

Governance of international sports federations

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Introduction

International Sports Federations (IFs) govern global sport. There are more than 100 IFs (members of the Global Association of International Sports Federations [GAISF]), of which approximately 60 have their headquarters in Switzerland. IFs range from the powerful FIFA (Fédération Internationale de Football Association) which has been based in Zurich since 1932, to the International Wushu Federation (IWUF), which recently established its headquarters in Lausanne to govern the Chinese martial art also known as Kung Fu. IFs act as umbrella organisations for the national federations of their sport; in turn, national federations and state federations oversee clubs. IFs establish and control global rules, award championships to cities and countries, negotiate with sponsors and broadcasters and fight the excesses of sport such as doping and corruption. They are usually associations of associations and, from this point of view, their governance deserves to be studied separately from that of sports associations that comprise individuals, such as the IOC (International Olympic Committee) or clubs (Chappelet, 2016a).

IFs work with private and public actors that have embraced organisational (or corporate) governance and political (or democratic) governance since the 1990s and, increasingly, require that their sport partners be governed appropriately within the scope of a systemic governance that involves all actors (private, public and nonprofit third parties) in the sport (Henry & Lee, 2004). Many IFs are over a century old, but their governance – which is obliged to take up a position straddling corporate and political governance – has evolved little since the Belle Époque, whereas the challenges in terms of commercial issues and sports regulation have become much more complex (Chappelet, 2018). At the turn of the century, several IFs experienced problems that can be described as problems of governance (i.e., failings concerning transparency, accountability, democracy, integrity and the control of decision-making by stakeholders).

The IOC, which governs the Olympic Games in conjunction with a wide range of partners (mainly Organising Committees of the Olympic Games [OCOGs], National Olympic Committees [NOCs] and International Sports Federations [IFs]), itself experienced governance problems in 1998–1999 [concerning the award of the Olympic Games]. These issues obliged the IOC to embark on significant reforms, such as introducing term limits for IOC members (maximum 8 + 4), reducing the age limit of its active members (from 80 to 70) and publishing

detailed financial accounts (Wenn, Barney & Martyn, 2011). Subsequent to what became known as the Salt Lake City Scandal (because it initially involved that city's bid committee for the 2002 Winter Games), other scandals that received less media coverage affected several IFs. These led to certain reforms of governance and the resignation of the presidents, who were also IOC members, of some IFs including the FIVB (volleyball), IJF (judo) and WTF (taekwondo).

Two of the largest IFs – FIFA for football and IAAF for athletics – experienced so-called “governance scandals” in 2015, which involved their respective former presidents. Following these scandals, in December 2015, the IOC asked the ASOIF to set up a working group on the governance of sport. This working group was established to study the issue in respect of IFs, while recognising their independence and autonomy and specifying that it would conduct an audit of its main subsidies to IFs (and also to NOCs and OCOGs) (IOC, 2015). More recently, the IOC (2018) called for reforms of the governance of the IFs overseeing boxing (AIBA) and biathlon (IBU) following the resignation of these IFs' presidents as the result of scandals.

This chapter focuses on the governance of IFs. It examines how ASOIF dealt with the IOC's request and what overall results were achieved (Section 1). The chapter then takes a closer look at the governance of a specific IF overseeing a major sport, namely cycling and the Union Cycliste Internationale (UCI) (Section 2). The UCI has had four presidents since the start of the 21st century. These changes in the presidency marked evolutions in the UCI's governance since 2000. Going beyond respect for the general principles of governance, Section 3 emphasises the importance to governance of the leadership of an IF and the relationship between the IF and the national federations. In conclusion, it is reiterated that the governance of an IF, beyond its own (organisational) governance, must absolutely address issues that arise from the political governance of its leaders and the systemic governance of its network.

The assessment of IF governance by ASOIF

In response to the IOC's request (IOC, 2015), ASOIF set up a working group known as the Governance Task Force (GTF). This task force, chaired by the ASOIF president – the former president of the ITF (International Tennis Federation) – consisted of three IF representatives (FEI – equestrian sport; FIBA – basketball; and FIVB – volleyball), an IOC member (former President of FISA – rowing), the IOC Chief Ethics and Compliance Officer, the FIBA Legal Director, an external expert and an academic (one of the authors), assisted by ASOIF staff and an independent “moderator”. (Information on the GTF and its activities is available at www.asoif.com/governance-task-force.)

The GTF rapidly came up with a set of five major principles (transparency, integrity, democracy, sport development and solidarity and control mechanisms), each measured by ten indicators. This followed the example of the tool that had been proposed a few years earlier by Chappelet and Mrkonjic (2013) featuring Basic Indicators for Better Governance in International Sport (BIBGIS) (ASOIF, 2016a). The Council and General Assembly of ASOIF, (i.e., the association of the 28 IFs that govern sports on the programme of the Summer Olympic Games) (ASOIF, 2016b), adopted these principles and indicators in April 2016.

Following this approval, a questionnaire was sent to all IF members of ASOIF. Each question was based on a pre-defined indicator. The IFs were asked if the indicators were either not fulfilled at all (in which case a score of 0 was allocated) or fulfilled (in which case a score of 1 to 4 was allocated depending on the degree of fulfilment of the indicator. The scores were 1 = partially fulfilled; 2 = fulfilled; 3 = well fulfilled according to published rules/procedures; 4 = totally fulfilled in a state-of-the-art manner). The indicators were not weighted (i.e., all were considered equally important).

