of key importance for examining mechanisms at work (McAdam, Tarrow et al. 2008). It allows an understanding of social mechanisms at stake for constructing activists' cognitions. Roads for elaborating contenders' cognitive maps are multiple. While life histories seem to reveal a baseline of activists' cognitive resources, its elaborations occur throughout actors' life. And these processes of cognitions' construction go through various paths: personal events (e.g. travel, work, or exile experiences), public events (e.g. protests in the 60ties), and interpersonal and organizational networks. In addition, protest commitment participates to this cognitive (re-)construction. Specifying social mechanisms at stake should be one of the most important tasks for future investigation.

In order to end this dissertation, let me return to the introduction and reflect on a more general contribution of this thesis for the field of political science and democracies in general. An important thematic field for political science are waves of democratization (Huntington 1991). The causes leading towards democratization are identified on the structural macro level. In order for democratization to take place, one need for example to install functioning electoral institutions, assure economic stability, prevent elite dominance of politics or ongoing military interference. While these are certainly important conditions for fostering democratic systems, a democracy cannot exist without strong, i.e. active, competent and vigilant citizens. As the word democracy already implies, without citizens there is no democracy.

Nowadays, we are witnessing a new wave of democratization in the Arab world. While many are rightfully concerned if the institutional and structural conditions in these countries are favoring a successful democratic transition, the cognitive "readiness of the citizens" of these countries is rarely put into question. In the framework of my contribution, the fact of existing protest in these countries gives hope that movement socialization is at work and that cognitively strong citizens grow up. However, we do not know if there are enough strong citizens in order to make a democratic transition possible. Consequently, ongoing research should start to evaluate this question.

I started this dissertation with the example of my father who was skeptical about my research project concerning left-wing activists. I used him as an illustration in order to point to the possibility that a more widespread part of the population could possibly have elaborated cognitions that resemble those of a strong citizen and that the most general problem I touched here is larger then only the analysis of the cognitions of activists' of the post-industrial social movement family. Some weeks before I finished this manuscript, I was sitting with my father at the regulars' table of our communal restaurant. He was proudly explaining to our friends and acquaintances about the importance of active (communal) political commitment. Having convinced my father about the importance of my research is an accomplishment. I hope I managed to convince others as well about the importance to study the worldviews of activists and citizens in general.

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Appendix A: Survey data

Appendix A.1: Example of an invitation letter for the survey

UNIL | Université de Lausanne
Institut d'études politiques
et internationales (IEPI)



Madame XXX Rue XXX 2300 <u>La Chaux-de-Fonds</u>

Lausanne, le 7 décembre 2009

Chère Madame XXX,

Greenpeace collabore avec l'Université de Lausanne pour réaliser une enquête auprès de tous ses membres (sympathisantEs, membre, volontaire, activiste, etc.). Pour nous Greenpeace, ce sondage permet de mieux connaître nos membres et leurs préoccupations afin d'organiser toujours mieux notre travail de défense de l'environnement. Depuis notre fondation nous avons pu bénéficier d'un soutien important auprès de nos membres. C'est ce soutien qui a permis de mener toutes nos luttes : la mort des forêts, le changement climatique, le nucléaire, le développement des énergies renouvelables, la destruction des océans, etc. La défense de l'environnement a besoin d'un soutien important aujourd'hui comme hier. Mieux connaître les défenseurs de l'environnement nous permet d'évaluer notre travail et de penser notre devenir. C'est pourquoi cette enquête est importante pour nous Greenpeace. Pour les chercheurs de l'Université de Lausanne ce sondage vise à comprendre l'engagement dans les mouvements sociaux. Cette enquête fait partie d'une vaste recherche sur l'engagement de la société civile. Elle est financée par le Fonds National Suisse de la Recherche Scientifique. Pour plus d'information sur la recherche ou notre collaboration, veuillez consulter le site : http://www.unil.ch/iepi/page65477.html.

Par ce courrier on vous demande de **remplir un questionnaire** concernant votre engagement au sein de Greenpeace. **Votre collaboration est essentielle**. Elle permet de mener à bien cette recherche et surtout d'en assurer la qualité. Chaque réponse manquante diminue la qualité statistique de l'enquête et donc la fiabilité des résultats pour la recherche et pour Greenpeace. Le temps consacré à répondre au questionnaire est un temps précieux de collaboration pour Greenpeace.

Comme 2'000 autres membres de Greenpeace, votre nom a été retenu par tirage aléatoire pour répondre au questionnaire. Il vous faudra environ 45 min. pour répondre à l'enquête. Nous sommes conscients que l'on vous demande beaucoup. Toutefois, ce temps permet de prendre votre engagement au sérieux et d'éviter tout regard caricatural sur votre soutien et/ou engagement pour la protection de l'environnement.

Dès que vous avez un moment de libre, pouvez-vous s'il vous plaît remplir le questionnaire que vous trouverez sur le Web à l'adresse suivante :

https://satiscan.com/greenpeace/

Code:

Lorsque vous êtes sur Internet inscrivez l'adresse de l'enquête en haut de l'écran comme ci-dessous.



Si vous n'avez pas de connexion Internet ou vous ne vous sentez pas à l'aise pour remplir le questionnaire en ligne, appelez-nous au **022.534.90.75** et nous vous ferons parvenir un questionnaire à votre domicile. Pour des raisons pratiques et financières, nous souhaiterions récolter le plus possible de questionnaires par le biais du site Internet.

Pour les personnes qui reçoivent ce courrier avec la mention « M. et Mme » ou « Famille », une personne seulement répondra au questionnaire. Nous souhaiterions, si possible, que ce soit la personne la plus active chez Greenpeace.

Cette enquête est traitée de manière **strictement anonyme** et le **site est protégé.** Les informations personnelles ne sont utilisées que pour empêcher les réponses à double, elles seront détruites avant l'analyse. Nous vous serions reconnaissants de répondre au questionnaire avant le **1 Février 2010**.

Les résultats de l'enquête seront disponibles pour tous les membres de Greenpeace. Vous serez tenus au courant par le biais de nos publications et/ou de notre site Internet.

Nous vous remercions d'avance pour votre précieuse collaboration. Pour toutes informations supplémentaires vous pouvez contacter Florence Passy de l'Université de Lausanne.

Veuillez agréer, chère Madame, nos meilleures salutations.

Marc Birbaum

Greenpeace

Florence Passy

Professeure à l'Université de Lausanne Responsable de cette recherche FNS florence.passy@unil.ch

Tel. 079 535 66 00

Appendix A.2: Example of the survey questionnaire (Activists of GP)

Nous aimerions commencer cette interview par quelques questions concernant votre engagement à Greenpeace

1.	En quelle	année êtes-vous devenuE membre de Greenpeace?
	En	(environ)
2.	•	ctuellement votre engagement au sein de Greenpeace? o cocher toutes les activités auxquelles vous participez.
		Je suis membre /cotisantE
		Je participe à des campagnes / activités organisées par Greenpeace (pétition, manifestation, activités online, etc.)
		Je participe au Projet Solaire Jeunesse
		Je suis un E volontaire, je participe à un (des) groupe(s) volontaire(s)
		Je suis un E activiste, je participe à des actions (bloquer le transport nucléaire, destruction de mais
		transgénique, stopper les chasseurs des baleines, etc.)
3.		us nous dire de quelle manière vous êtes entréE en contact avec Greenpeace? le biais de <i>3 réponses maximum</i> .
		Proche amiE
		Connaissance / voisinE / collègue de travail
		Membre de ma famille (parents, sœur / frère, conjointE / partenaire, cousinE, etc.)
		Association / groupe à laquelle j'appartenais (ou j'appartiens toujours)
		Publications / conférences de Greenpeace
		Campagnes / manifestations de Greenpeace (Contact dans la rue par Greenpeace)
		Reportages dans les médias / internet sur Greenpeace
		Autre

connaissi	e devenir membre de Greenpeace, est-ce qu'il y avait une ou plu ez personnellement (amiE, connaissance, parent, etc.) qui étai(en)t membre (citéE à devenir membre au sein de cette association/groupe?		
	Oui		
_	Non Passez à la question 5		
-	ue représentait pour vous cette personne (ces personnes)? vous connaissiez plusieurs personnes, veuillez retenir les 2 personnes les plus impe	ortantes.	
		1e	2 e
Proc	he amiE	personne	personne
	naissance / voisinE /collègue de travail		
	bre de ma famille (parents, sœur / frère, conjointE / partenaire, cousinE, etc.)		
Autr			
	1e personne	2e personne	
	1e	Oe.	
3.5			
Mem			
Partic		_	
	pait au Projet Solaire Jeunesse		
	un volontaire , participait à un / des groupe volontaire		
	ın activiste , participait à des actions (bloquer le transport nucléaire, empêcher		
	ailles de la genie génétique, stopper les chasseurs des baleines, etc.)	_	_
Pensez-ve	Très efficace Plutôt efficace Peu efficace Pas efficace Indécis	on de l'env	ironneme
	t évaluez-vous l'apport de votre engagement au sein de Greenpeace?	Le jugez-vo	ous
_ _ _	Très utile Plutôt utile Peu utile Pas utile		

Nous aimerions poursuivre cette interview par des questions sur votre engagement pour PROTEGER L'ENVIRONNEMENT

- 7. (a) Qu'est-ce qui vous a **sensibilisé / rendu attentif** aux problèmes de l'environnement ? *Plusieurs points sont possibles, cochez tout ce qui convient*
 - (b) Qu'est ce qui a **vous a poussé à vous engager** pour protéger l'environnement? *Plusieurs points sont possibles, cochez tout ce qui convient.*

	Sensibilisé/ Rendu attentif	Poussé à vous engager
Un proche amie		
Une connaissance / voisinE / collègue de travail		
Un membre de ma famille (parents, sœur / frère, conjointE / partenaire, cousinE, etc.)		
Une association / groupe à laquelle j'appartenais (appartiens)		
L'église, une communauté ecclésiastique		
Une expérience personnelle / expérience vécue		
Mon travail		
Un événement politique, social ou humain (ex: Tchernobyl, changement climatique, Kyoto, etc.)		
Lectures personnelles		
Reportage dans les médias / internet		
Publications / informations provenant des organisations écologistes		
Campagnes / manifestations / actions des organisations écologistes		
Autre		
J'ai toujours été sensible à la protection de l'environnement / j'ai toujours voulu m'engager	۵	

8. Avant de vous engager à Greenpeace est-ce que vos proches amiEs, connaissances et membres de votre famille étaient sensibilisés / attentifs aux problèmes de protection de l'environnement? De manière générale vous diriez que... Veuillez cocher sup chaque ligne.

	Tous sensibilisés et / ou engagés	La plupart d'entre eux	La moitié d'entre eux	Seule une partie d'entre eux	Personne n'était sensibilisé et / ou engagé	Ne s'applique pas
Proches amiEs						
Connaissances / voisinEs / collègues de travail						
Membres de ma famille (parents, sœur / frère, conjointE / partenaire, cousinE, etc.)						

9. **Quelle place a dans votre vie** la protection de l'environnement?

Motivation qui vient	 □ Fait partie des choses les plus importantes □ Est très importante □ Est assez importante □ N'est pas très importante □ Est de nature secondaire 			
Nous vivons sur la même planète, il est normal d'agir pour tous les êtres humains Moi, mes proches et ma famille, nous sommes directement touchés par les problèmes d'environnement (pollution, changements climatiques, etc.) Je veux protéger la planète : son environnement et sa biodiversité Je veux améliorer la qualité de l'environnement dans la société dans laquelle je vis, à savoir Indécis 11. Voici d'autres motivations qui peuvent caractériser votre engagement pour protéger l'environnement. Le aussi, peut-être que l'ensemble des motivations ci-dessous caractérise votre engagement. Toutefois, pouvez vous nous dire laquelle constitue la motivation centrale de votre engagement pour protéger l'environnement et quelle est la motivation qui viendrait en deuxième position? Cochez dans la 1e colonne votre motivation centrale et dans la 2e colonne votre motivation qui vient en 2e position. Motivation qui vient en 2e position. Motivation dui vient en 2e position. Motivation qui vient en 2e position.	l'ensemble des motivations ci-dessous caractérise en partie votre eng dire laquelle constitue la motivation centrale de votre engagement motivation qui viendrait en deuxième position ?	agement. Tou pour l'environt	atefois, pouvez- onnement et qu	vous nous
Moi, mes proches et ma famille, nous sommes directement touchés par les problèmes d'environnement (pollution, changements climatiques, etc.) Je veux protéger la planète : son environnement et sa biodiversité Je veux améliorer la qualité de l'environnement dans la société dans laquelle je vis, à savoir la Suisse Indécis Indécis Indécis Indécis Indécis Indécis Indécis Indécis Motivation qui peuvent caractériser votre engagement pour protéger l'environnement. Le aussi, peut-être que l'ensemble des motivations ci-dessous caractérise votre engagement. Toutefois, pouvez vous nous dire laquelle constitue la motivation centrale de votre engagement pour protéger l'environnement et quelle est la motivation qui viendrait en deuxième position? Cochez dans la 1º colonne votre motivation centrale et dans la 2º colonne votre motivation qui vient en 2º position. Motivation Motivation Qui vient en 2º position Motivation qui vient en 2º position Mon engagement va de soi, il est évident J'ai mûrement réfléchi avant de m'engager Mon engagement répond à mes convictions personnelles Mes proches m'ont convaincu de m'engager				Motivation qui vient en 2 ^e position
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Je veux améliorer la qualité de l'environnement dans la société dans laquelle je vis, à savoir Indécis Indéci		les problème	es 🗖	
11. Voici d'autres motivations qui peuvent caractériser votre engagement pour protéger l'environnement. Il aussi, peut-être que l'ensemble des motivations ci-dessous caractérise votre engagement. Toutefois, pouvez vous nous dire laquelle constitue la motivation centrale de votre engagement pour protéger l'environnemer et quelle est la motivation qui viendrait en deuxième position? Cochez dans la 1º colonne votre motivation centrale et dans la 2º colonne votre motivation qui vient en 2º position. Motivation qui vient en 2º position Mon engagement va de soi, il est évident J'ai mûrement réfléchi avant de m'engager Mon engagement répond à mes convictions personnelles Mes proches m'ont convaincu de m'engager	Je veux protéger la planète : son environnement et sa biodiversité			
11. Voici d'autres motivations qui peuvent caractériser votre engagement pour protéger l'environnement. Il aussi, peut-être que l'ensemble des motivations ci-dessous caractérise votre engagement. Toutefois, pouvez vous nous dire laquelle constitue la motivation centrale de votre engagement pour protéger l'environnement et quelle est la motivation qui viendrait en deuxième position? Cochez dans la 1º colonne votre motivation centrale et dans la 2º colonne votre motivation qui vient en 2º position. Motivation qui vient en 2º position Mon engagement va de soi, il est évident J'ai mûrement réfléchi avant de m'engager Mon engagement répond à mes convictions personnelles Mes proches m'ont convaincu de m'engager		je vis, à savoi	ir 🗖	
aussi, peut-être que l'ensemble des motivations ci-dessous caractérise votre engagement. Toutefois, pouvez vous nous dire laquelle constitue la motivation centrale de votre engagement pour protéger l'environnemer et quelle est la motivation qui viendrait en deuxième position? **Cochez dans la 1º colonne votre motivation centrale et dans la 2º colonne votre motivation qui vient en 2º position.** **Motivation qui vient en 2º position** Mon engagement va de soi, il est évident J'ai mûrement réfléchi avant de m'engager Mon engagement répond à mes convictions personnelles Mes proches m'ont convaincu de m'engager		Indéci	is 🗖	
Mon engagement va de soi, il est évident J'ai mûrement réfléchi avant de m'engager Mon engagement répond à mes convictions personnelles Mes proches m'ont convaincu de m'engager	aussi, peut-être que l'ensemble des motivations ci-dessous caractérise vous nous dire laquelle constitue la motivation centrale de votre enget quelle est la motivation qui viendrait en deuxième position ?	e votre engage agement pour vation qui vient	ement. Toutefoi protéger l'envir en 2º position.	s, pouvez-
J'ai mûrement réfléchi avant de m'engager Mon engagement répond à mes convictions personnelles Mes proches m'ont convaincu de m'engager □ □ □				
Mon engagement répond à mes convictions personnelles Mes proches m'ont convaincu de m'engager				
Mes proches m'ont convaincu de m'engager □ □				
Indécis 🗖			_	
	Indécis			

pousser motivatio été énonc engageme	questions précédentes nous vous avons prése à vous engager pour protéger l'environnement. ons qui, pour vous, sont les plus importantes? Cées dans les questions précédentes ou d'autres mont.	Pouvez Ces motiv	z-vous 1 vations p	nous dor euvent ê	nner main	ntenant vos qui ont déjà
1						
2						
۷		• • • • • • • • • •	•••••	••••••	•••••	
3					••••	
Dans que l'environn	s'engager, différentes incitations sur le plan perselle mesure, les incitations ci-dessous vous ont-ement? The cher sup chaque ligne.					
		Tout		Plutôt	Pas du	
Acquérir des	expériences utiles pour mon avenir professionnel	à fait	Plutôt	pas	tout	Indécis
•	on estime auprès de mes proches					
	une communauté / groupe qui partage mes idéaux					
Rencontrer d	les amis / connaissances					
Que mes enf	ants / proches vivent mieux demain					
Avoir une co	hérence entre mes idéaux / valeurs et mes actes					
Autres						
et de dispo	dans une association/groupe représente souvent un onibilité. Comment évaluez-vous votre investisseme Très lourd Plutôt lourd Plutôt pas lourd Pas du tout lourd Indécis pour une cause peut avoir des conséquences néga stimez-vous que votre engagement pour protéger l'apour votre vie personnelle ou sociale?	ent pour	protégei	Penviro	nnement? nel et/ou	pour sa vie
	Oui, tout à fait					
	Oui, plutôt					
	Non, plutôt pas					
	Non, pas du tout Indécis					
_	11140015					

16.	Voici une liste d'autorités politiques, d'associations et de groupes de citoyenNEs qui se préoccupent (ou
	devraient se préoccuper) de la protection de l'environnement. Pouvez-vous indiquer dans quelle mesure ces
	autorités, associations et groupes de citoyenNEs ont, selon vous, la volonté d'améliorer l'environnement?
	Merci de cocher chaque ligne.

