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Civil society and démocratie framing in Tunisia. How democracy is framed and its influence on the state.

Refle Jan-Erik

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Civil society and democratic framing in Tunisia.
How democracy is framed and its influence on the state.

THÈSE DE DOCTORAT

présentée à la
Faculté des sciences sociales et politiques de l'Université de Lausanne

pour l'obtention du grade de

Docteur en Science Politique

par

Jan-Erik Refle

Directrice de thèse
Prof. Florence Passy

Jury
Prof. Eva Green
Prof. Marco Giugni
Prof. John Chalcraft
Prof. Martino Maggetti

LAUSANNE
2019

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Faculté des sciences
sociales et politiques

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- Florence PASSY, directrice de thèse, Professeure à l'Université de Lausanne
- John CHALCRAFT, Professeur à la London School of Economics and Political Science
- Marco GIUGNI, Professeur à l'Université de Genève
- Martino MAGGETTI, Professeur à l'Université de Lausanne

autorise, sans se prononcer sur les opinions du candidat, l'impression de la thèse de Monsieur Jan-Erik REFLE, intitulée :

« **Civil Society and Democratic framing in Tunisia.** »

Jean-Philippe LERESCHE
Doyen

Lausanne, le 24 avril 2019

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Abstract

The sudden end of the Ben Ali regime in January 2011 led to a change towards a democratic political system in Tunisia. While researchers acknowledge the importance of social movements for the initial protests, there is no systematic proof of civil society influence on the Tunisian state. The thesis takes this blind spot and looks at the mechanisms by which civil society can have ideational influence. As the role of civil society for democracy and democratization is often discussed, the thesis asks how organizations perceive democracy and whether they diffuse a democratic framing towards the state. Organizational networks are analyzed to see who works with whom and which ministries are approached. These ministries are then asked on their networks to verify the connection between organizations and ministries. Afterwards the democratic framing of organizations and ministries is compared to see whether more interaction causes similar framing. Finally, the results of the analysis show mechanisms that influence framing and wider policies. Different possibilities for influence, be it direct effects or mediated indirect effects via the media, organizational or coalitional influence orient the thesis. The research is based on interviews with movement leaders and higher-level civil servants in ministries as well as organizational documents and media analysis. The research shows very specific influence, oriented towards concrete ministries. Personal contacts as well as institutionalized integration are useful to realize demands. The most effective interactions to promote a democratic framing exist between the Women Movement and the Ministry of Women and Family. Other interactions are found on a continuum between very restricted to no interaction and more intense interactions. There is not one democratic framing but several ones with different orientation.

Résumé

La fin soudaine du régime de Ben Ali en janvier 2011 a entraîné un changement vers un système politique démocratique en Tunisie. Bien que les chercheurs reconnaissent l'importance des mouvements sociaux dans les manifestations initiales, il n'y a pas de preuve systématique de l'influence de la société civile sur l'état tunisien. La thèse aborde cet angle mort et examine les mécanismes avec lesquels les organisations peuvent avoir une influence sur les idées. Comme le rôle de la société civile est souvent discuté, la thèse demande comment les organisations perçoivent la démocratie et si elles transmettent ces perceptions à l'égard de l'État. Les réseaux organisationnels sont analysés pour voir qui travaille avec qui et quels ministères sont abordés. Il est demandé à ces ministères de relever leurs réseaux afin de vérifier s'il existe une relation entre les organisations et les ministères. Puis, le framing de la démocratie des organisations et des ministères est comparé pour voir si plus d'interaction signifie aussi un framing similaire. Ensuite les résultats de l'analyse sont utiles pour montrer les mécanismes capables d'influencer le framing et les politiques plus larges. Différentes possibilités d'influence, qu'il s'agisse d'effets directs ou indirects (via les médias), d'influences organisationnelles ou collective orientent la thèse. La recherche repose sur des entretiens avec des dirigeants des organisations et des fonctionnaires de haut niveau dans des ministères et sur une analyse des documents et des médias. Cette influence est très spécifique et orientée vers des ministères concrets. Les contacts personnels ainsi que l'intégration institutionnalisée sont utiles pour réaliser les revendications. Les mécanismes les plus efficaces sont en place entre le mouvement féministe et le Ministère de la Femme et de la Famille. On trouve d'autres interactions sur un continuum entre des interactions très limitées, voire nulles, et des interactions plus intenses. En termes de framing démocratique, il n'y a pas un seul framing, mais plusieurs avec une orientation différenciée.

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List of abbreviations

ADDH	Association de Défense des Droits de l'Homme
ADLi	Association de Défense des Libertés Individuelles
AFTURD	Association des Femmes Tunisiennes pour la Recherche sur le Développement
ALECA	Accord de libre-échange complet et approfondi
AMT	Association des Magistrats Tunisiens
ANC	Assemblée nationale constituante
ANND	Arab NGO Network for Development
ARCI	Associazione Ricreativa e Culturale Italiana
ARP	Assemblée des représentants du peuple
ASAD	Association de Soutien à l'Auto-Développement
ASF	Avocats sans frontières
ATDD	Association Tunisienne de Droit de Développement
ATFD	Association tunisienne de femmes démocrates
ATIT	Alliance Tunisienne pour l'Intégrité et la Transparence
AWID	Association for Women Rights in Development
CAWTAR	Center of Arab Woman for Training and Research
CCFD	Comité catholique contre la faim et pour le développement – Terre Solidaire
CEDAW	Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women
CERES	Centre d'études et de recherche
CGT	Confédération Générale du Travail
CGTT	Confédération générale des travailleurs tunisiens
CIPD	Conférence internationale sur la population et le développement
CMODH	Coordination Maghreb Human Rights Organizations
CREDIF	Centre de recherches, d'études, de documentation et d'information sur la femme
CRLDHT	Comité pour le Respect des Libertés et des droits de l'homme en Tunisie
CSC	Confédération des syndicats chrétiens
DANIDA	Danish International Development Assistance
ECESR	Egyptian Center for Economic and Social Rights
ECOSOC	Economic and Social Council
EITI	Extractive Industries transparency Initiative
ENA	Ecole nationale d'administration
EU	European Union
Euromed	Réseau Euro-Méditerranéen des Droits Humains
FES	Friedrich Ebert Stiftung
FIDH	Fédération internationale des ligues des droits de l'Homme
FTDES	Forum Tunisien pour les Droits Economiques et Sociaux
GIZ	Gesellschaft für Internationale Zusammenarbeit
HAICA	Haute autorité indépendante de la Communication audio-visuelle
ICJ	International Commission of Jurists
ICRC	International Committee of the Red Cross
ICTJ	International Center for Transitional Justice
IDEA	International Institute for Democracy and Electoral Assistance

ILO	International Labor Organization
IMF	International Monetary Fund
INS	Institut national statistique
ITDD	Institut tunisien pour la démocratie et le développement
ITUC/CSI	International Trade Union Confederation
IVD	Instance Vérité et dignité
LGBT	Lesbian, Gay, Bisexual and Transgender
LTDH	Ligue Tunisienne pour la Défense des droits de l'Homme
MCT	Médecins contre la torture
MENA	Middle East and Northern Africa
MTI	Mouvement de la tendance islamique
NOVACT	International Institute for Nonviolent Action
OCTT	Organisation contre la Torture en Tunisie
OECD	Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development
OGP	Open Government Partnership
OMCT	Organisation Mondiale contre la Torture
ONAS	Office National de l'Assainissement
ONAT	Ordre National des Avocats de Tunisie
ONFP	Office National de la Famille et de la Population
OST	Observatoire Social Tunisien
OTDS	Organisation tunisienne pour le développement social
OTE	Observatoire Tunisien de l'Economie
OTT	Organisation Tunisienne du Travail
PASC	Programme d'Appui à la Société Civile
RCD	Rassemblement constitutionnel démocratique
SAF	Strategic Action Field
SMO	Social Movement Organization
SNJT	Syndicat National des Journalistes Tunisiens
STEG	Société tunisienne de l'électricité et du gaz
TAP	Tunis Afrique Presse
TJNA	Tax-Justice Network Africa
UDC	Union des diplômés chomeurs
UFT	Union des Femmes de Tunisie
UGET	Union générale des étudiants de Tunisie
UGTT	Union Générale Tunisienne du Travail
UMFT	Union musulmane des femmes tunisiennes
UN	United Nations
UNDP	United Nations Development Program
UNFPA	United Nations Populations Fund
UNFT	Union nationale des femmes tunisiennes
US	United States (of America)
UTAP	Union tunisienne de l'agriculture et de la pêche
UTICA	Union Tunisienne de l'industrie, du commerce et de l'artisanat
UTT	Union des Travailleurs de Tunisie
WWF	World Wildlife Fund

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Chapter One

Introduction

1 Introduction

“We have reason to expect at least a correlation between democratization and the proliferation of social movements in many countries” (Tilly 1993/1994:21).

In comparison with other countries in the region such as Morocco, Algeria, Libya or Egypt with persistent autocratic governments, unstable political situations or return to autocracy, Tunisia developed a new constitution, had several free and fair elections and developed new institutions. Civil society and social movements have been and are seen as vital and active in Tunisia and even critical analysts underline the positive developments of the country towards more democracy that is often attributed to civil society (Stepan 2012; Clark 2012; International Crisis Group 2014; Bellin 2013; Hanelt and Behrendt 2013; Ratka 2017; della Porta 2016). When Tunisia saw a change of the political system starting in 2010, social movements played and continued to play a key role for the transition (Paciello 2011; Gelvin 2015). After the end of the authoritarian regime, the number of organizations changed radically in Tunisia. As El-Khawas notes, around “fifteen hundred new civil society organizations were established [...] to promote democracy, gender equality, social justice, and human rights” (El-Khawas 2012:15).

As the origin of the Arab Spring, Tunisia started uprisings in 2010, followed by the end of the Ben Ali regime in 2011¹. While the uprisings started with the self-immolation of a young Tunisian, following a confiscation of the production cart and public humiliation by a policewoman on December 17, 2010 in Sidi Bouzid, this was by no means the only reason as corrupt rulers, economic stagnation as well as several other elements mobilized people (Dewey et al. 2012²; Brynen et al. 2012). In the following days “sustained, cross-class, geographically widespread, mass demonstrations” spread in the country putting pressure on the government (Angrist 2013:547). In January 2011, President Ben Ali fled the country and the repressive regime ended (Paciello 2011). Researchers underline that the prospects for social movements have been limited before the regime change (Bayat 2000; Paciello 2011). Not surprisingly, most political scientists did not foresee the Arab Spring as a whole especially as Arab Regimes had low rates of regime change and as Tunisia was seen as a stable autocracy (Cavatorta and Haugbølle 2012; Volpi 2017; Gerges 2015; Hinnebusch 2018³). Consequentially, research on movements in Tunisia is mainly of younger nature and focuses on the post-2011 period. The Tunisian post-uprisings period seems to be an ideal terrain for movements and organizations and thus for the analysis of them.

While civil society is very active in Tunisia and often seen as important factor for the democratic development, the question emerges *if* and eventually *why* Tunisian movements and organizations are effective enforcing democracy. While the initial citation suggests that either democratization promotes movements, or movements support democratization, the question merits a more detailed answer. Tilly in his articles on democratization thought about the second (Tilly 1993/1994). The thesis thus retraces the influence of selected Tunisian organizations in terms of framing democracy and its diffusion. This allows a better understanding of the role and importance of movements and organizations in post-2011 Tunisia. Not only organizations supporting democratization, but also conservative, less favorable organizations exist, which can produce counter framings to democracy-oriented organizations and challenge actors in the public discussion (Deane 2013). As a consequence,

¹ For a discussion on the term Arab Spring look for example Al-Sumait et al. 2015 who argue for the term Arab Uprisings.

² Dewey called it an injustice frame, a term that will become discussed later.

³ For further literature on the stability of the old regime see also: Geisser 2012; Gaub 2014; Bayat 2017; Haas and Lesch 2013; El-Khawas 2012; Pace and Cavatorta 2012; Schraeder and Redissi 2011; Zemni 2015; Brownlee et al. 2015; Camau 2012; Hudson 2015; Schwedler 2015.

it is not just important to analyze how movements frame democracy, but also whether state actors consider those and adopt a framing of democracy.

Although the literature acknowledges that movements played a main role and still influence democratization processes, researchers often state without explanation that there is influence of organizations (on the important role see: Stepan 2012; Chomiak 2016; Clark 2012; Brownlee et al. 2015). It is not clear how Tunisian civil society ensures links towards the state and transmits ideas. In addition, little is known on the Tunisian political system and the interaction between movements and the state. While literature on the initial uprisings becomes abundant, there is still a blind spot when it comes to civil society influence in post-2011 Tunisia in a changed political system with a new constitution and renewed institutions. Consequentially, the thesis takes up the concept of diffusion of ideas and ideational impact and analyses the influence of four organizations on Tunisian ministries, directly and via public discussions. As the change of the system towards a democracy was an important outcome of the uprisings, democracy and how it is framed by organizations (democratic framing) and the state (represented by ministries) will be an element of analysis. Retracing connections between movements and the state as well as their quality allows to identify mechanisms for diffusion. However, little research exists on the ideational impact of movements and the connection of democratic framing, movement impact and networks⁴. Movements may support democracy passively using granted liberties or actively promoting ideas about democracy. As little is known about framing impact of movements and less in a Tunisian context, the research is to a large part inductive and exploratory. The approach is constructivist in the sense that perceptions are seen as shaped in interaction.

To find an answer on the current influence of some organizations as part of movements in post-2011 Tunisia, the thesis uses a qualitative analysis of three types of data: Thirty-eight semi-structured interviews, media reports from the two main French-writing newspapers and documents provided by the organizations. Leaders of organizations as well as civil servants in ministries were interviewed on their conceptions of democracy as well as on

⁴ Two notable exceptions include Glenn (2015) who connects democracy and framing arguing on a democratic master frame for the democratization after the end of the Cold War. Hadden (2015) connects framing, networks and outcomes to show how strategies and actions, but also framing content influence especially the divisions within the international environmental movement.

their contacts towards each other. Building on this data, the framing of democracy is analyzed to determine whether movements and ministries understand democracy in the same way. The idea is to identify a framing that gets diffused through mechanisms, the latter identified by retracing networks towards each other. Those mechanisms are generally distinguished between direct elements like personal or organizational contacts, institutionalized access in committees as well as public elements that get mediated via the public. The media analysis enables to account for the second form of influence, the influence via public discussions and allows to identify whether democratic framing by organizations gets heard in public. The diffusion of democratic framing can consequentially take two forms, direct interaction and indirect interaction mediated by for example the media.

The thesis starts with a detailed problem formulation, research questions and a discussion on its relevance before outlining the context and descriptions of the four analyzed organizations. Chapter two is devoted to a literature review and theory building, before chapter three explains the methods. The empirical chapters include chapter four on the relations between actors, chapter five on the framings by organizations and chapter six on the framings by civil servants. The idea is to first verify whether and what kind of connections exist for the organizations analyzed to show whether interactions are frequent or not, thereby enabling or excluding certain mechanisms of diffusion. By looking at the ways framing can be diffused, chapter four establishes what ministries are relevant for the analyzed organizations, as well as whether those organizations work alone or in a coalition. The ministerial perspective that verifies whether those relations are similarly perceived by the ministerial side is a second element of chapter four. Chapter five then uses the framing of democracy by organizations to show what kind of democratic framing is present among organizations (single framing) and across organizations (coalitional framing). Having outlined the framing of and across organizations, chapter six then takes the ministerial perspective and outlines their democratic framing which is compared to the individual and collective movement perspective. Chapter seven takes up findings from chapters four to six and shows the mechanisms of diffusion by which organizations can exercise ideational influence as well as those that are not working well. Chapter seven establishes a link between frame diffusion and wider outcomes. The final chapter eight summarizes the results and gives ideas for future research.

1.1 Introduction of the context, problem, research question and cases

The first chapter outlines the role of movements and civil society for the Tunisian context and discusses and problematizes the research question that guides the thesis. The first part describes the relevance of the research, before the context of Tunisia is outlined. As not every reader is familiar with the Tunisian political system and the developments since the 2010 Uprisings, the factors influencing the initial uprisings, the relevant political aspects at the time of analysis as well as the situation in terms of protest and movement activities are outlined. The third section of chapter one is devoted to a case description of the four analyzed organizations where similarities and differences as well as the reasons for their inclusion are discussed. Like for every chapter, a short conclusion sums up the main elements of the chapter.

1.1.1 Influential movements or just overenthusiastic researchers?

Tunisia developed from a closed autocracy to a political system that appears to rely on civil society and movement activity (see literature on the role of movements and civil society above). As little research exists on the relations between civil society and the state, hardly anything can be said on whether this represents reality. To fill this gap, mechanisms by which movements can take ideational influence and position their ideas are formulated. While organizations have regularly internal discussions, they equally argue and frame problems and enter into claim-making vis-à-vis the state (at least the organizations analyzed, as will be outlined later not all movements or organizations have claims towards the state). This discussion may be concrete with the responsible person at a ministry, or may be realized via media or the public as well as via protest. Through those interactions, framings on democracy are exchanged and can get integrated. If movements have a clear framing of democracy (something to show equally) at least parts of this framing should be taken over by state actors, especially if we think about a strong civil society and a relatively weak state administration⁵. On the other hand, movements can change their own framing in order to align with the state and to make their own framing more suitable to state framing. In any case, interaction is expected to make framing similar to a certain degree that should be identifiable through the research. While I primarily state that movements or organizations

⁵ The argument builds on Kriesi et al. (1995) who state that civil society becomes a resource in terms of expertise and knowledge when administration is weak. As will be shown later, administration in Tunisia has effectively limited resources following several changes after the Uprisings that should be favorable towards the inclusion of civil society. If proposals in general are transmitted, this should then similarly be true for perceptions of democracy that get equally transmitted when exchanging on topics.

can influence the state, it shall be verified at the end, whether it is not the state that influences movements.

At the moment, it is neither clear what framings on democracy exist among movements, nor what type of democratic framing can be identified among state representatives. A better comprehension of the movements' and state's perspective on democracy can indicate what type of democracy is desired. Less democratic perceptions can be highlighted in the framing. From a normative perspective, best practices towards democratic ideals are identifiable.

In addition, networks among civil society in Tunisia have not been retraced on a national level leaving us with limited knowledge on network structures. Neither have contacts or mechanisms of influence been identified. New knowledge on interaction, ideational influence of movements and organizations and the state can be generated.

To analyze the impact and framing of movements, four organizations have been selected representing wider movements. The choice is based on different fields of activities, such as the women movement, the human rights movement, the labor movement as well as the environmental movement. The organizations allow not only to compare across topics, but also in terms of resources, members, and repertoires among other factors. The diversity of organizations allows to retrace whether those factors matter, so whether for example a larger organization has more ideational influence. In addition, their framing of democracy is expected to vary according to their field of activity. The Union Générale Tunisienne du Travail (UGTT), the Association Tunisienne de Femmes Démocrates (ATFD), the Forum Tunisien pour les Droits Economiques et Sociaux (FTDES) and the Ligue Tunisienne pour la Défense des droits de l'Homme (LTDH) are included. All except the FTDES were officially allowed under Ben Ali but more or less repressed. All have organizational structures that easily allow to identify leaders. Three (ATFD, FTDES, LTDH) qualify as organizations as part of larger movements, while the UGTT is a labor union, something discussed later in detail. The FTDES is one of few working on environmental aspects, but also on other aspects like migration. On the state side, the focus is on ministries and their interaction with movements as well as their democratic framing. While parliament and other state levels or political parties would be equally interesting to analyze, ministries are an important part of different

stages of the policy process that can allow a wider diffusion of ideas. In addition, the Tunisian party system is not yet well developed, while the administration at least existed under Ben Ali (although different, especially personnel, changes occurred). Using the four organizations as well as twelve ministries, different mechanisms and degrees of interaction as well as degrees of similar framing can be identified. The analysis thus includes cases with little interaction as well as with intense interaction to show differences and similarities.

1.1.2 Research Question

The research question leading the thesis is ***“How does a democratic framing diffuse across actors in Tunisia?”***

The research explains how civil society diffuses democratic framing and thereby democracy to state representatives in Tunisia. When democracy is well integrated into the framing of movements, they not only promote specific causes but also democracy. In interaction with the state, they try to convince civil servants on their own perspective and specific framings. The question responds to the missing knowledge on state-movement interactions in Tunisia as well as on the transmission of ideas in the form of democratic framing. As was shown earlier, research on post-2011 state-civil society interaction in Tunisia remains very limited although authors acknowledge an important role of the civil society.

To answer the question, three distinct, but linked elements of theory are used, namely interaction, framing and diffusion as part of an outcome oriented literature. Democracy related aspects are a focus (democratic framing). The combination of networks and ideational influence allows to retrace mechanisms of influence of movements and organizations. This framing diffusion can take different channels like direct interaction, indirect links (via the media or public opinion) and joint links (both types; the approach is inspired by the impact model of Giugni and Passy 2003). If there is more interaction through for example direct face-to-face discussions, then framing of organizations and civil servants should resemble each other.

In order to answer the question, the links of the four organizations and their relations towards the state are identified to verify whether organizations actually target the state (and which part). The networks of organizations enable to evaluate whether there is a single

influence by one organization or a coalitional by several organizations. In chapter four the relations of the ministries towards civil society actors are outlined. Afterwards the framing of democracy by organizations and state actors are outlined and compared. This allows to identify whether and what type of democracy is actively promoted, or whether a different cause is promoted and democracy comes as a by-product. In addition, it allows to evaluate the common elements across organizations but also towards the state. Finally, the interaction between the state and civil society is regarded in order to identify which mechanisms are used to promote a democratic framing. The final step summarizes the influence of organizations in terms of framing and evaluates the possibility of a wider influence on policies. Different sub-questions that guide each chapter are built in the theory chapter (see 2.6.3).

1.1.3 The relevance of the thesis

The contributions of this thesis are of theoretical and empirical nature. From a theoretical perspective especially the combination, but also testing of theories on ideational influence, framing and networks are major contributions. From an empirical point of view the thesis adds to the very few empirical studies on post-2011 Tunisia and generates knowledge on the political system. I emphasize the contribution to the research on influence of framing, the combination of different theoretical approaches such as frame diffusion and networks, the contributions to the study of democracy and the new context for knowledge generation.

Influence of democratic framing

The research is particularly relevant from a perspective on ideational influence of movements and organizations. This perspective is linked to the wider literature on outcomes that is limited. As Rasler puts it, there is currently little information why and how contention is successful (Rasler 2016). This is also related to methodological problems in identifying causal chains (Giugni 2009; Kolb 2007; Amenta 2005). Consequentially, a number of scholars turned their attention to mechanisms of influence that could indicate causal chains. Andrews for example underlined the importance of mechanisms through which organizations influence institutions (Andrews 2001; similarly, Kolb asks to focus on processes and mechanism Kolb 2007). More related to Northern Africa, Bennani-Chraïbi underlined the importance of mechanism and processes for change in Northern Africa (Bennani-Chraïbi 2017). While some models are identified, those are not often tested in different empirical contexts (Giugni and Passy 2003; since 2003 this did not change much although some more

studies like Hadden 2015 exist). The results from the thesis add to the literature on framing outcomes and identify which mechanisms enable organizations to influence the state. While the focus is on diffusion and its mechanisms, the research builds the basis for other analysis on movement outcomes. The research enlarges the existent literature to a Tunisian context and towards specific elements, namely framing of democracy that becomes an element of analysis. Outcomes in terms of framing are even less researched.

Studies on framing impacts are limited and studies on outcomes indicating the importance of framing independent of opportunities or resources are even rarer (Polletta and Ho 2006; Martin, G. 2015). Framing literature is seen as not systematic and is not comparing across different organizations, adding additional relevance for comparing the framing of several organizations (Benford 1997). In this research, the analysis of framing is connected with diffusion of ideas. By focusing on ministries as representing the state, the research shows how framings enter into different parts of the administration and highlight how those ideas can contribute to policy influence. The study explores the movement-state relationship and the chances of influencing a state in transition.

Combining frame diffusion and networks

This work aims to develop the literature on movement and organizational influence by combining the mechanisms of diffusion with networks and framing. The combination of different theoretical perspectives is a main contribution. Already Kriesi advocated to combine theories on social movements with revolutions, democratization or nationalism, but also with theories on interest groups, communication or electoral studies (Kriesi 2009). Similarly, della Porta called to bring social movement theory into the study of democratic transitions (della Porta 2016). This combination of different sections of the social movement theory such as framing, networks and outcomes but also theories on democracy is at the heart of this thesis and contributes to different fields of research.

Networks are one of those research fields. The network structures of organizations tell much about how organizations try to take influence. As Knoke and Wisely underline: "Analyzing the structure of interactions among SMOs and among SMOs and the polity members is critical to any comprehensive understanding of a movement's rise and fall" (Knoke and Wisely 1990:77). Linking the structure and internal perspective of networks and outcomes is

a relatively new research field (Hadden 2015). Recent studies include Diani's work on the cement of civil society (Diani 2015). As he outlines, relational patterns between actors, whether movement organizations cooperate or whether they prefer working alone, matter for outcomes (Diani 2015). Coalitions are not necessarily pro-democratic and also antidemocratic coalitions exist in transitioning countries (Bermeo and Yashar 2016). In this sense, interaction through established networks in Tunisia can show which actors are better positioned and more influential.

The study of democracy

The study adds to the literature on democratic transition ("transitology") and investigates a field that became prominent over years: The role of the civil society for democratization processes (Linz and Stepan 2010; Norton 1995; Bermeo 1997; Mercer 2002; Tilly 1993 and 1994; LeBas 2011; Johnston 2014). As the Arab Spring showed, democratization is not always easy. Despite having deficits in terms of civil liberties and press and Internet freedom, Tunisia was the first in the MENA region to be declared "free" by Freedom House, an international index measuring democracy (Fagan 2015). However, just in 2014, the Freedom House Index ranked Tunisia as only 'partly free' – thus not entirely democratic -, while other countries like Egypt clashed back from 'partly free' in 2013 towards 'not free' in 2014 (Freedom House 2013; Freedom House 2014a). Tunisia showed great improvements, while other countries in the region clashed back to autocracy. Tunisia today is still to be seen in a wider context of the Arab Spring. Dupont and Passy stated: "The Arab Spring is a formidable terrain to improve our knowledge as it adds new social and political contexts for studying protest politics" (Dupont and Passy 2011:448, in a similar direction argue Diani and Moffatt 2016). Tunisia is the most promising candidate for a democratic and peaceful transition in the region (Smith 2013; Sadiki 2015; Risse and Babayan 2015; Brownlee et al. 2015). Those elements make it particularly valuable to identify success factors and best practices that can be used to distinguish the Tunisian case from others. Apart from the scientific relevance, the social relevance is highlighted as successful models for democratization through civil society can be identified.

An additional scientific interest lies in testing qualitative measures of democracy in a different context (see for example Lauth 2011). As empirical evidence on qualitative measures of democracy is still missing, the research contributes to fill this gap. Scientists

often see democracy in a Western context. After the end of the Cold War, researchers discussed whether democracy is the last remaining successful political structure, while states in Northern Africa remained autocratic for a long time until the Arab Spring. The changed circumstances give new opportunities for research as King et al. state “observations from a different time period, or even a different part of the world may provide additional observable implications of a theory” (King et al. 1994:48).

A new context for testing theories and generating empirical findings

The scientific relevance of the topic is high as it gives insights on social movements and organizations in a non-Western context. Scholars such as Amenta criticize the focus on movement consequences in democratic and especially the U.S. context (Amenta 2014). Bosi and Uba state that “the consequences of mobilization in Western Europe have been examined less frequently, and even less is known about the outcomes of social movements in other regions” and that applying the theory to new contexts tests the theory and helps to nuance the arguments (Bosi and Uba 2009:411). In addition, the Middle East and Northern Africa has “been on the sidelines” of social movement theory (Beinin and Vairel 2013).

Although a lot is known about the initial Tunisian Uprisings as mentioned earlier, knowledge about current political configurations is limited and especially civil society-state relationships are not well researched. This surprises given that researchers assign the importance of civil society as mentioned earlier. Comprehension of the Tunisian consolidation of democracy may provide insights for other countries of the region or in the world. The thesis thus adds to fill several blind spots; be it on the ideational influence of movements, network configurations and mechanisms, democracy and frame diffusion or the regional knowledge on Tunisia and the Arab Spring.

Before detailing more on the theoretical basis in relation to networks, framing and diffusion, the national context is outlined to gain a better understanding of actors and developments.

1.2 The context: a country on its way towards democracy

This section familiarizes readers with the context of the Tunisian revolution and its aftermath. As we have seen before, much literature on the initial uprisings, some on the political system and much less on political processes after 2011 exist. The aim is to give a

short overview on the younger historical and current context in which the state and organizations operate. This context oriented the interviews and media reporting and is integral for their understanding. I am looking at a specific point in time, while the process of transition from one political system to another is an ongoing process. Thus, actors and processes can change over time and require a short elaboration on the situation that influenced the time of analysis. The description of the context is part of a literature review that is only oriented towards the country in question. The literature review on theory follows in the second chapter.

It is not the idea to go into detail into the pre-revolution context under Ben Ali or to give a complete history on Tunisian political development including for example colonialism or the Bourguiba phase, but to give an overview on younger developments. The order is chronological and the description of the political context selective on certain key events that are important to understand the Tunisian context. Starting with the 2011 uprisings, a first review on the Tunisian revolution reveals the main drivers for change and describes the role of organizations and movements for this development. A number of scholars highlight different reasons for protest and underline the role of some of the analyzed organizations. In the following, the development of the political system like the new constitution is outlined. Taking the revolution as starting point of recent Tunisian history, the chapter gives later an overview on the political context at the time of interviews (between 2015 and 2016) to put the analysis in context. Finally, the situation of movements and civil society is described and main actors are identified, before section one point three introduces the four organizations.

1.2.1 How democracy started in Tunisia: from the initial uprisings towards a democratic political system

This section gives an overview on the initial time frame from the revolution to the setting up of a democratic political system⁶. It starts by outlining the factors favorable for the initial Uprisings before summarizing main developments since the Uprisings as those still motivate ongoing protest activities and claim making as is shown later. Important milestones like the new constitution or the first elections are presented.

⁶ For a good overview on the developments so far see ATFD 2011b.

Research on the initial protest

A wide range of literature analyzed the persistent autocracy before the revolution. Tunisia was a prototype of a police state with a clear leader and a system based on surveillance and fear, as well as “very limited pluralism” (Bennani-Chraïbi 2017:8; compare also Grewal 2016; Hmed 2015; Daguzan 2017). Filiu reminds, “only puppet opposition and government-inspired “NGOs” (GONGOs) were not facing restriction and harassment” (Filiu 2011:15). Similarly, Ayari recalls that especially student activists got imprisoned under Ben Ali. Ben Ali reigned since 1987 where he overturned the former leader Bourguiba, who is still seen as the father of independence (Ayari 2016). Before the uprisings, elections have been manipulated and the presidential party controlled the political space (Murphy 2016). Filiu reminds that Arabs have often been seen as exceptional in terms of democratic attitudes, a belief that was destroyed by the Arab Spring (Filiu 2011).

In the beginning literature on Tunisia and its transition was based on NGO or think tank reports as well as early articles on the transition that were very descriptive. From 2016 onwards, scientific articles multiplied, became abundant and gained more prominence⁷. A number of international think tanks, like the International Crisis Group or Freedom House, occasionally provide reports on the developments in Tunisia, related to elections and current political developments (International Crisis Group 2013, 2014, 2015, 2017, 2018 or Freedom House 2014a and b). These reports are used because they provide on-the-ground knowledge that supplements academic literature, although it is less systematic and can include organizational bias. One part of the literature is country specific; on the other hand, plenty of research compares the macro-level perspective on the Arab Spring.

A number of researchers underline that protest movements developed in Tunisia over the last years of Ben Ali, illustrated by the protests in 2008 or Ben Guerdane or Regueb in 2010⁸ (Hibou 2011a; Volpi et al. 2016; Yousfi 2015; Lim 2013; Bayat 2013; Alexander 2011b; Beinin 2014; Chomiak 2011; Allal 2013; Marks 2015; Zemni 2015; Willis 2016; Murphy 2016; Hmed 2012). Yousfi highlights that the 2008 protests were already supported by ATFD, LTDH, opposition parties and emigrated Tunisians abroad (Yousfi 2015). Less concrete, Mallat and

⁷ Consequentially the literature basis was rather limited at the beginning and expanded during the research.

⁸ For an overview on protest data in relation to Tunisia see Della Porta 2016, however some caution is necessary as discussed later.

Mortimer insist that resistance existed throughout the Arab region before 2011 and that especially resistance in Tunisia “was not all expressed in the street” (Mallat and Mortimer 2016:12). Notwithstanding, Allal warns to see the protests between 2008 and 2010 as necessary precondition, because logics of engagement were different for the 2010/2011 uprisings (Allal 2012). As Beau and Lagarde or Gelvin underline, the protest remained limited to some areas, where protest was then oppressed by the regime and unionists were arrested (Beau and Lagarde 2014; Gelvin 2015). However, in the retro perspective, Volpi et al. argue that especially bottom-up challenges were not seen as powerful and sustained enough and thus ignored in favor of explaining stability in Tunisia and the region (Volpi et al. 2016). Thus, while protest existed, it was mainly ignored by researchers or seen as marginal. The Uprisings then turned scholars’ attention to protest activities.

Protest and its diverse reasons

A major part of research on Tunisia analyzes the initial processes of transition, where the role of extraordinary social movements and their unexpected development is analyzed (Hibou 2011b). Regarding protest and its spread, especially in the beginning of the transition, scholars like Angrist, Schraeder and Redissi or Clancy-Smith provide university-educated youth unemployment, unemployment following the 2008 crisis, rising food prices, facilitation through social media and diversity of those protesting as important factors (Angrist 2013; Schraeder and Redissi 2011; Clancy-Smith 2013). Several scholars argue in a similar direction (Kilani 2014; Zemni 2015; Willis 2016; Chalcraft 2016; Sela 2016; Wolf and Lefèvre 2012; Hinnebusch 2018; regarding food prices Gelvin 2015; Dakhli 2014). Further explanations refer to the political economy, material factors, but also emotions, norms and values (Hibou 2011b; Chomiak 2016, regarding emotions Merone 2013; regarding moral condemnation Zeghal 2013). Others place economic factors more prominently: El-Khawas states that the regime change “was not a cry for democracy but a demand for jobs” (El-Khawas 2012:8; in a similar direction argue Amami 2013; Moumneh 2011; Chomiak 2011; Hibou 2011a; Beinin 2016). Bayat goes further and relates the uprisings to the neoliberal economic orientation as well as the neoliberal city like Tunis (Bayat 2017). Activists linked demands for democracy with social and economic claims (Yousfi 2013a).

Others see it as purely anti-Ben Ali and anti-regime movement nourished by corruption of the regime and mismanagement (Ferjani 2011; regarding corruption: Smith 2013; Gherib

2012; Clancy-Smith 2013; Allal 2013; Allal and Pierret 2013; Sela 2016; Filiu 2011). Anderson takes a mixture of those perspectives, when she states that a range from “aging leaders and corrupt and ineffectual governments to their educated, unemployed, and disaffected youth” explains the protests not only in Tunisia, but in the whole region (Anderson 2011:2). Allal, Lecompte and Zemni underline the diversity of backgrounds and reasons for protest (Allal 2012; Allal 2013; Lecompte 2013; Zemni 2015). On the other hand, Hmed emphasizes the religious and ethnic homogeneity in Tunisia as well as the presence of the state that avoided wider conflict (Hmed 2011). Volpi argues that protest was not a strategy to highlight socio-economic or political tensions and does not explain the sudden eruption of protest (Volpi 2017). Mallat and Mortimer underline the non-violent perspective of protest that was important for its success (Mallat and Mortimer 2016). As we see from the very diverse and different explanations, researchers do not see one factor as particularly important, but several ones as contributing.

A leaderless movement and its diversity

While organizations were initially not included in the protest, they took over at a later point. Allal as well as other scholars underline that not the organized civil society organizations influenced the revolution, especially neither the UGTT nor Islamist activists, but the protest without leader, command or structure (Allal 2013; Filiu 2011; Ayari 2013; Hibou 2011a). Haugbølle and Cavatorta highlight that neither parties, nor Unions or politicians did start the protest and it was more horizontal and unstructured (Haugbølle and Cavatorta 2014; Cavatorta and Haugbølle 2012). While this is true for the initial protest, it contradicts other descriptions of a use of existing structure especially for the UGTT. Haugbølle and Cavatorta underline the role of social movements and ordinary citizens as “agents of change” (Haugbølle and Cavatorta 2014). It was especially the UGTT (local level) that played a key role for the mobilization and spread during the transition and as mediator (national level) following the end of the old regime (Allal 2012; International Crisis Group 2014; Bishara 2014; Angrist 2013; Beinin 2016; regarding the transition: Mizouri 2012; Elloumi 2013; Brownlee et al. 2015; Murphy 2016; Hmed 2012). Murphy underlines that the LTDH and the Committee for the Defense of Liberties and Human Rights played a role (Murphy 2016). Yousfi argues in a similar direction, that the UGTT is not only a labor union, but “rather a political organization where social claims have historically been closely linked to political and national claims” (Yousfi 2013b:23, in a similar direction argue Brownlee et al. 2015). Kerrou

supplements that beneath trade union activists, lawyers, cyber-activists and unemployed graduates played a key role (Kerrou 2013). However, political parties have been absent from the initial protest (Wolf 2014a).

Schraeder and Redissi state that it was particularly important, that “old and young, men and women, urbanities and rural dwellers, and professionals along with blue-collar workers” participated in the movements (Schraeder and Redissi 2011:13). In a similar direction argue Gaub, Behr or Camau saying that a wide alliance of society members ensured change (Gaub 2014; Behr 2012; Camau 2012). It has thus been a great variety of the population that got mobilized. Angrist discusses the non-involvement of the military as well as the mobilization of formerly silent people and even co-opted ones (Angrist 2013, regarding the military also Mongin 2011; Brownlee et al. 2015; Nepstad 2015; Filiu 2011; Volpi 2017; Bennani-Chraïbi 2017; Lynch 2014a). The non-involvement leads directly to the next point, a possible failure in repression.

A failure in repression

Some researchers describe the ongoing mobilization for toppling the regime as failure in repression (Camau 2012). Honwana adds that the Tunisian government might have been able to handle protest by just one group of the population like the poor and marginalized, but as protest enclosed different political classes and religious and social groups across different age groups and locations, it allowed Tunisians to topple the government (Honwana 2013). Wolf sees loss of control and missing own mobilization of the RCD as important factors (Wolf 2017). Similarly, Bennani-Chraïbi argues that repressive responses of the state showed an inadequate crisis management that led to a perceived loss of power (Bennani-Chraïbi 2017). In addition, the abruptness of the revolution and the high speed are underlined as Ben Ali had been forced out of power within one month (El-Khawas 2012; Ferjani 2011). On the other hand, Ayari brings unique explanations, namely, that clientelistic resources of the RCD declined especially in Sidi Bouzid causing reduced loyalty towards the regime (Ayari 2013).

Another often-disregarded point is that not only collective mobilization against Ben Ali, but also counterdemonstrations, so pro-regime demonstrations occurred (Stewart et al. 2015). In relation to counter-measures against protest, Willis underlines some mistakes by the

regime, namely shooting of demonstrators and incapacity to control the Internet as decisive for the initial revolution (Willis 2016). However, the issue of counter mobilization and counter framing raise the question on whether those frames still exist today.

Breaking a taboo and framing

Beneath changed power relations, researchers underline more cognitive factors. Hibou and others stress, that Tunisians broke a taboo when protesting, namely the one of fear and silent obligation (Hibou 2011b; Bessis 2011; Hmed 2012). Here a notion of agency and mobilization in the sense that protest became a veritable mean of protest can be found.

Halverson et al. focus on the narrative of the self-immolation. They underline the description of Mohamed Bouazizi – the one who immolated himself – as martyr - and as a victim of the government (Halverson et al. 2013; Hibou and Kadri 2011; Kilani 2014; Filiu 2011; DeGeorges 2013; for a critical analysis of the ‘white lies’ in relation to Bouazizi see Lim 2013). Jasper underlines the importance of “moral shocks” for creating injustice frames that are connected with blame and outrage and Nepstad as well as Khatib describe the self-immolation as a trigger (Jasper 1998; Nepstad 2015; Khatib 2016). Chalcraft remarks that self-immolations due to desperate situations existed before but had not the same effect (Chalcraft 2016). It was a ‘win’ of the master frame on Bouazizi over Ben Ali’s framing as underlined by Lim (2013). The initial injustice frame seemed to play an important role for the mobilization during the transition where the death of Bouazizi created outrage connected with anti-regime sentiments, it is however not the only factor. Shortly summarized, the initial injustice of the confiscation of a young street vendors cart is discussed from diverse perspectives and explications vary, while especially Gamson warns about seeing it as only factor (Gamson 2011). There have been a number of facilitating elements like the social media coverage of the events.

A social media uprising?

Another often-discussed aspect of the uprisings in Tunisia is the role of social media. Breuer for example uses citations from interviews and analyzes how videos showed the injustices like women beaten or people killed and contributed to the emotional mobilization of protest (Breuer 2016). While many scholars contest that social media use caused the revolution, researchers see it as crucial factor for its achievements or at least for its speed in interaction with other factors (in a different direction argue: Halverson et al. 2013; Kilani 2014; Kahlaoui

2013; on the limited role also Alimi 2016; Filiu 2011; Lecompte 2013; Markham 2014; for taking it as an accelerator argue: Elloumi 2013; Toska 2015; McGarty et al. 2013; Alexander 2011a; Breuer 2016; Hussain and Howard 2013; Diani and Moffatt 2016; Lynch 2014b). Others warn, that social media is not only a mean for democracy, but is equally used by autocrats (Gunitsky 2015; Breuer 2016). It needs to be underlined that acceleration played a role in toppling the Tunisian regime (see for example Rossi and della Porta 2015).

Zuckerman or Ayari note that Tunisians went to the streets not due to Facebook or WikiLeaks but due to frustration (Zuckerman 2011; Ayari 2013). Martin or Mallat and Mortimer underline that offline activism still plays an important role (Martin, A. 2015; Mallat and Mortimer 2016). Zayani describes, that Facebook is not only supporting political activism, but also access to information and to misinformation (Zayani 2016).

Off the radar

A different explanation lies on the international level. Gerges, who takes an international relations perspective, demands regarding the protest “in a broader set of global dynamics, causes, and discourses” and argues for the “power of norms, such as human rights, justice, equality, and dignity” (Gerges 2015:11). Nepstad identifies close ties towards Western democracies that influenced the initial revolution, especially because the discourse on human rights and democratic liberties between Western and autocratic leaders poses dilemmas for autocratic leaders to lose those ties in case of protest repression or to enable more protest by insisting on these values (Nepstad 2015).

Willis underlines, that Tunisia was off the radar for Western powers and thus no foreign influence caused or strongly oriented the Tunisian revolution (Willis 2016). Similarly, Hinnebusch notices the relatively low interference by international actors that can have been conducive to its development as international intervention can also have negative consequences (for example Libya; Hinnebusch 2018).

Other (non-) explications

A point, not highlighted by other scholars is the “element of Tunisian national culture, attachment to values of procedure, process, and forms of legality, rather than a simple aversion to violence” (Willis 2016:52). This would have been particularly important for the ongoing democratization. The notion of compromise and dialogue that is dominant in the

political system is positive for democratization as it goes against violent conflict resolution. Other explanations emphasize the role of music or culture among others (Filiu 2011). The role of religion as hindering or supporting the initial uprisings is however rejected by scholars (Filiu 2011, while Ennahdha was forbidden under Ben Ali, they played no role during the initial uprisings, but became more important later on). The list of different explications can probably be enlarged, it was however the aim to highlight some important ones. Given the multitude of factors it is doubtful whether researchers will ever agree on a limited set of necessary or sufficient conditions for the uprisings.

Not one cause, but several contributing factors

To summarize, researchers agree that it is difficult to identify one cause for the uprisings. Brownlee et al. assign in relation to the Arab Spring: “Until now readers have encountered important explanatory variables – from the uses of social media to the calculations of repressive agencies to the power of diffusion - but seldom found an overarching explanatory *framework*” (italics in original, Brownlee et al. 2015:8). The literature review reveals a list of initial factors that influenced the Tunisian regime change and scholars warn to use one-cause explanations (Alimi 2016). Figure 1.1 summarizes the main factors that were mentioned, ranging from elements that refer to the economic system, to perceptions of the Ben Ali regime, spontaneous decisions of actors as well as the framing of developments. It is however difficult to identify a clear hierarchy and all factors appear to have contributed to the initial uprisings.

Figure 1.1 Factors that influenced the Tunisian Uprisings of 2011

Elements of the Tunisian transition	Unemployment (especially graduates)
	Economic downturn (Financial Crisis)
	Corruption of the regime
	Food Prices
	Diversity of those protesting
	Spread of images etc. through social media
	Non-engagement of the military
	Martyr Mohamed Bouazizi
	Supporting Role of the UGTT
	Anti-regime sentiment/ regime without morality/dignity
	off the radar for international actors

Note: based on literature review, not hierarchical

Having outlined several factors for the initial protest, that partially - like economic factors – still influence protest today, I now turn to the political system that developed from those contentious actions.

The Tunisian political system

While the initial role of movements is often debated, the ongoing role is seldom discussed. Much less literature exists on the political system that emerged out of the initial protest. Directly after the revolution, protest like the Kasbah I and Kasbah II protests put pressure on political actors to pursue the perspective of the revolution (Beau and Lagarde 2014). As a consequence, a constitutional assembly has been elected in 2011 and a new constitution was elaborated and accepted in 2014. Tunisia adopted a semi-presidential system (Koehler and Warkotsch 2014).

Regarding the new constitution, scholars assigned that there is still “the shadow of the old constitution” (Bousbih and Yaalaoui 2015:20). Others outlined, that the constitution remains partly vague due to the search for compromise, but also that the constitution guarantees political freedoms and a separation of powers or freedom of opinion and freedom of speech (Hmed 2016; Böckenförde 2015). The compromise is a result of negotiations between various political actors including civil society⁹. During the process on the constitution, civil society pressured political parties to counter conservative, Islamic pressure exercised especially by Ennahdha (Beau and Lagarde 2014). Volpi underlined that the pre-institutionalization of several actors in Tunisia supported the transformation towards democracy (Volpi 2017). Actors that existed already under Ben Ali, but which have been more or less sidelined, could now influence the constitutional process. This initial weight of the civil society still has consequences today as will be shown later.

Other articles and reports emphasize the role of elections as Tunisia already held free and transparent elections in 2011 as well as the elections for parliament and for president in 2014, but saw political violence like the assassination of politicians in 2013 (Hmed 2016; Reuters 2011; International Crisis Group 2013; Brownlee et al. 2015; Antonakis-Nashif 2013; Volpi et al. 2016). Further studies focus on the role of Ennahdha, the most important Islamic

⁹ For a very detailed overview of the negotiations and the system transformation see Brownlee et al. 2015 or Antonakis-Nashif 2013.

party in Tunisia and its role for democracy (Gerges 2013; Wolf 2014a and b). Since Nida Tounes won the Parliament Elections and Béji Caid Essebsi became president in the same year, a coalition formed the government under Prime Minister Habib Essid, who was replaced by the government Chahed in August 2016¹⁰(for a detailed analysis of the elections see for example Wolf 2014b; Marks 2014). While the government Chahed is already the seventh since the revolution, the previous six governments were not a sign of political stability (Ratka and Roux 2016). No local elections have been held until end of 2016, but were realized in 2018¹¹. To summarize, Tunisia already hold several free and fair elections since the end of the Ben Ali regime and mainly two political parties (Nida Tounes and Ennahdha) gained seats in the 2014 elections, while several smaller parties exist.

Honwana underlines that not only pro-democratic forces, but also members of the RCD, the old government party, demonstrated in the name of democracy for their inclusion (Honwana 2013). A number of them got integrated in the new political system. Current president Essebsi served as minister in 1980 and President of Parliament under Ben Ali, but also expressed hostility towards Ben Ali (Beau and Lagarde 2014; Ghribi 2014). His party, Nida Tounes, is called a catchall party taking also old RCD members (Goujon 2015; Gana 2013; Willis 2016; Beinin 2016; Gelvin 2015; Wolf 2014a; Wolf 2017; Boubekour 2015; Marks 2014). While political parties are not a focus of analysis, the configuration with two important parties has nevertheless its influence on the perceptions by movement leaders as will be shown later. The inclusion of former party members in political parties is also a point of criticism that will be evoked later on. Given its influence, I shortly elaborate on the situation at the time of analysis.

1.2.2 The political and economic situation at the time of analysis, 2015 and 2016

The time of analysis – 2015 to 2016 - was not without changes in the political system. Following power struggles between former Prime Minister Essid and President Essebsi, the president designed Youssef Chahed as new head of government in summer 2016. Nine political parties, the UGTT and the UTICA have been involved in the negotiations for the new government and the pact of Carthage has been signed (Limburg 2016). Six political parties are involved in the government as well as several technocrats and even former members of

¹⁰ Composed of Ennahdha, Nida Tounes, The Free Patriotic Union and Prospects for Tunisia and Afek Tounes, Jamaoui 2015

¹¹ On the related problems see for example Volpi et al. 2016

the UGTT (Limburg 2016)¹². The coalition government until 2016 represented a neoliberal economic model and gave priority to fighting terrorism. Jamaoui or Hmed describe the coalition as right-wing (Jamaoui 2015; Hmed 2016). As the composition only changed slightly, the general orientation of the government remained the same except of a focus on fighting corruption. In 2016, a split within Nida Tounes, the party that originally won most seats during the elections, has caught the coalition. This split was foreseen by some analysts as a consequence of “lack of communication between the party’s MPs on the one level, and between members nominated either as ministers and secretaries of state or as the president’s assistants and advisors” (Jamaoui 2015:5; see also Wolf 2014b on different ideological positions within Nida Tounes)¹³. As a consequence of the internal divisions, Nida Tounes lost the status as biggest fraction to Ennahdha, the main Islamist party that has its origins in a social movement. Consequentially, parliamentary commissions were re-attributed on the basis of strength of political blocs in spring 2016¹⁴.

Secular political parties have been criticized for a “lack of internal democracy” and the strong leader role of Essebsi for Nida Tounes (while Ennahdha has a stronger internal democracy; Wolf 2014a). Tunisian parties, except Ennahdha, are characterized by an underdeveloped internal structure and missing anchorage in society (Yardimici-Geyikci and Tür 2018). One also needs to mention the Destourian (constitution) movement, which was important during the fight for independence and which later transformed into the Neo-Destour which became integrated in the former government party RCD (Wolf 2014b). The – often-negative – mention of the Destourian appears several times in interviews. To summarize, the party system lacks resources and still changes a lot, while few parties appear as relatively stable elements of the system.

Beneath the problems in the party system, the media landscape shows some problems. El Issawi underlines, that the Tunisian media was government controlled and consisted mainly

¹² Composed of Ennahdha, Nida Tounes, Afek Tounes, Democratic and Social Path, Al Joumhour, Democratic Alliance as well as a number of independents, see Directinfo (2016a).

¹³ At the time of writing, the coalition, still under the Chahed government, underwent additional crisis. Caused by disputes between the Nida Tounes party leader and Prime Minister Chahed the latter formed a new bloc in parliament including new alliances, making his coalition the biggest bloc in parliament. Additional reconfigurations of the party belongings in parliament are under way at the time of writing in preparation for the elections of President foreseen for 2019.

¹⁴ For an extensive overview on the Tunisian party system see Yardimici-Geyikci and Tür 2018, for an earlier overview Allal and Geisser 2011.

of monopolies, supervising all media outlets (El Issawi 2016). While a press code has been agreed on after the revolution, legally binding agreements are not ratified and the role of the High Independent Authority for Audiovisual Communication (HAICA) is discussed (ibid). State owned media continued its operation following the revolution, but editorial teams changed (ibid). El Issawi criticizes that while many media platforms emerged, media production becomes barely the expression of opinions (ibid). Consequentially, the role of the media may be problematic in the sense that professional summaries of different positions are lacking.

Corruption is another problem. There are a number of structural problems of transforming the old system and solving the issue of corruption (reports show existing corruption including ministerial levels: Aliriza 2016; Ratka and Roux 2016; International Crisis Group 2015; International Crisis Group 2017). Civil society organizations also underline the lack of justice and criticize police violence or torture (Aliriza 2015a; Nawaat 2015).

Problems of missing economic development like inadequate job creation and the threat of terrorism are other factors influencing the transition and democratization in Tunisia. Fighting terrorism for example restricts individual freedoms (World Bank 2014; Trabelsi 2014; Hmed 2016; Alkebsi and Malouche 2015; Beinin 2016; Ratka 2017; Labidi 2014; Fatafta 2016). In addition, radicalization of the Tunisian youth who joins radical Salafist movements is a problem (Wolf 2013; see also Dworkin 2014).

Cronyism and rent extraction are still in place years after the revolution and open security questions may make some Tunisians think of the secure Tunisia under Ben Ali (World Bank 2014; International Crisis Group 2015). In addition, the feeling that coastal regions are preferred over those in the interior of the country rises (Burgess 2016; similarly underlining regional discrepancies: Boukhars 2017; Ratka 2017; Rousselin 2015; Daguzan 2017; Schäfer 2017; Meddeb 2017). Notwithstanding different economic development, Tunisia is described as a very homogenous country (Gelvin 2015; Ayari 2016; Bennani-Chraïbi 2017). In relation to economic problems motivating protest, Chomiak argues, that “non-institutional and informal political contention will likely expand in scope, support, and activity in light of the public perception of looming economic austerity programs and contracted public sector”

(Chomiak 2016:3). Similarly, Youngs recalls: “The social drivers of the 2010-2011 revolution have not been addressed” (Youngs 2015:1; in a similar sense argue Dakhli 2013; Schmitter and Sika 2017). In addition, people get disenchanted with the revolution as researchers described (Cohen-Hadria 2017; Dworkin 2014).

Zeghal sees a potential that “the authoritarian state founded by Bourguiba and re-appropriated by Ben Ali might very well endure under a democratically elected government” (Zeghal 2013:270). She argues on the basis of the Islamism – secularists divide were Islamists used arguments of religious freedom to restrict freedom of expression. On the other hand, Haugbølle et al. underline that some old opposition forces strengthened their position and mention especially the quartet (Haugbølle et al. 2017)¹⁵. The research community is divided between pessimists who warn about an autocratic revival and optimists who see the transition towards democracy as finished as well as those in between that see some achievements but still many challenges.

Tribes, which have been weakened under Ben Ali, are not seen as playing a major role in the Tunisian political system (Sadiki 2015). This appears less surprising given that scholars already underlined that kinship ties play a more important role in Islamic movements (Sigillo 2016). On the other hand, one of the main political divisions (perhaps even a cleavage - to verify by future research) is between the youth and political elites. Political elites remain the same or “just” changed from the (suppressed) opposition to ministries or official positions, leaving the youth underrepresented. This is in line with young Tunisians losing trust in political institutions like the parliament (Yerkes 2016).

The political situation appears more or less stable, dependent on phases. While government shifts and party disputes regularly re-erupt, the political system has stabilized as actors arranged with the system. Notwithstanding this acceptance of a democratic system, scholars outlined the inherent dangers of some actors that were already active under Ben Ali and whose commitment to democracy is unclear. In addition, economic problems prevail and some of the problems that caused the revolution are not solved causing regular unrest, a factor that is regarded in the following.

¹⁵ For an excellent overview on the role of the quartet and the national dialogue see Haugbølle et al. 2017

1.2.3 Movement activities at the time of analysis

As the process of democratization is still ongoing, it is particularly relevant to enlarge the picture towards movements and civil society. Movements played a key role for the mobilizations in December 2010 and January 2011 (Paciello 2011; Stepan 2012). Existing intermediate level studies focus on the role of the UGTT during the transition; Yousfi's dense and rich analysis for example offers insights on the functioning of the organization during the initial days of transition (Yousfi 2013b). Yousfi provides a short comment not only on the activities of the UGTT, but also the Tunisian Human Rights League and the Lawyers Union (Yousfi 2013a). Apart the UGTT, the LTDH or the ONAT, Chomiak highlights the role of the UDC, the Union of Unemployed Graduates (Chomiak 2016). While those descriptions of the initial uprisings are frequent, information on activities at the time of analysis are rare and systematic analysis even rarer.

Researchers agree that civil society is strong and particularly syndicalist activities are important (Stepan 2012; Clark 2012; Brownlee et al. 2015; International Crisis Group 2014). For 2013 and 2014 for example numerous strikes and even violent protest has been reported (Martin and Rohac 2014; Clark 2012). Similarly, in their regular analysis of mobilization, the Tunisian Social Observatory, linked to the FTDES, reports between 280 and 480 protest activities per month between April and June 2015, most of them on social and political issues (Observatoire Social Tunisien 2015). In January 2016, the same organization acknowledged even more than 1500 protest activities, most of them in Tunis and Gafsa (Observatoire Social Tunisien 2016). This augmentation of protest activities is also underlined by other sources for 2016 (Huffpost Tunisie 2016b). Protest in 2016 includes for example a strike in Ben Guerdane over border closure towards Libya, protest on Kerkennah on waste and other problems as well as protest in Kasserine following a suicide (Middleeasteye.net 2016; Marzouk 2016; Chomiak 2016; Burgess 2016). Protest like the one in Kasserine rests on a local level and follow what Chomiak calls the "logic of non-institutionalized contention" (Chomiak 2016:2). Others like the protest in Kerkennah are brought to Tunis.

Following the initial regime change, mobilization continued mostly in the interior of the country and reemerges occasionally (Koehler and Warkotsch 2014; Boukhars 2017; Chomiak

2016). In the interior of the country, political marginalization is frequent and state authorities are not well accepted, while there is a divide between the pro-European cultural perspective in the north and east and the more traditional interior (Ratka and Roux 2016).

Especially the role of the quartet, which received the Nobel Peace Prize, comprised of the UGTT, the ONAT, the UTICA and the LTDH, is important for the search for compromise at a difficult time with political assassinations in 2013 (Brownlee et al. 2015). In a critical phase, the national dialogue saved the revolution. Brownlee et al. and Ratka elaborate on the argument of compromise between political actors and see the origins in the configuration of the Tunisian system based on economic development and urbanization (Brownlee et al. 2015; Ratka 2017). Notwithstanding, there are also scholars that speak of a “wishful projection” when describing the Arab Spring and mobilization as vibrant (Markham 2014).

The role of movements and civil society today is partly related to the state. Especially the main labor union, the UGTT, plays a role and has close relations with the Tunisian state¹⁶. While the UGTT is originally a Labor Union, they acted as movement in times of transition. However, as Hibou or Mizouri describe, the role has been rather ambivalent before as Ben Ali, especially on the national level, coopted the UGTT (Hibou 2011b; Mizouri 2012). Other often connected and mobilizing actors include the women movement, represented among others by the ATFD (Association Tunisienne des Femmes Démocrates), AFTURD (Association des Femmes Tunisiennes pour la Recherche sur le Développement) or CREDIF (Centre de Recherches, d'Etudes, de Documentation et d'Information sur la Femme), the human rights movement composed of LTDH (Ligue Tunisienne pour la défense des Droits de l'Homme), Centre against Torture and others, and connected movements and organizations that express claims towards the state like the ONAT (Ordre National Des Avocats De Tunisie), the Association of Journalists or the FTDES (Forum Tunisien pour les Droits Economiques et Sociaux). Newer mobilizing structures include for example the platform Jamaity or initiatives like Tun'Act. Here, the possible divide, even cleavage, between young and existent elites, is present as well, between those who existed before the end of the Ben Ali regime and those who mobilized afterwards with different consequences on respective resources or networks.

¹⁶ Mentioned in own interviews, especially the four plus four format with four UGTT members of the national executive board and four ministers is to name, as will be detailed later.

While we have already seen that the four analyzed organizations are part of a larger network that will be verified later, I now turn to a detailed description of the four organizations.

1.3 Case description of the analyzed organizations

While the case selection is described in detail in chapter three, I shortly introduce the background of the four analyzed organizations as it is linked to the context. As Volpi et al. note, the UGTT, LTDH, ONAT or AFD are among the most institutionalized organizations in Tunisia and while being active in the aftermath of the revolution, they were of lower importance for the very initial uprisings (Volpi et al. 2016). Three of them are part of movements, while the fourth, the UGTT, qualifies as labor union. The UGTT is by nature more integrated in the political system than the other organizations and is not a movement on all its levels and in all its activities. Therefore I use the term civil society, enclosing movements and labor unions, throughout the thesis. When the term movement is mentioned, it includes the movement activities of the UGTT; meaning mobilization and claim making and not salary negotiations. The aspect of being a labor union will enter regularly in the discussion; even though, a number of characteristics are very similar if not equal to movements. However, especially the structures towards the state are of different quality.

Each case description includes a short history of the organization, the role during the uprisings as well as repertoires and resources. This is done to provide an overview on what every organization wants and where it comes from. It also creates awareness on differences in size and topics and allows to verify later on whether influence is only due to size and resources and not due to ideas and framing.

1.3.1 The UGTT: a guarantee for stability or a driver for change?

Yousfi describes the UGTT as the most important and oldest organization of today's Tunisia (Yousfi 2015). Among the civil society organizations, the UGTT is described as exceptional due to its history and activities (Deane 2013). Beau and Lagarde underline that the UGTT, founded by Farhat Hachet, is a key actor since independence (Beau and Lagarde 2014; Beinin 2016).

Since 1973 the UGTT has the right to negotiate salaries and working conditions with the professional organization UTICA (Beinin 2016). Similarly, at least since 1970, the UGTT is

seen as political heavyweight; originally as a counter power, but later under pressure by the state (Sadiki 2002; Volpi 2017). The activity depended on the level of co-optation by the government during the Ben Ali era. Beinini and Zemni underline that even though parts have been coopted, local, regional and some of the sectoral unions remained partially autonomous (Beinini 2016; Zemni 2013). Yousfi argues that the UGTT always remained independent, but that the degree of independence changed considerably (Yousfi 2015). The UGTT played a double role, between official condemnation of protest and support for local leaders as well as for protest like in Gafsa and Redeyef in 2008 (Filiu 2011). During the December 2010 uprisings, the UGTT became an important actor for redressing the political system (Yousfi 2015). Especially the ambiguous role of the UGTT on national level under Ben Ali reminds what LeBas described for some African countries, namely that state-labor alliances guaranteed state control of labor and questions whether unions can free themselves entirely from that control (LeBas 2011). This is well in line with the complying national level and the more autonomous local and regional ones. Critics like Beinini assign that the UGTT was never an organization built for struggles, but for ensuring its own position in the Tunisian political system (Beinini 2016).

Under Ben Ali, the UGTT served as a haven for political activism and struggles for human rights and general freedoms (Bishara 2014; Hmed 2015; Yousfi 2015). Ayari describes that leftist and extreme leftists were active in the UGET and the UGTT during the 1980s (Ayari 2016). This also means that left-wing activists in other organizations passed by the UGTT. Beinini recalls that the UGTT did not demand democracy or regime change for a long period of its existence, but limited its role to wage negotiations and working conditions (Beinini 2016). On the other hand, Ayari underlines that labor union activism was for a long time associated with the democratic initiative in Tunisia, including organizations like the LTDH, Amnesty International, ATFD, AFTURD or other human rights associations which quasi excluded an activism for MTI-Ennahdha at the same time (Ayari 2016).

Worker mobilization played an important role during the uprisings as Bishara, Yousfi or Breuer outline (Bishara 2014; Yousfi 2013b; Breuer 2016). While this was less the case at the beginning, the national level supported the demands a bit later. The UGTT took leadership during the regime change following internal pressure of its militant member unions and

having a situation some years earlier in mind where the UGTT did nothing, leading to criticism from workers and some local branches (Angrist 2013). The UGTT facilitated the spread of demonstrations through its network and provided their offices as meeting point for protest organizers (Angrist 2013; Amami 2013). However, the central level reacted late and in January 2011, they gave green light for local sections to organize protest (Zemni 2015). Later, the UGTT mediated between government and opposition in the aftermath of the uprising and is an attentive partner of the government, able to block reforms (Youngs 2015; Murphy 2016; Hmed 2016). Following the revolution, the organization sent ministers to the appointed cabinet, but resigned from government in order to prevent former RDC members from remaining members of the government (Brynen et al. 2012). Soon after the revolution, the UGTT, like the LTDH or the ONAT, became part of several newly created councils to control government activities on whether those confirm with the goals of the revolution (Beau and Lagarde 2014; Volpi 2017). It is seen as the driving force behind the national dialogue of 2013 and can support or oppose important projects (Marks 2015).

The post-revolution role of the UGTT is not limited to the defense of worker rights. Yousfi for example assigns that the UGTT is more than a classical labor union, as it not only represents workers, but also middle-class actors (Yousfi 2015; La Presse.tn 2015). It served as gatekeeper for the whole political system since independence and as supervisor of protest activities (Ayari 2016). The UGTT played and plays also a political role and politicians and ambassadors have to pass by the headquarter of the UGTT (Nawaat 2015). It is described as mediator of social demands (Yousfi 2012; Beinin 2016). Yousfi stresses that while the UGTT seeks to represent civil society and the Tunisian people and to support not only workers, but also the institutions; leaders are willing to take political roles especially in times of crisis (Yousfi 2012). Beinin critically recalls that the UGTT is bureaucratic and involved in undemocratic practices and does rewrite its internal history today (Beinin 2016).

However, the UGTT is not a unitary actor, but presents different perspectives. Beinin underlines that the UGTT consists of Arab nationalists, Maoists, Trotskyists, social democrats and leftists (Beinin 2016). Yousfi describes internal struggles between those that see the role of the UGTT as defender of workers' rights only and those that advocate a more political role as national counter-power (Yousfi 2015). While the UGTT is in a tripartite configuration

including the professional organization UTICA and the state, it takes a role of a horizontal veto-player to the government at the same time (Beinin 2016; Dakhli 2013).

The repertoires of the UGTT are divided between confrontation and dialogue (Yousfi 2015). As scholars outline, the UGTT mainly relies on street mobilization and strikes as tool for pressure (Bishara 2014; Labidi 2015; Beinin 2016). Nevertheless, the UGTT calls for dialogue and listening and opposes wildcat strikes (Beinin 2016). The local level of the UGTT is normally more engaged in organizing strikes than the central office (Martin and Rohac 2014; Beinin 2014; Gherib 2012; Yousfi 2012).

Numbers of members vary according to sources: Some scholars report about seven hundred thousand adherents in 2014 and 2015; Ghilès and Yousfi speak about five hundred seventeen thousand for 2012, while Filiu speaks just about four hundred thousand people (Wolf 2014a:14; Yousfi 2015:25; Haugbølle et al. 2017:14; Ghilès 2012:1, Yousfi 2012:1; Filiu 2011:68). The difference might be explained by rising membership following the end of the Ben Ali regime with an increase from three hundred fifty thousand to seven hundred thousand members (Bishara 2014:6; Beinin 2016:126 mentions even seven hundred fifty thousand in 2014).

The UGTT consists of twenty-four regional unions, nineteen federal sections and twenty-one base unions. There are four levels, the local, regional, federal and national level, while the national council, elected by the national congress, serves as national leadership (Yousfi 2012; Yousfi 2015). Different unions are more or less militant. In one of the interviews conducted by Yousfi appear the unions on primary education as well as several regional unions like Sidi Bouzid or Gafsa as more active (Yousfi 2015). Beinin outlines that schoolteachers, healthcare, postal and telecommunication workers are the most militant UGTT members (Beinin 2016).

The UGTT is not free of criticism. Bishara outlines tensions between a political and social role, as seen above, as well as problems like internal corruption or internal democracy (Bishara 2014; on corruption also: Yousfi 2015). In addition, Beinin states: "The most undemocratic aspect of the renewed UGTT is the marginalization of women" (Beinin

2016:124; see also Yousfi 2015 on the role of women in leader positions). The executive committee of the UGTT has a number of privileges that through the union's bureaucracy also benefit members (Yousfi 2015).

Literature identified relations to other actors apart from the state like the UTICA as well as the already named ONAT. While cooperation with the UDC was only occasional, Beinin assigns that the UGTT sought to control the UDC (Beinin 2016; Yousfi speaks of an instrumental perspective: Yousfi 2015). Although several other labor unions like the CGTT or the OTT exist, the UGTT remains unchallenged as biggest union (Bishara 2014).