A predefined scale of scores between 1 and 4 was provided for each indicator/question and the IF was asked to self-assess. For example, for the question “Do you publish an annual activity report and main event reports?”, the responses were scored in accordance with the quality of the reports (ASOIF, 2016c): 0 = No; 1 = Some news published on IF website; 2 = News published regularly and an annual report available on IF website; 3 = News published regularly and several years of annual reports, easy to find on IF website; 4 = Full publication, easy to find on IF website, with extra data or explanation from past reports (for comparison). The score given for each indicator had to be justified (for example, by a website URL or an official document) and could be modified by the GTF as IFs were sometimes too severe or generous with themselves on the assessment of a specific indicator.

This scoring system allows both a quantitative evaluation (based on a score of 0 or another value, i.e., no/yes) and a qualitative evaluation (a score between 1 and 4 depending on the degree of sophistication in achieving the indicator). Thus, an age limit (an indicator not considered by the GTF) for IF board members of 80 years or more could correspond, for example, to a score of 1, age up to 75 to a score of 2, age up to 70 to a score of 3, age of 65 or less to a score of 4. No age limit would give an IF a score of 0 for this indicator. The scale chosen is important in determining the governance requirement at a given time in history and in accordance with different cultures/countries. For example, an advanced age is (was) more valued in Eastern than in Western cultures.

Depending on the prevailing ethos and standards of fairness, an age restriction could be considered as discriminatory, illustrating the cultural and temporal relativity of an assessment of governance. The notion that “good governance” could permanently be “good”, at any time, is a notion unfortunately very widely used by many authors. However, GTF indicators do constitute a “hard core” considered to be important for the bodies governing international sport (IFs) regardless of the country/culture in which they operate.

The five dimensions (each with 10 indicators) were complemented by a preliminary section entitled “Guiding Codes”. It is composed of 10 questions on the degree to which the responding IF satisfied the main codes of the Olympic movement (Olympic Charter, Code of Ethics, World Anti-Doping Code, Universal Basic Principles, Agenda 2020, Code on the Prevention of the Manipulation of Competitions) and national and international laws on sport. The 28 ASOIF member federations responded to the questionnaire and the results were published in April 2017 at the ASOIF General Assembly (ASOIF, 2017a) after the GTF had checked the answers and evidence provided (monitoring). The Guiding Codes section turned out to be difficult to monitor as it was very subjective; therefore, it was not published. The IFs achieved a score for each of the five dimensions. All the indicator scores for each IF were summated to give total scores (ASOIF, 2017a). This allowed the IFs to be classified into three groups: Group A (8 IFs with a total score between 122 and 170); group B (11 IFs with a total score of 91–113); group C (9 IFs with a total score of 65–83). The maximum score achievable was 200 and the average was 100. It was noted that, as often happens with the introduction of an innovation (in this case governance), the targets affected (in this case the IFs) can be categorised into three groups: The early adopters and late adopters – groups that are numerically similar and well above or below the average respectively – and a slightly larger middle-of-the-road group, scoring around the average. The average score of the IFs for this first review was 104 (out of a maximum of 200). A margin of error exists as in all measurements. In the end, it is not the absolute value of the scores which mattered but the fact that each IF could position itself in one of the groups and see how it could be better governed. In other words, if the IFs were too lenient with themselves, it was fooling nobody but itself.

This monitored self-assessment exercise was repeated at the end of 2017 and published in April 2018. However, this time 40 IFs were included – the 28 ASOIF members plus its five

observer members (the IFs of sports added to the programme of the Tokyo 2020 Olympic Games in addition to the 28 full Olympic sports), together with the seven IFs of the sports on the Winter Olympic Games programme. The questionnaire was almost the same as in the first exercise to allow year-on-year comparisons. There were only minor amendments of questions that had been poorly drafted or were the subject of debate (depending on the IFs' understanding) with the addition of general questions such as the IF's staff numbers, turnover and registered office (ASOIF, 2017b). The principle of five dimensions and ten indicators per dimension was retained, as was the Guiding Codes section, although this was renamed "Background".

The results for the 33 IFs that are members or observer members of ASOIF were published in April 2018 at the ASOIF General Assembly (ASOIF, 2018). This time the IFs were classified into four groups: A1 (6 IFs with scores between 152 and 177); A2 (8 IFs with scores of 120–142); B (10 IFs with scores from 96 to 112); C (9 IFs with scores of 46–89). These groups could be described respectively as strong, quite strong, average and weak in relation to the governance indicators used by ASOIF. The results of the seven winter sports IFs governance were published later by their association (AIOWF, 2018).

Compared to the results of the ASOIF 2017 review, the ASOIF 2018 review showed an improvement in the average score from 104 to 121. This suggests that, from one year to the next, the 33 IFs that are members or observer members of ASOIF have broadly improved their governance, with observer members (who want to remain on the Olympic programme after Tokyo 2020) achieving particularly high scores. Furthermore, half of the IFs evaluated in 2017 increased their total score by 20 points or more. The second review of governance of AIOWF members for 2017–2018 showed some progress since the first edition (mean scores improved from 93 to 109).