	Entièrement	Plutôt	Plutôt pas	Pas du tout	Indécis
Les autorités politiques nationales					
Les autorités politiques cantonales					
Les autorités politiques communales					
Les autorités politiques de l'Union Européenne					
Les associations internationales (ONU, FMI, etc.)					
Les associations/groupes de la société civile (Greenpeace, WWF, etc.)					
Nous, les citoyenNEs					

ous, les citoyer	nNEs			
	manière votre engagement pour la protection de l'en e où vous avez commencé à vous engager. De 			
	Beaucoup plus actif/ve			
	Un peu plus actif/ve			
	Votre engagement n'a pas changé			
	Un peu moins actif/ve			
	Beaucoup moins actif/ve			

18. S'engager peut-être une source de satisfaction. Est-ce que votre engagement pour protéger l'environnement vous apporte **certaines satisfactions** en retour ? *Merci de cocher chaque ligne.*

Acquérir des expériences utiles pour mon avenir professionnel	Tout à fait	Plutôt	Plutôt pas	Pas du tout	Indécis
Renforcer mon estime auprès de mes proches					
Appartenir à une communauté / groupe qui partage mes idéaux					
Rencontrer des amis / connaissances					
Que mes enfants / proches vivent mieux demain					
Avoir une cohérence entre mes idéaux / valeurs et mes actes					
Autres					

Voici quelques questions qui pourraient qualifier votre engagement pour la protection de l'environnement

19.	Commer avant tou	_	ualifie	z-vous	votre	engaş	gemen	t pour	la pro	otection	de l'environ	nement ? Mon enga	gement est
		Į	Un enga	agemer	nt pour	: proté	ger la p	lanète					
			_	_	-	-	_		t mes	proches	3		
			Les deu	_	-					•			
20.	On pour										ronnement (comme engagemen	t altruiste
		-	Γout à f	ait									
		I	Plutôt										
		I	Plutôt p	as									
		I	Pas du t	out									
		I	Indécis										
pen	Les gens sent surto eurs propro intérêts									es	es gens ssayent r les autres	Les deux à la fois, il n'y a pas d'opposition	Indécis
				П	П	П							
		_ 1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10		
Et ·	vous, pers	son	nellem	ent, co	omme	nt vou				cet axe	?		
	Je pense rtout à me propres intérêts	es									essaye e les autres	Les deux à la fois, il n'y a pas d'opposition	Indécis
		1	2	2	4	_	(7	0	0	10		

22. De manière général, diriez vous que vos proches amiEs, connaissances et membres de votre famille sont sensibilisés / attentifs aux questions liées à la défense des droits ou à l'amélioration des conditions de vie des autres (personnes dans le besoin, handicapés, aide humanitaire / développement, etc.)? De manière générale vous diriez que...

Veuillez cocher svp chaque ligne.

	Tous sensibilisés et / ou engagés	La plupart d'entre eux	La moitié d'entre eux	Seule une partie d'entre eux	Personne n'était sensibilisé et / ou engagé	Ne s'applique pas
Proches amiEs						
Connaissances / voisinEs / collègues de travail						
Membres de ma famille (parents, sœur / frère, conjointE / partenaire, cousinE, etc.)						

Voici maintenant quelques questions portant sur votre insertion dans le monde associatif

- 23. Voici une liste d'associations / groupes. Pouvez-vous nous dire...
 - a) Si vous étiez membre ou engagéE dans ces associations / groupes **AVANT** ou **APRÈS** votre engagement à **Greenpeace**
 - b) Etes-vous aujourd'hui encore engagéE dans ces associations / groupes?

	Je me suis dans associations	ces	Oui, je suis aujourd'hui encore engagéE
	AVANT	APRES	
Défense des droits humains / lutte contre le racisme			
Défense des droits des migrants / droit d'asile			
Aide au développement / Aide humanitaire			
Défense / soutien aux personnes dans le besoin (handicapés, chômeurs, personnes			
âgées, malades ou précaires)			
Ecologiste / antinucléaire / protection des animaux			
Pacifiste / promotion de la paix			
Altermondialiste			
Parti politique			
Anarchiste / autonomes			
Syndicats / associations d'employés			
Professionnelle / commerciale (y compris d'agriculteurs)			
Féministe / défense des femmes			
Gays / lesbiennes / queers			
Religieuse ou liée à une église			
D'automobilistes			
De patriotes / de militaires			
De locataires / droit au logement / de quartier			
De parents d'élèves			
De jeunes (scoutisme, etc.) / d'étudiants			
De consommateurs			
Culturelles ou liées à un hobby (club de foot, cercle littéraire, etc.)			
Autre			

- 24. Nous souhaiterions avoir quelques informations supplémentaires relatives à votre engagement. Voici la même liste d'associations / groupes, pouvez-vous nous dire :
 - a) Quel est actuellement votre **degré d'engagement** dans cette(ces) association(s)/groupe(s)? Dans une rubrique, si vous êtes membres de plusieurs associations veuillez mentionner le degré d'engagement le plus élevé.
 - b) Si cet engagement vous permet, en premier lieu, de défendre vos droits, de défendre les droits des autres ou de défendre à la fois vos droits et ceux des autres

ceux des autres	Je suis actif (participe à des campagnes, récolte des signatures,)	Je suis passif (sympathisantE, donatrice/-teur)	Défendre avant tout mes droits	Défendre avant tout le droit des autres	Les deux à la fois, défendre mes droits et ceux des autres
Défense des droits humains / lutte contre le racisme					
Défense des droits des migrants / droit d'asile					
Aide au développement / Aide humanitaire					
Défense / soutien aux personnes dans le besoin (handicapés,					
chômeurs, personnes âgées, malades ou précaires)					
Ecologiste / antinucléaire / protection des animaux					
Pacifiste / promotion de la paix					
Altermondialiste					
Parti politique					
Anarchiste / autonomes					
Syndicats / associations d'employés					
Professionnelle / commerciale (y compris d'agriculteurs)					
Féministe / défense des femmes					
Gays / lesbiennes / queers					
Religieuse ou liée à une église					
D'automobilistes					
De patriotes / de militaires					
De locataires / droit au logement / de quartier					
De parents d'élèves					
De jeunes (scoutisme, etc.) / d'étudiants					
De consommateurs					
Culturelles ou liées à un hobby (club de foot, cercle littéraire, etc.)					
Autre					

Voici maintenant quelques questions ayant trait à la politique en général

25. Nous aimerions que vous nous donniez votre opinion sur un certain nombre d'affirmations. A quel endroit placeriez-vous votre opinion sur cette échelle ? Si vous êtes tout à fait d'accord avec la première phrase, choisissez le chiffre 1 ou un chiffre proche de 1. Par contre, si vous optez pour la seconde phrase, choisissez le chiffre 10 ou un chiffre proche de 10. Vous pouvez utiliser les chiffres intermédiaires pour nuancer votre opinion.

Les dif entre le devraien	s rever	ıus							evenu s	randes différences de sont nécessaires afin ourager les efforts individuels	Indécis
	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	
L'Etat o s'eng davanta assure besoins	ager ge pou er les	r							ind néces est i	le responsabilité dividuelle est saire car chacun responsable de nir à ses besoins	Indécis
	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	
Les immigréE prennent le travail des gen nés dans le pay	ıs							pr tra	ennen avail de	gréEs ne t pas le es gens le pays	Indécis
	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	
La culture d'us pays est menacée par les immigréEs								pa me	culture nys n'es nacée p mmigr	t pas par les	Indécis

	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10			
diffé vou		ectifs s aire? E	sont én Et quel	umérés objecti	s. Si vo f serait	ous de t votre	eviez c e secon	hoisir p d choix	armi ce			ns la liste equel ser	
											1e choix	x 2	² choix
Mainteni	r l'ordre o	dans le	pays										
Augmen	ter la part	cicipatio	on des	citoyen	NEs a	ux dé	cisions	du gouv	ernemer	nt			
Combatt	re la haus	sse des	prix										
Garantir	la liberté	d'expr	ession										
									Indéc	is			
pou du t		e d'entr ord.	e elles	si vous			ait d'ac	cord, plu			, plutôt p	as, s'il vou: oas d'acco:	~
								Tout à fait l'accord	Plutôt d'accor		Plutôt pas d'accord	Pas du tout d'accord	Indécis
	rais une entaire é nement								0				
contre la	be au gou pollution coûte de l	n de l'e	environ										
28. Ave Etai	(s) ? Oui, Non, Non,	j'ai vot , je n'ai , je n'ai	é pas vo	oté	s c'étai	Ü		,	élections a			onal et Con	seil des

Etes-vo	ous membre d'un parti politique ?
	Oui, de quel parti?
	Non, quel est le parti qui vous est particulièrement proche?
	Cochez au maximum 2 partis.

	OUI, je suis membre de	NON, je suis proche de
Parti du Travail (PdT) / Parti ouvrier populaire (POP)		
Parti socialiste (PSS)		
Les Verts - Parti écologiste suisse (PES)		
Parti Vert-Liberal (PEL)		
Parti démocrate-chrétien (PDC)		
Parti chrétien-social (PCS)		
Parti libéral (PLS)		
Parti radical-démocratique (PRD)		
Union démocratique du centre (UDC)		
Démocrates suisses (DS) (ancienne Action Nationale (AN)		
Union démocratique fédérale (UDF)		
Patri bourgeois démocrate (PBD)		
Parti évangélique (PEV)		
Lega dei Ticinesi (Lega)		
Autre parti		
Aucun parti		

30. Pouvez-vous nous dire **quelle confiance vous accordez** aux institutions et associations/groupes suivantes : *Veuillez cocher svp chaque ligne*.

	Grande confiance	Une certaine confiance	Peu de confiance	Pas de confiance du tout	Indécis
Le Conseil fédéral					
Le Parlement fédéral (Conseil national et des Etats)					
Les autorités politiques de votre canton					
Les autorités politiques de votre commune					
Les partis politiques					
Les syndicats					
Les associations/groupes écologistes					
Les associations humanitaires ou caritatives					
L'Union européenne (UE)					
L'ONU					

31. Il y a différentes opinions sur ce qu'il faudrait faire pour **être unE bonNNE citoyenNE**. En ce qui vous concerne personnellement, sur une échelle de 1 à 7, où 1 correspond à pas important du tout et 7 à très important, quelle est l'importance de : Veuillez cocher sup chaque ligne.

	Pas importar du tout						rès ortant	Indécis
Toujours voter	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	
Jamais tenter de frauder le fisc	1	2	3	4	5	6	7 7	
Toujours obéir aux lois et aux règlements	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	
Se tenir au courant des actions du gouvernement	1		3	4	5	6	7	
Etre actif dans les associations sociales et politiques	1		3	4	5	6	7	
Essayer de comprendre la manière de penser des personnes qui ont des opinions différentes des vôtres	1		3	4	5	6	7	
Choisir les produits que vous achetez pour des raisons politiques, éthiques, environnementales même s'ils coûtent un peu plus chers	1	□ 2	3	4	5	6	7	
Aider les personnes en Suisse qui sont plus défavorisées que vous	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	
Aider les personnes dans le reste du monde qui sont plus défavorisées que vous	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	
Etre d'accord de servir dans l'armée en cas de nécessité	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	

		1	2	3	4	5	6	7	
d'acco	rd de servir dans l'armée en cas de								
55110		1	2	3	4	5	6	7	
Si ch	ue faudrait-il faire pour être pour être unE b nisse? En ce qui vous concerne personnellem noses importantes que doit (ou devrait) faire un nuvez-vous nous dire quelles sont les 3 choses les plus in	ent, po E citoy	uvez-v enNE	ous no dans u	ous dire ne soci	e quelle iété tell	es sont le que l	(seraien	t) les
	1			• • • • • • •					
	2								
	3								

Voici maintenant quelques questions ayant trait à la société en général

33. Voici une liste de qualités que les parents peuvent chercher à encourager chez leurs enfants. Voulez-vous citer celles que vous considérez comme particulièrement importantes? Veuillez choisir 5 réponses au maximum.

	Cochez 5 qualités particulièrement importantes
Les bonnes manières	
L'indépendance	
L'application au travail	
Le sens des responsabilités	
L'imagination	
La tolérance et le respect des autres	
L'esprit d'économie, ne pas gaspiller l'argent ni les choses	
La détermination, la persévérance	
La foi religieuse	
La générosité	
L'obéissance	

34. Dans quelle mesure **vous sentez-vous concernéE par les conditions de vie** de : *Merci de cocher ce qui convient pour chaque ligne.*

	Enormément	Beaucoup	Dans une certaine mesure	Pas du tout	Indécis
Votre famille					
Des gens de votre voisinage					
Des gens de la région où vous habitez					
De vos compatriotes					
Des Européens					
Des habitants d'autres régions du monde (en Afrique, Amérique du Nord, etc.)					
De l'humanité toute entière					

	Je n'aimerais pas avoir comme voisins
Des gens qui ont un casier judiciaire	
Des extrémistes de gauche	
Des gens portés sur la boisson	
Des extrémistes de droite	
Des familles nombreuses	
Des gens émotionnellement instables	
Des musulmans	
Des travailleurs étrangers ou des immigrés	
Des gens atteint du SIDA	
Des drogués	
Des homosexuels	
Des juifs	
Des gitans	
Des chrétiens	
Toutes les catégories des personnes me conviennent comme vo	oisin 🔲
Certaines personnes pensent que vivre en société nécessite de se pr eses biens que nous partageons tous et qui sont utiles à tous (ex : éducour tous). D'autres, en revanche, estiment qu'il faut d'abord se préc essonnellement, qu'en pensez-vous ?	cation, santé, logement, alimentation
	Les deux à la coccuper fois, il n'y a pas d'opposition

37.	7. Dans notre société, une des tâches de l'Etat est de se préoccuper des biens communs, ces biens q nous partageons tous et qui sont utiles à tous (ex : éducation, santé, logement, alimentation pour tous). Certaines personnes pensent que c'est aussi la tâche du citoyen de se préoccuper des biens communs. D'autres, en revanche, estiment que ce n'est pas la tâche du citoyen de se préoccu des biens communs. Vous, personnellement, qu'en pensez-vous?											s		
	du (pré	citoye: occup	la tâch n de se oer des nmuns							du	a'est pas la tâc a citoyen de se ccuper des bie communs		Ind	lécis
		1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10			
	Leur fai ? Veuillez					nce, pl		Je fais tout à fait		Je fais plutôt confiance	Je ne fais plutôt pas confiance	Je ne fais pas du tout confiance	Indécis]
Votr	e famille													
Vos	voisins													
Les g	gens que	vous (connai	ssez										
Les g	gens que	vous 1	rencon	trez la	premiè	ere fois								
Les g	gens d'un	e autr	e religi	ion										
Les §	gens d'un	e autr	e natic	nalité										
	rt tra Ces aup pas	répor aravar là p	nses sont. On	car ont inc	acté	sables	ique pour es répo	es so	cio	ension de	s réponses qu	elles e vous avez de Ces questions quel monde	lonnées ne sont	
39.	Etes-vo	Une	femme omme	:										