1.3.2 The LTDH and human rights networks

The LTDH was founded in 1976 and was subject of harassment during the Ben Ali regime, while they survived due to the support of the FIDH (Filiu 2011). It was the first non-governmental human rights organization in the Arab region (Gelvin 2015; Beinin 2016). Ayari describes the LTDH in the 1970s consisting mainly of people from the extreme left or urban liberals as well as destourians (Ayari 2016). During the Ben Ali period the level of criticism varied with more criticism at the beginning of the 1990s as well as at the end interrupted by repression and jailing of members (Langohr 2004; Chouikha and Gobe 2009; Volpi 2017; Haugbølle et al. 2017). It served as political refuge under Ben Ali and built a reputation for protest as it remained independent (Chouikha and Gobe 2009; Deane 2013). Following the revolution and like the UGTT, ONAT and UTICA, the LTDH was part of the national dialogue that ensured political discussion during difficult times (Brownlee et al. 2015).

Areas of activity include women rights, migration, education on human rights, social and economic rights, justice, youth and civil liberties (Euromedrights 2016). Human rights are the focus of activities since its beginning (Chouikha and Gobe 2009). The fight against torture as well as for liberties is important for the LTDH (Huffpost Tunisie 2016c). Compromises between political authorities and civil society describe well the relationship between associations defending human rights and the government (Chouikha and Gobe 2009).

The LTDH has around four thousand five hundred fixed members, which is also explained by the reluctance to give membership cards during the Ben Ali period to ensure trust and avoid infiltration (Chennaoui 2016; Jürgensen 2004:241). It has offices in Gabes, Medenine, Beja,

Kélibia, Sfax, Kébili, Metlaoui, Ariana, Sousse, Tozeur and Jendouba and its national headquarter in Tunis (Jamaity 2016). The LTDH is part of the FIDH that builds a network structure connecting Arab countries and coordinates actions (Filiu 2011). Chennaoui reports internal critics on its very hierarchical structure, missing stable finance, a lot of bureaucracy and missing resources as well as a lot of competition from other organizations (Chennaoui 2016).

Apart from few studies, the LTDH is less researched than the UGTT or the ATFD. Available information is much rarer.

1.3.3 The ATFD and the women movement

The ATFD was founded in 1985 and legalized in 1989 (Honwana 2013; El-Masri 2015). The women movement dates back to the 1920s as part of the national movement (Mahfoudh and Mahfoudh 2014). With the foundation of the state sponsored UNFT, women policies became controlled by the state. The missing independence has been underlined by several scholars (Mahfoudh and Mahfoudh 2014; El-Masri 2015; Labidi 2015). In the 1970s an independent women movement, consisting of students and integrated in the labor union structures, emerged with initial demands on the regional disequilibrium, the integration in the world economy and structural reform programs (Mahfoudh and Mahfoudh 2014). The beginnings are associated with the feminist club Thar Haddad and with socialist ideas that were guiding (Antonakis-Nashif 2016)¹⁷. While activists were also driven by disappointment with the UGTT due to lack of democracy or patriarchal networks, they nevertheless associated with students at the university, cultural clubs and labor union commissions or with the LTDH (Mahfoudh and Mahfoudh 2014).

Under Ben Ali additional administrative structures like the Ministry of Women and Family and the CREDIF have been founded (Mahfoudh and Mahfoudh 2014). However, the CREDIF and also the Center of Arab Women for Training and Research (CAWTAR) were seen as (too) close to the regime by other activists (Labidi 2015). While the ATFD was legal under Ben Ali, women rights activists were silenced by the regime (Honwana 2013; Labidi 2015).

¹⁷ For an additional overview on organizational beginnings including the foundation of the UNFT and the divisions within the movement, see Mahfoudh and Mahfoudh 2014; Labidi 2015.

Women played an important role for the uprisings, as did the youth (Trabelsi 2014; El-Masri 2015). A number of new organizations were founded, however Mahfoudh and Mahfoudh underline that most of the founders were already part of the independent women movement before (Mahfoudh and Mahfoudh 2014).

Following the regime change, the ATFD has been criticized – unreasonable as Labidi finds – for its closeness to the Ben Ali regime by more conservative women movements close to Ennahdha (Labidi 2015; see also Debuysere 2016). Something very difficult to verify as the ATFD has also been repressed by the old regime.

Topics include equality and power relations in families, work related questions, inclusion in higher positions, freedom of body and sexuality, sexual stereotypes, poverty and sexual harassment (Mahfoudh and Mahfoudh 2014). The claim for democracy is advocated together with the LTDH and the UGTT; with the latter the women movement formed a commission on women in 1983 as part of the UGTT (Mahfoudh and Mahfoudh 2014). In terms of democracy, the claims are based on the rule of law, labor, freedom, dignity, equality and citizenship as well as general support for democratic consolidation (Mahfoudh and Mahfoudh 2014). Haugbølle and Cavatorta argue that fighting Islamism was seen more important by the women movement than fighting for democracy (Haugbølle and Cavatorta 2011). Following the revolution, Mahfoudh and Mahfoudh underline the fight for individual liberties and equality in the constitution as important (Mahfoudh and Mahfoudh 2014¹⁸).

Gender issues and human rights were already advanced under Ben Ali and gender equality was formally achieved (Cavatorta and Haugbølle 2012). The situation in terms of women rights has been rather good in Tunisia and the modernity has often been used as part of the Ben Ali government's propaganda (Clancy-Smith 2013). The ATFD surely profits from the personal status law in Tunisia. This personal status code regarding the role of women dates back to 1956 and was long without comparison in the Arab World; family law is described as relatively liberal (Beau and Lagarde 2014; Labidi 2015; Arfaoui and Moghadam 2016).

¹⁸ While one of the two authors is one of the founders (Dora Mahfoudh) of the contemporary women movement in Tunisia, their article is nevertheless regarded with some reserves in terms of impartiality especially when evaluating Islamic movements.

The ATFD has a reputation in Tunisia. As Antonakis-Nashif describes: “The history of activism has provided it [ATFD] with a significant degree of credibility as a moral resource, in particular among the liberal camp and in the civil society landscape, which it helped pioneer” (Antonakis-Nashif 2016:134). The ATFD (as well as the AFTURD) is described as heavyweight when it comes to women rights organizations in Tunisia (Norbakk 2016).

As of 2014 the ATFD was reported to have one hundred fifty to two hundred active partisans, mainly with a high educational level (Antonakis-Nashif 2016:133f.). The ATFD has local offices in Tunis, Ben Arous, Bizerte, Sfax, Sousse and Kairouan (Arfaoui and Moghadam 2016; Antonakis-Nashif 2016). Apart from advocating, the ATFD occasionally provides micro credit grants for legal services (Arfaoui and Moghadam 2016). Debuysere underlines that organizations like the ATFD mainly resonate with upper class women in coastal cities (Debuysere 2016). Mahfoudh and Mahfoudh describe the double inscription of militants in the women and national movement as well as their urban, educated, even higher-class status that allows them to resist social pressure (Mahfoudh and Mahfoudh 2014). The ATFD is criticized for its elitism by other organizations (Norbakk 2016).

The ATFD is well connected in the women movement. Mahfoudh and Mahfoudh describe one network as build from coalitions among several associations like Doustourna, Kolna Tounes and Wamdha (Mahfoudh and Mahfoudh 2014). Another network is called Hrayer Tounès and includes the historic organizations of the ATFD, AFTURD, but also the women commissions of LTDH and UGTT, the Collectif pour les femmes de Tunisie or Doustourna (Mahfoudh and Mahfoudh 2014). On the other hand, the ATFD shows little interest in working with Islamic civil society. The unwillingness to cooperate with some women rights’ associations became obvious during the 2013/2014 Dialogue of Women because of the ATFD’s insistence on a universal human rights perspective (Debuysere 2016). Ennahdha is considered as enemy, what is not surprising. Arfaoui and Moghadam for example outline that Ennahdha’s referral to Islamic law and tolerance of Salafist violence against women raised attention of feminists in Tunisia (Arfaoui and Moghadam 2016). Arfaoui and Moghadam equally describe that a coalition of AFTURD, ATFD, LTDH, UGTT, Amnesty International Tunisia and the National Council for Freedom in Tunisia urged for women having a full citizen status during the constitutional process when Islamists tried to modify

the proposal for a constitution towards complementarity of men and women (Arfaoui and Moghadam 2016; Labidi 2015). Mahfoudh and Mahfoudh emphasize international links towards the UN, European agencies, the foundations, international NGOs as well as towards embassies (Mahfoudh and Mahfoudh 2014). While the ATFD claims political neutrality, other organizations like religious actors question their independence (Debuysere 2016).

Among their activities are writing reports, organizing seminars, petitions, sensitization campaigns, creating databases and building solidarity networks (ATFD n.d.; ATFD 2011c; ATFD 2014c).

1.3.4 The FTDES: umbrella organization for diverse issues

While the FTDES has originally been selected for working on environmental issues, there are many other fields of activity of the organization¹⁹. The FTDES was officially founded in 2011 to defend social and economic rights and has local offices in Kairouan, Monastir, Gafsa and Kasserine (FTDES 2016b). However, it has been active during the protest in 2003 in the textile industry, as well as 2008 in Redeyef and was founded by members of the UGTT and LTDH (CCFD Terre Solidaire 2014; Hmed 2015). According to their own description, they work on rights of worker, women rights, environmental rights as well as rights of migrants (FTDES 2016b). Especially on migration, the FTDES developed a profile that is recognized by researchers due to its protest activities and coordination on migration (Khalifa 2013; Bartels 2015). In September 2013, it founded the Observatoire Social Tunisien (OST) with the aim to discuss social and economic rights, migration, suicides, gender or environment from a scientific perspective and to provide proposals and solutions (FTDES 2014a; Mattes 2016). Martyrs of the revolution are another issue addressed by the FTDES (FTDES 2014a).

The FTDES describes targets as migrants, migrant families, workers in textiles, unemployed, scientific communities, journalists, associations, political deciders like the ministers (Prime Minister, the Ministry of Labor, the Ministry of the Interior, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the Ministry of Social Affairs, the Ministry of Industry, the Ministry of Justice and the Ministry of the Environment) as well as political parties, parliament, national and international NGOs as well as UN organizations or the EU (FTDES 2014a; FTDES 2012b).

¹⁹ On their work on environment see FTDES 2016a among others.

The FTDES organizes protest events in Tunis and coordinates the actions of other movements (Webdo 2016). The Forum also organizes sit-ins and strikes, demonstrations, seminars, cultural activities, press conferences as well as site visits (FTDES 2014a). It works as coordinator with the Euromed Human Rights network in order to support mobilization (Thebti 2016). Coordination between existing protest activities and its documentation are the main aims of the FTDES. However, in comparison to the ATFD or the UGTT, the FTDES is not (yet) well researched and data on adherents does currently not exist. However, the FTDES appears to be well-financed as it has a number of employees that elaborate reports or do the media work²⁰. The FTDES was the main organizer of the two World Social Forums of 2013 and 2015 in cooperation with other organizations.

1.4 Conclusion to chapter one

The introduction set the stage, namely a country in transition towards democracy where one specific point in time is regarded. The moment of analysis is embedded in a process of transition and consequentially main elements of the Tunisian younger history like the 2011 revolution, the new constitution as well as elections and the situation of the political and party system have been introduced. Throughout the first chapter we have seen that scholars assign that movements and civil society played and play a role for this democratization process. Some elements like the role of the women movement in building the constitution have been described; however, what currently lacks is a systematic analysis of diffusion of framing in relation to democracy. When civil society and movements are drivers of the Tunisian transition, they should have a clear democratic framing and there should be mechanisms that ensure their influence. This leads to the research question: ***“How does a democratic framing diffuse across actors in Tunisia?”***

As shown, the question how movements diffuse their framing towards the Tunisian state is particularly relevant as no studies exist proofing this influence. It is often stated by researchers that there is an influence, but the type and extent is not proved. This is not just a phenomenon for Tunisia, as overall studies on especially ideational influence of movements and organizations remain very limited. The thesis thus builds knowledge on how framing ensures that organizations can influence state actors, in my case ministries. The research contributes to the research on networks, overall on diffusion and mechanism as well as on

²⁰ Also observed during own visits of their offices.

framing and uses a context that has not been used before for many of those theories: Post-2011 Tunisia. Using a country in transition, it gives further insights for the study of democratization.

Important actors of the political system at the time of analysis like President Essebsi, Prime Ministers Essid and Chahed as well as important parties like Ennahdha and Nida Tounes have been introduced. At the same time, it became clear that there are still problems in terms of political parties, media landscape, corruption, economic development as well as terrorism; problems that influenced also the interviews with leaders as will be shown later on.

The organizations are regarded within their political context. Especially when it comes to the influence, the context becomes important to understand the citations used for the analysis. The presentation of cases showed that the four organizations are of different size and scope and cover different topics. This is in line with the research design that searches to control for different influencing factors, in my case resources and size among others. The presentation equally indicated that the UGTT has a very specific position in comparison to the others, being a labor union and a movement, at the same time with political and social positions. The analysis covers consequentially three organizations that are part of movements and one labor union (although with some movement activities).

Having outlined the context that orients the research, the thesis uses a threefold theoretical perspective focusing on networks, framing and diffusion. In chapter two, those strains of literature are discussed in order to find an answer for the above-mentioned research question.

Chapter Two

Theory

2 Networks, framing and impact

The second chapter gives an introduction on the main strands of literature relevant to answer the research question on how democratic framing diffuses across actors. The chapter starts with a short definition on civil society and social movements and discusses the tension between movements and labor unions. In a second step, the interaction between actors is presented, before in a third step framing is discussed. The concept of democratic framing that is built for this thesis is presented afterwards. The final section looks at diffusion, the channels available for the diffusion of framing and the literature on outcomes to situate ideational impact.

All steps identify the state of research and discuss problems and blind spots in the literature. A theoretical framework combining what was presented before is developed in the final part of this chapter. Interaction is seen as precondition for the diffusion of a democratic framing. When diffused, the democratic framing can influence the wider policy process. The research question is discussed in detail and further questions that orient each chapter are derived.

2.1 Civil Society and movements

The question what is a social movement shall be elaborated in the following, while the question of civil society is discussed afterwards. Different definitions exist and there are

some aspects that are repeated across authors while others are specific. I start with three definitions of social movements by Tilly, Diani and Amenta et al., while all are of different orientation:

“a sustained series of interactions between national authorities and persons successfully claiming to speak on behalf of a constituency lacking formal representation, in the course of which those persons make publicly-visible demands for changes in the distribution or exercise of power, and back those demands with public demonstrations of support” (Tilly 1981:6).

“as networks of informal interactions between a plurality of individuals, groups and/or organizations, engaged in political or cultural conflicts, on the basis of shared collective identities” (Diani 1992:1).

“We define political social movements as actors and organizations seeking to alter power deficits and to effect social transformations through the state by mobilizing regular citizens for sustained political action” (Amenta et al. 2010:288).

The first definition by Tilly focuses on interactions and claim making by challengers. The second by Diani equally highlights the interactive elements, but includes a shared identity that is not part of Tilly’s concept. While Diani does not relate the definition to the state (although the state can be an addressee), it is an essential element for Amenta et al., who equally highlight citizen mobilization to realize change. Amenta et al. also underlined sustained political action. Other definitions claim that movements exist on a given period of time and - in order to distinguish movements from parties - add the missing predefined criteria for membership in movements (Rucht 2005). Saunders discusses the degree of organization and formalization and argues to include organized and non-organized actors in the definition of social movements (Saunders 2013).

While I agree with Tilly’s definition, I acknowledge that for the types of organizations I analyze, equally shared identities like in Diani’s definition are useful. However, not all contention has to include a shared identity if being purely based on instrumental claims. While interest groups are necessarily promoting elements in the interest of its constituents (and thus rationally observable claims), movements can but must not include instrumental claims. They often refer to claims that promote public goods that once established benefit all and not particular groups. In case of particular interests, the difference towards interest groups becomes more complicated, but one can easily imagine protest for sanitation for example that simply bases on personal needs. Interest groups will prefer lobbying instead of

protest. There is however no strict border between interest groups and movements and it is more a continuum between different causes, instrumental claims or identities, different constituents, different forms of action and in some cases different organization.

While not all movements are oriented towards the state, for movements and for those organizations that I analyze, the state is a major addressee. In this sense, also Amenta's definition oriented towards the state becomes applicable, while it would not be applicable to all movements. To sum up for my analysis, social movements are organized or unorganized actors that regularly interact with the state (and other actors) in order to achieve changes in policy or society that benefit the public. I look at organizations that are part of a wider movement. They only represent a part of the movement, but the selection of cases is made to include organizations that well present the connected movements.

Movements fulfill different functions and roles. According to Tilly, social movements use "claim-making routines that apply to the same claimant-object pairs: bosses and workers, peasants and landlords, rival nationalist factions, and many more" (Tilly cited in Tarrow 2008:237). Movements can be challengers and excluded from policymaking or be part of the policy process (see Tilly 2000). This distinction is however not dichotomous. Movements can at the same time be part of the political system and be challengers. Especially labor movements find themselves in tripartite arrangements with political parties, the political and economic system (Kriesi 2009). This means that due to negotiations on salaries and working conditions they necessarily interact with the state and professional organizations. This is to keep in mind with relation to the UGTT.

Johnston refers to Tilly assigning that social movements are analyzed by regarding the groups and organizations that mobilize, the events that take place and the ideas that guide protest (Johnston 2014). Following these three aspects, the ideational-interpretative sphere or the ideas are the central point of research. This ideational-interpretative approach is embedded in younger social movement theory. Theories on movements developed over time from griefs, over rational choice, the role of resources or political opportunities towards new social movement theory that focuses also on framing (for an overview see

Johnston 2014; on the focus on ideational elements: Martin, G. 2015; Buechler 1995; McClurg Mueller 1992).

Concepts of social movement theory gained prominence also for Middle East Studies (Chalcraft 2016 for an overview). Most pertinent for this thesis is an approach on framings and collective action frames within theories on movements, but equally transcending theories on diffusion, outcomes and networks. As I look at the ideational perspective on how ideas can be transmitted from one actor to another, framing theories as well as theories on networks and influence are particularly useful. Numerous approaches use political opportunity structures as well as resources to explain the impact of movements. Using ideational elements and looking at the ideational influence of movements is less common, but has the potential to generate interesting results.

Distinguishing movements, organizations and civil society

As we have seen earlier, one of the analyzed organizations, the UGTT, has a different status than the others as it is a labor union in a tripartite configuration. It is consequentially not necessarily a challenger, but in some cases only a social partner of the government. Thus, I use the term civil society that also encloses NGOs to include the UGTT in this definition. Nevertheless, it needs to be mentioned that even the UGTT fits a wide number of elements of movements provided by Tilly but does not lack representation due to its status. The analysis covers therefore three organizations that are part of movements and one labor union and thus different parts of the Tunisian civil society.

When talking about movements, the question emerges how they relate to civil society as a whole. Burstein and Linton argue, that while scholars divide between political parties, interest groups and social movements, especially the latter two are difficult to distinguish and scholars inconsistently categorize the two (Burstein and Linton 2002). This already shows the closeness of interest groups and movements which is also represented in the literature on NGOs that sees movements as people's organizations and as sub-category of NGOs (Clarke 1998). In the case of the four organizations, all have a legal character, simply because it included some kind of acceptance under Ben Ali or is necessary to operate on a sustainable basis. All four analyzed actors are part of a wider movement (the UGTT with some reserves as outlined above) and can be defined as NGOs. As outlined above, it is more

a continuum between loose and informal protest and highly organized and structured actors as well the orientation towards public interests that are used to distinguish movements from interest groups and other terms.

The idea of this thesis is not to have a strict division between different types of actors, but to talk about a continuum that allows to place organizations in context. Scholars like Saunders or Diani criticize the strict differentiation between interest groups and social movements as artificial (Saunders 2013; Diani 2015). The consequence is not to drop both or one of those elements, but to be aware that movements might act as interest groups or have a configuration similar to those simply because it may be required by legislation or because organizations emerged out of the movement. The question of the level of institutionalization to distinguish movements is more or less artificial, but may indicate consequences for contentious action.

In this research, the preference is given to organizations, as those are easily approachable. Thus, this choice is mainly due to feasibility to identify unofficial leaders in informal movement networks. The analyzed organizations are part of movements and thus can be regarded under different prism, be it from a movement's perspective, from a NGO perspective or from a civil society perspective. However, it needs to be kept in mind that the UGTT is part of the civil society, but by definition is only partly a movement (especially local levels lacking formal representation can qualify more as a movement), but a labor union with institutionalized access. As we will see, this has consequences for the evaluation of their relations towards the state.

2.2 Interaction in networks

Having reviewed the status of the organizations analyzed, I turn to connections between organizations and towards the state. As part of the approach on framing diffusion, networks are essential from several perspectives. As diffusion depends on interaction, networks enable diffusion. The quality of interactions as well as whether it is influence by one organization or coalitional influence is outlined. Finally, the connection towards framing and its diffusion is built.

2.2.1 Structure and meaning construction

Networks have different functions. They can build confidence among interacting partners and can be used for the diffusion of ideas. Networks describe interaction between actors (Crossley 2016; Passy and Monsch 2014; Diani 2015). They do not only provide solidarity, but are also gluing movements together or opening possibilities for new contacts towards other actors (Saunders 2013). They are deeply linked to social movements: Scholars like Crossley or Diani and Moffatt argue that movements are by definition networks and that methods of network analysis become particularly valuable to analyze configurations (Crossley 2016; Diani and Moffatt 2016). Mainly two perspectives on networks exist: Interactions can be regarded as structural in the sense of political opportunity structures or as interpretative that construct for example identities (Passy and Monsch 2014). As part of this research, it is especially the latter perspective on interpretation and interaction that is highlighted. However, it is not to forget that those networks also serve as structure for the actors involved and determine with whom actors hold ties.

A basic distinction between organizational and individual level networks can be made. Giugni and Passy distinguish individual and collective ties between actors (Giugni and Passy 1998). While a lot of literature on individual networks exists, the focus of this thesis is given on group relations even though these are not totally independent from personal ones²¹. My approach is similar to Weible et al. underlining that policy process literature looks at individuals embedded in collectives instead of only looking at collectives to create or change policies (Weible et al. 2011). This is to keep in mind when analyzing who diffuses framing, even on an organizational level. While I look at ties between movements and the state, I equally highlight partners and coalitions used by movements to take the influence via or together with allies into account. By showing the structure of interactions, it becomes clear by which mechanism organizations can influence the state. The networks build possible channels for diffusion.

The interaction of movements and organizations has several recipients and thus networks go in different directions. Analyzing networks shows the channels used by actors (Hadden 2015). In my case, networks between organizations and towards the state play a role. The

²¹ Cornwell and Harrison provide a good overview on embedded activism and how individuals integrate in organizations and use different network levels (Cornwell and Harrison 2004).

latter is much discussed in the literature on state-civil society interactions. Reese claims that networks can increase access to policymakers and consequentially enable the negotiation of agreements (Reese 2005). The interaction with policymakers can even confuse the limits. Knoke summarizes that boundaries between nongovernmental organizations and the state are blurred through interaction (Knoke 1990). In addition, social movement organizations interact not only with power-holders, but also with the public (Passy and Monsch 2014). To summarize, interactions with other actors include not only other civil society actors, but also different state levels, the public and other actors.

Networks can also be distinguished in size and connectivity, so how many organizations are included and how those are connected (Hadden 2015). The network position reflects relative power as access to information or resources are guaranteed (Knoke 1990). Knoke states that network analysis is composed of nodes (objects) and relations (edges) (Knoke 1990; see also Crossley 2016; Ingold and Leifeld 2016). Diani gives the following advice:

“When analyzing civil society, we should focus on the structure of the cooperative ties that develop between voluntary organizations (as well as between them and other types of actor); we should try to identify the lines of segmentation within civic networks as well as the positions within them that secure their overall integration (if any); finally we should explore the matches and mismatches between the characteristics of civil society actors and their network position” (Diani 2015:13).

This leads directly to the question whether individual organizations take influence or coalitions.

2.2.2 Who works with whom and who does what? Coalitions and roles

One argument that is important for the Tunisian civil society, are coalitions of actors and their influence as will be outlined later. Allies can be important for the diffusion of framing. Regarding coalitions, literature highlights several by times contradicting elements. McCarthy describes coalitions as “more or less formally constituted agreements among pre-existing groups, organizations, and, sometimes, individuals to cooperate in the pursuit of common purposes” (McCarthy 2005:89). While coalitions can be based on existent networks, they can also build the basis for new networks. Literature is not clear on whether coalitions based on sustained networks or ad-hoc coalitions are more successful. Research on the international

level shows that inter-organizational coalitions coordinate their action in order to achieve outcomes (Hadden 2015). On the other hand, ad-hoc coalitions (like on immigration issues) are also used to achieve concrete outcomes (Reese 2005). Regardless of the effectiveness, Diani underlines the path dependency of coalitions, as choices of partners become repeated due to a common construction of reality once coalitions are established (Diani 2015).

Literature is divided on the question of large, same size or small, as well as diverse or narrow coalitions. Arguments for all sides exist in the literature. Diversity of coalitions can be an advantage but has also the potential for division and collapse (Grattet 2005). Hadden argues that larger networks are normally less connected (Hadden 2015). Smaller organizations may hesitate to join coalitions including bigger organizations as they fear being sidelined (Reese 2005). The opposing argument, that smaller organizations can expand their reach through coalitions, makes equally sense. On the other hand, Knoke states that “structurally equivalent actors may lack direct ties to one another, but maintain highly similar relations with the same set of actors” (Knoke 1990:12). Literature is neither clear whether large or narrow coalitions are more effective achieving desired outcomes, nor what type of actors work together or hesitate to cooperate. Furthermore, coalitions are not the only factor for influence as Giugni underlines: Protest and political alliances jointly support the impact of movements as does public opinion (Giugni 2004).

Literature is divided when it comes to perceptions hold by actors in networks. Carroll and Ratner argue that similar frames can be found among those who are closely tied together (Carroll and Ratner 1996). On the other hand, movement coalitions may evaluate a policy outcome enabled by movements different as movements have different political aims and coalitions may be fluid based on ad-hoc alliances (Meyer 2005). Actors working together can hold similar perceptions, but political aims may differ. Whether perceptions or even values are similar, probably depends on the form of coalition as reasons can also be instrumental: Diani and Moffatt or McCarthy describe the possibility of coalitional modes across movements that show interactions without building identity bonds, mostly focused on an instrumental logic (Diani and Moffatt 2016; McCarthy 2005). Both logics attribute a different importance to framing, while the framing can be expected to be more congruent among coalition members in case of an identity-based coalition. However, literature does not give a

clear understanding whether identity-based coalitions with common values are more effective, whether a purely instrumental logic may be sufficient or whether a combination of both is ideal in order to realize influence. I will however argue later, that identity-based coalitions with shared framings are conducive to a consistent framing across organizations and helpful for more trustful interactions. Given the vagueness of literature it cannot be excluded that findings will show a different framing across organizations and that instrumental cooperation is equally effective or that both get combined. One indicator that might be helpful to explain specific framing or who does what are roles in coalitions.

Roles in coalitions

Literature assigns that different roles exist within coalitions. Diani reminds that if civil society organizations are seen as interdependent, one should search for distinct roles within those interactions (Diani 2015). Diani further describes that organizations may have different tasks and divide labor where each organization focuses on specific issues or that organizations cover the same issues depending on the organization of the field (Diani 2015). Giugni and Passy add that cooperation depends on issues and that some issues are more complex than others (Giugni and Passy 1998). In a similar sense, Knoke underlines the specialization in order to more effectively use and exchange resources (Knoke 1990; see also Weible et al. 2011 on specialization for influencing policies). Specialization does not only include specialization on topics, but also on tactics as Biggs and Andrews outline, arguing that some movements focus on protest and others on bargaining with political elites (Biggs and Andrews 2015). Researchers underline that a reputation as being influential or expert on specific topics can lead to influence on policy makers (Ingold and Leifeld 2016; Knoke 1990). I later argue that especially reputation on a specific topic can become relevant for achieving influence.

To summarize, literature on coalitions is divided on the efficient forms, size and organizations. Thus, it is particularly difficult to have clear expectations about what can be observed in the Tunisian case and how framing may diffuse across actors (in coalitions, by specialized actors). The next section looks at how networks towards the state and policy members looks like and why it is important to distinguish between insiders and challengers when evaluating influence on state institutions.

2.2.3 Insider and Challenger – relations towards the state

While I already stated that diffusion is dependent on interaction, it is important to clarify state-civil society interactions in order to identify channels by which frames can get diffused. Baumgartner and Mahoney underline the interdependency of governments and movements (Baumgartner and Mahoney 2005). Banaszak argues that movements are not complete outsiders, but often overlap with the state (Banaszak 2005). This leads to the question of insiders and challengers, basically going back to Tilly (Tilly 2000; Tilly 1995). Insiders are included into decision making circles, while challengers do not have this access and consequentially rely on different channels of diffusion. From a political opportunity structures perspective, Amenta argues that favorable regimes are more open towards challengers and amplify impact, while unfavorable regimes hinder impacts of movements (Amenta 2005). Similarly, Tarrow, referring to Tilly, argues that variations in government capacity and the level of democracy limit or enable contestation (Tarrow 2008).

Literature assigns that the degree of integration influences the tactics and channels available. Movements that became insiders can use insider and outsider tactics at the same time (Baumgartner and Mahoney 2005). Melucci and Lyyra as well as Amenta underline the importance of membership in polity and the inclusion into decision making as it becomes easier to pass ideas (Melucci and Lyyra 1998; Amenta 2005). On the other hand, Kriesi et al. argue that social movement organizations may be coopted by the state (Kriesi et al. 1995). In addition, if challenger target bureaucrats they are more successful if it fits the legislative and administrative context (Amenta 2005). Amenta states that failed initiatives that gained wide support can show administrators the significance of an issue (Amenta 2005).

On the basis of rational choice arguments that bigger groups have more impact, Amenta et al. argue that a “challenger needs mainly to demonstrate that it has support, such as through writing letters, holding rallies, petitioning, initiating public awareness campaigns, staging limited protest, or even engaging in visible internal events” (Amenta et al. 2005:521). Thus, being active becomes central for movements in order to be heard. In addition, long-lasting existence builds an advantage. Biggs and Andrews argue that “pre-existing movement organizations [...] have a positive impact on success” (Biggs and Andrews 2015:422). Amenta summarizes that research indicates that “organizing is often central to movement influence”

as well as the ineffectiveness of disruption to influence policies (Amenta 2014:17). Scholars highlight that researchers should equally analyze the targets of movements (in my case the state), how they perceive protest as well as how they react (Bosi et al. 2016; Biggs and Andrews 2015). Thus, unorganized protest has different chances of success, if it is even disruptive its chances to influence policies are even lower.

Interactions with civil society and channels for diffusion

Taking the state perspective, motivations to include civil society can be diverse. One of the needs of legislators are information and the connections of issues or reframing of information (Burstein and Hirsh 2007; Uba 2009). Clemens underlines that state officials become habituated to certain types of actions and messages become familiar to state officials (Clemens 1998). Giugni points out, that movements may influence decision makers not on the short term but with a time lag (Giugni 2004). Button as well as Kolb remind that the implementation of policy programs may take years (Button 1978; Kolb 2007). While this is true for policy influence, it is probably realistic to a similar degree for frame diffusion. Thus, retracing the process of claim realization can be difficult. Consequentially, this research can only be a point of departure for future research on ideational consequences of movements in Tunisia. On the other hand, Tunisia changed the constitution and needs to change a number of laws now, so that policy changes and changes in framing may happen faster than in established democracies.

The channels used by civil society depend on how the state is conceptualized. Descriptions of the state differ in literature as some scholars see the state as unitary actors, while others underline that the state consists of multiple actors (Banaszak 2005). This division is important and will be considered later as it influences the direct channels for diffusion. Researchers highlight for example direct influence via former members: Movement members winning an office following elections shows movement influence; however, Meyer does not see it as sufficient for having influence (Meyer 2006). Banaszak showed the influence on the Ministry of Women in France, but also that this ministry is marginalized in comparison to other ministries (Banaszak 2005). I return to the question of different channels and mechanisms of diffusion for framing later. Now, I turn to the diffusion of ideas via networks and how literature discusses it.

2.2.4 Diffusion of ideas via networks

Networks can not only show how organizations take influence, but also how ideas and concepts get diffused. Passy and Monsch recall that regular interactions have a higher probability to shape cognitions and cultural meanings than occasional ones (Passy and Monsch 2014; compare also Jasper 2014). Equally, the role of framing is discussed in relation to networks. Krinsky and Crossley emphasize the diffusion of frames through networks towards a wider audience (Krinsky and Crossley 2013). Glenn, analyzing democracy and framing in Eastern Europe, states that "frames must be linked to networks" (Glenn 2001:57). Taking a combination of networks, outcomes and framing, Hadden argues, that "network structure influenced the tactics and framing choices of civil society organizations" (Hadden 2015:10). She claims that the combination of framing and tactical choices influences political outcomes (ibid). Networks thus establish or reinforce identities, tactics or frames and organizational decisions are equally relational (ibid). Carroll and Ratner suggest that "master framing and cross-movement networking probably condition each other" (Carroll and Ratner 1996:616). There are good arguments to link the diffusion of framing to networks as those show what and by which channels frames get diffused.

Carroll and Ratner showed that certain master frames are linked to certain movements as well as certain types of networks (Carroll and Ratner 1996). Literature gives many examples on how ideas and framing are diffused in networks. In my perspective, the framing of democracy is expected to be diffused from one actor to another through networks, while different parts of the framing are more important to some organizations within a network. Through the diffusion of framing, shared meanings get created and interpretation of problems becomes more similar. This translates into policy formulation in accordance with those framings. What framing actually means is discussed in the next section.

2.3 Framing a problem

The third part of this chapter looks at framing before the fourth continues with how democracy is defined. As the concept of framing democracy is at the heart of this thesis, the section highlights important elements in line with the three concepts that orient the thesis, networks, framing and diffusion. Two aspects are important in relation to framing: framing occurs in interaction between actors, but also via the public. Both parts are discussed in relation to the diffusion of framing in section 2.5.

2.3.1 What is framing

There is plenty of literature on movements and framing as well as collective action frames. According to Polletta and Jasper, this is due to gaps in political process theory, resource mobilization approaches and explanations for mobilization apart from material incentives (Polletta and Jasper 2001). Collective action frames gained prominence since mid-1980 and framing became accepted as “meaning construction” (Benford and Snow 2000:612ff; Benford 1997; Adler 2012). Collective action frames (CAF) are defined as “emergent action-oriented sets of beliefs and meaning that inspire and legitimate social movement activities and campaigns” (Benford 1993:199). A frame is defined as interpretative framework to evaluate actions and words to make sense of it (Johnston 2002; Johnston 2014; Benford and Snow 2000; Trumpy 2016; Kretsedemas 2000). Benford and Snow use a model of frame alignment including a “diagnosis of the situation, a prognosis of what should be done, and motivation to do it” (Jasper 1997:75). As Gamson underlines, collective action frames limit or require some forms of action (Gamson 1995). For this research, framing is seen as meaning construction to evaluate, create and legitimate activities. While framing itself is processual, I look at how frames are combined in order to retrace how meaning is constructed.

Referring to Benford and Snow, Adler describes one part of movements’ main work “to produce, negotiate, and maintain interpretive collective action frames” (Adler 2012:295). Apart from the definition in social movement studies, other definitions of framing exist, for example combining attributes voluntarily for inclusion on the media agenda, however still in the form of interpretative schemata (Scheufele 2000). These approaches base on the idea that small changes in wording can affect the resonance of frames (ibid). In this sense, Kelly defines framing as alternative interpretations of the same or simply a different wording (Kelly 2012). However, this definition has only few things in common with what Benford and Snow or Gamson define as framing, where not only words are different, but whole “sets of beliefs” are behind a different wording (and content). Woodyly describes frames as “arguments that co-occur together repeatedly” (Woodyly 2015:11). The combination of arguments should be kept in mind for the later theory building. This being said, it is the social movement approach towards framing that is followed in this research.

Benford and Snow see framing as “active, processual phenomenon that implies agency and contention at the level of reality construction” (Benford and Snow 2000:614). They assign that collective action frames are not constructed on the basis of individual perceptions, but through negotiation in society (Benford and Snow 2000). Woodyly describes framing as a primarily public process when it comes to persuade others about policies (Woodyly 2015). When accounting for the framing influence, it is equally important to include a perspective on public resonance of framing.

Benford and Snow differentiate between diagnostic, prognostic and motivational framing²² (Benford and Snow 2000). Particularly injustice frames are discussed in literature as motivating action (Gamson 1992; Klandermans 1992). These injustice frames must be shared in public to construct meaning and to enable individuals to recognize that an injustice frame is collectively identified and that there is awareness on the issue (Gamson 1992).

The reduction towards injustice frames seems “handy” as it combines an unjust interpretation with actions. However, the definitions by Benford and Snow and by Gamson clearly distinguish perceptions of a problem from proposed actions and their realization. In reality, this distinction between types of frames may be less clear as is explained later.

Within this research, framing is seen as social construction and combination of topics, issues, ideas or frames. It is especially about the connection of aspects and whether it is seen as a problem, a solution or a mobilizing factor. The thesis uses collective framing to answer how actors imagine democracy. Taking a similar direction, della Porta argues that “as frames of democracy [...] did consolidate, they constituted benchmark values against which the practices of representative democracy had been assessed and, often, criticized” (della Porta 2016:84). Democracy can become an overarching frame in society, but can also serve as part of collective frames of civil society. I return to framing democracy later.

Challenges for assessing framing influence

Research on frames is not without criticism. Polletta and Ho criticize that theory on framing is thin in relation to political contexts and that the impact of frames on institutions is not

²² Diagnostic framing identifies the problems, prognostic framing proposes a solution and motivational framing gives incentives to mobilization (Benford and Snow 2000, compare also Gamson on identity, injustice and agency frames, Gamson 1995).

well developed (Polletta and Ho 2006). Other criticism refers among others to few systematic empirical studies, regarding frames as static, elite focus as well as reductionism (Benford 1997). Johnston finds that definitions of frames are mixed with ideologies and discourses and that claims for frames are more frequent than their empirical verification (Johnston 2002). Limited research exists on whether movement frames influence the state. Trevizo underlines that the role of frames for social movement influence is not often a focus of research (Trevizo 2006). It is less clear whether a frame needs to be consistent in terms of sense or repeated in order to realize influence and/or resonance.

Another related question is whether frames are constructed on individual or collective levels. Kretsedemas reminds that frames are interpreted on the basis of personal, thus individual, experiences (Kretsedemas 2000). Polletta and Ho discuss whether people have identical perceptions or whether rules for interpreting ideas are shared (Polletta and Ho 2006). I argue for the latter, perceptions are not completely identical due to different personal experiences, but rules for interpretation (mindsets) are shared. Benford and Snow criticize Johnston or Klandermans for using collective action frames in the sense of schemas, a more psychological concept, where collective action frames are aggregations of individual perceptions and not – as Benford and Snow argue - existent on a collective level (Benford and Snow 2000). From my perspective, individual and collective levels are intertwined. In this thesis I focus on collective interpretations and reduce individual influences where possible to identify the collective framing of democracy. Frames also have a public dimension that is introduced in the following.

2.3.2 Frame resonance

The public dimension of frames is found in the literature on frame resonance and master frames. This becomes later of importance as not only direct transmission of frames, but also via public opinion is analyzed. Polletta and Ho recall the importance of frame resonance with an audience as well as the importance of master frames for movements (Polletta and Ho 2006). Master frames are wide reaching frames that resonate much in public. Benford and Snow refer to the size of the problem that is framed, with larger problems targeting more groups, but also in terms of inclusivity, flexibility or scope of frames (Benford and Snow 2000). Frame resonance is thus an important element of frame diffusion as it adds another channel, the public. However, master frames or resonant frames may not be strong enough

to convince people with different ideologies, but they can reduce the likelihood of effective counter-framing (Diani 1996). On the other hand, Polletta warns that some messages are more difficult to frame to be successful as not all frames resonate equally (Polletta 2008). Jasper as well as Clemens argue that actors try frames to identify those that resonate in public or towards a wider audience or incorporate new elements (Jasper 2014; Clemens 1998). Trying frames does however not result in repeated framing if frames do not resonate (given that the actor acknowledges the missing resonance). In my perspective, combinations of different frames can be used to build master frames and narratives that get repeated over time and that are useful to identify frequent and important frames (especially in the media).

It is important to account for resonance when assessing the public influence of framing that is detailed later (2.5). The combinations of ideas and what elements of frames get repeated over time is of importance when analyzing frames that may have an impact in the public sphere. Before discussing the channels of diffusion, I outline what I understand as democratic framing, a concept at the center of this thesis.

2.4 (Framing) democracy and its critics

What makes my concept specific is the referral to democracy as part of the framing. In a democratizing country, I expect perceptions of democracy to play a role influencing actors and policy in a desired direction. In the following I outline what democracy is and what I mean by framing democracy.

2.4.1 What is democracy?

The concept of democracy is contested with a great number of different, even contradicting understandings (Coppedge 2012; Coppedge et al. 2011; Croissant 2002; Burnell 2013; Vandewoude 2015; Lauth 2011; Schmitter and Karl 1991; Giebler et al. 2018). This variety is related to various traditions of democracy, signified by added adjectives like deliberative, representative, direct or liberal democracy, the latter being prominent today.

Democracy is a generic term, describing a variety of political systems, which are signified as “government of the people, by the people and for the people” (Lincoln cited in Schmidt 2004:147). In other words, democracy is a form of decision-making through collectively binding rules that are controlled by the people (Dahl 1989; Abromeit 2002; Hadenius 2008;

Schmitter and Karl 1991). Today, it is understood as much more than just elections. Bermeo and Yashar emphasize that the understanding of democracy developed over time and does not only include rights but also accountability and transparency (Bermeo and Yashar 2016). As several researchers outline, there is not one form of consolidated democracy, but several (Linz and Stepan 2010; Schmitter and Karl 1991; Brisson 2009; Merkel 2000).

It is to note, that “democratic theory is, when compared with other theoretical enterprises, a distinctively normative affair (...)” (Kelly 2012:2). Kelly underlines different arguments why democracy is good, like procedural aspects including deliberative aspects, competencies or stability (ibid). Keeping the normative dimension in mind is important when evaluating the influence of movements at the end. In the rest of the analysis, there is no distinction between any better or worse form of democracy or less democracy. For example, questions on democracy during interviews have been formulated in a neutral way in order to allow the expression of own conceptions of democracy.

There is continuous interest in a minimal definition of democracy. Although we have seen above that different forms of democracy exist, there are some common elements that are shared among researchers. Scholars normally focus on fair and secret elections and universal franchise as minimal elements, as well as guarantees of political freedoms, fairness, justice, deliberation and political rights while procedures and context dependency are additional elements (O’Kane 2004; Abromeit 2002; Dahl 1989; Schmitter and Karl 1991; for a good overview on the role of elections see Hadenius 2008). Other scholars talk about dimensions: rule of law, vertical and horizontal accountability, competition, freedom and equality, responsiveness and participation are for example identified (Lauth 2011; Lauth 2013). Scholars like Coppedge et al. use different typologies to distinguish between democracies, namely electoral, liberal, majoritarian, participatory, deliberative and egalitarian democracy (Coppedge et al. 2011). As mentioned earlier, liberal democracy is much discussed today. Core elements of liberal democracy are elections (and the choice between alternatives), representation with binding rules based on equity, pluralism and tolerance, as well as freedom of association and freedom of speech, self-determination, responsibility and the control of the government (O’Kane 2004; Bobbio 1988; for self-determination and protection of right: Dahl 1989; further approaches: Bauzon 1992; Ezrahi 2012; Coppedge et

al. 2011). Other forms like deliberative democracy are more focused on processes, participatory democracy or direct democratic ways of taking influence; egalitarian conceptions on redistribution of resources (Coppedge et al. 2011). While it would be easy to choose one of these forms of democracy, it is not clear what kind of democracy is preferred and thus it is difficult to apply one form of democracy in a context of democratization where the preferred form of democracy is perhaps not yet clear. Consequentially it becomes crucial to use an approach that can include all forms of democracy for Tunisia.

Lauth summarizes the dimensions of political freedom and individual political equality as necessary elements of democracy and regards political control in line with rule of law as a third dimension (Lauth 2010; Lauth 2013; Lauth 2011; Lauth and Schlenkrich 2018). Scholars analyzing indexes on democracy argue for the existence of two axes, the names however differ. Munck and Verkuilen talk about contestation or competition and participation or inclusion, Hadenius uses elections and political liberties and Bowman et al. talk about political liberties and political rights (Munck and Verkuilen 2002; Hadenius 2008; Bowman et al. 2005). In addition, it is contested whether democratic output should be used to evaluate a democracy (Lauth 2013; Lauth 2010). Lauth argues that a “trade-off” between different dimensions of democracy exists and ideal democracies cannot completely realize political liberty, political equality and political and judicial control at the same time (Lauth 2013; see also Lauth and Schlenkrich 2018 for a renewal of the argument of interdependence of dimensions). Coppedge et al. take a similar perspective stating that conceptions of democracy, like liberal or majoritarian conceptions, can be in conflict with each other (Coppedge et al. 2011).

I agree that the concepts of political freedom and political equality are central. Political control is a third dimension, focusing on the accountability and restrictions of a government. This is best summarized in a three-dimensional approach on control, equality and freedom. As we have seen, dimensions are in tension with each other and different political systems can emphasize different aspects of democracy. In the following, I open a different parenthesis for democratization, as Tunisia is currently in a process of democratization.

The whole picture - Democratization and social movements

A short review of processes of democratization helps to position the political context in Tunisia. The role of movements in democratization processes is much discussed and does not only allow to show the relevance, but also the possible actions taken by movements to support democratization. Democratization is defined as a process of economic, societal and political transformation (Ottoway 2007; Grugel 2002; Banegas 1993).

As Tilly states, “democratization does not follow a single path” but multiple and involves “movement towards broad citizenship, equal citizenship, binding consultation of citizens, and protection of citizens from arbitrary state action” (Tilly 2000:1f; see also: Tilly 1995; Tilly 2002; Guggenberger 2005; Vanhanen 1992). Similarly, Carothers and other researchers state that the ‘old’ model on stages of opening, breakthrough and consolidation is unstable regarding speed and direction of development and should be described as chaotic processes or multi causal pathways (Carothers 2010; LeBas 2011; Bermeo and Yashar 2016). It is not a short-term process, but lasts “years or decades” and no blueprint exists (Tilly 2000:2; Schwedler 2006). This long-lasting element is underlined by Merkel et al. who describe the need for democratic culture as part of citizenship, arguing that democracy becomes effective when one generation got socialized within it (Merkel et al. 1996; Merkel 2000; Barber 1984).

Following processes of democratization, countries in transition do not necessarily become democracies. Similarly, it cannot be said for sure, that democratic countries remain completely democratic. Stepan and Linz for example see an uncertainty for Tunisia (Stepan and Linz 2013). Tilly argues that processes that promote democratization when being inversed promote de-democratization (Tilly 2007). In this sense, Tunisia is still in a process of democratization and generations of people get slowly socialized with it. Here, the diffusion of democratic ideas plays a role (Schweitzer 2015; Bermeo and Yashar 2016).

Movements and democratization

While movements are not the only actors in democratization processes, they certainly play a role. Movements and mobilization are important for democracy not only controlling state power, but also legitimating states based on rule of law (Linz and Stepan 2010; Norton 1995; Bermeo 1997; Mercer 2002). Tilly underlines that there is at least a correlation between democratization and the proliferation of social movements, also including that social

movements cause democratization (Tilly 1993 and 1994:21; see also LeBas 2011; Johnston 2014; Schmitter and Sika 2017). Giugni sees democratization as connected with the emergence of social movements - at least in the Western world - and states that the proliferation of social movements referring to rights and obligations increases the impact on democratization (Giugni 1998a; compare the importance of civil society, but also political parties: Ahmed and Capoccia 2014; LeBas 2011; Bermeo and Yashar 2016; Clarke 1998; Stepan 2012).

The influence of movements on democratization processes is related to several aspects. Several scholars underline that social change and contentious actions such as strikes or protests are connected to active citizenship in line with democratic values and long-term transformation of the political system (Pancer 2015; Nepstad 2015; Bermeo and Yashar 2016). Sandoval argues that movements defending citizen rights, increasing participation and introducing pro-active demands support democratization (Sandoval 1998). Nord states that organizations like trade unions or human rights organizations serve as “arenas of democratic experiment and education”, where democratic perceptions are built (Nord 1995:37). On the other hand, movements promote aspects of democracy directly and profit from granted freedoms (Gutmann 2003). By claiming rights, movements promote democracy. To summarize with the words of Tilly, the construction of democracy bases on the creation of “a set of political arrangements whose effects are democratic” and of “shared understandings, the culture, that people create for themselves” (Tilly 1995:368).

However, scholars warn for overestimating the role of movements and mobilization. Burnell remarks that a vibrant civil society may neither be neither a precondition nor an indication for a healthy democracy (Burnell 2013; similarly argue Howard and Walters 2015). Tilly sees limitations for the impact of social movements on democratization when movements do not refer to a great variety of claims as well as explicit claims for democracy and when the state misses capacity to implement claims (Tilly 1993 and 1994). Risse and Babayan underline, that the balance of forces on the ground plays a role for the success of democratization apart from possible autocratic challengers and international support (Risse and Babayan 2015). Democratization is thus not only about movements and civil society, but can be related. In addition, some scholars support the perspective that ongoing mobilization may

be destabilizing young democracies (LeBas 2011; Koehler and Warkotsch 2014; Bermeo 1997). Thus, the reasons why there is not one path towards democracy may be connected to the different outcomes mobilization can have.

While some scholars underline the role of political parties, movements and civil society, others acknowledge that democratization is favored by economic development, equitable distribution of income (especially relevant in Muller and Seligson's study), few religious and ethnic divides as well as few internal cleavages (Schweitzer 2015; Muller and Seligson 1994; Schmitter and Sika 2017)²³. This focus on economic development should be kept in mind for the later analysis.

Younger research includes the Arab Spring in relation to democratization and poses the question of transferability of concepts. Lamont et al. argue that the Arab Spring is not about diffusion from the West to other parts of the world as it is unable to explain divergent political orders (Lamont et al. 2015; see also Valbjørn and Bank 2010 on transferability). Scholars underline the role of elites that try to maintain power in the MENA region (Diani and Moffatt 2016). Lamont et al. remark that democratization literature is not well suited to explain political transformations in the Arab Middle East (Lamont et al. 2015). While this might be true for some concepts of democracy, it does not per se contradict the assumption that civil society plays a role in the Arab World. Coppedge recommends to test in other context when stating that case studies in a Western context have been used to analyze democratization and thus argues to enlarge case studies on democratization towards the Middle East and Africa (Coppedge 2012).

I summarize that democratization processes are not necessarily linear, can be inversed and are context dependent. There is a continuum between democracy and autocracy. The role of civil society and social movements is discussed with divided arguments. What I take especially from Tilly are the clear pro-democratic claims by civil society and the state capacity to respond. It becomes important whether movements have a number of claims, are actively promoting democracy and whether those claims are incorporated by the state.

²³ The inclusion of economic aspects goes in the direction of the concept of embedded democracy where economic aspects build some kind of basis for democracy, for a good summary see Merkel 2000.

This leads to the question how democracy can be analyzed and how a democratic framing can be identified.

2.4.2 How democracy can be analyzed


This section focuses on the theoretical arguments related to measuring democracy. A second, method-oriented discussion is found in the method chapter. Here I discuss indicators for an operationalization of the concept. Democracy is often measured by a number of indicators that give an index or by expert interviews (Coppedge et al. 2011; Munck and Verkuilen 2002; Bowman et al. 2005)²⁴. Qualitative measures of democracy underline free and fair elections, an open and accountable government, civil and political rights and a democratic society including civil society and media (Lauth 2011). Further measures like social, economic and international dimensions of democracy do not necessarily lead to a more exact definition of democracy (ibid). As Coppedge et al. remark, elements of democracy may include “components [that] may not be entirely independent of one another” (Coppedge et al. 2011:251).

Another prominent aspect in research on democracy is the analysis of the quality of democracy, which is applicable also to non-democratic contexts (Munck 2014; Coppedge et al. 2011; Giebler et al. 2018). These approaches underline the problems of democracies and warn not to search for the ideal democracy that does not exist (Munck 2014). In addition, they do not judge whether a representative or direct democracy would be better, but measure which elements of democracy are emphasized. The aim is to identify the most important aspects and to evaluate the problems of democracy. The approach on the quality of democracy is in line with criticism on necessary and sufficient conditions for democracy. A number of scholars like Dahl, Lipset or Przeworski used models of necessary and sufficient conditions to analyze democracy. This is however not unchallenged: Tilly criticizes scholars working on democratization as being focused on path-tracing, as no clear path can be identified, and notes that theories on democratization came away from necessary and sufficient conditions (Tilly 2000). A family resemblance model as Goertz describes it might be more adequate given the number of different paths towards democracy, something to be discussed in the method chapter (Goertz 2006).

²⁴ Munck and Verkuilen 2002. provide a good interview on different data sets that measure dimensions of democracy

One far reaching and relatively open approach towards democracy includes the following nine main indicators (see Figure 2.1) according to the Democracy Barometer as part of the NCCR Democracy that respects the actual state of research (Bühlmann et al. 2014). The underlying concept for the Democracy Barometer as well as for this research is broad in order to account for the complexity of democracy itself (Jäckle et al. 2012). Individual liberties, rule of law, public and exchange of opinions, competition of political actors, division of power, governance capacity, transparency, participation and representation are part of the three dimensions control, freedom and equality as shown in Figure 2.1.

Figure 2.1 Quality of democracy



Source: Illustration based on Democracy Barometer 2014

Scholars like Munck add that economic factors support the perspective on the quality of democracy (Munck 2014; compare also Lipset 1959 for an older argument on economic aspects)²⁵. Hadenius emphasizes that economic factors and development go together with education and that the latter is favorable to democracy (Hadenius 2008). In the case of the Democracy Barometer, economic elements are transcending and appear for example in

²⁵ Munck 2014 provides a comparison of different approaches towards the quality of democracy and compares the Democracy Barometer approach to others. From this table, Munck identifies that final outcomes like for income or health as well as satisfaction with democracy are not included in the Democracy Barometer approach, while several other dimensions are, also in comparison to other approaches; Bowman et al. 2005 similarly provide an operationalization of political liberties and political rights

terms of inequality or corruption. However, it can be kept in mind that neither education nor economy takes a prominent role in the Barometer. Other criticism relates to the unclear operationalization on lower concept levels that are not shown in Figure 2.1 (Jäckle et al. 2012; Jäckle et al. 2013). The question of how democracy gets operationalized will be re-discussed in the method chapter (chapter three). Here, only theoretical perspectives are outlined.

From a normative perspective, democracy – as rule by the people – remains desirable, as dominance of individual interests and repression are reduced. However, democracy is often regarded as Western ideal that is applied on other countries and regions. Scholars like Hussain and Howard argue that democracy may look different in Muslim countries (Hussain and Howard 2013; see also Grugel 2002; Ezrahi 2012). Some scholars reject that democracy can be measured by similar instruments in different countries as the political context, like more or less homogeneous society structures or different electoral systems, require different forms of democracy (Lauth 2011 referring to Abromeit and Stoiber²⁶). However, due to limited experience, there is no agreement on how a Muslim democracy may look like. Consequentially, the easiest way to measure democracy is to be aware of possible problems and to test an originally Western concept that is open towards non-Western democracies where liberal democracy may not be the desired ideal.

Although being developed for quantitative analysis, the Barometer summarizes dimensions, elements and sub-elements and thus different aspects of democracy that can be related to the concept in qualitative terms. Therefore, the framing of democracy by Tunisian movements should allow to retrace a combination of factors named above.

2.4.3 The concept of framing democracy

In the following, (democratic) movements and organizations are seen as one factor for democratization; it is only one aspect of democracy and necessarily places other aspects – like parties or institutions - aside. Movements and organizations incorporate core elements of democracy in their collective framing when promoting democratization.

²⁶ The latter propose to account also for heterogeneity of a society, dominance structures, institutional complexity and formalization of decision-making systems (Lauth 2011).

Jasper sees worldviews as a “cluster of meaning that fit together into a coherent package” forming a “common vocabulary that anyone can use” (Jasper 1997:169). I argue that framings on democracy are integrated into frame building and share a vocabulary on democracy. Democracy is relatively abstract; however, sub-elements can be used as parts for framing like injustice frames on corruption and transparency. In order to analyze movements and civil society, their perception and framings of democracy is regarded. The democratic framing model encloses worldviews and perceptions (“shared meanings”) on the group level. Democracy may be an explicit movement goal, but may also be implicit when fighting for example human rights violations, highlighting the contingent goals (Boudreau 2016). A practical example is a movement that integrates the fight for political liberties into its collective group framing and combines it with existing frames of problems. The democratic framing across movements can be described as master frame, as relatively open in terms of interpretation, inclusive and flexible as several notions of democracy exist²⁷.

In terms of Benford and Snow’s diagnostic, prognostic and motivational framing, democracy identifies autocratic behavior and tendencies as potential enemy or autocratic tendencies to be changed. In addition, a prognostic ideal of a democratic Tunisia will be built; this can be a representative, deliberative or different form of democracy. Elements of democracy like freedom of association or inclusion emphasize the possibility to change policies and represent motivational framing. A democratic framing is defined as group framing that incorporates factors outlined by the Democracy Barometer (like support for rule of law). Not all aspects of democracy need to be incorporated as democracy can be defined differently according to the context and more than one type of democracy exists. A similar approach towards a social construction of democracy has been taken by a number of scholars illustrated by Andrews and Chapman: As “politics and state-building are inherently cultural activities, collective processes of conferring authority”, the construction of democracy, the meaning giving towards this rather abstract concept occurs through social interaction (Andrews and Chapman 1995:5).

I highlight the openness of the approach that gives the possibility to identify a Tunisian framing on democracy. Therefore, no particular perspective on for example liberal

²⁷ As part of this research the democracy frame is seen as master frame that is mediatized in the sense that it describes a democratic ideal that shall be realized in the ideal case.

democracy is given to avoid a predetermined perspective on what can be a movement's perspective. It is possible that the approach of the Democracy Barometer is not sufficient and that additional elements emerge. The approach on democracy becomes thus a mixture of deductive and inductive reasoning. While this opens the possibility to criticize the openness or missing concreteness towards one specific perspective on democracy, it fits well with the exploratory approach towards movements and avoids pre-determination.

The concept of a democratic framing has normative elements. The normative dimension should not be underestimated and the analysis enables an evaluation whether movements behave more or less democratic. Democracy is not seen as based only on institutionalized factors like elections or an elected government, but as a mix of institutional and social practices. Thus, the suggestion by Gerges to choose between institutionalized forms of democracy and on-going processes of democracy is consciously rejected and replaced by a complementary perspective (Gerges 2015). The aim of movements promoting democracy is not only to make claims on problems, but to combine these problems with a demand for democracy. They try to convince others in interaction leading to the concept of diffusion.

2.5 Impact, diffusion and mechanisms

This section focuses on the impact of movements and explains ideational impact as well as mechanisms for the diffusion of framing. The section starts discussing impact and outcomes before channels and mechanisms are outlined. The last part focuses on ideational impact and links impact to the question of frame diffusion and implications for policy outcome.

2.5.1 Defining impact, outcomes and the problem of causality

The study of impact and outcomes is a field of research where only few studies exist although the number of studies grew over the last years, especially since the 1990s as Bosi et al. outline (Bosi et al. 2016). While outcomes are seen as concrete in the form of attributed goods or policies, impact refers to a more general influence that is less visible. Several concurring approaches exist. It is often about the mechanisms that enable or hinder impact or more concrete policy outcomes. Scholars agree on the methodological and general problems when identifying causal claims on the impact of movements (Giugni 2009; Bosi and Uba 2009; Meyer 2006; Amenta 2005; Kolb 2007; Cress and Snow 2000). Giugni mentions a number of problems including the systematic study of movement outcomes covering "causal

attribution, the problem of time reference and effect stability, the problem of goal adaptation, the problem of interrelated effects, and the problem of unintended and perverse effects” (Giugni 2004:31). Policy and other impact can be influenced by a number of other actors that make it difficult to identify clear causal mechanisms (parliamentarians, parties, enterprises, media coverage, salience of topics and so on, compare also Baumgartner and Mahoney 2005). In addition, it is difficult to assess the influence of organizations due to the diversity of movements themselves, a number of possible consequences, not all intended, and the discussions on different mechanisms as well as the possibility to shape a story of influence (Meyer 2006). Melucci and Lyyra argue that another difficulty for analyzing impact lies in the tendency to see movements as producing positive outcomes, while movements are also antagonists (Melucci and Lyyra 1998).

While I share many of the objections towards finding causal links, I nevertheless argue that the Tunisian case is special as influence of civil society is reported to be large. It is a young democracy where administration depends on external knowledge as the state apparatus after the uprisings is much modified. Following these arguments, it should be easier to retrace movement influence in a state where parties as well as other political actors are seen as weak. In my specific case, mechanisms are seen as sustained interactions that enable the transmission of ideas. In addition, given the problems with causation and impact, it is crucial to equally discuss the role of other actors and their influence, especially when analyzing interviews with civil servants. I agree with McAdam and Schaffer Boudet who underline the need to show the impact of social movements, not only assume it (McAdam and Schaffer Boudet 2012). Assuming an impact is however often done in the Tunisian context so far, a problem that shall be reduced by this thesis. It is principally about ideational impact and less about concrete outcomes in terms of desired legislation, although it will be discussed how ideational influence can shape policy outcomes as an additional step.

Why I won't speak about success

Related to impact is the question of success. Jasper or Meyer underline that definitions of success are often complicated, in particular when it comes to mobilizing or attaining specific goals (Jasper 1997; Meyer 2005). Giugni argues that the notion of success of movements underestimates the heterogeneity of movements which means that there may be little agreement on specific claims (Giugni 2004). Similarly, one needs to underline, that it is not

only about movement's success, but that success also creates failure for other elements (Martin, G. 2015; Kolb 2007). In addition, not every success is claimed. Meyer emphasizes that claiming success includes dangers in relation to other organizations as well as for motivating participants (Meyer 2006). On the other hand, perceived failure may not be a failure in reality. Amenta et al. argue on the basis of collective benefit arguments; even a movement that fails in achieving its goals can have success because of for example new rights get introduced for all (Amenta et al. 2010). Following these arguments, claims may not be realized one by one, but can have partial and even unforeseen impacts.

Scholars like Mello or Amenta argue to replace the concept of success by the one of impacts (be it positive or negative, on a content or repertoire level; Mello 2015; Amenta 2006). As a consequence, I speak about impact or the diffusion of a certain framing. Before returning to ideational impact, I shortly discuss what other researchers showed for impact.

Empirical evidence for impact

The focus of research is very diverse and consequentially are its results. Uba and Romanos describe the state of research on impact and outcomes as focused on aspects like public opinion, allies or strategies for mobilization (Uba and Romanos 2016). However, literature is far from extensive and not all aspects are covered. According to Giugni, a substance gap exists in form of missing qualitative research on the processes and mechanisms behind movement outcomes (Giugni 2004). This did not change and retracing processes and mechanisms remains limited.

While literature often assumes impact of movements, the question of how much impact has seldom been discussed before Burstein and Linton presented their study and found relatively little influence, although statistically significant (Burstein and Linton 2002). Later, Burstein and Hirsh systematically summarized the literature on interest groups and outcomes and underlined the mixed results in relation to impacts. They found studies showing only negligible effects and warned for overestimating the impact of public opinion on policy (Burstein and Hirsh 2007). Others similarly trace a divided picture. Kolb or Amenta et al. summarize that evidence for impact of movements on political change is mixed between studies showing impact as well as those arguing for limited influence (Kolb 2007; Amenta et al. 2010). One can summarize that results on social movement outcomes are

diverse and often not connected with one another; or simply too limited or not well executed (Kolb 2007). It is therefore difficult to say when impact occurs and the influence in terms of ideas is even more difficult to assess. I consequentially focus on the channels and mechanisms of influence, before relating it to ideational influence.

2.5.2 Channels for influencing state actors

Research underlines a number of channels to realize impact. Research ranges from the influence of movements on media reporting to the influence on administration or the role of networks. Meyer showed that free media and freedom of expression give movements the possibility to place content that does concern them in the public sphere (Meyer 2005). Another way to influence administration is shown by Banaszak: She shows that members of the women movement were part of the Kennedy administration and that activists in institutional settings increase the chances of success for policy outcomes (Banaszak 2005). Kolb agrees that the better activists are integrated in institutional positions, the stronger is their impact (Kolb 2007). Other examples include Burstein and Hirsh who retraced the flow of information during U.S. congress hearings towards parliamentarians that then guided their decisions (Burstein and Hirsh 2007). Amenta argues that the widespread discussion of a problem can potentially influence new legislation (Amenta 2006). Research on networks and impact shows on the international level and especially for climate change networks that these networks can influence changes in politics (Hadden 2015).

From those examples, especially the approach by Hadden, who combines framing, outcomes and networks, comes close to my own approach although her results on framing are relatively limited at the end (she mainly emphasizes the network structure as important for repertoires and strategies). It is to note, that a number of direct channels for influence, be it in direct discussion, in committees or via members in the administration exist, that can diffuse a framing towards the state.

The importance of resources and professionalization for outcomes is also discussed. Volpi et al. confirm that “professionalization of their role, a mobilization of local resources, and an effective dialogue with the state administration” increased the chances of influencing outcomes in the direct aftermath of the revolution (Volpi et al. 2016:373). However, when including the targets’ needs, Burstein and Linton argue that resources, be it in terms of

number of members or financial means “are unlikely to strongly influence policy change” (Burstein and Linton 2002:387). The question of resources, professionalization as well as other factors should be taken into account although the focus lies on ideational outcomes.

From these findings, a distinction between direct channels of influence and indirect ones via public opinion or the media emerges. Discussions can be direct, for example in committees, or indirect via public opinion.

Influencing public opinion

Public opinion is often discussed in relation to movement outcomes. Integration of new ideas in the public discourse is seen as impact of movements by scholars (Meyer 2006; Koopmans et al. 2005; Giugni 2004). Kriesi underlines the role of the public and thus of media by which movements can reach their targets and, especially in case of elected people, exercise pressure (Kriesi 2009; for reelection see also Kolb 2007).

However, evidence for the influence of public opinion is not clear and Uba found it impossible to show that public opinion enhanced effects by movements (Uba 2009). On the other hand, Woodly shows that movements can influence public discourse not only through contestation but also through credible views and proposals (Woodly 2015). Polletta and Ho indicate that activists would modify their frames so that they fit institutional insiders rather than the public because the public has no influence on policy making (Polletta and Ho 2006). I do not share the perspective by Polletta and Ho as for example mediatized protest can shape public opinion and force state actors that want to represent the peoples’ will to adapt. While evidence is divided, it may be useful to use Kriesi’s distinction between reactive and proactive effects, where especially the reactive element, to prevent disadvantages, is realized via public opinion, which get mobilized in order to preserve the status quo. On the other hand, public opinion can be seen as less influential for policy proposals.

Based on Burstein’s model of indirect effects on policies, Giugni mentions changing public preferences, increasing public concern and changing the decision makers’ perspectives on the former preferences and concern (Giugni 2004). Public preferences and concern are often seen as discussions in media, although it is not the same. Scheufele criticizes the link between public opinion and media coverage as findings show that news coverage is not


affected by public opinion (Scheufele 2000). For Tunisia, a practical problem arises: As no systematic opinion polls apart from the very general Arab Barometer and few other surveys exist, a reliance on media coverage appears as better option. Whether media can influence state actors is a connected question of responsiveness of political leaders. While scholars show responsiveness for public opinion in Western countries, it is not clear whether a “young” democracy as Tunisia shows the same features (for a summary in Western contexts see Giugni 2004).

In media, claims by movements are present. A claim is not exactly the same as a frame, but the combination of several concepts within arguments can be part of a specific framing. While every claim includes a prognostic or also a diagnostic framing, not every framing includes claims as especially motivational framing like a call for action can be interpreted separately from claims. Both are nevertheless very close and claims are taking up only some elements of framing. Therefore an oral explanation by movement leaders is seen as more complete as a condensed (and eventually modified) version in form of claims in public. Movement claims are fluent and can change over time (Sandoval 1998; Andrews 2001). Claims of movements are regarded for combinations of arguments that are part of a wider framing. The question of claims is discussed later when analyzing articles.