Each IF received its score from these reviews with a view to highlighting where their own governance could be improved. However, the IF individual scores were not published as this would inevitably have led to a classification of IFs which, according to the GTF, would be nonsensical given the very different sizes of the organisations (from over 500 to fewer than 10 employees). Two questions in the second questionnaire by the ASOIF GTF on the IFs' staff size and turnover did illustrate a strong correlation between large size or turnover and a good governance score (ASOIF, 2018).

Another system for measuring IF governance was published for the first time in 2015 as a result of the Action for Good Governance in International Sport (AGGIS) project funded by the European Commission within the scope of the Erasmus+ programme (Alm, 2013). The system, known as Sports Governance Observer (SGO), is based on a method similar to the GTF and features four dimensions: Transparency and public communication (12 indicators); democratic process (10 indicators); checks and balances (9 indicators); solidarity (7 indicators), namely a total of 38 indicators for the current version of the SGO (Play the Game, 2017). The SGO study originally concerned 35 IFs of sports that feature in the programmes of the Summer or Winter Olympic Games. Unfortunately, the report is no longer available on the Play the Game website (AGGIS consortium leader). It emphasised the overall need to improve IF governance and highlighted glaring deficiencies, particularly in terms of the non-publication of financial reports or officials' remuneration and the absence of a limit on the number of terms of office for IF presidents. The report produced a ranking of IFs, with FEI (equestrian) placed first and FIFA (football) second, even though FIFA was in the middle of a scandal concerning governance (Ingle, 2015).

In 2018, the SGO study considered just five IFs: FIFA (football), FINA (swimming), IAAF (athletics), IHF (handball) and ITF (tennis) (Geeraert, 2018). These five IFs do not reflect the diversity of the 40 organisations (33 if only those IFs governing sports on the programme of the

Summer Games are considered). It is also not clear why some IFs were chosen and others were not, irrespective of whether or not they were affected by governance scandals. In addition, the collection of the data necessary for the 2015 and 2018 SGO studies was largely conducted without the collaboration of the IFs in question. Information was taken from the available websites and did not benefit from comments made by the parties involved.

When the sports ministers of the Council of Europe met in Budapest in November 2016, the second resolution of the meeting encouraged all IFs to use the principles and indicators developed by the ASOIF GTF as a first step towards improving their governance (Council of Europe [CoE], 2016). In January 2018, the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe, following a report by Assembly member Jensen (not available on the organisation's website), acknowledged the efforts made by the ASOIF GTF while making two recommendations (PACE, 2018, p. 1) that a set of indicators for the governance of IFs should be certified, for example, by an organisation such as ISO (International Organisation for Standardisation) (point 8 of Resolution 2199,2) that the sports movement should establish an "independent sport ethics rating system" similar to rating systems that exist in other areas such as environmental issues (point 12).

ASOIF launched a Governance Support Monitoring Unit (GSMU) in November 2018. This comprised the same members as the GTF but without IF representatives; in this way being more independent of IFs. This new unit is also chaired by the ASOIF president and is tasked with carrying out a further assessment of the governance of IFs, again based on the GTF questionnaire, for publication in 2020. Furthermore, the GSMU will assist IFs that want to improve their governance – in particular by means of quick wins that can be implemented by IF management without decisions by the board or general assembly. The GSMU will also study the proportion of IOC subsidies in IF budgets (originally requested by the IOC Executive Board in December 2015 – see above) and support risk assessment for IFs, an important dimension of governance. Moreover, the GTF example is to be followed by other IFs rather than just ASOIF or AIOWF members. In November 2018, the approximately 50 IF members of the GAISE, which are not part of ASOIF or AIOWF, announced their intention to use a reduced set of ASOIF GTF indicators (about 20) to improve their governance.

It should be noted that the IOC has gradually increased pressure on IFs to practice better governance. Evidence of this lies in the November 2018 decisions of the IOC Executive Board to continue monitoring the governance of the IWF (weightlifting), in particular with regard to its anti-doping programme and to open an investigation into the governance of the AIBA (boxing) which could lead to the removal of boxing from the Olympic programme (IOC, 2018) despite the efforts of this IF with its New Foundation Plan adopted in mid-2018 (AIBA, 2018). Similar pressures were exerted on the IBU at the time that it was changing its president. The previous president was under investigation in his own country (Norway) and in the country of the IBU's headquarters (Austria).

As can be seen, the work on the governance of IFs is far from complete, even though there has been significant progress. This is not just due to the GTF; there has also been an independent move by some IFs since the turn of the century, as is shown in the next section in relation to the UCI (cycling) (Section 2). However, it will also be shown (in Section 3) that much depends on the leadership of the IF president and the network of member national federations, in other words it is not enough for an IF to simply "tick the boxes". Stakeholders and observers should be able to undertake a qualitative assessment of the governance style of IFs leaders which cannot be assessed only by indicators such as those used by the GTF and which would take into consideration the effectiveness of boards in ensuring good governance and the achievement of organisational objectives.