40.	Quelle	est votre année de naissance ?
	En	
41.	Avez-v	ous la nationalité suisse ?
		Oui, et je n'ai que la nationalité suisse
		Oui, mais j'ai aussi une autre nationalité
		Non, je n'ai pas la nationalité suisse
42.	a) Avez	z-vous des enfants ?
		Oui, ils vivent chez moi
		Oui, mais ils ne vivement pas chez moi
		Non, je n'ai pas d'enfants Passez à la question 43
	b) Con	nbien d'enfants avez-vous ?
43.		ors des mariages, des enterrements et des baptêmes, à quelle fréquence assistez-vous à un religieux de votre confession?
		Plus d'une fois par semaine
		Une fois par semaine
		Une fois par mois
		Seulement pour des fêtes religieuses
		Une fois par an
		Moins souvent
		Jamais ou pratiquement jamais
44.		que vous aviez douze ans , en dehors des mariages, des enterrements et des baptêmes, à quelle nce assistiez-vous à un service religieux de votre confession ?
		Plus d'une fois par semaine
		Une fois par semaine
		Une fois par mois
		Seulement pour des fêtes religieuses
		Une fois par an
		Moins souvent
		Jamais ou pratiquement jamais

45.	Quelle est 1st que vous av	a formation la plus élevée que vous avez achevée, ou quel est le diplôme le plus élevé rez obtenu ?
		Aucune formation scolaire / professionnelle
		Ecole obligatoire (primaire, cycle)
		Apprentissage professionnel (moins de 3 ans)
		Apprentissage professionnel (3 ans ou plus)
		Ecole supérieure (maturité, bac)
		Haute école spécialisée (Technicum, HES, etc.)
		Université ou EPF
46.	Avez-vous	actuellement un emploi ?
	☐ Ou	i
	☐ No	n Passez à la question 47
	a) Quel	est votre type d'emploi ?
		☐ Je travaille à l'Etat
		☐ Je travaille dans une association à but non-lucratif
		Je suis employéE dans une entreprise privée
		Je suis indépendantE et emploie entre 0 et 1 employé Passez à la question 49
		Je suis indépendantE et emploie entre 2 à 10 employés Passez à la question 49
		Je suis indépendantE et emploie plus de 10 employés Passez à la question 49
		□ Autre
	b) Est-c	re que vous occupez une fonction de supérieur hiérarchique ?
		☐ Oui
		□ Non
	•	te que vous participez aux décisions stratégiques de votre organisation? exemple: aux décisions concernant la production, le personnel ou les finances)
		□ Oui
		□ Non
		le est votre profession ? Donner en quelques mots une description détaillée de votre profession. Par « maître dans une école primaire », au lieu de simplement « enseignant ».

e) Vo	tre travail correspond à un
	☐ Temps complet (80-100%)
	Temps partiel: 50 à moins de 80% 30 à moins de 50% moins de 30%
	Passez à la question 49
47. Quelle est	t votre situation actuelle ?
	En formation Femme / homme au foyer RetraitéE / AVS Rentier/rentière / bénéficiaire de l'AI Au chômage Autre
48. Est-ce qu	e vous aviez un emploi autrefois ?
	Oui
	Non Passez à la question 49
a) Qu	el était votre dernier type d'emploi ?
	Je travaillais à l'Etat
	Je travaillais dans une association à but non-lucratif
	J'étais employéE dans une entreprise privée
	J'étais indépendantE et employais entre 0 et 1 employé Passez à la question 49
	J'étais indépendantE et employais entre 2 à 10 employés Passez à la question 49
	J'étais indépendantE et employais plus de 10 employés Passez à la question 49
	Autre
b) Es	t-ce que vous occupiez une fonction de supérieur hiérarchique?
	□ Oui □ Non

c) Est-ce que vous participiez aux **décisions stratégiques** de votre organisation?

		(par exemp	le: aux décisions concernant la production, le personnel ou les finances)
			Oui
			Non
			it votre profession ? Donner en quelques mots une description détaillée de votre profession. Par ître dans une école primaire », au lieu de simplement « enseignant ».
		••••	
	e) '	Votre trav	ail correspondait à un
			Temps complet (80-100%)
			Temps partiel:
			□ 50 à moins de 80%
			☐ 30 à moins de 50%
			☐ moins de 30%
49. I	∃tes-vo	ous	
		Célibatai	re Passez à la question 54
		MariéE	
		LiéE par	une déclaration de partenariat (partenariat enregistré, PACS, etc.)
		-	unE partenaire
		Veuf/ve	
		Divorcél	E/séparéE Passez à la question 54
50. (Quelle	est la forn	nation la plus élevée ou le diplôme le plus élevé obtenu par votre partenaire?
		Aucune	formation scolaire / professionnelle
		Ecole ob	oligatoire (primaire, cycle)
		Apprenti	issage professionnel (moins de 3 ans)
		Apprent	issage professionnel (3 ans ou plus)
		Ecole su	périeure (maturité, bac)
			ole spécialisée (Technicum, HES, etc.)
		Universi	té ou EPF
51. V	Votre p	partenaire	/ époux/SE a-t-il/elle actuellement un emploi ?
		Oui	
		Non	Passez à la question 53

a) (Quel est	on type d'emploi ?	
		l/elle travaille à l'Etat	
		l/elle travaille dans une association à but non-lucratif	
		l/elle est employéE dans une entreprise privée	
		l/elle est indépendantE et emploie entre 0 et 1 employ	é Passez à la question 54
		l/elle est indépendantE et emploie entre 2 à 10 employ	rés Passez à la question 54
		l/elle est indépendantE et emploie plus de 10 employé	s Passez à la question 54
		Autre	
	b) Est-c	qu'il / elle occupe une fonction de supérieur hiérare	chique ?
		O ui	
		Non	
	,	qu'il / elle participe aux décisions stratégiques de so semple: aux décisions concernant la production, le personnel ou le Oui	C
		Non	
		st sa profession ? Donner en quelques mots une description de sune école primaire », au lieu de simplement « enseignant ». Passez à la question 54	étaillée de votre profession. Par exemple:
52. Que	elle est s	situation actuelle ?	
		ormation	
		me / homme au foyer	
		iitéE / AVS	
		ier / bénéficiaire de l'AI	
		hômage	
	☐ Aut		

Lot cc qu'i	/elle avai	t un emploi autrefois ?		
☐ Ot	11			
□ No		Passez à la question 54		
_ 110	,11	I wood a sa quomon s		
a) Que				
		Il/elle travaillait à l'Etat		
		Il/elle travaillait dans une association à but non-lu	ıcratif	
		Il/elle était employéE dans une entreprise privée		
	Il/elle é	tait indépendantE et employait entre 0 et 1 employ	yé ^P Passez à la	a question
	Il/elle é	tait indépendantE et employait entre 2 à 10 emplo	oyés Passez à .	la question
	Il/elle é	tait indépendantE et employait plus de 10 employe	és ^P Passez à la	question 5
		Autre		
b) Est-	_	elle occupait une fonction de supérieur hiérarch	hique?	
<i>b)</i> Lst	cc qu ii /	che occupat une fonction de supericul inclarer	inque :	
		Oui		
		Non		
	ce qu'il / exemple: a	elle participait aux décisions stratégiques de son		
		Oui		
		Non		
exemple	: « maître (a profession ? Donner en quelques mots une description descriptio	int ».	
			Père	Mère
Aucune		n scolaire / professionnelle		
	oligatoire	(primaire, cycle)		
Apprent	issage pro	ofessionnel (moins de 3 ans)		
Apprent Apprent	issage pro issage pro	ofessionnel (moins de 3 ans) ofessionnel (3 ans ou plus) (maturité, bac)	0	

Université ou EPF

55. **En repensant à la vie de vos parents** quand vous aviez 14 ans, dites-nous dans quelle mesure les phrases suivantes leur correspondent? *Veuillez cocher svp chaque ligne.*

	Oui	Dans une certaine mesure	Un peu	Non	Ne sais pas
Ma mère aimait lire des livres					
Je discutais politique à la maison avec ma mère					
Ma mère aimait suivre l'actualité					
Mes parents avaient du mal à joindre les deux bouts					
Mon père aimait lire des livres					
Je discutais politique à la maison avec mon père					
Mon père aimait suivre l'actualité					

56. D	ans quel canton vivez-vous?
	Argovie (AG)
	Bâle-campagne (BL)
	Bâle-ville (BS)
	Berne (BE)
	Fribourg (FR)
	Genève (GE)
	Glaris (GL)
	Grisons (GR)
	Jura (JU)
	Lucerne
	Neuchâtel (NE)
	Nidwald (NW)
	Obwald (OW)
	Rhodes-Extérieures (AR)
	Rhodes-Intérieures (AI)
	Saint-Gall (SG)
	Schaffhouse (SH)
	Soleure (SO)
	Schwytz (SZ)
	Tessin (TI)
	Thurgovie (TG)
	Uri (UR)
	Valais (VS)
	Vaud (VD)
	Zoug (ZG)
	Zurich (ZH)

Appendix A.3: Differences between language regions

	SAB			STP			GP		
	German	French	Diff.	German	French	Diff.	German	French	Diff
	%	%	V	%	%	V	n (%)	n (%)	V
Relation to society							l '		
Common Goods									
Commons are also citizen's responsibility	97	97	ns	88	94	11*	88	95	13**
n	413	201		186	180		312	309	
Importance to take care of Commons	46	57	11*	42	31	ns	44	53	ns
Imp. to take care of oneself and Commons	52	41		55	65		48	42	
n	415	200		189	190		273	224	
Responsible consumption: Important	80	78	ns	68	65	ns	79	83	ns
n	421	201		192	189		316	319	
Concerned by distant others	55	38	.16***	47	21	.27***	46	21	.27***
n	411	193		190	189		319	313	
Self-extension	111	173		150	107		317	313	
Self-extension scale: Extension/Self	49	49	ns	28	36	ns	30	26	ns
Self-extension scale: Extension	32	25	113	64	54	113	60	67	113
	401	193		174	165		310	305	
n Social Exemples No	7		21***	15				303 19	
Social Frontiers: No		22	21***		21	ns	14		ns
n e i i e a a a a a a a a a a a a a a a a	407	201	02***	191	190	10***	320	318	12**
Social Frontiers: Political minorities	87	68	.23***	83	68	.18***	80	68	.13**
n	407	201		191	190		320	318	
Social Frontiers: Cultural minorities	7	4	ns	11	14	ns	18	16	ns
n	407	201		191	190		320	318	
Social Frontiers: Social deviant minorities	71	50	.21***	56	48	ns	66	60	ns
n	407	201		191	190		320	318	
Trust: Unknown Others	71	80	10*	57	59	ns	52	59	ns
n	359	182		170	175		287	282	
Trust: Distant Others	95	99	10*	81	89	12*	77	86	-13**
n	345	177		151	168		255	258	
Relation to politics									
Political sphere									
Resistance	64	45	.22***	51	31	.23**	58	38	.25***
Complementary	32	55		46	59		34	59	
n	277	132		114	124		195	214	
Citizen's role									
To keep watch on government	30	35	ns	14	23	22**	17	21	19**
n	419	199		190	190		313	312	
To be active in social and pol. associations	32	27	ns	13	10	ns	13	9	ns
n	418	197	110	184	186	110	313	307	110
Injustice frame	110			101	100		313	507	
Issue's centrality: Most important	8	13	25***	5	5	.17*	29	35	ns
n	466	211	.23	199	197	.17	341	325	113
Agency frame	100	211		177	17/		311	323	
Collective efficacy: Rather and Very	65	71	ne	86	80	ne	93	95	ne
French speaking	428	195	ns	163	132	ns	348	332	ns
Individual usefulness: Rather and Very	54	63	14*	52	59	200	72	63	.14**
marviauai userumess: Ratner and Very			14"			ns			.14***
I.i	386	190		180	172		343	328	
Identity frame (with concerned group)	42	(5	01 444	4.5	FO.	4 5 4			
Same humanity	43	65	.21***	45	59	15*	-	-	
Same humanity but different	54	35		51	39				
n	455	207		179	186				

Appendix B

Appendix B.1: Interview guideline

Introduction

- ⇒ Présentation (cf. lettre)
 - FP : Université de Lausanne, Institut de scpo (IEPI)
 - Domaine de recherche: Mouvements sociaux, migrations et relations ethniques, engagement dans les mouvements
 - Moi-même assez engagée : thèse de doctorat
- ⇒ Buts de cette recherche
 - Comprendre l'engagement politique et, surtout, l'engagement pour les autres
 - Pourquoi des personnes comme vous se sont engagées et sont encore engagées – pour défendre le droit des migrants (droit des autres)? Motivations.
 - Comment s'est engagement a eu lieu, s'est produit ? Incitations
 - Qui sont les personnes qui s'engagent ? Qui sont-elles ?
 - Résumé: Pourquoi, comment et qui
 - Comprendre l'action que des personnes engagent pour d'autres : action que d'aucuns nomment altruiste/pro-social
 - Qu'est-ce que cela veut dire de s'engager pour les autres ?
 - Comment vous voyez cet engagement?
- ⇒ Entretien en 2 temps/fois
 - Connaître votre histoire
 - Qui vous êtes, d'où vous venez
 - Comment vous êtes arrivés à l'engagement, à l'engagement pour défense le droit des migrants
 - Evénements clés, les rencontres
 - Pourquoi ce type d'engagement pour les autres
 - Vous connaître
 - Discussion sur quelques thèmes qui aura resurgi de ce premier entretien
 - Discussion thématique sur quelques axes pour mieux vous comprendre
 - Thèmes de mon questionnement de recherche

⇒ Entretien

- Discussion ouverte sur votre action, vos expériences et comment vous ressentez ces expériences. Sentez-vous libre de vous exprimer comme vous le voulez
- Entretien anonyme
- Enregistré pour faciliter le travail de recherche
- Vous pouvez avoir l'enregistrement de l'entretien si vous le souhaitez
- Remerciements pour sa collaboration

I. RECIT DE VIE

1. La famille d'origine : statut social et valeurs véhiculées

L'influence du contexte familial sur le futur engagement politique et engagement altruiste ; et sur la formation des intérêts

(1) Contexte social, origine et composition de la famille

- Pays d'origine, où il/elle a vécu dans son enfance (ville/campagne)
- Profession du père/mère
- Conditions matérielles/socio-économique (position de la famille dans la stratification sociale, type de quartier, de milieu)
- Type de famille (large, recomposée, monoparentale, etc.)