Influence models

Taking direct and indirect influence channels together leads to different influence models. Giugni and Passy outline three influence models: a direct-effect model, a joint-effect model and a mediated-effect model (Giugni and Passy 2003). In the first case, there is a direct tie between movements towards authorities’ responsiveness; in-direct or mediated ways use public opinion or alliances while a joint approach uses both channels (Giugni and Passy 2003). Giugni describes indirect transmission, where allies “carry” claims into institutions; once they entered they may enter into policies (Giugni 2004). Figure 2.2 summarizes the different effect models as described by Giugni (2004). Indirect effect models use other actors or public opinion to achieve policy changes, while a direct model focuses on movements only. In reality, several effects get combined (see joint-effect model), leading to policy changes.

Figure 2.2 Direct/Indirect/joint effect model



Note: Illustration based on Giugni 2004:125, each step includes another point in time

Giugni underlines that a “social movement interpretation”, a joint effect of movement actions, public opinion and media coverage can change legislation (Giugni 2004; see also Amenta 2014). Giugni highlights the role of the media in this model. However, Giugni and Yamasaki as well as Kolb also assign that several paths towards outcomes exist, causing problems for causality as outlined earlier (Giugni and Yamasaki 2009; Kolb 2007). Different policy areas have different degrees of complexity and thus different numbers of causal paths (Giugni and Yamasaki 2009). Giugni and Yamasaki emphasize that the joint-effect model fits differently according to national contexts; for example, less for Italy than for the United States (ibid). This should be kept in mind when applying the model to the Tunisian case. In my case it is about policy changes in the very end. Ideational influence in terms of a shared democratic framing is much more important for this thesis. In order to identify the mechanisms of influence that exist and what kind of effect model fits, I use networks that serve as vehicle to transport democratic framing.

2.5.3 Political and ideational impact: influencing the policy process

Giugni summarizes that political, cultural and individual biographic effects by movements can be identified (Giugni 2009; Bosi et al. 2016). As part of this thesis, political consequences and what I call ideational impact are of interest. Ideational impact is transcending elements

that can enter and influence different policies. I also relate policy influence to the administration.

Framing and ideas are seldom discussed when talking about impact. Nevertheless, some examples for framing and outcomes exist. Woodly argues that impact of movements does not depend on the organization, but on ideas and political meaning (Woodly 2015). Meyer advances the concept of framing to analyze movement outcomes (Meyer 2006). Other researchers connect impact not only with directed, plausible framing, but also with mobilization, strategies and resources (Amenta et al. 2005). Nevertheless, analyzing impact from a framing perspective remains an exception and is worth to be tested. Amenta et al. underline that it is difficult to examine framing in relation to political outcomes as frames need to be resonant and plausible (Amenta et al. 2010). Creating a resonant and plausible framing does not depend on resources. Even organizations with few resources can have a huge impact by creating – through framing - a perception that their organization is important and by creating a dominant interpretation of a topic. As we have seen above, empirical evidence is divided between researchers seeing few influences and those who argue for specific outcomes. It is thus worth to look at the different types of influence.

Burstein and Hirsh use a detailed distinction and identify five modes of government responsiveness: Access responsiveness (the willingness to hear organizations, similar to Gamson's acceptance, see below), agenda responsiveness (accepting the importance of a problem highlighted by an organization), policy responsiveness (accepting a policy proposal), output responsiveness (realizing implementation) or impact responsiveness (reducing the impact of the original problem) which is seen as a process which occurs stepwise (Burstein and Hirsh 2007; the approach is equally highlighted by Giugni 2004 and Amenta 2005). Kriesi et al. as well as Kolb distinguish between proactive success, meaning that movements gain advantages, or reactive, so that they prevent disadvantages (Kriesi et al. 1995; Kolb 2007).

A lot of social movement theory on outcomes bases on Gamson's approach on acceptance and it is outlined here as it builds the basis for Burstein and Hirsh's model. Acceptance as a political actor means being seen as "valid spokesman" or spokeswoman while the advantages can be in the form of passing a desired legislation or similar (Gamson 1990:29;

Giugni 1998b). Amenta et al. remark that scholars working on outcomes of movements “have moved away from addressing whether movements or organizations are successful in gaining new benefits or acceptance (Gamson 1990) and have turned to examining the causal influence of movements on political outcomes and processes drawn from political sociology literature” (reference in original, same book as included in bibliography; Amenta et al. 2010:289). While the idea of acceptance is still present, the typology of impact got more sophisticated over time. Table 2.3 summarizes main distinctions of impacts. I focus on responsiveness and its relation to democratic framing. When it comes to mechanisms, both distinctions by Burstein and Hirsh as well as by Kriesi et al. are used to show the possible (ideational) influence of organizations on the state.

Table 2.3 Typology of Impact according to different authors

Burstein and Hirsh 2007	Kriesi et al. 1995
Access responsiveness	Proactive impact
Agenda responsiveness	Reactive impact
Policy responsiveness	
Output responsiveness	
Implementation responsiveness	

Diffusion of ideas and policies

The core of the thesis is about the diffusion of ideas and about their influence on policies. It is therefore useful to connect it with literature on policy diffusion that not only regards the diffusion of policies, but also of ideas. Policy diffusion is defined as “the process whereby policy choices in one unit are influenced by policy choices in another unit” (Maggetti and Gilardi 2016:89). Gilardi and other scholars further elaborate that not only policies spread, but also ideational frameworks (Gilardi 2012; see also Börzel and Risse 2009²⁸). Units between which ideas or policies diffuse can be states, cities, organizations and other actors. This already shows that diffusion is often related to an international context. In this sense and related to the diffusion of democracy, especially studies on human rights and democracy promotion are to mention. Interdependence of actors is one important element of diffusion and is not only linked to specific policies. Gilardi does not only state that diffusion is a consequence of interdependence, but also that “diffusion does not occur only at the international level, that national governments are not the only relevant units, and that it is

²⁸ Gilardi provides an extensive overview on different forms of diffusion, be it the level (international, national etc.) or the types of diffusion (Gilardi 2012), Börzel and Risse (2009) provide equally a good overview on different forms of diffusion.

not only specific policies that diffuse” (Gilardi 2012:2; see also Simmons et al. 2006 for an argument on interdependence).

Gilardi notes that diffusion is not equivalent to convergence, as diffusion is the process by which the outcome of convergence is achieved (Gilardi 2012). In this sense “convergence can, but need not, follow from diffusion” (Gilardi 2012:3). Linked to my research, the framing of ideas comes close to the research on the diffusion of principles or templates as overarching guidelines (Gilardi 2012). Also democracy has been regarded from a perspective of diffusion across countries (Gilardi 2012). Diffusion is often measured through the already evoked convergence. It is observed through spatial or temporal clustering (Gilardi 2012). I focus on the spatial clustering of actors that are compared on their level and orientation of democratic framing. The diffusion of a democratic framing is expected to be from civil society to the Tunisian state. In this sense, the approach of comparing civil society actors and the state is similar to the approach used on an international level. The second element is then the interdependence of actors and the possible diffusion mechanisms that is accounted for in the network analysis.

Literature on diffusion also identifies mechanisms. Maggetti and Gilardi provide an overview on policy diffusion literature and distinguish between three forms of (transnational) diffusion: Learning, emulation and competition (Maggetti and Gilardi 2016; for older overviews see Marsh and Sharman 2009; Simmons et al. 2006 or Börzel and Risse 2009). These forms of diffusion are threatened as mechanisms, while some researchers name the forms differently or add others (Marsh and Sharman 2009 for example speak about learning, competition, coercion and mimicry, see also Shipan and Volden 2008). Learning is seen as influence on policies through the consequences of policies in other cases, emulation is seen as conformity with normative expectations and competition is linked to policies that in other cases attracted (or retained) resources (Maggetti and Gilardi 2016; Meseguer and Gilardi 2009; Gilardi 2012). It is also the mechanism most in line with constructivist approaches (Simmons et al. 2006). However, mechanisms are a much discussed concept as mechanism of policy diffusion are defined and operationalized in different ways across literature (Maggetti and Gilardi 2016). In addition, Meseguer and Gilardi warn that not every mechanism may be sufficient as different mechanisms have different importance (Meseguer

and Gilardi 2009). Scholars also underline the “multiple causation” when it comes to policy diffusion as different mechanisms are at work at the same time (Marsh and Sharman 2009:273).

As other scholars noted, literature on policy diffusion is well developed, the diffusion of policies is empirically documented, but much less is known about mechanisms of diffusion (Shipan and Volden 2008). A lot of the studies, including many of the examples cited by Gilardi, include policy diffusion on an international level (Gilardi 2012). At the same time, it is assigned that policy diffusion, including the diffusion of ideas, also happens at a national level. There are numerous empirical studies on policy diffusion on different levels and topics - like the work of Tews, Busch and Jörgens arguing that diffusion happens not only due to perceived efficacy, but also to increase legitimacy, the work of Shipan and Volden on antismoking policy diffusion across U.S. states or works by Greenhill on the diffusion and socialization of human rights norms (Tews, Busch and Jörgens 2002; Shipan and Volden 2008; Greenhill 2010). Other studies like the work by Lodge on policy transfer underline the possible pressures by other organizations, the configuration of the state (whether the state is open to learning) as well as the possible access of societal actors (Lodge 2003). While Lodge focuses on institutional learning, it should be emphasized that these categories overlap with those found in social movement studies where protest and openness of the political system are underscored.

I look at the circumstances under which diffusion of democratic framing occurs. However, diffusion is not taken for granted and first it needs to be shown whether diffusion of democratic framing occurs. The question is still, whether the threefold division on mechanisms of diffusion as learning, competition and emulation is also true on a national level. In the case of democracy, emulation is seen as the most probable mechanism, while learning on the bases of old policies seems difficult as most policies are new in Tunisia. Old, still existent policies can however be modified through learning. Competition can be seen as idea competition, where ideal practices would be consistent framings of democracy. When actors adopt a successful framing of democracy, this framing is expected to diffuse automatically due to the perceived wide acceptance. Similarly, emulation is seen as “process

whereby policies diffuse because of their normative and socially constructed properties” (Gilardi 2012:22).

Influence on policies

The focus on ideational impact as part of this thesis is finally linked to the question of policies influenced through democratic framing. This final step links the more abstract framing of democracy to the possibility of shaping policies. However, the policy process itself is very complex and consists of different phases (Weible et al. 2011; Schlager and Weible 2013). Due to this diversity, Cress and Snow describe that pathways for achieving movement outcome are multiple (Cress and Snow 2000)²⁹. Amenta et al. divide the process into agenda setting, legislative content preparation, passage and implementation (Amenta et al. 2010; Amenta 2005). Weible et al. add evaluation and termination as additional stages (Weible et al. 2011). Based on these divisions, one can argue that the role of networks and the organizational perception as experts can play a role for agenda setting and the elaboration of the legislative content. The passage and implementation processes, but also agenda setting may be dominated by protest. Professional input through experts is for example less important for the issue creation phase in comparison to the policy formulation phase (Grattet 2005). I do not consider everything that follows the adoption of a law (/change) - the implementation, termination and evaluation phase - as my data only covers the policy process up to the passage. A focus is taken on the ideational influence on policies.

Woodly argues that movements have more power when influencing general policies through agenda setting and giving solutions instead of concrete policy proposals (Woodly 2015). However, Amenta et al. underline that movements may be less influential in later stages of the policy process, meaning that mobilization in later stages may not be useful or that protest as a strategy might not help (Amenta et al. 2010). According to Amenta: “It is easiest for challengers to influence policy in its earliest phase, before a program of policy becomes highly institutionalized” (Amenta 2006:28; compare also Bosi et al. 2016).

As a consequence, literature on policy influence is not clear about which stage of the policy protest is most adequate for a certain type of movement action. Research only states that

²⁹ Cress and Snow give also a good overview on different factors that can influence outcomes: Cress and Snow 2000.

the type of policy-making processes influences the chances of success of coalitions depending on targets and timing (Reese 2005). Weible et al. state that “success or failure in the policy process is a matter of odds, but these odds can be changed favorably [...]” (Weible et al. 2011:3). While Amenta argues that it is easier to influence early phases, it is not related to a specific type of action which effectively can be of different importance according to stages of the policy process. Thus, it should be kept in mind that (ideational) influence at different levels of the policy process can be different in terms of actions used as well as in terms of proposal/opposition. This brings us back to Kriesi’s distinction between pro-active and reactive influence that equally can play a role.

As mentioned earlier, policy processes are complex. Meyer assigns that policy processes are often not linear and can be influenced by various actors and events (Meyer 2005). Kolb remarks that the influence of other political actors such as parties, government and so on should be considered for research to avoid “pseudo outcomes” that can lead to an overstatement of the impact of movements (Kolb 2007:22).

Whether protest can influence policy processes is another question that is discussed by scholars. Some scholars even argue that given the limited costs for ignoring protest or given its disruptive potential, protest does not matter at all, is counterproductive or has just a very limited effect (Biggs and Andrews 2015). Protest may be seen as less credible in comparison to lobbying by policymakers (Uba 2009). Protest is seen as one mean to gain attention, be it directly or via the media.

2.6 Towards a theoretical framework

Chapter 2.6 takes up the findings from the literature review and develops the theory of the thesis. Theories on framing democracy are connected with theories on diffusion and networks. All this to answer the research question: *“How does a democratic framing diffuse across actors in Tunisia?”*

Section 2.2 outlined the role of networks. The importance of interdependence for the diffusion of ideas was highlighted. The ties established towards different actors of the political system as well as the media help to account for the scope of ideational influence that each organization can exert. Network configurations pre-determine whether

movements can influence certain actors. It is not only single organizational influence but also collective influence that is taken into account. The argument of a movement coalition is used as certain concepts/ideas may only be promoted through a wide alliance of movements (2.2.2). The existence of such a coalition and/or organizational ways to influence is highlighted in the analysis. The networks indicate which actors are closer to the state and which actors are challengers. Networks do not only allow access to other actors, but also let ideas travel (2.2.4). The interaction of actors in a social constructivist perspective will thus shape their meaning making and allow democratic framing to travel.

Movements refer to frames more or less in line with democracy and combine these with their issues of interest (for example women rights for the ATFD). The main three dimensions of democracy freedom, equality and control are divided in several sub-elements in order to identify whether movements consistently promote all, few or specific elements of democracy (2.3 and 2.4). The assessment of a democratic framing shows whether organizations focus on freedom, equality or control, so whether they promote a libertarian, egalitarian or majoritarian conception of democracy. The combination of elements of democracy helps to identify specific elements of each organizational framing.

The third part of literature used for analysis is the literature on diffusion, influence and mechanisms (section 2.5). Different channels of influence exist be it through direct or indirect ways. The types of influence (agenda impact, policy access and so on) differ. The direct and indirect influence is analyzed through networks between the state and organizations as well as via a media analysis that stands for public opinion. The diffusion of ideas is especially well researched on an international level, but is applicable to ideas and national levels. Especially normative diffusion through emulation appears relevant. The proactive and reactive influence is kept in mind.

Mechanisms are important for the diffusion of ideas. Mechanisms are sustained interactions that enable the transmission of ideas. Better influence mechanisms thus easier promote a specific framing of democracy. If movements are successful as stated in literature (see chapter one), democratic framing should already have entered the state and successful mechanism will have let to congruent framing between organizations and ministries. This

congruence is highlighted by the literature on diffusion, while it is to keep in mind that it not necessarily proves diffusion without assessing the ways ideas can diffuse.

The theory starts by outlining the reasoning and details how concepts are combined. The chapter concludes with some critical reflections on the approach. The interactions of movements with the state (and vice-versa) enable in combination with framings on democracy to identify efficient mechanisms of influence. As part of this thesis, especially the questions *if* framings diffuse and *how* orient the questioning. Finally, the influence of a democratic framing on policies is discussed.

2.6.1 Ontological reflections

A social constructivist perspective builds the basis of the thesis. The world is seen as intersubjective constructed and meaning is given through the interaction of people who assign attributes to things (Berger and Luckmann 2012). Similarly, Klandermans states that social beliefs and collective perceptions become part of a social reality when they are shared and as a consequence become independent of the individual (Klandermans 1992). Interaction, arguing and bargaining or non-verbal interactions construct worldviews and framings. Lapsley and Narvaez evaluate it from a psychological perspective: “Persons and contexts are not static, orthogonal effects, but they are instead dynamically interacting” (Lapsley and Narvaez 2009:194). Interaction is crucial because a face-to-face interaction allows to present oneself and to interpret others (Berger and Luckmann 2012). The meaning of the term democracy for example is shaped through interaction. This includes that an understanding of democracy by a social movement actor in Tunisia may differ from a Western perspective or even from perspectives hold by other actors. The meaning may be influenced by the Western perspective, but be adapted to the Tunisian context. Thus, democracy can be defined differently. The perspective on democracy is influenced by how groups, in my case organizations, construct democracy. A perspective that resembles mine, is the one taken by Ezrahi, who outlines the imagination and construction of meaning of democracy (Ezrahi 2012)³⁰. Movements combine for example the framing of ensuring liberties like the freedom of speech with their framing of democracy in Tunisia and promote

³⁰ However, Ezrahi remains on a very abstract, philosophical level and mainly discusses the theoretical importance for democracy.

these aspects. Consequentially, they build a shared understanding of the world that is expressed by activists and leaders.

Movements “construct an alternative view of social reality” (Klandermans 1992:90). To give a practical example: a group-mobilizing people for a cause does promote a set of worldviews and framings on what should be changed. In the Tunisian case, a group like the UGTT does not only promote workers’ rights, but also aspects of democracy like liberties, support for alternation in power, fighting corruption and so on. These aspects become thus part of the organization’s framing.

From a method-oriented perspective Robson adds, that a constructivist perspective means that “the task of the researcher is to understand the multiple constructions of meaning and knowledge” (Robson 2005:27). For this research it becomes important to account for the perceived reality of actors, thus who is seen as ally, enemy or important actor of the political system. It includes how actors construct democracy from their point of view and what they emphasize or neglect. This has also methodological consequences as it requires methods that can account for the subjective construction of democracy and networks (like interviews³¹).

2.6.2 Framing and its diffusion through networks

Movements construct/combine and use frames in interaction with each other, but also with other actors of the political system (2.3). The focus of the thesis is on collective democratic framing. This said, combinations of individual frames are used to indicate differences and similarities in the use of the concept of democracy. The framing of democracy is integrated into “normal” movement frames like issue specific claims on more women rights and the like. Framing is seen as social construction and combination of topics, issues or ideas. It is about the connection of aspects and whether it is seen as a problem, a solution or a mobilizing factor. A frame is seen as interpretation of a perceived situation from a specific angle. Framing occurs when elements like workers’ rights are connected with other issues to construct an interpretation of a situation. As part of framing, problems get identified, solutions proposed and actions prepared (diagnostic, prognostic and motivational framing).

³¹ This also means that data from interviews is seen as better in comparison to media data as it stands for a subjective interpretation by actors.

While speeches not necessarily include all three framing elements, they do at least include one of them and link it to an issue of occupation for the organization (for example environmental pollution and the demand for the state to take action because it is bad for health, for animals or so on). Within organizations several framings can exist, however organizations normally agree on common aspects.

Wide reaching frames within a society can be referred to as master frames that resonate with the perspectives of many people (and collectives). One can imagine that “democracy” or “we are democrats” take a broad, abstract master frame that can be found across organizations. Master frames are inclusive, flexible and broad in terms of interpretative scope and have already been identified for the framing of rights, culturally pluralist frames and others (Benford and Snow 2000; Martin, G. 2015). Frames are useful to analyze how democracy is justified and supported. As a consequence, autocratic actions are evaluated as bad and dangerous to democracy. Frame resonance in public can be retraced and consequentially a picture of frame influence is drawn.

Tunisian movements operate in a political system that is still changing. The question emerges, how movements perceive democracy and whether they can influence the state. How do they establish a tie towards the state and does the state take over the organizations’ framing? What is their perception about democracy and how is it incorporated into their collective action frames? This includes the development of a “democratic framing”. The organizations position themselves towards the concept of democracy and evaluate certain aspects negative and others positive. This provides an explication of what is desirable in terms of democracy and what is seen as core of a democratic framing. While intra-organizational democratic framings express this ideal, public framings may be more radical, claiming more than the ideal in order to achieve the ideal. A frequent focus on a problem in public can indicate points that have to be changed from the perspective of the organizations.

From the literature on networks (2.2), the argument on coalitions, but also on the division of tasks within coalitions and perceived influence are taken over. It can be expected that every organization has a specific role and does not cover all topics. The literature states that

frames resemble within coalitions. Thus, the framing on specific topics is expected to be different, but similar when it comes to a possible master frame on democracy.

What happens with commonly supported law proposals? Do organizations adopt a common framing in line with their democratic framing similar to the one proposed by the expert movement or do they focus on their own field of expertise and combine frames? These questions orient chapter seven as there are still empty spots in literature. Framing democracy and framing in general as well as interaction are not well researched. Whether democracy frames resonate in countries that democratize is also not well researched. When it comes to movement coalitions, roles and framing it is not clear to what degree framing is similar or different.

Network connections and their quality can tell much on who interacts with whom and who takes which role. Networks are seen as particularly important for socialization and meaning construction. Passy explains for the individual level that “social networks contribute to the socialization of individuals, or to increase awareness on a political conflict [...], but also to the construction of specific identities that allow them to identify themselves with a conflict and give meaning to their actions” (own translation, Passy 1998:109). In my perspective meaning is constructed among compound actors, so between organizations and the state (as well as between organizations and other organizations). Perceptions enable certain networks or support the transmission of ideas, while networks create the mechanisms for their diffusion. To analyze the selected movements, organization centered networks are used, as a complete network picture is difficult in a political system where not all actors are easily identifiable. Thus, the ties between organizations and other actors are analyzed. The actor-centered network perspective is equally applied to ministries, but with a focus on cooperation with civil society organizations and movements to verify whether ministries ascribe importance to organizations. The framings analyzed are centered on the concept of democracy. While framing in interviews is directly accessible, the approach for analyzing the media (indirect and joint effect model) is focused on framing integrated in claims, as these are easier to be identified.

Frame resonance in public – using claims

Analyzing frames is not easy, as discourse analysis of frames may leave reasons for interpretation implicit (Johnston 1995). One approach attributes “close attention to language, the analyst can reconstruct a schema that systematically shows the relationships between concepts and experience represented in speech” (Johnston 1995:220). The approach used for analyzing framing as part of this thesis is close to what Woodly calls a principal component analysis, where especially the combination of frames is analyzed (Woodly 2015). While this is relatively easy for interviews oriented on a specific topic, it is much more difficult for media articles where not only movement ideas but also other elements are presented. The concept of claims is used to distinguish movement positions from simple reporting in relation to the organization and thus to identify frame resonance in public. A claim is defined as “*purposive and public articulation of political demands, calls to action, proposals, criticisms, or physical attacks, which, actually or potentially, affect the interests or integrity of the claimants and/or other collective actors*” (Koopmans et al. 2005:24, italics in original).

Claim analysis is often connected to analyzing frames. Koopmans et al. used a model with newspaper covering the protest including claim making, thus the “publicly visible part of claims making” (Koopmans et al. 2005:25). Political claim analysis uses for example protest event analysis but also speeches and public discourses and sees the public action as process of meaning giving with a focus on collective action frames (Koopmans et al. 2005). Koopmans et al. differentiate between locations of claims, the claimants, and forms of claims, the addressee, the content, the object actor and the justification of a claim, which should be identifiable (Koopmans et al. 2005). As part of the thesis, the claim itself, the claimants as well as the addressee are identified. Claims are seen as representing prognostic framing as it represents a demand for a situation to be changed. It can also be related to diagnostic framing where organizations for example criticize torture in prisons and demand it to be stopped. Whether framing is effective also depends on the resonance of frames in public.

Retracing diffusion through mechanisms

The literature on diffusion and outcomes by movements underscores the importance of mechanism of diffusion (Crossley 2016). As shown earlier effects can be direct and indirect

and consequentially mechanisms integrate both channels. Mechanisms for the diffusion of ideas focus on a normative perspective on diffusion and on pressure on the state to adopt a certain framing. On the other hand, mechanisms are not seen uncritical as it is often used as all-encompassing term (Chalcraft 2016). In my research mechanisms are interactions within networks that enable the transmission of ideas and show influence of movements.

Having an impact in terms of this thesis is primarily influencing framings on democracy hold by civil servants in leader positions in ministries. In a second step this impact should translate in policy impact, so the realization or blocking of legislation in the desired – as framed – way. State actors sharing the same framings of democracy are more receptive for other claims. For the realization of a democratic framing, social movements engage in claim making and incorporate democratic elements into their paroles. These claims are shared on a state level via relays, for example movement members that enter government, or connections to official state representatives. Diffusion is achieved through regular exchange that reinforces shared framings. Incorporations of movement actors in state institutions allow to spread the perspective on democracy as well as to promote ideas of democracy indirectly via public opinion or public claims. As outlined by literature expertise equally plays a role.

A first aspect is to identify different channels for diffusion, thus interactions that are able to shape framings in the Tunisian case. From there mechanisms of diffusion are derived. These can be organizational and individual relays or indirect ways via the media. The channels of diffusion also interact with different levels of influence: Based on the distinctions by Burstein and Hirsh that are shared by Amenta, Giugni and Andrews, the ways of influencing can be distinguished in five different categories (Burstein and Hirsh 2007):

- Access responsiveness
- Agenda responsiveness
- Policy responsiveness
- Output responsiveness
- Impact responsiveness

These types of responsiveness of the state system show different entry points for framing of democracy and their degrees. Access responsiveness is for example important for improved

interaction. Being able to set an agenda also stands for master frames, policy responsiveness can show that democratic framing are integrated into policies. Output responsiveness can show that policies including democratic framing are implemented and impact responsiveness is related to the output dimension of democracy. What is taken over from the literature review is that influence can be easier achieved in the early policy formulation process as outlined by Amenta and that Kriesi et al. distinguish between reactive and proactive impact by (Amenta et al. 2010; Amenta 2005; Kriesi et al. 1995).

The role of public opinion but also of direct influence is important. I recall the model on direct, indirect and joint influence by movements. Indirect ways use allies or media to achieve an outcome, direct ways influence the target without relying on other actors. It is probable that direct and indirect ways are used at the same time (joint effect), so that influence is not only achieved through direct interactions, but also through public opinion. The role of former members that enter the political system as well as the integration of movements in policy making process shall be kept in mind. I now turn to an in-depth elaboration on the research questions.

2.6.3 Research questions

While the main research question was already stated in chapter 1.2, this subsection formulates a number of additional questions that guide the thesis as well as the respective chapters. Movements in Tunisia operate in a context that changed with a new constitution as well as a new political system and this poses several questions. Researchers assign that the Tunisian case is a success story, but is this due to the movements' positive influence? Do organizations have a framing towards democracy? Are they impactful because of their pro-democratic framing? And how do they realize that their pro-democratic claims are realized in state administration? As there is limited knowledge on the topic, in particular on the relation towards the state, these questions are addressed as part of the research question. The study takes a social-constructivist approach and starts at a meso-level to analyze collective movement framing with a specific focus on democracy as well as how framings resonate on a state level. The thesis does not only contribute to the analysis of democratic framing, but also to the analysis of state-civil society interactions.

The research question that guides this thesis is:

How does a democratic framing diffuse across actors in Tunisia?

Diffusion is not taken for granted. With the help of additional questions, it is verified whether democratic framing is transmitted before mechanisms are outlined.

This includes the following additional questions:

- How are movements connected to each other and to which degree do they interact?

The first question refers to the inter-actor relations as literature showed that movements take roles and that coalitions exist. The question of possible coalitions allows to determine whether they advocate common or different framings of democracy. In addition, it helps to evaluate whether organizations try to influence the state individually or in cooperation. The network structure and the types of organizations included indicate roles in a coalition.

- Which ties exist between movements and the state and what quality do these have?

The second question asks what types of connections exist between the state and the movements. By analyzing the connections as being allies or partners I can determine whether movements and ministries have close or loose connections. This question becomes important to identify possible mechanisms of influence as the relative importance of for example committees or media work is highlighted.

- Do the analyzed movements, the UGTT, the LTDH, the ATFD, and the FTDES have a collective democratic framing and which elements of a democratic framing are highlighted individually?

The third question asks whether the analyzed organizations have common and/or different framings of democracy. Based on the first question, a possible movement coalition is expected to have a somewhat similar framing with certain differences. The answer to this question allows the comparison to the ministerial perspective that is covered by question four. It allows to evaluate organizational and coalitional frames.

- Do the same framings exist from the state perspective (did movements diffuse their democratic framing)?

The fourth question looks at the democratic framing of civil servants. Their democratic framing is compared to the one held by movements and similarities and difficulties are identified. Similar visions indicate effective mechanisms, so whether the connections between actors allow a certain framing to be adopted. These mechanisms are qualified with the help of interviews in order to determine the causal direction.

- What are the mechanisms used by movements and how effective are these?

The fifth question relates to the mechanisms of influence for a democratic framing. It combines the questions of networks and their quality with the diffusion of ideas. The combination of similar/different framing when comparing organizations and ministries and the quality of networks allows to identify mechanisms of influence. These mechanisms are outlined and illustrated by three examples on law projects that allow to connect the influence in terms of democratic framing to policy influence.

Movements framing and its influence are a focus of research. The analysis is divided into an explorative and an explanatory part. During the explorative phase, ties between movements as well as a democratic framing are identified, while the second phase verifies the realization of a democratic framing on a state level as well as the underlying connecting mechanisms for diffusion. The questions structure the thesis as follows:

Table 2.4 Chapters and research questions

Chapter	Topic	Question
Five	Networks	One, two
Six	Democratic framings by movements	Three
Seven	Democratic framings by ministries	Four
Eight	Diffusion mechanisms and influence	Five

2.6.4 What is expected and what is controlled for

While the approach remains inductive on a number of aspects, some ideas guide the research. For transparency, the initial ideas that oriented the research are outlined briefly. In addition, I identify alternative explanations apart of the main theoretical model that should be kept in mind and be used as control for other explanations.

As outlined earlier, democratic framings are transmitted via direct networks towards the state, indirectly via coalitions and partners as well as via media between movements and the state (joint effect). The stronger a coalition and the more resonance in public opinion, the more do the framings held by the movements and the Tunisian administration resemble. It should be kept in mind that a number of ideas that orient the research base on exploratory research and remain vague. The exploratory nature is also the reason why I do not formulate concrete hypotheses. In addition, theory (for example on outcomes) is difficult to interpret in terms of projected outcomes. Missing knowledge on the functioning of the Tunisian political system cause additional problems for the analysis of diffusion towards the state.

When starting the research, the following ideas oriented the research: First of all, it was assumed, that old coalitions persist, which means that UGTT, LTDH and ATFD - who were all more or less restricted in their work under Ben Ali, but who held contacts before - have close networks. Those three were expected to build a coalition. The FTDES has fewer ties to the old civil society. Interaction is regular for the coalition and limited to the FTDES. When it comes to ministries, literature indicates that expertise on topics plays a role, so movements have closer contacts towards specific ministries in areas where they are experts.

Regarding a democratic framing it was expected that, depending on issues covered and positions, specific elements are highlighted. In a similar sense, the three dimensions control, equality and freedom take a different weight according to organizations, but are in general comparable. Organizations such as the ATFD insist more on equality, while the LTDH focuses on freedoms and human rights. Each organization has some unique combinations of framing, including for example the call for more government stability connected with more participation. As Tunisia is a young democracy, it is possible that democratic framing is not totally clear and can go into different directions for example demanding a stronger state and at the same time more checks and balances. From the state perspective, in case of much interaction between organizations and ministries, ministries and organizations were expected to have similar framings of democracy.

When it comes to how mechanisms are used, movements were expected to rely on the joint effect approach, meaning that they use direct contacts and the public opinion/media/allies at the same time. For example, movements use (former) members that entered the state

apparatus to position their ideas. In addition, they have institutionalized contacts with ministries in order to influence them (relays). For the analysis I look at whether movements have former members in ministries, whether there are institutionalized committees including state actors and civil society, whether movements participate in hearings in parliament or whether open consultations are relevant. Indirect mechanisms are analyzed using the basic distinction between protest activities and media work, both are however seen as linked. When it comes to the media, it was expected that some of the movement frames resonate. The resonating frames do not have to be the same as articulated as important by organizations themselves. When it comes to overall mechanism, we have seen that different stages of the policy process exist. It was expected that the channels and mechanisms used to influence framings differ from one stage to another. As concluded by theory, it was assumed that it is easier to influence early stages.

The actual “state” of democracy has often been analyzed, but the underlying social processes of acceptance or non-acceptance of democracy or types of democracy have not been a focus of research. In addition, a number of elements are tested in a more exploratory way as literature does not give clear indication. Among those are for example whether large or narrow coalitions are more successful and the degree to which framings are shared among actors.

What the literature review could not clarify...

Given the limitations in the literature, some points are difficult to clarify. Some aspects like coalitions are also influenced by choices. While I look at the ideational dimension of coalitions, the rational incentives for coalitions are equally discussed in the literature. Coalitions might thus be purely instrumental and not based on common framings. While this is to be kept in mind, I argue that coalitions based on shared framings are more influential as they do not only rely on instrumental aims that can easily change. While a number of concurrent explications exist, I insist on the elaborated combination of theories on framing, networks and outcomes as this allows to explain more aspects and to draw an extensive picture of perceptions of democracy across movements and the state.

Framing is not without criticism. Contamin identifies a number of limits of the framing approach, namely the difficulty of a circular reasoning where a certain outcome is associated

with a successful framing as well as the danger of analyzing a frame only at a certain time and not the framing processes themselves (Contamin 2009). Contamin also criticizes that a number of studies focus on elite framing and not on the interaction of several frames within a movement, in the media or with respect to opponents (ibid). While the first criticism can only be partially addressed, the second criticism is regarded as interviews might reveal different perspectives. Future research should have a detailed look at the internal frame interactions within each movement to verify the results.

The literature on diffusion showed the major limitation as it is often the international diffusion that is regarded; these political systems under scrutiny are already well researched and do not lack scholarly information as in the Tunisian case. Scholars assign that it is transferable to national political configurations - and some scholars do. Mostly emulation and the normative perspective are seen as useful for the diffusion of democratic framing and movement influence.

Reflections, problems and alternatives

While I do not criticize my own approach, I want to discuss some alternative approaches that were prominent in the literature review and that should be discussed again at the end. Alternative perspectives include institutional or rational choice approaches as well as for example political opportunity structures. Especially the latter orient until today a lot of the literature on outcomes and stand for a number of empirical results making it difficult to sideline it. Here, I outline why some theoretical approaches were seen as less useful than the applied one.

The social movement literature on outcomes is strongly influenced by scholars working on political opportunity structures. While this is not a problem as such, it becomes a small problem for this thesis as current findings on impact and outcomes highlight opportunity structures as foreseen by theory. Consequentially, movement influence is currently regarded from a different perspective as mine. The explanations of outcomes focus on opportunity structures, certainly not because other ways of influence are unimportant, but because it was a focus of analysis.

Amenta, in his political mediation model, argues that challenger's proposals are "mediated by political circumstances", where he especially underlines the openness of the political system towards challenger's arguments, but also other actors (Amenta 2006:8; Amenta et al. 2005). While I take the results especially from Amenta or Kriesi into account, I propose a different reading of influence related to framings and networks. While I do not contend that the context and the design of the political system may play a role, I refer to a rather rhetorical reframing of political opportunity structures. In fact, I argue that political opportunity structures are nothing fixed, but that the interpretation depends on the actual actor's framing. The Tunisian state may be described as democratic, but what that means is actually realized through interactions between the state and other actors (movements, political parties and so on). When the dominant framing describes the democratic state as a direct-democratic state, this could be a dominant framing that shapes the perceived political opportunities for actors. Other actors may oppose different framings of democracy within a state. Depending on the possibility to reframe, to spread a frame or to constitute or challenge a frame, dominant perceptions of a system may change. It thus depends on the stance others take and on counter framing. So, even in autocratic states, perceived opportunities may emerge even if those are in reality – not yet - there, which also explains why it is possible to topple a stable autocratic system.

It needs to be kept in mind, that each theoretical perspective has its weaknesses while it remains important to know which (Kriesi 2009). As mentioned earlier, the focus is on the social construction through interaction and exchange. Thus, the political system is not seen as static, but as continuously negotiated. The political system itself did not create the organizations that emerged in Tunisia – although it speeded up the creation of new civil society organizations – but civil society organizations and other actors shape the configuration of the state. It is more about perceived opportunities than about real ones, and again, when (closed) political opportunity structures failed to explain the initial uprisings, why should they be better suited to explain ongoing democratization? Beinin correctly summarizes that Tunisia did neither show an expansion of civil society nor of new opportunity structures before the uprisings (Beinin 2016). It is the main reason why a focus on social interpretation is used, because democratization is about a constant renegotiation of political structures and policies.

Resource mobilization approaches are not seen as crucial as resources were limited before and during the revolution. The analyzed organizations were coopted or had limited resources available. However, the organizations existed before and were more or less restricted by the state. All organizations had no or limited protest experience with the UGTT having some experience from smaller protest events. Comparing the organizations in terms of size and in terms of resources can control for those resources. The UGTT has most members and resources, while the ATFD has only few members and limited resources. The LTDH has limited resources as well as a limited number of members (but more than the ATFD). For the FTDES no exact numbers on members exist, but it seems that the FTDES has some resources, given the number of employees of the organization. All organizations can attract international donors like Oxfam to finance projects. If resource mobilization theory is true, the UGTT would have most influence, followed by LTDH and FTDES. The ATFD would have least influence.

Finally, other actors are important as well. Similar to Tilly's perspective, social movements are not the only important actor of contentious politics (see for example Tarrow 2008). This means that social movements are only one actor among others including political parties. Scholars underline the role of parties as intermediary between civil society and state actors for successful democratization (Lai and Melkonian-Hoover 2005). While the focus of research is not on political parties, due to a fast-changing party system and unclear positions, their influence on democratization processes can be an "interference" in the transmission of ideas from movements towards the state³². Thus, an alternative explication for the diffusion of ideas is the analysis of the role of political parties for the democratization process. While this is left to other researcher, it is taken into account for the final analysis. It is however kept in mind that political parties in Tunisia are of younger origin without clear positions, reason why movements have been analyzed. Thus, literature on interest groups or political parties is complementary, but is not within the scope of this thesis.

³² While the first elections already took place at the beginning of this research, the positioning of parties was not yet clear. As showed later, only few political parties (namely Nida Tounes and Ennahdha) rest relatively stable on a high level of vote share, while many other parties like the Congress for the Republic have fluctuating support by the population.

2.7 Conclusion to chapter two

The literature review addressed three key aspects, namely networks, framing and diffusion. The theory of the thesis bases on social movement theory with some insights from theories on democracy and policy processes. When combining different theoretical approaches, one needs to ask whether those can be combined or not (see for example della Porta 2014). As discussed earlier, literature on diffusion takes networks as well as framing into account. All three approaches are compatible as networks allow to answer the question how framings travel, while framing helps to assess the content of the framings, in my case with a special focus on democracy. Theories on influence and diffusion highlight the effectiveness of certain mechanisms. While the compatibility is given, it needs to be recalled that a number of aspects remain few discussed in theory and various empty spots exist. As a consequence, a final evaluation of the complementarity is not entirely possible as knowledge might be too limited to identify contradictions.

As mentioned earlier, the theoretical and empirical contributions of the thesis are high. Framings of movements in terms of democracy are not well researched yet. Findings do not only contribute to the debate on movements' theory, but also on democratization. Especially for democratization or transition the literature lacks clear models that are supported by empirical evidence (Almeida 2008; on mobilization and revolutions see also Banegas 1993). Not only is the influence of movements following a revolution not well researched, but also the context. Furthermore, how movements realize their claims in Tunisia is not well researched yet. Very few studies are looking at the meso-level in non-democratic contexts or countries in transition. One of the few exemptions is the book by Almeida on democratization in El Salvador (Almeida 2008; and of course Charles Tilly). The analysis of movements in changing contexts is worth more research to explain processes of democratization from a meso perspective. Movements are a key actor to realize democracy as they fight for rights, use freedom of association and freedom of speech actively. They are thus a vital part of an effective democracy.

Another issue is the use of "Western" concepts that is not only true for democracy, but also for social movement theory that has been rarely applied to the Arab world. Regarding the transferability of "Western" concepts, Gerges states that repertoires and forms of

contentious action are the same, but the context for actors differs (Gerges 2015). Alimi acknowledges differences between contention in authoritarian regimes and contention in other systems, but also between regional or local configurations at the same time and not to exclude Western theories as such (Alimi 2016). Other scholars like Markham warn that scholars should “desist from imposing interpretative or normative frameworks” on the Arab world (Markham 2014:99). I apply those concepts to a new context keeping in mind that they might neither have a perfect fit, nor that the same concepts will be regarded as desirable, something that is evaluated in the end.

I now turn to the points for networks, framing and diffusion that are used for the analysis as shown in Figure 2.5. Networks should allow to retrace contacts towards the state and thus enable the identification of mechanisms of diffusion that can be used in a Tunisian context. In addition, literature discusses expertise and roles as part of movement coalitions as well as the ideal size (even though without clear recommendation on the ideal size for a coalition).

The theoretical perspective on framing outlined different important points. Frames are constructed within social context. Collectively shared frames are not just the aggregate of individual frames, but interact with those and build a collective meaning. The change of framing happens through networks. Interaction in society, where views and attitudes linked to a movement framing are challenged and defended, plays a role.

To realize influence, explanations by theory differ and do not provide clear ways on how movements can influence, but outline several channels and mechanisms. Different stages of the policy process matter for policy influence; it is equally important whether there is openness towards movements by the state and whether for example external expertise is needed. In addition, the direct and indirect model (via public opinion and allies) as well as the joint model (both) of taking influence is discussed in the literature (Figure 2.5). Proactive and reactive influence as well as the influence for different elements of the policy making process are outlined. As recommended by scholars the focus is on mechanisms of diffusion as final influence are mediated by a number of (different) actors in the political system.

Figure 2.5 Important elements of the theoretical framework

Networks	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - indicators for mechanisms - partners and coalitions - expertise and roles
Framing	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - framing and interaction - master frames and frame resonance - democratic framing
Influence and diffusion	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - stages of the policy process - direct/indirect/joint effect - proactive/reactive ---> mechanism of influence

When it comes to framing democracy, the approach used for the Democracy Barometer with three main dimensions and nine elements (three each) is used. Regarding the final influence, several combinations in relation to framings on democracy and networks are possible as Table 2.6 shows: I expect that one and four are in line with my arguments on diffusion, while configurations two and three go against my expectations. Configuration one is seen as influence, while configuration three might lead to desired outcomes for movements, but not due to movements influence. While I am only looking at the transmission towards the state, it cannot be excluded that interactions shape perceptions in both directions, so that not only the perceptions by state representatives are shaped by their interactions with civil society but vice-versa. By verification through interviews the causal direction can be accounted for.

Table 2.6 Configurations

Configuration	Framing Movement-State	Networks
One	Same framing of democracy	Frequent exchanges and discussions
Two	Different framing of democracy	Frequent exchanges and discussions
Three	Same framing of democracy	No exchanges and discussion
Four	Different framing of democracy	No exchanges and discussion

The thesis consists of four empirical chapters focusing on different elements of social movement theory. Table 2.7 summarizes what theory elements become relevant in which chapter. Having outlined the theoretical framework that provides ideas on how to answer the question why movements are impacting the promotion of democracy in Tunisia, I now elaborate on methods suitable for the approach focused on networks, framing and diffusion/influence.

Table 2.7 Chapters and Theory

Chapter	Topic	Theory
Four	Networks	Networks
Five	Democratic framings by movements	Framing
Six	Democratic framings by ministries	Framing
Seven	Diffusion and mechanisms	Networks, framing, influence

Chapter Three

Method

3 How to compare movements and the state on democratic framing

The method chapter introduces the methods used in order to answer the research question on frame diffusion. Chapter one already explained, why Tunisia is a good case to analyze the perceptions on democracy. The second chapter described the three parts of literature that are important, networks, framing and outcomes. The study compares the ideational (and policy) impact of different organizations with the state administration.

The method chapter takes up four elements. First, it outlines the case selection criteria. Second it describes the data collected and its utility for the analysis. Third, and basing on the theory chapter, it outlines the operationalization of concepts. A last step discusses the resulting biases. Strategies to reduce biases like the referral to several sources to reduce selection biases or biases of social desirability are explained.

The chapter starts with an overview on the design and research objects. Here, the four already presented organizations from chapter one as well as the ministries selected are discussed. The section also outlines the differences and similarities across actors that are later used for the comparison of outcomes. Why leaders of organizations are interviewed is

described. The section also gives a short overview on the time of analysis. Having outlined the research *objects*, the chapter continues with describing the ways for analyzing the research *content*. The second section describes the data that has been collected for this research. It discusses why interviews and media, as well as documents have been used and details how those have been collected. The third section discussed the operationalization of networks, framing and outcomes. The indicators for each of the concepts that have been used for the analysis of interviews and media as well as documents are outlined. The last section before the conclusion then takes up the problems encountered and discusses the limits and biases of research.

3.1 Design and Terrain, research objects, level of analysis and timing

3.1.1 Organizations

While the organizations that are analyzed are already outlined in chapter one, this section explains *how* organizations have been selected. Leaders of organizations and a labor union are selected and their framing is compared with civil servants in leading positions³³. The Tunisian political system builds the context in that organizations operate. The comparison centers on mechanisms used and the ideational and policy influence of organizations. The access towards the Tunisian state is expected to vary among organizations, as does the possibility for influencing framing and policies. Each organization will use several mechanisms of transmission; the influence is expected to be different across organizations. However, it needs to be noted that the selection of cases is limited to at least partly influential movements, as irrelevant movements are not visible and no media data exists.

While individuals are interviewed, it is the group level that is important as discussed under 3.3; where a collective framing in terms of democracy is analyzed. It should be kept in mind that there is an on-going exchange between levels. Group perceptions are constructed through social interaction of individuals; a backwards-oriented influence can therefore not be excluded. Individual perceptions and their aggregation on a movement and organizational level (so intra-movement or intra-ministry dynamics) may be a point for further research. The collective perspective is expected to be found particularly among leaders, as those are used to speak on behalf of its constituency in public. The same goes for higher positions in ministries.

³³ A definition of leaders is provided later in this chapter

How organizations were selected

I compare cases to analyze single-movement but also collective influence. A case is described as “a spatially delimited phenomenon (a unit) observed at a single point in time or over some period of time” (Gerring 2007:19f.). The units under analysis are not representative for all organizations, but the case study has advantages for an exploratory research design that appears particularly suited to uncover the democratic framings. The research design uses a cross-case study as described by Gerring (2007). Four organizations of the Tunisian civil society were selected for analysis. Similar to Antonakis-Nashif’s model, civil society organizations in different sectors have been identified (Antonakis-Nashif 2016). For her research she identified gender justice, socio-economic justice and transitional justice as three fields of occupation that are analyzed. While I do not stick to the same fields, I use four different fields to show similarities and differences in democratic framing across different fields of activities.

The selection is based on an initial research for civil society organizations from different thematic sectors. The selection was inspired by the first empirical studies that followed the Uprisings and that mentioned active organizations. In addition, the participant list of the World Social Forum 2013 with organizations from Tunisia was screened. Organizations that then appeared several times during those search processes were estimated as active and potential targets of the research. The organizations were then contacted on the basis of thematic fields of activity, leading to the analyzed and some additional organizations. That organizations formally exist and that they are active are important for this research. It was seen as more probable that established organizations have already developed a relatively clear framing that is identifiable and that active organizations are easier to contact. Chapter one already described the four case organizations so that I recall some elements and explains the selection here.

Especially the UGTT (Union Générale Tunisienne du Travail) served as organization for activism and laboratory during the revolution (Mizouri 2012; Yousfi 2013b). The ATFD (Association tunisienne de femmes démocrates) on the other hand ensured that women were represented in protests during the transition and was also quite developed before the transition (Schraeder and Redissi 2011). Although prominent environmental movements are

difficult to identify, the FTDES (Forum Tunisien pour les Droits Economiques et Sociaux) has been selected as example; it also covers migration and socio-economic rights. However, the FTDES covers similarly other aspects closer to UGTT topics. Despite being a rather young organization, a large number of publications exist on the FTDES facilitating access. While the human rights movement includes international actors like Amnesty International or Oxfam that qualify as NGOs due to missing mobilization on the ground and also have an international scope, one of the best-known actors in the field are the LTDH (Ligue Tunisienne pour la Défense des droits de l'Homme) and the ONAT (Ordre national des avocats tunisiens) that mobilize more on justice. It needs to be acknowledged that information on UGTT and ATFD is more widespread than on FTDES and LTDH. Especially for empirical studies, much more studies exist on the former than on the latter, allowing much more comparisons. It should be kept in mind that the UGTT as a labor union has a different status as negotiator of salaries, but equally mobilizes on social, political and economic problems. The UGTT is thus expected to hold more extensive contacts towards the state and enterprises as part of the tripartite configuration.

The organizations are compared on their democratic framing as well as with the democratic framing of the state. The aim is to verify on possible transmission of democratic framing from movements to the state. All selected organizations are expected to be at least partly successful with different degrees, as will be shown during the analysis. McAdam and Schaffer Boudet warn on selecting on the dependent variable and analyzing only successful movements (McAdam and Schaffer Boudet 2012). As elaborated previously, the selected movements are successful to a certain degree in terms of mobilization, but not necessarily in promoting democracy. Considering influence on policy members, it remains unclear which organization has more and which less access. It can only be expected that the UGTT with its tripartite configuration has a different access and other channels of transmission available. Due to a lack of data and the Tunisian history, when all movements had none up to very limited influence under the Ben Ali regime, there is no pre-existent successful movement in terms of impact. The long-lasting existence can thus not be taken as a criterion for potential impact as the political system changed. In addition, organizations were not selected on the basis of the Nobel Peace Prize, which was just announced after the first wave of interviews,

but which honored two of the selected movements (interviews with a third honored organization were used for comparison).

Another layer for comparison is the thematic orientation of organizations. Why are thematic orientations important? As every organization focuses on another topic, they are expected to have different framings of democracy linked to their field of occupation. The main issues covered are outlined in Table 3.1. The choice of organizations is important, as the chosen organizations are expected to hold different framings on democracy. The UGTT should combine workers' rights and social aspects with democracy. The women movement is expected to focus on women rights and equality, while the LTDH should focus on human rights, freedom of association or freedom of speech. The FTDES is expected to promote environmental aspects, but also to address questions of poverty and social inequality. Those thematic orientations should be logically linked to certain dimensions of democracy and it makes less sense to connect for example women rights with a strong state.

Table 3.1 summarizes some of the major differences across organizations that have been presented before. Organizations vary considerably in size, a point to consider at the end. The last column establishes the distinction between the FTDES and the others as the FTDES was not officially registered under Ben Ali. It can be expected, that its structures and framing may be less developed than the others due to its newer origin. As framing might be limited, it can have negative consequences on their possible influence on the state. The FTDES is expected to show different characteristics in terms of framing or reputation due to its younger origin. From my theoretical perspective, the size or resources should not have an influence on the organizational framing or outcomes and are used for controlling for other factors.

Table 3.1 Differences across organizations

Organization	Main topics	Size ³⁴	Existed officially before uprisings
UGTT	Wage negotiations, social and economic problems, general policies	Seven hundred to seven hundred fifty thousand members	Yes, partly repressed
LTDH	Human rights, torture, security	Four thousand five hundred members	Yes, repressed
FTDES	Environmental rights, migrant rights, general socio-economic rights	Unknown, around ten fixed employees guessed ³⁵ , fluent borders to unorganized movements	No
ATFD	Women rights (equality, own body, sexual rights, workers' rights and so on)	Around one hundred fifty to two hundred active militants	Yes, repressed

³⁴ See chapter one on sources.

³⁵ The number bases on own observation during the visit of their localities in Tunis.

The focus lies on *organizations* that stand for a wider movement due to practical reasons as it is easier to identify organizational leaders than unofficial movement leaders. The organizations that were selected have an elaborated member base and it is expected that members know what the organizations stand for. With newer organizations it would probably be more difficult to identify a group framing as this might still be much discussed. Multiple memberships occur among leaders showing also the connections on an individual level (on multiple membership see Diani 2015; Carroll and Ratner 1996; Knoke and Wisely 1990; Cornwell and Harrison 2004).

It was planned to include further organizations that work on additional subjects. Ennahdha as an Islamic actor was initially planned to be included (party with origins in a movement that still has a movement section³⁶). It would have been interesting as divergent views exist between Ennahdha and the UGTT (Yousfi 2013b). It would have allowed to test whether a different perspective on democracy gets resonance in public and/or among civil servants. Access to interview partners showed particularly difficult and it was finally excluded.

In addition, the target of three interviews per organization has not been reached for organizations working on justice, but also human rights (ONAT), on capacity building (PASC as well as Jamaity), on social issues (OTDS) and on youth and democracy (TUN'Act). While interviews have been conducted with the organizations with less than three interviews, interviews were not analyzed systematically and serve as comparison especially as all except the ONAT represent organizations founded after the end of the Ben Ali regime. This layer of comparison of organizations founded after the revolution and those before is consequentially restricted to the comparison between the FTDES and others. The selection is not exhaustive and does not represent the entire Tunisian civil society.

Why are at least three leaders necessary for organizations to be included? To reduce individual perspective biases, the target of at least three interviews per organization has been identified because those allow comparing across individuals on similarities and differences. It also allows to decide when two interviews show the same and a third

³⁶ The movement section is an organizational part of Ennahdha, the organizational structure distinguishes between a party section and a movement section, the latter used for mobilization. As Ennahdha was initially not a political party, the second section still persists.

something different. At least three interviews were achieved for the UGTT, the ATFD, the LTDH, and the FTDES.

The selection of interviewees was based on the national level; regional leaders have not been included in line with the research focus on the national level³⁷. As Tunisia is a very centralized country where main organizations need a representation in the capital, the study focusses solely on Tunis (Antonakis-Nashif 2016).

What is a leader?

Leaders of all selected organizations have been interviewed. A leader is a person involved in the management of the organization. The leader takes over responsibility for the discourse and/or action dimension (Giugni and Passy 1998). In my case, members of the national executive committee or presidents as well as their deputies have been contacted. The interviews are thus expected to represent the organizational perspective.

The selection of leaders of organizations is important as those frequently speak on behalf of the organizations and are consequentially capable to express organizational perspectives and not individual ones. This basic statement is important for the quality of the research. If leaders would have expressed personal perspectives, I could not speak about the organizational perspective. As a consequence, careful attention to the insistence on the collective perspective is given during interviews. In addition, interviews are verified afterwards, whereas the number of at least three interviews per organization is important.

3.1.2 State

Ministries have been chosen as they are highly involved in policy formulation. The choice of ministries was based on the initial responses by movement leaders. Keeping in mind that relevant ministries should be analyzed; the ministries have been contacted after movement leaders indicated that they interact with the respective ministries. The ministry selection bases on the question on which ministries they cooperate with. After a first evaluation of this question, ministries have been identified. Due to the different fields of activity, many different ministries were contacted as those were indicated by organizations³⁸. Especially

³⁷ The exact selection procedure is detailed under 3.3.1.

³⁸ A list of all interviews and the respective ministries is found in the Annex, included ministries are the Ministry of Women and Family, the Ministry of Industry, the Ministry of Tourism, Ministry of Youth and Sports, the Ministry of Education, the Ministry of Finance, the Ministry of the Interior, the Ministry of Habitation, the

the FTDES and the UGTT leaders mentioned many different ministries with only few (for example the one on Religious Affairs) that were not discussed. Some ministries like the ones on Social Affairs, Relations with Civil Society and the Institutions as well as the Ministry of the Interior have been frequently evoked. As for organizations, ministries do not represent the entire Tunisian state that would also include regional as well as state-sponsored organizations. The research is consequentially limited to specific ministries. Two relevant ministries could not be included in the analysis as they did not reply to frequent requests, namely the Ministry of Social Affairs as well as the Ministry of Justice (the latter being crucial for the LTDH). Consequences will be discussed later when discussing biases.

Civil servants interviewed in ministries represent higher levels (at least head of section) as those should be capable to speak on behalf of the ministry. Preference was given to include many ministries to see whether there is a common state perspective. The analysis is focused on the general state perspective and not on the individual ministries as the aim is to identify mechanism for frame transmission that are valid across ministries. Again, only collective perspectives are analyzed, leaving individual perspectives aside. On both side compound players are regarded.

Comparing the impact on ministries across organizations

For this thesis four civil society organizations and their democratic framings are analyzed and compared. After assessing the democratic framings, these framings are compared with what can be found on the site of the state as well as in public opinion. The comparison indicates which movement has more influence and which frames are repeated most. The idea is to account for the direct and indirect effects (as well as joint) as outlined in the theory chapter.

As Amenta et al. underline in relation to outcomes and social movements, comparative designs analyzing several movements can reveal the influence of these (Amenta et al. 2010). They argue to compare across issues and beyond the agenda setting stage (ibid). By using the cross-organizational comparison in my case, it becomes possible to relate the differences in ideational impact to networks and democratic framing.

Ministry of Relations with Civil Society and the Institutions, the Ministry of Regional Development, the Ministry of Agriculture and the Presidency of the Government.


The research design focuses only on the differences between movements and not on the differences across space (different regions) or time (before and after the revolution for example). Although the other two dimensions are equally important, this research focusses on the differences between movements due to limited data and because very few research exists on the actual situation. The data generated is seen as rich in validity for the actual situation, but is not very reliable as any research during other moments or other locations will generate different results. A comparison across space in Tunisia makes less sense in my case, as Tunis as Tunisian capital and level for discussions between groups and ministries is the focus of research.

3.1.3 Timing

I shortly introduce the time frame to situate the analysis in the context of the democratization process in Tunisia. As we see from Figure 3.2 the analysis was conducted when democratization processes are ongoing. The initial uprisings were already over as a new constitution has been accepted and first elections took place. The time horizon of the analyses ranges from January 2015 to December 2016. The research design is not longitudinal and the period is not determined by any important event. The study uses one point in time of the transformation to analyze the framings on democracy and the influence on state institutions. This point in time could have been any point, as the influence of movements should be measurable at different points, although with different degrees. The data collection period is influenced by practical reasons as the data collection plan was ready at the beginning of 2015. Interviews started mid-2015 and ended in 2016, the timing for media data was set so that it also covers few months before and few months after the interviews to gain a broader picture. It is expected that perceptions of democracy become more stable sometime after the uprisings and thus starting around four years after the uprisings appears as a good starting point.

As outlined in chapter one, the period includes one change of the prime minister, a reshuffle of the government as well as a change of the strongest bloc in parliament due to changed membership of parliamentarians. The change of the prime minister can be considered as important event. Terrorism was another important issue during the time of analysis as 2015 occurred an attack in Sousse and end of 2016 in Tunis.

Figure 3.2 Focus of analysis



A longitudinal design would have enabled retracing the changed importance of social movement actors for the state and their changed perspectives of framing; however, that is not an aim of this research. It is the purpose to give a detailed explanation of the situation at the point of analysis in order to build a basis for future research.

It cannot be excluded that the situation as found in 2015/2016 already changed by the time of writing, however the political system is more stable than in the first years after the initial uprisings leading up to the new constitution and first free elections. The next section looks at the data that has been collected for this thesis.

3.2 Data

3.2.1 Three sources of data

As existing data does not focus on democratic framing, mechanisms and networks, own data collection was crucial from the beginning. The thesis uses three sources of data, namely interviews with movement leaders and civil servants, newspaper articles (from the newspaper website), as well as documents from the organizations. As Tunisia is a non-Western context and concepts may be realized differently, qualitative data collection is important to identify key elements before engaging in further research. The limited knowledge on the functioning of the political system in Tunisia, but also on movements emphasized primary data collection. The decision for written and spoken words goes back to Benford and Snow, who state that frames emerge through discursive – including talk,

speeches or written documents which serve as frame articulation and punctuation - framing to achieve defined goals and contest processes (Benford and Snow 2000).

Similar to those authors, the most original framing is seen to be found in discussions, speeches and organizational documents. As seen earlier in chapter two, priority is given to perceived interactions and interpretations of democracy as part of a democratic framing. The method used acknowledges this orientation towards ideational influence and looks at those interpretations. As we have also seen in chapter two, effects can be direct, indirect or joint which necessitates not only to regard the direct effects between actors (analyzed through interviews), but also to account for the indirect effects (analyzed through media analysis).

I collected data in several steps as Table 3.3 shows, starting with interviews with organizational leaders and organizational documents to identify important actors and framing elements. Interviews with ministries followed, to search and probe for details. In addition, ministries that were named in the first step were contacted. In a third stage newspaper articles were analyzed for the influence on public opinion. This was done after having a first idea on actors and topics (thus after the first interviews with organizations) and started at the same time as interviews with state representatives (and closed a bit later). Part one preceded the others because it identified targeted ministries and highlighted and verified important framing elements that were then used for the newspaper analysis. Articles allow to verify the ties of movements when they published for example common claims. In cases where coalitions demanded change, those were equally coded for analysis.

In function of the respective chapter and research question, these different sources serve different purposes as Table 3.4 summarizes. For the chapter on networks, interviews are the primary data, as they allow to qualify networks and to identify “friends and foes”; articles are used to verify those connections – although to a limited extent - as well as to control, whether those ties are equally perceived by media.

Table 3.3 Parts of data collection

Part	Data collection	Reach
Part One (Organizations)	Qualitative data collection through interviews with movement leaders and document analysis	At least three leaders of each organization are interviewed on the organizational framing and networks/ acceptance, targeted ministries are identified
Part Two (State)	Qualitative data collection through interviews with civil servants	State representatives interviewed on the framing and the relations towards the analyzed organizations
Part Three (Public Opinion)	Analysis of secondary data derived from the two newspapers	Newspaper articles analyzed on the frame resonance in public and whether ties/coalitions are mediatized

The chapter on framings by movements is based on interviews. Articles are used in order to account for the indirect diffusion of frames via the media and are searched for frame resonance, so whether specific frames by movements are overtaken in articles. While interviews allow authentic descriptions of democratic framings, the articles enable to control whether those framings are transmitted to a wider audience. In addition, it helps to identify frames that “perform well” or that resonate in the public sphere. Given the theoretical framework of direct and indirect effects (chapter two), it appears crucial to account for both ways adequately. Having an original and mediated form of democratic framing for each organization allows to evaluate whether both resemble and if not, whether one of both is similar to the perspective hold by state actors.

For the chapter on framings in ministries, only interviews with civil servants build the data to identify frames that resonate with civil servants. It is not complemented by media data, as the data collection for articles focused on organizations and a separate search for ministries would have produced a huge amount of additional data that would not have been possible to analyze in the same time frame. It appeared unclear whether ministries engage also in “claim-making” in a wider sense and whether this is mediatized. Initial searches raised doubts.

The chapter on diffusion and mechanisms relies on interviews and media analysis. In the following I outline the data types and data collection strategies.

Table 3.4 Sources of data and chapters

Chapter	Topic	Type of data
Four	Networks	Interviews, (media analysis)
Five	Democratic framings by movements	Interviews, media analysis, documents
Six	Democratic framings by ministries	Interviews
Seven	Diffusion and mechanisms	Interviews, media analysis

3.2.2 Interviews – analyzing the perceptions of interviewees

Qualitative methods are used to evaluate frames into categories, as they are seen as particularly useful in analyzing meaning construction in a context where little is known and where aspects shall be clarified (see Blee and Taylor 2002 on little researched phenomena or Lilleker 2003 on clarification). Therefore, interviews are preferred for the first verification of the most important elements of a democratic framing.

Structure and form of interviews

The qualitative data consists of in-depth interviews with movement leaders and state representatives (compare on in-depth interviews: McGivern 2006; Legard et al. 2003; Robson 2005). The interviews are similar to those described by Garraud or Kvale and Brinkmann using an interview guide – tested during the first interviews – which is not followed completely depending on the discussion (Garraud 1999; Kvale and Brinkmann 2009; 11.1 Interview Guides and materials). The interview guide developed with an increasing number of interviews, however only minor changes were made³⁹. The interviews were semi-structured using a general outline and allowed for probing where necessary (Johnston 2014; Blee and Taylor 2002.). The interview guide was not openly visible to interviewees; however, it was clear that I followed the guide in order to increase seriousness and perceived competencies (Beaud 1996).

During the interviews, it was necessary to keep the interviewees focused on the researched topic, a problem already encountered by other researchers (Blee and Taylor 2002). Therefore, it was prompted for details and questions were re-introduced during interviews. The interviews used ground mapping, dimension mapping, probing questions and perspective-widening questions (Legard et al. 2003; Savarese 2002; Axinn and Pearce 2006). The interviews followed Cohen's recommendation to pose questions to precise elements

³⁹ The interview guides can be found in the Annex under 11.1.

and to verify the interpretation (“if I got it right then your position...”) or to oppose positions by contradicting arguments (for example “you said freedom of speech is important, but is this also true for radical actors who might call for violent action?”; Cohen 1999a). Equally, positions were affirmed or questioned by the referral to media articles and the like to push interviewees for further elaboration (Lilleker 2003). In the beginning open questions were asked to let the interviewee develop some ideas for later referral (Beaud 1996).

Blee and Taylor acknowledge the importance of interviews to assess the construction of meaning and perceptions (Blee and Taylor 2002). However, as interviews were contextual, Blee and Taylor recommend to use other data collection techniques in combination with interviews (Blee and Taylor 2002). This recommendation is realized by adding internal text documents, as well as information that circulate in the media to not only rely on interviews.

Number of interviews and conditions

The initially envisaged number of interviews with organizations was higher than the realized twenty-five interviews due to problems with Ennahdha and other practical limitations; thirty interviews were planned in order to include several organizations with several leaders. A minimum of three interviews per organization was envisaged to reduce individual perception biases.

Table 3.5 shows interviews by organization. A number of additional interviews with other organizations were conducted to ensure comparability towards the larger civil society. All interviews were transcribed and imported in NVivo for comparison, but only the interviews of the four selected organizations were analyzed in detail. Some of the transcriptions were made by externals and were consequentially verified afterwards⁴⁰.

⁴⁰ Externals had to sign a letter of confidentiality to secure anonymity as transcribers heard the voice as well as later anonymized elements. Own transcriptions were also checked again.

Table 3.5 Number of interviews by organization

Organization	Number of Interviews
UGTT	7
ATFD	5
LTDH	4
ONAT	2
FTDES	3
TUN'Act	1
OTDS	1
PASC	1
Jamaity	1
Total	25

For the state representatives, ten interviews were envisaged; thirteen have been realized as Table 3.6 shows. The problem of individual perspectives was the same and the interviewer insisted on the collective framing of the state. Contrary to the interviews with movements, where the focus laid on at least three interviews, the interviews with ministries aimed for a large number of ministries to identify possible divergences of the state perspective. Relevant ministries were identified during the interviews with organizations to exclude those that hold no ties to the mentioned movements. Interviews were conducted with the following ministries:

Table 3.6 Number of Interviews by ministry

Organization	Number of Interviews
Ministry of Women and Family	2
Ministry of Industry	1
Ministry of Tourism	1
Ministry of Youth and Sport	1
Ministry of Education	1
Ministry of Finance	1
Ministry of the Interior	1
Ministry of Habitation	1
Ministry of Relations with Civil Society and the Institutions	1
Ministry of Regional Development	1
Ministry of Agriculture	1
Presidency of the Government	1
Total	13

Two interviews were conducted with the Ministry of Women and Family (hereafter Ministry of Women). The second one was accepted to verify the first one. A very short interview with

the Ministry of Agriculture does not qualify as a complete interview and was used to supplement the other interview with a civil servant from this ministry.

Interviews took between twenty minutes and two hours with an average duration of sixty-six minutes and were conducted in French (not the mother tongue of interviewees, but due to the wide acceptance of French in Tunisia a minor problem as will be discussed later). The time was indicated with one to one and a half hour, while few interviewees were available for only twenty minutes.

With confirmation of the interviewees the interviews were recorded which was in all cases except four no problem. The interviewees who rejected did this by principle or by fear that their position could be revealed (ministries) as they explained. In those cases, notes were taken simultaneously and transcribed afterwards. The transcriptions of the interviews that were not recorded were made out of memory approximately one hour after the interview. This follows Lilleker's guidelines not to rely on own memory for longer than a few hours following the interview (Lilleker 2003). Although the memory was still recent, the wording is not completely equal to other interviews. The interviews were consequentially treated with caution and used for additional information mainly.

Interviewees were informed on the use of the anonymized data in written form to ensure transparency towards interviewees as part of the research ethics (Kvale and Brinkmann 2009). All interviewees received a letter on the utilization of the information (especially the anonymous use of their answers) and on the subject of study including contact information of the researcher (Annex 11.1 provides an example of a contact letter as well as the letter on data use and anonymity). Third persons that appeared on recordings are marked as third person speaking or interruption while their speech was not transcribed. Anonymity of answers is guaranteed to build a higher confidence level, especially given the autocratic history of the country. In addition, the anonymity allowed for a freer speech, at the same time increasing the danger of personal perspectives that were expressed during interviews.