The governance of the UCI (Union Cycliste Internationale)

The governance of IFs has become an all-consuming question not only in academic literature but also in the mainstream media. This reflects concerns about the limits of IFs' autonomy as closed, self-regulating organisations at the head of an inter-organisational network. Enjoying significant legal freedom despite their increasing commercialisation, IFs continue to function as quasi-monopolies (Forster, 2006; Geeraert, 2015). Waning public trust and the proliferation of scandals involving governance raises the question of whether IFs are still capable of self-regulation. The example of the UCI illustrates the shift from a governance model centred on the president to one that is increasingly influenced by external pressures. The following section describes and analyses the evolution of the UCI's governance model from 1991 to the present day by examining four presidencies (Hein Verbruggen, Pat McQuaid, Brian Cookson and David Lappartient) and the respective changes in governance that these presidents ordered/initiated on their own or were forced to implement. The data upon which this section is based comes from personal observations, discussions and interviews conducted by one of the authors who used to work at the UCI. Secondary sources are also used, such as the Regulations, Constitution and reports published on the UCI website, as well as journal articles.

Hein Verbruggen (1991–2005)

The presidency of Hein Verbruggen laid the foundation of the UCI's governance model. This period is characterised by three major, distinct issues, namely (1) the recognition of the UCI as the sole governing body of cycling, (2) control of the international cycling calendar and (3) corporate leadership. Hein Verbruggen became UCI president in 1991. Before this, from 1984 to 1991, he was president of the Fédération Internationale du Cyclisme Professionnel (FICP), one of cycling's three governing bodies in that era. Since 1965, cycling had been governed by the UCI, the FICP (mainly representing western capitalist countries) and the Fédération Internationale Amateur de Cyclisme (FIAC) (mainly representing communist countries). This separation had become compulsory when Avery Brundage, IOC president from 1952 to 1972, reinforced the amateur code in 1964. The amateur code excluded all athletes who had participated in sporting events for money or material advantage from the Olympic Games. The IOC only recognised the FIAC, cycling's amateur federation. In an attempt to ensure political balance, the UCI board was equally composed of FICP and FIAC members. However, persistent political and ideological differences between the FICP and the FIAC resulted in an unsurmountable impasse. This *de facto* deadlock paralysed the UCI for 27 years. Verbruggen's first major official act was therefore to confer all powers to the UCI. He achieved this goal through the dissolution of both the FICP and the FIAC in 1992. Two events facilitated these dissolutions. Firstly, the word amateur was removed from the Olympic Charter and, as of 1984, professional athletes could participate in the Olympic Games. Secondly, the demise of the USSR in 1989 simplified the fall of the Iron Curtain in cycling.

Verbruggen was convinced that, in order to control and govern its sport, an IF had to take charge of its international calendar and sporting rules. The UCI rulebook was very thin at the time. The actual regulatory power lay with race organisers, who established their own rules for their races. Verbruggen "saw very quickly that ASO¹ was the master of the international cycling calendar" (Hein Verbruggen, November 2014). In fact, the international cycling calendar represented a means to regulate and control race organisers, cycling teams and the sport itself and was also a source of revenue. Verbruggen's main political and economic challenge in 1991 was therefore to wrest control of the international cycling calendar from the all-powerful race organisers. As the UCI tried to take hold of the calendar, tensions with the most powerful race organisers increased,

especially with the ASO. The launch of the ProTour in 2005, a UCI-owned circuit, marked the beginning of a power struggle between the UCI and ASO, which was to last until 2008 and required the intervention of the IOC as a mediator. In terms of the rules, the UCI set an example to other IFs and some even “revised their statutes in function of our statutes” (Hein Verbruggen, November 2014). For instance, as early as 1992, the remuneration of board members in the form of compensation for loss of earnings was openly introduced into the UCI Constitution.

Unlike multinationals, the shareholders of which seek a return on investment, IF members (i.e., continental confederations and national federations) generally lack common objectives. At least, this was Hein Verbruggen’s point of view: “It’s like a basket full of frogs. They go in all directions. [...] 150 or 200 members, all have their own interests and work against each other. You’re not going to find optimal solutions with 200 people in a room” (Hein Verbruggen, November 2014). Verbruggen tried to overcome the political sclerosis of the UCI’s **system of governance by imposing strong (autocratic) leadership**. Applying the principles of management that he had learned during his time at M&M/Mars (the confectionary company, which was a major cycling sponsor), Verbruggen was a pioneer with regard to the implementation of corporate management practices in IFs. The president became an executive president who, together with the 15 board members, determined the objectives and the strategy of the UCI. A small group made up of the president, director general and the legal and financial directors, took political decisions. The director general was in control of several departments (e.g., legal, financial, event, marketing and sports). One of Verbruggen’s main concerns was to ensure a clear separation of powers to avoid staff becoming involved in politics and to prevent elected officials having an influence in day-to-day operations. However, Verbruggen was said to be involved in both – and to have acted with an iron fist. As the UCI Constitution had to be revised after the dissolution of the FICP and FIAC, Verbruggen used this opportunity to reduce the power of the continental confederations, considering them a political and financial burden and responsible for draining money from the IF. Continental confederations were mainly represented in their role as voting delegates. Instead of a one-nation-one-vote system, the UCI adopted a representative democracy under Verbruggen. This system consisted of 42 voting delegates distributed among the five continental confederations. This weighted system of votes was supposed to reflect the geographical representation of cycling worldwide and was therefore very Eurocentric. The system is still in place today, as Article 36 of the UCI Constitution testifies, although now consisting of 45 voting delegates (UCI, 2018a).