(2) Contexte idéologique, religieux et identitaire de la famille

- Religion (engagement religieux, pratiques de la famille)
- Politique (orientation politique, engagement politique et social)
- Valeurs importantes de la famille
- Identités dominantes
- Vision/compréhension de l'humanité
- Engagement associatif
- Engagement altruiste

(3) Ambiance familiale

- Type de famille : libérale/autoritaire
- Ouverture sur les autres (fermeture sur le cocon familial)
- Conflits (valeurs, modes de vie, engagement politiques (associatifs)

(4) Influence: engagement et altruisme

- Contexte familial a joué un rôle dans ses choix d'engagement
- Et sur l'engagement pour les migrants/pro-social (pour les autres)

2. Jeunesse : intérêts, aspirations et frustrations

Maturation idéologique et culture, et son influence sur son futur engagement politique et engagement altruiste, et sur la formation de ses intérêts (à l'égard des autres)

(1) Contexte social et relationnel

- Ecoles/études (succès et échecs)
- Types d'activités (musique, sport, voyages, etc.)
- Groupes d'insertion (église, sports, etc.)
- Amis d'enfance, de jeunesse, types de copains (groupes d'amis)

(2) Evénements marquants

- Personne(s) qui a compté particulièrement pour vous à cette période (famille ou autre)
- Evénement(s) qui a compté particulièrement pour vous à cette période (personnel ou historique)
- Expériences marquantes

(3) Monde subjectif : Perceptions du monde, maturation idéologique, intérêts

- Perception du monde/société (sentiments d'injustice, révolte, etc.)
- Croyances (politiques, religieuses, sociales) de l'époque
- Identités dominantes
- Vision/compréhension de l'humanité à cette époque
- Personnage(s) idéels qui faisait l'objet d'une profonde admiration
- Lectures
- Perception de son avenir
- Quels souvenirs de cette période de votre vie (difficile, heureux)

(4) Influence : engagement et altruisme

- Jeunesse a joué un rôle dans ses choix d'engagement
- Et sur l'engagement pour les migrants/pro-social (pour les autres)

3. Vie adulte

Trajectoire dans sa vie adulte, ses valeurs/identités, son rapport aux autres, ses réseaux

(1) Contexte social et caractéristiques socio-économiques

- Profession (changements, parcours dans le monde du travail)
- Conditions matérielles/socio-économique (position de la famille dans la stratification sociale, type de quartier, de milieu)
- Voyages, vécu à l'étranger

(2) Contexte relationnel et affectif

- Amis (type, milieu, engagés politiquement, pour les autres)
- Partenaire (type, milieu, engagés politiquement, pour les autres)
- Enfants
- Groupes d'insertion (église, sports, etc.), réseau associatif

(3) Contexte idéologique, religieux et identitaire

- Perception du monde (changements et intensification)
- Valeurs importantes, croyances
- Religion (engagement religieux, pratiques, croyances)
- Politique (orientation politique, sensibilité politique et sociale)
- Identités dominantes (ce qui vous définit aujourd'hui, évolution/intensification, nouvelle identité, identités délaissées)
- Vision/compréhension de l'humanité/société
- Développement d'un intérêt pour engagement politique/associatif
- Développement d'un intérêt pour engagement pour les autres (altruisme)

4. Engagement politique et associatif

Comment est-il arrivé à l'engagement politique et Pourquoi s'est-il engagé. Généalogies des engagements politiques

(1) Premier engagement politique et associatif

- Quand la première activité politique (âge, période de sa vie)
- Enjeux politiques
- Quelle organisation/réseau (type)
- Son activité dans cette organisation/réseau (intensité)
- Motivations qui ont poussé à cet engagement (pourquoi cet engagement)
- Sens de cet engagement (que représente-t-il, dans votre vie)
- Si engagement altruiste: motivation de s'engager pour les autres (sens)
- Incitations à s'engager (opportunités, réseaux, amis, médias, etc.)
- Influence de ces réseaux/amis sur ces motivations
- Engagement accidentel/allant de soi (lien avec sa vie -croyances/intérêts- part du hasard)

(2) Parcours dans ses engagements politiques et associatifs

- Autres engagements
- Enjeux
- Organisation/réseaux
- Nouveaux centres d'intérêt/préoccupations (croyances politiques changent/ événements politiques)
- Motivations qui ont poussé à cet engagement (pourquoi cet engagement)
- Sens de cet engagement (que représente-t-il, dans votre vie)
- Si engagements altruistes: motivation de s'engager pour les autres (sens)
- Incitations à s'engager (opportunités, réseaux, amis, médias, etc.)
- Influence de ces réseaux/amis sur ces motivations
- Engagement accidentel ou allant de soi (lien avec sa vie croyances/intérêts part du hasard)
- Panorama de ses engagements (motivations, incitations, liens entre engagements)

(3) Motivation à s'engager politiquement

- Motivations qui le conduisent à s'engager (vie politique, associative)
- Pourquoi être actif, qu'est-ce qui le pousse à être actif (croyance, nécessité d'agir pour un société plus viable, etc.)
- On peut laisser les autres s'engager (engagement a un coût)

(4) Politique, société civile et rôle du citoyen

- Perception des autorités politiques (Etat/gvt/démo., légitimité/délég. lutter contre, etc.)
- Perception des organisations/monde associatif (légitimité, nécessité, lutter ensemble, etc.)
- Perception du rôle de citoyen (actif/vigilent ou passif, responsabilité sociale, rôle c'est de voter c'est tout)
- Construction de ces perceptions (amis, réseaux, événements, milieu familial)
- Biens collectifs (à défendre, promouvoir, protéger, etc.)
- Motivations à maintenir un engagement (croyance, amis/réseaux, événements)
- Apports/Efficacité de ces engagements pour changement social (collectif)

- Apports de ses engagements pour changement social (personnel)

5. Engagement dans l'association SOSF, engagement altruiste

Comment est-il arrivé à s'engager pour défendre le droit des migrants et Pourquoi s'est-il engagé pour les autres

(1) Action

- Depuis quand
- Choix de cette organisation/groupe (enjeux, modes d'action, identité, membres, hasard, amis, etc.)
- Ce qu'il/elle fait (intensité)

(2) Sens de l'action, de cet engagement

- Importance de cet engagement (centralité enjeux)
- Sens de cet engagement (que représente-t-il, dans votre vie, est-vous attaché)
- Si important : Pourquoi l'est-il (injustice, identification à l'enjeu, responsabilité, etc.)
- Si important, Processus : Comment l'est-il devenu (l'a toujours été, famille, événements, réseaux, amis, etc.)
- Définir cet engagement (engagement altruiste/pro-social, politique)

(3) Motivations et cognitions : Pourquoi

- Motivations qui ont poussé à cet engagement (pourquoi cet engagement)
- Motivation de s'engager pour les autres (sens)
- Engagement accidentel ou allant de soi (lien avec sa vie -croyances/intérêts-, part du hasard)

(4) Rapport de soi aux autres

- Identification aux migrants (facilité et difficulté d'identification)
- Engagement pour d'autres personnes (facile/naturel, difficile, sentiment à cet égard)
- Processus d'identification (famille, événements, réseaux, amis, etc.)
- Conception de l'humanité (destin commun, humanité partagée/segmentée)
- Interdépendance des individus (interconnections)
- Identifications pour d'autres personnes en situation difficile (autre que migrants)

(5) Contexte relationnel: Construction du pourquoi et Comment

- Incitations à s'engager (opportunités, réseaux, amis, médias, etc.)
- Processus d'engagement : comment ça s'est passé (réseaux, trust, etc.)
- Influence de ces réseaux/amis sur ces motivations
- Motivations à maintenir un engagement (croyance, amis/réseaux, événements)

(6) Apports/efficacité de cet engagement

- Apports de cet engagement (action politique change-t-elle qq. chose)
- Apports de son engagement personnel (son action change-t-elle qq. chose)
- Apports/changements : est-ce un élément important ou non de l'engagement
- Apports de cet engagement (personnel, bénéfices)
- Si bénéfices : avant ou après de s'engager

6. Altruisme et pluralité motivationnelle

Thèses de l'altruisme : Bénéfices individuels, Biens différés (coopération), Autre fonction d'utilité (personnalité), Pluralité motivationnelle, Résonance cognitive (évidence de l'acte)

(1) Acte altruiste

- Intérêt personnel avant de s'engager (compétences/savoir, amis, reconnaissance, etc.)
- Résonance avec vos idéaux/croyances (cohérence avec votre parcours)
- Acte évident (coule de source)
- Intérêts différés (recevoir qq. chose de façon indirecte ou plus tard)
- Personnalité altruiste (autodéfinition de la personne)
- Ni altruiste, ni individualiste mais les deux (autodéfinition de la personne)

1. Fin de notre conversation : 1^e phase

- (1) Points qu'il souhaite ajouter
- (2) Commentaires sur l'entretien
- (3) Autre

Fin de l'entretien

- (1) Remerciements
- (2) S'assurer du prochain rdv

II. ENTRETIEN THEMATIQUE

Discussion orientée sur les axes de la recherche. Développement et approfondissement des thèmes abordés dans le récit de vie (entretien thématique doit intégrer les éléments livrés par l'interviewé dans le récite de vie) . Fil rouge de la discussion : Altruisme et actes pro-social

Laisser émerger les liens : laisser la personne faire des lieens/associations ; la laisser parler le plus librement et de façon chaotique.

1. Contexte organisationnel

(1) Choix et perceptions de l'organisation X

- Choix de s'engager dans cette organisation (pourquoi : enjeux, modes d'actions, identités, membres, amis, etc.) Réseaux (liens)
- Enjeux/Thèmes les plus importants à ses yeux (pourquoi)
- Orientation idéologique et politique de l'organisation
- Stratégies d'action
- Engagement important (sens dans sa vie : centrale, périphérique)

(2) Membres de l'organisation

- Connaissances des membres
- Identification (se sentir proche; aspects de l'identification)
- Fréquences des interactions avec les membres
- Personnes importantes à ses yeux (signification du lien : trust, etc.)
- Importance de ces personnes dans sa vie (centrale, périphérique)

(3) Multi engagement pour les migrants / pour les autres / pour soi (self-interest)

- Unique engagement/engagement pluriel pour les migrants (pourquoi, cohérence)
- Unique engagement/engagement pluriel pour les autres (pourquoi, cohérence)
- Cohérence de ses engagements (existe, ou hasard)

(4) Apports/Efficacité collective

- Changements apportés (lesquels, les plus importants, qui ont du sens)
- Rôle de cette organisation dans la défense des migrants (place, succès et échecs)
- Rôle des organisations dans la défense des migrants (place, succès et échecs)
- Si inefficace: motivations pour rester actifs

(5) Apports/Efficacité individuel

- Changements apportés personnellement à cette cause (lesquels/plus importants/ qui ont du sens)
- Rôle/importance de son engagement pour l'organisation (fait la différence d'être là ou pas)
- Rôle/importance de son engagement dans la défense des migrants (fait la différence d'être là ou pas)
- Si inefficace: motivations pour rester actifs

2. Réseaux sociaux et interpersonnels

(1) Réseaux sociaux, multi engagement politique et associatif

- Types d'engagement (ordre d'importance : centralité, identité)
- Liens entre ces engagements (cohérence ou hasard)
- Liens de ces engagements avec la défense des migrants
- Intensité d'engagement (personnes très engagée, superficiellement engagée)
- Motivations/sens de ces engagements et engagements multiples

(2) Réseaux interpersonnels

- Réseau d'amis : proches de la défense des migrants (sensibles, engagement)
- Réseau d'amis : proches des enjeux d'aide aux autres (sensibles, engagement)
- Famille (origine): proche de la défense des migrants (sensibles, engagement)
- Famille (origine): proche des enjeux d'aide aux autres (sensibles, engagement)
- Partenaire/enfants : proche de la défense des migrants (sensibles, engagement)
- Partenaire/enfants: proche des enjeux d'aide aux autres (sensibles, engagement)
- Influence des amis/famille sur engagement pour défendre les migrants/autres (comment, quels aspects)

(3) Rencontre(s) influente(s)

- Rencontres influentes dans sa vie : engagement, droit migrants, aide aux autres)
- Qui est cette personne (ami, trust, etc.), que représente-elle ?
- Sens de cette influence à ses yeux

3. Carte cognitive - Altruisme : Rapport de soi aux autres

(1) Identification au groupe aidé/défense de leurs droits

- Perception des migrants
- Identification aux migrants (points communs/appartenir au même monde)
- Ce qui le distingue des migrants (appartenir à des mondes différents)
- Identification à d'autres personnes dans des situations difficiles (lesquels, pourquoi, similitudes/différences entre ces personnes dans le besoin)

→ Processus et Influences : Identification au groupe aidé

- Comment s'est construit cette identification (construction, toujours là)
- Influence de la famille/enfance (personnes, valeurs)
- Influence de votre entourage amical (personnes, valeurs)
- Influence d'expériences vécues

○ Dilemme de l'engagement sans identification

- Difficulté de s'engager sans s'identifier aux migrants
- Comment surmonter ses difficultés

(2) Extension de soi

- Son rapport aux autres, à la différence (mondes différents, monde commun, humanité que l'on partage, destins communs ou pas)
- Se sentir appartenir au monde ou à des groupes (appartenances, ordonnancer ces appartenances, frontières entre les uns et les autres)
- Perception de l'être humain (humanisme, empathie)
- Identités, se définir (autodéfinition et ordonnancement de ses identités)

→ Processus et Influences : Extension de soi/inclusion au monde

- Comment s'est construit cette conception (construction, toujours là)
- Influence de la famille/enfance (personnes, valeurs)
- Influence de votre entourage amical (personnes, valeurs)
- Influence d'expériences vécues

(3) Biens collectifs/communs

- Existence et importance des biens communs/collectifs (biens que tous citoyens/individus doivent/devaient partager; ex: éducation, santé, alimentation pour tous)
- Exemples donnés par l'interviewé et ordonnancement
- Interdépendance des citoyens/individus (interdépendance des ind./dépendance des uns et des autres)
- Son interdépendance avec les autres

→ Processus et Influences : Biens collectifs/communs

- Comment s'est construit cette conception (construction, toujours là)
- Influence de la famille/enfance (personnes, valeurs)
- Influence de votre entourage amical (personnes, valeurs)
- Influence d'expériences vécues

4. Carte cognitive – Injustice frame : Rapport de soi à l'enjeu

(1) Enjeu – Injustice frame

- Importance de cet enjeu dans votre vie (centralité : centrale, périphérique)
- Sens de l'engagement pour cette cause (sens dans sa vie, que représente-t-il)
- Identification à cet enjeu (qu'est ce qui vous touche dans cet enjeu)

→ Processus et Influences : Enjeu / Injustice frame

- Comment s'est construit cette conception (construction, toujours là)
- Influence de la famille/enfance (personnes, valeurs)
- Influence de votre entourage amical (personnes, valeurs)
- Influence d'expériences vécues

5. Carte cognitive - Action politique : Rapport de soi à la communauté politique

(1) Délégitimation de l'action étatique

- Evaluation de l'action étatique à l'égard des migrants (apports/succès, critiques/échecs)
- Etat (gyt/plt) considéré comme un adversaire politique (nous/eux)
- Autres acteurs considérés comme adversaires politiques (nous/eux)
- Perspectives (avenir, futur)

(2) Légitimation de l'action de la société civile (SMOs)

- Evaluation de l'action des organisations à l'égard des migrants (apports/succès, critiques/échecs)
- Organisations considérées comme alliés politiques (nous/eux)
- Autres acteurs considérés comme adversaires politiques (nous/eux)
- Perspectives (avenir, futur)
- Sentiment d'être une minorité (masse critique)

→ Processus et Influences : Délégitimation/légitimation

- Comment s'est construit cette conception (construction, toujours là)
- Influence de la famille/enfance (personnes, valeurs)
- Influence de votre entourage amical (personnes, valeurs)
- Influence d'expériences vécues

(3) Délégitimation/légitimation en général

- Action étatique est souvent à combattre/remettre en question (autres enjeux où il faut lutter/s'engager)
- Fonctionnement de la démocratie suisse
- Action des organisations/réseaux nécessaire pour une démocratie
- Exemples en suisse (ailleurs)

(4) Apport/Efficacité de l'engagement

- Apport des organisations pour apporter des changements en général
- Dans les migrations/droits des migrants
- Apport de son engagement pour apporter des changements en général
- Dans les migrations/droits des migrants

(5) Rôle du citoyen

- Rôle du citoyen à ses yeux (actifs, critiques, vigilent / inverse)
- Importance de ce rôle (rôle décrit par l'interviewé)
- Identification/attachement à ce rôle (rôle décrit par l'interviewé)
- Identification aux autres citoyens (appartenance à communauté citoyenne)

→ Processus et Influences : Rôle du citoyen

- Comment s'est construit cette conception (construction, toujours là)
- Influence de la famille/enfance (personnes, valeurs)
- Influence de votre entourage amical (personnes, valeurs)
- Influence d'expériences vécues

6. Altruisme et pluralité motivationnelle

(1) Coût de l'engagement

- Engagement dans l'organisation X est coûteuse/lourde (aspects, sens)
- Conséquences négatives (personnelle, vie sociale)
- Dépasser ces coûts (comment, stratégies)

(2) Perception de l'acte altruiste

- Perception de son engagement comme altruiste/pro-social (conscience ou non)
- Décrire ce qu'est cet engagement à ses yeux
- Décrire ces autres engagements (altruisme/pro-social, défense de ses intérêts)

(3) Bénéfices individuels

- Intérêts/apports personnels qui auraient motivé/incité engagement dans X [AVANT] (compétence/savoir, contacts, amis, reconnaissance, etc./qq. chose qui aurait motivé engagement)
- *Si oui* : motivation ou by-product (conséquence, ce qu'il apporte en retour)
- Qu'est-ce qu'apporte cet engagement en retour (satisfaction en retour; inattendues)

(4) Bénéfices différés

- Engagement pour les migrants/autres est aussi un engagement utile pour vous (actuellement, dans le futur, exemple environnement en Amazonie)
- Engagement pour les migrants/autres est aussi un engagement utile pour votre société/Suisse (actuellement, dans le futur, exemple environnement en Amazonie)
- Revenu collectif de cette action (un bénéfice pour tous et eux y compris)

(5) Autre fonction d'utilité : personnalité altruiste

- Personnalité altruiste :aider les autres/défendre droits des autres fait partie de moi (auto-définition, définition de leur entourage/proches)
- Si Personnalité altruiste : toujours été le cas (variation dans son parcours de vie)
- Comment s'est construit cette personnalité (famille/enfance, entourage amical, expériences vécues)

(6) Pluralité motivationnelle

- Ni altruiste, ni individualiste : les deux à la fois (exemples dans sa vie)
- Engagement dans X : les deux à la fois (intérêt personnel, intérêt pour les autres)
- Opposition entre individualisme et altruisme à ses yeux

(7) Thèse cognitive – Résonance cognitive et identitaire [vignette?]