Slight modifications are made when transferring oral speech to a written text as the logic of both types of expression is different (Kvale and Brinkmann 2009). The spoken words for

example often included repetitions of words that are neither useful for analysis nor easy to read. However, no content has been changed and hesitations that are important for understanding are left in the citations.

Most of the interviews were face-to-face; only one interview with a leader from the ONAT was made by phone due to incapability to travel to Tunis on short notice. Not all interviews took place in offices of the interviewees; especially leaders of organizations were sometimes interviewed in cafés. It does not seem that they restricted their speech in public places when comparing interviews. For the quality of recordings this did not play a great role as most of the records were understandable notwithstanding some noise in the background.

All interviewees learned that it is a study on the role of movements and civil society for democratization in Tunisia. During the interviews no problems with unpleasant questions occurred, but some questions remained unanswered. At the beginning of the interview, it was made sure, that interviewees understood that I am a researcher. Occasionally, some interviewees tested whether I would be a journalist similar to what Savarese describes and some reservations were overcome (Savarese 2002).

The interviews include three waves, namely: September 2015, November 2015 and November 2016. The last wave focused on interviews with ministries. The time frame for conducting interviews was rather short and fits what Lieberman describes as prepared visits with a clear schedule for meetings and a clear focus on the content with the disadvantage of missing integration in communities (Lieberman 2004b). The stays allow to identify context specific aspects as visits can be compared. Time specific answers can thus be better identified.

How leaders got selected

Interviewees were selected by a non-random selection process and an additional snowball system. Purposive sampling as outlined by Weisberg, Krosnick and Bowen was performed respecting the careful selection process of leaders but creating problems in terms of generalization (Weisberg et al. 1996). As leaders are expected to “know” their organization best, a non-random selection process appears appropriate. A random selection of leaders would have been difficult, as there are only few and the research relies on the availability of

movements leaders and state representatives. Cohen underlines the difficulties in interviewing leaders which are occupied and not always open towards interviews as those give insights about their specialized knowledge (Cohen 1999b). A bias as outlined by Garraud exists as probably the interviewees most interested and most favorable towards the research participated (Garraud 1999).

Leaders were contacted using different approaches. First of all, the best-positioned leaders were contacted. These steer the respective organizations and should consequentially be able to take the organization's position. Thereafter, a snowball method was used, asking committee members whether they know other influential persons. A similar method (snowball and leaders) has been used by Carroll and Ratner (Carroll and Ratner 1996). The selection method bases on a combination of positional selection and reputational selection where the second is based on a snowball method. The snowball method was not the principal method in order to avoid interviewing a group of people that already cooperates closely.

Ideally, potential interviewees reacted on the first contact, normally by email. It was expected, that field visits enable to build a wider network of potential interviewees and points of contact for further interviews. This showed true as the main contact in the following was by telephone. This procedure also depends on what Ostrander describes as approaching the "right" person (in the right order), which remains difficult to verify in the end (Ostrander 1993).

Potential problems

Cautious about the role of leaders, Krinsky and Crossley noted that "those people *designated* as leaders in a community are not necessarily the *real* leaders" (italics in original, Krinsky and Crossley 2013:2). This kept in mind; the combination of reputational and positional selection should have reduced the bias. However, the availability of top-leaders was restricted by time and language constraints.

Another emerging bias includes the language. Interviewees were contacted in French excluding those who only speak Arabic. One may argue that the most "Westernized" leaders have been interviewed which consequentially causes biases. This bias is only partly reduced

by the documents as those are again probably translated by the most Westernized who speak and write French. As a conclusion, the perspective on democracy is probably too Westernized.

Beside the issues of availability and language skills, as well as the interest in the research, another aspect appeared during the interviews: Polletta et al. noted that “people usually end up conforming to the stories that are expected from them” and interviewees were telling several stories about their organization (Polletta et al. 2011:116). Thus, one may argue that apart from social desirability probably saying something positive about Tunisian democracy to a Western researcher played a role and influences their narrative towards what is expected of them. This includes the advantage that those leaders tend to speak for the organization as this is expected of them and can put own positions aside. It has been emphasized in every interview that the conversation is about organizational and not personal perspectives. The data has been compared afterwards with other sources.

The profile of the interviewees is diverse but bound to age groups between thirty and sixty-five years (with notably one exception from the leadership of the youth section of the UGTT). In addition, at least for the ATFD, the FTDES and the LTDH, leaders had a higher educational status as they finished university. This is to a lower degree true for UGTT leaders; student union activism was important for the first engagement of a number of leaders. A specific referral to academia was mentioned during interviews with FTDES, ATFD and LTDH leaders. However, no detailed questions on personal backgrounds were posed as the focus lies on collective levels (the interview guide including some questions is found in Annex A).

How state representatives got selected

The sampling strategy for state representatives relies on the cooperation of the ministry. While the respective ministry as a whole is contacted separately, individual contacts are established as well. Ideally, movement leaders mentioned some contact persons in ministries, which could have been contacted for confirmation or rejection of the movement’s access point. Unfortunately, movement leaders were cautious in revealing contact persons in ministries (or there was no concrete person which appears rather improbable). As most ministries in Tunisia have a responsible for relations with civil society,

this person was contacted first as it was expected that the person can confirm or deny regular contacts between a specific organization and the ministry. The availability of interviewees in ministries was however not always given and depended also on the openness of ministries. It can be expected that ministries, who perceive their contacts as too limited or too broad, may not want to discuss those in an interview.

Interview partners were searched to be in leader positions in a ministry. In ministerial terms that means the person interviewed needed to be at least Head of Section. Beneath the official channels and snowball methods when interviewing civil servants, online research was used to identify the responsible for relations with civil society as well as additional people in leading positions. The choice was not on the highest level of the ministerial hierarchy as those were expected to have limited time resources (minister or members of the highest hierarchical level). In addition, Cohen as well as McAdam and Schaffer Boudet describe that the second rank is an important and useful source of information as those are easier available and hold similar knowledge to the first rank (Cohen 1999a; McAdam and Schaffer Boudet 2012).


Consequentially, directors or deputy-directors have been approached, as well as special advisors on relations with the civil society. The interviewees thus represent a medium level of the ministerial hierarchies. If no responsible for relations with the civil society could be identified, leaders from the Head of Section level upwards have been contacted leading to a number of directors as final interviewees. Higher levels have more freedom to respond to requests by researchers than the lowest level; be it to train themselves in communication or to get additional information about civil society or to get external views.

Interview topics of movement leader interviews

Figure 3.7 shows the general topics of leader interviews. I started with a presentation before coming to an organizational framing. The interview topics include the three dimensions of democracy as identified by the Democracy Barometer. Their relative importance and the evaluation of the dimensions were included. Notwithstanding the democratic framing of the organization, other explanations for a movement's access to the state were analyzed (such as resources). This included questions on whether interviewees think they are successful in their activities or whether they can name failures. In addition, ties towards other civil society

actors were asked, so whether specific actors are categorized as allies, partners or opponents. The detailed interview guide can be found in the Annex under 11.1.

Figure 3.7 Interview topics of movement leader interviews




Interview topics of state representative interviews

Figure 3.8 shows the topics covered in interviews with civil servants. The interview topics of the state representative interviews resemble those of the leader interviews (with the exception of questions on success/failure). The state's position on democracy is demanded and the possible relations towards organizations are compared. However, as the internal organization and the resources of the state are not important to determine whether movements have success or not, those are not included. The detailed interview guide for these interviews is also available in the annex under 11.1.

One of the interviews (with a representative of the Ministry of Education) needs to be handled with care as the person answered many questions affirmative. In comparison to the other interviews (where interviewees posed questions or opposed views), it might be that the person tended to say what the person thought was desired. This becomes more evident when the person answers very superficial when prompting for details. The interview is treated carefully and only few sentences that seem to represent the interviewees' experiences in the ministry are taken over. This is not to say that the same did not happen with other interviews, a bias that is difficult to account for; but in comparison to the other interviews it was clearer that there is a problem with this specific interview. It might also

show that the person did not have the experience be it with the language or in talking to researchers.

Figure 3.8 Topics Interviews ministries



Having outlined the way interview data was collected, I now turn to the media data.

3.2.3 Accounting for the public, analyzing the media

As mentioned in the theory chapter, it is possible to have direct and indirect (as well as joint) effects (section 2.2). The aim of this section is to explain how the indirect effects have been accounted for. As indirect effects use for example public opinion or the media, newspaper articles on the organizations are analyzed in order to identify what frames resonate in public. Therefore, claims of movements have been analyzed on their framing and are at the end compared to the ministerial framing. This procedure is accompanied by questions on the media use to civil servants, where it is revealed whether they regard the media and its content or only regard content that is transmitted through direct interaction. Those questions were linked to the questions on democracy and freedom of speech and where thus integrated in the section on frames on democracy (3.3).

How articles were selected

The second part of the content analysis consists of a detailed media analysis of selected key media in Tunisia. The focus lies on public claims that can be identified in articles. Networks are not the principal focus when analyzing media due to missing information on allies and cooperation, however, articles can indicate relations between actors. The media analysis

reveals the attention organizations get in terms of coverage, but are also used for triangulation, to confirm information from interviews (Lilleker 2003).

The two main French speaking newspapers La Presse and Le Temps are analyzed. Although little data on printed numbers is available, La Presse is the most important newspaper in French, Le Temps with estimated six-thousand to seven-thousand printed newspapers daily the second largest (Revello 2018). Both newspapers were selected after a first research that identified them as the most important daily newspapers. They have both the advantage of having an extensive online catalogue that covers their articles and that has a search function.

The time span of articles is similar to the interviews and includes the period from January 2015 to December 2016. Due to the search function, the whole period can be exactly covered. The two newspapers belong to different editorial houses (Le Temps to Dar Assabah part of Al Karama holding (Revello 2018), La Presse as former coopted media under Ben Ali became independent after the revolution, similar for Dar Assabah which did not report for all protest events during the Ben Ali period; Hmed 2015; DeGeorges 2013). Dar Assabah also publishes in Arab.

Johnston recalls that speech can be prepared for different audience which is effectively the difference towards the interviews (Johnston 1995). While interviews are discussions (with a researcher), media articles are announcements covered by the media (ibid). The media equally reports about declarations that are directly addressed towards government. When comparing interview and media data, the second is clearly public, while the first one is of private nature (ibid).

The media analysis is bound to the analyzed organizations. The search for media articles is actor centered and starts with the claimant. A comparable model with search for organization names was used by Andrews and Caren (Andrews and Caren 2010). A separate search for each organization in the online data catalogue of each newspaper was done; Table 3.9 shows the number of articles by each organization. The search was based on the abbreviations of each organization as these are frequently used in Tunisia and are easier to identify than the complete name which may be slightly different or abbreviated in some

cases. Thus, the search for abbreviations appears to give more valid results. Table 3.9 shows that reporting was by far strongest for the UGTT followed by FTDES and LTDH. Le Temps reports less on all organizations, for LTDH and FTDES much less (a list of all article including titles and subtitles can be found in the annex). The table also shows that the analysis of the ATFD bases on much less articles than for the other organizations, potentially creating a bias as the resonance may be influenced by few articles.

Table 3.9 Number of articles for each organization

Search word	Le Temps	La Presse	Total
ATFD	16	22	38
FTDES	24	113	137
LTDH	27	109	136
UGTT	489	502	991

As separate searches are conducted, the same article can appear several times in this overview. For analysis, articles naming several organizations are kept separate as the analysis is focused on each organization. I also verified whether the other organizations have been mentioned in articles on the respective organization. There was effectively more overlap for La Presse in comparison to Le Temps, meaning that there were more articles mentioning more than one of the analyzed organizations. This overlap touches especially the articles on the FTDES as well as those of the LTDH in La Presse where the UGTT was named. Especially the articles on the LTDH showed many mentions of the UGTT. The articles are consequentially studied with more attention and coding is verified to really include claims of the LTDH⁴¹.

As researchers note, the extent and content of media coverage indicate a movement’s strength (Kolb 2007; Andrews and Caren 2010). Media coverage is by far wider for the UGTT than for the other organizations representing also the different sizes of the organizations (as already indicated in chapter one). Organizations appear as more or less newsworthy depending on how they position themselves on a topic, but larger organizations are also covered more often due to higher (perceived) social significance (Andrews and Caren 2010). Coverage of the ATFD is limited; something already found by other researchers. Khalil and

⁴¹ An article can include an UGTT claim and being coded under LTDH, but may include no LTDH claim. It then would only be coded as UGTT claim.

the ATFD itself underline that media reports rarely on the ATFD or women issues (Khalil 2014; ATFD 2011b).

Andrews and Caren argue that organizations with contact to the government will receive more attention than organizations that target the media or hold demonstrations in comparison to organizations that use outsider tactics (Andrews and Caren 2010). This indicates that the UGTT might be closer to the government, something discussed later in the analysis.

Potential problems

There are nevertheless some problems with the use of newspapers for data generation. It needs to be kept in mind that newspapers are not the only source of information, but that television and internet platforms like Facebook and Twitter also play an important role (Woodly 2015; Kahlaoui 2013). Thus, it catches a more formalized debate where editors serve as filters of messages issued by organizations. It does not show the complete picture of contestation, creating limits in reach for the thesis. A sample selection bias can occur related to the internal organization of media outlets in terms of deadlines, characteristics of events, reporting on major or minor events and journalistic norms of the political perspectives that are driven forward by a newspaper (Trevizo 2006; Earl et al. 2004; Woodly 2015). Investigative journalism is not seen as frequent in Tunisia (ATFD 2011b). In addition, the newspaper only catches a part of the discussion in Tunisia as Arabic newspapers are excluded due to resource restrictions. While it is assumed that the media outlets “simply” translate their Arab articles to French, it is not clear whether all articles are available in both languages or whether modifications occur. In this sense, the debate in Arabic might be slightly different from the public debate in French, creating an additional limitation.

Given the problems, it is important to use more than one newspaper. The use of at least two newspapers already accounted for more unique events in the case of event analysis and augmented data for analysis (Earl et al. 2004). This should be similar for democratic framing that will be covered differently across newspapers. It should also be kept in mind that different newspapers report differently on the same organization (Andrews and Caren 2010). The ATFD criticizes that La Presse and also Le Temps often do not publish neutral information, Le Temps even ignoring the code of conduct among journalists (putting sources

for opinion polls and so on; ATFD 2011b). This lack of professionalism also of the Tunisian Press Agency (TAP) is criticized by scholars like Klaus or Dakhli (Klaus 2017; Dakhli 2013). However, while media has been criticized of repeating paroles of political actor, it allows assessing a more original argumentation by organizations, less filtered by journalists.

How media got analyzed

After the initial search for organizations, the articles are regarded one by one and claims are identified. Those claims are then coded under the dimensions of democracy, targets mentioned as well as other aspects that emerged. La Presse and Le Temps are analyzed on whether movements succeeded in positioning their framings on democracy in the public sphere (as well as whether they build networks). The media analysis allows to retrace the combinations of framing that resonate in public as well as interactions of organizations.

The frames are analyzed under three characteristics: all content of frames, the combinations of frames and whether frames get repeated. While the repetition itself does not say anything about the importance for the organizations, it nevertheless reflects the resonance in public, so whether media outlets evaluate the frames as important. Combinations illustrate what dimensions of democracy get combined. Each article has been regarded and coded according to the same approach as for interviews. The content of frames in terms of democracy has been coded for each article individually. Search word-based coding was used in addition. Every article thus went through a double process of manual verification, as well as search word-based coding for the most important topics like democracy⁴². For some chapters specific searches have been conducted. For the second part of the chapter seven for example, a text search in NVivo for exactly three key words/word combinations (terrorisme, reconciliation and harcèlement sexuel⁴³) has been done.

The links towards other organizations, the abbreviation, the official name or modified versions are coded (for example: Ordre des Avocats or ONAT, Ministère de la Formation professionnelle et de l'emploi, Ministère de l'emploi, Ministère du travail). The majority of organizations were already known through interviews, other organizations came up during the media analysis.

⁴² "double codings" are excluded as Nvivo automatically summarizes the same nodes at the same place.

⁴³ for the FTDES harcèlement sexuel produced no results, so sexual violence was used as a proxy.

It should be noted, that during the time of interviews and media analysis, the composition of government changed and some ministries disappeared. Nevertheless, media analysis for the organizations is performed on the basis of both compositions of government, thus including the Essid and the Chahed government. Data from interviews and media is supplemented by organizational documents.

3.2.4 Reports by organizations on democracy

Frames and discourses are not only part of speeches, but also of documents (Johnston 2002). A third part of the data are documents of and on the four organizations, explaining their framing. Those documents were for example found on the organizational website or were provided by the leaders. In addition, a number of scientific articles as well as reports supplement the perspective, especially on the UGTT.

How documents got selected and analyzed

The key documents of the organizations are normally found on their website, Facebook page or are distributed by the leaders during interviews. In addition, scientific and journalistic documents on the organization are searched separately. Documents have been filtered on whether they include general framings and/or the concrete perspective on democracy. It is to recall that the documents are used to verify elements of the organizational framing. In the case of organizational publications, those represent internal, pure and unfiltered arguments nevertheless prepared for a public audience. It is to emphasize that the internal and external documents by/on movements differ in their content and are thus regarded under different perspectives. Internal documents present the movement perspective in a written form and summarize consensual points articulated by the organizations. They thus allow to identify the individual perspective of interviewees that may have created biases for the organizational perspective. The documents external to the organizations are regarded from a different angle as those have already been filtered by another actor. Even movement publications can differ in the content that may be prepared for the public or only for internal purposes.

The documents have been sampled to get the most information possible. It is possible that the selected documents are not the most important ones for the organizations themselves. Unfortunately, no minutes from meetings and thus purely internal documents could be

obtained (despite asking). However, careful research allows to select the documents where elements of democracy are included. Purely technical reports for example are excluded. As the documents were selected on whether elements of democracy are discussed, the following analysis was less systematic compared to interviews. A detailed coding was thus not performed. Consequentially, the data analysis for documents differs from those for interviews and articles.

Documents have the advantage that they are “discursively rich” in comparison to newspaper reports (Koopmans and Statham 1999:221). Especially for the selected materials, perspectives on democracy are condensed into the – written - organizational perspective and different elements were highlighted. However, the availability of materials in French differed from one organization to another as did the amount of scientific literature (more on UGTT and ATFD, less on LTDH and FTDES).

3.2.5 Some words on interpreting data

The thesis uses an interpretative approach that summarizes words or sentences in categories like different frames as described by Janning et al. (Janning et al. 2009). Following the interviews, the arguments are transcribed and expressions are counted as suggested by Axinn and Pearce and analyzed through thematic analysis (Axinn and Pearce 2006). The approach used for analysis is a mixture of discourse and content analysis. While discourse analysis is especially suited for analyzing the intersubjective construction of reality as well as the linguistic interpretation of words and phrases, content analysis relies on word counts and quantitative analysis of messages (Herrera and Braunmoeller 2004; Hardy et al. 2004; Neuendorf 2004). However, as it is neither the aim to discuss the linguistic quality nor to interpret every phrase - which would be equally difficult given that no interview was conducted in the person’s mother tongue -, and a pure content analysis appears as too static leaving no space for context or for analyzing the importance of some parts of the interview or media data, a mixture of both approaches is preferred (Hardy et al. 2004; Hopf 2004).

Content analysis relies on pre-determined categories, while discourse analysis leaves more space to interpretation following the interviews (Herrera and Braunmoeller 2004). While content analysis assumes a system within the text and allows to code and count, more qualitative versions of content analysis do not only look at the number of words used, but

also at the context and the sensitivity (Hardy et al. 2004). According to this version in between content analysis and discourse analysis, meaning is constructed in contexts, categories emerge from data, and based on that, counting is possible (Hardy et al. 2004). As a consequence, the preferred strategy to analyze interviews is a mix of content analysis and discourse analysis. Similar to Hardy et al., the text is seen as dependent on the context (Hardy et al. 2004). The analysis is thus not as strict as content analysis, as coding schemes are finalized after the data collection, but also not as open as discourse analysis and especially the linguistic dimension is not analyzed in detail. The intersubjective construction plays a role; however, there are also systematic elements that enter into play when key frames are repeated. This concept is applied to articles in a slightly modified version where content analysis is more important due to the larger amount of data available. While it is expected that key frames are repeated over time, a more frequent discussion of concepts and frames does not necessarily mean more importance.

Mainly two criteria are used to analyze frames: Which frames appear, thus which aspects of democracy are framed, and secondly what frames get connected. The connection tells much about the key arguments and which concepts get linked. It allows identifying the nuances that are attributed to elements of democracy. One example is that equality of participation can be regarded in line with economic aspects and linked to corruption, or it can be argued from a perspective on discrimination of women or other groups. Accounting for those details appears important for distinguishing between different orientations on democracy.

The longer interviews give more material for analysis. This does not mean that shorter interviews are less important, but they are more used to verify the statements derived from the longer ones. As it was sometimes impossible to conduct longer interviews due to limited availability, this problem is acknowledged but cannot be solved. Having outlined the types of data, I will now turn to the operationalization that is closely linked to how data is analyzed.

3.3 Operationalization of concepts

3.3.1 How networks get operationalized

I recall that the approach is a mixture of deductive and inductive reasoning. The approach is deductive, applying a theoretical framework (networks, democratic framing and ideational influence) on a case. As the theoretical framework on democracy raised doubts on its

applicability in Arab contexts (see literature review), the reasoning is also inductive as it is open to not-mentioned elements that are mentioned often and play an important role. As little is known about the Tunisian context, new elements were threatened in an inductive way. In addition, it is explorative and explanatory as – even though theory gives few suggestions – current knowledge on individual perceptions in movements in transforming contexts is limited.

As noted by scholars, it is difficult to establish clear causal chains between movement actions and change in society as multiple actors try to influence the state and as movements may have unintended effects (Martin 2008; Giugni 1998b). The framing of the state (ministries) and organizations (UGTT, LTDH, FTDES, ATFD) are compared. By identifying the possible influence on the state, the effectiveness of frame diffusion can be shown. Movements are expected to directly influence the visions of the state or indirectly through public opinion. While framings on democracy are expected to be comparable, some elements of democracy will vary according to expertise; an organization working on women rights is not expected to promote competition of political parties as primary aim.

Mechanisms are seen as interactions that allow the transmission of ideas. They are not the same as networks, but networks can indicate mechanism. According to McAdam et al. a mechanism is defined as “delimited changes that alter relations among specific sets of elements of identical or closely similar ways over a variety of situations” (McAdam et al. 2008:308). Indicators for mechanisms are consultation, negotiations, formal recognition or inclusion by/with the government and the organization. The direct influence as well as indirect influence depends on different mechanisms mobilized. Influence can be direct from movements to the state or mediated via public opinion. A framing of democracy can consequentially be transmitted in direct interaction with state actors as well as via the media that is used for representing public opinion and thus in a mediated way.

The degree of ties however is different from one organization to another. The coding of networks is described in the following.

Measuring networks and their quality

Not only democracy but also networks are measured through questions similar to the one that Schneider and Leifeld posed, namely with what organization they cooperate and whether there are organizations that are allies or adversaries (Schneider and Leifeld 2009). The approach by Schneider and Leifeld bases much on the important work by Knoke on networks (Knoke 1990). Diani uses a similar approach to measure positions of movements asking whether other organizations are recognized as influential (Diani 2015). By this operationalization, state perspectives and organizational perspectives can be compared and confirmed or infirmed similar to how Schneider and Leifeld proceeded in the case of diffusion networks (Schneider and Leifeld 2009; compare also Schneider 2009).

The quality of ties was more difficult to assess. The notion of partners or allies was used for interviews. When other actors are seen as partners those ties are of higher quality than actors that are only described as connected actors. The frequent mention of organizations as ally across organizations was used as indicator for a movement coalition. For articles, the frequency of mentions in articles was used as a proxy (co-occurrences). These may not necessarily be the same allies or partners as outlined in interviews. The frequency of interactions was also introduced into Gephi, a network analysis tool, so that network maps were elaborated (those can be found in the Annex).

Diani emphasizes the choice for relying on objective or subjective perceptions of ties (Diani 2015). In my case, the subjective ties are analyzed and thus it is about perceived allies and accepted actors. The analysis focusses on organizations and not on individuals although individuals serve as informants of organizational relations. Table 3.10 shows the different degree of interaction that is assessed by questions. The interactions of the state and organizations -in between and towards the state- are regarded and how they perceive each other. Other actors can thus be identified as “allies” or “adversaries” as well as “accepted” (Gamson) actors of the political system. When talking about networks, organizations were encouraged to name their main partners. As the study focuses on four organizations, questions on those specific organizations followed the questions on networks. Whenever an organization was mentioned in interviews (but equally in articles) this organization was coded. The organizations were then categorized in clusters for analysis. Based on those

cluster, movement coalitions as seen in 2.3 are identified and the possibility of a coalitional influence is assessed.

For the interviews with state representatives, the same questions on regular interactions, the quality of those ties and on partners or accepted actors of the political system were posed. As interviews with civil servants were also used to verify the connections mentioned by movements, civil servants were asked whether they know the four organizations and were asked on their respective status. The four organizations were not well known in all ministries, and in some cases other organizations were more important as will be shown later. When including the media perspective, the question on the role of the media is already included in the assessment of democratic framing (see 3.2.2) and thus allowed to prompt for how media are perceived and whether those are used to inform others (organizations) or stay informed (ministries). This is important as media would only have a reduced role if no actor sees it as relevant.

The networks retraced are no complete network between all civil society organizations and the state, but follow the perspective of movements as for example proposed by Crossley (Crossley 2016). A complete network structure is not analyzed as the collection of complete network structures are very resource intensive (Knoke 1990). The networks thus focus on organizations and not the whole political system in Tunisia.

When networks are combined with framing, the underlying idea is that leaders of organizations and civil servants in leading positions in ministries have similar framings on democracy in case of intense interaction. Shared framings go hand-in-hand with interaction between the state and organizations that allow framings of democracy to be transmitted from movements to the state. The mechanisms by which democratic framings get diffused are discussed in chapter seven.

Table 3.10 Operationalization of networks

Main Dimension	Sub-element	Coded
Actor named	Type of actor	The actors named were coded and categorized at the time of coding. As categories emerged organizations, enterprises or government among others. Every organization and ministry named is coded with its name.
Link to other	Acceptance	Other actor is accepted in the political system. Acceptance is for example coded when interviewees justify why certain actors are part of the networks.
	Adversaries	Adversaries are coded only if the question on adversaries is answered, as well as when explicitly named as adversary.
	Allies	Allies are coded when the question on allies is answered as well when actors are named as partners or allies.
	Direct link	Direct link is coded every time when direct interactions are explained.
	Motivations for links	Motivations include the reasons for interactions when mentioned.
	Networks	Networks are coded when the interviewee talked about networks of the organization.
	Personal/impersonal link	The personal/impersonal link element is coded when the interviewees explained on personal or organizational contacts.
	Quality of links	The quality of links element is coded whenever a positive or negative connotation for the links is given.

Note: Own figure, inspired by Sciarini 1994, Schneider and Leifeld 2009; Schneider 2009, Diani 2015

Analyzing networks serves a double purpose: First networks and ties towards the state indicate mechanism of influence as they identify possible ways ideas can travel. Second, networks allow to identify the structure of civil society, thus who cooperates with whom and introduces the possibility of a movement coalition (see 2.3). Thus, if there is no direct link to the ministry, certain mechanisms are not possible as there is no direct influence. However, still influence via a coalition might be possible or via the media (alone or together). In the following, the way democratic framing is coded is described.

3.3.2 Operationalizing democratic framing

Indicators for perceptions and democratic framings are built on the basis of key factors for democracy outlined in chapter two (2.4) and will be explained in the following section. The concept of a democratic framing is used as deductive element derived from the theory on

democratic quality and the Democracy Barometer as explained in chapter two. The dimensions of the Democracy Barometer are in line with those of other qualitative measures of democracy (for example Lauth 2011). The deductive approach is supplemented by an inductive element: While being focused on the aspects of democracy as outlined by theory, the approach remains open towards other dimensions mentioned during interviews. This means also that elements specific to the Tunisian context are added. The categories used in the Democracy Barometer are not mutually exclusive and can be combined in one or the other way. They measure the type and orientation of democracy, but are equally useful to assess the degree or quality of democracy.

As has been underlined by other scholars, the fine differences between democracies and the quality of democracy become measurable using an index like the Democracy Barometer as orientation (see 2.4). The Barometer is normally used for quantitative analysis. Its wide orientation makes different forms of democracy measurable. Bühlmann et al. identify nine elements for democracy that are part of three main dimensions (Bühlmann et al. 2014, see 2.4):

- Competition of political actors (showing the perception of political struggles)
- Governance capacity (showing the perception of capacity for implementing policies)
- Division of power (showing the perception of balance of political power)
- Participation (showing the perception on modes of political participation)
- Representation (showing the perception of modes of representation)
- Transparency (showing the perception on political corruption)
- Individual liberties (showing the perception on individual liberties and rights)
- Public and exchange of opinions (showing the perception on freedom of association and freedom of speech)
- Rule of law (showing the perception of juridical powers)

These nine main elements are categorized into three dimensions: control (one to three), equality (four to six) and freedom (seven to nine; Jäckle et al. 2012). Especially freedom and equality are also found at other scholars, while control is occasionally circumscribed by responsiveness (Quaranta 2016).

As mentioned earlier, I will not focus on necessary and sufficient conditions for democracy, but use an operationalization of democracy that is compatible with different forms of democracies. A family resemblance model on the indicator level is used from a methodological perspective (Goertz 2006). A family resemblance model sees none of the indicators as a necessary condition, but a high sum of indicators is best in terms of democracy (ibid). In this sense, not every organization nor state actor has to evaluate for example elections as important for democracy. If a movement's framing includes freedom of association but not alternation of power the movement is not automatically described as antidemocratic. Similarly, Glenn argues that it does not make sense to see democracy as dichotomous, but as continuous (Glenn 2001). For the Democracy Barometer, it is to note that it is impossible to support all dimensions at the same time due to tensions between dimensions (Bühlmann et al. 2014; Merkel et al. 2013). Some dimensions like the call for a strong state and at the same time a call for more control institutions appears as improbable and contradicting. At the same time interactions of different dimensions are observable which makes the identification of combinations of elements and dimensions particularly important.

No dimension of democracy is seen as more important than another. Bühlmann et al. argue for an equal weighting of factors of democracy and see an interaction between the three core concepts freedom, equality and control which result in a case specific equilibrium (Bühlmann et al. 2014; Jäckle et al. 2013). While the approach of the Democracy Barometer is originally quantitative⁴⁴, it is useful as point of orientation for qualitative analysis as it is detailed and wide-reaching. Its three dimensions and nine elements summarize a very wide array of factors of democracy that allows identifying a specific framing of democracy. Below, the dimensions and their components are explained in more detail:

First dimension of democratic framing: Control

Table 3.11 gives an overview on the elements coded as part of the control dimension. These include horizontal and vertical constraints to power, but also whether elections result in a concentration of seats (Merkel et al. 2013). The competition component covers vulnerability and anti-dominant actor components, meaning also that the outcome of elections is not

⁴⁴ Unfortunately, Tunisia has not yet been included.

predetermined as well as the possibility for nearly each actor to contest policies (including low barriers, Bühlmann et al. 2014).

The capacity of the democratic government bases on ideas of representative democracy where the government has resources to govern and also the possibility for efficient implementation (ibid). The division of power in democracy emphasizes differences between executive and legislative based on the ideas of Locke and Montesquieu with a distinction between horizontal and vertical power constraints (ibid).

An example is criticism of the party system being dominated by few actors. When a movement or a labor union claims that the party system should be less dominated, this is coded under competition as part of the control dimension. Similarly, a demand for a stable government falls under resources as part of the government capacity. A demand for decentralization asks for vertical checks and balances under the mutual constraints dimension.

Table 3.11 Control Dimension, sub and third level elements

Control Dimension		
Sub element	Third level element	Coded
Competition	Vulnerability	Accurate electoral outcomes, rules for competition, concentration of seats (parliament and other elected bodies)
	Contestability	Hurdles for entry, effective contestation, access to resources
Government capacity	Resources	Government stability, public support for government, legislative period, time frame, cabinet changes
	Conditions and implementation	Anti-government actions, inference military, inference religion, independence administration political inference, administrative capacities, bureaucracies, role central bank
Mutual constraints	Horizontal checks and balances	Executive and legislative, checks, balances, juridical review
	Vertical checks and balances	Federalism, financial autonomy

Note: Own Figure, based on Bühlmann et al. 2014

Second dimension of democratic framing: Equality

The second dimension of the Democracy Barometer includes equal access to rights through equal representation and participation guaranteed through the freedom of information and thus transparency and which is presented in Table 3.12 (Merkel et al. 2013). The participation component includes effectiveness and equality of participation (Bühlmann et al. 2014). It is expected that the participation dimension is supported by movements as they rely on protest activities that fall under the participation label.

Representation encompasses aspects such as representation of all groups within the population as well as representation of preferences in the outcome (ibid). Transparency covers transparent political processes and limited secrecy as it may support corruption (ibid). While Lauth criticizes the inclusion of transparency under the equality dimension, it makes sense given the perspective to ensure equality (Lauth 2011). Merkel et al. argue that secrecy hinders equality as it promotes specific interests (Merkel et al. 2013). One can equally ask whether rule of law and equal treatment of citizens before courts should also be part of this dimension. The inclusion of transparency under equality is the most important criticism on the Democracy Barometer. I nevertheless keep the initial framework and propose modifications at the end. It can also be discussed whether economic factors should be part of the equality dimension, as poverty may hinder participation (for example no time for voting, missing competencies and so on; Quaranta 2016).

The criticism of low participation in elections is coded under equality of participation as part of the participation dimension. A demand for the inclusion of minorities is coded as descriptive representation under the representation dimension. Criticism of corruption is coded as no secrecy under the transparency dimension.

Table 3.12 Equality Dimension, sub and third level elements

Equality Dimension		
Sub element	Third level element	Coded
Participation	Equality of Participation	Universal suffrage, representative turnout elections, representative non-electoral activities
	Effective Participation	Rules facilitating participation, institutionalized participation (regulations for elections, referendum and so on), petitions, strikes, protest events
Representation	Substantive	Voting district distribution, direct democracy, left-right disequilibrium
	Descriptive	Inclusion of minorities, representation of women, access to power for minorities
Transparency	No secrecy	Disclosure party financing, disclosure public finance, corruption
	Transparent political process	Freedom of information, informational openness, willingness for transparent communication

Note: Own Figure, based on Bühlmann et al. 2014

Third dimension of democratic framing: Freedom

Table 3.13 shows the elements coded under the freedom dimension. The freedom dimension is justified as protection and guarantee of individual and civic rights which are connected to the legal basis, so the rule of law (Merkel et al. 2013). Given the current state of research it is clear that freedom is one main dimension and it is distinguished between individual and collective guaranteed rights for the expression of opinions or the personal integrity. The formal, effective guarantee in the form of the rule of law is inevitably connected. Individual liberties summarize aspects of freedom, the rights on physical integrity, right on self-determination and realization of life (Bühlmann et al. 2014).

The public exchange element is one of the most important ones for movements. It encloses the freedom to associate and the freedom of speech (ibid). The rule of law component of democracy protects freedom and political rights, where the necessity of rule of law is emphasized (ibid).

Examples include the criticism of inequality before the law that is coded under equality before the law as part of the rule of law dimension. Other examples include the criticism of torture that is coded as physical integrity under individual liberties or a demand for the respect of freedom of associations that is coded under the public sphere dimension.

Table 3.13 Freedom Dimension, sub and third level elements

Freedom Dimension		
Sub element	Third level element	Coded
Rule of Law	Equality before the law	Effective independence other actors, constitutional provisions, effective impartiality
	Quality of the legal system	Juridical professionalism, confidence in the system, confidence in the police
Individual liberties	Physical integrity	Constitutional physical integrity provisions, ratification of ban against torture, state torture, inhumane, or degrading treatments, mutual acceptance of those rights, homicides, riots
	Free conduct of life	Constitutional guarantees individual liberties, freedom of religion, freedom of movement, property rights
Public Sphere	Freedom to associate	Guarantees for freedom of association, degree of association, membership
	Freedom of opinion	Freedom of speech, media offer, political neutrality

Note: Own Figure, based on Bühlmann et al. 2014

The elements are coded with or without an explicit referral to democracy. As Beinin for example mentions, movements seldom claim democracy or a regime change as their aim, but rather particular topics (Beinin 2014). By using this distinction, elements of democracy can be retraced as part of the framing, as the discourse using the term democracy is limited.

It is however difficult to estimate the perceptions hold by organizations in Tunisia as there is simply up to no information on civil society’s perception of democracy. It is expected that leaders refer to democracy in connection to the uprisings and that the participation dimension is emphasized as it is key to social movement activities.

Applicability and criticism

As the lower levels below the nine elements have been criticized in terms of validity and conceptual stretching and overloaded in terms of number of indicators, lower level indicators are only regarded as inspiration for coding as those are used as quantifiable indicators in the Barometer (Jäckle et al. 2012; Jäckle et al. 2013). In addition, the coding list is not completed beforehand which is in line with the unknown interpretation of the Tunisian democracy. Possible additional elements have been coded at the time of analysis; especially one element emerged as will be described later.

The approach by the Democracy Barometer is not without criticism. Lauth criticizes the Democracy Barometer for including transparency under equality as mentioned above. In addition, Lauth states that some functions not only represent one dimension, but several ones, thus jeopardizing the threefold division made by the Barometer (Lauth 2010). However, in a recent paper he and Schlenkrich distinguish between freedom, equality and control as main dimensions (Lauth and Schlenkrich 2018). Other criticism was formulated on the reduced role of output as well as the already mentioned economic issues (see chapter two). While the criticism shall be kept in mind for the analysis, the Barometer is used as orientation on how to measure democracy. The Barometer served for coding, but coding remains equally open towards dimensions not named in the Democracy Barometer. I now turn to how framing in public was coded.

3.3.3 Democratic framing and public opinion

When operationalizing a democratic framing in public discourse, media articles are used to account for the public debate. While interviews are more authentic and express the organizational perspective, this is not necessarily the case for articles that mention the organizations. Therefore, an additional layer has been introduced for the coding of dimensions of democracy in the public debate. Figure 3.14 explains what indicators in sentences have been used to code claims. As claims are defined as political demands (see 2.6.2), all demands towards the state got coded. The additional coded element “claim” was then used in combination with the dimensions of democracy already outlined before. This translated in requests on matrix coding in NVivo for every organization.

An article on freedom of speech that mentions somewhere the UGTT is for example only regarded in the analysis if a claim by the UGTT is included, so when the UGTT criticizes the restriction of freedom of speech. This is done as not every article that includes the respective organizations necessarily includes a claim by this organization.

Figure 3.14 Coded claims in articles

Element	Coded
Claim	A claim has been coded when a political demand towards the state has been expressed. It normally follows formulations like the UGTT calls/demands for [claim].
Addressee of Claim	In addition to the claim, the addressee of claims is coded as sometimes additional addressees were mentioned together with the state.

When it comes to the coding of actors, the organizations already identified in interviews have been searched for in articles and were coded respectively. Every article was then screened for additional names of organizations. As mentioned earlier, the articles were used as additional indicator whether organizations have links as it is expected that regular interactions will also be visible in the media through reporting on meetings. The measure used is co-occurrences which are however only a proxy for relations as no detailed data on the quality of networks can be derived from articles.

3.4 No research without shortcomings: biases of the approach

3.4.1 What data allows to account for and what not

The thesis has a number of limitations and addresses several biases that could disturb the research. This section underlines what can be shown by the data and similarly highlights limitations of the research in terms of causal direction, limitations as well as problems encountered.

Retracing processes and causal direction

It is difficult to establish a causal chain for influencing framing as well as policy processes. As Janning et al. underline, policy processes are influenced by a number of different actors including interest groups, parliament or government (Janning et al. 2009). As Sandoval explains “regime transformation, government reform, and even policy changes are the result of the complex interaction between multiple political forces including powerholders, polity

elites, challengers, and their elite allies” which makes searching for causal relations a difficult task (Sandoval 1998:169; on democratic outcomes in complex societies Melucci and Lyyra 1998). Similar to what Saunders describes for a small sample, cause-effect relations are difficult to establish, but the exploratory research gives a starting point (Saunders 2013). By verifying the state perspective, the mechanisms that are available to movements can be identified and their effectivity be assessed.

There are still numerous actors that are not regarded. Parliament for example is not analyzed in detail; only interactions by organizations with parliament are retraced. However, not all actors mentioned to influence framing and policies are analyzed in detail, but only civil society organizations and state representatives. This choice is taken due to resources and accessibility. A number of other explanations of movement influence and the role for democratization are possible. Their possible influence on the results is re-discussed at the end.

Limitations and consequences

The most important point to be aware of is that the data used for analysis is not reliable as any repetition across time would generate slightly different results when the context changes. The basis on interviews leads on the other hand to valid data, directly related to the perceptions within organizations.

Another important limitation lies in the non-availability of two relevant ministries albeit mentioned in interviews. The Ministry of Social Affairs having ties especially with the UGTT and the FTDES, but also the ATFD, was contacted officially and several leaders have been contacted separately. As no response was given one can only speculate whether internal policies exist that prevent external contacts⁴⁵. Equally, no interview with the Ministry of Justice was conducted, a ministry central for the LTDH. The interactions between the organizations and those ministries are thus not included in the state perspective, albeit potentially intense contacts exist. Especially the missing Ministry of Social Affairs represents a major shortcoming.

⁴⁵ One indicator was given by a person approached who demanded an official authorization for conducting research (mainly an agreement with the Ministry for Higher Education). After several consultations with the ministry and embassies, it showed that this authorization was necessary under Ben Ali, but no longer needed. However, the respective person could not be convinced that this was no longer the case and finally no interview was possible in this case.

Another important point directs towards the number of interviews with ministries. While it was initially planned to have different ministries included to see similarities in framing, the state perspective shows few coherence. A point that will be discussed at the end is whether not more interviews per ministry would have ensured a more detailed regard on the perspective on each ministry. My research design gives priority to many ministries included, while a more detailed regard might have been necessary.

Whether the group level is detailed in all interviews is another question to pose. I underline that the study operates on a collective level and analyzes group framings. While a more general perspective on individual perceptions would generate some (different) value, the organizational level is the main level of analysis and consequentially individual framings are disregarded. As individual and collective framings are difficult to distinguish, the thesis takes not just individual interviews, but several for each organization. This is important for validity, as individual biases would limit the strength of this research that lies in valid descriptions of the situation. The interviewer insisted on the collective perspective and framings are checked with the help of documents and media. I did the best to ensure that it was clear at any moment, that the organizational and ministerial perspective is important and not the individual one. Several measures at the moment of data collection, data comparison and data analysis ensure that the collective and not the individual level are regarded.

Limited knowledge restricts research choices

I underline the limited knowledge on organizations and influence in Tunisia that made research decisions difficult. This made also opt for qualitative research. Results give a first overview in a field where little is known. While qualitative research is well suited for causal process observations and to analyze relationships between variables, generalization is not possible (Lieberman 2004a). The number of four movements is not representative for all social movements in Tunisia; the results remain limited to the four organizations. There are still other actors that are taken into account but that were not a focus of research as outlined above (political parties and so on).

Other biases that emerge are difficult to avoid. Given the limited knowledge on social movements in Tunisia, interviews with leaders appear as most cost-effective way to assess

the collective framing of organizations. Focus groups would have been possible as well but would be more difficult to steer which made me opt for individual interviews. This includes the risk of leaders explaining what is asked for instead of focusing on important issues. From my perspective, interviews are ideal in assessing the democratic framing as they also allow for prompting and flexible reactions.

The problems with leaders

Leader interviews have another problem: The elite perspective on framing has been criticized by scholars as it makes sense to regard the framing within an organization and to include all actors (Benford 1997, compare also chapter two). Critical researchers note that elites will not represent the whole diversity within an organization and will only express a part of the organizational perspective. Due to feasibility problems and due to the research design including also the public, the elite perspective is nevertheless adequate for this research. It would have been very difficult to target a representative sample within every organization and would have needed more resources. In addition, not every member may be equally able to summarize the organizational perspective. Newcomers in movements are for example not (yet) able to describe contacts towards others or even to concretize the aims of the organization.

Another problem with interviews for data collection is similar to what Trumpy stated for focus groups, namely activists portraying the movement as more coherent as it is (Trumpy 2016). While this is less problematic for individual evaluation as interviewees do not know what others said, there is a strong social desirability to show homogeneity of the organization and to play down conflicts to not destroy a potential good reputation. The inclusion of documents does not solve this problem, only a high number of different courants within movements would acknowledge for internal differences. However, this goes beyond the scope of this thesis. Where possible, different perspectives within one organization are acknowledged. Social desirability can also play a role when positive personal or collective consequences of participation are expected.

The problems with media and a Western perspective

For the media analysis different other problems arise. As mentioned before media outlets are not completely neutral. One needs to be aware that although the media has recently been classified as free, some scholars cast doubt that the media sector was reformed. The

law still allows prosecution because of offenses against the state and similar delicts (Aliriza 2014). The question arises whether media reporting is not biased, a question that will be retaken at the end. As little information existed at the beginning of the research, media reporting was regarded as having similar functions as stated in theory – mainly for Western contexts.

The Western context of many theories and methods is another question that will be re-evaluated at the end. In addition, language constraints and interviews in French have probably caused a bias towards a more Western perspective. Interviewees were probably more open towards Western researchers, meaning that a Western perspective is very probably overrepresented in this research. Due to limited resources it is up to future research to solve this issue and consequentially this study gives a first endeavor to the situation in Tunisia.

The not regarded regional level

I underline that the thesis focuses on the national level. The reliance on Tunis includes the risk that national politics may be over evaluated. Regional differences are not assessed; however, it is left to other studies to show them. Cities have specific political, but also social and economic dynamics as Stadnicki or Bayat as well as others highlight (Stadnicki 2015; Allegra et al. 2013; Bayat 2017; Knoke 1990). The focus on Tunis means also that the results cannot be transferred to other cities as configurations are different as Merone and De Facci showed for Sfax for example (Merone and De Facci 2015). On the other hand, access to ministries would not be comparable in other cities.

Another question is whether movements approach national or regional levels, as local governments tend to be more receptive (Meyer 2005). While the first chapter suggested that the analyzed organizations are equally active on the regional level (and what appeared also during interviews), the analysis is limited to the national level, and the influence towards ministries. The most important aims of movements may thus not be covered when formulated on a regional level.

No generalization, but first insights

Many of those biases lead to the conclusion that no generalization is possible. Only first insights can be generated as the analysis focusses on qualitative data. Qualitative data is

used for explorative data generation as the organizational framings towards democracy are not clear. Qualitative data is also used to assess the possibility of organizations to influence policies. Given the low number of real leaders in a movement, a quantitative approach appears unrealistic or would have needed a cross-organizational focus were extensive contacts to any organizations would have been needed. The reliability is augmented through triangulation to reduce individual perspectives (McAdam et al. 2008).

For the state representatives, individual interviews appear as most appropriate as a large-scale survey would require access to a number of ministry employees which is difficult to ensure; especially given the autocratic history of the country with a strict hierarchy. Again, the qualitative approach allows to identify previously unimagined access channels of organizations.

Media allow to verify for a public perspective. The data from articles helps to reduce the problem of few interviews; however, they measure mainly another form of mechanism and have a different quality. As two newspapers are used, results are still not generalizable towards the whole media landscape, but limited to the two analyzed ones. As the larger picture is regarded, media articles appear to be more representative for overall newspaper coverage than interviews for all civil society organizations.

3.4.2 Initial problems for feasibility

As for other research, questions of feasibility arose before starting the fieldwork. Among those was available funding, which was provided several institutions. Nevertheless, the limited funding restrained longer field visits which could have enabled more interviews, something especially important for ministries as well as for a more diverse perspective on organizations in Tunisia.

Another problem was the language. As the researcher has limited Arab language skills, extensive interaction in the native language of most Tunisians was difficult. As French is a language of commerce in Tunisia the limitations in terms of feasibility were not crucial (CIA 2014). As interviews were conducted with leaders in higher ranked positions where a higher level of education is expected, the possible biases were limited. Nevertheless, it was neither the mother tongue of the researcher nor of interviewees (on language and mother tongue

Axinn and Pearce 2006). In few cases possible interviewees could not be contacted due to language restrictions. The already discussed bias of having interviewed those with a higher education and wider language skills – or the most international – should be kept in mind.

3.4.3 Isn't it about...controlling for other factors.

One may ask whether interaction in networks does not go in both directions and indeed I do not reject this. As literature principally states that civil society influences the Tunisian state, I consider this argument worth being tested. The data available allows suggestions on whether the state influenced movements in their perspective if for example leaders of organizations discuss elements that are not part of their written documents and no other explanation emerges. By asking civil servants directly on the interactions with civil society and how they are influenced by those actors asks however on a causal direction from organizations towards the state. The focus on this causal direction is kept throughout the interviews in order to be able to assess it in detail.

When it comes to (ideational) influence, control becomes important. As mentioned earlier, relative resources or capacities are regarded in order to control for alternative explanations of influence (for example resource mobilization theory). As we have seen in the literature review, political opportunities can equally play a role – as it influenced many empirical results on outcomes - and are consequentially discussed in the end. As the focus lies on the responsiveness of the state, one alternative way via parliamentarians is also asked for. The question of other factors that may have produced a certain outcome is a crucial one that will be re-discussed at the end in line with the causal direction.

The control for other events that influence the political discussion like terrorist attacks have been identified in the media analysis. The attacks in 2015 and 2016 were widely discussed in the media. While this also oriented discussion in interviews, it is something that can be explained and can have led to an overrepresentation of fighting terrorism as a topic. On the other hand, terrorism is a topic that was important before and after the time of analysis.

Even though interviews are standardized to a certain point, the aspects influencing for example the mood of the interviewee cannot be controlled. Thus, the interviews are particularly contextual and would individually not be enough to retrace the framing of each

movement. Therefore, interviews are conducted with different leaders for each organization, and are compared with the official documents to ensure that the collective framing is correctly identified. Even though the context is explained, no final control is possible and it remains one of the main limits of this research that could for example be overcome by a longitudinal study. The analysis remains thus limited to a specific point in time and cannot be generalized across time.

Another remaining criticism I want to express is the individual level data collection for assessing a collective perspective. Regarding personal background of interviewees, it would be interesting to have a complete biographical background, but due to anonymity of data as well as a very streamlined interview guide that was focused on framing and networks, questions on the personal background were limited. In this sense, the interesting question on whether the personal background is important for a certain framing cannot be assessed.

3.5 Conclusion to chapter three

The data collection to answer the question how framing is diffused towards the state is based on different data types and a mixture of deductive and inductive approaches. In order to identify the influence of an organization, an approach with leader interviews which can express the framings and organizational networks is taken. Interviews with civil servants in ministries on the same aspects allow to retrace networks and compare the framing. They allow also retracing the direction of causal paths. Those interviews are checked with articles on what frames resonate as well as interactions between actors. Both data - from interviews and media – are seen as complementary and are used in relation to theory on direct, indirect and joint effects.

The framing of democracy is operationalized with the help of the Democracy Barometer, where three main dimensions (control, equality and freedom) have several sub dimensions (three each). The perspective on democracy is relatively open with several possible framings on democracy. The approach is not only deductive when it comes to elements of democracy, but also inductive as the final evaluation of democratic framing bases on the findings in the field. In addition, questions as well as media analysis allow to track networks towards other actors and to identify regular interactions or allies and adversaries.

One point in time is regarded and thus the research cannot account for the full period of democratization. In addition, only a limited number of organizations are analyzed and results are not generalizable. Among the discussed biases are the problems of causal direction, of problems with some ministries, of individual perspectives in interviews or the limitation imposed by language. The results are probably more westernized than in reality as the most international and educated probably participated in interviews. Other factors like the influence of resources are discussed in order to account other explanations.

Having outlined the methodological approaches that guide the research, the first empirical chapter looks at the networks among and between organizations as well as towards ministries.

Chapter Four

The networks

4 Coalitions, specialization and very specific ties

The fourth chapter focuses on the analysis of network configurations among movements and the identification of possible mechanisms, ties between organizations and towards the state. Recalling the research question, “How does a democratic framing diffuse across actors in Tunisia?” a first insight on ways ideas can travel is given by outlining networks. If there is the possibility of direct or indirect effects, the respective networks towards state actors as well as towards the media should exist. Thus, in order to verify whether transmissions of ideas between the analyzed organizations and the state are possible, the interactions between actors are shown first.

The aim of the chapter is to answer the question: How are movements connected to each other and to which degree do they interact? Literature suggested that networks and especially coalitions are path-dependent (see 2.2), but does this mean that those who already worked together under Ben Ali, still work together and partly exclude newer organizations from their interaction? I recall that the UGTT (Union Générale Tunisienne du Travail), the LTDH (Ligue Tunisienne pour la Défense des droits de l’Homme) and the ATFD (Association tunisienne de femmes démocrates) were registered but repressed under Ben Ali, while the FTDES (Forum Tunisien pour les Droits Economiques et Sociaux) did not

officially exist. It is thus question, whether the FTDES has a different status among those organizations and whether it is part of a possible coalition.

The network approach allows to identify partners, allies and adversaries. Consequentially, the possibility of a movement coalition or of other ways of influencing is identified. It is argued that not only single influence by one organization, but also coalitional influence is possible if the organizations are part of a coalition. This enhances the overall capacity to influence policies. Organizational and coalitional influence is complementary. In case of a coalition, movements do not necessarily rely on their own networks, but reach out via other organizations in case of close cooperation.

Another point is the question of roles in coalitions (2.2). If there is a coalition, the network structure and its orientation towards specific actors helps already outlining possible specializations of organizations. A human rights group should for example have extensive networks towards other human rights organizations, while an organization defending environmental aspects does not necessarily need those ties. In relation to the following chapters on democratic framing, the chapter sets the framework to identify the thematic specialization of movements.

The chapter prepares the later analysis on framing. It identifies possible ways that ideas/frames could take when travelling. The chapter elaborates on three main aspects: first partners and coalitions, second expertise and roles and third networks towards the state. In this chapter organizational ties as well as specialization and coalitions are discussed, before in a second part connections towards the state get verified from a state perspective.

The second part of the chapter poses an additional question: Which ties do exist between movements and the state and what qualities do those have? The question aims to provide insights into the possibility of especially direct effects (see 2.5) and to a limited degree indirect effects via media. Direct effects need an interaction between actors. While organizations can state that networks exist, their verification from a state perspective is important in order to identify the intensity and quality of interaction. The evaluation of those aspects then allows determining whether a mechanism of direct influence is effective

for every organization. If there are no interactions, mechanisms of direct effects cannot exist, leaving only the possibility of indirect effects, thus through other organizations or the media or public opinion.

One limitation needs to be kept in mind: According to Saunders' study on movement networks, social movement organizations do not claim that they have negative relations with the state (Saunders 2013). This finding that also appears in the study might make movements show that they have good relations and can influence the state. It is thus crucial not only to regard the movement, but also the state side. Evaluating the state perspective on networks allows a qualification of the expressed ties towards the state and allows identifying where movements exaggerate on their ties towards the state.

The chapter bases on twenty-five leader interviews with civil society actors (nineteen with the analyzed organizations), as well as thirteen interviews with civil servants⁴⁶. In addition, media reporting takes a minor role and is used to verify whether actors are also perceived as acting in coalitions by the public. Those networks are national level and Tunis based networks, which has consequences for the actors named (primarily national level) and concerns a limitation outlined earlier (see chapter three).

From a methodological perspective, leaders in organizations as well as ministries have been asked on their interaction with the respective other side. The interviewees made statements about with whom they hold directed links (ties), as well as with what actors they only work distantly. By asking questions on the quality of those links to other actors (allies, adversaries, accepted actors, see ch. 3.3), those ties can be evaluated from both perspectives. Allies are seen as particularly intense interactions as they probably require common framings, while interactions with accepted actors might just be accepted due to their legacy.

The analysis prepares the later analysis of mechanisms as mechanisms are particularly useful when possibilities for the transmission of ideas – and thus interactions – are seen as

⁴⁶ A list can be found in the Annex. Nineteen interviews were conducted with leaders from the analyzed organizations, additional six interviews include interviews with other civil society actors that are used for comparison of the networks. It also helps to assess the network structure, as some mentioned similarities as well as differences towards the analyzed organizational networks (for example actors like the OTDS have administration centered networks and no links to the analyzed organizations).

important by both sides. The use of NVivo for data analysis facilitated to see which actor mentions what organization or ministry how many times and with what quality. I equally recall that a manual coding that distinguishes between different degrees of interaction as outlined in section 3.3 was used.

One of the limits is the subjective evaluation of links by leaders. When an organization is seen as an ally by a ministry it does not yet tell much about the frequency of exchanges. The subjective interpretation has however the advantage that it includes Gamson's acceptance. As Gamson underlined only accepted actors can be influential ones (2.5). In addition, as the indicated links might be just links between one ministry and one organization and not between the state and organizations, careful attention is given to outline those dyadic relations.

The chapter uses a similar structure for each organization and the ministries. First, it "zooms-in" to analyze each organization's ties towards civil society and towards the state in order to identify possible ways of influencing. Interviews qualify those links. Due to better readability, the network analysis is divided into two parts, one on civil society and international actors to show the possible coalitions and specialization and a second that evaluates the links towards the state (or civil society for the state) in order to evaluate the possibility of direct effects. At the end I "zoom-out" to look at the question of whether not only the individual organizations, but also a movement coalition may influence framing and policymaking.

4.1 Organizational networks

Like for the following chapters I start with the UGTT as the UGTT is seen as the oldest and most established organization of the four analyzed ones. I then continue with the LTDH, the ATFD and the FTDES. As outlined above, I start with the ties towards civil society as well as towards international actors, continuing with ties to the state and political parties before qualifying those. The international level is included as it shows the international integration of organizations and allows to identify similarities and differences. Political parties are integrated in the second part as most (though not all) parties are active in parliament and were named together with parliament.

4.1.1 UGTT: a limited civil society framework

Civil society interaction and international links

Figure 4.1 shows the ties of the UGTT towards other organizations as well as international actors that I summarized in five clusters. As outlined earlier the UGTT consists of sectors and regions that may have different ties, but only the national level is regarded in this research.

The first cluster includes the Tunisian civil society. The ATFD, the LTDH and the ONAT (Order of Advocates) have been named as principal partners. The own youth organization, the UGET was not mentioned often, probably as it is not considered a separate actor by UGTT leaders. The Association of Magistrats as well as the FTDES are only marginally relevant for the UGTT and were not consistently named across interviews. In addition, relatively few organizations were mentioned as closely tied to the UGTT. The links in this cluster go in the direction of a coalition of the old civil society, with the FTDES – while being mentioned – of minor importance.

The UTICA was mentioned as an important partner, but is subsumed in a separate cluster as it is representing the enterprises. It is part of the tripartite configuration and included in negotiations for salaries and working conditions. As part of the configuration, interviewees emphasized its role as a partner.

Media contacts are not focused on specific media outlets but directed towards all journalists. The UGTT has its own publication, reaching all of its members. In addition, contacts towards the Tunisian media agency (TAP) are outlined allowing a facilitated access to place press releases. At least for the persons interviewed, media contacts do not play an important role.

On the international level, the UGTT works with international labor unions, and European, Latin American and Arab labor unions. The International Trade Union has been mentioned as cooperation partner in interviews. Also, other foreign national labor unions have been identified as holding close relations with the UGTT. As an UGTT leader highlights, the relations with the French Confédération Générale du Travail (CGT) are important, as are those with the Belgian Confédération des Syndicats Chrétiens (CSC) or those with the


Brazilian labor union. The UGTT even has official agreements with other unions like the CGT and different parts of the organization cooperate with further labor unions (Businessnews 2014). Sofien, an UGTT leader, highlights the need for a state-independent organization of Arab worker Unions (UGTT, Sofien). He particularly insists that independence from the state is important for cooperation with other unions. Sofien clarifies that relations with European labor unions increased over the last years as those supported Tunisia.

Other relations exist with the IMF and the World Bank and Ahmed, another UGTT leader, expressed proudly “The delegations of the World Bank that visited since 2011 have all visited the UGTT” (UGTT, Ahmed). This cluster includes international organizations and are contacts that are not normal for civil society actors as especially IMF and World Bank work with states and not with civil society.

To summarize and compare to the other organizations that are presented later, ties to other actors are limited to few actors. This is in line with the important position of the UGTT and its integration in the political system as shown below, that makes few other organizations necessary to achieve their goals. The UGTT is less dependent on coalitions as the other organizations as shown in the section on state actors. On the national level, ties with the old civil society that existed already under Ben Ali are crucial. The UGTT has no other contacts in the field of working conditions apart the own youth organization UGET. Not only concrete organizations, but also abstract categories (worker, women and youth) have been mentioned that were not shown in the clusters and that subsume tranches of the population.

While no referral to organizations active on workers’ rights was found on a national level, the networks clearly show a labor union orientation when it comes to international ties. On the international level, contacts towards the World Bank and IMF show the exceptional position of the UGTT.

Figure 4.1 UGTT ties towards civil society and international actors



Connection towards the state and political parties

Figure 4.2 shows the ties of the UGTT towards the state and political parties. These ties of the UGTT are strong and compared to the ties to civil society there is a nearly equal number of ties. As member of the quartet who received the Nobel Peace Prize, the organization ascribes itself an important role for Tunisian history with a lot of heritage. Interviewees regularly outlined the historic role and reputation of the UGTT similar to how described by Yousfi (Yousfi 2015). This includes very close ties to ministries and the national government.

The cluster on Ministries includes many ministries in comparison to the other organizations. UGTT networks towards the state are particularly oriented towards the Ministry of Social Affairs, but also to many others. During the analyzed period (2015-2016), especially contacts towards the Ministry of Education were prominent mainly related to the negotiations of working conditions for teachers. UGTT leaders mentioned that the organization has contacts to all ministries. The contacts towards the Presidency of the Government are also described as intense by interviewees.

The contacts towards ministries and the state are influenced by another structure that is seen as mediating institution between the UGTT and several ministries. It does not exist for other organizations. Dependent on its composition, the institution is called four plus

four/five plus five arrangement, where four/five ministers meet four/five counterparts of the UGTT. It is an institutionalized exchange on a regular basis (see also Dermech who mentions the same observation: Dermech 2015). Those Ministries are a Secretary General from the Presidency of the Government as well as the Ministers of the Interior, of Finance, of Social Affairs and of the Economy.

State administration is also partially important and exchanges occur. Contacts with the police are very limited and only occasional, for example when applying for authorization of protest. This is similar for the military where only one contact in relation to a protest organization was mentioned.


The cluster on parliament is of less importance. Parliament ties are not very strong and mostly limited to deputies that are former UGTT functionaries, but also open towards all political parties (while the Popular Front is politically closer). While we see several parties in Figure 4.2, Ennahdha is still perceived as an enemy and UGTT leaders expressed preferences for the Popular Front, but nevertheless contacts exist. Given that the Tunisian democratic system relies on a parliament to vote on laws, the limited importance appears as surprising as it should be more important when the UGTT wants to influence legislation.

Another actor is regional governments. As the UGTT has several sub-divisions, the regional sectors are more focusing on governors as those are more important for their work. Occasionally, governors are important to the national level if regional questions gain importance.

Due to their close state relations via their regular consultations, the UGTT should have much influence on ministries, something to keep in mind when analyzing the networks from a state perspective. Especially the national executive committee holds close contacts with ministries. These connections are not one-directional but go in both directions, so ministers call for example their UGTT contact and vice-versa. Those contacts are in addition used in combination with for example protest events. The dialogue gets priority, but if it fails, pressure may take to the streets. The UGTT shows interactions like the four plus four format

that are not available for other organizations. Those are already important findings that are later reused in chapter seven.

Figure 4.2 UGTT ties towards state actors and parties



Qualifying those links

I currently described the ties that exist from a UGTT perspective. The ties will be qualified and detailed in this section. When qualifying the ties, I rely on questions on the respective allies of each organization that have been asked during the interviews. Figure 4.3 summarizes the main allies of the UGTT. Higher numbers show that many leaders mentioned another actor, meaning that those actors are more accepted as ally across the UGTT. The more leaders mentioned an organization, the closer the (perceived) partnership.

Especially the LTDH, but also the ONAT and other (international) labor unions are main partners and have been mentioned by nearly all leaders (out of seven). The civil society in general is also an ally. UTICA, ATFD and the Ordre des Magistrats have been mentioned by three UGTT leaders. Left wing parties, the FTDES and the national government were mentioned by two leaders. Different other actors include the Presidency of the Government, the IMF or the FIDH just to mention a few. Ennahdha and Nida Tounes are not partners as such but were mentioned in line with other political parties.

It is important to note, that relatively few other actors are named as key partners by many UGTT leaders. Those actors include organizations that existed before the revolution like the


LTDH or the ONAT, but also the ATFD. Consequentially, two of the other analyzed organizations are identified as main partners of the UGTT, the FTDES a bit less. On the other hand, the UGTT leaders expressed the most diverse number of partners in comparison to other organizations, but many allies were only mentioned by one leader.

It is to note, that ministries and notably the national government are mentioned as allies by some UGTT leaders. Among the list of partners are more ministries than for the other organizations, showing that UGTT leaders see the organization as relatively close to the government.

One aspect that is common for allies is the human rights and/or labor union orientation. The UGTT also defends human rights together with other organizations:

"But the civil society had to have several associations; [...] it is to enrich the political life in Tunisia [...]. But at the same time the UGTT is also interested in human rights so [...] it is the league that defends them, but the UGTT defends them similarly. So, both work well together." (UGTT, Sofien)

Figure 4.3 Allies as mentioned by number of leaders



Note: Out of 7 interviews with UGTT leaders

When it comes to adversaries, UGTT leaders expressed opposition towards the political right. The relation of the UGTT towards Ennahdha is rather ambivalent but developed towards acceptance of the status quo following several disputes in the last years. However, a clear adversary is the UTT (Union des Travailleurs Tunisiens), another labor union, as they suspect it not to represent the workers (UGTT, Moncef).

Media data on the UGTT

While interviews were the main data used for determining ties and allies, the media data was used to supplement this perspective. However, and this is to keep in mind, media data does not include any qualification on relationships or unclear information about partnerships. It can only provide co-occurrences that can show whether actors are often mentioned together, indicating that there are links between those actors.

A search for co-occurrences in the articles on the four organizations has been performed and the results can be found in the Annex (Table 10.1). This analysis revealed that the government was mentioned by far most often in articles on the UGTT, followed by the UTICA and the President of the Republic. Nida Tounes, the parliament, the TAP or the military (in relation to fighting terrorism) are among the most frequent co-occurrences. Ministries like the Ministry of Social Affairs and the one on Primary Education equally play a role.

The first non-governmental organization among the top-co-occurrences is the ONAT, followed by the LTDH. It is to note, that media has reported more on the government and political parties, while ties to other organizations are underestimated or were not prominent at all. It is especially the tripartite configuration including the government and the UTICA that makes media report a lot on salary negotiations as well as conflicts on work related issues. In this sense, the position of the UGTT is clearly related to its role as labor union while civil society alliances are less important in media reports than the relations towards UTICA and government.

Summary on the UGTT's networks

The UGTT networks are clearly oriented towards the state, some state actors are even perceived as allies by some UGTT leaders. In line with its own narrative as important actor for the Tunisian political system, the UGTT approaches quasi all ministries, while some like the Ministry of Social Affairs are more important to the organization. The Ministry of Social

Affairs plays a particularly important role in line with the tripartite configuration that is not only very present in interviews, but also very present when it comes to media articles. Both types of data show, that the UGTT has intense contacts towards the state.

Beneath state relations, the ties towards what is called the old civil society (LTDH, ONAT, ATFD) and to a minor and more limited degree the FTDES are very important. When it comes to civil society, the UGTT has very few, but important ties to other organizations. It illustrates well the position of the UGTT as there is no need to have a large reach towards other actor as the organization itself has enough contacts. The UGTT has on the one hand fewer possibilities for coalitional ways of influencing, but also less need. Other actors like parliament or the administration are of lower importance to the organization.

4.1.2 LTDH: a human rights network

Civil society interaction and international links

The ties of the LTDH include more clusters than for the UGTT. Especially human rights clusters are more important.