Hein Verbruggen was much praised during his presidency for the UCI’s growing prosperity, improved structure and professionalisation. In 2004, the UCI was one of the first IFs to adopt Rules of governance based on 11 principles: Identity, objectives, representation, decision-making process, transparency, communication, sport management, roles, commercial activities, finances and solidarity (Chappelet & Mrkonjic, 2013). Hein Verbruggen became an IOC member in 1996 in his capacity as an IF president. However, a string of allegations against Verbruggen emerged from 2008. Although a report commissioned by the UCI and published in 2015 could not establish clear proof of corrupt behaviour, Verbruggen was accused of preferential treatment in specific cases, autocratic leadership and a lack of checks and balances during his time as UCI president. He robustly defended his achievements as UCI president and refuted these allegations until his death in June 2017.

Pat McQuaid (2005–2013)

Pat McQuaid’s presidency represented somewhat of a continuity of Verbruggen’s agenda. According to former staff members, McQuaid often called Verbruggen for advice. McQuaid did not have the charisma of Verbruggen – nor his skills in politics, management or visionary

thinking. Nevertheless, his presidency is associated with two main achievements. Firstly, the creation of the Cycling Anti-Doping Foundation (CADF) in 2008 to manage the UCI's anti-doping programme (e.g., to define and implement the UCI's doping control strategy and conduct in- and out-of-competition testing). Secondly, after a power struggle that started with the announcement of the ProTour in 2004, ASO and the UCI finally came to an agreement in 2008. Throughout McQuaid's presidency, the pervasive influence of Verbruggen on the governance of cycling persisted. (Verbruggen was re-elected as an IOC member in 2006 in his capacity as Honorary UCI president; he was also a close friend of Jacques Rogge, the IOC president at the time.) McQuaid was defeated by Brian Cookson in the 2013 presidential election after a hard-fought campaign. Cookson and his team did everything they could to discredit Verbruggen and McQuaid in order to present Cookson as the leader of a campaign to restore the UCI's credibility and distance the new president from allegations against the UCI.

Freeburn (2013), who examined the allegations against the UCI in the investigation into doping concerning Lance Armstrong and the US Postal Service Pro Cycling Team, argued that although Pat McQuaid was not an instigator, he did maintain a defective structure of governance that ultimately resulted in many calls for the reform of the UCI.

Brian Cookson (2013–2017)

Brian Cookson took over the UCI presidency at a time when its credibility had suffered a considerable blow as a result of the Lance Armstrong affair. This had severely discredited the UCI's governance. Cookson's 2013 electoral manifesto had two priorities: An overhaul of cycling's anti-doping policies and the development of women's cycling. The first aimed to come to terms with the past (i.e., UCI anti-doping practices and allegations of laxity regarding Verbruggen and McQuaid) and restore credibility (notably vis-à-vis the IOC and cycling's stakeholders). The objective of the second priority (the development of women's cycling) was to create a forward-looking, progressive image for the UCI. Soon after his election, Cookson established the Cycling Independent Reform Commission (CIRC), which published a damning 227-page report in 2015 accusing Verbruggen and McQuaid of colluding with Lance Armstrong (Mackay, 2015).

Despite his ambitious objectives and desire for governance reform, Cookson's short presidency was contested for various reasons. He was accused by both staff and board members of being too hesitant, of lacking the necessary leadership skills and of delegating too many responsibilities to his director general (Pavitt, 2016; Roan, 2017). Cookson further ignored the growing dissatisfaction of the board with the leadership imbalance that arose from the director general's prominence and Cookson's absence. He was not an executive president as his predecessors. Furthermore, after just 18 months, the turnover of UCI staff had exceeded 50 percent (due to dismissals and voluntary departures) with no strategy in place for knowledge transfer. Cookson suffered a humiliating defeat to David Lappartient in the 2017 presidential election (37 votes to 8). He thus became the first UCI president to serve just one term. Despite Cookson's defeat and repeated criticism of his leadership, he and his team achieved many important governance reforms during the four years of his mandate. Table 13.1 gives details of three of the five GTF dimensions.

David Lappartient (since September 2017)

While Brian Cookson's main challenge was to restore trust in the UCI's governance, which he notably tackled by reforming anti-doping policies, governance was no longer a critical issue when David Lappartient was elected to the UCI presidency in September 2017. On the contrary, the UCI was even considered a model of governance in many respects. According to

Table 13.1 The UCI's governance reforms under President Brian Cookson

Democracy	A term limit (12 years) was introduced for the president in 2016 – UCI Constitution, Art. 62 (UCI, 2018a).
Transparency	The president's remuneration and the overall remuneration of all board members have been disclosed in the UCI's financial report since 2013. A transparent bidding process for the award of major cycling events was introduced in 2015 ² .
Integrity	The UCI Ethics Commission was completely revamped in 2016. It now has to be composed of five members, including a minimum of one woman. As per Article 12 of the UCI Code of Ethics, the chair and two further members have to be independent of the world of cycling. The secretariat of the Ethics Commission is independent of the UCI administration (UCI Code of Ethics, Art. 13.1). The Ethics Commission can sanction behaviour (UCI, 2018b). Until 2013, the UCI president was a member of the Cycling Anti-Doping Foundation (CADF) board. Under Cookson, the CADF became a separate legal entity, completely independent of the UCI. Furthermore, Legal Anti-Doping Services (LADS) was created, overseen by an external lawyer (CADF, 2018). In 2014 and 2015, the Cycling Independent Reform Committee, an independent entity, conducted "a wide-ranging independent investigation into the causes of the pattern of doping that developed within cycling and allegations which implicate the UCI and other governing bodies and officials over ineffective investigation of such doping practices" (Rebeggiani, 2016). State-of-the-art confidential reporting mechanisms were created for whistle-blowers. A Women's Commission was established. Every commission/committee must have at least one female member (although this is not yet formalised in the Constitution). All UCI World Championships offered equal prize money for men and women by 2016 (Clarke, 2016).