- Engagement pour les migrants : va de soi/évidence/incontournable ; je ne peux pas faire autrement (Ex : sauveteurs de Juifs pendant WW2)
- Résonance profonde avec qui vous êtes (croyances, conviction, personnalité)
- Possible de ne pas s'engager pour cette cause (autres)

7. Contexte idéologique, religieux et identitaire (pour conclure la conversation)

(1) Ouvert

- Ses valeurs qu'il souhaiterait transmettre à ses enfants (liste et ordonnancement de la liste)

(2) A l'égard de l'individu - Guide de vie

- Valeurs qui guident votre vie (qui vous habitent)
- Responsabilité individuelle/responsable de ses actes (importance, pourquoi)
- Responsabilité à l'égard des autres (importance, pourquoi)
- Confiance dans les autres/autres personnes (importance, pourquoi)
- Solidarité entre les individus (importance, pourquoi)
- Individualisme (importance, pourquoi)
- Religion comme guide de vie (importance, pourquoi)

(3) A l'égard de la société – Guide de vie collective

- Valeurs qui guident votre vie en collectivité (qui vous habitent)
- Respect de la diversité culturelle (importance, pourquoi)
- Egalité (min. ethniques, religieuses, sexuelles, etc., égalités des droits, autres)
- Liberté des autres (émancipation)
- Confiance dans les autres groupes (groupes dont il n'appartient pas)
- Différences de revenu
- Religion comme guide de vie collective
- Individualisme
- Environnement
- Tolérance politique (extrêmes politiques : ED, anarchisme, etc.)

8. Fin de notre conversation

- (4) Points qu'il souhaite ajouter
- (5) Commentaires sur l'entretien
- (6) Autre

Fin de l'entretien

- (3) Remerciements
- (4) Recevoir un enregistrement de l'entretien / transcription écrite

Appendix B.2: Example for the analysis of one interview

I only show here the summary table and the interpretative biography for the relation to society and politics for one activist as an illustrative example. If someone is interested to see the transcription, the coding output of this example or the whole analysis for this case or the other activists used in this dissertation, they are available on demand. The example below is from Christian, an active member of Greenpeace.

Thème générique	Résumé et sens donné par la personne (leurs mots)		
2. Rapport à l'autre			
2.1 Extension de soi	Thème		
- Contenu (dim.):	Souhaite travailler dans l'imagerie médicale pour aider le domaine médicale		
i) Percep. de l'autre?	Je voulais faire l'imagérie médicale parce qu'il y a le côté très positif de savoir qu'on peut, bon peut-être pas sauver des vies, mais on aide le domaine médicale et on peut aider à		
ii) Rapport à l'autre?	diagnostiquer les choses et tout. C'était vraiment ça qui me plaisait, c'était le domaine. Après, il y a très peu d'offre d'emploi dans le domaine. J'ai trouvé un travail dans la vidéo		
iii) Curiosité?	surveillance. Mais il n'y a pas le côté éthique si on veut, ce n'est pas tjs le même entre la vidéo surveillance et l'magérie médicale.		
- Liens cognitifs:			
i) cf. liste!	Les pays en voie de developpement souffrent le plus à cause du rechauffement climatique		
ii) Valeurs?	Je pars du principe que si on detruit la planète à notre niveau que ça a aussi un impact sur les pays en developpement, c'est eux-mêmes qui souffrent le plus.		
iii) Identités?	Pour le rechauffement climatique, autant en Suisse, je peux imaginer qu'on aura assez d'argent pour faire face aux inondations même un ouragan ou autres. Autant le Bangladesh		
- Construction:	qui est sous les eaux, il ne peut pas faire grande chose et puis en Afrique où il y a un ouragan, ils n'ont pas des immeubles pour resister ou l'Amérique du Sud que ce soit les		
i) Enf./Jeun./adulte?	bidonvilles, c'est eux qui risquent le plus d'en souffrir. C'est les pays les moins developpés qui souffrent le plus à cause de l'environnement. Ils n'ont pas les moyens d'y faire face ou il y aura des réfugiés climatiques. Je pense qu'il y a		
ii) Méchanisme?	quand même un lien asez fort entre les 2.		
ii) Weenamsine:	quanti menie un nen asez fort entre les 2.		
- Centralité/Evidence:	Pas de frontière entre les êtres humains et sauver la nature: C'est apprendre à vivre ensemble		
i) Pourquoi?	On met trop souvent les être humains en contradiction avec la nature quand on dit des choses comme quoi la déforestation, ça fait vivre telle ou telle personne. Pour moi, ce		
ii) Mom. (parcours vie)	n'est pas en contradiction. Si on n'a plus de nature, les êtres humains ne pourront plus continuer. C'est apprendre à vivre ensemble en essayant de ne pas détruire complètement		
, a	la nature. Il faut arriver à avoir une osmose, une vie entre les 2.		
	Je ne suis pas pour qu'on aille vivre dans les tentes. Il y a la téchnologie, il y a la vie moderne qui a ses avantages, après comment faire pour ne pas diminuer énormément notre		
	confort et puis à côté respecter la nature et ne pas détruire totalement tout ce qu'on a et qu'on puisse encore profiter de forêts, d'océans. Il n'y a pas une frontière entre les deux.		
	Je trouve qu'on n'a pas à choisir entre sauver des êtres humains et sauver la nature.		
	Si on pollue la nature après on boit l'eau par exemple, en fait si on pollue les champs avec trop d'engrais, etcon a les effets des pesticides ou des choses comme ça. On est		
	vraiment très lié entre-nous et la nautre même si on a un peu coupé la relation qu'on pouvait avoir entre nous et la nature, on est un peu décallé mais je trouve qu'on est vraiment		
	lié et il y a vraiemnt une dépendance extrème entre les 2.		
	Les 2 peuvent aller ensemble, il n'y a pas d'un côté soit l'économie ou les hommes et puis l'autre la nature qui est juste à prendre, à épuiser, à utiliser ses ressources.		
	Aider localement les autres		
	Ce que je trouve bien chez Medecin du Monde, ce qu'ils aident dans les pays du tiers monde mais aussi ils aident en locale que ce soient les Tziganes en France, les réfugiés		
	Roumains, ou même les prostitués qui ont des soucis. Il y a tjs ce côté d'agir localement qui me plaît.		
	Tous les progrès qu'on faut au niveau écologique que ce soit en Sussie ou ailleurs, ça profite à tout le monde en fait.		
	Tous les progres qu'on taut au inveau écologique que ce soit en oussie ou ameurs, ça pronte à tout le monde en fait.		
	Un engagement qui a peu d'impact sur lui mais qui peut avoir un impact fort au niveau de la société		
	Je m'engage plus pour changer les choses que pour moi-même. Bon, j'ai du plaisir à y aller mais je veux dire autant ça m'apporte qqc à moi an ayant du plaisir mais ce n'est pas ça		
I	Je mengage pius pour changer les choses que pour mor-meme. Don, j'ai du piaisir a y anei mais je veux dire autaine ça m'apporte que a moi an ayant du piaisir mais ce n'est pas ça		

qui va bep changer ma vie ou grandement l'améliorer. Alors que je pense que au niveau de la société ça peut avoir un impact fort.

Solidarité et générosité comme valeurs importants

La solidarité justement opposé à l'individualisme qui est de plus en plus. Ne pas seulement penser à soi parce que mine de rien, il y a aussi des choses qui arrivent aux autres qui pourraient nous arriver. Donc, penser aux autres et auder quand même les gens qui ont moins de chance que nous que ce soit parce qu'ils sont nées dans une famille plus pauvre ou dans un pays plus pauvre.

C'est la solidarité, le respect de la nature, la générosité, de ne pas être sur juste l'argent pour nous mais essayer aussi d'en donner à ceux qui ont moins de chance. La solidarité, je pense qu'il y a de moins en moins mais il faut qu'il y aie une certaine solidarité avec un certain partage des ressources ou des biens communs qui existent.

Respecter la diversité des gens

On doit respecter la diversité des gens. Même s'ils sont différents de nous, il faut vivre avec, les aider, qu'il y ait une même solidarité avec les gens qui ne sont pas forcement de notre communauté ou de notre famille ou qui ne sont pas forcement comme nous, ça je pense que c'est aussi important.

Difficile à être tolérant envers d'autres idées politiques

C'est difficile de respecter les autres idées politiques quand il y a qqn qui n'a vraiment pas ses idées, ça m'arrive à m'énerver vraiement avec qqn qui n'a pas mes idées. Il y a quand même des idées qui m'énervent totalement. Il y a des gens que je ne supporte pas parce qu'ils n'ont pas du tout mes idées, ça je ne peux pas le cacher.

Faire des action puissantes mais tjs garder le respect de l'autre

GP fait des actions puissante mais pour moi, ça doit tjs rester non violent. Ça peut être illégal mais ça doit rester non violent et dans les limites du respect des autres.

Confiance dans l'autre

C'est important d'avoir confiance dans d'autres personnes sinon on a plus tendance à se recroqueviller sur soi-même. Si on n'a pas confiance en les autres, on va devenir plus individualiste à juste penser à son sort.

	Thème
groupe aidé	
- Contenu (dim.):	RIEN
i) Identification?	
ii) Type identification?	
- Liens cognitifs:	
i) cf. liste!	
ii) Valeurs?	
iii) Autres identités?	
- Construction:	
i) Enf./Jeun./adulte?	
ii) Méchanisme?	
- Centralité/Evidence:	
i) Pourquoi?	
ii) Mom. (parcours vie)	
2.9 Autre	

Thème générique	Résumé et sens donné par la personne
3. Rapport au politique	
3.1 Autorités enjeu	Thème
- Contenu (dim.):	Les autorités privilégient l'économie en détriment de l'environnement
i) Perception des auto?	Je trouve qu'ils font malheureusement assez peu parce qu'ils mettent tjs l'économie en face en disant que ça couterait trop cher.
ii) Rapport aux auto?	Ils ont tendance à mettre l'économie en contradiction avec l'environnement.
- Liens cognitifs:	Les Etats, pour l'instant, refléchissent un peu trop à court terme et puis ils pensent à la crise économique, à donner l'argent aux banques mais pas du tout à protéger l'env.
i) cf. liste!	C'est vraiment l'économie avant tout et puis l'environnement après. Si ça peut rapoorter de l'argent on le fait mais sonon on le fait pas. C'est cette vision que j'ai pour l'instant.
ii) Valeurs?	Ils font peu même s'il y a eu quelques progrès
iii) Identités?	Ils font assez peu même s'il y a eu quelques progrès, en France, il y a eu le grenelle de l'environnement qui a changé 2 ou 3 choses. Mais c'était pour moi très médiatique de dire
- Construction:	on fait des choses pour l'environnement et au final, il n'y a pas bcp de décisions qui ont été prises. Ok, bonus malus pour les voitures, moratoire sur les OGMs, mais il y a plein
i) Enf./Jeun./adulte?	de questions sur le nucléaire qui n'ont pas été abordées, les énergies alternatives, ça n'a pas été très abordées. Pareille en Suisse, ben, ils soutiennent les énérgies alternatives un peu
ii) Méchanisme?	mais pas autant qu'ils devraient.
	Les politiques ont quand même une prise de conscience écologique qu'il n'y avait pas il y a qqc années.
- Centralité/Evidence:	Pas d'espoir pour le sommet de Copenhague
i) Pourquoi?	Pour Copenhague, malheureusement je sens que ça va finir avec un accord assez faible parce que personne ne veut s'engager à payer vrament l'argent nécessaire.
ii) Mom. (parcours vie)	
	Il faut faire pression sur l'Etat, mais ce n'est pas un adversaire
	Je ne sais pas si c'est vraiment un adversaire. Mais il faut faire pression sur l'Etat dans les actions médiatiques, il faut qu'ils prennent les bonnes décisions ou les décisions en
	connaissance de cause. Ce n'est pas un adversaire, mais ils ont tendance à faire passer l'environnement après. Il faut donc leur rappeller constamment que c'est important, que
	ça peut avoir des conséquences, leur donner des idées, des moyens d'arriver aux résultats auxquels ils auraient pas pensé.
	C'est à la fois un adversaire, qqn sur lequel il faut faire pression et qqn avec qui il faut discuter en donnant des idées, des solutions, des possibilités d'améliorer les choses.
	Autant certaines entreprises peuvent être des adversaires, l'Etat je ne trouve pas forcément.
	L'Etat est un adversaire pour le nucléaire, mais les entreprises sont le plus grand adversaires
	Pour le nucléaire, c'est un peu plus un adversaire parce qu'ils sont quand même assez pour des nouvelles centrales nucléaires. Mais les adversaires, ce sont plus les entreprises
	électriques, mais il y a quand même l'Etat derrière auquel il faut faire un peu pression ou informer des risques.
	L'Etat comme allié dans certaines domaines (transport comme ex.) Je pense en Suisse, il y a des domaines comme par exemple les transports ferroviarire ou le conseiller est assez pour le transport et l'environnement. Il n'arrive pas tjs à avoir
	l'argent qu'il souhaite mais il est vraiment pour le developpement.
	ragent qu'il souhaite mais il est vraiment pour le developpement.
	L'Etat Suisse est assez écologique
	Je pense quand même que la Suisse au niveau politique, c'est assez écologique.
	Par rapport à l'environnement, le conseiller féferal fait assez bien son travail. Après, il y a des fois des adversaires mais en soi, le conseiller féferal pour l'environnement, il est
	asseu écolo même s'il ne va pas assez loin. Mais je pense que ce n'est pas lui qui ne veut pas aller loin puisqu'il a des adversaires que ce soit au niveau conseil féderal ou au conseil
	des Etat. C'est pour ça qu'il faut faire pression sur toute la classe politique pour qu'ils deviennent plus écolo, mais dans certaines domaines, l'Etat fait des choses bien
3.2 Autorités en général	Thème
- Contenu (dim.):	L'Etat devrait gérer tous les biens communs: Pas de privatisation!
i) Perception des auto?	Je trouve que l'Etat se désolidarise un peu des problématiques, c'est de plus en plus donné aux privés. Les hôpitaux, par exemple, il y a des plus en plus des cliniques privées, le

- ii) Rapport aux auto? - Liens cognitifs:
- i) cf. liste!
- ii) Valeurs?
- iii) Identités?
- Construction:
- i) Enf./Jeun./adulte?
- ii) Méchanisme?
- Centralité/Evidence:
- i) Pourquoi?
- ii) Mom. (parcours vie)

système de santé, ben l'assurance maladie en Suisse, c'est pricé.

Je ne suis pas tout à fait d'accord avec l'idée de privatiser certains domaines qui devraient être vraiment publics et appartenir à tout le monde que ce soit la santé, l'eau, tout ce qui est compagnie d'eau, on ne devrait pas du tout profiter sur l'eau, tout ce qui est l'écetricité est tellement sensible au niveau d'un Etat et d'une nation, ca ne devrait pas être privé, ça ne devrait pas être basé sur le profit, mais sur l'utilité de tout le monde.

L'Etat privatise de plus ne plus. C'est en contestation avec ca, que l'Etat devrait avoir plus de pouvoir et garder la main sur ces sujets importants pour tous.

L'Etat devrait être plus autoritaire

ca ne me choque pas que l'Etat diese qu'il ne doit y avoir plus de 12 fois entre le plus bas salaire et le plus haut. Ou, un salaire minimum, ca ne me choquerait pas que l'Etat diese qu'un travail mérite au moins un tel salaire.

L'Etat devrait s'impliquer plus dans certaines domaines

L'Etat devrait faire plus dans tout ce qui est d'aide aux réfugies ou aide social ou aide au développement.