On the national level, ties include the ATFD, AFTURD, the Journalists Association, the Centre against torture, the UTICA, the FTDES, the Association des Magistrats and the UGTT as shown by Figure 4.4. The quartet plays a role and we find the same names as for the UGTT, but with slightly different orientation towards the women movement and on torture. This is explained by the orientation of the LTDH; the LTDH stands for cultural and civil rights while the UGTT stands for social and economic rights (LTDH, Medhi). The UTICA is mentioned as important but is not summarized under civil society organizations due to its task of promoting the interests of enterprises. Like for the UGTT, many organizations that are part of the old civil society active under Ben Ali are mentioned as ties.


On the international level, a number of cooperation has been highlighted. As a human rights group, the LTDH has contacts with the World Organization against torture and several other international organizations. The EUROMED network and the International Human Rights Federation are important.

Another human rights related cluster includes the African and Arab human rights networks. Several ties exist towards for example the Arab Human Rights Association as well as Mahgrebin organizations.

Other institutions act as financers. According to interviewees contacts with the EU exist. A similar cluster of financers is built by the German FES as well as Dignity Denmark and Oxfam.

The LTDH is well integrated into international human rights networks. During interviews, the French axis as well as the Arab axis for cooperation has been mentioned, while the Arab axis was evaluated as not that important. It shows that many contacts are of international nature and Tunisian contacts are relatively limited in numbers.

Figure 4.4 LTDH ties towards civil society and international actors



Connection towards the state and political parties

Figure 4.5 shows the ties of the LTDH towards the state and political parties. Those are very limited especially in comparison to the UGTT. The cluster on Ministries includes only three ministries, the Presidency of the Government can be added as ministerial actor. The LTDH has relations with the Ministries for Social Affairs, Justice and the Interior. Due to their focus on prisoners and torture, the importance of the Ministry of the Interior as well as the one on


Justice is self-explaining. In comparison to the UGTT, the LTDH is much more focused on the issues of occupation when it comes to ties towards the state.

Another cluster is built by administration and police. The LTDH enters in contact with the state administration through for example written complaints. Those are mainly case-related. While the LTDH has contacts with the police on various issues (prisons, security forces and so on), no contacts with the military have been mentioned.

Like for the UGTT, the LTDH has few contacts with parliamentarians even though those are important decision makers in a representative democracy. Cooperation with regional governments is still in its development as interviewees explained.

Compared to the UGTT the state relations are very limited towards few ministries. This is in line with specialization and the role the LTDH takes on human rights issues and especially torture and prisoners.

Figure 4.5 LTDH ties towards state actors and parties




Qualifying those links

Figure 4.6 summarizes main allies as mentioned in interviews. Especially AFTURD and the ATFD – and thus the women movement -, but also the UGTT, the Association of Journalists and the Center against Torture are important.

Among their allies mentioned by one interviewee are three ministries (Social Affairs, Interior and Justice) and the national government. The FTDES was not mentioned explicitly as ally. On the other hand, some international human rights actors, but also the ONAT or abstract categories such as workers, the youth or media are mentioned as ally by one interviewee.

The close links of the LTDH show an orientation towards the women and human rights movement. In addition, we find the “usual suspects” (ATFD, UGTT, ONAT, Association of Journalists) as part of a network that can be described as coalition. None of the interviewed leaders mentioned an adversary.

Figure 4.6 Allies as mentioned by number of leaders



Note: Out of four interviews with LTDH leaders

Media Data on the LTDH

When it comes to co-occurrences in articles on the LTDH (Table 10.2, Annex), the government is by far the most mentioned actor like for the UGTT. The UGTT figures on the second place. Shortly after follow the Quartet and the UTICA, as well as the President of the Republic and the ONAT.

Parties are less prominent, but organizations like the FTDES, the SNJT, the ATFD or the Organization against Torture are placed more prominently. The clear tie towards the women movement, easily identifiable in interviews, is not represented in media reporting. The media reports are more focused on the role of the LTDH as part of the quartet and the interaction with the government. However, the coalition of civil society actors is better

identifiable than for the UGTT whose reporting is simply dominated by co-occurrences with state actors.

Summary on the LTDH's networks

The LTDH has a more extensive network when it comes to non-state actors, but a much more limited one when it comes to state actors. As part of its ties, especially the inclusion into the old civil society is to underline; the FTDES is consequentially not mentioned as an ally although ties exist. The Women movement has a more important status than other organizations like the UGTT, although those ties are not found in media reporting due to few reporting on the women movement as shown later.

Links towards the state are emphasized in media reports as especially the quartet is often mentioned. This is however less related to common projects or real interactions, but because of the Nobel Peace Prize. The media analysis is partly misleading here, something that is remarked when looking at articles in detail.

The international dimension plays a less important role in terms of allies, but networks are wide and include Arab, Maghrebin and international ties towards human rights organizations. The focus on human rights organizations is clearly visible in LTDH networks.

We have seen that the LTDH is well integrated in the women movement at least for interviews; I now turn to the women movement, represented through the ATFD.

4.1.3 ATFD: women and the national coalition

Civil society interaction and international links

Figure 4.7 shows the ties of the ATFD. Compared to the networks of UGTT and LTDH, ties are much more extensive. There are six major clusters that are identified. Other researchers already highlighted a lot of those ties towards other organizations of the women movement.

The ATFD holds strong ties to the AFTURD; some scholars even do not distinguish between the two's networks (Arfaoui and Moghadam 2016; Moghadam 2018). As Arfaoui and Moghadam describe, the ATFD has networks towards the government sponsored CREDIF, but also towards the UGTT, the LTDH and the Office National de la Famille et la Population

(ONFP; *ibid*). It makes sense to open a separate cluster for women rights organization as part of the ATFD's network, because there are many organizations such as Beity or Doustourna that are working on women rights. Those networks are also summarized by other researchers and partly overlap with another cluster, the (mainly old) Tunisian civil society. The ATFD is not only well connected to the old women movement, but also towards newer organizations like Beity or Doustourna⁴⁷.

Mahfoudh and Mahfoudh emphasize the Hrayer Tounès network (Free Women of Tunisia) as the biggest network of the women movement in Tunisia, regrouping ATFD, AFTURD, the women commissions of UGTT and LTDH, but also including newer groups like Doustourna or the Collective for women of Tunisia (Mahfoudh and Mahfoudh 2014). Those ties are equally visible in my research in Figure 4.7.

The cluster on the Tunisian civil society also shows that the already mentioned coalition of actors holds true for the ATFD. Other scholars summarize the close ties of the ATFD with the LTDH, the ONAT and the UGTT (Antonakis-Nashif 2016; Yousfi 2015). Similarly, the ATFD co-organized workshops with the UGTT, the LTDH, the FIDH, the FTDES and several other organizations at the World Social Forum (ATFD 2015c). Although the FTDES is mentioned when interviewees were asked on ties, the organization is mostly considered when prompting for other ties towards further actors, while the other ones are named when the first question on links to other actors is posed (thus, the quality of partnership is different).

Several clusters show that the ATFD has ties with other human rights groups on the international level. Several ATFD leaders like Nour explained that they are among others in contact with the regional Amnesty section, but also highlighted their ties with the United Nations Economic and Social Council (ECOSOC), the FIDH and the Euromed network. Other leaders underlined the contacts with Oxfam, which implements also the program AMAL, an empowerment program for rural women in Tunisia. Those clusters can be summarized into one Arab and Maghrebin women and human rights cluster, an international human rights cluster, a cluster on Foundations as well as an UN cluster.

⁴⁷ As some interviewees noted those organizations have been founded by ATFD militants who saw the need to create new associations.

UN Women and Oxfam are financers of ATFD programs; the UNDP financed another program. A lot of cooperation with the UN in a wider sense is highlighted.


The Arab and Maghrebin cooperation is mainly composed of the Forum of Arab Women AÏSHA, the Arab NGO Network for Development (ANND), and the Salma network against women violence, the Institute for Arab Human Rights and the Collectif 95 Maghreb-Egalité as well as the Forum Soil Maghrébin for Maghreb (ATFD 2016).

Hiba, another ATFD leader, explained that they work also with the Association for Women's rights in development (AWID), as well as German, French and Canadian Foundations in terms of financing and cooperation (ATFD, Hiba). Foundations and institutions of international development cooperation are not just financers but also partners. The ATFD selects partners carefully based on whether the other side holds shared visions. Thus, not every demand for cooperation is accepted (ATFD, Myriam).

In addition, there is another element that emerged throughout the interviews: The background in education of a number of leaders and the centrality of ties towards universities seems to be of additional importance. While this tie has not explicitly named, it seems important, as it becomes a contact point with student activists (so recruitment among others).

The ATFD is first and foremost part of the women movement, including international actors defending women rights. It is equally part of the human rights network, quite similar to the LTDH. However, the specialization of the ATFD on women issues is as visible as the specialization of the LTDH on prisoners and torture. The ATFD holds together with the FTDES the greatest variety of ties towards different organizations in comparison to the other organizations.

Figure 4.7 ATFD ties towards civil society and international actors



Connection towards the state and political parties

Compared to UGTT and LTDH, the ATFD has ties to the state and political parties that resemble a lot those of the LTDH as shown in Figure 4.8.

Quite important appear relations towards the Ministry of Social Affairs, but equally the Ministry of Women as well as the Ministry of the Interior. When comparing networks towards ministries with the UGTT, those are however much more formal towards most other ministries, except the Ministry of Women.

Former militants enter the ministries and provide a point of entry. In addition, the relations towards the Ministry of Women have been confirmed by the other side, as a former women movement leader became responsible for the coordination with civil society (Ministry of Women, Soulayma); a case I return to in chapter seven. The relations towards the Ministry of Women appear best as they share a number of visions as interviewees expressed.

In interviews meetings with the national government, be it the President of the Republic or the Presidency of the Government, are reported as well. When comparing with the UGTT for


example, the ATFD cannot that easily approach ministers, apart from the Minister of Women.

Contacts with the administration are held on a case-by-case basis, so if there is an issue, relations are used. The regional government is approached when there is an issue related to the regions. Contacts towards the police are rather ambivalent and seen with skepticism and mistrust, while sensitization campaigns are open towards the police. No contacts with the military exist.

Contacts with parliamentarians are on a personal basis. While some interviewees mentioned few contacts, others insisted on several contacts. The ATFD is open towards most parties except Ennahdha. However, relations to political parties are neither well developed nor a priority of the ATFD. It is more by hazard that two militants have been elected for Nida Tounes and thus represent ties that are used occasionally.

The specialization of the ATFD on Women issues is obvious when it comes to relations with the state, as the Ministry of Women is the main target.

Figure 4.8 ATFD ties towards state actors and parties




Qualifying those links

The ATFD's network is quite elaborated towards human rights groups and women organizations and as noticed earlier is the largest network towards civil society. On the human rights level it resembles a lot the network of the LTDH.

Figure 4.9 shows the allies as mentioned by ATFD leaders. As shown, the LTDH, AFTURD, Amnesty International and the UGTT have been mentioned as allies by all five leaders. The Association of Journalists follows close, as well as the general category NGOs. Three out of five leaders mentioned general categories like women or civil society, but also the FIDH and the UGET. The FTDES or the ONAT were only mentioned by two leaders. There are more actors named as allies than for LTDH and FTDES, but less than for the UGTT. Given the wide network of the ATFD this is not surprising. It is to note, that the Ministry of Women was mentioned by one leader as being an ally, but no other state actor is included in their list of allies. The UTICA does also not play a role.

The allies mentioned resemble the ones for LTDH and UGTT although the ONAT plays less a role. As for the other two organizations, the FTDES plays a reduced role. What dominates is the old civil society as well as ties towards Amnesty International, an actor that is evaluated as important for the ATFD but that played no role for the other organizations.

Figure 4.9 Allies as mentioned by number of leaders



Note: out of five interviews in with ATFD leaders

Adversaries of the ATFD are Ennahdha or Zionist organizations, but there is also a general distrust towards Islamic actors like in the case of Qatari finance related towards the different perception of women's role. Kilani explains that a number of Tunisians became "allergic" faced with Qatar and are suspicious of their intentions (Kilani 2014). This is similar for the ATFD. The ATFD is skeptical towards all types of Islamist actors, conservatives as well as towards the old regime, or how it is also called by the ATFD: "integrist", or "destourians"⁴⁸ (ATFD, Myriam).

Media data on the ATFD

When it comes to co-occurrences in articles, like for the other two organizations, the government is placed most prominently, directly followed by articles including Ennahdha (Table 10.3, Annex).

Other actors named in articles on the ATFD are the media, parliament, the Ministry of Women and Nida Tounes. Other organizations mentioned include the AFTURD, the Euromed

⁴⁸ The notion of destourian refers to the movement for independence and the time of Bourguiba and summarizes the constitutional and cultural heritage of that time.

Human Rights Networks, the Foundation “Femmes et mémoire”, the LTDH, the UGTT, the FTDES and the SNJT.

The media analysis confirms the reporting on governmental affairs in line with organizations. It underlines the antagonistic role of Ennahdha and the ATFD that is shown by the high co-occurrence with Ennahdha.

The media analysis shows the same links that are mentioned in the interviews, however with different weight. The link towards the Ministry of Women is visible as is the coalition of actors that is repeated throughout the interviews.

Summary on the ATFD's networks

In relation to the networks that exist, the ATFD focuses on human rights and women rights networks on an UN level, but also shows high levels of cooperation with European actors especially as financiers of common projects. The role of the ATFD is clearly an expert on women and human rights. It's cooperation on a national level are shaped by its integration in the women movement, but also into the old civil society.

With regard to networks towards the state, the ATFD is much focused on the Ministry of Women. Networks towards the state are as limited as for the LTDH.

While UGTT, LTDH and ATFD are key actors of the old civil society coalition, the FTDES is named, but normally of less importance. I now analyze how the FTDES evaluates their ties towards other actors.

4.1.4 FTDES: migration, justice and so much more

Civil society interaction and international links

Figure 4.10 shows the ties of the FTDES towards other civil society and international actors. Again at least five important clusters are identified. After the ATFD, it is the second largest network among the four organizations. The OST is to mention at it is an institution founded by and dependent on the FTDES.

On the national level, the FTDES works with strategic partners, namely the UGTT, the ATFD and others (FTDES, Sami). Those have recognized values as stated during interviews. Similarly, another leader called it the “hard core” (FTDES, Nejb). These include also the LTDH, the ONAT, the UGET and the Tunisian Journalist Association. The FTDES works with the CREDIF, another actor within the women movement. As we have seen before, other organizations hesitated to count the FTDES among the hard core; FTDES leaders nevertheless see themselves as part of it (or at least they try to suggest it). The same organizations as for the others are mainly identified for the civil society cluster. On the other hand, the FTDES emphasizes its regional ties with the UGTT for example on pollution or health, for the latter subject also with the LTDH and the UTICA (FTDES 2016a). For the FTDES, abstract groups like civil society in general, the youth and citizens were mentioned as well, but are not shown in this overview on clusters.

On the international level, the FTDES works with human rights groups like the FIDH or the Euromed network. They get engaged with the European and the Maghrébin axes as part of international cooperation; including Moroccan organizations or even wider when it comes to ties towards the Egyptian ECESR. Regarding the European axes, they are in contact with the EU, similar to the LTDH. Apart from those, the FTDES has also contacts towards Brazilian organizations.

Foundations and international organizations play a role, namely Oxfam, the Open Society Foundation, the Rosa Luxembourg Foundation and the FES have been identified. The latter are probably more important for financing projects. UN institutions play no role contrary to ATFD and LTDH.

The FTDES organized the World Social Forum twice. They are in contact with the Tunisian diaspora something not explicitly mentioned by the other organizations.


Special for the FTDES are on the one hand its networks on migration (boats4People and so on) as well as the ties towards organizations working on social responsibility or tax justice. It needs to be remarked that the ties on migration are of international nature (organizations in the lower right of Figure 4.10 are no Tunisian organizations). In this sense and similar to the

UGTT for labor issues, the organization seems to hesitate working with organizations that operate on the same issue on a national level.

However, no organization working on environmental issues was identified, something that is surprising given their focus on environmental problems (see chapter one). From the network it looks more like a human rights organization with focus on migration and some social aspects, something that is nevertheless in line with their mission.

When it comes to the media, the FTDES did not mention any outlets in particular. The FTDES holds regular press conferences and is in contact with several media outlets, however no selection is made.

Figure 4.10 FTDES ties towards civil society and international actors



Connection towards the state and political parties

Figure 4.11 shows the ties of the FTDES towards the state as well as political parties. The FTDES approaches the second highest number of ministries after the UGTT. This shows the diversity of topics covered; in some cases, it shows very specific ties. The ties towards the Ministry of Transport for example have been established to organize the transport at the World Social Forum (FTDES, Sami). Other ties towards ministries include the Ministry of Social Affairs, of Relations with Civil Society, of Foreign Affairs (for example on migration as well as on trade with the EU), the Ministry of the Interior as well as of Higher Education. The Minister of Relations with Civil Society is considered a friend by FTDES leaders. The ties of the FTDES towards ministries show the diversity of issues. They also show that


environmental issues are not a priority as the Ministry of Environment is not among the mentioned ties. At the same time, it is difficult to identify a clear specialization of the FTDES by looking at its networks towards the state.

Due to their personal background, university contacts are equally important as illustrated by the CERES (a research institute) and the Ministry of Higher Education. Especially for their reports, the organization relies on academic experts.

Personal contacts exist also with deputies. Sami for example speaks of a group of deputies who have the same background (syndicalist and people they know) that is “nourished” with reports (FTDES, Sami). On the other hand, only remote contact is hold with political parties.

Contacts do exist with the police in relation to the organization of events. The FTDES has very broad contacts with the military as the World Social Forum was too big to be handled by police only. These contacts are not regular and event related. They are in contact with the administration depending on cases. For the regional government it depends on cases as contacts are not regular.

Figure 4.11 FTDES ties towards state actors and parties



Qualifying those links


Figure 4.12 shows the allies as mentioned in interviews. All interviewees mentioned the UGTT and the ATFD as allies. In addition, and different from the other organizations, deputies in parliament have been mentioned as allies by all three leaders.

Media is mentioned by two leaders as an ally. This is related to the extensive media work that the FTDES does. In this sense, the relations to media are very different, not to say completely different especially in comparison to the ATFD. In addition, the civil society as well as women and the LTDH are identified by two leaders.

Only one leader mentions the youth, the Ministry of Higher Education, the Minister for Relations with Civil Society, the Observatoire de la jeunesse or the CERES. Similarly, ONAT, Euromed Human Rights as well as foundations were only mentioned once.

Compared to the other organizations, the old civil society is again well represented among allies. Notwithstanding the other organizations, parliament and media are mentioned as allies. For parliament, this does however not mean that it is the whole parliament, but a selection of deputies as became clear in interviews.

Figure 4.12 Allies as mentioned by number of leaders



Note: Out of three interviews with FTDES leaders

Although being asked on adversaries, FTDES leaders did not explicitly mention any. This was consistent across leaders, even though it became clear between the lines that Ennahdha and Islamists are not appreciated a lot.

Media data on the FTDES

Related to co-occurrences in articles (Table 10.4, Annex), the government is again most prominently placed, followed by the European Union. The co-occurrences in articles including the FTDES show a slightly different orientation as for the other organizations. The IVD (Truth Commission) for example is more prominently placed, as is the World Social Forum. The UGTT figures as the best placed other organization, followed by the Tunisian Social Observatory, an organization belonging to the FTDES. The LTDH, Euromed Human Rights and Avocats sans frontières are often mentioned. Among the Ministries are the Ministry of Social Affairs as well as the one for Vocational Training (the latter did not appear in interviews).

A balance exists between the co-occurrences of other countries as well as the UN, something different from other organizations. Especially the role of the EU can be explained by the extensive demand of the FTDES to be included in the ALECA negotiations (trade partnership). In addition, a number of questions on migration are related to the EU, but also other countries. The presence of the IVD, that is responsible for covering cases of political

disadvantages and prosecution under Ben Ali, shows that issues of justice get covered a lot in relation to the FTDES.

The media analysis shows a different picture than the interviews. Media co-occurrences do not help to identify the role of the FTDES as the additional topic of transitional justice prominently emerges.

Summary on the FTDES's networks

It can be concluded that the FTDES is visibly an organization active on many fronts and without one or two clear specializations. In addition, environmental issues play no role, raising the question why the issue is named prominently in interviews, documents and their website. No contact towards other environmental organizations exists neither on a national nor an international level. While the FTDES has been selected for its environmental engagement (which is certainly existent), it does not translate in their network structure; one surprising finding. Possible explanations range from missing other national level organizations (something already noted when searching for organizations mobilizing on environmental issues, but not explaining missing international links towards for example WWF or Greenpeace), towards environment as a regional issue that is not covered on a national level. It becomes clear that the role of the FTDES cannot be well determined.

Similar to the first finding, the FTDES approaches a number of different ministries and not necessarily the same as the other organizations. Although it is also focused on the Ministry of Social Affairs other ministries like the one on External Relations – not mentioned for other organizations – play a role.

On a national level, contacts are oriented towards the old civil society that also figures as allies. The FTDES much stronger names the other analyzed organization as partners than the others name the FTDS. This puzzle will be discussed in the following where I discuss whether coalitional influence is possible for what organizations.

4.1.5 A coalition, but how close

I now turn to the quality of the networks in terms of a coalition and start by outlining the ties towards each other. Table 10.6 and Table 10.7 in the Annex show how often the other organizations have been mentioned in the case category that includes all interviews/articles

on the respective organization⁴⁹. We have already seen in the previous sections that organizations mentioned the same allies while the ATFD and LTDH appear as particularly close. While the FTDES is slightly apart, the UGTT is clearly connected to the other organizations.

What becomes evident through the network analysis are the arguments for a strong movement coalition, but also some missing or not developed ties towards media, the public as well as parliament. While actors are not very positive towards media outlets, they nevertheless underline the role of public opinion. The traditional media may not be equally important for opinion building as in a Western context, having consequences for theory.

Table 10.6 reads as follows: In all interviews with ATFD leaders, the FTDES was mentioned two times, while LTDH and UGTT were mentioned much more often. When qualifying those interview statements, the LTDH and UGTT were often mentioned as allies and core cooperation, strengthening the arguments for a close coalition of those actors.

For the FTDES fewer other organizations have been coded; here, no clear differences between the three other organizations emerge, while the UGTT is most often mentioned. From the FTDES perspective, the organizations are of equal importance, with the UGTT being slightly more important.

Taking the LTDH, overall few other organizations have been mentioned, something already found in their network towards other organizations. However, the differences between ATFD and UGTT on the one hand and FTDES on the other are striking as the FTDES was only coded once in the leader interviews compared to six respective seven times for the other two organizations.

A different picture emerges for the UGTT where ATFD and FTDES are on a similar level, while the LTDH is most often coded showing that the LTDH is a more important partner than the other two organizations.

⁴⁹ Every interview with a representative of an organization has been coded as a case. The case encloses all interviews with that organization. Other organizations that were mentioned within each interview were coded under the organizational name.

To summarize, it shows that the FTDES, although considering itself as part of this network and seeing the other movements as partners, is somehow distant from the “inner circle” for some of the organizations as it has been mentioned much less than others. In addition, although being relatively often mentioned in interviews with UGTT leaders, the most often heard allies across all organizations were UGTT, ATFD, LTDH as well as the Association of Journalists, the ONAT and the UGET. The interviewees stressed the quality of those allies and consequentially one can conclude that a close coalition of these actors exists.

This means, that from the perspective of interviews, the first three organizations can use a coalitional mode easily for approaching for example ministries, while the FTDES will not be capable to the same degree to reunite the others for example on protest. Indirect effects are seen as less effective for the FTDES when it comes to a coalitional mode, reason why the FTDES focuses much on media when it comes to indirect effects.

Is the coalition present in the media reporting?

Table 10.7 tested the co-occurrences for articles in order to see whether the organizations were mentioned more often in relation to other organizations.

In articles on the ATFD, the other organizations were mentioned to a similar degree. For articles on the FTDES, the ATFD played a minor role, while the UGTT was coded twice as much than the LTDH. It becomes clear that ATFD and FTDES are rarely mentioned in articles compared to the UGTT and LTDH. In media reports (Table 10.7), the ATFD has fewer links to other organizations; something that is related to few media reporting on the ATFD, a problem that has been outlined before and that continues to be an issue.

When it comes to articles, the exclusion of the FTDES from the inner circle is not that present. In this sense, the FTDES is more successful portraying itself as part of the inner circle of civil society in the media than when it comes to evaluations by leaders. The FTDES uses the media and portrays a different image to compensate for the missing perceived integration in the inner circle. It is not automatically mentioned as a core partner in interviews as it appeared after the revolution but is threatened on a same level in articles, even though not being part of the old civil society.

On the other hand, the tie between the UGTT and the LTDH gets underlined in the media also as part of the national dialogue and is mentioned frequently in articles. The old civil society is a social construction of the organizations included. Diani would probably assign that the old civil society is an identity used to identify partners and cooperation.

The four organizations work together on some issues and are part of a wider movement coalition (including for example equally the ONAT and the Association of Journalists or what is mainly seen as old civil society; compare also Volpi et al. 2016). What we see is a close coalition between the organizations analyzed with some reserves when it comes to the FTDES. Not all organizations perceive others to a similar degree as allies.

Diani underlines that organizations search for alliances across levels of prestige and influence across a civil society sector, so that cooperation is not necessarily horizontal (Diani 2015). Indeed, although of different size, the ATFD and the UGTT cooperate. In addition, the organizations have unique specializations that only overlap when it comes to human rights.

I also developed network maps showing the shared ties based on articles in order to see what contacts are similar/distinct from one organization to another (to be found in the annex, Table 10.5). This is important from a coalition perspective, as it shows which actors can be approached by every organization or only by specific organizations.

Main shared contacts are contacts towards the president, political parties, parliament, some ministries and the quartet. Apart from that, the military or some contacts towards actors from other countries like Sweden were mentioned. Due to the media coverage, especially the UGTT's ties get emphasized and are much more covered than those of the other organizations. When looking at the media data, the UGTT is the most central actor with a number of very dense contacts; however, the reach towards different specific organizations is wider especially for the LTDH that is mentioned together with the highest amount of other organizations. This is surprising and contradicts the findings from interviews were ties towards other organizations, but also towards government remain limited. However, I have more confidence to the interviewees as they are closer to the organizations. Media articles

do not necessarily represent reality as they for example over report on the quartet. The quartet is then linked to other actors. It might however be, that links exposed in public are seen as wider as in interviews and that the LTDH succeeds in giving the impression of having a large network due to many not very close cooperation that were not mentioned in interviews. However, several other problems exist with over reporting on the government that I faced earlier. Another example is Oxfam. It appears that ties towards Oxfam, mentioned by three out of four organizations in interviews are underreported in articles perhaps due to the finance they provide for organizations, an issue that is less reported on.

Old networks and closed circles

Media as well as articles show that the analyzed movements hold a relatively dense network (with some reserves for the FTDES); especially other organizations and younger organizations cannot easily enter this network of organizations and thus have difficulties to get the same level of representation. This is well explained by the reluctance of some UGTT leaders to work with younger organizations. In addition, this perceptive was confirmed by leaders from younger civil society organizations that have been interviewed for comparison and that feel excluded (Tun'Act, Wassim; Jamaity, Farah). Thus, a divide in the Tunisian civil society exists, dividing organizations with a long history and reputation and those with fewer experience and resources.

Hadden argues that larger networks get less connected when many new organizations get integrated in networks and from this perspective integration has also its limits (Hadden 2015). If the network grows too big, coordination among all members becomes too difficult. Thus, it is understandable that organizations are reluctant to reach out to newer actors. On the other hand, notably the FTDES tries to include younger movements that are not yet organized to scale demands.

Another aspect is the growing competition that can increase network divisions as emphasized by Hadden for climate change networks (Hadden 2015). As noted earlier, especially the smallest organization (ATFD) as well as the youngest (FTDES) have a wide network towards other civil society actors including younger organizations. LTDH and UGTT are reluctant when it comes to extending their existent network that remains relatively limited or selective in comparison to the other two organizations. ATFD and FTDES need a

larger network because they are not regarded by media attention (ATFD) or still searching for their position (FTDES).

In addition, contacts towards allies are not only organizational, but also personal. What became clear through interviews is multi-engagement. A number of interviewees are not only in one organization but in several of the same movement network. Even on an organizational level, FTDES and LTDH are for example closely tied, with members being on both executive boards. Labidi shows a similar example: Bochra Belhaj Hmida was president of the ATFD from 1995 to 2001, member of the LTDH, local human-rights activist and one of the founders of Amnesty International in Tunisia (Labidi 2015; this explains also the frequent mentions of Amnesty as a partner by ATFD leaders).

There are several examples like this, also in line with the role of the UGTT under Ben Ali where the organization to a certain degree educated activists. Interviewees referred to militants they know from common actions under Ben Ali that re-enforce the double (personal and organizational) links. In this sense, personal contacts and experience re-enforce the old network structures on an organizational level.

Roles in a network

We have already seen above, that different parts of the network are shared across organizations. One of those shared elements is for example a tie towards the international human rights network (FIDH as well as Euromed; not present to a similar degree for the UGTT though).

Beneath some shared elements, different specializations are visible throughout the network. The ATFD for example works with organizations on women and human rights, while the UGTT focuses on worker and social rights and has ties towards labor unions in other countries. The LTDH uses human rights networks as well as works with organizations on prisoners' rights and torture. A special case is the FTDES where the specialization is less visible through networks with human rights elements, migration, social justice and trade included. The specialization allows identifying experts on topics, something that becomes more difficult for the FTDES. This might also be the reason why the FTDES is not clearly

mentioned as important ally by all leaders as it is not clear for what it stands and how it can integrate the coalition.

The UGTT is an important actor in terms of network structure. When the UGTT is included, more political weight can be assigned due to the reputation and size of the UGTT. Thus, it is not surprising that the UGTT networks on a national level appear rather limited compared to other organizations. All other organizations (the FTDES a bit less) can serve as gatekeepers for the UGTT that has itself ties towards fewer organizations. The UGTT can also serve as access point towards more ministries, especially towards informal structures. However, officially, access to ministries is equally possible for all actors in the system; a point I return to in chapter seven.

One of the biggest mobilizing structures, the UDC (representing the unemployed), is not explicitly mentioned by interviewees and is also not a main partner according to the media analysis. This is explained by the missing representation of the UDC on the national level. The UDC cooperates probably (few data exist) on a local level with the UGTT. The absence of the UDC at a national level recalls however the criticism by Hibou that the poorest actors with the unemployed were not organized, so that more organized social categories got heard (Hibou 2011a). Given the development of the UDC in recent years, it appears surprising that the organization is not integrated on a national level. The missing professionalization and some general skepticism towards the UDC are expressed between the lines by UGTT leaders.

A number of interviewees underlined that they act in network to augment the chances of success (ATFD, Myriam; FTDES, Mehdi; LTDH, Bechir; LTDH, Rim; UGTT, Nada and UGTT, Aziz). For mobilization, all organizations refrain to a larger network in order to achieve outcomes beneath the efforts by each organization.

The specific roles make specific ministries important for each organization, while efforts to change for example ideas about democracy or legislation can be single or joint actions. Keeping the double option of single and joint effect in mind, this point is detailed in chapter seven and equally accompanies the analysis of framing in order to identify common and

single framing. Now I turn to the ministerial networks in order to verify the direct interactions.

4.2 Ministerial network

The ministerial networks are analyzed on the basis of what ministries were mentioned as important before. The UGTT has ties towards quasi-all ministries but more explicitly the Ministry of Social Affairs (unfortunately not included in the analysis) as well as the institutionalized four plus four/five plus five arrangements.

The LTDH holds closer ties towards the Ministry of the Interior, the Ministry of Justice as well as the Ministry of Social Affairs. The ATFD approaches mainly the Ministry of Women and the Ministry of Social Affairs. The FTDES approaches more ministries than the LTDH or the ATFD as it covers more issues and includes for example the Ministry of Relations with Civil Society and the Institutions (in the following Ministry of Relations with Civil Society) as well as the Ministry of Social Affairs. In comparison, the UGTT holds the most extensive ties towards ministries followed by the FTDES. LTDH and ATFD have more specific ties. A number of different ministries have been approached to verify whether those connections exist and what quality they have. In the following I outline the ties expressed by civil servants before integrating the state-oriented relations hold by ministries.

4.2.1 Towards civil society – it's specific to every ministry and diverse


Figure 4.13 shows the general ties of the Ministries. They are regrouped in seven clusters. As all ministries are regarded together some clusters are very large like the one on the Tunisian civil society.

One of those clusters is international links that get divided into three different clusters. One is related to the Human Rights network including Euromed or UN institutions, one related to good governance including for example EITI (relevant for the Ministry of Industry), and the largest one focuses on international cooperation that can have different thematic orientations. International cooperation includes countries, as well as international institutions or foundations.

On the lower right are some organizations that are state sponsored or that represent employers. Those groups are defined more as NGOs, professional organizations or lobby groups. Under this category falls the UTICA, but also several federations of enterprises or national companies like the STEG. Some ministries mentioned associations that are linked to a specific ministry and that are found in the cluster on the lower right.

The lower left shows the ties towards the overall civil society. Not all of those organizations represent movements, and again some are quite specific for ministries like the Ordre des Experts Comptable (working on finance). Given that the schema represents a high number of different ministries, the number of civil society organizations is still rather limited. We find not only organizations that qualify as old civil society like ATFD, UGTT, ONAT or LTDH, but also younger ones like I Watch, Al Bawsala, PASC or Beity. However, some of the ties have been mentioned only once and represent only the tie of one specific ministry (like the Amitié for the Ministry of Habitation). As part of this overview, even single mentions are shown in Figure 4.13.

Figure 4.13 Ministerial ties towards civil society and international actors



As there are many organizations in the overview, the question emerges which organizations have been mentioned most by several civil servants across ministries. Table 4.14 shows the most mentioned organizations and in how many interviews the referral occurred.

The ties to civil society towards the UGTT, the ATFD, I Watch, as well as towards FTDES, LTDH and the EU were mentioned. The analyzed organizations are probably overrepresented because specific questions on them have been posed which augmented the number of mentions⁵⁰. As no specific questions on I Watch or I Bawsala (not in Table 4.14 as less than five coding) have been posed, these appear as important organizations apart from the four analyzed ones because they were mentioned without questioning. From these details, we

⁵⁰ When civil servants answered to have no contact to for example the UGTT , those are not included in the numbers of course. Questions were systematically posed to all civil servants, however not all confirmed those links.

already see that many organizations from Figure 4.13 are not relevant for all ministries and that there are many organizations only mentioned by one ministry.

Table 4.14 Mentioned direct ties to other actors

	Mentioned in interviews	Number of different interviews
UGTT	10	6
ATFD	7	3
I Watch	7	3
FTDES	6	2
LTDH	6	2
EU	6	4

Note: including civil society and international actors (five or more mentions in interviews), civil society as abstract category was often mentions, equally women and citizens have been evoked. Those categories are not shown as they subsume unspecific groups.

Looking at the number of interviewees that refer to other organizations and actors, it is shown that the ties towards many other civil society actors are rather an exception.

It becomes clear that ties towards the LTDH or FTDES are limited to few ministries (especially the Ministry of Relations with Civil Society). It also shows that the UGTT is the best-connected organization of the four analyzed ones as it was coded in six out of thirteen interviews. On the other hand, it already shows that ties by ministries towards organizations are rather the exception, something that will be discussed when talking about allies later on. I equally recall that especially the UGTT stated to have ties to many different ministries as the FTDES did. In comparison, not all civil servants did confirm those ties and especially not for the FTDES. It is not to exclude that organizations were not named because they are subsumed under civil society in general, however this tells much about the quality of those links.

To complete the picture, I also shortly elaborate on the inter-ministerial networks as well as towards political parties as it shows how organizations perform in relation to political parties. Afterwards the links will be qualified in terms of perceived allies.

4.2.2 Ties towards other state actors and political parties – a lack of coordination?


When it comes to other ministries as shown in Figure 4.15, most civil servants mentioned other ministries very broadly and only few mentioned concrete contacts. While there are no specific ministries that appear as cooperating regularly, there is some coordination. On the

other hand, some civil servants claimed a lack of communication and coordination across ministries.

Another cluster includes state owned institutions like the ENA or the HAICA that were stated on a similar level as the administration. Specific contacts of individual ministries exist, like police and military that are not linked to all other ministries, but to the Ministry of the Interior.

When it comes to political parties, concretely mentioned were only WATAD (Popular Front) and Ennahdha, while anyone explicitly referred to Nida Tounes. This may be artificial as most civil servants referred to the abstract category of “political parties” instead of concrete parties, something that can be well explained by political neutrality. Parliament and political parties are prominently named. The Presidency of the Government and the Ministry of Finance play a role that is highlighted in chapter seven. The ties towards other state actors enable to verify the ways law proposals take, something that is shown later.

Figure 4.15 Ministerial ties towards the state and parties




4.2.3 Qualifying those links – how close are the state and civil society?

Civil servants were also asked on allies. The most frequently mentioned category is very general with the civil society.

When being asked for concrete organizations the most frequently named organization was the UGTT, followed by the ONAT as Figure 4.16 shows. Other organizations like the LTDH, the ATFD, the UTICA or the PASC have only been mentioned once as ally. Compared to the organizations, civil servants were more reluctant to speak about allies and particularly allies in civil society. The perception of allies often depends on only one or very few ministries. On the other hand, the civil society in general is defined as an ally by half of the ministries. This may be due to the perceived importance of civil society in Tunisia. However, it is difficult to identify concrete partners with such a wide category and it is unclear whether this category serves as category for describing coalitions of actors. From these findings, only the UGTT is more or less accepted as ally.

Figure 4.16 Allies



Note: as mentioned by number of ministries (out of 12 ministries in total)

Another question on acceptance of movements and civil society was asked. For this question (not shown), it was the UGTT that was mentioned most prominently; other organizations that are well accepted include I Watch and the LTDH, to a lesser degree UTICA, Al Bawsala, as well as the ATFD. It is to recall that equally civil society organizations only spoke less

frequently about ministries as allies so that the state and civil society perspective fit well together.

While this makes it already difficult to talk about intense exchanges if few organizations are mentioned as allies or as accepted, a more detailed analysis shows that some ministries are responsible for several connotations as allies, while others do not name any partners. To illustrate the differences between ministries I briefly compare the allies mentioned by a civil servant from the Ministry of Regional Development with the ones mentioned by a civil servant from the Ministry of Industry.

While the one from the Ministry of Regional Development mentioned the UGTT, civil society, other ministries, UTAP, UTICA and international foundations, the one from the Ministry of Industry only stated other ministries as ally. This shows the differences between ministries, as not all civil servants will speak about allies to the same degree. Some civil servants like Kamel from the Ministry of Habitation did even not speak about allies, but about accepted organizations instead.

The type of actors differs from one ministry to another. While the Ministry of Women and the Ministry of Relations with Civil Society mostly mentioned civil society organizations as partner, the Presidency of the Government focused on different ministries. These differences in perceptions are discussed later in detail as they influence the way framings diffuse (and especially limit the diffusion). I recall also that no media analysis is performed for ministries and the relations towards other actors in the media, as data was organization centered and not collected for ministries.

Summary on the ministerial networks

What became evident from the ministerial networks that not every ministry has the same contacts towards civil society. Some have very limited ones, others like the Ministry for Relations with Civil Society and the Institution very large ones. While all organizations are mentioned by at least one ministry, the intensity of interactions differs. Few ministries speak about organizations as allies, especially the UGTT is here to highlight as being mentioned by some ministries as ally. Other organizations such as the FTDES are not mentioned at all as

ally by any ministry. This does however not mean that no ties exist, but it means that those interactions are not very intense.

There are several dyads that emerge from a detailed look at the data. One of those is the Ministry of Women and the ATFD. Another is the Presidency of the Government and the UGTT, as well as the Ministry for Relations with Civil Society and the LTDH and FTDES.

4.3 Conclusion to chapter four

4.3.1 Answer to the first question - How are movements connected to each other and to which degree to they interact?

There is a core of organizations that is not just built among the analyzed organizations, but also the ONAT, the Association of Journalists, the UGET and others. Those build what I call the old civil society that is effectively a coalition. The FTDES is only partly integrated. ATFD and FTDES are more open towards younger organizations. Coalitional modes of functioning are thus possible for UGTT, LTDH and ATFD among each other and only partly for the FTDES.

The old civil society has strong networks among each other with each organization holding some unique ties and the UGTT holding few unique ties (compare Figure 10.8 in Annex). The divide between young and existent elites is present; between those who existed before the end of the Ben Ali regime and those who mobilized afterwards. The division in new and old civil society has severe consequences. While newer social movements can influence their reputation, it is difficult to enter into structural circles of influence making. New organizations therefore have the disadvantage that their influence is restricted through the existent organizations. As members of the existent networks expressed, newer organizations often miss the experience and reputation (and in their view the professionalism). Although it was not the aim to regard the consequences and outcomes of those younger networks, interviews with leaders of younger organizations confirmed the differences in access. While newer organizations struggle with approaching at least one ministry, established organizations have at least contacts, in some cases even former militants in ministries. Consequentially only the old organizations may be able to influence policymaking, something to keep in mind for chapter seven when it comes to mechanisms of influence. One possible entry point for newer organizations already used by Al Bawsala or I Watch is

hearings of ministries which enable to build lasting contacts. This point is taken up again in chapter seven.

While organizations normally hold contacts to older organizations, one small exemption is the ATFD which named Doustourna and where one leader expressed “we gained eventually two to three associations maximum” (ATFD, Nour). This said, the ATFD is aware that they work with the same organizations as before and only added those two to three organizations. Similarly, the leaders of younger organizations did not mention contacts towards the old civil society organizations, but to the same foundations and international actors as mentioned by the old organizations. In addition, those revealed that the role is different and problems in terms of funding and the like greater (perhaps except for the EU financed PASC). Certain contacts have a strategic financing intention like those towards a number of foundations, others provide international support where needed (Euromed or FIDH) and the national ones are of strategic nature when it comes to putting pressure on state officials.

The analyzed organizations show a clear integration into international human rights networks. From the international dimension three out of four organizations mentioned explicitly the Euromed Human Rights Network as well as the FIDH and Oxfam as important partners.

When comparing the findings with the media reports, it becomes evident that, while contacts towards political parties and the government are shared among the analyzed organizations, all organizations hold unique ties towards organizations and ministries that work in their area of expertise. These specialized ties are more intense. This is re-discussed when answering the second question that oriented this paper.

Multidimensional networks and a coalition

Networks should not be seen as unitary. Different types of networks, be it personal, organizational, institutionalized or informal contacts, exist and mechanisms depend on the type of networks and aim of interaction as is discussed later.

The analyzed movements can clearly be described as a social movement coalition, with the FTDES in a slightly reduced role. This means that not only individual influence of each organization is possible, but also combined influence by a movement coalition. The structure appears like a circle or dense web where most of the organizations are connected with each other. It is in line with what van Dyke and McCammon found for a different context, who describe a coalition of several movements that works on common tasks (van Dyke and McCammon 2010). While there is no umbrella organization, the UGTT is the most decisive organization and can decide on whether for example protest gets a national scope or whether it remains local based. The UGTT is thus the most central actor in this network, also because it ensures the ties towards the state. The FTDES is a bit aside, probably because of its newer origin or because of its diverse topics. However, the FTDES tries (and in media succeeds) to be part of this inner circle. Among those who are seen as part of the movement coalition are those that have been repressed under Ben Ali (with the exception of the Islamic movement which is not – longer – seen as part of this coalition).

The FIDH or Euromed can scale problems to the international level or act as support. International actors are described less as allies and are more seen as support or resources.

Interviewees showed optimism that the united coalition is able to mobilize against authoritarianism. This potential for mobilization is not just found in instrumental goals, but is based on shared visions and values. This is similar to what Diani found; that commonality in basic values is the most important factor to establish and maintain networks (Diani 2015). It is not surprising to find the named organizations as part of a coalition, given the history of opposition in Tunisia that included either jihadist groups or professional associations or advocacy NGOs in coalitions (Ayari 2016). In this case, the civil society that fought together against Ben Ali gets united in its demand for several different issues.

Personal contacts are the glue of the social movement coalition, similar to what van Dyke and McCammon found (van Dyke and McCammon 2010). Effectively, many of the interviewees claimed that it is not just about organizational ties, but about personal ones. Both should be seen as complementary. Many activists passed through an education on activism that was influenced by the UGTT and syndicalist activities.

Interviews revealed that the role of organizations differs and problems vary. A number of organizations underlined the importance of having complementary roles when working with their allies, something similar to Diani's findings (Diani 2015). The differences between movements are important for the composition of protest. While the UGTT ensures the reach towards workers and the national spread, the LTDH is expert for human rights and the ATFD for women rights. The Journalist association can serve as expert for media questions, the ONAT as expert for the rule of law and the FTDES as expert for migration or environment. The boundaries are clearer for the organizations themselves than they appear from outside. It can be expected, that human rights and democracy dominate when looking at the framing of democracy hold by the analyzed organizations because they are the most common denominator in terms of networks. It can also be expected from the network structure, that different organizations set different thematic foci when it comes to framing democracy.

From the first question it is to keep in mind that both direct contacts as well as indirect contacts either via other organizations or via media are possible. Interaction with the latter is not very frequent apart from the FTDES.

4.3.2 Answer to the second question - Which ties between movements and the state do exist and what qualities do those have?

While all analyzed organizations mentioned contacts towards the national government, ministries, the state administration as well as the governor, three of four organizations especially mentioned the Ministry of Social Affairs as being important (which unfortunately was not available for interviews although several attempts). All organizations mentioned contacts towards the media, parliament and political parties, while the degree differed. Nevertheless, the most unattended element is rather weak ties towards parties and parliament. Direct ties to major political parties were not that prominent; one could easily imagine that for example the UGTT would cooperate more with the Popular Front like Amenta et al. outlined for the US context between labor and civil rights movement and the Democratic Party (Amenta et al. 2010). This is however not the case and contacts towards parties are limited to keep a reputation of independence. This is surprising given that the new democratic system relies on parliament; a point that is to keep in mind for later. The

outreach towards parliament may become more important in the future. At the moment it is more occasionally and not very intense.

All organizations hold ties towards specific ministries in their area of expertise. In some cases, ministries do not always acknowledge those ties (especially for the FTDES). On the other hand, the Ministry of Women indicates strong ties towards organizations. The UGTT is mentioned by a number of ministries and holds not only specific ties, but overarching ones that are not bound to thematic orientations.

In comparison to other organizations, the state relation of the UGTT is much more explicit as they intensively cooperate with ministers and policy makers on an institutionalized level. Recalling Tilly's distinction between insider and challenger, the UGTT appears as closest to an insider position (Tilly 2000). It is not a one-way street as the UGTT gets solicited by ministries in some cases. The UGTT is involved in policy making especially via the four plus four/ five plus five format and thus can find itself in a privileged position. It becomes insider, while it still plays the challenger when mobilizing against the state. The other organizations have less and more specific ties.

To answer the second question of this chapter: Yes, the four organizations have regular contacts towards ministries that were partly confirmed by ministries and of different intensity. The extent is wider for the UGTT and appears limited for the other three organizations. There are ministries with more ties towards political organizations like the ATFD, the LTDH or the FTDES, while others hold more contacts towards less political organizations. The UGTT was mentioned several times by ministries. While the ATFD and LTDH were mentioned as partners of the Ministry of Women, the FTDES was not mentioned as partner by any ministry.

On the other hand, as part of a close coalition, not all organizations need close contact to all ministries as other organizations in the coalition can cover those in a more efficient way (like the UGTT). In addition, some other organizations play a role: Some ministries did mention organizations working on transparency like I Watch or Al Bawsala. Both organizations have a very good reputation across ministries. Those special cases build

another point for discussion for chapter seven as I Watch and Al Bawsala use a different way for spreading their ideas than the four analyzed organizations.

Relations between civil society and the state are far from being important for all included ministries, raising doubts on the transmission of frames through interaction for all ministries. In addition, it is questionable whether movements and civil society can realize many goals on a national level if they do not have the wide support across ministries. The consequences are discussed in chapter seven in detail.

A short remark on tribes and clans as the topic is regularly discussed in relation to states in the MENA region: At least for Greater Tunis I doubt that, what other researchers described as informal and clientelistic networks based on family or clans, really shape the political landscape (Diani and Moffatt 2016). My findings contradict generalizations on political networks in the MENA region, while I nevertheless acknowledge informal networks. A clan was not used as a referral and only evoked by two interviewees who at the same time acknowledged that it does not play an important role or only becomes important in the South of the country (UGTT, Moncef; UGTT, Aziz).

Consequences for a similar framing

However, it is not surprising that different ministries mention different organizations according to the field of specialization. As a consequence, it is more a link between a specific organization and a specific ministry than a link between civil society overall and civil servants across ministries. When it comes to framing, it can be expected that ministries with specific ties towards organizations have a similar framing, while ministries without clear ties towards civil society have a more divergent framing of democracy. In addition, given the extensive ties of the UGTT, it is expected that especially the framing of the UGTT can be found among ministries, while the LTDH for example is capable of influencing the framing of the Ministry of the Interior or the Ministry of Justice.

Before turning to the question of mechanisms, the framings by movements and ministries are outlined. Networks and framing get combined in chapter seven. From chapter four it should be kept in mind, that it may be difficult to identify the same framing across ministries as networks are very specific towards concrete ministries and not towards the state.

Chapter Five

The organizational framing

5 An organizational democratic framing


Chapter five answers the question: Do the analyzed organizations, the UGTT (Union Générale Tunisienne du Travail), the ATFD (Association tunisienne de femmes démocrates), the FTDES (Forum Tunisien pour les Droits Economiques et Sociaux) and the LTDH (Ligue Tunisienne pour la Défense des droits de l'Homme) have one or several collective democratic framing(s) and which elements of a democratic framing are highlighted (see 2.4). I also recall the research question: *“How does a democratic framing diffuse across actors in Tunisia?”*

It is not taken for granted that social movements are said to promote democracy, but this chapter highlights perspectives on democracy. It is neither clear what types of democracy are promoted by organizations. As Tunisia had an electoral system with quasi-predetermined outcomes for a long time, it is possible that the focus on elections as part of democracy persists today. While researchers often assigned the role of movements for democratization (2.4), little is known about whether and what type of democracy is

promoted in Tunisia. As will be shown, organizations set different foci of their framing. This also means that dependent on the field of activity, different elements are highlighted.

Figure 5.1 recalls the three main dimensions as well as the elements that fall under the three dimensions. The main division is between the three dimensions of control, equality and freedom. As outlined in chapter two, three elements exist for each of the three dimensions.

Figure 5.1 Dimensions of democracy



Note: own Figure based on Bühlmann et al. 2014, see also 2.5

As we have seen in chapter four, the Tunisian civil society is highly interconnected. But does this mean that Tunisian movements share the same perspective on democracy? The chapter identifies frames they have in common as well as unique frames. The combination of frames is used to determine the orientation of democratic framings and how frames are connected to make ideas travel. Some of the movements like the ATFD not only promote women rights and thus the perspective on liberty and equality, but also other aspects that are similar to other movements. This mixture of unique and shared framing is in line with the coalitions as well as the roles within it. An organization like the ATFD thus relies on shared frames like the protection of human rights, but combines it with unique elements for example on rural women.

The chapter takes up three key arguments. First, the democratic framing focuses on specific dimensions of democracy. Organizations emphasize one of the three dimensions and not necessarily the same. Second there are overarching similar elements that are present across organizations. Consequentially, there is a division between unique and shared framings across organizations. Third, when it comes to frame resonance, framing that is important in public discussions should be identifiable in media reporting. It is an open question whether unique organizational framing or common framings by a coalition get more resonance in public. The last point is important to determine the possibility of ideational influence via the media.

The chapter describes the framing of the organizations in order to be able to compare with the perspective of state representatives. The chapter starts outlining the profile of democratic framing for each organization by referral to the dimensions and elements of democracy. The Democracy Barometer, as well as other literature, outlined three dimensions (freedom, equality, control), as well as several elements (Bühlmann et al. 2014; Lauth 2010; Lauth 2013; Lauth 2011; Lauth and Schlenkrich 2018). The Democracy Barometer is used as it is – although not being perfect – wide and allows accounting for different types of democracy without being pre-determined. It is a useful point of orientation also for qualitative studies. Concretely, the chapter regards how for example frames on women rights are combined with other aspects of democracy like the rule of law and the constitution.

For interviews all frame content and combinations are regarded, repetitions are of less importance for the analysis of interviews but build the basis to determine the resonance in public. Frames that resonate a lot in public should be more often repeated in newspapers.

In this chapter, every section outlines the data from interviews and documents as those are seen as more original and not filtered. The chapter bases on interviews with eighteen of the twenty-five civil society leaders⁵¹. In a second step, the findings from media articles are compared. Both types of data account for different types of mechanisms. While the framing

⁵¹ A list can be found in the Annex under 11.2, the eighteen interviews include those with the selected organizations. Additional interviews with other civil society actors are used for comparison. UGTT: Seven interviews, ATFD: five interviews, LTDH: four interviews, FTDES: three interviews

in speech and document is seen as unfiltered and as the content that can be transmitted through direct mechanism, the content of the media is seen as filtered and describes the indirect mechanisms via public opinion. It is to keep in mind that media content does not necessarily represent the original framing by organizations but can be rephrased by journalists. Reporting is furthermore influenced by issue salience, making some topics resonate more than others.

When numbers of mentions are indicated, it is principally to show that frames get used across actors and less to show repetitions as those can also be influenced by the individual interviews. It is indicated whether the dimension was mentioned by all interviewees to show whether the dimension is evoked across interviews as well as in order to identify potential individual biases. The perspective may not be shared across the organization if only few interviewees evoke it.

While the analysis bases on numbers of mentions and content elements derived from NVivo, the aim is not to make a quantitative, detailed analysis of all statistics that would still not allow generalization due to the limited number of interviews. The statistics are used to account for the distribution across interviews as well intensity of frames. This is in line with the mixed approach in between discourse analysis and content analysis. Every time when using statistics for this qualitative analysis, two aspects are taken into account: Are those mentions on democracy that are reported distributed across interviews and if not, does the uneven distribution cause a bias that would raise doubts on those numbers. Those numbers thus serve as basic orientation and are ever qualified when looking in the detailed interviews. For every aspect it is controlled whether those mentions play a role for all interviewees and if not what are the reasons. In some cases it is noted, that the element of democracy was only evoked prominently by one interviewee, raising doubts on its validity for the organization. This is indicated in a transparent matter. As interviews were on civil society, especially the importance of participation as a dimension shall be threatened with caution as it may be over reported.

As for the networks, I start with the UGTT and LTDH, followed by ATFD and FTDES. I begin with an overview on what category has been coded how, before entering into the details of


each framing. After outlining each dimension of democracy, I regard frame combinations in interviews before turning to a media analysis. Frame combinations are used to for assessing the unique framing as for example government capacity can be seen from a critical perspective as hindering protest or a positive perspective on fighting terrorism (and thus combining different dimensions of democracy). They are seen as complementary to the referral to only one dimension and can detail on dimensions. The media analysis then takes up the dimensions and looks which frames resonate in public. Every organizational section is followed by a short summary.

5.1 UGTT: the state, representation and collective rights

In interviews, as shown in Figure 5.2, the control dimension has been found more often than the freedom or equality dimension, the latter being the less evoked. Government capacity and competition are the most often evoked elements followed by representation, individual liberties, and rule of law, public sphere and participation. Mutual constraints and transparency play a minor role. The distribution between the three dimensions is relatively equal, except more mentions on control. From the overview, the UGTT is more control-oriented and as we will see later it is the most control-oriented organization of the four.

After the overview on dimensions, I turn to each dimension in detail for every organization. For the UGTT, I recall the elements that are included under each dimension; for the other organizations those will not be repeated again. I equally outline whether one interview was dominant for the framing of elements of democracy.

Figure 5.2 Mentioned dimensions and elements in interviews



Note: number of mentions, 326 total mentions on dimensions of democracy (Competition: 44, Government Capacity: 66, Mutual Constraints: 20, Participation: 27, Representation: 40, Transparency: 20, Freedom and liberties: 39, public sphere: 32, rule of law: 38).

5.1.1 Control dimension: government capacity as important element

Competition: A lot of different elements

The competition dimension covers competition of political parties including different programs and electoral competition, but also whether elections represent reality. The competition dimension is one of the more prominent dimensions in interviews, however, appears much less in the public debate (see below). Competition was mentioned in all seven interviews with the UGTT, but has been particularly emphasized by Moncef. There were many different aspects that emerged in interviews.

What did the UGTT state on party programs? UGTT leaders were divided on whether programs of different parties are clear or not, as well as whether elections only focus on persons instead of political programs. When it comes to party programs, UGTT leaders disagree on the extent of domination of the system by few parties, something especially criticized by Ahmed:

"I am skeptical about this alliance between the first two forces. From the point of view of my education [...], I look around me at what has been happening for centuries in relation to modern democracy. We cannot do democracy without alternation. The alternation is between the most important forces. If the biggest forces rule together, [...] they can run the country like that for a hundred years or so. And like that, step by step, they will find that it is easier to arrange between them than to arrange with the people. [...] There must be an alternation

between two major representative parties. [...] So, I think we must break this alliance to save democracy” (UGTT, Ahmed)

The perspective on parties shifts between skepticism on alternation of power and the demand for a higher representation of the left, which is closer to the UGTT.

“The mistakes we made as UGTT with parties that sympathize with the UGTT where we thought we were going to win the elections. But it's not true; it's the right that won. [...] But we have the Popular Front [...] it's a set of small parts, [...] they do not have a great reputation but they have a reputation among young people.” (UGTT, Moncef)

The citation by Moncef also shows that the UGTT had preferences before the elections and expected the left to win. It also shows the preferences for the Popular Front.

As we have seen above, political parties and especially the two large ones are criticized for having a dominant position. Ennahdha gets criticized not for the influence of religion (that would have been coded under government capacity), but its dominant influence on parts of the political system that is outlined:

“[...] most officials in the administration are part of Ennahdha. It is Ennahdha who governs. They do not have ministers but they have the administration. All key positions.” (UGTT, Moncef)

“Well, Ennahdha [...] they have their supporters, unfortunately. There are people who believe in Ennahdha. [...] But when Ennahdha had the power, it behaved exactly like Ben Ali so it renewed the same practices of Ben Ali [...] it is the extreme right, who defends its interests and on the contrary it is worse than Ben Ali.” (UGTT, Sofien)

This criticism is in line with the skepticism faced with Ennahdha that was already presented in chapter four on networks. On the other hand, the UGTT is officially independent from political parties (for example UGTT, Aziz) and underlines this independence:

“Now we are free. But it is still difficult. Because there are one hundred sixty parties, who want to be at the UGTT. We are defending our independence. Everyone wants the UGTT to always go forward for political causes. We say no, we do not do politics. We are here [...] we do social policy. We defend the interests of Tunisia first, then the workers afterwards. It is us who makes the balance, who lead the national dialogue, who exercised our strength to arrive with a parliament, to have a government, to have elections, to always play a role of balance between people.” (UGTT, Mohamed)

The citation by Mohamed also shows that the UGTT gets a lot solicited by parties, but that they want to show independence, so reject working with parties. It also is an example of a leader who defends the social role to the detriment of a more political role. In addition,

there is a clear referral to the national dialogue. This guarantee for the national dialogue and for a balance is a framing that re-emerges across interviews.

While the framing of dominant parties as well as criticism of Ennahdha was shared across several interviews, other aspects like electoral outcome were more controversial. Electoral outcome is connected with different aspects of democracy including representation or corruption. UGTT leaders were more consistent and showed skepticism on whether electoral outcome represents reality:

"[...] but what is reality? What reality are we talking about? They represent the reality, but it is a treated reality. That is a reality that is created under the influence of money and the media. The orientation of the media and the political money, not to mention the dirty money, that, it must remain to verify, played a very important role for the orientation of the population." (UGTT, Ahmed)

"The elections were also attended by international observers and proceeded transparently. And that reflects badly [...] well it's a new phenomenon for us, elections and democratic elections that's why sometimes there are choices, I mean [...] a little weird. (laughter)" (UGTT, Amine)

The two citations show two elements: First elections are seen as influenced by money and thus represent a modified reality and second electoral choices are not ever understood. Especially in relation to understanding vote choices, Amine highlights the novelty of democracy.

Similar to the evaluation of elections, the regional elections were highlighted and build a link towards vertical checks and balances (UGTT, Moncef and UGTT, Aziz). The perspective of the UGTT is very diverse itself, perhaps more diverse than for the other organizations. This is less surprising given that the UGTT reunites many more actors of the Tunisian political landscape.

Government capacity: The old regime and fighting terrorism

The UGTT connects government capacity with the old regime as well as with fighting terrorism. The government capacity dimension includes the possible interference on government by specific actors, but also the resources and capacities (control of the state, security forces and so on) that lie in the hands of the government as well as its stability. The government capacity dimension appears in all interviews with UGTT leaders, but is more prominent in interviews with Moncef and Sofien. The dimension is the most important single

category in interviews and was often mentioned in articles on UGTT claims (see below), showing the importance of government capacity to the UGTT.

The mix of businessmen and the old regime is seen as negative and as influencing politics:

"I also want to point out that already Essebsi, the current president, or the Nida party, is a party that has [...] two and a half years. But in a way the majority, or a large part of Nida's adherents, are [...] of the former regime. And of course, they want to install themselves now, the former regime it wants to install itself gradually [...]. So currently Nida defends the interests of the commons, the interests of businessmen, the interests of men, corrupt people at the time of Ben Ali, he exculpates them." (UGTT, Sofien)

"There are more resources and there are more resources to feed the media too. To spend 80% of their time on a candidate, for example, very specific, or lists, or the creation of a party [...] there were all sorts of concessions." (UGTT, Ahmed)

The criticism of businessmen as influencing politics is often repeated and is one of the core framings of the UGTT. A connected aspect is the persistence of autocratic perspectives that influence especially the administration. While Mohamed mentions the "old habits", Moncef insists more on the administration to be neutral, transparent and democratic:

"We have lived fifty years of dictatorship, a dictatorship regime. And now we have for three years a changed system. It takes time. Because the people, they do not have the experience and the habit in democracy [...] One cannot change after fifty years with administrative persons, political and anything [...] to change after three years [...] We cannot hide that the old regime is still there. There are people who still want to participate in politics; they have not stopped mingling with politics. There are many rich people who give a lot of money to the parties and still want to command to safeguard their interests." (UGTT, Mohamed)

"For me it's unacceptable. I see that the administration must be a neutral, transparent, democratic administration and not a mix with the political parties in power. And I think that Tunisia has been able without leaving the revolution, it is the administration that has turned the political life of Tunisians during the transition." (UGTT, Moncef)

The referral to money is also found in the citation by Mohamed, but Mohamed tries to explain the persistence of influence taking by that people are used to it and that it will time. Moncef has a harsher critique especially targeted on the administration that has to be neutral. As interviews show, influence on the government is principally related to businessmen or the influence of dominant parties.

A second important element in the UGTT's argumentation is government resources and security as well as fighting terrorism. The UGTT is relatively close to the government and support for more government resources is given. Especially the argument of government stability plays a role, but not at any price: A bad functioning government has to be replaced.

"The fact, that since the revolution we have had seven governments. There was a transitional government that lasted ten days or [...] half. Changing is in itself bad because it creates certain instability [...] and it disrupts work. But what do you want; we are in a situation of democratic gestation. If a government does not work as it should, it will leave. It does not matter; it's not because of stability that you have to keep a government that does not work. [...] Well, we have dismissed this or that government because there have been problems [...]. Anti-democratic problems, problems of assassination of political leaders, incapacity problems. [...]" (UGTT, Aziz)

Especially Sofien and Ahmed state that while the government appears as stable, it has to be seen as particularly fragile and that "a disagreement between Nida and Ennahdha could let it explode" (UGTT, Sofien).

Another factor connected to the stability is the fight against terrorism. This fight is strongly supported by UGTT leaders.

"There is a very important factor that has come into play, it is also terrorism. Terrorism was not taken into account. Because practically the majority of efforts has been diverted to the fight against terrorism." (UGTT, Nada)

"But to have stability, there are conditions that must be met first. To have stability, we had to fight terrorism first. As long as there is terrorism, there is no stability." (UGTT, Sofien)

"We cannot talk about democracy without establishing stability. We cannot say a democracy in an environment [...] that is not stable. So, first we have to achieve security, economic stability and I do not know what [...]" (UGTT, Moncef)

Democracy itself gets connected to stability by Moncef. He also sets priorities as security is the first most important element and then comes economic stability. This perspective on security, that fighting terrorism is a precondition for democracy can also be found in Sofien's citation as well as those of others. However, the fight against terrorism goes not for any price and especially individual liberties remain important. In addition, the border towards Libya is mentioned as a threat to the stability of the political system (UGTT, Moncef). Government resources get connected with terrorism and security, but also with economic problems. The resources of the government get also connected to taxation and parallel economies; an argument quite important for the UGTT.

Mutual Constraints, institutions and limited support for decentralization

The dimension on mutual constraints includes horizontal as well as vertical checks and balances. The perspective on mutual constraints is less important when it comes to framing in interviews. In interviews it is not mentioned by Amine. While it is not an important dimension, I present some arguments that are highlighted by UGTT leaders.

As part of the horizontal checks and balances, it is especially the constitutional court (that does not yet exist) that plays a role in arguments on mutual constraints (for example UGTT, Amine). The Economic and Social Council as well as the Council for Sustainable Development are mentioned to be introduced rapidly (UGTT, Aziz). On the other hand, Amine connects the missing institutions with lobbyism and influence of particular interests, an argument heard earlier on government interference:

"Yes, because the state was weakened after the revolution. Well, there was a corporatist state [...]. We are in the process of transitioning, to establish the instances. So, the state is weak now and it has an influence [...] we have lobbies, lobbies of doctors, lobbies of lawyers, lobbies of businessmen. Because of the situation of transition, we are not yet in a political system that is stable and we have not yet established our instances." (UGTT, Amine)

Separation of powers is another point that is underscored for example by Aziz.

Decentralization and vertical checks and balances are more often named for the other organizations. The framing on decentralization of the UGTT is limited to few elements as expressed by Nada or Sofien:

"But there will be elections soon, municipal and regional elections; there will be local governance. And that's important. Where each governorate will have its autonomy. First, you have to pass by financial autonomy, to have a different autonomy. When one is financially dependent on the system, one cannot be independent." (UGTT, Nada)

"And one of the goals of our revolution is to have regional and local democracy. [...]. Why up to now is the governor, [...] why he must be appointed by the president, by the prime minister? Why don't we have a local election and the people, the citizens there, elect their governor. There are small projects that can be set up, that may be set up, you have to have a budget for each region, certain autonomy, say economic and financial [...] people have to have a regional council. It is the one who decides on projects all that. [...] We are in favor of that there must be a part that is centralized, but we must not centralize everything." (UGTT, Sofien)

While especially Sofien's argumentation sounds like a support for decentralization, he equally describes decentralization as difficult without a tradition; something that can be taken as exemplary for the UGTT's perspective on decentralization. The demand for decentralization includes arguments on justice for regions in the interior, participation of the people, but also financial independence and skepticism. An important element highlighted by Moncef and Aziz are the local and municipal elections that can serve as link from the bottom towards political (local) decision making.

5.1.2 Equality dimension: Representation and its internal dimension

Participation, electoral participation and protest

The participation dimension summarizes effective participation and protest, as well as the equality of participation. The equality dimension is the least important dimension; representation and participation and to a minor amount transparency is included in the framing of problems. Participation appears in all interviews with UGTT leaders and slightly more in the interview with Ahmed.

As for the other organizations, participation of the people and encouraging electoral participation plays a role in their argumentation:

"We first make a campaign to mobilize people to vote. Direct them a little bit [...] because you cannot direct them directly to one party or another, but you can direct them to a program. So, a program that is adopted by the social democratic parties. [...] And we are mobilizing for women to run for office so that they are present in local governance, because that is very important. [...]" (UGTT, Nada)

While the role of guiding the electorate is shared among several leaders, the support for women is somehow ambiguous. On the other hand, participation gets connected to groups of the population that may have difficulties. Participation of youth as well as disadvantaged is seen problematic:

"Participation can be calculated by electoral participation. Since young people do not participate in elections, that means we have a problem. That's for sure. In addition, as long as young people do not participate so much, it is automatically that the future of the political country has a problem. Who will take over tomorrow? With a 90-year-old president you cannot go far. So that's it. The second amalgam that we can get rid of the rich. [...] According to the statistics we have had, 70 of the richest of the world can be counted in Tunisia. With fortunes that are outside the country. In addition, there are the difficulties of corruption [...]" (UGTT, Moncef)

"Young people worked mostly for what I told you, after the revolution we saw a lot of young people who took positions of responsibility within the unions. [...]" (UGTT, Amine)

"Theoretically, that is to say on the legislative level and everything, there is [...] universal suffrage guaranteed for everyone. But, on a practical level, that is to say a man or a woman who is poor does not find today, does not find it interesting to participate. She does not believe that the name of the one who will be elected can influence her economic and social situation. And the facts show that the person is right." (UGTT, Ahmed)

While the inclusion of the youth or the poor is a framing that is used across leaders, some like Nada include also the participation of women and the persisting problems:

"There are too many men; there are too many charges for women. So, the charges are not shared equally in the couple [...] what makes that the woman, to participate in politics, she must be a superwoman. [Laughs] So she has to reconcile between her home, housework and all that, her job, to support the man in fact. So, if she still has a bit of time, she's making politics. So, you have to be really perseverant to do politics." (UGTT, Nada)

This perspective on charges of women is neither shared across UGTT leaders (all other interviewed UGTT leaders are men), and even not resembles the one of the ATFD that would include key terms like equality. It nevertheless highlights a number of private and economic problems women can face.