a staff member, this has left Lappartient in the comfortable position of being able to focus on sporting projects, such as the reform of the WorldTour, which features cycling's most prestigious cycling races (e.g., Tour de France, Giro d'Italia, Vuelta a España). Lappartient's impact in terms of shaping and improving the UCI's governance will have to be measured against the promises he set out in his election manifesto in which he emphasised his commitment to improving the governance of cycling, notably with regard to technological fraud, doping and potential manipulation through betting. Since his election, Lappartient's manifesto has been developed into a strategic vision known as UCI Agenda 2022 (UCI, 2018c), bringing to mind the IOC's Agenda 2020. In the UCI Agenda 2022, Lappartient reiterates the need for "real and effective leadership" (p. 6), reaffirms the role of the president and stresses rebuilding the "badly damaged relationship" (p. 7) between the president and the Management Committee. The principles of modern governance will be further improved in the following areas: 1) The processes of managing solidarity funds and the transparency of allocations to stakeholders, 2) regular audits by independent external entities and gender parity at all levels. Greater transparency on allocations and working towards gender parity seem to be direct responses to the weaknesses in the UCI's governance revealed by the ASOIF governance reviews. Some aspects that may require further improvement are listed below by GTF dimension (see Table 13.2).

Table 13.2 Possible future improvements to the UCI's governance

Democracy	A term limit was introduced for the president in 2016, but not for members of the Management Committee or Commissions ³ .
Transparency	No independent reporting mechanisms exist regarding the allocation of resources for development.
Integrity	The UCI performs poorly at decision-making level in terms of gender balance (11% female board members in May 2018). On a more positive note, the UCI is seeking to implement equal pay at the administrative level.
Checks & balances/ control mechanisms	An Internal Audit Committee was established under Cookson, fulfilling a strategic promise (the consolidated financial statements of the UCI were audited by KPMG). However, since the UCI replaced the financial consultant with a full-time chief financial officer under Lappartient, the Internal Audit Committee is not independent of the UCI administration.

The announcement by broadcast giant Sky in December 2018 that it would end its sponsorship deal with Team Sky, worth £30 million a year, after the 2019 season brought another recurring issue to the fore; namely, the financial precariousness of the economic model of cycling in general, and professional road cycling teams and riders in particular, given the considerable dependence on sponsor investment (Pavitt, 2018). Verbruggen had already tried to tackle the issue of teams' vulnerability by creating the ProTour/WorldTour in 2005. The objective of the UCI-owned circuit was to stabilise the teams' financial situation by guaranteeing top-level participation. "We wanted to open new sources of revenues for the teams and bind sponsors via participation guarantees" (Hein Verbruggen, April 2015). However, cycling's economic model continues to be fragile and many professional road cycling teams disband once the main sponsor leaves. Probably the most dangerous downside of this situation is the professional instability for riders and the increased risk of them using prohibited substances to improve their results to secure a contract (Aubel & Ohl, 2015; Ohl, Fincoeur, Lentillon-Kaestner, Defrance & Brissonneau, 2015). If teams rely almost entirely on their main sponsors this is also because there is no redistribution of TV rights to them. The withdrawal of Sky as the sponsor of the team that has dominated road cycling over recent years shows that "no team is immune from potential difficulties under the current model" (Pavitt, 2018). The issue of the precariousness of cycling's economic model needs to be addressed in future reforms of the UCI, especially as event organisers and teams are seeking more involvement. While Verbruggen's presidency was very autocratic and built around his personality, Lappartient has to involve cycling's main stakeholders in decision-making.

The example of the UCI illustrates the importance of the president's leadership in the governance of an IF. It also shows the power of the national federations that elect (or sometimes do not re-elect) the president and that must vote on significant reforms of governance while being beneficiaries, or not, of a redistribution of IF resources.

Two underestimated key factors of IF governance

According to Henry and Lee (2004), three dimensions of governance that have an impact on the operation of organisations can be distinguished; these specifically apply in the case of IFs and shine a light on the levels of reflection and action and associated key factors. These three dimensions are the organisational, political and systemic dimensions. The organisational (corporate)

dimension concerns the exercise of the power of management and control within IFs, in other words the decision-making processes and the conduct of strategy in order to improve the performance of the organisation and the achievement of its objectives.

The political dimension concerns the relationship that IFs maintain in the political field. It reports on the manner in which political institutions (states, European Union, United Nations, etc.) seek to influence, or indeed regulate, international sport by means of the mobilisation of regulatory, financial and moral mechanisms or by various political influences. The question of power is no longer analysed in its intra-organisational dimension but rather in its inter-organisational dimension. This political governance is less significant for IFs than for national federations, which generally maintain strong partnership relationships with their ministries of sport.