L'Etat devrait aider les handicapés, ils font quand même partie de notre société. On doit les aider plus pour tout ce qui est installation sportive. Ça ne doit pas être les assoc. Qui ammènent cet argent, ca devrait être tout le monde par solidarité qui contribue à l'aide...en fait, c'est un example.

Tout ce qui est aide plus important, les hôpitaux, les accueils sociaux et des choses comme ca, ca doit être l'Etat qui règle ces problèmes pour moi.

Qqn qui n'a pas de maison, ce n'est pas aux citoyens de lui offrir une maison, ce n'est pas le rôle de lui donner de l'argent dans la rue pour qu'il reste mendiant. Ça doit être l'Etat qui le prend en charge et qui fait tout pour lui trouver un travail.

Délégitimation des Etat dans le tiers monde

Il faut faire du lobbying au niveau des Etats que de donner directement de la nouritture. Ca ne va pas changer le problème, ca jouerait que sur le symptôme, que sur les enfants qui ont faim. Mais c'est tout le système: Qu'il n'y a pas d'école, qu'on leur achète le café à des prix trop bas ou des choses comme ça. Je préfère agir à un niveau plus globale pour ces pays-là.

Pour une libération des brevets des médicaments (L'Etat Suisse protège les entreprises pharma)

La DB se battent pour les brevets des médicaments en Inde pour qu'ils puissent faire eux-même leurs médicaments sans payer des brevets hors de prix à la Suisse.

3.3 Société civile enjeu

(+ eff. Collective)

- Contenu (dim.):

i) Perception acteurs? ii) Rapport aux acteurs?

- Liens cognitifs:

Thème

Alliés: Le groupe régional de GP est bien lié à d'autres organisations

Les actions qu'on fait, c'est bcp avec d'autres organisations genre Prudence OGM, les Verts ou d'autres.

Toutes les associations écolo en générale, on a bcp, que ce soit pour les initiatives ou autre, il n'y a pas mal d'alliance que ce soit le stop au nucléaire ou autre chose.

Des partis politiques comme alliés

Les Verts pour moi, c'est un allié. Bon, ils ne sont pas forcément tis d'accord sur tout parce que il y a le côté politique où il faut souvent faire des compromis.

L'écologie libéral est d'accord sur la plus part des sujets. Après, ils ont quand même le mot libéral dans le nom.

Les socialistes au final commencent à être assez écolo, donc pour certains sujets ça peut aller jusqu'au parti socialiste comme allié au niveau politique.

Les entreprises ne peuvent pas être des alliés

Toutes les entreprises qui font des éoliennes, ben, ce n'est pas des adversaires parce qu'ils vont dans le sens où on désire aller, mais ce n'est non plus des alliées puisqu'il n'y pas d'interaction en fait avec eux.

Leur dire c'est bien, les efforts qu'ils font, mais pas s'allier avec eux plus proche que ca. Rester tis indépendant, donc un peut faire un classement en disant tel entreprise, c'est bien telle n'est pas bien etc...mais pas négocier avec eux tout le temps. Sur un sujet précis oui, mais pas faire des partenariats.

Différentes organisations avec différentes stratégies d'action et différentes spécialisations thématiques

Le WWF par exemple, c'est bcp moins dans la contestation et c'est bcp plus soit dans l'information et l'éducation des enfants, soit dans la négociation avec les entreprises.

- i) cf. liste!
- ii) Valeurs?
- iii) Identités?
- Construction:
- i) Enf./Jeun./adulte?
- ii) Méchanisme?
- Centralité/Evidence:
- i) Pourquoi?
- ii) Mom. (parcours vie)

Les autres organisations plus locales, ils ont plus des rôles locales et spécifiques selon des sujets précis.

Pour moi, entre le WWF et Greenpeace, la différence principale, c'est qu'il y en a une qui est plus contestataire et l'autre plus dans la négociation, un peu plus mou je dirais. C'est le côté qui me plaît moins du WWF, j'ai plus envie de m'engager pour GP.

Complémentarité entre différentes organizations

Les 2 (GP et Pro Natura) vont ensemble. Si on fait rien contre le rechauffement climatique, c'est vrai que ça ne sert à rien de proteger cette forêt là. Mais en même temps, toute biodiversité qu'on perd, ça sera de toute façon perdu après pour le futur. Donc je suis quand même pour la conservation des espaces avec la biodiversité, des choses qu'on n'a pas ailleurs le plus longtemps possible. Parce que si on la perd, on la perdera pour tjs.

Associations écologiques sont indispensable pour avoir un contrepoids

Je trouve que c'est indispensable, on voit que le droit de recours par exemple en Suisse, c'est quand même utilisé de temps en temps par les associations écolo. C'est utile dans la majorité des cas où ils font appel.

Je pense que c'est indispensable pour avoir un contrepoids à tous les autres lobby que ce soit économique et nucléaire ou autre, il faut des associations en face qui pensent aux problématiques écologiques.

Protection de la nature (travail de Pro Natura) est important

Les forêts, ca fait aussi partie de la qualité de vie qu'on a en Suisse. D'avoir ces forêts, ces reserves naturelles, c'est important.

Critique: Les organisations doivent rester indépendant des entreprises (ex. Label WWF)

Le WWF je trouve qu'ils ne sont pas assez critique avec les entreprises.

Efficacité GP:

ça pourrait tjs être plus efficace

J'aimerais tis que ca soit plus efficace.

Je trouve tis que c'est malheureusement un peu lent entre la dénonciation et puis la réaction du gouvernement ou des entreprises.

Très efficace dans la sensibilisation

Je trouve que pour poser des problèmatiques au grand jour ou faire sortir les problèmes, ils sont assez efficaces.

Tout le côté information des gens qui est quand même assez important.

De temps en temps des victoires fortes

Ils ont de temps en temps qu'victoires qui sont quand même fortes, comme par exemple la campagne internet contre Apple.

En Suisse, il y avait Bonfol qu'ils ont fini par réussir la décharge chimique des entreprises pharmaceutiques et chimiques. Ils ont réussi à obtenir l'argent de ces entreprises pour dépolluer le site.

Efficacité du propre groupe régional: limite

On a tis l'impression qu'on a assez peu d'impact au final, malgré ce qu'on peut s'investir.

On a l'impression de soit prêcher des convaincus qui sont déjà adhérent à GP ou WWF, soit des gens qui nous prennent pour des rigolos, qui pensent qu'on s'éclaire à la bougie. Ces gens ne sont pas du tout d'accord avec nos idées qu'on a vraiment du mal à convaincre.

De temps en temps, on a l'impression qu'il y a assez peu d'impact dans ce qu'on fait, mais je pense que c'est quand même nécessaire que les gens voient que ça soit GP ou voir qu'il y a des gens qui s'intéressent au sujet, qu'ils entendent parler du sujet, je pense petit à petit, ça fait réfléchir les gens.

L'effet qu'on apporte, ce n'est pas un effet, mais du jour au lendemain ça va changer.

Le groupe Vaud en soi, je pense qu'il y en a quand même un effet et une importance. On est une dizaine, mais ces 10 là, je trouve qu'on a quand même un impact.

Utiliser la force de GP Suisse

Le but d'un groupe local, c'est quand même utiliser la puissance de GP pour les campagnes internationales et puis nationales.

Efficacité des autres organisations environnementales

Organisations spécialisés sont plus efficace dans leur domaine mais ne touche pas les autres domaines (complémentarité entre GP et les autres)

Pour des sujets précis, je pense qu'ils peuvent être plus efficaces. Ils sont plus efficaces dans leur domaine, mais ils ne toucheront pas du tous les autres domaines.

Pour des sujets précis comme les parcs naturels en Suisse, là c'est vraiment Pro Natura qui fait tout le travail. Aussi pour la protection de la biodiversité et types de forêts, c'est

plus Pro Natura qui travaille sur ces sujets. Donc, GP ne fait pas le travail que Pro Natura fait, les 2 ont besoin des 2.

3.4 Société civile en géné

(+ eff. Collective)

- Contenu (dim.):
- i) Perception acteurs?
- ii) Rapport aux acteurs?
- Liens cognitifs:
- i) cf. liste!
- ii) Valeurs?
- iii) Identités?
- Construction:
- i) Enf./Jeun./adulte?
- ii) Méchanisme?
- Centralité/Evidence:
- i) Pourquoi?
- ii) Mom. (parcours vie)

Thème

Société civile a un rôle important: Tja là où l'Etat ne fait pas son boulot

Je suis covaincu du rôle de la société civile. Pour certaines faiblesses de l'Etat, elles ont un rôle que ce soit pour faire pression, pour remonter les problèmes, pour aider les gens quand l'Etat ne joue pas son rôle social ou autre.

La société civile, malheureusement si on veut, elles ont un rôle. Si l'Etat pouvait faire ce travail, ça serait bien, mais je trouve qu'elles ont un rôle pour faire remonter les problèmes auxquels les gens de l'Etat ne pourraient pas penser faire pression deçu pour améliorer les lois ou les finances pour le developpement ou qqc comme ça. La société civile a un grand rôle.

Société civile peut mettre des sujets sur l'agenda politique dans une démocratie

Dans une démocratie, elles peuvent justement dire ce qu'elles pensent et ça fait partie du rôle de la société civile de dire que sur tel sujet, elles ne sont pas d'accord avec la façon dont c'est géré. Ça améliore les choses.

3.5 Rôle du citoyen

- Info à prendre à partir du rapport aux autorités et acteurs de la société civile.
- Passivité des autres?
- Contenu (dim.):
- i) Perception du rôle?
- ii) Rapport au rôle?
- Liens cognitifs:
- i) cf. liste!
- ii) Valeurs?
- iii) Identités?
- Construction:

i) Pourquoi?

- i) Enf./Jeun./adulte?
- ii) Méchanisme?
- Centralité/Evidence:

Etre prêt à payer plus des impôts

Chaque citoyen doit accepter de payer plus d'impôts pour que l'Etat prenne en charge cette partie de solidarité (environnement, aide sociale, aide aux réfugiés, etc.)

Le citoyen devait accepter de payer des impôts et pas tout faire pour en payer moins, genre démenager ailleurs ou cacher son argent.

Reduire sa consommation

Il y a des domaines ou chacun doit faire dans sa vie de tous les jours. Donc je pense à tout ce qui est écologie, trier les déchets et tout, faire des économie d'énergie, pas mettre le chauffage à 22 degré, il y a plein de geste que tout le monde doivent faire.

Le citoyen a peu d'impact sur le social/aide aux autres

Pour tout ce qui est social, je ne vois pas ce que le citoyen vraiment peut faire (c'est le rôle de l'Etat).

A part voter pour des groupes ou des gens qui sont plus sociaux, je pense que individuellement, on peut faire assez peu, pour être citoyen.

Importance de voter

Le vote, c'est crucial. Parce que justement ça permet à des gens qui auront bcp plus de pouvoir de faire des choses qui auront de l'impact. Voter, c'est une des seules choses qu'on peut faire, c'est voter pour des gens qui ont des idées plus sociales ou qui font plus attention à ces problèmatiques.

Le vote, c'est vraiment puissat pour exprimer son point de vue et puis faire changer les choses. Pour ça la démocratie, c'est l'outil principale et c'est assez puissant.

Etre vigilant, suivre et s'intéresser à la politique

ii) Mom. (parcours vie)

Une fois qu'on a voté pour les gens, il faut quand même vérifier que tout se passe bien ou qu'ils ne prennent pas des décisions dans lesquelles on n'est vraiment pas d'accord. Je pense qu'il faut suivre ce que l'Etat fait et puis s'intéresser un minimum à la politique et aux décisions qui sont prises. Ça, je pense que c'est important.

C'est bien de suivre ce que l'Etat fait et que après au prochain vote de dire si on est d'accord ou pas de ce qu'ils ont fait et puis réorienter son choix en fonction de ce qu'il sait faire.

Manifester, devenir actif

Manifester pour une chose qui me touche, ça je trouve bien de s'engager pour ça quoi. Ça montre aussi au politique (en dehors du vote) qu'on n'est pas d'accord avec tel ou tel sujet.

Mais moins d'impact que par le vote

Personnellement, je trouve qu'on a assez peu d'impact. On peut aller manifester, je trouve bien de montrer qu'on n'est pas d'accord. Sinon, les politiques ne se rendent pas compte Mais on ne peut pas à mon sens faire bcp bouger les choses. Il y a bcp plus de pouvoir dans le vote que dans l'engagement personnel politique.

Engagement politique (dans la politique) c'est bien, mais il y a trop de compromis là-dedans

Après, l'engagement politique en soi, ce n'est pas qqc qui me touche. Pour être élu, il faut tel ou tel compromis.

Il faut des gens qui s'engagent au politique.

3.6 Efficacité propre eng.

- Contenu (dim.):
- i) Perception de son eff?
- ii) Rapport à cette eff?
- Liens cognitifs:
- i) cf. liste!
- 1) CI. 1131C
- ii) Valeurs?
- iii) Identités?
- Construction:
- i) Enf./Jeun./adulte?
- ii) Méchanisme?
- Centralité/Evidence:
- i) Pourquoi?
- ii) Mom. (parcours vie)

Thème

Actions individuelles: On peut faire bcp pour l'environnement déjà au niveau individuel

On peut trier ses déchets, économiser l'énergie, ne pas prendre l'avion, essayer de moins prendre la voiture. C'est plus facile que faire qqc pour l'aide au développement, bon à part acheter équitable.

Ne se perçoit pas comme spécialement utile

Autant je trouve que ça m'apporte bcp autant, bon j'apporte un peu, mais pour l'instant, on n'a pas fait non plus des actions.

Au final, si j'aurais été ou pas dans le groupe, je ne pense pas que ça aurait changé la face du monde. Donc que moi, je trouve ça bien, pour moi, j'avais besoin de cet engagement, on fait quand même des choses et on aide un peu, mais c'est assez petit.

L'apport personnel moins appréciable dans une grande organisation comme GP

C'est aussi ce côté d'être dans une grande organisation mondiale avec leurs grandes campagnes. Avec nos petits engagements à faire des stands à Lausanne, mais si on n'avait pas été là, ça aurait pas suppriméla grande campagne. Par contre, pour les organisations comme Pro Natura, quand ils vont nettoyer des zones sauvages, bon le gars qui ne va pas, ça fait une personne de moins pour nettoyer.

L'impact personnel est moins sensible ou moins visible que d'autres.

L'utilité personnelle est seulement visible dans l'action collective et l'efficacité collective

Moi tout seul peut être ça ne va pas changer mais le groupe, quand on est dans le groupe Vaud, on est une dizaine. Si on n'était pas là, il y aurait quand même des choses qui se seraient pas passés, des gens qui auraient pas été informés sur Muleberg ou sur les OGMs.

Le groupe Vaud en soi, je pense qu'il y en a quand même un effet et une importance. On est une dizaine à avoir un rôle là-dedans, mais ces 10, je trouve qu'on a un impact.

Moins d'impact que par le vote

Personnellement, je trouve qu'on a assez peu d'impact. On peut aller manifester, je trouve bien de montrer qu'on n'est pas d'accord. Sinon, les politiques ne se rendent pas compte Mais on ne peut pas à mon sens faire bcp bouger les choses. Il y a bcp plus de pouvoir dans le vote que dans l'engagement personnel politique.