But participation is not only connected to participation in elections but also to protest, another important element of the UGTT's framing. While strikes are evoked several times especially as a tactical tool, protest was especially underlined by Ahmed:

"People are protesting. Today people go on Facebook, go to the media, they talk. When someone [...] before when you are opposed to the power and opponent of the UGTT, the regime, if for example the general secretary of the UGTT wants to exclude someone, the power also excludes him. The media are closed; of course, they do not find where to talk. Now we cannot do that. Now people are talking. And that's good. [...] Afterwards, step by step people were doing politics on the street. The second phase is that we occupied the street. That is, it was Kasbah 1, Kasbah 2 and all that that imposed things. Afterwards, step by step, people were doing sit-ins, and this was invaded, the movement was invaded by sectoral and social demands. That is to say, many requests, salary increase, tenure, social benefits, all that, all that stuff. And that, step by step, let the movement grow. [...]" (UGTT, Ahmed)

The citation by Ahmed underlines Facebook, but also traditional media and touch the question of the links between UGTT and the media. He also evokes that due to the closeness of the UGTT to the Ben Ali regime, media did not criticize the UGTT, something that starts

slowly now. On the other hand, he connects protest to the revolution and that people claim social and economic benefits.

From an organizational perspective Nada and Ahmed evoked that participation through the UGTT plays a role. The organization emphasizes its role as mediator of social and political demands. Inserting its own role for participation, UGTT leaders connect participation and protest with the revolution. In addition, participation is not seen as equal, as economic status, gender and age influence whether a person participates. This is directly connected with the equality of participation. As will be shown later, economic elements enter frequently in arguments on participation.

Representation, internal representation and the question of whether there are any minorities

Representation from an UGTT perspective is often referred to internal problems in representation. The UGTT is divided on whether there are any minorities in Tunisia. The dimension on representation includes direct democracy as well as the representation of minorities and women. While women are no minority their representation in political processes is often minoritarian and equal representation of men and women is important to democracy. The dimension was mentioned in all interviews, but less by Amine and Mohamed.

Direct democracy is not important to the UGTT and it was not often mentioned. It is more a participatory democracy that is seen as useful:

"I think what will bring us a little closer to participatory democracy is when we vote. The principle is there at the beginning of the constitution [...] Second, the constitution foresees local democracy. We will elect local and regional representatives. [...] or there will be no democracy in Tunisia, which is likely, or there will be a democracy that resembles a lot participatory democracy." (UGTT, Ahmed)

The connection that Ahmed establishes between participatory democracy passes in this case by the vote and not by organizations. The citation also underlines that participatory democracy is the most likely outcome of Tunisian democratization processes.

When it comes to the representation of minorities, opinions differ. While Moncef argues that minorities guard their rights within a democracy or Ahmed argues that minority rights

are not yet realized, others like Aziz underline that there are no minority problems, but that there might be some tribal issues.

"In fact, we [...] speak of certain minorities but that's not it. So, we are not in the Iraqi or Syrian context or all that. [...] in some areas of the south, of the center, some tribes [...] Tunisian democracy consists of a number of tribes. But sometimes there is a certain tension between the different tribes. And no, there are no minority issues. [...]" (UGTT, Aziz)

Both arguments, that there are no minorities or that rights are not yet effective, are often found in interviews, not just with the UGTT, but especially with representatives in ministries as will be shown later. The UGTT is very distant when it comes to rights of homosexuals and sexual orientations:

"They are not very representative in Tunisia so [...] there are not really minorities. No. There are some associations that defend a bit the rights for example of black people, the rights of homosexuals, but it is limited to some associations. [...] And as it is a little delicate for example for homosexuals. You understand: a Muslim country. But we talk about it anyway, we talk about it." (UGTT, Nada)

In this sense, while some interviewees acknowledge problems with minority rights, there is a tendency to deny that there are any minorities in the country. While this is well in line with the narrative of Tunisia as homogeneous country, it contradicts the reality as in every country minorities do exist. UGTT leaders are not very aware of those minorities.

The representation of women and internal representation

As we will see for the other organizations, the role of women has been discussed. How does the UGTT evaluate the participation of women? When asked on the representation of women, own organizational problems with the equal representation of women are acknowledged, as if they would need to clarify a well-known problem:

"The female representation is minimal. Even for us. For example, at the central union, there is no female representation at the headquarter. We have representation as a federation for example. Even for regional unions it's minimal. One cannot exceed the number of fingers of the hand. So, it's because it's related to the mind. We have women who are members or they want to participate. But at the level of taking responsibility, you have to responsible them. Political parties must be responsible." (UGTT, Moncef)

"Yes, it is a patriarchal organization, it must be admitted. Well, that said, there is always these efforts to be in line with what is happening in the world and to be, now you may know that there is an official request from the ITUC to impose somewhere to the directorates of the union centers that there are women. And there the UGTT will find a solution [...]" (UGTT, Ahmed)

The UGTT, having problems of internal representation of women, is also criticized by the women movement for example. On the other hand, it is logic that UGTT leaders do not criticize other actors for missing representation of women if their own organization does not perform better. It can also be an externally exposed frame that automatically links representation of women with internal problems. One can easily imagine that the women movement or even the own commission on women openly criticize the internal organization.

The UGTT discusses internal representation between different regions, where some regions are seen as more influential due to their reputation or more activities (like Kairouan, Jendouba or Gafsa; UGTT, Moncef). However, Ahmed underlines that the UGTT reunites the whole Tunisian political spectrum when it comes to representation:

"It's diversity too, you find all the political tendencies, from the far left to the far right, to the liberals. Generally, it is a minority the liberals in Tunisia in the union. But generally, we find all the political conceptions, all the small groups are represented and you find all sorts of ideologies and perceptions of the trade union work. [...]" (UGTT, Ahmed)

The dimension on equal representation includes the representation of excluded regions, poor people as well as unemployment. The economic dimension in the framing of equality of representation is thus important as will be elaborated in detail later on. In addition, the UGTT discusses internal representation, however without providing solutions to the ongoing underrepresentation of women.

Transparency: it's all about corruption, businessmen and the old regime

The framing of the UGTT focuses a lot on corruption, businessmen as well as the old regime. The transparency dimension includes freedom of information, publishing finances as well as corruption. The transparency dimension was not mentioned by Nada, but by all other UGTT leaders. It is however among the least evoked categories.

The focus of UGTT leaders is on transparency and publishing finances in relation to political parties as the citation of Ahmed exemplifies:

"Yes. But we could not, that is to say stop at the time of the elections, to stop the financing actions which seemed a little shady and all that. Now the report has been published, and a copy has been sent to the judiciary. But that will not influence the election results." (UGTT, Ahmed)

This referral to the use of money during elections is one of the few found across organizations. It is however pessimistic as elections are over and the published report on abuses will not change election results.

On the other hand, the question of corruption is equally discussed. Positive developments as well as negative evaluations get highlighted. Corruption is the most important element when it comes to framing transparency, although some leaders are more optimistic than others.

"There are always deviations in every country [...]. But sincerely after the revolution things are much more objective. There are always people who have the opportunity through corruption and everything from having positions of influence [...]. But it is less than before especially that there is no political interference." (UGTT, Aziz)

"So, after four years of revolution, we must put an end to these practices, to these Mafiosi practices. For the moment, the 4 successive governments, none of the governments have worked to put an end to corruption on the types that exist in Tunisia. Be it regulatory corruption by law, and second corruption as abuse of power. Because before it was said that it was the family of Ben Ali and now the family is no longer so who does the corruption? That's it; there are others who do the same thing. [...]" (UGTT, Moncef)

The first citation by Aziz nearly accepts corruption as something that is normal, while the second criticizes in a more harsh way the incompetency of the government in terms of corruption. Others like Sofien link corruption to the old regime, Nida Tounes and the RCD. Similarly, Ahmed connects the question of corruption and violence to the old regime and the police state. Corruption gets connected to the electoral system and government responsibility. This framing, that several governments did not touch the question is a repeated framing that is frequently evoked.

5.1.3 Freedom dimension: worker and collective rights

Individual liberties, human rights and collective rights

The dimension on individual liberties includes liberties, free conduct of life, but also physical integrity. The dimension appears in all interviews on a relatively equal level. The individual liberties dimension plays a role in interviews, but does not resonate in public as will be shown later.

However, as for the LTDH, the role of human rights is underlined. Often, this referral to human rights goes hand in hand with a referral to worker rights.

"As I told you, the UGTT upholds the principles of human rights, collective and individual rights, including decent work for all workers. Decent work, respect for humanity, as an individual." (UGTT, Nada)

While Nada here speaks about both, collective and individual rights, Ahmed underlines that the UGTT defends practically more collective rights:

"Of course, the UGTT has always defended individual and collective freedoms and everything. But in the day-to-day work of the headquarter and even sections and regions, there is always collective freedom rather than individual freedom. That's the nature of the organization, which is an organization dedicated to collective action. But on the statutes, on the values, the individual freedom is something very important." (UGTT, Ahmed)

This human rights orientation and its connection towards workers and decent work are regularly discussed and are linked to the economic dimension that will be introduced later. Nada connects several elements in her argumentation on human rights. She does not only connect it to equality, but also to the constitution. By connecting equality, human rights and constitution, she adopts a framing that is particularly close to the one by the women movement as will be shown later.

"So, we can say that we have a constitution that meets our expectations, where there is equality between men and women, where there is respect for human rights, so all freedoms are guaranteed in the constitution, but I tell you that the constitution [...] it is not enough to write a constitution. We must monitor the application, the application of these laws, and take radical measures against excesses [...]." (UGTT, Nada)

The position by Nada is less representative for the overall UGTT framing, where human rights get more frequently connected with worker rights and with economic elements. However, the distinction between legal texts and application is similar; something emphasized by Moncef. With the referral to workers' rights, the UGTT goes farer (or in another direction) than the other organizations.

As most of the other organizations, the UGTT discusses physical integrity. Physical integrity gets connected with the defense of movements from violence.

"For example, this morning there is a press release from the UGTT. It says that social movements should not be treated by security police actions. You have to talk to people. Following the events of Ben Guerdane⁵² there was brutality, as we have said. You have to talk to people. It is necessary to understand the origins of these causes of these social movements, poverty, exclusion and

⁵² He refers probably to the protest following a closure of the Tuniso-Lybian border in September 2016, Middleeasteye 2016

precariousness, and to attack the roots of these movements rather than say to treat it in securitarian way [...]. You have to listen, analyze the problem and try to find solutions in partnership with people. But not shoot people [...] or stop people.” (UGTT, Aziz)

"It's a question of power. If people come by thousands, if they come in large numbers, the minister of the interior has only five-thousand [security forces] [...] good if it finds a few hundred, of course it can hit, it can have gas bombs and all that but [...] it's a question of power.” (UGTT, Sofien)

The focus on collective rights becomes evident with the question on physical integrity. While other organizations emphasized individual physical integrity, the UGTT takes a collective perspective and speaks about the physical integrity of protesters as a group. While both perspectives fall under the same dimension, the framing is different and shows a somewhat divergent perspective in comparison to the other organizations. The framing as protector of movements is only comparable to the FTDES. The question of physical integrity gets connected to the next dimension, the public sphere, where freedom of speech is limited by violence.

Public Sphere, freedom of speech as achievement of the revolution

The public sphere dimension, including freedom of speech and freedom to associate, accounts for a number of demands exposed during interviews. It was not mentioned by Amine, but by all other leaders of the UGTT and slightly more by Sofien.

Freedom of expression is essential for democracy:

"I would say that freedom of expression is a crucial time for democratization. So, we need freedom of expression if not how to establish a democracy if there is no freedom of expression? [...] I am for total freedom of expression. Without restriction. Everyone has the right to express themselves freely.” (UGTT, Nada)

"It's an open exchange. We are now [...] fortunately we are in a democratic climate. And we allow ourselves to criticize when there is reason to criticize. We do not criticize for criticism. But when we feel that there is a deviation that things do not work, it must be rectified; we criticize the government's approach.” (UGTT, Aziz)

Freedom of speech not just breaks with the old traditions; Moncef for example highlights that freedom of speech shifts the old categories of clan belonging as everyone has the right to express themselves freely (UGTT, Moncef). In a similar vein, freedom of speech is often compared with the pre-uprisings period and is portrayed as main achievement of the uprisings.

"Before the revolution the Tunisian is afraid, does not want to discuss politics. Now you see all the people arguing wrongly or differently. People talk, people denounce, people protest, people claim. And so, there is a dynamic, there is a dynamic within the street at different stages even illiterate poor [...], they claim." (UGTT, Aziz)

"If there is one gain after the revolution, it is freedom of expression in the media. Because we are not used to it. So, before we spoke in newspapers that are censored [...] there was a single sound of a bell, it is the bell of the government, the party in power. Because there was only one party in power. Now there are a hundred parties, so everyone expresses himself freely. Even the extremists, they express themselves [...]." (UGTT, Nada)

In the perspective of the UGTT, freedom of speech is the most important achievement of the revolution. Similarly, when it comes to criticizing the government, the criticism by the UGTT becomes evident in relation to freedom of expression. The same framing with a referral to the old system is used to criticize limitations of the freedom of expression today.

"Right now, so in the last few times, it feels like the government wants step by step to silence people. The proof of it is, I said, the attack on the protesters in a civil way. And there, the police forces attacked fiercely. Which was not the case for example last year. [...] One feels, in the last weeks, a lot of [...] media that somehow more or less is dominated by the government. It is not as it used to be. There is the dosage of criticizing the government that has decreased a bit. We feel that there is a collaboration between the former regime and a lot of television stations or radio, with the government and all that. We feel that things are getting arranged on the government side and the regime side." (UGTT, Sofien)

The limits of freedom of speech are the demand for violence and are quite similar to the framing of the other organizations.

"No, but of course there are limits to everything. When you say freedom of expression I agree, but there are red areas not to exceed. It is not in the name of the freedom of expression one comes here for example to make a publication [...] to encourage the young people to go to Syria to a camp [...] for the jihad in Syria. That is, on the contrary, it is a provocation for terrorism and it is not a freedom of expression, it is a deterioration of the civil society." (UGTT, Sofien)

Freedom of expression is linked to the question of democracy and the opposition to the old regimes as well as the will of the people. The government is criticized for restricting freedom of speech.

While freedom of speech was named relatively often, freedom to associate plays a limited role and gets connected to repression and terrorism as especially Sofien expressed (UGTT, Sofien). While freedom of association has not been mentioned often in detail, it is more or

less taken for granted and subsumed under freedom of expression as public contestation by the UGTT evidently plays out by the street and mobilization (or the threat of mobilization as strikes are a major tool of the UGTT).

Rule of law, independence and the question of corruption

The rule of law dimension includes the equality before the law, the quality of the legal system and the constitution. It was only mentioned by five out of seven UGTT leaders and a bit more by Aziz in comparison to the others. It is a dimension that was part of the framing of the UGTT, although of less importance.

The equality before the law plays less a role than the quality of the legal system. When it comes to the quality of the legal system, one framing that reoccurs is a demand for independence.

"The judicial system should be based on independence, autonomy and objectivity, the actual application of the law." (UGTT, Aziz)

"Equality, theoretically yes, but practically no. There is a big problem at the judicial and security level in Tunisia, it is corruption." (UGTT, Ahmed)

"There is still the influence of the people in power, the influence of the rich, the influence of all that on the judges. Until now, we do not have an honest and transparent justice system [...]." (UGTT, Sofien)

Corruption and the fight against terrorism are transcending elements of the framing that get connected with the quality of the legal system. The call for reforms in the security as well as juridical sector includes the demand for a constitutional court. The independence of the juridical sector and thus a connection towards horizontal checks and balances is established. Another aspect that was often mentioned is the referral to transitional justice, an element still to be realized.

5.1.4 Summary on the UGTT's framing

What do we retain from the UGTT's framing on democracy? The UGTT's framing on democracy is much about the support for the government in the fight against terrorism, but with respect to freedom of association. The UGTT is the only organization that highlights that a change of the fiscal regime should be used to finance the fight against terrorism.

The framing underlines also participation. This triangle between government capacity, strikes and freedom of speech covers many arguments. Another influencing element is the

role of businessmen that are framed as corrupt and influencing the government. This element of corrupt businessmen named in line with the old regime equally influences framing on rule of law as businessmen are seen as influencing jurisdiction.

The criticism of the two dominant parties is something much more pronounced for the UGTT than for the other parties. The UGTT appears also less sensitive when it comes to minority rights as there are no minorities from their point of view. Regarding freedoms it is to note that the UGTT underlines worker rights in line with human rights and emphasizes a collective perspective. Much in line with workers' rights is the focus on economic aspects that is much more important than democracy itself as we will see in the following.

5.1.5 Frame combinations: Dimensions of democracy but first and foremost economic issues

Having outlined the democratic framing of the UGTT and the major preoccupations, I now turn to frame combinations. Those connections are important to describe the unique and shared elements of a democratic framing. It helps in the search for common elements, as if for example participation and public freedom get combined by all organizations, it can be an element that gets promoted together. Differences are highlighted because dimensions have not the same meaning when getting combined with different other dimensions. Combinations are an additional element of analysis because organizations can have single or combined referral to dimensions.

Frame combinations include for example the connection of corruption with interference on government and the role of businessmen as part of the argumentation. Equally, the electoral outcome is connected with the dominance of the two most important parties.

There are three elements of democracy that often get connected with other elements of democracy; concretely government capacity, individual liberties and rule of law (Table 10.12 in Annex). The combination of government capacity and competition is mentioned most in terms of quantity and is important when regarding the framing in detail from a qualitative perspective. The role of political parties and especially of Ennahdha and Nida Tounes, that build the government, are a point of discussion. There is a criticism of their dominant

position as well as the general weakness of political parties that influences government capacity.

Mutual constraints and rule of law get equally often connected. It is however to recall, that rule of law was only mentioned by five out of seven interviewees. Those five nevertheless consistently connected rule of law with the constitutional court and an independent justice in the sense of horizontal checks and balances.

Individual liberties showed important and get often connected with other elements although we have seen earlier that it is mainly about collective rights. Representation and individual liberties get often evoked together, however the argument here is not necessarily positive as it also connects homosexuality and representation of minorities that is not seen as important. Another combination, individual liberties and government capacity, for example stands for the discussions on the fight against terrorism. It connects state capacity with restriction of freedom of speech at the same time. Another element that is connected to democracy are economic factors; a factor that is regarded in more detail in the following section.

Democracy and the Economy

"The UGTT is a national militant organization that defends democracy, social justice, the economic and social rights of workers and [...] who adopts as a basis for discussion the social dialogue [...]" (UGTT, Aziz)

The framing of the UGTT on democracy is not only a demand for democracy, but also strongly related to the economy as the citation shows. One example is protest (part of the participation dimension), mainly strikes, that is connected to the demand for higher salaries. A number of economic factors, including development or unemployment, are found in central positions. This also includes political parties: Moncef for example criticizes political parties as being liberal in an economic perspective (UGTT, Moncef). Nearly every dimension on democracy is framed from an economic perspective as is the question of stability:

"But to have stability, there are conditions that must be met first. To have stability, we have to fight against terrorism first. So as long as there is terrorism, there is no stability. The problem of unemployment, of the unemployed, would be solved enormously and deeply, so we have more than three hundred fifty thousand graduated, who are graduated and unemployed. So, we would have to solve, as I said earlier, the problem of the interior regions. It is necessary to be

actively interested, it would be necessary to make a small economic development in these interior regions. And of course, it would be necessary to solve the social problems of the various workers in Tunisia. So, at that moment, we can talk about stability.” (UGTT, Sofien)

Socio-economic factors are not only related to stability, but socio-economic factors are framed as hindering participation. Especially the question of (rural) women, a topic much covered also by the ATFD, has a prominent position:

"It is not a question of rich and poor for political participation. It's a question of commitment. One is engaged in the political process, or one is not engaged. But I can tell you that effectively all Tunisian women are engaged in the political process, especially after the revolution. Because we had a whiplash or a slap after the revolution, because we saw our achievements that were starting to reverse. So, we were obliged, all Tunisian women, we were obliged to participate at least in community life, in demonstrations to defend our rights. Because we were threatened. Not threatened, we began to nibble some of our achievements, which had been acquired for at least fifty years, sixty years. So, that's why women have been forced to defend their rights.” (UGTT, Nada)

"Unemployed. Women also have problems of equality of insertion, especially rural women, integration into economic and social activity. So, we try a little through our dialogue with the different structures to help support and express our point of view on the modalities of a better professional integration of young people and women for a social stability of better social cohesion because there is no cohesion and stability the proliferation of social movements. It's a destabilizing factor.” (UGTT, Aziz)

The rural women frame is a frame particularly compatible for several organizations as we will see later. Economic exclusion plays a role in the framing of the UGTT, often accompanied by a demand for inclusion of the poor.

“We are with the people, with public opinion, and with the poor, with the poorest regions, we are defending the middle class, the poor class, the unemployed and even equality between people. Between regions, between people. It is not necessary that five or ten or eleven or thousand can have all the goods of Tunisia.” (UGTT, Mohamed)

Economic aspects are more prominently placed in the framing than is democracy. When it comes to the poor, also redistribution of income is an option, especially in order to overcome regional exclusion:

"Of course, the UGTT also defends a democratic, civil society [...] it is for a free Tunisia, it is necessary to have a social balance between the regions. It also defends a legal distribution of wealth in Tunisia. And also, [...] it was necessary to have a new policy especially for taxes and debts and so on, because you know that in the Ben Ali regime, practically bourgeois and businessmen [...] it is only the workers and the wage earners who pay the taxes. The majority [...] of

businessmen are practically [...] doing what they want. We judge in the UGTT that, say the tax policy, is an unfair policy and in which it was necessary to initiate, it was necessary that the businessmen, the people who have money they must participate in a fair way, like the others." (UGTT, Sofien)

"It's the interior. They are called the regions where unemployment is accentuated, especially unemployment of graduates. That's our first axis. Our second axis that we wanted to work with the government was [...] the tax reform. Because at home in Tunisia you know that eighty-two percent of income is [...] the employees and employers. It's a little crazy [...]. So, it's [...] the third axis is the caisses⁵³[...]. As long as unemployment increases, as long as there is no recruitment, the pension funds are empty. So, we have to find other ways to feed them, such as [...] the taxes on fortune. [...] the fourth is to find solutions [...] to [make] the unemployed survive [...]" (UGTT, Moncef)

The economic dimension is not to underestimate for the UGTT. When regarding the combinations, it appears that democracy is actually a side product of arguments and gets connected with a number of economic problems. As part of the tripartite configuration, the demand for higher salaries is very important. It is however also the aspect that gets most mediatized as shown in the following.

5.1.6 Frame resonance in public: Economy and a bit more

This section shows which frame elements resonate in public. This becomes important in order to determine whether framings are eventually more convincing when mediated than through the direct channel or whether both can be used at the same time.


First of all, it is to recall that the UGTT is by far bigger than the other organizations as this is represented in the number of articles and coded elements. When it comes to the framing of the UGTT, especially economic aspects and the demand for salaries are crucial. A number of claims presented in articles do not relate to democracy. The extent of this can be found in articles where economic issues like salaries dominate the media coverage as shown in Figure 5.3 (a more detailed list can be found in the annex, Figure 10.11). Those findings qualify the overall relevance of democracy as part of the framing of the UGTT and set it more as a by-product of claims.

⁵³ Social security funds.

Many other elements like reconciliation, education and martyrs are other frame elements that appear often (coded under other as they were not part of the coding scheme on democracy).

It is especially the perspective on government capacity or the fight against terrorism that are evoked in media. The state-oriented perspective is related to the UGTT's central position in the political system. As they are closer to the state, the UGTT supports the state in its mediatized framing. While Kilani underlines that UGTT members had to rectify their own image following the revolution and instead took an offensive position against the old regime, the positive perspective towards the state at the national level persists (Kilani 2014).

Figure 5.3 Topics of claims in articles



Note: absolute occurrences of main dimensions, UGTT, total number of claims in articles: 826

Resonance of democratic framing in public

When it comes to the distribution across dimensions of democracies, eight hundred twenty-six democracy-related claims appear in articles. As indicated earlier, I only look at clear organizational demands (claims) in articles and whether those include elements of democracy as part of their framing. The UGTT has a much higher media resonance than all other organizations taken together. However, as already seen, a huge number of claims are not directly related to democracy.

Claims on democracy in articles are shown in Figure 5.4. Compared to interviews, the picture gets a bit less equally distributed and the focus shifts towards the equality dimension. This is

mainly due to the reporting on the threat as well as actual protest. The UGTT connects the demand for higher salaries and better working conditions often to this threat.


Beneath the reporting on strikes or its threat, two other elements of democracy resonate a lot in media reporting: Government capacity and much less freedom and liberties. While mutual constraints are not part of claims that resonate well in the media, government capacity alone accounts for two hundred eighteen of the claims. Adding the seventeen for competition and eleven for mutual constraints, the control dimension arrives at two hundred forty-six claims in relation to democracy.

From the equality dimension it is especially participation and more concretely strikes and protest that play a role as well as to a minor degree transparency and participation. The equality dimension comes on three hundred thirty-seven democracy-related claims and thus more than the control dimension.

The freedom dimension gets integrated in few public claims; while individual liberties are most represented and present an important element, rule of law and the public sphere are less relevant as shown in Figure 5.4. In articles, two dimensions with participation and government capacity gain more prominence than in interviews.

Those findings are detailed in the following. The UGTT puts the revolution in the center of the debate as can be seen from articles (see Figure 10.11 in Annex). Corruption is a relatively central concept and gets connected to different other elements. Not only government stability, legislation and government inference, but also repression or justice are found in central positions and often connected with other elements.

Figure 5.4 Coded dimensions in claims in articles



Note: number of coded claims, 826 total mentions on dimensions of democracy (Competition: 17, Government Capacity: 218, Mutual Constraints: 11, Participation: 264, Representation: 46, Transparency: 48, Freedom and liberties: 74, public sphere: 27, rule of law: 47).

While rule of law, individual liberties and government capacity were important in interviews, government capacity and individual liberties have more or less equal importance in articles. This is also due to issue salience of the fight against terrorism at the time of analysis. However, the notion of individual freedoms can irritate as it is mainly human rights and collective rights that are defended by the UGTT.

The government capacity is outstanding in the sense that it is much more combined in articles than other dimensions. This is linked to the already mentioned close position of the UGTT with the state and to the media coverage that is state-oriented. In this sense, the reporting on government stability can be overestimated as UGTT leaders were frequently asked on their position on governmental questions. From a different perspective and given the importance of government capacity in interviews, the importance of this dimension for the UGTT's framing is there. Even if it is over reported in articles, the UGTT integrates government questions in their framing. Whether they do this to get more attention or whether they are asked to do this by the media is not clear. Commenting on the government could become a habit that gets integrated in organizational framing, not because the organization wants to do it, but because they are solicited.

The main three dimensions that get combined are rule of law, individual freedoms and government capacity for interviews. Participation, individual freedoms and government capacity are important combinations for articles. In this sense the internal framing of democracy can be found in the media, however to a slightly different degree. For the UGTT it can consequentially be argued that they are relatively successful in placing their claims in the media, although the relative importance of dimensions changes.

The link towards the state shows also the possible compatibility of framing of the UGTT with the state that will be discussed again later. The UGTT criticizes the state, but at the same time refers to old governments or the old regime and less to the actual government. While especially the restriction of collective rights leads to claims towards the state, a lot of criticism is directed towards businessmen and corruption. The old regime is blamed for unequal distribution and so on instead of the actual one.

Especially in relation to the public image that was expressed in articles, the UGTT appears as particularly close to the state. In line with the network structure presented in chapter four, the UGTT approaches a number of state actors and interacts more than other organizations with the state. It can thus be expected, that state representatives who interact a lot with the UGTT adopt a similar perspective, thus focused on government capacity, collective rights as well as rule of law. If they follow the mediatized perspective, they will emphasize participation instead of rule of law.

5.1.7 Summary on the framing of the UGTT in interviews and media

In comparison to the other organizations it becomes clear that the UGTT is first of all a labor union, defending workers' rights and demanding higher salaries, at least when press reporting is concerned. The demand for higher salaries and better working conditions are aspects that resonate well in the public sphere. In addition, the UGTT highlights the government capacity and underlines elements like the fight against terrorism.

Articles exist on the historic role of the UGTT that do not exist in a similar way for the other organizations. However, the UGTT is also more often subject to criticism. Especially its role as influencer of the government is criticized as going too far in articles published in *Le Temps*. The UGTT is portrayed as negative element able to influence the government and

thus as anti-democratic element in a number of journalist comments. Yousfi finds similar arguments in her analysis stating that the UGTT is accused of supporting anarchy through mobilization or described as uncivil actor (Yousfi 2015; Yousfi 2017).

The perspective of the UGTT as consensus seekers is equally influenced by their position in the political system. The UGTT connects the framing on democracy with a narrative of the UGTT as national protector of democracy and guarantee for national dialogue on the basis of historic achievements. This framing fits well with what Meyer describes as a narrative of movement influence as part of the framing, or even a myth with historical scope (Meyer 2006). Thus, the question on democracy is not just on democracy itself, but is connected to the image of the UGTT. Some interviewees used storytelling to illustrate points – and especially the historic role - through the use of examples (on storytelling see Polletta et al. 2011). This was more frequent than for the other organizations. Explaining why storytelling is more frequent among UGTT leaders is difficult. Perhaps it is the wide reach of the organization, including very different tranches of the population that leads to a simplification in the sense that more examples become used as those might be easier understandable across different perspectives and positions.

It shall be kept in mind that while interviews showed a relatively equal distribution with a slight focus on government capacity and thus the control dimension of democracy, the distribution in articles is different with a strong support for the government capacity dimension, but also for elements of equality. The UGTT is close to the state and defends more resources for the state. This argument is accentuated in the sense that for example the fiscal regime should be adapted so that workers and poor people get support. The framing of the UGTT is internally sometimes less consistent than for other organizations as the examples on parties and electoral outcome show.

In chapter six it will be analyzed whether UGTT leaders have a similar framing of democracy compared to state representatives. Given the extensive networks, it is expected that this is the case. Following this argumentation, government capacity, collective rights and rule of law or participation should be prominent across civil servants.


5.2 LTDH: human rights and rule of law

The LTDH is focused on the freedom dimension of democracy. The dimension is mentioned twice as much as each of the other two dimensions as can be seen in Figure 5.5. The control dimension as well as the equality dimension was mentioned less than the freedom dimension for interviews. However, different sub dimensions are of uneven importance.

The unequal distribution causes a less detailed analysis as some dimensions are simply included in too few framings of democracy. It is less a problem of the number of interviews, but more the fact, that the LTDH is much more freedom-oriented and does not talk much about other elements, especially not separately. As a consequence, only few interviews concretely cited the control and the equality dimension.

The focus lies clearly on the element of individual liberties as well as rule of law as Figure 5.5 shows. Even public sphere is among the most important elements although it is much less important than rule of law and individual liberties. I discuss every dimension, although not every category will be discussed extensively due to the limitations mentioned above.

Figure 5.5 Coded dimensions and sub dimensions in interviews



Note: number of coded mentions, 112 total mentions on dimensions of democracy (Competition: 6, Government Capacity: 8, Mutual Constraints: 9, Participation: 3, Representation: 11, Transparency: 8, Freedom and liberties: 41, public sphere: 9, rule of law: 17).

5.2.1 Control dimension: a dimension of reduced importance

Competition of political actors: elections

Competition of political actors is not often mentioned in interviews as shown in the overview and it is especially the electoral outcome that is coded. Nevertheless, it was mentioned by three out of four interviewees, however not by Bechir and more by Ali. The perspective on competition should be handled with caution; a bias through the more prominent mentions by Ali is possible. In addition, the framing in the interview of Ali is often connected to other dimensions such as the rule of law.

One element that can be retained from interviews is the question of electoral observation that is evaluated as relevant by Rim:

"So, there are a lot of networks that exist. The networks exist to organize the elections together for example, and a huge network has been set up to organize the observation of the elections together." (LTDH, Rim)

There is not much of the competition dimension included in the LTDH framing; it is not a very relevant dimension. The caution that the perspective on competition as a dimension of democracy may be biased becomes nearly obsolete as there is very few to analyze.

In relation to theory and operationalization it needs to be said, that it was partly difficult to code elements of democracy as there was little to analyze.

Government capacity: criticizing the security forces and the influence of the old regime

Similar to control, government capacity is a category which received limited attention as part of a wider framing. The element was mentioned by Bechir and Rim, but not by the other two leaders.

The influence of especially the old regime is criticized as augmenting: "Yes, the influence is still there, but it amplifies visibly." (LTDH, Bechir). On the other hand, government stability and security forces are evoked, the latter in connection with liberties.

"That the government is unstable during this period of metamorphosis is normal and also conflict. But the stability of the country interests us. And the cooperation of all actors for stability. It is the social and political stability that is important [...] even during difficult times we have never given up but after the dissolution of the secret police. But we always put liberties as a red line. Even if, in the name of national security and rights, it is difficult to combine all." (LTDH, Bechir)

Especially in comparison to the UGTT, the differences become evident. While the UGTT is much more oriented towards state stability and government resources, the LTDH sees it as relevant, but other elements like freedom are more important; a point that is discussed when it comes to the freedom dimension.

Mutual constraints: civil society as a watchdog

Like all categories of the control dimension, mutual constraints did not receive a lot of attention. The framing was not mentioned by Medhi and is much influenced by the arguments presented by Bechir. The perspective on mutual constraints is to be handled with caution; a bias through the more prominent mentions by Bechir is possible.

When I state that all categories of the control dimension face the same problem, it does not mean that discussions with leaders did not cover those topics. However, LTDH leaders used very clearly a different framing, oriented on the freedom dimension, to answer questions on the respective elements. One element that is mentioned in relation to mutual constraints is the role of civil society.

"Civil society controls the government, especially after the Nobel Prize. Nothing will be changed without the mediation of civil society [...] Good governance is also important. The Nobel Prize was not only for the guarantors of democracy but for the Tunisian exception. [...] To be realistic. The first actor is the people through elections and civil society. Civil society has the power to control the government. It is a partnership between government and civil society. What we think to succeed and will also succeed in the other countries of the Arab Spring. Tunisia is a model." (LTDH, Bechir)

This perspective describes civil society as controller as well as partner of the government and as separate control institution. As mentioned earlier, this element is to be handled with caution and shall not be generalized to the whole LTDH.

5.2.2 Equality dimension: socioeconomic factors and equality

Participation: it's the civil society that participates

The participation dimension was rarely named in interviews, but more in articles as we will see later. It was only mentioned by Rim and Bechir and may consequentially represent only partly the framing of the LTDH.

Participation is not seen independently, but gets connected to rights and the constitution (LTDH, Rim). Even more explicit on the role that civil society can play in policy formulation,

Rim connects the participation of civil society with the state, but also the resources of civil society and its possible implication:

"So here too the revolution has [...] allowed the climate of freedoms a lot, helped much to decongest the freeze that existed, the ice, the wall of ice that separated civil society from public institutions. It is true that there were [...] attempts of coordination between civil society, this two-part dialogue which is absolutely necessary. [...] There are departments that are more open to listen to civil society, more adapted than others. But doing so is the battle, is never fully won. It is essential to ensure that civil society is not only consulted systematically in politics, in the implementation of policies, but it must be respected that its choices are adopted and that it really weighs. This poses an enormous question of the responsibility of civil society, which must absolutely increase its capacities to become a real force of proposition." (LTDH, Rim)

This citation first of all highlights that connections between the state and civil society are already getting better, but that it depends much on departments whether civil society is consulted. Rim also remarks that inclusion in policy-making is not systematic. At the end she highlights the responsibilities of civil society to ameliorate in order to become a force of proposition.

Participation is based on rights but also on practices vis-a-vis the state (and representation). The proposal and framing of the LTDH goes in the direction of an institutionalized access of civil society to political decisions and thus effective participation of civil society. However, only half of the interviewees mentioned the element and thus information remains limited and is to be verified by future research.

Representation: socioeconomic factors and equality

Representation was named several times as part of the framing. It was mentioned by all leaders, slightly more by Ali. However, it is not often presented as essential by interviewees. It is more the connection towards other elements of democracy that are important elements of representation.

LTDH leaders for example argue that the socioeconomic exclusion in the interior of the country also hinders representation due to limited resources, a framing we have already seen for the UGTT. In addition, women rights and equality are underlined, again with a focus on rights.

"We are for total equality. That's the general principle. How to adapt to a discourse, [...] it is according to the specificities of the region. But the basic principle is the same. Rights do not change" (LTDH, Ali)

"It's in the constitution and we aspire total equality." (LTDH, Bechir)

Representation of minorities was not mentioned by interviewees. What already emerged for other dimensions is the strong referral to freedoms and rights which is regarded in detail for the freedom dimension.

Transparency: it is all about corruption

Transparency was evoked in interviews only to a limited degree. It was mentioned by Rim, Bechir and Medhi, but not by Ali.

Especially corruption is discussed by the LTDH:

"(Laughter) the systematic corruption that lasted thirty-five years is not to be solved within four to five years. The fight should be institutionalized." (LTDH, Bechir)

"[If] the people who continue to corrupt [...] and be corrupt know they will not be able to do it with impunity anymore. We will begin to hope for a cleaning of the economic world and social life in a general way." (LTDH, Rim)

The first citation calls for a more institutionalized fight against corruption, while the second asks for more persecution of corruption in order to show that corruption is nothing accepted. This sensitivity on corruption goes also for the own financing, not only due to the danger of money laundering, but also because of other perceptions:

"We refused money. [...] Above all, there are funders where there is an exclamation mark. There may be funders who are laundering money. There are funders who are Zionists and we do not deal with Zionists. We do not have any problem with the Jews. We have problems with the Zionists. In addition, our accounting is very clear; we have an accountant who will divulge in the newspapers." (LTDH, Medhi)

The combination of the fight against corruption with other topics is less clear, apart from internal finance and the economic system. The equality dimension like the control dimension was few evoked in interviews, contrary to the freedom dimension.

5.2.3 Freedom dimension: a human rights orientation

Before introducing the elements of the freedom dimension, it is worth to recall that this dimension is by far the most important and thus essential to understand the perspective of the LTDH. It becomes that important that other dimensions are of minor importance. The

dimension gets more attention in the analysis as it is important to analyze this dimension carefully. In comparison to the other organizations it is remarkable that the distinction in the framing of the LTDH in favor of the freedom dimension is clearly pronounced.

Individual liberties: human rights at the heart of the LTDH's framing

Individual liberties are by far the most important element when it comes to democracy. It was mentioned by all interviewees and a great part of all answers turned out to be on human rights even if questions referred to different aspects.

It is this referral to human rights that is very prominent in the framing by the LTDH and this human rights framing encompasses several links towards other concepts like freedom, equality, democracy or torture.

"The principles of the league are based on the principles of human rights and the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and the Charter. [...] It is fundamental rights and freedoms that are important to us. We also paid the bill symbolically. We are the first association for the defense of human rights in Tunisia, the Arab world and Africa. [...] The league as an NGO can only perform these functions in a context of human rights, democracy and the rule of law. This is not possible in an autocracy." (LTDH, Bechir)

"We touch everything. All about human rights in Tunisia. Political, social, economic. And everything that happens especially in prisons, the restriction of freedom, complaints, prisons, [...] the constitution of the country as a country on the way to freedom. Gender, gender equality. When we say gender, it is fifty/fifty. And we have parity too, we are for parity. We [...] fight for the constitution too. We do not have a single niche." (LTDH, Medhi)

Especially the second citation shows that human rights are also connected to prisons and prisoners. There is again not only a link to the Universal Declaration of Human Rights as in the first citation, but also a referral to the constitution. Others like Rim refer to the LTDH as an old organization that was essentially founded for the defense of human rights. This goes hand in hand with a demand for the state to respect human rights and gets linked to the respect for the freedom of association.

In addition, the difference towards the UGTT for example is actually found in the difference of rights defended, as Bechir elaborates: "The UGTT defends social and economic rights and the LTDH civil rights and culture. Each has its own specificity. These are the generations of human rights." (LTDH, Bechir) Human rights are a transcending element that covers much of the framing of the LTDH.

Physical integrity and the defense of prisoners and engagement against torture play a role. Prisoner rights are one specific aspect that is covered by the LTDH and that was not found for the other organizations. Especially, controls of prisons are one of the means of the LTDH:

"We have several that we work with now; we imposed the unannounced visit of places of detention with the Ministry of Justice. And we are negotiating with the Ministry of the Interior to visit places of detention" (LTDH, Medhi)

"So, since its creation it has aligned itself with the universal declarations of human rights and [...] whose mandate is mainly the defense of individual and collective liberties, it is the defense of all victims who see violated their rights, of political prisoners who have been tortured. It has campaigned for the release of political prisoners and has also supported all justified and peaceful social movements that do not use violence." (LTDH, Ali)

The LTDH is the only organization that has the defense of prisoner rights and the protection against torture as focus, something already noted when it comes to the networks of the LTDH.

It is also the referral to weapons and violence that is seen as "red line" for the LTDH when it comes to freedom of speech for example (LTDH, Bechir).

Public sphere: more freedom of speech

The public sphere and thus freedom of speech and freedom to associate get less attention. The element was not mentioned by Medhi.

Generally, two arguments exist, one focusing on the role of the (social) media to defend freedom of speech and another one that sees protest as realization of the freedom of speech (as expressed by Ali).

"Certainly, in a modern sense, Facebook, Twitter, etc., the media have played a vital role and still play in defending the freedoms of expression. The media are not always independent; some media speak for the parties" (LTDH, Bechir)

The above citation shows also the skepticism towards some media outlets that are criticized as promoting particular interests, but that are nevertheless connected to freedom of speech. As mentioned before, the public sphere is the least integrated element of the freedom dimension and is thus not of great importance for the framing of the LTDH.

Rule of law: the legal basis for human rights

The rule of law dimension is together with individual liberties the most important element for the LTDH. The framing can be nearly exclusively be referred to those two dimensions. The dimension was mentioned by all interviewed leaders, but less by Medhi. The rule of law is described as pre-condition for the activities of the LTDH and for human rights and democracy, something that makes the link between both categories even clearer.

"The league as an NGO can only perform these functions in a context of human rights, democracy and the rule of law. It's not possible in an autocracy" (LTDH, Bechir)

"It is a rule of law that is to say where there is a separation between the three powers and where the power is held following democratic elections, that it is a process, good schematic but it is a process, all that is simple. It is the power that can only change with free and fair elections. So, the three powers must be separated. The laws should be in accordance with the constitution. This is democracy and respect for individual and collective freedoms, freedom of the press and information. That's democracy." (LTDH, Ali)

While the first citation connects rule of law, democracy and human rights as opposed to autocracy, the second links rule of law to the separation of powers. This call for separation of powers is seen as important for the quality of the juridical sector as independent actor. The constitution serves again as a referral.

However, the quality of the legal system and less equality before the law plays a role. Bechir stated that while equality before the law exists on paper, problems persist in reality. The reform of the juridical sector is a topic underlined by Bechir:

"In comparison we are less wary of the legal system, but we have reservations. There are still authoritarian structures. The legal system is not independent, it's not finished yet." (LTDH, Bechir)

The persistence of authoritarian structures and its criticism is something found across LTDH leaders.

The constitution and the realization of the content of the constitution are central to framing. In this sense (and like for the ATFD) the constitution becomes an important referral for the guarantee of human rights, but also for the demand of reforms. The human rights legislation, be it national or international, is an important point of referral that emerged also in publications (LTDH 2011a and b).

"So, democracy means participation. It [...] means to concretize [...] all that the constitution has brought as a promise, has brought as a principle for the respect of the fundamental freedoms, the respect of the fundamentals of the universal human rights of the state, of the rights of the achievements in matters of women's rights. That's all mentioned in the constitution. The constitution also includes aspects of the need to decentralize, to decentralize power and to give the regions a kind of self-determination, within the unity of the state, of course, but it is something that is quite new. And it is necessary that the laws which are promulgated be the most respectful. It is a struggle how to make these principles translated into laws in all areas that give concrete substance to the general and in the constitution written principles" (LTDH, Rim)

From this argumentation, the constitution is seen as the referral for many demands, be it decentralization, human rights, women rights. It is not just about codification, but also about application of the constitution.

Two different additional topics emerge. Ali used justice in relation to social justice and the disadvantaged regions and Rim connected justice to the question of helping others on juridical questions - another topic as the LTDH wants to establish an effective juridical counselling.

5.2.4 Summary on the LTDH's framing

Shortly summarized, the framing of the LTDH is relatively simple in the sense that two categories of the freedom dimension (human rights and rule of law) get combined in their argumentation. There is not much to summarize on the LTDH as it is very much about the connection of human rights with its codification, mainly the constitution. Rule of law is seen as precondition of democracy which is seen as condition for human rights guarantees.

Human rights are that dominant in the framing that few unique elements exist. Nearly every element of democracy gets connected to it. The most evident mentions on other dimensions of democracy are related to civil society as a watchdog as well as to the role of freedom of speech.

It is quite surprising that leaders of the LTDH did not extensively speak about other elements than human rights and rule of law. One could expect that democracy is perceived as more than human rights, also by LTDH leaders. The framing is that limited that it is even less in line with democracy as democracy is no concept only focused on the freedom dimension. While

the LTDH is clearly libertarian in its perspective on democracy, the question should be posed, whether a that unidimensional framing is sufficient to influence actors in a democratic system without a clear idea on democracy.

5.2.5 Frame combinations: the freedom dimension's importance underlined

Not surprisingly, the most important combination is between individual liberties and rule of law. Other important combinations include freedom of speech and individual liberties as well as representation and individual liberties.

In addition, the individual liberties dimension and thus human rights get connected to other elements like government capacity or electoral competition. Given the low number of mentions of government capacity or electoral competition it also means that nearly every referral to those two elements gets linked to human rights, something that again emphasizes the importance for the LTDH framing. The framing is very limited, but also much targeted. The LTDH does not integrate many other elements in their human rights and rule of law framing.

5.2.6 Frame resonance in public: it's still about human rights

"We had the Nobel prize recently following [...] the quartet. To unlock the country. [...] we have never looked for the Nobel. We never, not even thought. But we thought about the good of our country and the continuity of [...] democracy. Although there are lower phases, there are peaks, [...] and above all we are aware that democracy goes hand in hand with the economic side. If the economic component does not work, democracy will regress. And unfortunately for us, our economic situation is very delicate. And with the delicacy of the economic conditions, it is sure that democracy will regress." (LTDH, Medhi)


The above citation mentions an aspect that resonates in public, that was not yet discussed, the Nobel Peace Prize: The Nobel Peace Prize plays a role when it comes to articles and is frequently named in relation with the LTDH as can be seen under the category other in Figure 5.6 (a more detailed list including more elements can be found in the Annex, Figure 10.14).

Figure 5.6 shows the predominance of the individual and rule of law dimensions, but equally sees government capacity in a prominent position when it comes to articles (partly related to the fight against terrorism, a salient topic at the time of analysis). Economic aspects figure

prominently, but not as prominent as for the UGTT. Individual liberties, government capacity and rule of law are more important than economic or other elements.

The first not democracy related dimension is other, followed by economy. Aspects that fall in the category “other” and that resonate much include the revolution and the question of martyrs, health related issues and to a minor degree migration, culture or tourism. Terrorism and reconciliation are other topics that occupy the LTDH.

Figure 5.6 Topics of claims in articles, main dimensions




Note: absolute occurrences, LTDH, total number of claims in articles: 92

Resonance of democratic framing in public, more about freedom, but there is a bit more...

Ninety-two claims appear in articles, much more in LaPresse than in Le Temps. Figure 5.7 shows that the dimensions individual liberties, government capacity and rule of law resonate a lot in the public sphere probably due to the perceived expertise of the LTDH.

On the other hand, there are three sub dimensions (competition, mutual constraints and transparency) that have been only rarely coded in the claims in articles (Figure 5.7). In comparison to the interviews, the coding in articles is more balanced. While the freedom dimension stays most important, the control as well as equality dimension account nevertheless for more coding than in interviews.

Figure 5.7 Coded dimensions in claims in articles



Note: number of coded claims, 92 total mentions on dimensions of democracy (Competition: 3, Government Capacity: 37, Mutual Constraints: 4, Participation: 22, Representation: 21, Transparency: 7, Freedom and liberties: 40, public sphere: 17, rule of law: 34).

For articles one can notice that especially human rights, the constitution, but also security or the revolution, justice, repression or participation are often connected with other elements. Also, the question of prisons can be prominently found in the framing and gets connected with rights and repression (an overview on centrality of topics can be found in the Annex, Figure 10.15).

When it comes to frame combinations in articles as shown in Table 10.17 in the Annex, four dimensions get more connected to other dimensions, namely government capacity, individual liberties, public sphere and rule of law. Apart from the government capacity dimension that gets more coverage in the media – but only related to security aspects -, frame combinations center on the freedom dimension and show a very consistent picture for the LTDH.

The most frequent combination is between government capacity and individual liberties. Under this category falls the criticism of the fight against terrorism as well as the role of prisoners in connection to human rights. The connection between human rights and the constitution and legal texts has already been mentioned. It is no surprise that the legal texts are equally used to criticize the government in relation to the security apparatus. While the

focus on the freedom dimension is also visible in articles, there are more of the other dimensions than in interviews that get combined.

Economic issues play a role, but are not as central as for the UGTT. Resources and government stability play nearly no role in frame combinations in articles. It is more the question of security forces that is most important in terms of government capacity. In addition, it is to remark that neither competition, mutual constraints or transparency are virtually integrated in the framing.

When it comes to combinations with other elements than democracy, it is to note that the questions of lesbian and gay rights emerge for the LTDH in articles.

One of the reasons why the LTDH is more covered on other dimensions in the media are the calls for protest together with other organizations covering different topics as well as their inclusion in the quartet. In this sense, interviews appear as pure in the sense that they present the heart of the LTDH framing. This also shows that the inclusion of the LTDH in coalitions causes a much broader perception of its framing in the public sphere. By sidelining with other organizations, the LTDH gets mediatized with a much more equalized perspective, covering other aspects than freedom.

5.2.7 Summary on the framing of the LTDH in interviews and media

The key topics of human rights, security, repression, protest, legislation and justice are important frame content of the LTDH. The rights-oriented approach is clearly represented in interviews and articles.

Compared to the UGTT, media coverage is different as still a number of state actors are included, but the most important dimension is clearly the freedom dimension. When it comes to the state, security forces get criticized. The role of the LTDH is less supportive for the state in comparison to the UGTT.

While the LTDH clearly argues on the bases of what it was founded for (human rights), one can highlight that the LTDH still has a mono-dimensional framing of democracy. One can equally criticize that the framing of the LTDH fails to integrate other important dimensions of

democracy as democracy is much more than the freedom dimension. While this limited framing is certainly easy to identify by all actors of the political system, one can question whether it is adequate in a more and more democratic context, where human rights are not the only demand.


When it comes to ideational influence it is difficult to say whether the LTDH is able to influence the Ministry of the Interior or the Ministry of Justice. As we have seen from chapter four, at least relations with the Ministry of the Interior are frequent but distant. It is more to expect that ideational influence on the Ministry for Relations with Civil Society are better as those are seen more positive from both sites.

The problem of the limited framing of the LTDH is no artefact, but a much focalized framing. The LTDH currently fails to provide a full picture of democracy. The ATFD on the other hand, while being focused on human rights as well, integrates other dimensions of democracy.

5.3 ATFD: interference, representation of women and legal texts

Figure 5.8 shows a distribution of dimensions that resembles a lot the one of the LTDH for articles with a very important freedom dimension. While the control and equality dimension are mentioned to an equal degree, the freedom dimension received much more attention. However, within those categories some poles are more important than other sub-categories. When it comes to the control dimension, it is government capacity in line with terrorism that has been coded most. For the equality dimension, especially aspects of representation (of women, but not only) and participation were named. For the freedom dimension, the focus on individual liberties and human rights as well as rule of law is to emphasize.

Figure 5.8 Coded dimensions and element in interviews



Note: number of coded mentions, 415 total mentions on dimensions of democracy (Competition: 30, Government Capacity: 64, Mutual Constraints: 20, Participation: 40, Representation: 57, Transparency: 22, Freedom and liberties: 98, public sphere: 31, rule of law: 53).

5.3.1 Control dimension: religious inference and the role of businessmen

Competition of political actors: weaknesses of political parties and skepticism

As we have seen above, competition of political actors is not very important for the ATFD. It nevertheless appears in all interviews, while being less mentioned by Myriam. Two aspects are to be highlighted. The perceived weakness of political parties and skepticism towards those parties.

A referral to party programs is part of the organizational framing, oriented towards priorities – and connected to civil society – as well as towards the missing regional reach of political parties and their diverse problems.

"There are divisions already, in most parties. There are contradictions. There are also differences in the priorities of each [...] for example if we take the civil society, there are so many priority issues, important questions, that we cannot all agree on the priorities for which we must fight." (ATFD, Yasmine)

When it comes to political parties themselves, Myriam for example identifies the opposition, Ennahdha and Nida Tounes, as three poles of the system (ATFD, Myriam). On political parties Nour added:

"They are terrible, it's horror. When I see how they work, it's terrible. They are small grocers who think about what to win, stuff like that. When we see as the Front from the left, stuff like that. [...] We do not really have political parties that are up to the situation". (ATFD, Nour)

The citation shows a missing confidence towards political parties that is not just shared across ATFD leaders, but also with some of the other leaders. The contradictions mentioned are also part of a negative perception of political parties, covering different aspects like party programs.

One of the few referrals to the competition of parties is found in one of the ATFD publications remarking that party competition did not ensure absolute equality (ATFD 2011b). Interviews did not go in detail on competition of political actors. When prompted for, interviewees were divided between some existing competition between parties and the perception of missing competition of political programs. There appears to be more confidence in civil society than in political parties, thus the missing clear position on political parties and party competition appears logic. It can be argued, that those topics get salient during electoral campaigns; something similarly valid for the other organizations.

Another aspect is the criticism of “rich” parties in election campaigns as well as the predominance of men in leading positions of electoral lists (ATFD 2011b).

“For example, at present, the majority of the population is the poor or the poorest, but economic choices are essentially liberal. So, they do not represent the interest of the masses. And in the elections, there was a lot of use of money, for election campaigns.” (ATFD, Sarah)

“[...] that’s not really the reality. Because it’s also the money that played a role in the elections, the last elections.” (ATFD, Yasmine)

Elections are criticized for representing more the fortune of actors than the reality. This critique often gets linked to the exclusion of the poor. In addition, the first elections after the Ben Ali era are seen with skepticism:

“People voted for the first time in 2011, mainly for the Islamic party because they thought [...] they made promises, they are honest people who went to jail. They have values that are guarantees and everything. And then they realized that they are people like the others. They are politicians like the others, who have made calculations like the others, who make promises they do not keep, like the others. And so, they changed, they made vote-sanctions. So, as you know, they punished, they went to the other side. Many women voted for Nida as alternative.” (ATFD, Hiba)

The criticism of political parties has several names because it is that politicians are not honest, that they search compromises and do not stick to their vote promises. At the same time, the ATFD criticizes a missing professionalization of political parties (ATFD 2011b). The ATFD sees

elections as only one part of democracy, in combination with civil society as interviewees expressed (see 5.3.2 on participation):

"I think that the fact that there are two, three, four parties that are there, I think it limits. And I believe that civil society, unions and all that are very vigilant. People follow what is happening, ask for accounts. There will be new traditions, I think that if we go like that there will be new habits, new traditions." (ATFD, Hiba)

While the electoral outcome is nevertheless accepted, the ATFD criticizes the influence of other aspects than political programs and argues for a greater inclusion of civil society, also as additional control instance. It is especially this framing of civil society complementary to electoral outcome that seeks to strengthen the role of civil society as a whole.

Government capacity: the role of religion and businessmen

Government capacity is one of the most important dimensions expressed in all interviews. In relation to government capacity and whether specific actors are able to influence the government, ATFD leaders expressed their concern for religion as well as businessmen to influence the government.

"So, there is this side, there is the cleavage that is also religious. And who says religious, it's very complex here. Because it is religious Islamist, political, because there is the political religious and there is the religious all at short. It's not the politics, it's the spiritual side, the religious affiliation, and it's the culture." (ATFD, Nour)

"We know it very well. The central bank mentioned that there is a lot of money coming from the so-called associations to build mosques, and so on, but basically it is for terrorism." (ATFD, Yasmine)

The skepticism towards religious actors is widespread among ATFD leaders. The influence of religion does not only concern the government but also the juridical sector as Yasmine argued (ATFD, Yasmine). Different perspectives on whether religion is bad per se and leaders arguing for different actors that use religion exist within the ATFD. The skepticism towards Ennahdha is shared among many interviewees of the other organizations, but ATFD interviewees most clearly linked it to political interference.

As mentioned earlier, it is not only the inference of religion, but equally the influence of the money or businessmen that is criticized. Myriam for example states that "capitalism reigns in Tunisia" (ATFD, Myriam). While this position is at one extreme of the ATFD framing of influence with a critique of capitalism, the question of rich people influencing politics is a

common perspective. Not all leaders criticize capitalism, but they at least criticize the economic system.

Another element of government capacity are terrorism and security. The question of government capacity or state authority is seen more skeptical and negative, as the ATFD underlines problematic events like police aggression (ATFD 2011b). On the other hand, the ATFD condemns the violence committed by Daesh, especially in relation to atrocities against women or political assassinations (ATFD 2014c; ATFD 2015d; ATFD 2015b). There is support for the fight against terrorism, but this clearly within the limits of the respect for human rights.

Government stability is supported and a strong state is sometimes emphasized, but with limitations.

"Stability of the government is important, of course it is important. But not at all costs. The goal is not the stability of the government. If a government is unable to ensure a correct and consistent follow-up, if it is unable to work; in the general interest of the people and the nation, we do not want it. But it's still good, a stable state, it's always better than an unstable state. But not at any condition. It depends what it does." (ATFD, Sarah)

"We need a strong state. But these ministers and ministries are weak. It is because they are infiltrated and there is an imbalance within, or it is a desire to keep the position. Personally, they hold to their position and they do not make decisions." (ATFD, Yasmine)

As the first citation shows, stability of the government is bound to an effective government. If the government does not work in the interest of the people, the ATFD sees it better to change a government. The second citation furthermore highlights the problems with ministers as well as personal interests to keep in power positions. Both together advocate stability if it is in line with policies in the interest of the country.

ATFD leaders are divided between the demand for a strong state in terms of fighting terrorism and the danger for individual liberties that result from a harder fight against terrorism. The ATFD appears more skeptical towards government resources and capacities, especially in comparison to the UGTT. The framing is more compatible with a LTDH framing.

Mutual constraints: decentralization and participatory democracy

The horizontal and vertical checks and balances were mentioned by all interviewees, but a bit more by Sarah.

The ATFD underlines the demand for independent institutions within the state that are able to regulate for example the media (ATFD 2011b). While institutional checks and balances would enable civil society actors to enter institutional councils as part of their expertise, the demand for controlling institutions was not prominent. The most explicit demand was for the constitutional court, as there is still a divide between actual laws and the constitution.

Especially Sarah demands independent institutions as answer to those practices of influencing:

"That is to say, sometimes we do not have a real political will to involve the authorities concerned. And one does not want autonomy of these bodies. For example, one does not want media autonomy; one does not want autonomy of justice. One does not want because currently the people who compose it are not all true Democrats, because there are political negotiations. There are the Islamist parties, there are the far-right parties, there are the liberals [...] if there is autonomy of justice, if there is a constitutional court, if there is autonomy of expression, if there are no material issues in the media for example. At least the national press [...] should be controlled for their material sources as well." (ATFD, Sarah)

The ATFD criticizes here the missing political will to develop independent institutions, because they see the people in institutions as more democratic than politicians. The demand for institutions includes the constitutional court, but also independent media and independent justice among other.

The second aspect that was discussed a lot was decentralization of the political system. It is foreseen by the new constitution but not yet implemented.

"You know, decentralization does not mean regional autonomy, to say total autonomy. [...] It's a big debate still, it's a big debate. When we made the Tunisian constitution, the new constitution, we had great regional debates about stuff like that. How far can we go in terms of decentralization? Does the region have to be truly autonomous? Because there is the region, the governorate [...] so that's the division even in regions, do we keep the same nomenclatures as before, do we change?" (ATFD, Nour)

"So there has to be this participation. Participatory democracy, it should be developed, now at least at the level of local power, local governance. I hope so." (ATFD, Hiba)

"[...] to establish a participatory democracy, to enable women to be in these forms of institutions. For that, I would have to talk mainly about disadvantaged regions, regions where there are still difficulties for women to participate" (ATFD, Yasmine)

The ATFD framing goes in the direction of a limited autonomy and includes many questions where ATFD leaders hesitate to give answers. There is a wide support for decentralization, but there is no answer to the degree of autonomy. At the same time, the demand for redistribution in the sense of federal equilibration from one governorate to another was mentioned. Another key word is participatory democracy to give an idea about what kind of democracy Tunisia could develop (ATFD, Sarah). In this participatory approach, local democracy and civil society play an important role.

While decentralization is an issue, it was not among the most prominent frames as we saw from the overview on dimensions. What appears as important for the ATFD is not decentralization at any price, but a well-planned one.

5.3.2 Equality dimension: parity of men and women and participatory democracy

Participation: participatory democracy and civil society as intermediary

Participation appears in all interviews, slightly more in the interview with Sarah. Participation of women is one of the key elements in ATFD's argumentation.

Participation also includes the participation of civil society and the link towards the state. Especially participatory democracy re-emerges as a term and is a key frame when it comes to democracy, being connected to a number of different elements.

"It must exist. There must be a real desire for participatory democracy. If we want to build a democratic state. [...] And where the civil society has a role, where the people also has a role, it intervenes in the big choices of the State. It is a participatory state. [...] Normally through elections it [the people] participates directly. During the elections, it is a participation [...] it can also be represented by the civil society. For example, for unions, through associations like ours. It's not contradictory, it's complementary. Whenever it has the opportunity, it also participates indirectly through the elected to the parliament, through the parties too, for those who are in the parties." (ATFD, Sarah)

Participatory democracy includes not only citizens, but also civil society. Civil society is here seen as a relay for people's demands. The referral to participatory democracy by women

movements around the world is also underlined by scholars like Anne Phillips as it fits well when combining feminism and democracy (Phillips 1995).

Another aspect is the equality of participation. Here, the role of women in line with parity and representation gets discussed. The framing on representation is presented in the following section, but both elements, equality of participation and representation get often connected. On the other hand, there are also some doubts on the willingness of people as well as civil society to get mobilized.

"Today, people are exhausted [...]. But there are women's associations that continue to work." (ATFD, Sarah)

"Because, well, we fight against it. But it is not up to us to mobilize alone, to make the decisions; it is also to the Tunisian people. But the Tunisian people with the revolution I feel that it is [...] exhausted. Also, we are very touched by the economic crisis; the Tunisians are very much affected by this. They are no longer interested in politics more than in their lifestyles, in their salary." (ATFD, Myriam)

This notion of an exhausted people is a widespread framing and is also found for some other organizations. The ATFD places it more prominently than the other organizations. Another difference towards other organizations lies in the evaluation of the people's capacities. The people are seen with skepticism questioning the capacities of voters: This position is an elitist position that goes against the conception of democracy based on equal participation.

"[...] I think both. I would say the people, but the people are so manipulatable sometimes [...] the elections showed that. I think that the people say its word, that's for sure. We saw how women in particular voted during the last election." (ATFD, Hiba)

This framing of a manipulatable people is something unique to ATFD leaders and was not found for other organizations.

Summarizing, the disadvantaged position of women hinders participation of women according to the ATFD. This has equally influence on the representation. Effectively, participation and representation are closely linked for the ATFD.

Representation: Parity, and minority rights

Representation was mentioned by all interviewees and a bit more by Yasmine and Sarah.

It is especially the representation of women and minorities that plays a role while neither left-right wing representation nor direct democracy are important. Some of the few arguments on direct democracy link it to participatory democracy, the key term already discussed above. Given the caution towards decentralization and the partly missing confidence in the people, the reserves towards direct democracy are consequential.

The representation of especially women is one of the most important pillars in the argumentation of the ATFD. The ATFD asks for more women in local and decisive councils and for equality in representation (ATFD 2014a; Huffpost Maghreb 2013).

"[...] when it comes to mass movements, women are very strong there. But when it comes to elections and representation at the level [...] of decision posts, both in political parties and in government institutions, we don't find them anymore. So, it's not them who do not want to. But it is also the lack of political position taking, political decision that allows them to go ahead. [...] First in law, there is no protection or promotion of women's political participation. You now see the latest appointments of governors, at the regional level; they are all men while there is a lot of female competence. Similar in parties, unfortunately, even those on the left, there is no promotion of women's political participation. There must be positive discriminatory measures, unfortunately." (ATFD, Yasmine)

The ATFD connects representation in the administration; institutions and so on with several articles of the constitution (see 5.3.3; ATFD, Sarah and ATFD, Yasmine). The organization asks for parity of men and women as part of legislation including electoral laws (ATFD 2012; ATFD 2014c). This parity gets divided into horizontal and vertical parity.

"But that [success] was parity [...] first of all it was written in the constitution, it was our battle too. But currently it is not [...] for example article forty-six says that the state must take all the measures so that there is parity in the elective bodies. It is not parity on the electoral lists. In institutions. And to have parity in the institutions, we must give ourselves every opportunity to ensure that women are effectively present in the elected bodies. And we must therefore apply horizontal and vertical parity. That is to say that in the heads of lists, there must be fifty percent of men and women. [...] The parties also have their role to play. There are parties that claim to be democratic and have no women at their head first. Women are not represented in their leadership [...]. And they did not want to vote for horizontal and vertical parity, on the pretext that there are not enough women, that there is no competence [...] whereas for us there is a lot of female competence in these specific parties, in the unions too." (ATFD, Sarah)

"Well we have fought for parity, already in the high instance for the democratic transition [...] and therefore within this body we have campaigned for an electoral law that takes into account parity. Unfortunately, we did not reach parity but it was at least known. It continued later in the period when there was the electoral code that was to be discussed within the ANC. We campaigned for

horizontal and vertical parity but unfortunately it was not accepted. We have also campaigned with other associations and we have been active in ensuring that the constitution [...] shapes the need for equality, respect for individual and collective freedoms, freedoms for men and women. Well, there are some achievements. Article twenty-six and article forty-seven.” (ATFD, Yasmine)

This division between representation of women and representation in leading positions was not found for the other organizations. The framing on equality is more detailed. In addition, there is a strong referral to international treaties and human rights as those are more progressive in the fight against discrimination. The ATFD criticizes the unequal representation of women, especially in line with elections, as well as their missing presence in political functions. Parity or equality are key terms for the ATFD.

Heritage and legislation on heritage play a role for the ATFD connected to an egalitarian perspective:

"At the moment, there are laws that discriminate against women, which are not for equality. And according to the constitution, these laws must be modified and repealed. They must be repealed to be in harmony with the constitution, otherwise they would be unconstitutional. And there is currently no real political will to change these laws. [...]. And we want these laws to change. For example, equality in the inheritance, if article twenty-one of the constitution says that the citizens are equal, then the inequality in the inheritance becomes unconstitutional. If the constitution says that the state must take all measures to protect women from violence, discriminatory laws [...] that is not a change of law because there are laws which are for equality that exist in Tunisia but that are not respected.” (ATFD, Sarah)

"Although Tunisian laws are supposedly for equality, discrimination against women still persists. In the family. Already in the family, tutoring is for the husband. It's the father, the husband who is the head of the family. Hence there is a lot of discrimination, both in the important choices of the family, to solve the daily problems, [...] it follows of course the inequality in inheritance, which still remains [...] the woman half of what the man inherits. And also, choices for children” (ATFD, Yasmine)

This referral to heritage is not directly linked to democracy, but is nevertheless important for the claims of the ATFD. It is important for the framing on equality as equality covers many different aspects. The demand for equality in heritage with a referral to the constitution and the demand to change existent laws is typical for the framing of the ATFD.