The systemic dimension aims to describe situations of interdependence and the forms of regulation of inter-organisational relations as well as the coordination of actions within a complex system such as the total Olympic system (Chappelet, 2016b). The concept of the complexity of the sporting and Olympic system refers to the uncertainty of the environment, the wide range of stakeholders – often with differing interests (public, community, commercial) – and the multiplicity of levels of coordination (from local to global). In dynamic terms, the notion of systemic governance marks the transition from a regulation/coordination of actions that is centralised, hierarchical and vertical (government) to a horizontal regulation/coordination in terms of networks based on consensus/compromise and power shared with several actors (governance). This new type of regulation is well expressed in the implementation of public–private partnerships, as demonstrated by the regulation of the global fight against doping through the operations of the World Anti-Doping Agency (Chappelet & van Luijk, 2018).

These three levels of governance are complementary, interrelated and must be integrated and implemented in the governance of an IF in order to improve their efficacy and legitimacy. There seem to be two key points. The first point relates to the exercise of power and leadership in the IFs and at the administrative headquarters. This concerns a good definition within the IFs, going beyond statutory formalism, of questions such as: Who decides? Who implements? Who checks and reports on the results and to whom? In this respect, it is necessary to analyse the roles of the president, the director general, the Board of Directors (BoD) and the general assembly (GA). There are four main types of configuration of power in IFs, namely 1) a strong presidency (an executive president generally relying on two key employees, the administrative/financial director and the sports director, in order to lead the federation); 2) a dispersed presidency (a powerful executive president surrounded by five or six main key actors, whether paid or not); 3) a tandem presidency (also termed the president/director tandem); and 4) managerial power (managerial and political power to a paid CEO) over elected officials (Bayle & Robinson, 2007).

Four cases of IFs (UCI, FIFA, FISA, International Hockey Federation [FIH]) of different sizes and levels of professionalisation serve to illustrate these power configurations. As seen above, the UCI has traditionally had a strong presidency (type 1) (followed by managerial power around the CEO and a reluctant board during the Cookson presidency – type 4). FIFA is a dispersed presidency (type 2) that had autocratic leadership by the president during the Blatter era. This situation recurred after Infantino's election despite governance reforms and the reinforcement of the secretary general's position to oversee the administrative headquarters (the FIFA Board is more dedicated to ensuring political equilibrium between representatives of continental confederations). FISA has a tradition of a president with a strong rowing background (obligatory in the constitution) and has achieved greater professionalisation through a tandem presidency (type 3) of the president/director general. FIH built a managerial model around a strong CEO between 2010 and 2015 (type 4).

In reality, the doctrine by which elected officials (board) decide, employees (the IF's secretariat or administration) implement and the GA monitors is often poorly observed. Presidents are increasingly executive or compensated presidents and other elected officials are less prominent at the headquarters; boards of directors rarely play an executive role and act as a genuine counterweight to presidential power. Furthermore, the GA monitors the results obtained in a rather distant and very formal manner. While IF reporting methods are evolving and becoming more professional (with the emergence of more detailed financial and activity reports that are publicly accessible on the Internet), checks of performance measurements and countervailing powers are still weak (states, the media and NGOs have little influence in regulating any excesses of governance).

The IOC has a significant right of scrutiny as a result of the redistribution of a part of the broadcasting and marketing rights for the Olympic Games to IFs (via ASOIF). The magnitude of this has increased substantially since 2012 (approximately USD\$600 million over four years shared between the 28 Summer Olympic IFs for 2013–2016) and one of the evaluation criteria for sport to remain on the Olympic programme is IF governance (IOC, 2012). However, the effectiveness of this evaluation can be queried. After the Rio Games, the largest sum was allocated to the IAAF⁴ despite the 2015 governance scandal involving its former president. Changes in systemic governance also sometimes imply consequences for organisational governance, as illustrated by the advent of directorships on the BoD reserved for stakeholders (athletes, officials, representatives of the professional sport, doctors and women) and/or qualified or independent individuals. Independent ethics committees (e.g., for the UCI) and/or governance committees (for FIFA) have also been established with the aspiration of ensuring better governance.

The second key point for the governance of IFs concerns the support of continental and national structures and, more broadly, the improvement of the federal network. In other words, the governance of the federal pyramid and the quality of collaboration between the five levels of intervention (international, continental, national, regional and local) are important to create the optimal conditions for the organisation and development of the sport. Mrkonjic's work (2015) on European federations shows that three models of continental IF organisation can be distinguished. The first is the legal (and sometimes political, although rarely economic) autonomy of continental confederations with a European federation that is often stronger than the others (a clear example is the case of the European Football Confederation (UEFA)). This model is very rare; continental confederations are generally weak and their connections are sometimes ineffective in the implementation of IF development policies. Two other organisational models exist, namely a) the very common institutional absence of continental confederations (e.g., FISA) and b) the unique case, potentially offering inspiration for the future, of the creation of continental offices under the control of the international headquarters in line with the one FIBA strategy (FIBA Europe, FIBA Americas, etc.).