3.9 Autre

Thème générique	Résumé et sens donné par la personne
4. Rapport à la société	A A
4.1 Interconnectedness	Thème
Perception de liens entre	Interdépendance locale
les membres de la sté.	Il y a tis ce côté d'agir localement qui me plaît.
- Contenu (dim.):	Je trouve que c'est bien d'agir dans la communauté, avec des gens qui vivent autour de nous. Il y a des gens pauvres aussi que ce soit en France ou en Suisse et je trouve qu'il
i) Perception des liens?	faut aussi aider ces gens-là, ces gens qui sont là.
ii) Rapport à ces liens?	Je veux aussi contribuer dans mon propre pays ou le pays où j'habite à un niveau plus local.
- Liens cognitifs:	
i) cf. liste!	Nos actions peuvent avoir des conséquences ailleurs
ii) Valeurs?	Nos actions peuvent avoir bcp d'impact sur eux. Tout est lié, ce qu'on peut faire ici, ça peut avoir un impact, c'est lié à ce qui peut se passer ailleurs dans le monde et c'est un
iii) Identités?	impact. De la même façon, ce qu'on achète ici, ça peut avoir un impact sur les conditions de travail dans les autres pays et la manière de vivre ailleurs.
- Construction:	Je pense que ce qu'on fait nous, ça peut avoir un effet sur d'autres personnes et d'autres pays.
i) Enf./Jeun./adulte?	
ii) Méchanisme?	Une interdépendance désequilibre entre les pays du sud et les pays industrialisés
- Centralité/Evidence:	Pout l'instant, je pense quand même que c'est plus les pays du sud et du tiers monde qui sont dépendants des pays qu'on dit industrialisé. Parce que la majorité de l'argent et du
i) Pourquoi?	pouvoir et tout, c'est quand même dans les pays industrialisés, donc les pays du sud ont assez peu de pouvoir malheureusement dessus.
ii) Mom. (parcours vie)	Après, on a l'effet inverse, il y a les réfugiés qui peuvent venir dans les pays industrialisés. Donc, ça a aussi un impact sur nous, mais la dépendance elle est plus désequilibre vers le sud.
	Par contre, interdépendance extreme entre la nature et les êtres humains
	La nature et les hommes, c'est encore plus lié que les populations entre eux. Si on pollue la nature, après on boit l'eau par exemple, en fait, si on pollue les champs avec trop
	d'engrais, on a les effets des pesticides ou des choses comme ça. Là, je pense on est vraiment lié entre-nous et la nature même on a un peu coupé la relation qu'on pouvait avoir
	entre nous et la nature, on est un peu plus décallé, mais je trouve qu'on est vraiment lié et puis qu'il y a vraiment une dépendance extrème entre les 2.
	Les 2 peuvent aller qu'ensemble. Il n'y a pas d'un côté soit l'économie ou les hommes et puis l'autre la nature qui est juste bonne à prendre, à épuiser, à utiliser ses ressources.
4.2 Bien commun	Thème
Contenu (dim.):	L'Etat doit s'occuper plus des biens communs (contre la privatisation)
i) Percep. du bien?	Les hôpitaux, il y a de plus en plus de cliniques privées, l'assurance maladie en Suisse, c'est privé. Pour moi, je ne suis pas tout à fait d'accord avec l'idée de privatiser certaines
ii) Rapport au bien?	domaines qui devraient être vraiment publics et appartenir à tout le monde que ce soit la santé, l'eau, tout ce qui est compagnie d'eau, on ne devrait pas profiter de ça. Tout ce qui
- Liens cognitifs:	est l'éléctricité est tellement sensible au niveau d'un Etat et d'une nation, ça ne devrait pas êtr privé, ça devrait par être basé sur le profit, mais sur l'utilité pour tout le monde.
i) cf. liste!	Je trouve que l'Etat devrait avoir plus de pouvoir et garder plus la main sur ces sujets importants. Pour moi, ça devrait tous appartenir au domaine public.
ii) Valeurs?	
iii) Identités?	Importance des biens communs, mais il a peur qu'ils disparaissent à cause de la privatisation
- Construction:	C'est vraiment des choses importantes et ça doit justement pas être en mains privés et puis continués à rester des biens communs. Il y a des choses qui doivent vraiment être
i) Enf./Jeun./adulte?	accessible à tous que ce soit la santé, l'eau, l'électricité, la nature ou des choses comme ça, bon c'est vraiment des biens communs à tout le monde et ça ne doit pas être privatisés
ii) Méchanisme?	et ça devrait être pour le bien de tous.
- Centralité/Evidence:	I l'Etat delt aéres les hiers gemannes. En tent qu'individu, en ple per hen de pouve le
i) Pourquoi?	L'Etat doit gérer les biens communs. En tant qu'individu, on n'a pas bcp de pouvoir On n'a pas bcp de pouvoir là-dessus. Si l'eau, elle est gerée par une entreprise privée, on ne peut y faire grande chose à part de voter pour des gens qui sont au pouvoir, pour
ii) Mom. (parcours vie)	on n'a pas bep de pouvoir la-dessus. Si l'eau, elle est geree par une entreprise privee, on ne peut y faire grande chose a part de voter pour des gens qui sont au pouvoir, pour privatiser ou rendre public l'eau, mais on n'a pas
	Pareil, l'électricité, on n'a pas bcp le choix de où on achète notre électricité et puis de comment c'est geré.
4.9 Autre	1 area, recedience, on it a pas uch ic choix de ou on acheic noue electriche et puis de comment e est gere.
T.7 /1uiic	

Appendix B.3: Interpetative biography

A1. Contexte de l'interview

III. Contexte de l'interview		
Information générale sur l'entretien		
- Qui a conduit l'entretien ?	GAM	
 Où s'est déroulé l'entretien 	A la maison de Christian	
Contexte de l'entretien		
- Evénements spécifiques, particuliers ?	Non	
- Présence d'autres personnes (qui ?)	Personne	
 Difficultés particulières ? 	Non	
- Autres	-	
Qualité d'entretien/influences		
- Facilité ou non à parler ? Parle facilement		
- Comment se sentait l'intervieweur ?	A l'aise	
- Qualité de l'interaction ?	Bonne	

A2. Eléments factuels sur l'acteur

Données biographiques :

o Age: 27 ans (1983)

Région : Vaud (né et grandi en France)
 Formation : Ingénieur en télécommunication
 Profession : Formation Conducteur locomotive

• Engagement politique:

Domaine	SMOs	Degré d'eng.	Durée	Tjs engagé?	Quand? (Enfance,
		(prendre le plus haut)			jeunesse, vie adulte)
Prot. Env.	Greenpeace	Actif	1 an	Oui	Vie adulte
Syndicalisme	-(Unia, cf9)	Actif	1- 2 ans	Oui	Vie adulte
Prot. Env.	Pro Natura	Passif	2-3 ans	Oui	Vie adulte
Dvpt.	DB	Passif	2-3 ans	Oui	Vie adulte
Prot. Env.	ATE	Passif	2-3 ans	Oui	Vie adulte
Humanitaire	Médecins	Passif	qqs. années	Non	Jeunesse
	du monde				

A3. Points d'entrée dans le récit et moments épiphaniques

- Point d'entrée dans le récit
 - o Famille, fraterie, selon mon introduction. Pas un point d'entrée particulière
- Moment(s) épiphanique(s) : articulateur de la vie de l'acteur et influents dans ces eng./altruisne
 - o Évènements épiphanique/marqueur pour l'engagement/altruisme
 - Non
 - o Événements importants pour l'engagement/altruisme
 - Année d'études en Finlande / Amie (réseau informel)
 - o Evénements structurants le récit
 - Travail (il a été licencié récemment et vient de se réorienter professionnellement), et critique du monde de travail et capitalisme

SUMMARY 2	CARTE COGNITIVE				
Résumé interprétatif	RAPPORT A L'AUTRE				
Nos mots					
	Extension de soi				
	Contenu (dimensions)				
Perception de l'autre	Pas de frontières entre les êtres humains et la nature : Vivre ensemble - Sans la nature, les être humains ne pourront pas continuer, il faut apprendre à vivre ensemble (ce n'est pas le cas maintenant). - « Il faut arriver à avoir une osmose. » - Il n'est pas un « naturaliste » : Respecter et préserver la nature tout en gardant notre living standard (technologie, vie moderne) - Dépendance forte entre les 2. Son engagement : Impact surtout pour la société/humanité - Son engagement n'aura pas d'impact sur lui, mais ça peut avoir un impact fort au niveau de la société en général. Valeurs importants : Solidarité, générosité - Une solidarité qui s'oppose à l'individualisme qui ne cesse pas de croitre. - Ne pas seulement penser à soi, il y a aussi des choses qui arrivent aux autres qui pourraient nous arriver. - Penser aux autres et aider les gens qui ont moins de chance que nous. Essayer de donner à ceux qui ont moins de chance. - Partage des ressources ou des biens communs. Respecter la diversité des gens, confiance dans l'autre - Même s'il y a des gens qui sont différents de nous, il faut vivre avec, les aider. - Sans avoir confiance dans l'autre, on a tendance à se recroqueviller sur soi-même : La solidarité en souffre en premier. - Les actions de GP sont puissantes parfois mais ça reste non violent, c'est tjs dans les limites du respect des autres.				
Rapport à l'autre	Conséquences écologiques touchent surtout les autres - Les pays en voie de développement souffrent le plus à cause du réchauffement climatique - Tout progrès local au niveau écologique permet à tout le monde d'en profiter Travailler dans l'imagerie médicale pour aider le domaine médical - Ce travail permet d'aider le domaine médical, notamment en améliorant les diagnoses. Difficile à être tolérant envers d'autres idées politiques - Qqn qui n'a vraiment pas ses idées, ça lui énerve, il ne supporte pas ces gens, il ne peut pas le cacher.				
Curiosité à l'égard de l'autre	RIEN				

	Liens cognitifs
Cognitions (cf. liste)	Bien commun : Protéger la nature est une aide aux autres sur le premier plan. Importance du partage des biens communs avec les autres. Injustice : Sans la solidarité, l'individualisme croît et la conséquence c'est que l'environnement en souffre. Notre pollution impact surtout les autres (pays en développement, pauvres en Suisse, etc.)
Valeurs	
Identités	
	Construction
Moment (enfance,)	Jeunesse : Voyage en Turquie, expérience des gens très accueillants.
Processus	
- Mind (C/V/I)	
- Fact. (R, E, Ev)	Interaction avec l'autre : Expérience en Turquie.
	Centralité et évidence
Pourquoi (central-périphérique)	Central: Son engagement a surtout un impact sur les autres
Moment: enfance, Depuis quand c'est central?	Vie adulte: Probablement en s'informant avec des journaux et sites d'internet des organisations. (?)
	Identification au groupe
	Contenu (dimensions)
Perception du groupe	RIEN
Rapport au groupe	
Comment ? (s'il y a une identification)	

Autres	
	Liens cognitifs
Cognitions (liste)	
Valeurs	
Identités	
	Construction
Moment (enfance,)	
Processus - Mind (C/V/I)	
- Fact. (R, E, Ev)	
	Centralité et évidence
Pourquoi (central-périphérique)	
Moment: enfance, Depuis quand c'est central?	

C1. Synthèse: Cognition (Présence, centralité, liens cognitifs), moment de l'apparition de cette cognition et son influence sur son engagement

- Information sur la cognition : Présence (Oui/non), Centralité (Périphérique/centrale/évidente), Liens avec d'autres dim. cognitives
- Moment de l'apparition de cette cognition : A quel moment (enfance, jeunesse, etc.) et grâce à quel fait/mécanisme (formation, expérience, etc.)
- Influence de la cognition sur son engagement protestataire : Oui/non; fort/faible et pourquoi?)
- Influence de la cognition sur son engagement altruiste : Oui/non; fort/faible et pourquoi?)

Cognition	Construction de cette cognition	Influence sur son engagement protestataire	Influence sur son engagement altruiste
Extension de soi	Extension de soi	Extension de soi	Extension de soi
Présence	Enfance	Oui/non et pourquoi	Oui/non et pourquoi
- Oui	Jeunesse	- Oui, son engagement a surtout	
Centralité	- Voyage en Turquie	un impact aux autres.	
- Central	Vie adulte		
Liens avec d'autres dim. Cognitives	- Information : Lectures etc.		
- Bien commun	Processus (M ou fact.)		
- Injustice			
Identification au gr. aidé	Identification au gr. aidé	Identification au gr. aidé	Identification au gr. aidé
Présence	Enfance	Oui/non et pourquoi	Oui/non et pourquoi
Centralité	Jeunesse		
Liens avec d'autres dim. cognitives	Vie adulte		
	Processus (M ou fact.)		
Synthèse générale	Synthèse générale	Synthèse générale	Synthèse générale
Carte mentale	Extension de soi		
Liens	Identification au groupe aidé		

SUMMARY 3	CARTE COGNITIVE		
Résumé interprétatif	RAPPORT AU POLITIQUE		
Nos mots			
	Autorités (par rapport à l'enjeu)		
	Contenu (dimensions)		
Perception des autorités	Privilégient l'économie en détriment de l'environnement		
	- Argument clé contre la protection d'environnement : L'économie, couts élevés		
	- Contradiction entre économie et environnement.		
	- « C'est vraiment l'économie avant tout et l'environnement après. »		
	Font peu pour la protection d'environnement		
	- Ils font assez peu, pas autant qu'ils devraient.		
	Qqs progrès (notamment en France)		
	- Il y a eu qqs progrès, en France, il y a eu le grenèle de l'environnement : Bonus malus pour les voitures, moratoire sur les OGMs		
	Mais bcp des choses qui restent à faire		
	- Plein de questions sur le nucléaire et les énergies alternatives n'ont pas encore été abordés.		
Rapport aux autorités	Nécessité de faire pression		
	- Par les actions médiatiques pour qu'ils prennent des bonnes décisions en connaissance de cause.		
	- Rappeler constamment l'importance de l'environnement.		
	Ce n'est pas un adversaire, ça peut être un allié dans certain cas		
	- Il faut discuter avec, donner des idées, des solutions.		
	- Certaines entreprises peuvent être des adversaires, l'Etat pas forcément		
	- L'Etat est un peu plus un adversaire pour le nucléaire, mais concrètement, ce sont les entreprises électriques qui font du lobbying derrière.		
	- Pour certains domaines, comme le transport ou l'environnement, en Suisse, l'Etat et notamment le conseiller conerné est assez favorable.		
Autre			
	Liens cognitifs		
Cognitions (liste)	Injustice : L'Etat favorise les questions d'environnement en détriment des questions environnementales.		
	,		
Valeurs			
v aicuis			

Identités	
	Construction
Moment (enfance,)	Vie adulte : Au moment où il commence à s'intéresser à la politique (élections présidentielle)
	Vie adulte : Par son engagement, tout la partie où il explique qu'il faut faire pression à l'Etat, lui donner des bonnes idées, etc.
Processus	
- Mind (C/V/I)	
, ,	
- Fact. (R, E, Ev)	
	Centralité et évidence
Pourquoi	Périphérique
(central – pérophérique)	
Moment : enfance,	
Depuis quand c'est central?	
	Autorités (en général)
	Contenu (dimensions)
Perception des autorités	L'Etat est le seul responsable pour les biens communs
	- Critique la privatisation, c'est l'Etat qui se « désolidarise ». (surtout au niveau de la santé: hôpitaux, assurance maladie)
	- «L'Etat devrait avoir plus de pouvoir et garder la main sur ces sujets importants pour tous. » Critique les Etats du Tiers Monde
	- Toute le système qui ne marche pas : Pas assez d'école, il vend le café à des prix trop pas.
	- Ce sont les Etats d'ici qui doivent faire pression aux Etats du Tiers Monde.
	L'Etat Suisse protège trop les entreprises pharma
	- Il est pour une libération des brevets des médicaments.
Rapport aux autorités	Centralité de l'Etat
	- Il souhaite d'avoir un Etat fort : Fixé un salaire maximal et minimal.
I	- Il demande une plus grande implication : Aide aux réfugies, aide social et développement, handicapés

	- Tout ce qui est de l'aide important, ça doit être l'Etat qui règle ces problèmes (et pas les associations qui le font actuellement à sa place).
Autre	
Tutte	Liens cognitifs
Cognitions (liste)	Bien commun: L'Etat est responsable.
	Injustice : Etat (en Afrique etc.) crée des injustices dans leurs pays respectifs.
Valeurs	
Identités	
	Construction
Moment (enfance,)	Enfance (?): Valeurs socialiste Jeunesse/Vie adulte: Renforcement des ces valeurs socialistes, voir extrême gauche.
Processus	
- Mind (C/V/I)	
- Fact. (R, E, Ev)	
	Centralité et évidence
Pourquoi	Périphérique
(central – périphérique)	
Moment: enfance,	
Depuis quand c'est central?	
	Autre (mettre dans les catégories si possible)