A lot of arguments of the ATFD turn around women. The exclusion of the youth and the question of minorities still get attention. Minority rights as well as discrimination are named

by ATFD leaders, which was not the case to a similar degree for the other organizations. The ATFD even discusses rights of homosexuals in line with discrimination.

"Minority rights, of course. We are against all discrimination according to sex, race, sexual orientation, social origin, country. So, all forms of discrimination. We are all equal before the law [...]" (ATFD, Sarah)

It is to keep in mind that this framing with a support for sexual orientation as a way of life is something very progressive in Tunisia. When it comes to discrimination, the ATFD – like the FTDES – includes racism against black people in its argumentation, something not found in a similar way for the UGTT or the LTDH.

"There are problems. You know we worked a lot and during the 2015 Social Forum, this year. The dynamics [...] the question of black [...] racism. We put it on the table. It was not easy. There we saw the difficulty of being accepted. For them, it does not exist. That's not true, you raise a false problem. They live among us there is no problem. It is not a problem. Just saying that [...] is a total ignorance of what these people are going through. [...] They feel excluded. They live it as social exclusions." (ATFD, Nour)

In addition, the rural sector as well as exclusion of poor people is covered by the ATFD. This is a transversal theme that will be discussed later in detail when it comes to frame combinations. The ATFD highlights the representation of women and parity in institutions and political parties, discrimination not just against women, but also minorities and the exclusion due to economic reasons.

Transparency: rather abstract demands for transparency

Transparency appeared in all interviews, while being more present in the one with Sarah. While availability of information is named by the ATFD - especially in line with transparency- it is to recall that it is not an important topic often used.

The demand for transparency remains abstract when Sarah demands that state institutions work on transparency and honesty or where opacity is criticized (ATFD, Sarah). Other mentions focus on transparency of electoral campaigns as well as the control by civil society to blame the abuse of money. In addition, informal economies are a problem in line with the state capacity:

"Listen, when you have fifty percent of the revenues of the national economy in the national economy, it is the parallel market, what do you want? What state are we talking about?" (ATFD, Nour)

On the other hand, corruption itself is not regularly evoked by the ATFD. While it is criticized, there are no concrete demands on how to tackle the problem.

"In any case, corruption has increased in Tunisia according to international statistics. [...] because of the impunity, it is a post-revolutionary period, because of the impunity the corruption has increased. [...] Of course. It is contradictory to transparency and democracy." (ATFD, Sarah)

"It's more than before. Because there is a lot of dirty money. A mad money laundering. There are bundles of money coming into the country. We do not know [...] we know its parallel trade, all that too. [...] the trafficking, the mafia that spread with the Salafists here." (ATFD, Nour)

Transparency is not a very important demand of the ATFD and it shows a limited framing of the problem. The framing is nevertheless very compatible with other organizational perspectives as it rests on a very abstract level. It becomes clear that transparency and corruption are no important issues to the ATFD.

5.3.3 Freedom dimension: sexual rights, women rights, human rights

Individual liberties: defense of freedoms and physical integrity

Recalling the statistics on topics named as part of their framing, one can assign that individual rights and the free conduct of life, as well as physical integrity especially of women are among the most important elements for the ATFD. Individual liberties were mentioned by all interviewees on a high level, while being even higher for Sarah. This becomes already clear in the objectives of the ATFD: "elimination of all forms of discrimination against women [...], the defense of the achieved rights and the evolution of Tunisian legislation towards effective equality of sexes [...], the transformation of patriarchal mentalities [...], the recognition by women of their problems and the solidary fight towards anti-discriminatory solutions [...], the participation of women in civil and political life [...], the recognition without exception of their complete citizenship" (ATFD 2015a, own translation). In addition, freedom of movement, liberty of religious practice, the "right to difference", the rights of minorities or the equal distribution of values between men and women are part of their arguments (ATFD 2012).

In interviews, their framing on rights focusses on human rights. Those human rights are together with international treaties a main point of reference.

"We are for all individual freedoms. We fight for individual freedom, [...] we are against racism, [...] we carry all human rights, this is our reference. Our reference is human rights, international conventions." (ATFD, Myriam)

"Democracy is a state of law, where all individual freedoms are respected [...] we fight against all discrimination and where dignity, social concerns and human rights are respected." (ATFD, Sarah)

The framing of democracy as a state of law and its combination with human rights describes well the framing of the ATFD. Human rights are also used to determine cooperation, so they actually build the basis for the perceptions of other actors as Sarah expressed:

"No, not by the word. It's with exercise. For example, we know that the Tunisian League for Human Rights has always campaigned for rights [...] I said that currently, for example, they have voted for parity for the leadership and for the regional leaderships, in addition we have always defended the same rights, they are for the rights of expression, individual liberties, freedoms [...] against torture, against the death penalty. That is to say, we share these values there. We push them [...] they started to take charge of women's rights and they never say no, it is not possible in the name of religion or in the name of anything. But we would like them to adhere, that their base adheres more massively to these values there." (ATFD, Sarah)

The citation also shows that human rights and a rights-based approach is not promoted alone, but together with the LTDH, which indeed has a very similar framing. However, it is not only a referral to human rights, but more concretely to women rights for the ATFD.

"[...] the basic principles [...] for us it is the defense of women's rights, which are an integral part of universal rights. So, from there, our battle is part of this fight, too, for the universal. We believe that even if we belong to a country, that there is the world, too, that is there, that contributes." (ATFD, Nour)

"What binds us are the rights of women, it is the democracy, it is the freedoms and we are plural, that is to say we have copines⁵⁴ who are in different parties, but generally those are parties of [...] modernists, democratic, who are for the respect of human rights. We are not, for example, none of us in the Ennahdha party or the Islamist parties. So, we are copines, what binds us is respect for these rights." (ATFD, Sarah)

The framing of the ATFD is nevertheless often more progressive in comparison to the LTDH. Sexual rights are part of the human rights and are linked to democracy, something very far reaching in comparison to the other organizations (ATFD 2013). The ATFD demands freedom in relation to the way of life for example of youth when it comes to alcohol, choice of workplace or other aspects (ATFD, Yasmine). Especially the demand of freedom of sexual

⁵⁴ The term copines is not translated as it is used to connotate members of the ATFD.

orientation is not very common in Tunisia. To recall, the ATFD is one of the organizations with relations to organizations defending gays and lesbians⁵⁵.

"For us, for example, the criminalization of homosexuality, because homosexuality is punishable by three years in prison. And the state, and the constitution includes provisions for respecting and protecting individual life and privacy. That's part of the individual choices. So, we use the constitutional arguments to attack those discriminatory laws that already exist. And it's not about changing the laws only; it's also about conducting awareness campaigns. [...] And currently young people [...] for example, there are many young associations working for specificities, for example organizations for the rights on sexual orientation, which are not declared totally gay or lesbian but we work with them. We have always supported sexual orientation, because it is difficult to do in Tunisia. Moreover, the Islamists attacked us during the election campaign saying that it is people who are against Islam and against traditions; they advocate the marriage of gays and lesbians. For us it's not even a question of marriage. For us it is the respect of freedoms. Because we do not care if people want to get married, whether they are gay or not gay, or straight, that's not our problem. Marriage is a personal choice. But their freedom, respect for their freedom is a claim we have always had since the beginning of our activity."
(ATFD, Sarah)

This framing on lifestyles shows a very libertarian conception of democracy. The realization of the own way of life is deeply embedded in the ATFD's framing. Much of the framing describes the modernity of the Tunisian political system.

In line with modernity, the ATFD is against the headscarf and discusses the freedom of religion.

"We are against the veil and our position is clear, but we receive veiled women in our listening center for battered women. We accompany them, we follow them, we are in solidarity with them. [...] So we have no problem, we are for the choice of clothes, but we have a position, we are against the veil because we think it is discriminatory." (ATFD, Myriam)

"You are for women's rights, or you are against it. If you are for, how? Because even for the pros, they say we are for the right of women, even Islamists that's what they say. We are for women's rights [...] according to the vision of the Koran. The Koran, it gives rights, and they must be applicable. So, to tell you that it's a real negotiation, it's not [...] It's this cleavage that will make the difference, I think. The question of women's rights, are these fundamental rights for you, or not? At the social level, at the religious level, are you for the separation of religion from politics? [...] And that's the big cleavage. [...] everyone has the right to choose the religion he wants to practice. That's clear, you see. To practice [...]"

⁵⁵ Fortier summarizes the very difficult situation of activists for LGBTB issues and the related problems in Tunisia (Fortier 2015). Consequentially, the ATFD takes up a very controversial topic that does not have yet societal consensus.

but at the same time, we are for that religious people also respect those who have no religion, or those who have different religions.” (ATFD, Nour)

The question of the headscarf again shows the tension and skepticism towards religious actors. The interpretation of women rights and religious rights is a quite important point in the framing of the ATFD. Religion is used as main criticism for more traditional ways of life.

The right on physical integrity, on the own body and against violence is often mentioned (ATFD 2012; ATFD 2014a; ATFD 2011 a; ATFD 2014c; ATFD 2015d). Other researchers already found that this framing resonates well. Arfaoui and Moghadam argue: “Framing violence against women as a human rights issue resonated with many lawmakers and policymakers, especially at a global level” (Arfaoui and Moghadam 2016:639). This is found in a similar way for the ATFD. The protection against violence is targeted via the Centers of listening for victims of violence, where the ATFD helps and tries to sensitize in case of violence (ATFD 2011a).

“The minimum of freedom is to dispose of one's body. You cannot talk about freedom if you do not even decide on your body. We are against pedophilia; we are against violence [...]. But everyone has the freedom to dispose his body within the limits of the law, that is to say you cannot dispose your body while being, while going out with a child. But it's freedoms as long as it does not touch between two consenting people, two consenting adult people; it's not our business, nor the business of the state. We must respect the individual choices of people.” (ATFD, Sarah)

The right to dispose on its own body establishes the connection to healthcare. Health related questions and access to healthcare by women or the right to abortion are further aspects demanded by the ATFD (ATFD 2014c; ATFD 2015b; ATFD 2013). The ATFD thus consciously breaks the taboo to talk about sexuality and especially the right on abortion to enable women to completely dispose their body without influence from the patriarchy (ATFD 2013; ATFD 2014b).

The ATFD supplements its perspective on reproductive health with several international treaties and conferences like the pact on social, economic and cultural rights, the CEDAW, the CIPD, the Conference of Beijing, the Millennium Development Goals, the Protocol on Women rights in Africa (2005) or the Maputo Action Plan, but equally bases its argumentation on national legislation (ATFD 2013). The main argument, based on human rights and international conventions is the right for the own body, where also reproductive

rights are included. Empowerment of women is hereby also promoted through health-related questions.

All this already shows the connection of human rights, individual liberties and physical integrity with the rule of law. Individual liberties build the key of the ATFD's argumentation it is clearly a libertarian perspective, even a very Western perspective.

Public Sphere: freedom of speech and the problems with media

As seen above, the public sphere plays a role for the ATFD, but not as important as individual liberties or participation. It was mentioned by all interviewees and slightly more by Hiba.

Freedom of expression is seen as achievement, be it new or old media and as positive for democracy.

"If we have won something, it is this freedom of expression. So, it's very important for us. That's why even the young people are fighting for it [...] But I think that to send the critical message [...] because you know after the revolution, there has been an almost radical transformation of the expression even. At the radio level stuff like that. There are new journalists who have returned. But the ancients too, who have changed, depending on the climate [...] well, they have qualities." (ATFD, Nour)

"Yes. I think that with the possibilities for information that are spreading, it will become popular. And there are many people who cannot speak; they will come to the party meetings. They express themselves on the Internet, they send messages. No, the virtual space is extraordinary. It freed the speech and it brought people together in an incredible way. [...] it is as if we were pressuring us already by the media because, already at the level of Facebook, the debates were discussed, we were forced a little bit. So, I think it will be democratized." (ATFD, Hiba)

Freedom of expression is evaluated very positive and notably the internet gets emphasized. When looking at the framing on media, there exist many reserves on whether particular interests hide behind media outlets. The importance of the media and of information also for society has been discussed by a report of the ATFD during the initial transition where they, in cooperation with other organizations, monitored the media (ATFD 2011b). The independence of media from politics is important and some owners of media outlets have been criticized for using their enterprise to promote themselves (ATFD 2011b; ATFD, Sarah).

The question of freedom of expression gets connected to the fight against terrorism as mentioned earlier.

"So, it is not with this slogan that we must stop the freedom of expression of journalists. There was this fear, as we have said, do not touch freedoms in the name of the fight against terrorism. The fight against terrorism is known. We must first fight criminals now; we must control the people who provide them with money, weapons. [...] and above all it is necessary to make society aware of the danger of terrorism and to improve the socio-economic conditions because these people buy them more easily because they are poor. It's not the minister's son who is going to blow himself up. They use, the terrorist movement, their leaders use more disadvantaged social groups, young people" (ATFD, Sarah)

The criticism, that the fight against terrorism is used to restrict freedom of expression is an important element for ATFD leaders. It connects the fight against terrorism and sets limits to it, notably where freedom of speech is touched. On the other hand, freedom of expression also has its limits, notably in hate speech.

"The limits are the respect of others. Respect for the rights of others We do not have the right to say that such person [...] For example there was at one time the Islamists made Facebook sites, sites that were specialized in aggression and insults and defamation of Democrats, democratic parties and women essentially, feminist activists. That is to say it is pure and simple defamation [...] For us it is possible to express, one cannot disagree, but on the condition of respecting others and not to preach violence and hate. For the extremist parties it's not a freedom of expression, it's a call to hatred, it's a call to violence, and there they have no right to do it." (ATFD, Sarah)

"Well simply, when it is something that is considered a threat, the state takes action. Threats of assassination, saying in a mosque such is a [...] how we call it, the Takfir" (ATFD, Hiba)

Freedom of speech is certainly important for the ATFD. Nevertheless, the ATFD clearly evokes limits to freedom of speech in interviews, notably hate speech, and criticizes the media for missing professionalism or particularism. Those limits for freedom of speech are similar for all organizations that have been analyzed. The argument on missing professionalism was more expressed for the ATFD in comparison to the other organizations.

Freedom to associate is not that often referred to and often in combination with freedom of speech as seen above. Freedom to associate is either taken for granted or gets only attention when security forces repress protest.

Rule of law: the basis for many arguments

Rule of law is a very important dimension for the ATFD and several referrals to national and international law can be found. The dimension was discussed with all interviewees, slightly more by Hiba and Sarah.

The ATFD refers to the Tunisian constitution and especially article six on religion, article twenty-one on equality before the law and article forty-six on the protection of women rights (ATFD 2015a; ATFD 2014a; ATFD 2015b). Article thirty-four on women representation is equally important (ATFD 2015b). The personal status law and the constitution are main points of reference, also for sensitization campaign (ATFD 2014c; ATFD 2015b). The CEDAW is advanced and especially article thirty-eight (ATFD 2014a; ATFD 2014c; ATFD 2012). On the international level, the Convention on Children Rights from 1992 is referred to in line with the national code on the protection of children (ATFD 2014b). All those legal references can be found in the framing of the ATFD, often used for justification. One example is the argumentation by Hiba on equality of men and women.

"2012, the story of complementarity, we had to talk about that. We cancelled article twenty-eight, which said that the woman is complementary to the man. And so, we rolled it back. So, the action on the drafting of the constitution was important, very important. The CEDAW as well, we lobbied for the state to withdraw the CEDAW's reservations for the first time in 2011 and a second time in 2014. 2013-2014." (ATFD, Hiba)

As we have seen legal texts play an important role for the framing of the ATFD. If one would need to pick a more important text, than it would be the constitution that was often mentioned as referral.

"Of course. To promote the values of equality, equality of opportunity, to defend the rights of women, especially in the last constitution. Now we must try to see that the laws are in conformity with the constitution." (ATFD, Hiba)

"[...] all that is asked is to harmonize the laws with the constitution. It is not easy. We are in our right and we can, if there is a constitutional court, we can file a complaint. [...] We are a force of argumentation and a force of proposal, too. Because we propose. As we did for the constitution, we proposed a constitution on women's rights. We wrote what we wanted to be mentioned in the constitution." (ATFD, Sarah)

"Of course, the basic principles of ATFD are women's rights, which are included in human rights in general. It is the struggle for equality, for dignity, for individual and collective freedom. And we also fit into [...] the international principles of human rights, the universal charter of human rights, the CEDAW and all

international conventions that are against discrimination against women and against all minorities.” (ATFD, Yasmine)

The constitution and especially its sections on the equality between men and women are highlighted and its missing application is often criticized. With this referral to legal texts comes also a criticism on the inequality before the law that remains a problem as leaders expressed.

"You know the rule of law is a daily battle. We see it with judges and lawyers, in the field, on women's files. [...] It's not systematic; it's not something that goes on its own. Especially in a period where impunity covers everything. They all [...] are the last governor I do not know, you heard, the governor of Beja, who married, who made a second fictitious wedding. He lied more to the second telling her he was not married. A governor, who allows himself this kind of behavior, thinking to be in complete impunity, must be solved.” (ATFD, Nour)

Equality before the law is underscored with the referral to international conventions, which is again linked to the quality of the legal system. It is exactly this quality of the legal system that accounts for the majority of arguments.

"There are still [...] the judges themselves they say, they wait for the directives often. In their majority. Of course, there are judges who are more independent, even at the time of Ben Ali. That is to say, they made their work independent of Ben Ali. Well, on political issues they are still dependent, I think.” (ATFD, Nour)

"Of course. First, there must be autonomy of justice. Justice must be autonomous so that politicians do not try to influence the course of trials, for example. So, for there to be the bases of a democratic state, it is autonomy and freedom of expression, it is the autonomy of justice and independent autonomous structures, like those of elections for example, the constitutional [...] administrative court which must review the constitutionality of rights, and which can be used in case of problems. That is to say if these instances, these high instances are not respected and are not autonomous, there is always an interference of the executive” (ATFD, Sarah)

"There are still problems. First, because there is still no body that controls judges, [...] which is not yet there, the high authority for the conformity with the constitution of laws. It is not set up yet. That's a big problem. And even if it will be put in place, if the way to put it in place is not democratic, we will have an instance that will be challenged, too. Also, at the level of the ministry, the independence of justice is not yet respected.” (ATFD, Yasmine)

The missing independence of the juridical sector is seen as a major problem by ATFD leaders. This includes the missing control for judges but also judges that wait for political orders. The autonomy of the juridical sector is seen as a precondition for democracy. In line are independent institutions mentioned as well as the control of constitutionality of laws. The referral to existent law and regulations is connected to a harmonization of existent laws with

those regulations. The constitution and international conventions build important references of the framing. The independence and functioning of the juridical sector are emphasized.

5.3.4 Summary on the ATFD's framing

The ATFD shows the same libertarian orientation as the LTDH. Their focus on human rights and their codification in the constitution and in international treaties are very important elements of their framing. But in the case of the ATFD it are first and foremost women rights that are part of human rights and it is more than just the freedom dimension of democracy that is framed. The ATFD has a framing that is also focused on government capacity and representation.

Government capacity is linked to the criticism of religious actors. Government stability is relevant, but it goes not at any price as freedom of association and individual liberties are important.

Not surprisingly, the representation of women, but also of minorities gets highlighted. The ATFD has in contrast to the UGTT a much more individual orientation on rights and is accepting homosexuality as part of the freedoms. Equally, sexual rights and health related rights of women are important.

Recurrent framing include their advocacy for the law on violence against women, as well as questions of discrimination and equality in heritage. For the ATFD, while being strongly libertarian, democracy is not a unidimensional concept, but includes equality and to a certain degree also government stability because it is the government through its codified legislative texts that has to guarantee women and human rights.

5.3.5 Frame combinations of the ATFD

The ATFD combines its main frames like the representation of women or individual liberties and free conduct of life in interviews.

As we can see, individual liberties and representation are connected in an important manner, often with human rights or legal texts. A criticism of the influence of religion (government capacity) gets connected with individual liberties. In addition, equality of participation is often combined with those frame elements.

The quality of the legal system is connected to a number of rights-based claims. The rights-based approach of the ATFD is thus well represented in frame combinations and builds a key component of its framing. This is quite similar to the referral to (however less) legal texts by the LTDH.

There is an additional transcending element that appeared during interviews and that is not summarized under the democracy dimensions, namely social justice. This transcending element is similar to the UGTT's referral to economic aspects, but with a slightly different orientation.

Social justice

"Of course. It was a claim of January fourteen. Social justice, social equality, freedom, dignity and equality. These are the slogans for which people have revolted." (ATFD, Sarah)

One transcending dimension can be summarized as social justice. The identified challenges are socio-economic problems as well as political-cultural like female poverty, social vulnerability of women, domestic or public violence against women, inequality and juridical discrimination (ATFD 2009; ATFD n.d.; ATFD 2011c; ATFD 2012; ATFD 2014c). Equality in its socio-economic dimension has its foundation in perceived discrimination. In some of the publications, unemployment and work are prominently placed as well (ATFD n.d.). In their argumentation, equality of participation (for women) gets connected with economic and social hindrances:

"Already their conditions, they work practically [...] women work in the agricultural sector on a continuous basis, there is not even a limit of hours. Sometimes they work in the family farm, but without being paid." (ATFD, Sarah)

"I believe that the will to participate is the same. But the means to have one's voice heard, the resources, say, to express oneself, it is much easier for rich people who have the means, who have the level of education. [...] because they know how to formulate in meetings and so on. They have the means to move around the city, to attend meetings very late, there are people who ensure for them the work at home. Women who have the resources can go to meetings. So, I believe that there are intellectual and material means that make them more likely to participate and express their word" (ATFD, Hiba)

Both leaders link participation to the time and resources available for women and rich people. Hiba also underlines that only women with resources can go to meetings and

formulate demands. From the last perspective, also the elite role within the women movement appears as justified as those who have the resources will also work for the others. As part of this framing, the resources influence the degree of participation. Poor people are framed as having much more difficulties than richer ones.

"It's a difference between the poor and the rich. Anyway, even in farming sector, in rural areas there are businessmen, big farmers who live better than in cities. So, the problem is the most disadvantaged layers" (ATFD, Sarah)

"Yes. I think that patriarchy, behind all these discriminations, is very strong in some areas where taboos are larger, where also the difficulties are greater for women to move. For example, if we already start with the little girl, little girls, besides the difficulties of going to school when she is far away. Because they are subject to aggression. And so sometimes they leave school because they cannot travel miles to school." (ATFD, Yasmine)

The citations also show, that it is not only about political participation, but also about school attendance or working conditions and that women are in a worse situation than men.

Another issue is the question of rural women, in line with regional, economic and gender inequality. The framing on rural women is a very performant framing that was also found for other organizations, but that was explained in detail by the ATFD. In 2014 for example, the ATFD conducted a large study on rural women and their poverty (ATFD 2014a). As we will see later, this study builds the basis for a number of arguments that also enter ministries.

"Of course. The agricultural sector [...] because we worked on women working in the agricultural sector, we did a survey and this survey showed that there is an incredible exploitation of these women. Because in the informal sectors, it is essentially women who work. These are sectors where mostly women do this work. And even if there are men, they do not have the same salary for example. Firstly, there is no respect for labor agreements, there is no employment contract, there is no social protection, there are no fixed hours and there is discrimination in wages." (ATFD, Sarah)

The ATFD discusses all questions of rural women like "housing, marriage, juvenile marriage, virginity, contraception, the different forms of violence against women, religious extremism, school attendance and so on" (ATFD 2014b:7, own translation; see also ATFD 2014a). This is an important framing for the ATFD as it encloses not only very modern demands but also a referral to the poor in the interior.

In line with their framing on equality, the ATFD calls for an egalitarian and fair society (ATFD 2014c). This equality also includes equal chances across regions.

"Of course, it's social justice. First between regions. We want the state to invest because there are regions that have been forgotten for about fifty years. Like the south, the north [...]" (ATFD, Sarah)

While the state should not only guarantee citizenships to men and women, political participation and representation rights, social justice is similarly important (ATFD 2012). The ATFD attributes a clear responsibility to the state to secure all these aspects.

Additional elements

The ATFD includes unique elements in their framing that are outlined briefly. The ATFD is open to all kind of women including various social backgrounds and ideological perspectives as Moufida Missaoui, an ATFD member, expressed in its communication with Debuysere (Debuysere 2016). In reality, some reserves exist on religious actors as can be observed in their publication or against Ennahdha in media articles (ATFD 2013; Huffpost Maghreb 2013). The ATFD sees their enemies in Islamists, something confirmed by other research (Debuysere 2016). This negative perception of religious actors is not surprising, given that the ATFD has a modern picture of a Tunisian women, advances sexual freedoms and insists on the right on the own body.

Another aspect is a call of support for women suffering from war and armed conflicts as well as solidarity with women in Palestine (ATFD 2014c). During the interviews an anti-American and especially supportive perspective for the Palestinian cause is promoted. This is in line with the general anti-Americanism and support for Palestine in the Arab world (Gelvin 2015; Filiu 2011).


In other publications activists like Asma Fanni are hailed for their activism for youth, culture and the women movement (ATFD n.d.). By linking cultural activism with democracy, the ATFD speaks of "democratic vigilance" in the sense of identifying right violations and of the democratization of social justice (ATFD n.d.). In their demands, the ATFD includes freedom to cultural creations and publications without restrictions, freedom of thought, protection of ideas, as well as academic and scientific freedoms or sport (sic) without discrimination (ATFD 2012). Numerous cultural activities also supported by Oxfam like showing films with discussion or critical shows allow the ATFD to address a wider audience (ATFD 2014b). The cultural dimension is more expressed for the ATFD than for the other organizations.

5.3.6 Frame resonance in public

After having presented the framing in articles, I now turn to the public framing. Figure 5.9 shows the claims in articles. It becomes clear that physical integrity, individual liberties as well as representation and equality of women resonate in public. The category other consists mainly of children, work and heritage related claims (for a more detailed list of claim related coding see Figure 10.18 in the annex).

Another argument is the referral to socio-economic rights and the economic situation of women. The socio-economic frame in line with democracy is often recurring. Similarly, discrimination is linked. A support for legal measures to reinforce equality in line with the constitution can be found. Arguments are rights based and the construction of history uses the progressive Tunisian example. It is to note that claim related coding in articles are relatively limited in numbers compared to the other organizations.

Figure 5.9 Topics of claims in articles



Note: absolute occurrences, total number of claims in articles: 57


Resonance of democratic framing in public

In total, fifty-seven claims in articles can be identified for the ATFD. The claims in articles reveal a stronger focus on rule of law as well as individual liberties, representation of women and participation as shown in Figure 5.10. Frame resonance in media does thus not represent the complete organizational framing although the most important dimensions from interviews are present as well.

The limited number of articles has consequences on some dimensions. It is obvious that the control dimension rarely mentioned in interviews is nearly not present in media articles and transparency was not coded at all. The freedom dimension is represented most (Figure 5.10). The media analysis shows that nearly all articles on the ATFD include the law project against violence on women and often the equality of heritage as well as a referral to national or international legislation or conventions.

While there is much fewer reporting on the ATFD, articles are relatively long in comparison to the other organizations including several claims. Contrary to the UGTT, the ATFD is not close to the government, meaning that reporting on the government capacity dimension is limited as well in articles. The control dimension is nearly not existent in articles, meaning also that the criticism on the government does not resonate a lot.

Figure 5.10 Coded dimensions in claims in articles



Note: number of coded claims, 57 total mentions on dimensions of democracy (Competition: 2, Government Capacity: 5, Mutual Constraints: 1, Participation: 10, Representation: 24, Transparency: 0, Freedom and liberties: 39, public sphere: 4, rule of law: 14).

The government capacity dimension is seldom coded in articles. Representation and individual liberties get connected most; rule of law in combination with individual liberties also play a role. Not surprisingly and as already found in interviews, representation and participation get often combined.

The focus of combinations in articles lies on individual liberties, violence and aggressions linked to free conduct of life and human rights. In addition, the equality dimension is connected to the economy and social politics as can be seen in Figure 10.19 in the Annex. It becomes also clear that some claims are isolated and just bound to one or few other claims, while those in the center (Figure 10.19 in the Annex) are better connected.

5.3.7 Summary on the framing of the ATFD in interviews and media

The claims in media are the same as those in interviews. The only dimension not covered equally in articles is the control dimension. The freedom dimension is more important in the public debate. Rule of law, representation and participation are of similar importance.

The ATFD is comparable to the LTDH when it comes to human rights and a legal basis. While the LTDH and the ATFD hold a juridical-constitutional and freedom-oriented perception of democracy, the UGTT has a more equalized position with more support for a majoritarian perspective. The role of rule of law is not the same between ATFD/LTDH and UGTT. It is a much more important referral for the first organizations.

The ATFD uses different key frames than the LTDH, namely on parity, women rights, equality in heritage and violence against women that are easily identifiable. In this sense the framing of the ATFD is more complete than the one of the LTDH and includes also representation and participation elements, but also a referral to interference on government.

The ATFD has a clear referral to the state. The rule of law-based approach asks the state to fulfill the legislation. The state is responsible for the actual situation and a target for claims.

Given the extensive networks of the ATFD towards the Ministry of Women it is expected that ATFD and Ministry of Women are particularly close in terms of framing democracy. Similarly, the Ministry of Social Affairs should include frame elements used by the ATFD, but is unfortunately not analyzed. Other ministries are of minor importance and thus frame influence is limited to few ministries.

I now turn to the FTDES, an organization that equally holds the state responsible, but that has a different focus of framing.


5.4 FTDES: a bit of everything

For the FTDES democracy is multi-dimensional and perhaps most balanced in comparison to the three other organizations. The three dimensions of democracy are equally distributed in interviews with none of the dimensions gaining a higher level of attention.

There is no dimension to highlight in particular as shown in Figure 5.11. The difference towards the other organizations is for sure the more pronounced equality dimension. Different elements of democracy get more attention for the FTDES. Questions of representation of minorities, the quality of the legal system, electoral outcomes or effective participation are aspects that have been mentioned more often.

The FTDES has an equilibrated framing of democracy touching all aspects nearly equally with no dimension gaining more prominence over other. The analysis of each element will consequentially take up the differences within each element and detail more on those.

Figure 5.11 Coded dimensions and element in interviews



Note: number of coded mentions, 214 total mentions on dimensions of democracy (Competition: 21, Government Capacity: 30, Mutual Constraints: 19, Participation: 21, Representation: 31, Transparency: 18, Freedom and liberties: 29, public sphere: 17, rule of law: 28).

5.4.1 Control dimension: influence by businessmen and instability

Competition of political actors: programs, alternation and rich parties

The competition dimension was mentioned by all three interviewees to an equal degree. While not being one of the most important dimensions, interviewees expressed skepticism towards political programs and competition:

"But honestly, the competition is not happening now in terms of programs. I think that only six percent of Tunisians make their choice from programs. I think rather [...] that the model of society before, to say between a rather modern model of society and a somewhat retrograde, conservative model of society, and now, perhaps more stability, security. [...] that interests people. But also, the economic issues of purchasing power, public service, employment for young people, all these questions start to interest people." (FTDES, Sami)

"There is competition between political parties that is clear. But you also know there is this magical couple between Nida and Ennahdha working together. They are two liberal parties [...]." (FTDES, Mehdi)

The criticism of the political party system resembled the UGTT framing with the criticism of the dichotomous party configuration. Equally a conservative model of society is criticized.

As we can see from Sami's quotation, the FTDES uses a different model of economic development to evaluate political parties. Democracy and alternation in power are connected with socio-economic rights. Another different is the referral to citizenship. The FTDES speaks not only about alternation of power, but also about a culture of citizenship.

"Well, obviously democracy means what it means for everyone. [Laughs] We do not have a special conception. Obviously, for us, it must not be limited to alternation. For us, it must be rooted in a culture of citizenship that we seek to develop. So, for us, it is a cultural phenomenon, it must not be limited to the issue of freedoms and elections." (FTDES, Nejib)

This notion of culture of citizenship is an important point to the FTDES that will re-emerge several times in the following analysis. A mix of skepticism towards electoral outcomes and the perception of a system that is still changing exists. As for the ATFD, the dominance of rich parties and money is criticized.

To summarize, electoral outcome is connected to dominant parties and the influence of money as well as to local elections. However, the time of interviews was not the time of elections and thus it might be discussed differently when it becomes more important in the public perception.

Government capacity: hidden influence and an instable government

Government capacity is more important in interviews as seen in the overview. It was discussed by all interviewees, but a bit more by Sami.

When it comes to inference on the government, the FTDES criticizes hidden influence as well as missing independence:

"It's not power. I think that if they are influenced it is in an indirect way; it is by the lobbies of money [...]. But I do not think there is any direct government pressure on the media." (FTDES, Sami)

"Of course, it's a difference. It's always the rich. The rich and the so-called privileged. That is to say, what does it mean the privileged, it is historically speaking what's telling, what led to the revolution, there are two poles in Tunisia. There is the favored pole, the coastal regions and there are the marginalized, who are the people of the interior. And until now in the same, in this rhythm, we have not changed." (FTDES, Mehdi)

This referral to money and the rich is very prominent across interviews. It is similar to the one promoted by the ATFD. In addition, Nejib criticizes the influence of religion, which is equally linked to the question of money.

"Politics too is a little roughened by the confusion between religion and politics. That's why it complicates existence. There are people who utilize religion to make politics. Recently, things are getting more complicated because confusion arises between politics and money. You know in the Chamber of Deputies there are thirty-three businessmen. And businessmen believe they can directly use politics to expand their wealth. So, this is not yet stable scene, the political landscape is full of [...] there are even rogue businessmen, who try to utilize politics and politicians. So that's why I'm not hiding from you, I have a lot of concerns about this democratic transition. [...] for democracy for me the ideal is a secular state. Moreover, those who are most laic are religious minorities." (FTDES, Nejib)

Nejib details his criticisms on Ennahdha also in relation to extremism that is accepted by Ennahdha. This criticism is less widespread than for the ATFD, however it is still relevant. Government interference is referred to rich people as well as religion.

The framing of the FTDES resembles also the one of other organizations when it comes to government stability. Stability of the government is important, but it is not unconditional stability that is demanded by the FTDES.

"Certainly, it's always the stability of the government, everywhere, that is important. Even more in the context of the democratic transition. Good, unfortunately, we have a government, [...] that is not yet stable. It is composed of a heterogeneous mass of parties, four parties between which there is not a constant convergence of perspectives, of program, of perception, of appreciation of things. And in addition, it is complicated when the first party of the government is going through a catastrophic situation; it is likely to break out [...] So unfortunately, this phase of democratic transition suffers from these aspects

of institutional uncertainty and institutional confusion, and government instability, and internal partisan conflicts." (FTDES, Nejb)

The diagnosis of government stability is influenced by the role of institutions as well as internal problems of governing parties. This instability is also linked to specific individual actors that are posing problems. The responsible persons are criticized for missing visions or inappropriate behavior.

"It's not a question of stable. As I told you, there are people who work, there is no, you do not feel that there is a group working. There are individuals, and it depends on the individuals. And that's a problem, too. There is not a clear vision for this government." (FTDES, Mehdi)

"No, it's confusion. As it is confusion, we have a president who behaves as if he is in a presidential regime. He forgot that the regime is no longer presidential. We have a prime minister who is not aware of the power he has. We have a chamber of deputies, who has normally most of the power but who lack the means to exercise it, and who also lack the culture to know how to exercise it. So, it's still [...] not stable. It is a political landscape that is not clear yet. There is a lot of blur and confusion." (FTDES, Nejb)

The criticism of persons is something that was not found for other organizations. It is however systematic in the framing of the FTDES that not only parties, but also individuals get criticized.

Another aspect linked to government stability is the fight against terrorism. This is in line with the reforms for the security sector that are demanded. The framing is compatible with the framing of the other organizations.

"It's reformed yes. Now the police is playing a big role in maintaining security, the fight against terrorism. A great role also for the life in the city in a general way, the borders and all that. So, I think there is some improvement. But we consider that the whole body itself also needs profound reforms." (FTDES, Sami)

The FTDES also connects the imprisonment and fight against terrorists with human rights (FTDES 2014a).

The framing of the FTDES is a mixture of all framings we have seen before when it comes to government stability. On the one hand, missing stability and the role of parties are criticized; on the other hand, the question of terrorism is equally connected to the socio-economic situation. The influence of the rich plays a role. What is unique is the criticism of persons in power that was not found for the other organizations.

Mutual constraints: participatory citizenship and redistribution

The mutual constraint dimension was mentioned by all three leaders, slightly more by Sami.

The FTDES highlights the independence of juridical institution as well as the constitutional council that should proof whether laws are in line with the constitution (FTDES 2012a). The arguments of the FTDES focus much on the constitutional court and division of power: "Yes. I consider that it will be the court that will really translate the authority of the constitution on the state and society." (FTDES, Sami). Especially the perspective on a problematic juridical sector is part of the framing of horizontal checks and balances and democracy.

Other institutional horizontal control mechanisms are not part of the framing; however, decentralization is important also in the publications of the FTDES. The FTDES has "participative citizenship" as a democratic ideal, which goes in hand with decentralization and good governance as well as efficiency (FTDES 2012a; FTDES 2016a). This participative citizenship sound like participatory democracy mentioned by the ATFD, the focus is however more on the citizen then on civil society.

Local democracy is another topic of publications describing local democracy as reconstruction project (FTDES 2012a). The notion of decentralization is framed as equal to participative citizenship.

"Participatory. Certainly. We are in the middle of a debate about the electoral laws for the municipalities. So, it's next year. So, certainly the law itself, it is the law that will prepare the elections, but also the specific law of the functioning of municipal structures in the regions are supposed to be participative structures, that is to say they integrate the citizens of the regions." (FTDES, Sami)

The FTDES argues for a new collectives-state relationship which currently suffers from the central state (FTDES 2012a). The argument includes exchange between the state and representatives of citizens rather than individual persons (ibid). This demand for more implications of local groups gets linked to new initiatives, efficacy as well as comprehensibility of public policies (ibid). Another argument for decentralization and local democracy is the proximity between local discussions and policy implementations that is seen as better (ibid). On the other hand, decentralization is seen skeptical in some cases although being supported:

"Yes, but it must be well studied. Why? Because Tunisians are not ready for some form of decentralization. That's one. Two, the question of decentralization leads to other problems, there is no difference in the culture of Tunisians, between decentralization and separation. That is to say that the Gafsa region, where there is a phosphate company that has enormous wealth, if you go through a process of decentralization that is not prepared, they will tell you, the phosphate is ours, and the wealth is ours. We are not part of Tunisia. So, it must be well studied, it must be in its overall vision." (FTDES, Mehdi)

"We have to go slowly with that, because you see, there is still a community culture. There is still a regionalist culture. Who rules to be careful in this decentralization. But it necessarily implies the gradual transfer of certain tax-attributions from the center to the local authorities. Whether local or regional. And it also implies the transfer of many human resources so that decentralization is not an empty word, but must be accompanied by a redistribution of resources as well. In human terms, in financial terms, and in terms of prerogatives, initiatives. But in all of this you have to go gradually." (FTDES, Nejb)

The referral to regional fiscal autonomy to a certain degree goes farer than for the other organizations. Decentralization appears as key framing for the FTDES while there is some skepticism. It is related to the question of municipal elections:

"Right now, we do not have the law on decentralization, it is not yet voted. But this is the essential point, this municipal election. That's why we are currently a bit preparing civil society to play its part in setting up these new institutions and this new power. Power at the local level. [...] We are doing a lot of training for civil society so that they can make proposals. So that they are also able to interact with others, and so on. Otherwise this local power will be chaos that's all. If the people, the actors are not prepared to exercise it, to exercise this local power." (FTDES, Nejb)

Vertical checks and balances play an important role in framing; especially problems of resources as argument for redistribution are included and are part of the socio-economic approach of the FTDES. This socio-economic approach combined with a perspective on missing experiences with local democracy leads to some skepticism. The approach of the FTDES with redistribution goes farer as for other organizations, while the support for local inclusion is similar but more detailed.

5.4.2 Equality dimension: participatory democracy and representation of vulnerable groups

Participation: participatory democracy and problems in participation

Participation is discussed by all interviewees, slightly more by Sami.

The FTDES connects the question of effective participation with the question of suicides as protest activity. They do not only observe the number of protest activities across the country, but they also monitor the number of suicides. The monitoring of suicides and its evaluation as protest (or as sign of bad socio-economic conditions) is a unique element of the framing. In addition, the FTDES supports participation through capacity building for movements and local actors (FTDES 2014a).

As evoked above, participatory democracy is another term that appears in publications and interviews of the FTDES, often linked to local or regional topics (FTDES 2014a).

"Democracy is a participatory democracy that involves the citizen, who integrates him into the decision. It is local and global governance at the same time that embodies transparency, civic engagement, citizen integration. Democracy too is social justice through taxation, through investment in the regions, through the role of the state. Democracy too is openness to the world through debate and dialogue." (FTDES, Sami)

The framing of the FTDES puts – contrary to the ATFD that focuses on civil society – the citizen at the heart of the argumentation. The citizen shall be included in decision making to enhance the acceptance of outcomes. This conception is not without problems as participation is seen as fluctuating:

"We have the feeling that a good part of the population has fallen back on itself, for different reasons, people maybe are tired, people are seeing that the country is now stabilized, people are perhaps now [...] no longer trusting politics in itself, in the political class in itself so maybe they want to change the rhythm anyway. So, it is not with the same density that one sees for the citizen engagement. [...] It's not a problem, but when you compare the commitment a few months ago and these days, there is a difference. People are no longer mobilized by themselves [...] it's not just about us, it's about everybody." (FTDES, Sami)

"At the moment this participation goes through different channels. There is participation through the political channels. Unfortunately, politization is not yet very big in Tunisia. There are the professional channels, but also this channel is not sufficiently developed except at the level of the class of employed labor, the working class. But the peasants are poorly organized in professional terms. The informal sector does not have an organization. [...] Finally, we, for the moment, are aware of this fragility of the circuits, of the channels, which do not encourage

and mobilize the population enough that is why we are orienting ourselves a little in a direction which consists in developing social knowledge and solidarity [...].” (FTDES, Nejb)

The FTDES criticizes not only missing participation, but also the channels that are used to channel demands. Here, the FTDES is conscious that poor people have less possibility to participate in decision making. This question of participations falls back on the local level and the framing attempts to encourage more participation.

When it comes to equality of participation, the FTDES proposes little to no framing. Much of the demand for equality is between the rich and the poor. While there is a general support for the women movement, this does not result in a combination of equality and participation like we saw for the ATFD.

“We are very much in touch with feminist movements, not just the great feminism of the state, that is, feminism driven and encouraged by the state. But really the feminist movement rooted in society, within the union movement of the UGTT. And we consider that Tunisia has a feminist movement quite important in terms of societal weight and in terms of qualitative weight. Educated women, women teachers, women executives, women artists, all these people can continue to push the situation of the women, also with the women worker, the peasant women, the women in the localities.” (FTDES, Sami)

The citation above is less a call for equality in participation, but an expression of support for the women movement. Effective participation is more mentioned than equality of participation. On the other hand, the FTDES underlines representation of vulnerable groups.

Representation: particular business interests and the defense of vulnerable groups

Representation is discussed by all three leaders to a rather equal degree and only slightly less by Nejb.

The elements of direct democracy and left right representation are not regularly evoked by the FTDES and appear only occasionally. However, a missing adequate representation of the left and an overrepresentation of businessmen are criticized:

“Good the assembly anyway there is a left opposition group that is active. Who is relatively weak, but who tries to raise its voice. There is also civil society that continues to be awake. It also has a say.” (FTDES, Sami)

“It is clear because we are in the same mechanisms as before. So those who are represented are those who have money. And proof that you have an assembly of

people's representatives, twelve percent are businessmen. So, we are always in this logic. It is not well represented the Tunisian people.” (FTDES, Mehdi)

As we have seen earlier, there is a strong criticism of businessmen and money. Similarly, the form of the electoral system that was foreseen for the municipal elections was criticized as a winner takes it all system does not ensure representation and supports the bigger parties (FTDES, Sami). This perspective goes clearly against a majoritarian conception of democracy and emphasizes equality.

Mehdi sees direct democracy as part of the FTDES claims and in line with participatory democracy and representation (FTDES, Mehdi). Direct democracy is however not detailed and as we have seen earlier under mutual constraints, direct democracy integrates into questions of decentralization and citizen participation.

While direct democracy plays no role, the representation of minorities and migrants as well as discriminated people is an important pillar of the FTDES framing.

“Well, there are associations that defend minorities in Tunisia [...] I find that the constitution remained a little vague, vague on the issue of minorities and the issue of religion. And so, you have article six that says yes and says no at the same time, so, in the end it's [...] not clear at all. But for me, it is necessary to base, on the question of minorities [...], it is necessary that also those who feel like minority pass on the global question. That is to say, to seek complicity more than to try to be different. And so, they can base on articles of the constitution so, that they guarantee at least the Tunisian citizenship and also guarantee the rights. So, the rights of the Tunisian citizen. So, you have to change your didactic strategy, given the vagueness of the constitution and laws. [...] Not minorities, it's not the [...] as I told you, the vulnerable groups, those who do not have [...] that easily [...] in a region far from Tunis, do not find media next to them, who do not find the voice to express themselves, so it's our role to help them to know, to express themselves.” (FTDES, Mehdi)

“Well, in fact we must recognize that we do not have a real ethnic minority in Tunisia. The majority are Muslim Arabs. So, we do not have an ethnic divide [...] maybe Libya or Algeria or even Morocco have this question, but all the same, the cultural richness of the Tunisian cultural heritage is dear to us. But we consider that there is even a return to some actions and some [...] racism, which must be tackled from the beginning. With regard even to the Africans who are at us. There are still some racist practices that continue to be in Djerba, southern Tunisia.” (FTDES, Sami)

The FTDES is thus the only organization that really discusses the representation of migrants. This is in line with its orientation as we have seen from its network structure. Migrants are

part of a wider group of vulnerable groups. This group includes also the youth that is not well represented.

"It's deeper. There is this cleavage there but there is also a cleavage identity. That is to say that a good part of the youth finds in this withdrawal of identity a refuge, an answer to their worries to their disarray, in defiance of the West, to poverty. And another part of the population that sees openness, modernity, partnership with Europe, that's the salvation. And between the two, I would not say choose but it is necessary to hold a frank debate, a direct debate and a constructive debate." (FTDES, Sami)

"It is not easy. It's not easy as I told you because political parties are trying to [...] young people do not have access to decision-making positions. We are still in the same mentality as before and we do not have this facilitation [...] for young people to go for political activities." (FTDES, Mehdi)

Those citations frame the missing inclusion of the youth as a structural problem, something not found for the other organizations. The criticism of the FTDES is much more systemic than for the other organizations.

In relation to women rights, there is a demand for parity of men and women in representation. The FTDES adopts positions very close to the framing of the ATFD.

"Of course, we see problems; we are not satisfied with the situation of women in Tunisia today. [...]. Today we are in 2015. So, our goal is total equality, our goal is equal inheritance, our goal is to ratify all the conventions that guarantee equality, who fight against violence against women. We are talking about violence associated with the economy. So, there are a lot [...] of the steps you have to do." (FTDES, Mehdi)

"The parity at the level of the principles of law, if we compare that with other Arab and Muslim countries, we are much ahead but we still hope to improve the situation of Tunisian women even more. Even in mentalities, even in people's minds, even in everyday life." (FTDES, Sami)

The FTDES adopts not only the term parity, but also the question of inheritance as well as violence against women. The framing is less detailed as for the ATFD and it appears that the FTDES overtakes some of the ATFD's arguments.

The focus lies on different vulnerable groups and their representation as well as of youth and women. As for other organizations, there is the notion of intermediary in form of civil society that bridges state and citizens; however, the notion of the citizen is much more important. It is to recall that the representation dimensions take a good part of the framing of the FTDES.

Transparency: corruption and influence of financiers

It is more corruption than freedom of information that plays a role when it comes to transparency. It is discussed by all leaders and slightly more by Sami.

When freedom of information emerges, it is in relation to freedom of speech and the media:

"They are freer. They are free but today it is not a problem of freedom in the media. It's a problem of lobbies. So, it's people who finance. And that can influence the media. It's not a problem of freedom." (FTDES, Mehdi)

The influence of money on media has already be found for some of the other organizations. As we will see later, the media is however perceived more positively by the FTDES.

In line with transparency is the demand for good governance and fighting corruption. The FTDES also covers taxation, as well as the mobilization of national resources which is connected with democracy, good governance and the fight against corruption (FTDES 2014a). This issue of fighting corruption is an important framing of the FTDES.

"And we consider that the fight against corruption, good governance, allows all potentialities, all energies to liberate themselves. That is to say that fighting poverty can be led by a certain solidarity and social economy, which gives the chance to the peasants [...]." (FTDES, Sami)

"It's always a problem. I consider corruption one of the biggest problems in Tunisia. And the number one enemy that threatens this democracy. [...] Yes, there is no trust because they see [...] the corruption it starts with even the zero level of the relations between the citizen and the administration, the citizen and the administration or even the power." (FTDES, Mehdi)

Corruption gets connected to several aspects like good governance but also to poverty and the rich or institutional actors. This link towards socio-economic factors is mentioned as solution to corruption with economic incentives getting reduced. Socio-economic factors will be discussed later as it is a transcending element of the framing of democracy.

5.4.3 Freedom dimension: migrant rights, human rights and the public***Individual liberties***

Individual liberties play a role for the framing of the FTDES. It was discussed by all leaders, slightly more by Nejb.

For the FTDES, human rights are connected to economic rights. The framing focuses on social and economic rights that are indivisible and universal (FTDES 2012b). The FTDES

connects democracy with freedom, equality and dignity, but also critically reflects that no democratic tradition exists (FTDES 2012a). As mentioned earlier, the citizen takes an important role.

"Freedom is the starting point of any militant action. So, we focus on freedom, we also focus on the organization. It must be organized, because until now in Tunisia, freedom is rather chaos, disorganization, indiscipline. For us it is not that freedom. Freedom is a right that can only be acquired if people are aware of duty too, of their duty. That's why I tell you the concept of citizenship is structuring. We are committed to freedom as much as we are concerned with organization and discipline." (FTDES, Nejib)

The citizen is a concept that includes not only freedom but also duties. It is thus not an unlimited freedom, but a freedom that is regulated. What this exactly means was difficult to retrace with the help of the interviews and remains an open question.

The FTDES is the only organization to talk about migrant rights and refugees under the perspective of free circulation (FTDES 2014a; Boats4People 2014).

"The Forum is an NGO that is more interested in human rights in general, but it is more directly involved, and there is more proximity to economic and social rights, rights of the people, employees, unemployed, excluded, women, remote areas, illegal immigration, school failure. All that is the problems of the environment, of the ecology. And we begin to develop timidly anyway some axes that concern cultural rights and activities." (FTDES, Sami)

The framing on migration and the notion of free circulation as a right is a unique framing to the FTDES. It is however nothing that stands alone and gets connected to rights of other vulnerable groups.

Compared to the ATFD or the LTDH, individual liberties are less often underlined by the FTDES. The most specific aspect is the strong prominence of migrant rights, not necessarily connected to democracy itself, but to human rights as one sub-element of democracy.

The individual and civil rights that are important for democracy get connected with the right to work. Given the history of the revolution that demanded jobs, it appears logic to connect democracy and work. However, this interpretation goes farer than democracy itself as it connects democracy with the economic situation. While a certain income level or a middle class is often seen as supporting democracy, the supply of jobs itself is not a precondition of democracy. However, the output dimension of democracy should satisfy the voters and thus

create jobs. This demand itself could also be satisfied by other political systems than democracy. I will return to job creation and economic aspects when discussing the transcending socio-economic elements.

Physical integrity is to mention in line with individual liberties. The FTDES works especially for the protection of protesters from violence.

"Good in three years, we filed about twenty complaints. But the biggest was that of [...] Siliana. So [...] we filed a complaint because the number of victims, not deaths, but victims affected by buckshot, exceeded hundred people. So, we filed a complaint against more than thirty people, including the Minister of the Interior and the then head of government. And the trial so far is in progress." (FTDES, Mehdi)

"But as I said, the overall goal is to go into negotiations and have results. [...] but sometimes also, it is not us who choose the demonstrations. There is triggering of the demonstrations, and so you have to support them [...] either by what is called protection, that there is no police repression, or by framing it, having clear claims. That it will not be an absurd event [...]" (FTDES, Mehdi)

Violence is mainly framed from a perspective of protection where the FTDES seeks to protect mobilization against repression. This is in line with its self-perception as umbrella organization for protest movements.

Public Sphere, the basis for the own existence

The public sphere dimension is discussed to an equal degree by all interviewees.

In interviews, freedom of speech and freedom to associate are frequently mentioned. They take an important position for the internal history of the FTDES as it is seen as basis for all. From this point of view, although few evoked, the public sphere and freedom of speech are enabling factors for the own organizational existence.

"I think at the beginning, that is to say the first months after the revolution, larger Tunis was really a Greek agora [...] open [...] Avenue Habib Bourguiba could see everything [...]. Flags of all colors. But I think now, after the real threats of terrorism, the hotbeds of terrorism, the dangers that can be considered by radical young Salafists, I think there is some restriction that is understandable anyway." (FTDES, Sami)

"For the moment, I believe there is no problem of freedom of expression. There may be problems with excesses, that is, excesses because this freedom must target the problems of substance, not attack people and their private lives." (FTDES, Nejib)

FTDES leaders perceive freedom of expression partly in contradiction with individual liberties, a tension that in this way was not found for the other organizations. The referral to freedom of expression as basis for the own existence is underscored by Nejib and Mehdi.

"Without this freedom of expression, we would not have existed [...] at least we would not have existed in a formal and institutional way. [...] The society is taking advantage of those achievements, which is new to us. But for the moment this achievement is not yet exploited in a productive way. And so, it is used in a somewhat chaotic and unproductive way. Unproductive, when you see a lot of mess, when you see that there is a relaxation in terms of work, there is a relaxation in terms of productivity in all sectors, including even garbage collection, cleanliness. So, we will have to move quickly beyond this situation, which is not conducive to the maintenance of freedom, and which is not conducive to democratic transition. [...] So that's why freedoms are a precious good that must be saved. Well, we are concerned about this point of view, because it is our condition of existence, but also these conditions are fragile if we do not know how to exploit them properly." (FTDES, Nejib)

"We started with individual freedoms, but we started with freedom of expression as well. We began with freedom to manifest freely in the street, despite the state of emergency. But, here, democracy is not only that. Democracy is the state of institutions. Democracy is a new constitution. For a new constitution, it is necessary to have the mechanisms that guarantee the application of these laws. There is [...] democracy, there are thousands and thousands of laws that are unconstitutional today. Democracy is a process. Democracy also means finding solutions to social, economic and cultural issues." (FTDES, Mehdi)

The freedom of expression is particularly relevant to the FTDES. It is the only organization that emphasizes freedom of expression a lot. It is seen as basis for their existence. The element is linked to the limits of freedom of expression when actors call for violence, something similar to the other organizations. In addition, aggressions are condemned.

"As long as we are in a peaceful environment, when we are in the context of dialogue that comes within the framework of freedom of expression. As soon as one is in hatred, in hostility, in revenge, in rejection, and even in the threat, of violence, one goes out of the civil framework." (FTDES, Sami)

The combination of freedom of speech and freedom to associate is natural for the FTDES and the defense of the public sphere elements clearer than for other organizations.

Rule of law, independence of the juridical sector and the constitution

Rule of law is more discussed by Sami than by the others. It is however not relevant in terms of a potential bias.

Compared to the ATFD and LTDH, the perspective of the FTDES is less rights based as the referral to the constitution and legal texts is not that pronounced. Nevertheless, the rule of law dimension is often combined with other elements as will be shown later.

Equality before the law for example is seen as problematic in Tunisia, in line with the other organizations.

"There are still problems of equality before the law since we are talking about a juridical system that is not sound, that is not reformed. So, this irremediably generates problems of inequality before the law. And this inequality will persist as long as the necessary reform has not been achieved in the field of the juridical system." (FTDES, Nejjib)

In addition, bureaucracy as well as independence of the juridical sector is highlighted by FTDES leaders, similar to what we have seen for the ATFD.

"There is a problem of bureaucracy, of slowness. It's clear. And there is a real problem of independence. I do not take all judges but I think there is a problem of real independence. And there is also a problem of proximity, modernization of the sector in general. [...] In a concrete way [...] the details and the legal treatment of the files it takes a long time therefore the principle of right itself, as defended in a political way can be lost in the detail of the laws. So, you can still feel a little helpless before the jurisdiction that makes you lost in the details." (FTDES, Sami)

"We are not yet in the independent justice phase, so no. [...] Justice is not independent and the constitutional court so far, we have passed the deadline, and so far, we do not have a constitutional court. And so, we cannot hope too much through justice. Sometimes we have the good will of the judge, but not justice." (FTDES, Mehdi)

The FTDES underlines on the one hand like the ATFD the independence of the juridical sector, but speaks also about administrative problems. Concretely the organization of the juridical sector in terms of proximity, modernization and also speed gets criticized.

The framing on the juridical sector is focused on the constitution and on the inequality based on resources among others. The focus on the constitution can also be found when looking at the quality of the legal system.

5.4.4 Summary on the FTDES's framing

The FTDES has the most equalized framing of all organizations and mentions all elements of democracy to a nearly equal degree. This means also that the FTDES is highlighting the equality dimension more than the other organizations. The equality dimension is important

from an economic point of view. As came clear through interviews, the FTDES promotes a more solidary form of economy that has consequences for several elements of democracy.

One example is the strong support for decentralization. While of course reserves exist due to missing experience, it is supported as part of local democracy. Decisions closer to citizens get preferred. Participation, and especially protest, including suicides, gets emphasized because it shows the deteriorating socio-economic situation.

Another aspect is a strong criticism of money that resembles a lot the one of the UGTT on businessmen. Money is seen as influencing elections and the government, but – and this time differently to the UGTT – the exclusion of poor people gets criticized. Vulnerable groups, including poor people, migrants and so on are a key term for the FTDES and their defense part of the mission of the organization.

When it comes to the freedom dimension, the perspective of the FTDES is often closer to collective rights and thus much in line with the UGTT, although taking a different perspective. The freedom dimension is seen as empowering factor especially in relation to the freedom of expression. On the other hand, the FTDES emphasized the rights for all types of vulnerable groups be it migrants, women or minorities.

5.4.5 Frame combinations

Some of the frame combinations like suicides and participation, as well as economic problems as part of democratic rights are transcending elements of their framing. Among the most important connected dimensions are participation and representation, individual liberties and rule of law as well as rule of law and mutual constraints. Participation and representation are often combined by the FTDES, something similar to the ATFD. It is interesting to note, that the rule of law on legal aspects gets combined with the mutual constraints element showing the demand for a constitutional court. This combination was effectively a combination that was also prominent for the UGTT, but not for the other organizations.

There are some combinations and elements that are similar to the other organizations, others differ. This is also the reason why I explained earlier that the FTDES represents a mixture of the other framings.

Like for the UGTT, it is to note, that socio-economic factors are of huge importance to the FTDES, not surprising as it is already in their name. The transcending framings should be regarded in the following.

Socio-economic rights: part of its name, part of its perceptions

"It must be understood in depth, in its cultural dimension, which requires the development of a culture of citizenship, and in its social dimension. That is why our forum is called the Tunisian Forum for Economic and Social Rights. So, we are campaigning for the economy to be not only dominated by market logic, but also dominated by ethics and respect for values. So, this is for us democracy, it is to be rooted and irreversible, so we must develop a culture of citizenship and develop the sense of law. And of course, when you say rights, also of duties. And that is the citizenship; it is this balance between rights and duty, and this awareness and this appropriation of this balance." (FTDES, Nejib)

Socio-economic rights are already in the name of the FTDES and Nejib summarizes some of its main dimensions. Another example for the transcendence of socio-economic rights is the referral to government stability that is described as dependent on the social economic situation. As we have seen above, regional distribution and local finances are a key demand of the FTDES. From their perspective, it is a question of equality to connect rich and poor regions; something that is deeply inscribed in their socio-economic framing (FTDES, Sami).

While the FTDES also remarked that information on socio-economic aspects is missing, they founded the OST (Observatoire Social Tunisien). The OST collects data on protest, so on who protests where. Protest serves here as an indicator of socio-economic problems.

"That's what guides us. Obviously, we wanted to organize this task. [...] that is why in the first place we created an observatory. Which is called the Tunisian Social Observatory. Who is responsible for conducting ongoing, ongoing work that includes observing social movements, identifying key demands, identifying a priority, setting a priority, engaging with stakeholders to discuss an agenda for action which can take different forms, which usually starts with a thorough study of the question that is posed, whether it is women's social movements, in some companies, whether it is pollution, whether it is illegal immigration, [...] whether it is a matter of dropping out of school, whether it is shale gas [...]." (FTDES, Nejib)

The topics covered include development, unemployment and poverty and links to the discussion of regional and local development and decentralization (FTDES 2013a). Environmental protection and durable economy are advocated in order to create new jobs (FTDES 2013a; FTDES 2013b; FTDES 2014a). The government is blamed for the pollution and

responsible for environmental problems in order to ameliorate the health situation (FTDES 2013b). One of the few referrals to environmental problems is thus linked to economic questions and health.

The FTDES brings the economic dimension to the front. The economic dimension is framed as being part of democracy as they subsume the right to work as part of rights. This perspective may be surprising to Western observers, but it gives sense from the perspective of the FTDES that criticizes neoliberalism. Thus, underlining the right to work is seen as empowerment of citizens enabling participation.

The FTDES framing becomes even clearer in their communications. The FTDES states that the socio-economic model that was applied under Ben Ali caused the isolation of the Tunisian government at that time (FTDES 2013a). Thus, they argue that the revolution showed the limits of the Tunisian economic model and has to be understood as international struggle against neoliberalism and social regression (ibid). The proposed solution is the introduction of a new, durable and equitable economic system on the basis of reciprocity setting all actors on an equal level (ibid).

A number of arguments that could also come from the UGTT, like workers' rights, working conditions or other problems like child work, poverty and salary questions, are covered (FTDES 2014c). As Mehdi expresses, it is all about vulnerable groups:

"In fact, it is the defense, what is called the defense of vulnerable groups, that is the victims of social and economic violence, the victims of environmental policies, pollution, the victims of social exclusion as well, the victims of educational exclusion policies and the victims of the failure of the education system in fact. And we are working on what we call the victim regions, that is, regions of the interior that have been [...] marginalized [...]. So, we work on the economic, social, cultural, educational and environmental aspects. In fact, we are in logic, in the global perspective that [...] what is called as I said at the beginning the social origins of the revolutions. We cannot reach the completion of the Tunisian revolution, if we do not mention the social and economic question, and that of education. So that's clear. Otherwise we will go, we will be in what is called the instability that lasts. And we never manage to finalize the revolution."
(FTDES, Mehdi)

Those vulnerable groups are impacted by social and economic conditions. Migration and the defense of migrant rights also in line with the precarious living situation are important topics

for the FTDES (FTDES 2014b). From this perspective, economic problems build the basis for clandestine emigration.

Where is the environment?

As the selection criteria for the FTDES was originally the environmental protection, this is equally a transcending framing although not as important as other elements.

"Yes, sometimes people are very sensitive to pollution problems, especially water, sea. People who live on the coast. People are also sensitive to garbage. You see Tunis is very dirty, it is a very dirty city, so people are sensitive to that. But to say that people are perhaps sensitive to nuclear energy issues is elitist." (FTDES, Sami)

"But a state must be renewed. That is renewed in terms of relationship with not only the economy, but with society [...]. Also, in its relationship with the environment, in the sense of respect for the right to a justified, dignified, healthy environment. And also, in the sense of good resource management. So, it's all of these reforms that we're trying to focus on our alternative development model that I mentioned earlier." (FTDES, Nejib)

The demand for environmental protection goes hand in hand with a demand for health and the change of an economic culture based on exploitation. If one evaluates the environmental framing by the FTDES, one needs to state that it is not very important in relation to the overall framing. Consequentially, the choice of the FTDES for environmental activism is not false as projects exist, but it is far from important. The number of alternatives on environmental activism for the case selection was rather limited and one could add that environmental issues are not a salient topic in Tunisia leading to the media coverage of other FTDES demands.

5.4.6 Frame resonance in public


The focus on socio-economic factors is concretely visible in the claim representation in articles, where economic problems take a dominant position as can be seen in Figure 5.12 (a more detailed list can be found in the annex, Figure 10.22). Under the category other fall aspects other than democracy or economy including migration, the interior of the country or environmental issues (environmental issues are included in sixteen claims).

Forms of participation as highlighted by articles are important. Generally, socio-economic problems as well as participation are emphasized. Suicides and migration are the most often coded claims beneath elements of democracy or economic factors.

Especially suicides are connected to participation and forms of mobilization and framed as legitimate repertoires of contention that are the result, mostly, of socio-economic situations. The press conference on mobilization and suicides creates a great number of articles on the FTDES. In addition, there is a focus on migrant rights present in a number of publications and articles. Education and water are further topics in claims.

Taking a strategic action fields perspective one can argue, that the FTDES tries to generate new fields and to put pressure on existent fields in order to consolidate its position (Fligstein and McAdam 2011).

Figure 5.12 Topics of claims in articles



Note: main dimensions, absolute occurrences, FTDES, total number of claims in articles: 207

Resonance of democratic framing in public

When it comes to democracy related claims in articles, the attention shifts slightly in comparison to interviews. For the FTDES two hundred and seven claims appear in articles, much more than for the ATFD or the LTDH, but less than for the UGTT. Comparing for example the LTDH and the FTDES, the FTDES is able to place some topics in media, which can be related to their regular use of press conferences.


When it comes to the dimensions of democracy (Figure 5.13), the control dimension attains only some coverage. Only government capacity plays a role, as neither political competition nor mutual constraints have been coded much. The lack of one element is a problem of

resonance in public, as especially decentralization was named during interviews, but disappears in media coverage. While the FTDES mentions decentralization frequently it is either a topic not expressed in press conferences or it does not resonate a lot.

The elements under the equality dimension are equally distributed and account for the majority of claims as Figure 5.13 shows. Among those categories, representation and participation are a bit more prominent than transparency. Equality is the most important dimension in public, showing an egalitarian perspective on democracy.

The freedom dimension is more covered than the control dimension, but less than equality. Claims on individual liberties and rule of law are more important than those on the public sphere. While more relevant in interviews, the public sphere dimension does not play a large role. The equal distribution from interviews is less present for articles. However, dimensions like participation, representation, government capacity or individual liberties resonate a lot in public. Others like competition, mutual constraints or the public sphere play no or limited role in articles.

Figure 5.13 Coded dimensions in claims in articles



Note: number of coded claims, 207 total mentions on dimensions of democracy (Competition: 0, Government Capacity: 44, Mutual Constraints: 6, Participation: 64, Representation: 38, Transparency: 24, Freedom and liberties: 41, public sphere: 11, rule of law: 23).

When it comes to combinations in articles the focus shifts a bit towards participation, government capacity as well as individual liberties. Government capacity, participation, representation and individual liberties are often combined.

Figure 10.23 in the Annex shows the centrality of combinations of some framings. Parts of the inner circle are economic and social aspects, as well as corruption, unemployment, individual liberties, the equality dimension of democracy, security or terrorism. It is not to forget that especially security, terrorism or economic problems resonate well in the public sphere.

5.4.7 Summary on the framing of the FTDES in interviews and media

The FTDES has a relatively equal distribution of dimensions of democracy in interviews and is more focused on equality in articles. The dimensions already relevant in interviews - government capacity, participation, representation and rule of law are underlined. Other elements like decentralization or freedom of expression do not resonate in public.

In comparison to the other organizations, the framing looks like a mixture of many elements of the other organizations' framing. For example, FTDES leaders use framings of the ATFD in relation to women rights and of the UGTT in relation to economic aspects. What distinguishes UGTT and FTDES is the demand for a solidary economy that is much stronger for the FTDES. The FTDES has a much clearer vision of a different economic system that encompasses labor, salaries, profit-making, equal distribution of resources across regions, but also environmental aspects. The socio-economic problems are seen as a basic problem that gets related to migration or environmental pollution. This conception leads to the support of minority rights, but also to the demand for a more redistributive state and a state closer to the citizen. This conception of economy influences the framing of democracy and leads to a slightly different framing than for the other organizations.