IFs that are seeking to give impetus to their federal network of national federations have a range of choices and resources depending on whether or not they can fund the development and structuring of the network. FIFA has connections through its six confederations and offers strong support to national federations with overall annual contributions both to operations and in accordance with national federation projects. Each national federation has the same influence as the GA (one-country-one-vote system). The FIH instead relies on a collaboration with its strongest national federations (England, the Netherlands, India, etc.) and through knowledge-sharing with others. The UCI tries to support its national federations through a knowledge-sharing platform for each continent. FISA is more focused on institutional and sport relationships with its national federations.

The management of the organisational governance of the administrative headquarters and the federal network is a challenge due to the very strong heterogeneity of continental and national structures in terms of professionalisation. Systemic governance must therefore be more strongly integrated into the reflections of IFs in the future through the relationships that they must form with the IOC, other IFs, states (often co-organising their events), intergovernmental organisations (EU, UN), private partners, the media, NGOs and even civil society. This increased complexity requires high-level organisational governance, bringing together professionalism and responsiveness while preserving democratic principles (efficacy and democracy can sometimes appear to be contradictory). The qualities of leaders (skills, managerial expertise, strategic vision, involvement, values) and, more specifically, of IF presidents, are put directly to the test on this subject.

In this respect, it should be noted that the accession of an IF president to power is not only achieved through professional skills but also, and especially, by a political capacity to achieve and retain power. The media and soft power platforms that international sport and the Olympic Games offer explain why countries (such as Russia, the Gulf States, China, United States, etc.) are developing genuine strategies to encourage their citizens to attain these presidential functions. However, despite everything, these positions are overwhelmingly occupied by men from Western Europe.

Conclusion

This chapter summarises the efforts made by the IFs of sports of the summer and winter Olympic programmes to achieve better governance under the auspices of a system of indicators drawn up by ASOIF in 2015 at the IOC's request. In particular, it focuses on the case of the UCI, which governs cycling and has had a series of four presidents since the turn of the century. These presidents have initiated, and then confronted, major governance reforms that have not yet been fully accomplished. The chapter then emphasises two important factors for improved IF governance. Firstly, it is essential for the organisational and political governance of an IF for the elected president to demonstrate leadership, in particular for the day-to-day operation of its administrative headquarters. This leadership is also key to the chemistry of the duo formed by the president and the IF's number two, whether he or she is known as the director or secretary (general or executive) or chief executive officer (CEO) and whether elected or appointed, with a greater or lesser degree of autonomy. Secondly, the governance of the network of national and continental federations and, more broadly speaking, stakeholders, is crucial to the governance of the IF and the systemic governance of the ecosystem of its sport through the redistribution of sometimes significant resources and the democratic principle that almost always gives one vote to each member—national federation of the IF. Future research should be carried out examining the leadership styles and national networks of IFs as they can both impact negatively the overall governance of an IF and can destroy the best efforts towards better governance at the international level through scandals linked to a person or a country at a local level. To what extent, for example, can an IF impose its governance standards on its national sport federations or push its national leaders towards improved governance?

Many IFs are over 100 years old and operate with substantial budgets. However, there are now many new players interested in sport that want to take advantage of its benefits. These are, of course, primarily athletes of the sport in question. There are also commercial players such as sponsors, broadcasters and professional leagues, as well as public actors, such as local or national governments, becoming increasingly involved in the organisation of sporting events and the

fight against the scourges afflicting sport; or, quite simply, they are seeking to get their populations moving to enjoy the benefits of movement through sport. The basics of the governance of IFs dates back to the foundation of many of these federations in the early 20th century. Governance practises must now adapt to the current situation in which commercialisation and professionalisation of the IFs demand a more transparent culture.

Notes

- 1 Amaury Sport Organisation (ASO) is the company that organises the Tour de France, the Vuelta a España, Paris–Nice, as well as other major cycling races and sporting events (e.g., Dakar, Paris Marathon), totalling 75 events in 25 countries in 2018 (aso.fr, 2018).
- 2 The 2016 UCI Road World Championships in Qatar (awarded during the presidency of Pat McQuaid) was an example of a contrary approach; the event was awarded to Qatar as the highest bidder.
- 3 According to a staff member, term limits for members of the Management Committee were rejected in 2016.
- 4 FINA (swimming) and FIG (gymnastics) receive the same amount as the IAAF.

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Routledge Handbook of Sport Governance
Edited by David Shilbury and Lesley Ferkins



Routledge Handbook
Sport Governance

The *Routledge Handbook of Sport Governance* is a comprehensive and authoritative survey of the wide range of issues shaping sport governance. It considers the evolution of the sport industry from a largely amateur, volunteer-driven sector into the globalised business that it is today and examines how professionalisation has fundamentally shifted the governance landscape for sport organisations and all those working within sport.

Written by a team of leading sport management scholars from around the world, the book is organised around five key themes:

- Part I: Overview of sport governance
- Part II: Environmental context and policy perspectives
- Part III: Ownership structures and governance models: Implications for sport governance
- Part IV: Board roles in the governance process
- Part V: Future sport governance challenges

Each chapter reviews the most recent research available and, in some cases, presents new data to support previously published studies. As sport governance is a relatively young field, each chapter maps future research needs to provide direction for sport governance scholars. A special feature of the handbook is a series of nine shorter research chapters in Part IV examining board roles in the governance process, tying theory to the day-to-day practical aspects of running a sport organisation.

With broader and deeper coverage of the key issues in contemporary sport governance than any other book, this handbook is essential reading for students, researchers and practitioners in sport business and management.

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