	Acteurs de la société civile (par rapport à l'enjeu)	
	Contenu (dimensions)	
Perception des acteurs	L'univers organisationnel est très différent mais complémentaire Différentes stratégies d'action: WWF est moins dans la contestation et plus dans l'information et l'éducation des enfants et la négociation Différentes niveau régional: Organisations locales se concentrent surtout sur des enjeux locaux. Différentes spécialisations thématiques: Organisations généralistes comme GP et des spécialistes comme ATE pour le transport. Ces différences sont complémentaires: Il faut s'engager à tous les fronts. Importance de la protection de la nature: Le travail de Pro Natura. Un contrepoids indispensable contre les lobbies des entreprises Contre les lobbies économique, nucléaire et autre. Mettre des assoc. en face qui pensent aux problématiques écologiques. GP: Certains partis politiques sont des alliés Les Verts c'est un allié clair. L'écologie libéral est d'accord sur la plus part des sujets. Mais ils sont aussi libéral (ce qui est négatif) Les socialistes commencent à être assez écolo, des fois ce sont des alliés (mais ça dépend de l'enjeu concret). GP Vaud: Bep d'alliés au niveau régional Ils organisent bep d'actions avec d'autres groupes comme Prudence OGM, les Verts, Stop au nucléaire, etc. GP: Les entreprises ne peuvent pas être des alliés Ceux qui font les éoliennes font aussi des centrales nucléaires. Pas d'interaction avec les entreprises, importance de rester indépendant d'eux, il faut tjs les critiquer. Critique le WWF pour donner leur label pour certains produits des entreprises.	
Rapport aux acteurs		
Perception de l'eff. coll.	GP en général: Ça peut tjs être plus efficace - Ça prend surtout trop de temps pour changer les choses Très efficace dans la sensibilisation - Poser des problématiques au grand jour ou faire sortir les problèmes. Grandes victoires de temps en temps - Campagne Internet contre Apple - Réussir à obtenir la décharge chimique des entreprises pharmaceutiques : Recevoir de l'argent pour dépolluer le site. GP Vaud :	

	 Peu d'efficacité Ils investissent bcp mais ils ont peu d'impact. Soit on parle avec des gens déjà convaincus soient avec des gens qui ne sont pas du tout d'accord avec leurs idées. Difficile à convaincre ces derniers. Toutefois, il estime d'avoir un certain impact, mais c'est un effet à long terme. Utiliser la force de GP Suisse Un group local doit utiliser la puissance de GP pour ses campagnes.
	Efficacité des autres organisations environnementales - Organisations spécialises plus efficace dans leurs domaines respectives. - Complémentaire avec GP : GP ne fait pas le travail que Pro Natura fait, les 2 ont besoin des 2.
Rapport à l'eff. coll.	
Autre	
	Liens cognitifs
Cognitions (liste)	Autorités/Etat : La place où il faut affronter les autres lobbies, parties comme alliés.
Valeurs	
Identités	
	Construction
Moment (enfance,)	Vie adulte. Par son engagement
Processus	
- Mind (C/V/I)	
- Fact. (R, E, Ev)	

	Centralité et évidence		
Pourquoi (central – périphérique)	Périphérique		
Moment: enfance, Depuis quand c'est central?			
	Acteurs de la société civile (en général)		
	Contenu (dimensions)		
Perception des acteurs Legitimation ?	Remplisse les trous laissés par l'Etat - Il est convaincu du rôle de la société civile : Contrer les faiblesses de l'Etat que ce soit par la pression, par la sensibilisation ou par aide direct. Société civile met des sujets sur l'agenda politique		
	- Doit s'exprimer sur les sujets avec lesquelles elle n'est pas d'accord.		
Rapport aux acteurs Legitimation ?			
Perception de l'efficacité collective			
Rapport à l'efficacité coll.			
Autres			
	Liens cognitifs		
Cognitions (liste)	Autorités: Faire les choses que l'Etat ne fait pas, faire bouger l'Etat		
Valeurs			

Identités			
Moment (enfance,) Processus - Mind (C/V/I) - Fact. (R, E, Ew) Pourquoi (central - périphérique) Moment : enfance, Depuis quand c'est central? Autre (mettre dans les catégories si possible) Autre (mettre dans les catégories si possible) Rôle du citoyen Perception du citoyen Un bon citoyen doit	Identités		
Moment (enfance,) Processus - Mind (C/V/I) - Fact. (R, E, Ew) Pourquoi (central - périphérique) Moment : enfance, Depuis quand c'est central? Autre (mettre dans les catégories si possible) Autre (mettre dans les catégories si possible) Rôle du citoyen Perception du citoyen Un bon citoyen doit			
Moment (enfance,) Processus - Mind (C/V/I) - Fact. (R, E, Ew) Pourquoi (central - périphérique) Moment : enfance, Depuis quand c'est central? Autre (mettre dans les catégories si possible) Autre (mettre dans les catégories si possible) Rôle du citoyen Perception du citoyen Un bon citoyen doit			
Processus - Mind (C/V/I) - Fact (R, E, Ev) Centralité et évidence			
- Mind (C/V/I) - Fact. (R, E, Ev) Central	Moment (enfance,)]	
- Mind (C/V/I) - Fact. (R, E, Ev) Central			
- Mind (C/V/I) - Fact. (R, E, Ev) Central	Processus		
Fact. (R, E, Ev) Centralité et évidence Pourquoi (central – périphérique) Moment : enfance, Depuis quand c'est central? Autre (mettre dans les catégories si possible) Rôle du citoyen Perception du citoyen Un bon citoyen doit			
Centralité et évidence	1111111 (3/ 1/1)		
Pourquoi (central – périphérique) Moment : enfance, Depuis quand c'est central? Autre (mettre dans les catégories si possible) Rôle du citoyen Contenu (dimensions) Perception du citoyen Un bon citoyen doit	- Fact. (R, E, Ev)		
Pourquoi (central – périphérique) Moment : enfance, Depuis quand c'est central? Autre (mettre dans les catégories si possible) Rôle du citoyen Contenu (dimensions) Perception du citoyen Un bon citoyen doit	,		
Pourquoi (central – périphérique) Moment : enfance, Depuis quand c'est central? Autre (mettre dans les catégories si possible) Rôle du citoyen Contenu (dimensions) Perception du citoyen Un bon citoyen doit			
(central – périphérique) Moment : enfance, Depuis quand c'est central ? Autre (mettre dans les catégories si possible) Autre (mettre dans les catégories si possible) Rôle du citoyen Contenu (dimensions) Un bon citoyen doit			
Moment : enfance, Depuis quand c'est central? Autre (mettre dans les catégories si possible) Rôle du citoyen Contenu (dimensions) Perception du citoyen Un bon citoyen doit		Périphérique	
Depuis quand c'est central? Autre (mettre dans les catégories si possible) Rôle du citoyen Contenu (dimensions) Perception du citoyen Un bon citoyen doit	(central – périphérique)		
Autre (mettre dans les catégories si possible) Rôle du citoyen Contenu (dimensions) Perception du citoyen Un bon citoyen doit	The state of the s		
Rôle du citoyen Contenu (dimensions) Perception du citoyen Un bon citoyen doit	Depuis quand c'est central?		
Rôle du citoyen Contenu (dimensions) Perception du citoyen Un bon citoyen doit		Autre (mettre dans les catégories si possible)	
Perception du citoyen Un bon citoyen doit Un bon citoyen doit			
Perception du citoyen Un bon citoyen doit Un bon citoyen doit			
Perception du citoyen Un bon citoyen doit Un bon citoyen doit			
Perception du citoyen Un bon citoyen doit		·	
	D : 1 ::		
	Perception du citoyen		
- Réduire sa consommation (responsabilité individuelle)		- Ente d'accord à payer plus d'impois (pour que l'Etat puisse ette plus sondaire et prendre les problèmes dans ses mains) Réduire sa consommation (responsabilité individuelle)	
- Voter c'est crucial. Elire des gens qui sont d'accord avec ses idées. Le vote comme un acte puissant pour exprimer son point de vue e		77 . 3	
changer les choses.			
- Vigilance, s'intéresser à la politique			
- Manifester, être actif : C'est complémentaire avec le vote, mais ça a moins d'impact !		- Manifester, être actif : C'est complémentaire avec le vote, mais ça a moins d'impact !	

	Le citoyen a peu d'impact sur le social/aide aux autres - C'est dans la responsabilité de l'Etat, individuellement, on ne peut pas faire grande chose.
Rapport au citoyen	
Autres	
	Liens cognitifs
Cognitions (liste)	Autorités: Un bon citoyen doit voter les autorités « correctes » Bien commun: Un bon citoyen essaye de réduire sa consommation.
Valeurs	
Identités	
	Construction
Moment (enfance,)	Vie adulte (?): Au moment où il commence à s'intéresser à la politique Vie adulte: Par son engagement à GP.
Processus	
- Mind (C/V/I)	
- Fact. (R, E, Ev)	
	Centralité et évidence
Pourquoi (central – périphérique)	Périphérique
Moment : enfance,	

Depuis quand c'est central?	
	Autre (mettre dans les catégories si possible)
	Efficacité de son engagement
	Contenu (dimensions)
Perception de son eff.	Très efficace déjà sur un niveau individuelle Trier les déchets, économiser l'énergie, ne pas prendre l'avion, de moins prendre la voiture On peut faire bcp au niveau individuel pour protéger la nature. Au niveau du group régional : Il estime qu'il est remplaçable J'apporte un peu, mais ma présence ne change pas la face du monde. On ne remarque pas trop son utilité perso dans une grande organisation comme GP L'engagement local n'est pas nécessaire pour un bon déroulement de la campagne de GP. Par contre, quand Pro Natura va nettoyer une zone sauvage, on remarque chaque personne qui ne vient pas. Son engagement est moins utile que son acte de vote « Il y a plus de pouvoir dans le vote que dans l'engagement personnel. »
Rapport à son eff.	
Autres	
	Liens cognitifs
Cognitions (liste)	Société civile : Efficacité collective de GP n'est pas très touché Citoyen : Même si l'engagement perso est important, l'acte de vote reste crucial.
Valeurs	
Identités	

	Construction	
Moment (enfance,)	Vie adulte (?): Au moment où il commence à s'intéresser à la politique	
	Vie adulte: Par son engagement à GP.	
Processus		
- Mind (C/V/I)		
- Fact. (R, E, Ev)		
	Centralité et évidence	
Pourquoi	Périphérique	
(central – périphérique)		
Moment : enfance,		
Depuis quand c'est central		
	Autre (mettre dans les catégories si possible)	

C2. Synthèse: Cognition (Présence, centralité, liens cognitifs), moment de l'apparition de cette cognition et son influence sur son engagement

Cognition	Construction de cette cognition	Influence sur son engagement protestataire	Influence sur son engagement altruiste
Autorité (par rapport à l'enjeu)	Autorité (par rapport à l'enjeu)	Autorité (par rapport à l'enjeu)	Autorité (par rapport à l'enjeu)
Présence	Enfance	Oui/non et pourquoi	Oui/non et pourquoi
- Oui	Jeunesse	- Non	
Centralité	Vie adulte		
- Périphérique	- Droit de vote		
Liens avec d'autres dim. Cognitives	- Engagement		
- Injustice	Processus (M ou fact.)		
Autorité (en général)	Autorité (en général)	Autorité (en général)	Autorité (en général)
Présence	Enfance	Oui/non et pourquoi	Oui/non et pourquoi
- Oui	- Valeurs socialistes (?)	- Non	
Centralité	Jeunesse		
- Périphérique	- Renforcement de ces valeurs		
Liens avec d'autres dim. Cognitives	Vie adulte		
- Bien Commun	- Renforcement de ces valeurs		
- Injustice	Processus (M ou fact.)		
Acteurs sté civil (par rapport à l'enjeu)	Acteurs sté civil (par rapport à l'enjeu)	Acteurs sté civil (par rapport à l'enjeu)	Acteurs sté civil (par rapport à l'enjeu)
Présence	Enfance	Oui/non et pourquoi	Oui/non et pourquoi
- Oui	Jeunesse	- Non	
Centralité	Vie adulte		
- Périphérique	- Par son engagement		
Liens avec d'autres dim. Cognitives	Processus (M ou fact.)		
- Autorités			
Acteurs sté civil (en général)	Acteurs sté civil (en général)	Acteurs sté civil (en général)	Acteurs sté civil (en général)
Présence	Jeunesse	Oui/non et pourquoi	Oui/non et pourquoi
- Oui	Vie adulte	- Non	
Centralité	Processus (M ou fact.)		
- Périphérique			
Liens avec d'autres dim. Cognitives			
- Autorités			

Rôle du citoyen	Rôle du citoyen	Rôle du citoyen	Rôle du citoyen
Présence	Enfance	Oui/non et pourquoi	Oui/non et pourquoi
- Oui	Jeunesse	- Non	
Centralité	Vie adulte		
- Périphérique	- Droit de vote		
Liens avec d'autres dim. Cognitives	- Engagement		
- Autorités	Processus (M ou fact.)		
- Biens communs			
Efficacité de son engagement	Efficacité de son engagement	Efficacité de son engagement	Efficacité de son engagement
Présence	Jeunesse	Oui/non et pourquoi	Oui/non et pourquoi
- Oui	Vie adulte	- Non	
Centralité	- Droit de vote		
- Périphérique	- Engagement		
Liens avec d'autres dim. Cognitives	Processus (M ou fact.)		
- Société civile			
- Citoyen			
Synthèse générale (liens et centralité)	Synthèse générale	Synthèse générale	Synthèse générale
Carte mentale	Rapport aux autorités	- Pas une dimension importante	
Liens	Rapport à la société civile	pour son engagement. Mais	
	Rapport au rôle du citoyen	touché par son engagement.	
	Rapport à son efficacité personelle		

SUMMARY 4	CARTE COGNITIVE		
Résumé interprétatif	RAPPORT A LA SOCIETE (NB : rôle du citoyen, mettre au Summary 3)		
Nos mots			
	Interconnectedness (Liens entre membres de la société)		
	Contenu (dimensions)		
Perception des liens	Interdépendance au niveau environnementale et social Nos actions peuvent avoir des conséquences ailleurs : Ex. la consommation impact les conditions de travail. Une interdépendance déséquilibrée Les pays du sud et du tiers monde sont dépendants des pays industrialisés. Un effet sur les pays industrialisés sont les réfugies, mais ça reste déséquilibré. Interdépendance forte entre nature et êtres humains C'est plus lié que les populations entre eux. « Les 2 peuvent aller que ensemble. Il n'y a pas d'un côté l'économie ou les hommes et à l'autre la nature. »		
Rapport à ces liens	Interdépendance locale, agir localement - Agir dans la communauté, avec les gens qui vivent autour de nous. - Aider les pauvres ici, contribuer dans son propre pays.		
Autres			
	Liens cognitifs		
Cognitions (liste)	Injustice: Notre consommation a un impact sur d'autres populations.		
Valeurs			
Identités			

	Construction
Moment (enfance,)	?
Processus	
- Mind (C/V/I)	
- Fact. (R, E, Ev)	
	Centralité et évidence
Pourquoi (central – périphérique)	Périphérique
Moment: enfance,	
Depuis quand c'est central?	
	Bien commun
	Contenu (dimensions)
Perception des biens co.	Etat est responsable pour les biens communs - Il est contre la privatisation (assurance maladie, hôpitaux, etc.) : ça doit être public et appartenir à tout le monde. - L'Etat devrait avoir plus de pouvoir et garder plus la main sur ces sujets, ça devrait appartenir au domaine public. - C'est à l'Etat de gérer les biens communs, l'individu n'a pas assez de pouvoir pour s'en occuper. Bien commun est important mais en voie de disparation à cause de la privatisation - Si on privatise, il n'y a plus des biens publics. - Privatisation peut empêcher une accessibilité générale.
Rapport au bien com.	
Autres	

	Liens cognitifs			
Cognitions (liste)	Autorités : Comme responsable du bien commun.			
	Injustice: Privatisation menace les biens communs.			
X7 1				
Valeurs				
Identités				
	Construction			
Moment (enfance,)	•			
Processus				
	Centralité et évidence			
Pourquoi	Périphérique			
(central – périphérique)				
25				
Moment : enfance,				
Depuis quand c'est central?				
	Autre (mettre dans les catégories si possible)			

C3. Synthèse: Cognition (Présence, centralité, liens cognitifs), moment de l'apparition de cette cognition et son influence sur son engagement Mettre rôle du citoyen dans summury 4 (State and civil sty).

Cognition	Construction de cette cognition	Influence sur son engagement protestataire	Influence sur son engagement altruiste
Interconnectedness/individualisme	Interconnectedness/ individualisme	Interconnectedness/ individualisme	Interconnectedness/ individualisme
Présence	Enfance	Oui/non et pourquoi	Oui/non et pourquoi
- Oui	Jeunesse	- Non	
Centralité	Vie adulte		
- Périphérique	Processus (M ou fact.)		
Liens avec d'autres dim. Cognitives			
- Injustice			
Bien commun	Bien commun	Bien commun	Bien commun
Présence	Enfance	Oui/non et pourquoi	Oui/non et pourquoi
- Oui	Jeunesse	- Non	
Centralité	Vie adulte		
- Périphérique	Processus (M ou fact.)		
Liens avec d'autres dim. cognitives			
- Autorités			
- Injustice			
Synthèse générale	Synthèse générale	Synthèse générale	Synthèse générale
Carte mentale	Interconnectedness		
Liens	Bien commun		