On the methodological level it is to keep in mind that the interview with Sami produced more mentions of several dimensions of democracy. While it was only slightly more in most cases, it could nevertheless have created a small bias that is countered by not over interpreting only Sami's interpretations.

When analyzing each organization's democratic framing, I have already outlined some similarities across organizations. In the next section I identify possible common frames that could serve elements for common actions.

5.5 Common frames of democracy

The section on common frames identifies similarities and differences across frames on democracy across organizations. This is made as frames present among all organizations can travel easier when promoted collectively and could thus be more present among state representatives. If actors have collective influence on framing of ministries, this should be possible through the most important collective frames.

While the most frequent framing is the link to human rights, the other framing is different and dependent on the orientation of the organizations. Figure 5.14, summarizes the most important frame combinations by organizations and underscores the findings as individual liberties figure often among the most important frame combinations.

One can put the LTDH and ATFD on the one side with a very strong focus on freedom and UGTT and FTDES on the other with more focus on equality and control, although from different perspectives. Not surprisingly, the strengthening of the government capacity is not a focus of all civil society actors, apart from the support for fighting terrorism.

The other dimensions that are repeated across organizations, although in a different order and to a different degree are government capacity, rule of law, representation as well as participation.

Economic aspects are among the most mentioned other dimensions, showing its importance across organizations. What strikes is also the absence of transparency and competition elements among the top combinations.

Figure 5.14 Most mentioned frame combinations (fc) of dimensions of democracy

Organization	1 st fc	2 nd fc	3 rd fc	Most imp. frame apart democracy
UGTT interv.	Gov. capacity/ competition	Rule of law/ mutual constraints	indiv. liberties/ representation	Economy
UGTT art.	Gov. capacity/ participation	Gov. capacity/ indiv. liberties	Indiv. liberties/ participation	Economy
LTDH interv.	Indiv. liberties/ rule of law	Indiv. liberties/ representation, Indiv. liberties/ public sphere		Economy
LTDH art.	Indiv. liberties/ gov. capacity	Indiv. liberties/ rule of law	Gov. capacity/ rule of law	Other (pre- revolution phase)
ATFD interv.	Indiv. liberties/ representation	Indiv. liberties/ government capacity	Representation/ participation	Legislation
ATFD art.	Indiv. liberties/ representation	Indiv. liberties/ rule of law	Representation/ participation	Economy
FTDES interv.	Representation/participation, mutual constraints/rule of law, individual liberties/ public sphere (all on same level)			Economy
FTDES art.	Indiv. liberties/ participation	Indiv. liberties/ government capacity	representation/ participation	Economy

Note: based on illustrations for frame combinations for the other sections , see Annex

It becomes obvious that each organization specializes more or less on one dimension of democracy, be it freedom for LTDH and ATFD and slightly equality for the FTDES as well as control for UGTT to a limited degree as equality plays also an important role as a comparison of the orientations of each organization shows. The most equalized organizations in terms of dimensions of democracy are FTDES and UGTT with relatively equal distribution of the dimensions at least when it comes to interviews.

It is to keep in mind that not all dimensions resonate equally in public which can have resulted in a discrepancy towards reality in terms of media reporting. As before, the interviews and documents are taken as basis as those are seen to represent the real organizational perspective. The mediatized perspective is nevertheless important for the mechanisms via public opinion. Results go in the same direction as those found by Cohen-Hadria, that civil society discourses are mainly focused on their area of specialization (Cohen-Hadria 2017).


Figure 5.15 and Figure 5.16 take the mentions of dimensions of democracy for all organizations together. The figure summarizes what has been said before; mainly that LTDH and ATFD hold a strong freedom-oriented perspective of democracy, while the UGTT focuses more on control and equality and the FTDES on equality, especially when it comes to articles.

Lauth and Schlenkrich used a similar distinction as in Figure 5.15 to identify libertarian, egalitarian and control-oriented democracy (Lauth and Schlenkrich 2018). From their approach one can argue that the UGTT promotes a slightly control oriented approach, but also egalitarian approach, while the LTDH and ATFD have a libertarian approach towards democracy. The FTDES has an egalitarian approach to democracy. When applying Lauth and Schlenkrich's model we are thus faced with three different conceptions of democracy for the four organizations raising doubts on possible common frames notwithstanding human rights and economic elements that could be promoted together. There are effectively few elements that could resonate in public and build a widely accepted frame in society, thus a master frame. This is even more problematic when human rights that do not resonate a lot in media are the most evident common element.

What became also clear in the media analysis for each organization is that not all frames resonate in public. It is not to forget that media were part of the authoritarian regime as a state industry leaving room for limited discussion (Mirgani 2016). Zayani underlines that the media in the Arab world developed over the last years and is still in transformation in terms of more diversity, more openness and more activity (Zayani 2016). However, it is equally to note, that while the FTDES works actively with the media, the LTDH and ATFD do this much less also due to missing confidence in reporting.

As discussed in chapter four, the coalitional perspective is important with the FTDES being slightly aside. Regarding the framing, the inclusion or exclusion of the FTDES in coalitional framing would not make a great difference, as already the other orientations differ quite much. The inclusion of the FTDES re-enforces more human rights as a common point, while the economic perspective is more similar for the other three organizations.


Figure 5.15 Comparison of main dimensions (interviews)



Note: number of mentions in interviews by organizations⁵⁶

⁵⁶ The author produced the figures before knowing that Lauth and Schlenkrich 2018:84 use a nearly similar figure for distinguishing between types of democracy. While those figures were not inspired by Lauth and Schlenkrich, they show nevertheless the same distinction of dimensions as well as a similar approach towards democracy.

Figure 5.16 Comparison of main dimensions (articles)



Note: number of claims in articles by organizations

When it comes to the aspects that are common as well as different mainly three elements can be highlighted. Common elements are a human rights approach (although with different additional elements), a framing including a connection between economy and democracy and to a limited degree participatory democracy.

In comparison to a European perspective of (liberal) democracy, Tunisian civil society includes also work as a right or economic aspect as part of democracy (especially the FTDES and the UGTT). While the right to work is not connected to democracy in Western democracies, or only as part of effective governance, it appears central in Tunisia which is not surprising considering the uprisings as a demand for jobs. The output of democracy is seen as more important in the analyzed context.

It is not a purely liberal picture of democracy that appears in the Tunisian context, but a picture that seeks civil society as mediator, as watchdog, but also as important element of a participatory democracy that reaches from the local to the national level.

The crux with minorities

Although Tunisia never had major ethnic divisions (perhaps apart from the Berber question, Sadiki 2002), the question of minorities and for example black immigrants is ignored by

many interviewees. Apart from the FTDES and the ATFD for sexual minorities, the answer on minorities was that there are no minorities which is however not completely true. On the other hand, it represents exactly the former state perspective.

While the divides for regional disparities have become visible following the end of the regime and the narrative accepts those divisions, other rights like those of minorities are not often discussed. This is also problematic in line with rights of homosexuals for example which is another aspect not often discussed apart from the ATFD in interviews and the LTDH in articles. Thus, while some organizations have more open perspectives on minorities, especially the UGTT can be said to be in line with public opinion and does not seek a change actively. While problems might be accepted by parts of the UGTT, the question would probably be referred to the more specialized organizations in that sector, such as the ATFD.

This is similar for women rights. While women rights are discussed within the UGTT, the missing internal representation of women in higher positions and missing public support for women parity casts doubts on the reality of this commitment (compare also with other researchers: Labidi 2015; Bishara 2014). The question of women rights will thus be referred to the internal commissions, which then cooperate with other organizations and share the same perspective. At the end, the UGTT builds a diverse microcosm of the Tunisian society and thus becomes an important profiteer of the division of tasks also in terms of democratic framing in Tunisia. As shown earlier, also other organizations use a framing on women rights that is similar to the ATFD ones although less elaborated.

5.6 Conclusion to chapter five

As we have seen, the highly interconnected organizations (chapter four) do not share the same framing on democracy. In response to the research question that guided the chapter, three different perspectives, focused on different of the three dimensions are identified. The common aspects that can be promoted together are oriented towards human rights, economic elements or participatory democracy. The most important frame combinations resemble, but different dimensions of democracy get underlined. Economy plays a major role for all organizations and is a specific element linked to democracy.

I expected more similarities in the framings. While some of the key words are often used in a similar way (human rights, representation, equality), the framing is nuanced and thus sometimes different, sometimes similar. In any case, apart from the focus on human rights or economy in general and thus the output of democracy, as well as the mention of participatory democracy, no clear common framing emerges.

This raises the question whether human rights and economic elements are enough to glue the coalition together or whether it is “just” the common perception of formerly repressed organizations (except the FTDES) and not a common framing in terms of democracy that holds the coalition together. In line is the question from the theory chapter whether coalitions frame on the basis of their roles or whether some or many elements are shared. From my results, only very few elements are shared and I indeed suggest that the perception of close allies is sufficient to cooperate without common perspective. This consequentially raises doubts on whether a coalition can have a framing clear enough to convince, a question that will be discussed again in chapter seven.

As we have seen from chapter four, the human rights focus can be a sign of the organizational integrations into the international human rights network. One can also make the distinction between organizations that have their origin in workers or collective rights (UGTT and partly FTDES) as well as the more individual oriented rights (LTDH and ATFD). It is especially the framing of the UGTT with a strong support for the state that remains compatible with the political system under Ben Ali, with the notable exception of their framing on freedom of speech. There are elements that are not compatible with all forms of democracy, especially when it comes to minority rights. The argument that Tunisia is a homogeneous country underestimates minorities and goes clearly with a majoritarian form of democracy.

Forms and distinctions of democracy

What is more important and not foreseen by the theory on democracy is the distinction between individual and collective rights, which has been emphasized by some interviewees. While the tension is nevertheless indirectly in the framework of the Democracy Barometer, it is difficult to retrace in reality.

While collective rights are important and act as the safeguard of democracy, mainly individual freedoms are emphasized as insufficient by civil society groups. Thus, while they relatively easily find support for collective elements, the individual level appears more difficult to promote (especially sexual rights and so on). This orientation towards collective or individual rights can determine in which direction the Tunisian democracy will turn, whether it will be a majoritarian, egalitarian or libertarian system.

A more participatory approach towards democracy is highlighted by leaders. However, I remain cautious on further conclusions especially when it comes to what some called “participatory democracy”. While there appears to be a wide support for this form, especially when civil society represents the people and acts as mediator, the prominence of participation is not to overestimate. It is partly caused by the topic of interviews (civil society participation), but is equally a mean to achieve more influence for organizations. Similarly, can the support for decentralization be interpreted in the sense that it could enable more movement influence on local levels. Those dimensions of democracy have also a strategic use in framing.

Common or individual framing

Regarding coalitions and fields of expertise, neither is the movement coalition completely divided according to topics, nor have those organizations totally shared visions. The reality is a combination of both. Some topics are framed in a similar way while others topics are characterized by different frames.

The combination of human rights and a legal basis for example is found with a nearly similar framing for ATFD and LTDH. On the other hand, while UGTT and FTDES discussed similar points, their argumentation is partly similar for example on the dominance by political parties, while on the question on stability and terrorism the UGTT appears as much closer to the state.

The coalition distinguishes experts for certain problems, like the ATFD for women issues, based on the reputation and experiences with the organization. Thus, I argue that it is less about the “real” mediatized frames that can show similarities or differences, but the perceived expertise of each organization that also includes a point of referral in case of

questions on the topic. We see similar and different frames across organizations and it is difficult to identify the origins of each frame. Again, women issues are a good example. While the equality in heritage is a frame that has also been used by FTDES leaders, it is probably a frame that originates from the women movement. However, it is not possible to prove this with the data available.

It can be argued that coalitions can be more successful if movement specific and collective coalition frames coincide. I would thus assume, that proposals including human rights and individual liberties are easier to promote by the movement coalition, than would be questions of government capacity for example. While we have seen earlier that three of the four belong to a movement coalition, while the FTDES partly fits in, the framings on democracy appear as quite different at the inside. It appears that the four organizations do not hold a clear common perspective, but several ones on democracy, something that contradicts the common understanding of movements as safeguard of the Tunisian democracy. It is possible that this multitude of perspectives is quite normal in democracies and that it influences the Tunisian democracy in its ensemble and diversity.

UGTT, ATFD or LTDH leaders emphasize the historic role of their respective movements and their activism that has its origins long before the revolution and highlight the longstanding tradition of protest (although critical scholars remark that the UGTT has been coopted on a national level). As mentioned earlier, this criterion is actively used to distinguish between friends and foes with the notable exception of Ennahdha (which was repressed but is perceived as a foe).

Raising questions on the parliamentary system

It is to note, that the parliament does not play an important democratic role for the named organization in their framing which can be interpreted under the light of either no experience with representative democracy or a focus on more participatory forms. A referral to parliament was not the case when it comes to networks as seen in chapter four, nor is it the case for framing.

While parties are at least mentioned, interviewees hardly ever evoked the parliament as important element of the Tunisian democracy. When it comes to parties, interviewees tend

to stress the independent or even apolitical character of their organization and criticize parties. They could say that they are not associated with parties or independent and they partly do, but they often just state being apolitical. Is it linked to the type of organization? Is it to protect themselves or something normal? Or does the notion of being apolitical serve as a protection to keep themselves out of debates or to avoid a negative picture? All those are questions that can be points for further research because they would require further interviews on those specific questions that were not covered by this thesis.

Organizational framing of democracy and consequences for the state framing

As we have seen, we are faced with three conceptions of democracy. The LTDH and ATFD have a very similar framing connecting human rights with rule of law and a freedom-oriented argumentation. On the other hand, the UGTT promotes collective rights and has a perspective that is more supportive to the state. While the equality and control dimensions are also important for the FTDES, their perspective is much more critical and they cover more minority rights and issues that get limited public attention (environment, racism, suicides) than the UGTT.

Taking the networks into consideration with a much-restricted network of the UGTT, oriented towards the state, one would imagine that the state perspective is closer to the UGTT than to the other organizations. Taking the human rights perspective of all organizations into consideration, especially the network role of the FIDH and the Euromed network are to underline leading to the conclusion that human rights should be among the most prominent framings by civil servants if there is a coalitional movement influence.

It can be expected that the more specific ties towards ministries by for example the ATFD (Ministry of Women) or other bilateral configurations (LTDH- Ministry of the Interior, FTDES – Ministry of Relations with Civil Society and so on as seen from chapter four) lead to a more similar framing when comparing those bilateral configurations. It shall equally be kept in mind, that coalitional and individual influence can be complementary.

The following chapter analyzes the Tunisian state and the perspective on democracy hold by state representatives.

Chapter Six

The ministerial framing

6 The state perspective on democracy

Chapter six follows the same structure as chapter five, taking the state perspective. Recalling the research question: “How does a democratic framing diffuse across actors in Tunisia?”, chapter six asks a more concrete question: Which are the democratic framings that are present among state representatives? The findings from the perspective of civil servants is then related to the one by leaders: Are the same framings existent from the state perspective (did the movements realize their democratic framing)?

To recall the movement perspective, the UGTT holds a state capacity-oriented view, while the ATFD (women) and the LTDH (human rights) hold a right based approach focused on freedom. The orientation of ATFD and LTDH are closer to each other, while the ATFD covers more dimensions (also participation and representation). The FTDES (socio-economic rights, environment and migration) holds a rather equally distributed view on control, equality and freedom with a focus on vulnerable groups and the equality dimension.

From chapter five we know that the most common element among organizations is the referral to human rights and liberties, which has been prominently mentioned by all organizations, often with a right-based background. It is difficult to identify a clear framing of democracy that is shared by all members of the movement coalition except human rights, participatory elements and economic aspects. The latter are not directly part of the dimensions of democracy, but related to the output dimension of democracy.

What does this mean for the state perspective? The referral to human rights should be part of the state framing of democracy if organizations can influence the framing of ministries, as it is the most important point of referral of all organizations. However, as human rights do not resonate in public, it would be a sign of direct influence. In addition, participatory democracy as a term plays a role (some caution is necessary as outlined in chapter five). Apart from that coalitional influence is limited to very few specific frame elements and economic aspects are expected to be part of the ministerial framing.

In addition it was shown that interactions are higher between specific ministries and specific organizations. It is possible that a bilateral interaction results in a similar framing. The state perspective can thus show the same differences than across organizations. An alternative regard would be whether the state developed a consistent perspective on democracy across ministries, meaning that most civil servants are easily able to identify what democracy means in Tunisia. This refers to what has been questioned in section 2.5, whether the state is a unitary or multidimensional actor in Tunisia. Both are actual possibilities as the state was very centralized with a clear state perspective under Ben Ali, while the chaotic processes after the uprisings and interaction with specific organizations could have led to very divergent perspectives on democracy. The middle way with clearly identifiable core elements of a Tunisian democracy, as well as some smaller differences could equally be a possibility. This leads to a conditional argument. Dependent on the possibility to identify a common state framing, another option will be regarded: If there are several framings of democracy, do some of those resemble the ones of individual ministries? The argument bases on the question of individual organizational influence not on the entire state, but on specific ministries dependent on issues.

This chapter bases on thirteen interviews with state representatives from ministries that have been identified as interacting with civil society organizations. A list of all interviews and the respective ministries is found in the Annex. Included ministries are the Ministry of Women and Family, the Ministry of Industry, the Ministry of Tourism, Ministry of Youth and Sports, the Ministry of Education, the Ministry of Finance, the Ministry of the Interior, the Ministry of Habitation, the Ministry of Relations with Civil Society and the Institutions, the Ministry of Regional Development, the Ministry of Agriculture and the Presidency of the Government.

It is to recall that those interviews served a double purpose: To verify relations towards civil society and qualify those and to identify the framing(s) of democracy that can be found in ministries. While the first purpose was already exposed in chapter four, the second purpose is covered in this chapter.

Interviews can only indicate whether there is a certain preference towards elements of democracy, but the results are not generalizable on all civil servants. The number of civil servants interviewed is with thirteen interviews low. The representatives are sampled on their position in higher ranks and are not representative for all civil servants. As for organizations, it can be expected that the most open, most interested and probably also most Westernized participated when a Western researcher contacted them. As virtually nothing is known about perceptions of democracy by civil servants, the research presents a first endeavor.


The structure from the analysis of democracy for organizations is taken over to present this analysis. The chapter starts with the democratic framing present among ministries referring to the three main dimensions and nine elements used earlier. The resonance of ministerial framing in public is not a point of analysis⁵⁷. The chapter describes the framing of the ministries to build the basis for comparison with the perspective of organizational leaders.

⁵⁷ As mentioned in the method chapter, no search for ministries in articles was performed due to several arguments: First it was unclear whether ministries will expose claims to the same degree as organizations as they do not have to rely on the media for advancing issues towards other ministries. Second, it was not clear whether media allows to clearly identify all concerned ministries. It would have needed an additional amount of resources that was not available.

The dimensions and elements of democracy used earlier are also used for this chapter as recalled in Figure 6.1. The dimensions are used in a deductive way, but were open towards additional aspects of democracy that may not be part of a Western concept as part of inductive reasoning.

First, the perspective on democracy is outlined, before a short comparison towards organizations describes similarities and differences in framing at the end of each section. The last section already gives a short connection towards the interactions between organizations and the state to prepare the analysis in chapter seven. The framing of democracy is often limited and the overall analysis for state actors is shorter than the description of the four organizations.

Figure 6.1 Dimensions of democracy



Note: own Figure based on Bühlmann et al. 2014, see also chapter five

6.1 General view on democracy: the participation of civil society

The perspective on democracy expressed in interviews with state representatives often underscores the participation of civil society and movements. However, it is to keep in mind that participation of civil society was one of the main topics of interviews and were thus mentioned more than other aspects. Consequentially, the participation dimension is probably overrepresented. The dimension is regarded with some reserves in the analysis and


comparable to a weighting, the other dimensions orient more strongly the analysis in order to account for this bias.

When looking at the rough statistics on topics discussed during interviews as shown in Figure 6.2, the equality dimension and participation take a lot of space when discussing civil society and democracy with state representatives. Even if one argues that estimated one third of the framing on participation is due to the overrepresentation of this dimension, it would still be the most important element and equality the most important dimension.

Not surprisingly, also the government capacity dimension is important. As we will see, a lot of its importance is related to practical, work related problems and not to democracy as a concept. The freedom dimension does play a minor role when looking at all interviews together; casting doubts on whether movements could integrate human rights into the framing of state representatives.

It is also to underline that the equality dimension was not equally prominent among organizations, showing that the state perspective on democracy might be more egalitarian. On the other hand, the framing by state representatives resembles a bit the framing in articles as found for the UGTT with the notable exception of mutual constraints and transparency being more prominent for civil servants in contrast to individual liberties that are less prominent.

Figure 6.2 Coded dimensions and elements in interviews



Note: number of coded mentions, 692 total mentions on dimensions of democracy (Competition: 25, Government Capacity: 103, Mutual Constraints: 67, Participation: 240, Representation: 50, Transparency: 83, Freedom and liberties: 49, public sphere: 26, rule of law: 49).

6.2 Control dimension: stability is important

6.2.1 Competition of political actors: party competition and uncertainty about programs

Recalling Figure 6.2, competition is one of the least discussed dimensions, which will nevertheless be discussed in order to rest systematic. Six out of thirteen civil servants did not mention this dimension showing its lack of importance.

When it comes to the competition of political actors, civil servants mentioning it and underlined the recent introduction of party competition and thus the missing experience.

"Because our political system, [...] it's a parliamentary system. There are many parties in parliament, so there is no absolute majority. Many parties, one cannot have an absolute majority. So, you need a coalition to govern. [...] And there is this coalition but we hope a lot, we hope very much that we will better handle the situation." (Ministry of Education, Hamdi)

Some civil servants equally discussed political programs, but are – probably depending on sectors – more or less sure on political programs. Others like the civil servant from the Ministry for Sport and Youth connect missing programs with missing transparency. Political programs are evaluated not under the perspective of democracy, but from a work-related perspective to know what to expect.

"It's not clear, there is no program, there is no plan. The parties, as I said, are quite young, they are not organized strategically enough. Strategically, there is not something to do, something they can deal with strategically, in terms of

planning. Unfortunately, when the Minister arrives, we do not really know where we are going, we do not know.” (Ministry of Youth and Sports, Walid)

On the other hand, the party system is not seen as stable and is influenced by money as the civil servant from the Ministry of Relations with Civil Society expresses. The framing of the problem resembles civil society framing. In addition, he underlines, that new parties are still in creation and others disappear. He underlines the importance of the 2011 elections and the respective political programs and emphasizes the competition, but also the freedom of speech in relation to new political actors. The framing by the civil servant from the Ministry with Relations with Civil Society is no common perspective hold across ministries, but something that should be kept in mind for later.

Competition of political actors appears less relevant to civil servants. What occupies civil servants are less surprisingly political programs that are more or less clear in order to identify what the respective minister and the government want, as well as questions of interaction with political parties. Framing does not correspond a lot to organizational framing of any of the four organizations. The only exception is the interviewee from the Ministry of Relations with civil society when he mentions the influence of money, but also aspects such as freedom of speech.

6.2.2 Government capacity: stability is good for the own work

The government capacity dimension came up in all interviews except the one with the Ministry of Habitation, indicating the importance of this dimension that is also underscored by the second highest number of mentions for elements of democracy.

Civil servants underlined the stability of a government. However, this perspective is of rather practical nature criticizing the problems for continuity of problems or competencies. Government stability is not basically considered being good for democracy, but being good for the own work.

"It's a problem, yes. And in addition, the ministers who come, they are not technicians. So, we have to redo everything. Explain everything again and redo everything. Well, there are those who understand faster than others [...] And there is, as everyone has a political color" (Ministry of Finance, Cyrine)

"We are at the seventh government [...]. Every time there is a new minister there is a restart stop, one hundred thirty km / h. You have to stop for five minutes

afterwards we must restart to get back to your km / h, like at a toll station. We must stop and afterwards restart.” (Ministry of Tourism, Aymen)

The civil servant from the Presidency of the Government underlines that new ministers are not necessarily familiar with the general visions of the ministry or arrive without preparation.

In addition, each government has a particular priority. According to the civil servant each minister implicates some changes regarding positions causing interruptions for the administration. The interviewee from the Ministry of Industry describes the confusion and fluidity that shape the months surrounding the change of a minister. However, the degree of continuity differs from one ministry to another.

“It changes absolutely nothing because the continuity is so sacred in the administration; but because the team working on the issues is the same, [...] ministers, fortunately, they all arrive after the revolution are also convinced of the utility” (Ministry of Regional Development, Mawa)

The framing of changes of ministers as being bad for the own work is widely shared across civil servants and stability is preferred.

There is also strong criticism of politicians, as they are often seen as not having the necessary competencies or knowledge. The degree of competencies of ministers as well as the administration from the perspective of civil servants differs as well:

“So, the political parties do not have enough experience, let's say. Sure, they've been appointed as ministers, they do not have enough experience [...] to understand the administration, to manage public administration and the functionaries and all that. So, to have the politician's support for more transparency, for more citizens' contribution or citizen awareness in public life, [...] is a bit difficult.” (Ministry of Youth and Sports, Walid)

“There are some people who have the competencies. But these people have lived elsewhere. I do not know where. They studied in France. They made their superior in Cambridge. They think the best of the best. Our problem is another. We now want to plant bananas in Russia. We do not arrive. All the theories you have learned in Europe are not the reality. It's bad, it's totally different.” (Ministry of Tourism, Aymen)

This criticism of personal competencies has only been found under FTDES leaders. The question of competencies is enlarged to the approaches taken as well as internal capacities: The interviewee from the Ministry of Tourism criticizes the Western theories on problems as not adequate for the Tunisian context. Taking a different perspective, the civil servant from

the Ministry of Industry underlines the missing expertise within the administration as a lot of people left and as recruitment processes were either partisan recruitment or forced by protest. Consequentially he sees resources and recruitments as not helpful for the administration.

Government capacity is seen as influenced by bad communication. Communication between ministries as well as optimizing processes is another topic that concerns civil servants. Recalling that the support for stability is widespread, the question of competencies, approaches and resources of the government is discussed from several perspectives.

Not surprisingly, but different from other ministries, the interviewee in the Ministry of the Interior underlines the capacity of the government and mentions a strong state as important. However, the ministry is special as it represents a state within a state, as the ministry was used under Ben Ali to control the whole security apparatus and thereby the whole population (Hmed 2016; see also Deane 2013 for the relations towards civil society). The interviewee from the ministry emphasized the term sovereignty in line with government capacity. It goes hand-in-hand with a security focus. It is linked to interaction with civil society that is called “manipulation” as well as with democratization.

“With the sovereign approach of the state, security is a function of the state. It can even be a danger. Especially if there is manipulation by civil society. The Ministry of the Interior has now [...], there is an exchange but with restrictions, civil society cannot access all the reforms. There is an opening with this democratization. To say civil society is not the Leviathan. There is a double helmet. [...] In comparison with many others, we are a country, I can tell you by comparing for example with Georgia, [...], we are advanced. Thanks to a good partnership, thanks to this awareness. We are on the process of success, we have no right to fail, it is an obligation of [producing] results.” (Ministry of the Interior, Rania)

While the very state capacity focused approach of the Ministry of the Interior differs from other ministries, there is nevertheless a general referral to stability in the country.

Good governance is another issue for some of the interviewees, especially from the Ministry of Industry; it is however a limited element of framing, as only some ministries referred to it.

Some civil servants relate government influence to the UGTT. Too many or too aggressive protest activities as well as in some case the UGTT are evaluated as negative for the government. According to civil servants, too many protest actions hinder the efficacy of the administration. A criticism that is partly shared among civil servants is the perspective on the UGTT as having too much influence on the government, influence that can even make the juridical sector change opinion. As mentioned in chapter five, this narrative is frequent in the media and only includes the UGTT and no other organizations.

Few civil servants discuss influence of religious actors. Especially for the civil servants in the Ministry of Relations with Civil Society, but also in the Ministry of Women and the Ministry for Tourism mention it.

"Because Tunisia is now, we cannot deny it, is divided in two: the Islamist clan and the progressive clan. And I choose explicitly my words, Islamist and progressive, to say that Islamist is reactionary." (Ministry of Women, Soulayma - a)

Interestingly, the representative from the Ministry of Relations with Civil Society connects the question of religion with fighting terrorism and thus draws a positive picture of its utility for fighting terrorism (Ministry of Relations with Civil Society, Khaled). While the evaluation of religion by the civil servant from the Ministry of Women could also be a statement by ATFD leaders, the evaluation of religion in line with government interference is not found across ministries.

There are still differences towards the four analyzed organizations on how the government capacity dimension is framed. First of all, there is the utilitarian criticism of government stability that is only partly present among organizational leaders. The perspective of the ATFD still comes closest when it comes to criticizing changes in government. In addition, it appears that personal influence is seen as critical for the work of the administration, while the criticism of businessmen and corruption as influencing policies – prominent among movement leaders – is not shared among civil servants. Good governance was only rarely mentioned by interviewees.

On the other hand, the combination with fighting terrorism that was present in narratives of the UGTT did only come up in the interview with the civil servant from the Ministry of

Relations with Civil Society as well as the one from the Ministry of the Interior. There is nevertheless little congruence with framing on government capacity by organizations.

I especially underline the comparison between the LTDH and the Ministry of the Interior. The strong referral to the government capacity by the Ministry of the Interior is not shared by the LTDH that expressed close ties to this Ministry. While the interviewee from the Ministry of the Interior acknowledges that the situation is now different towards the time of Ben Ali and civil society plays a greater role, the perspective on government capacity is different as it is much more positive towards security forces than in the case of the LTDH. The latter did not insist on government capacity in the same way.

6.2.3 Mutual constraints: control institutions and skepticism towards decentralization

The representatives of ministries did all mention this dimension, except the one from the Ministry of Habitation. The four analyzed organizations did not insist on mutual constraints but focused on the constitutional court or decentralization.

"The Constitution of 2014, it dedicated the separation of powers and the complementarity of powers. So, we have a democratic transition, unique in the world." (Ministry of Education, Hamdi)

Interviews with civil servants emphasizes the institutional checks and balances as well as the challenges of decentralization; the latter quite similar to the organizations (especially the FTDES).

The interviewee from the Ministry of Youth and Sports underlines the importance of autonomy and freedom of the administration, especially when it comes to the nomination procedures for control bodies that are currently steered by the sections that they should control. He links this to the control of the executive body and gives the example of the National Statistics Institute (INS) that, although delivering much more reliable numbers than before, is still not independent in terms of its organizational status creating a risk for manipulation. Similar framings exist with respect to other government bodies.

Others highlight the role of the administration as safeguard of respect for laws and as a controller of government:

"It is not always evident that the administration is neutral and even if [...] you might say that the administration always complies with it, it always resists any

diversion, it is the watchdog of the law, of the respect for the law” (Presidency of the Government, Mokhtar)

The referral to administration and institutions as control for politicians is something shared across civil servants. The civil servant from the Ministry of Relations with Civil Society mentions the importance of institutions that are part of a vital democracy. He describes especially problems for inter-institutional checks and balances:

"[...]because democracy is not only elections [...], it is also about the institutions, so we are contacted of course, on the issues of democracy that, come into play [...] with the institutions, because there is a problem. The constitution of 2014 has created new powers but has not completely defined the relationship between its powers, there are shadow areas and it is for this reason that there are misunderstandings. Everyone sees the things from his side and does not see the relationship with the other and the return. It is complicated to manage a country when the constitution is new, democracy is new, the recognition of the other is recent and trust is not quite established” (Ministry of Relations with Civil Society, Khaled)

The interviewee from the Ministry of Relations with Civil Society also criticizes that many institutions have not yet the power assigned by the constitution.

When it comes to relative power across ministries another issue emerged: As one interviewee from the Ministry of Women for example outlines, that while being sure that the minister tries everything for women rights, one cannot be sure on the influence of the minister on the ministerial council (Ministry of Women, Soulayma - a). This leads to something discussed in chapter seven, where even a shared position with civil society may not be sufficient to convince other ministries. There is effectively competition across ministries adding another layer to horizontal checks and balances.

Linked to vertical checks and balances are the municipal elections that shall embed democracy on a local level as for example interviewees from the Ministry of Education or the Ministry for Regional Development express. Equally, a link between local democracy and civil society that will be discussed under participation gets evoked. On the other hand, local democracy and decentralization is also seen as a challenge.

"Anyway, we have no choice. [...] it's decentralization that is done in stages. We preview at least 9 years. And therefore, there are attributions that will be affected. [...] So, we are obliged even if we try to delay a little or [...] we are obliged. You have to respect the constitution to do it. [...]. It's something good; it

takes a lot of money. It takes a lot, a lot of resources for that. And we must not make mistakes in the process” (Ministry of Finance, Cyrine)

“I believe it is a process today that is irreversible; it is written in our constitution and there is today a roadmap to prepare this decentralization; there is no decentralization today, not yet, but today there is all the architecture [...]. So, we should already have [...] a common understanding of what decentralization is; after the revolution everyone wanted to have decentralization in Tunisia, and I assure you no one understood what that meant, because it's complicated [...] transfer of decision-making power, transfer of funds, and so on. [...] it takes years of work, it takes a lot of thinking, it requires a great maturity, a great understanding [...], one day establish this participative approach, concretely said, and to be likely effective, it would also need a good associative basis, active and mature” (Ministry of Regional Development, Mawa)

As those citations show, framing on decentralization is very diverse. Local competencies are seen as limited as the interviewee from the Ministry of Finance expresses. Others underline that decentralization is a long-term process. Some civil servants propose alternatives: E-governance is considered a better solution than decentralization of offices towards every region by some civil servants.

The perspective on checks and balances is oriented towards regional competencies as well as practical consequences of decentralization. In this sense, decentralization is seen as positive, but also skeptical and as a long-term process.

While organizations and ministries agree on the general importance of decentralization as foreseen by the constitution, organizations stronger insist on regional participation and the FTDES especially on more independence. The skepticism towards new arrangements for regional and local democracy is shared across ministries and civil society. The demand for independent institutions is even stronger among civil servants compared to organizations.

6.3 Equality dimension: let them participate and transparency

6.3.1 Participation: participation through organization and criteria of selection

Civil servants underline the participation of civil society and participatory approaches before the equality of participation. It was mentioned in all interviews.

As interviews were on democracy and participation of civil society, all interviewees elaborated on the contacts towards civil society. Consequentially, this dimension takes a lot

of coverage and could probably be overrepresented. Due to the wide coverage, some subtitles orient the section on participation. This section consequentially gets a bit longer as civil servants elaborate on the criteria for civil society participation. It appears that some organizations have easier access to ministries than others, as some ministries are more open than others.

Civil servants drew a positive picture of participation of civil society.

"Yes, it is in the sense of setting up precisely a participatory approach because the Tunisian civil society has shown itself quite mature in its vision, in its way of seeing things and in acting. And in any case, it fits into the very framework of the definition of democracy because in the framework of democracy civil society is a very important component. So, it goes a little bit in the general democratic policy that we want for the country." (Ministry of Women, Soulayma – b)

"So, we have the civil society in Tunisia, it's an essential element. An essential element in the democratic transition and it is an essential element [...] in the control of power, be it executive or parliamentary. [...]. There is the civil society that is active in parliament. And also participates in this dynamic of transition, of economic and social development." (Ministry of Education, Hamdi)

"For the formulation of priorities. There is a consultation process and an implementation. We have partners like the Red Crescent Tunisia [...] and with the National Order of the Lawyers [ONAT], or with the Order of the Magistrates [...] with the ICRC we also have projects. [...] At the same time we have a local security council with the participation of the civil society and the security forces." (Ministry of the Interior, Rania)

One key word in the framing on participation is a participatory approach. This term appears throughout interviews with civil servants and plays a major role. The interviewee from the Ministry of Regional Development gives a good example on how the participatory approach is defined when it comes to its implementation:

"Participatory approach, it means all actors at the local regional level should be able to participate in the decision making that concerns their everyday lives or the big decisions that concern their regions directly as investment, like project, like regulation etc. and that it is not only in the hands of policy makers and local authorities. [...] Before the revolution it was not the case at all. The decision was really top down so everything was done centrally and ran at the regional level. Now the trend has inversed. It's bottom up" (Ministry of Regional Development, Mawa)

Those descriptions and the comparison with the pre-revolution time are frequent. The civil servant from the Ministry of Finance describes that organizations did not attempt to approach the administration before and ministries did not accept help from experts; a

situation that changed. According to the interviewee from the Ministry of Relations with Civil Society the state no longer fears civil society and the role of civil society is strengthened through their argumentation and their protest. He concludes that the civil society is more active and less aggressive due to increased confidence between state and civil society, but that this relation is still in its “embryonal phase” (Ministry of Relations with Civil Society, Khaled). The notion on a participatory approach is shared with some organizations.

Participation through organizations and consultations

Participation through organizations rather than individual participation by citizens is emphasized. Most interviewees prefer citizens using associations to articulate their positions. In this sense the Tunisian approach favors organizations compared to individual participation or protest (like writing letters and so on) and consequentially representation.

“Well the citizen as natural person, even if he is interested, he has a rare chance to access the information, to come forward, to see his opinion materialized, so that's why citizens generally choose to join their efforts in the framework of an association [...] sure, with a single representative it is much easier than to speak with each one separately” (Presidency of the Government, Youssef)

Civil servants respond to requests and special units within the ministry explain decisions and respond to citizens. The referral to the participative elements of democracy is also found in the interviews with civil servants. However, the ministerial perspective resembles more the perspective of ATFD or LTDH and less the one of the FTDES that focuses more on the individual's contribution.

Participation gets connected to the principle of consultation as the interviewee from the Ministry of Tourism expressed. He explicitly mentioned “shura” as principle to be included:

“Participation is the whole thing; we have to teach it at school, we have to make sure that this generation [...] We even have in our religion. Participation, the participation approach is shura, [...] it's consulting all the components of civil society, but we're not going to consult them [...] one by one, we will not consult the population one by one, but it is necessary that the population is organized in the professional groups represented by associations.” (Ministry of Tourism, Aymen)

While the civil servant from the Ministry of Tourism mentioned shura as principle, other civil servants advanced other reasons for the participation of civil society. The position by the interviewee from the Ministry of Tourism is specific as there is a frequent referral to religion, different from other actors.

Dialogue is an important element for some civil servants (Ministry of Finance, Cyrine; Ministry of Industry, Anis). This referral to dialogue was prominent for the UGTT framing. In line, the national dialogue is emphasized by the civil servant from the Ministry of Relations with Civil Society and the role of the four organizations for Tunisia is highlighted.

The motivations for civil society participation reach from inspiration, historical reasons and common values to more practical motivations like creating acceptance through integrating civil society.

"[...] for better fit of projects, that is when citizens, and when they are well organized in an association, that there is really an important network of associations that sends its voice to the decision-makers to choose, to decide, the project or the decision that will be made, which will be taken at that local or regional level, it will be more appropriate to say that people will feel involved in the project so they will ensure that it is done in proper form, they will also ensure to preserve what has been done and take care of it, so that's all it is a philosophy in life too, it's a mentality to change, but it's better, it's much better like that and then it's also freedom, it's democracy" (Ministry of Regional Development, Mawa)

"But it is of course based on common values [...] and of course on what we defend together. And besides, what I personally find is extraordinary with my head civil society, something that I find extraordinary that we begin to receive a civil society that was hostile to all that is institutional and public etc. There we begin to receive them and they express their predispositions to work in close collaboration with the ministries" (Ministry of Women, Soulayma – b)

"Personally, when I find an association involved in a competition it gives more guarantee for me even as an administration, that once the results are published there will be less protest" (Presidency of the Government, Youssef)

Similar to the civil servant from the Presidency of the Government, another from the Ministry of Women confirms that there is less protest and fewer demonstrations due to those processes.

Another motivation is underlined by the interviewee from the Ministry of Relations with Civil Society who describes the historical role of civil society as deeply embedded in the Tunisian society. Some see participation also as an obligation or a task prescribed by law.

"It's a duty, it's an obligation, now it's an obligation, we cannot work alone. The administration, the ministry can no longer work alone [...] So, I find that even decisions of the administration now and the decisions of the ministry [...] are more [...] I would say seem more credible" (Ministry of Agriculture, Safa)

"So, the second reason why civil society is important in Tunisia is because the Tunisian constitution of 2014 gave civil society a new life. This new life is led by a principle. If you read the constitution we are creating or setting up or developing a participatory republican civil country. [...] So participation becomes a component of the country's governance." (Ministry of Relations with Civil Society, Khaled)

This perspective with referral to a historical role of civil society or to the achievements of the revolution in terms of civil society participation is widespread. Occasionally, different, singular elements were highlighted. One interviewee from the Ministry of Women explained an interesting point as he stated to "use" civil society for own lobbying:

"From the beginning in all the steps, from the idea to the project until the lobbying. In particular, it is a force of proposition. We consider it [civil society] as a partner a force of proposal but also a lobbying force." (Ministry of Women, Nizar)

Increased participation and exclusion via selection criteria

The diversity of civil society and its recent development is often mentioned by civil servants. From this perspective, the freedom to associate gets connected to participation of civil society. On the other hand, links to civil society are not necessarily good.

"No, not always good relationships. We have relationships that can be good. Everyone plays his role. When I told you a force of proposition, it is a force of proposition. I do not expect civil society to have a position that is the same as ours. And we can even go to [...] discussions that sometimes are a circle discussion. But generally, one can arrive, that shows that there is diversity. Even if we do not share the same ideas, we share the same values [...]. Certainly, we share the same values, [...] we do not share the same ideas, we do not share the same solutions but we share the same values. And this way we hope to have a force of proposition." (Ministry of Women, Nizar)

While there is still a difference between ministries and civil society, there is a general openness.

When it comes to the equality of participation, different degrees of participation exist. Participation is not equal and the possibilities to enter into contact are better for larger organizations like the UGTT or UTICA.

"We have two organizations that are very important organizations in Tunisia [...]. From a quantitative or qualitative point of view [...]. So, there are other associations but they do not have a very important impact on the decision, on the support, [...], on its way of participation [...]. As I already said, with the two big organizations, UTICA and UGTT" (Ministry of Education, Hamdi)

The civil servant from the Ministry of Agriculture argues that they limit participation to the organization known best. The one from the Ministry of Tourism adds the federations that are seen as key partners and the civil servant from the Ministry of Relations with Civil Society states that they work with four labor unions in terms of representation, but that on other topics expertise is the most important criteria of selection. The latter distinguishes between those that are known and that often approach the ministry and those who less often come up, for example through the media. Across organizations exist many different criteria for selection making the possibility of civil society participation different from one ministry to another.

Other civil servants do not distinguish between organizations when inviting and chances are more equal:

"That's not exclusion. When one is asked to be present in workshops, etc., one is present as far as possible, dependent on the availabilities of the staff, [...]. But finally, for example, there are missions where the civil society is involved, in quotation marks, obligatory in the administrative work, for example, at the level of the OGP [Open Governance Program], you cannot work an action plan by yourself or alone, we must involve all associations. Generally, it is done by a call to the public, to associations. So, there are associations that present themselves, they want to be presented in that, good. Generally, we accept everyone" (Ministry of Industry, Energy and Mines, Anis)

"All organizations are treated in the same way. The proof is that in all [...] in all the calls for proposals, in the calls for applications, etc. it's a call for tenders, so we get calls, there's a commission that meets on the basis of pre-defined criteria [...]. So, everything is done in transparency." (Ministry of Women, Soulayma – a)

Notwithstanding those two citations, a number of interviewees acknowledge the exclusion of parts of the civil society. In addition, some parts of the civil society are seen as not having enough competencies to effectively discuss policies:

"They do not have the technicality. Public finances are a little complicated. And so, they [...] sometimes they have false, totally wrong concepts." (Ministry of Finance, Cyrine)

"The problem is that sometimes, when we do not have enough information on the current situation of the administration, we [...] badly [...] hear ideas that are not [...] applicable, unfortunately, or who ask for funding and resources that the country or the state does not have [...]. So, to give realistic solutions, the association or the organization, the citizen must have real information of the sector" (Ministry of Industry, Energy and Mines, Anis)

In line with this is professionalization of civil society, another aspect frequently mentioned and a criterion of selection of civil society. The interviewee from the Ministry of Industry highlights an organized well financed civil society, with clear good governance, a stable team, a strategy, action plan and partners as important aspects that can make organizations privileged partners of the administration. The interviewee from the Ministry of Regional Development points in a similar direction:

"Absolutely and his ability to analyze, and his ability to learn things and to anticipate, to propose, that's also it, not only to be a receiver but to be active to be really active in a process of change [...] there is not enough maturity in fact, that everyone claims his right to participate, [...] why do you not make us participate [...], at the first meeting everyone is there, at the second meeting no one is there, when it comes to taking action, when it comes to assigning responsibilities that everyone takes care of something for example, and also share the tasks, there we feel that people start to flee, I do not speak of all associations, it is really those who cannot have many experiences, which do not have a lot of active [members] [...], for an association to participate and that it is really an effective participation, it is necessary that at least there is a minimum of financial resources, human, office, I do not know, mail account, press releases, telephone, thus the basic, unfortunately this is not always the case" (Ministry of Regional Development, Mawa)

"What I see is that the new civil society is a civil society that tends towards professionalism and the black spots; it lacks commitments, it lacks activism, it becomes a job that it is professional" (Ministry of Relations with Civil Society, Khaled)

The civil servant from the Ministry of Relations with Civil Society underlines the expertise as well as the comprehensible and pertinent language that is used by organizations like I Watch; also used in their reports that shape public debates. He highlights organizations like the Euromed Human Rights Network as well Jamaity. In some cases, participation of civil society got institutionalized and thus connected with representation of civil society.

Apart from that, the implication in legislative processes is highlighted by some civil servants and will be discussed in chapter seven in detail. It is particularly the civil servant from the Ministry of Relations with Civil Society⁵⁸ who underlines the number of consultations in relation to the electoral law for the municipal elections as well as other law projects. Another example is participation in the five years planning explained by the interview from the Ministry of Regional Development.

⁵⁸ He details the role the civil society takes and will take in the future through over the interview that can be found in the annex.

The interviewee from the Ministry of Relations with Civil Society also expressed that they are trying to ameliorate the coordination between ministries and civil society, as well as regional level relations. From the ministerial perspective however, missing confidence from the civil society is another problem:

"What is curious [...] is that the first consultations people came rather protesting [...], they start, one is never consulted, they do not realize that they are actually in a consultation, there is also a phenomenon of lack of confidence" (Ministry of Civil Relations and Institutions, Khaled)

"According to my explanation, they may not have so much confidence in the process. So, they come as spectators. [...] Well, if they want to make proposals to insert them there. No reaction. We sent two emails. We [...] we talked about it verbally, they did not send anything. [...]. I explain because they do not have so much confidence." (Ministry of Finance, Cyrine)

Another aspect is the criticism of disruptive protest. Protest itself is seen as rather positive, but disruptive protest as a problem.

"Now they cut the road. They no longer write letters, they cut the road. This aspect is really nasty" (Ministry of Tourism, Aymen)

"First of all, it must be recognized that after a revolution, and after a dictatorship, it is quite normal that there are uprisings, that there are frustrations related to the problems of strikes and the problems of [...] a problem of disorder. It's something natural, something [...] let's say, logical that it's happening. [...] But after two or three years, it becomes much more critical, especially since this kind of strike, it will paralyze the economy, economic activity, it will paralyze political stability, etc. So, that's where this kind of strike especially wildcat strike [...], it's not regulatory strikes. The wildcat strikes are beginning to give more concern to politicians, administrations, the government." (Ministry of Industry, Energy and Mines, Anis)

This framing of protest as disruptive is similar to the media coverage that exists on the UGTT that is seen as motivating wildcat strikes that hinder production.

Summary on participation

The interviews gave a very detailed picture on how civil society participates in decision making processes. What became obvious is the different degree of participation that is promoted by each ministry. While there is general legislation that civil society should participate (as well as the constitution that mentions a participatory approach), some ministries underline the utility of civil society for recruitment processes for example.

The interview at the Ministry for Habitation and Infrastructure is a good example, as the interviewees underlined the way they integrated civil society organizations in the recruitment process to create legitimacy. Other ministries like the Ministry of Women and the Ministry of Relations with Civil Society hold a different perspective as they mentioned also common visions and values that make it easier to cooperate with civil society. Other civil servants mentioned a perspective in between, where they “tried” participation and are still figuring out how it could work effectively.

When it comes to participation of civil society – and it is to underline that it is civil society and not individual citizens – participation is not equal as not every movement or organization has the same chances. Looser movements that do not operate within the context of professionalized organizations will have difficulties to enter the discussion.

In comparison to the organizational framing we have seen some similarities when it comes to participation through organizations, but also differences, for example a strong referral to legal requirements to make civil society participate by civil servants. The hypothesis that participatory democracy as shared element of a movement coalition is found among civil servants shows only partly true.

6.3.2 Representation: Representation of women and no discussion of minorities

Representation was mentioned in all interviews. In comparison to other dimensions, it is less important than for example participation or government capacity. However, it is a dimension that is often connected to participation. Representation of women is one of the discussed aspects.

"At the level of the Ministry of Finance, there are more women than men. And the female development rate is very important. And at the level of the agents of the FISC⁵⁹, are more women than men. So, it's paradoxical but it exists."
(Ministry of Finance, Cyrine)

"Tunisia is ahead in terms of equality men-women compared to other Arab countries, [...]. But in terms of management, in terms of responsibilities, there is always an effort to be made. For example, the new government has enough women. So, there is a positive change." (Ministry of Youth and Sports, Walid)

⁵⁹ Tax authorities.

The two citations by civil servants from different ministries relate representation of women to internal representation. Like for the UGTT, they focus less on the role of representation in society and political decision making, but in relation to their own organization.

Especially with regard to equality in representation of men and women, the argumentation within the Ministry of Women is very close to the one advocated by civil society in line with their perspective on women rights:

"It is a project called Project for the Promotion of Equality between Women and Men which consists of three specific objectives, three areas of work [...] to institutionalize gender on promotion economic empowerment and women's policy and the fight against all forms of gender-based violence." (Ministry of Women, Nizar)

The Ministry of Women connects equality of participation with equal rights and women rights, but also violence against women. Other interviewees like the one from the Ministry of Agriculture relate the problems in the interior with problems for rural women. In this sense, arguments on economic aspects similar to those raised among others by ATFD leaders emerged during some interviews.

On the other hand, minorities like handicapped people are excluded although some institutional mechanisms for representation exist. The interviewees from the Ministry of Youth and Sports as well as from the Presidency of the Government mention fixed quotas in order to achieve representation. The civil servant from the Ministry of Finance, on the other hand, mentions the missing documentation for blind persons relating it to personal experiences.

As mentioned earlier, some of the relations between civil society and state got institutionalized and representation of the civil society in committees is generally seen as useful. The representation dimension is often coded in relation with the participation dimension showing that both dimensions are connected. The question of handicapped was not touched by organizations. On the other hand, representation of different minorities (especially mentioned by the FTDES, ATFD and LTDH) did not play a role in interviews with civil servants, as did not left-right representation. What played a more important role is the representation of women (in line with arguments of the ATFD), as well as civil society in committees.

6.3.3 Transparency: it's about corruption

Transparency was neither coded in the interviews with the Ministry of Women nor in the interview with the Ministry of the Interior. However, it represents a dimension that is quite important for the remaining civil servants. Access to information and its legal basis is underlined by civil servants.

"So, we have a very important law that has been voted, [...] the law of access to information. It is a very important law and there is a specialized authority in this area." (Ministry of Education, Hamdi)

"I give you an example concerning the law on access to public information. [...] the law that was proposed by the government for the vote of the parliament, this law contains constraints for access to public information. These constraints were of public interest but the association "I Watch" has put pressure, great pressure on the government to remove this constraint. And the law was passed for access to public information without constraint. And it is a great achievement for the part of Tunisia. It's thanks to the civil association." (Ministry of Youth and Sports, Walid)

It is especially the demand for transparency that makes civil servants emphasize the dimension. The civil servant from the Ministry of Industry remarks that they publish, as part of the Open Data platform where all data generated by the ministry are available, in order to get feedback from citizens. One interview from the Ministry of Agriculture confirms that they have to publish information. For some civil servants transparency goes hand in hand with participation of civil society.

"We get organizations working on transparency involved. Budget transparency. We have I Watch with us, [...] We have Bawsala, we have Transparency First. We have opengov.tn. [...] We had, they dropped out, an organization called Influenza. And well, ITDD, the Institute of Development" (Ministry of Finance, Cyrine)

"It gave transparency. We treated everyone equally. We will also publish the competition notices. There is a publication on the website, also on the website of the employment agency. We do not exclude anyone." (Ministry of Habitation, Slim)

The perspective of the Ministry of Habitation as "using" civil society to assure legitimacy through transparency resembles the utilitarian perspective on elements of democracy that was evoked earlier. It is however not a perspective shared across all civil servants.

Corruption plays a role as part of the framing of civil servants. The interviewee from the Ministry of Youth and Sports for example underlines the economic consequences of corruption that cost two percent of growth. Also, other civil servants like the one from the

Ministry of Education or the Ministry of Regional Development acknowledge the problems. The interviewee from the Ministry of Relations with Civil Society connects the question of corruption with institutions and that also rural areas need access to the anti-corruption body (Ministry of Relations with Civil Society, Khaled).

Corruption gets connected to transparency and publishing information to prevent corruption. Particularly for those working on finance, open budgets and publishing information is important for fighting corruption. Some civil servants assign that cooperation with civil society creates transparency and thus less contestation. In comparison to the organizations analyzed, the question of transparency is more important, especially in relation to solutions. It is to recall that while corruption played only a minor role for organizations, it is the third most important dimension for civil servants.

6.4 Freedom dimension: diverse framing

6.4.1 Individual liberties: some emphasize human rights, others are more ambivalent

Individual liberties were not referred to in the interview with the Ministry of Youth and Sports, the Ministry of Industry and the Ministry for Regional Development. From the freedom dimension, individual liberties is the sub dimension discussed most. However, especially in comparison to organizations such as the LTDH, freedom and individual liberties do not play a big role as part of the framing of democracy.

Individual liberties are seen positive and as important element of the Tunisian revolution.

"The great achievement in 2011 is freedom. For all Tunisia. [...] Of course, we are free and we have a pride and all that in comparison with the other Arab countries. We are proud of this event. We are proud of this change that has made Tunisia's reputation in the world." (Ministry of Education, Hamdi)

"Demonizing human rights defenders in the country or abroad has left a mark in our thinking. Before, it was something very problematic, more than once, after 2011 it's different, so we became aware of our rights, the way in which we could enjoy our rights, but concretely there was no institution that could guarantee that, how can I have my right, if we read the 2014 constitution, chapter two devoted to individual and collective law, it is a huge achievement compared to articles seven to eleven in the old constitution" (Ministry of Relations with Civil Society, Khaled)

The acceptance of human rights activists and freedom is only one element of the framing. Different perspectives exist. On the other hand, the interviewee from the Ministry of

Tourism mentions that the Ben Ali period had the advantage of stability while lacking freedom, presenting a position that could live with autocracy.

"It may have been a more stable period than now, fewer freedoms, but it was more stable. We were safer. Now the officials are a bit like fired officials. If one does not do a job one is fired." (Ministry of Tourism, Aymen)

However, this position is not shared among civil servants. On the other extreme, interviewees from the Ministry of Relations with Civil Society as well as from the Ministry of Women underline the role of human rights, similar to what I found for the analyzed organizations as shown in chapter five:

"This is a guarantee that is enormous [...] now the rights are written in the constitution, how I as Tunisian can enjoy my right, [...] in the phase of law which comes into force which are not /no more consistent with this constitution and that they would have to change, so a lot of work needs to be done to change the laws, amend the laws to bring them in line with the constitution and especially to set up the institutions that will guarantee the real revival of these rights, we speak about a national human rights body we do not have [...]" (Ministry of Relations with Civil Society, Khaled)

"So, we were very precise on this point and on the values of human rights. So, to say that good the Arab-Muslim specificity etc., but there are also human rights. We respect it for those who want it to be their reference, but we must respect others as well. [...] Nothing for the Tunisian women is different compared to all the women of the world, whether in America or Europe, so we claim, and there I do not speak in my name only, but as citizen of the world. [...] So she [the Minister] is totally in favor of women's human rights and for total equality and with international references, etc. there is no problem at this level. [...] how to say, between theory and reality there are always difficulties, because she is still in a government, she is still in a political environment that is not always very favorable." (Ministry of Women, Soulayma – a)

The interviewee from the Ministry of Women for example underlines women rights as specific aspect of human rights and sees human rights as "condition sine qua non" for interaction with civil society, something that is absolutely in line with the framing of the ATFD (Ministry of Women, Soulayma – a).

For other ministries there are rather mixed results when it comes to freedom and way of life, for example when it comes to homosexuality, that is not seen as acceptable.

"Individual freedom, for example, there is a problem that [...] well, I do not know, for example, homosexuality is not allowed. [...] Maybe because we are a Muslim country, maybe [...]. Otherwise, all the rest, there is no taboo, there is no particular problem" (Ministry of Finance, Cyrine)

There are some elements that are only named by one interviewee: The interviewee from the Ministry of Tourism for example mentions the freedom of religion as element. The one from the Ministry of Relations with Civil Society adds transitional justice and rights and violence against women have been evoked by the one from the Ministry of Women. The civil servant from the Ministry of Relations with Civil Society refers to torture as a topic they cover and explains that Tunisia has the perspective of acknowledging the existence of torture while not accepting it. All those elements have only been mentioned by one civil servant showing the diversity of perspectives on individual liberties.

To summarize, freedom is integrated in framing, but different civil servants highlight different aspects like human rights, freedom of religion or violence against women. In this sense, especially the interviewee from the Ministry of Relations with Civil Society mentions with torture a topic that so far was only discussed by the LTDH. The civil servant from the Ministry of Women underlines the role of human rights and especially women rights as does the ATFD. Those similarities touch especially ministries like the Ministry of Women as well as the Ministry of Relations with Civil Society.

There are some ministries that use framings more similar to the movements' perspectives, while others clearly do not. It is to recall that some civil servants did not mention human rights or individual liberties. Others are more limited than organizational ones. With notably two exceptions, ministries have a rather limited perception of human rights and democracy especially when compared to LTDH and ATFD. One of the hypotheses that human rights as transcending element of a coalitional framing can be found among civil servants does not show true for all.

6.4.2 Public Sphere: few discussed and missing professionalization

The dimension was not coded in interviews with the Ministry of Women, with the Ministry of Tourism, with the Ministry of the Interior as well as with the Presidency of the Government. These limitations already show that the public sphere is less important than for example participation. The public sphere dimension is one of the least discussed dimensions in interviews.

When talking about the public sphere, civil servants referred to the role of the media, but also acknowledged that media outlets are not impartial. While the interviewee from the Ministry of Education for example describes the media landscape in Tunisia as free, the one from the Ministry of Youth and Sports criticizes that media outlets are not neutral but closer to specific parties. The proximity of media outlets to some parties is also shared by the interviewee from the Ministry of Finance. Professionalization of media is another aspect discussed:

"Freedom has given us the right to have an open internet and many among the Tunisians have seen the world differently because we thought we were free and really we saw how the freedom is elsewhere; it is different and our regime said we were democratic, we made the elections, we want democracy; [...] afterwards it was the 2011 elections that the elections became different [...]" (Ministry of Relations with Civil Society, Khaled)

"[...]with the media, now, they start to validate or search the information informally following various training sessions, etc., they try to validate the information and to see with us before [...] they publish anything.[...]it is still to emphasize that the social networks or the media, it remains in Tunisia at a very low level in terms of professionalism, because generally, there are many newspapers or media relaying false information or relay a point of view without having the other point of view. So, there is a lack of professionalism. There are some media that are funded by political parties or influential people, etc., to try to divert public opinion, so the media sector is still in movement [...], it is necessary to take the function of media with precaution for certain files or certain information." (Ministry of Industry, Energy and Mines, Anis)

Those limitations for the functioning of the media are widespread among civil servants with the notable exception of the civil servant from the Ministry of Education. Those illustrate also the practical limitations, while other limits for freedom of speech get discussed.

The limit of freedom of speech is seen in radical opinions that incite violence, a position that is also shared by movement leaders. The interviewee from the Ministry of Women underlines the difficulties for freedom of expression after years of dictatorship:

"It was not easy at all after [...] decades of dictatorship, to have the opportunity today to express oneself, and again, there is a small question mark in relation to that, have the opportunity to express oneself, discover one's own possibilities and skills etc. [...]" (Ministry of Women, Soulayma – a)

This framing is however nothing widespread across civil servants and shows again the particularity of the Ministry of Women.

Civil servants underline the role of the media that are not always impartial and reliable. On the other hand, ministries know that problems can be easily mediatized. The public sphere is not an essential part of the framing of civil servants. While a lot of elements resemble those presented by organizations, it is doubtful whether it stands for all civil servants given that many did not mention this dimension.

6.4.3 Rule of law: the constitution as basis

The dimension was not included in the interviews with the Ministry of Habitation. All others made a referral to the rule of law dimension, while it was not very detailed in most cases.

The Ministry of Women and the Ministry of Relations with Civil Society clearly refer to the constitution as well as international treaties (for the Ministry of Relations with Civil Society compare also 6.4.1).

"[...] the reference is clear. There is the constitution, there are the international conventions. So, there is no problem even with a change of ministers. [...] and the vision is already established. So, we cannot go against that vision and against the constitution." (Ministry of Women, Soulayma – b)

These are again the same two ministries that are closer to civil society. On the other hand, the constitution is also important for other civil servants:

"In 2015 with an established constitution we have a legitimacy of the institutions. Institutions must be constitutional. It must be reflected. Hence the importance of exchange, hence the different levels of the political and institutional environment." (Ministry of the Interior, Rania)

The civil servant from the Ministry of Relations with Civil Society connects codified rights with human rights, but also warns that existent legislation needs to be conform to the constitution. The constitution builds the general guidelines for the realization of democracy in Tunisia. State representatives regularly refer to the constitution as a general guideline, however this does not concretize in other explanations. The dimension is not of great importance to the majority of civil servants and included only limited explanations, often with a general referral to the constitution.

6.5 Several framings of democracy

It is difficult to identify one clear framing of democracy across ministries, something acknowledged by interviewees as well.

"She [the minister] is in a context of the country [...] where you have to have a certain vision of democracy, because democracy in Tunisia is not democracy in

Europe, with all the experience accumulated since the French and other revolutions in the world. It is not the same thing; it is a new fact so this approach towards democracy, it is necessary to have a vision for that and I think that it is not always a shared vision, so it is not a program put in place by the government, which is a mix of different political tendencies. So, there is not a clear and evident vision of democracy” (Ministry of Women, Soulayma – a)

While the larger setting of a democratic political system is accepted, each ministry has its own orientation. However, ministries share a referral to civil society and a participative approach. Participation enters in the general definition of democracy.

"Democracy, you know, it's the citizen who chooses first and foremost. It is the one who chooses its leader and its governor. That's the point, that's democracy; [...] It's the participation of citizens in public life too." (Ministry of Youth and Sports, Walid)

"You know in Tunisia, democracy [...] is very recent. We are not used to involve people in decision-making, and so on. But I think it's a good initiative. Personally, I think it's good and we work mainly in collaboration with all the organizations and all that with the associations. There are [...] more ideas, there are more proposals, there is a trial of a feedback." (Ministry of Agriculture, Safa)

Summarizing the relative importance of every (sub-) dimension of democracy, it appears that framings not only differ from one organization to another, but also from one ministry to another. I shortly summarize the main findings from the analysis of the three dimensions before turning to a more detailed picture of frame combinations as well as the specifics of each ministry.

The competition of political actors does only play a minor role in the framing of democracy of the civil servants. Government capacity on the other hand, is an important sub-dimension for civil servants. Especially the stability of the government is important, mainly from a practical perspective as change disrupts the work of civil servants. This is perfectly in line with the framing of the organizations. Competencies of ministers as well as good governance are included in the framing of government capacities and were not for civil society leaders except the FTDES.

The referral to security and terrorism, often found for example for the UGTT especially in articles, is shared only by the Ministry of the Interior. Mutual constraints are particularly important to civil servants in the sense that decentralization as well as some control institutions are underlined. However, this is done with caution, as it is new to the

administration. This framing on democracy, with a cautious perspective on decentralization, is comparable to the one expressed by ATFD or UGTT for example. Another aspect, even stronger than for movement leaders, is the referral to civil society as a counter power or watchdog to the state as well as the important role of institutions. The partly similar framing of decentralization as well as government stability is rather an exception and framing appears as different in comparison to the organizations.

When it comes to equality, participation is the most important dimension mentioned by civil servants. It is thus an essential part of the framing of democracy. The perspective is very positive towards the inclusion of civil society as a whole and linked with representation. It covers a number of elements like reasons for civil society participation (inspiration, legitimacy and so on), professionalization of civil society as well as questions related to participation.

The participation of civil society occurs not on an equal basis. Effectively, well-connected and old organizations are easier included, professionalization equally plays a role. In this sense, equality of participation is limited. When it comes to representation, some organizations are better represented than others (and thereby different parts of the population). The partly negative referral to too much protest in interviews with civil servants is not found for the organizations and appears only in the reporting on the UGTT.

The representation of women is mentioned, while the representation of minorities does not play a role, except handicapped people and this more from an administrative perspective. This perspective on minorities is more in line with the framing of the UGTT arguing that there are no minorities in Tunisia.

When it comes to transparency, open access to legislation and access to information as well as the fight against corruption are important. However, when it comes to fighting corruption, businessmen for example were only partly named as main influencers, while the framing focusses on internal measures against corruption. The framing on transparency shows an orientation towards the ministry itself and includes justification or measures that

are taken against corruption on the administration level. It misses the general perspective for society. There is no systematic similarity with organizational framing.

On freedom, some state representatives highlight the codification of rights, while civil society actors emphasize their application. On the other hand, especially the Ministry of Women as well as the Ministry of Relations with Civil Society have a more explicit rights-based approach connected to human rights. Equality before the law as a sub-dimension plays no role for civil servants. Contrary to the findings for especially the ATFD and the LTDH, the freedom dimension did not play an important role for the ministries. Freedom of speech gets underlined to a limited degree. For rule of law, there is a certain referral to the constitution but no detailed one.

As mentioned earlier, it is difficult to identify common elements. When it comes to elements of democracy it is the participation of civil society that is most consistently framed. The referral to human rights is limited to some ministries and not consistently prominent across ministries.

Democracy across ministries

When taking all ministries together an overwhelmingly amount of mentions is related to the equality dimension as Table 10.28 in the Annex shows. This dimension accounts for over half of all mentions which is very much compared to the organizations and is probably caused by a bias if civil servants felt that they should talk more about participation. However, not all of this coverage can be attributed to the bias and even when focusing on the content it is the framing that is most consistently promoted across civil servants.

This finding needs to be qualified even more than for the organizations as perceptions across ministries vary strongly. As Table 10.28 shows, participation is for all ministries, except the Ministry for Sport and the Ministry of the Interior the most important element. The mentions for each dimension vary largely also when relating to the total framing by each civil servant. The equality dimension is the most important dimension apart for the Ministry of the Interior. Other dimensions like government capacity, but also mutual constraints are mentioned to an important degree by some ministries but are irrelevant to others.

The diversity of perceptions of democracy across ministries can be shown well with the dimension of transparency. This dimension is important in the interviews with the Ministry of Youth and Sports as well as the Ministry on Habitation. For other civil servants it only plays a minor role and even the interviewees from both ministries have a different perception of it. While the civil servant from the Ministry of Youth and Sports underlines budget and financial transparency, the civil servants from the Ministry of Habitation emphasize the transparency of recruitment processes. For the Ministry of Women or also for the Ministry of Tourism as well as the one for the Interior it is not important at all.

Because of the difficulty to identify common elements in the state perspective, it is also difficult to relate the influence to organizations. The perspective on the freedom dimension illustrates differences and similarities towards organizations. Recalling that the freedom dimension plays an important role for ATFD and LTDH, but also for the FTDES, this is not the case for most ministries, with the exception of two ministries, the Ministry of Relations with Civil Society as well as the Ministry of Women. This means that while it is not possible to speak about overarching ideational influence on the state, the influence is limited to some ministries.

Recalling its importance for the organizations, it is surprising that human rights did not get more coverage. In addition, it contradicts the assumption that organizations have a collective influence on the framing of human rights as human rights were not prominent across ministries and took different perspectives. Possible explanations include that the question of individual liberties concerns only some of the Ministries like the Ministry of the Interior and does simply not represent the working reality of other ministries. It refutes the central idea that especially human rights can be promoted by civil society towards (all) ministries, influence is limited to specific ministries.

It needs to be kept in mind, that none of the interviewees was an official spokesperson, but all in leading positions. This might also be the reason why there is no clear framing of democracy, but a very diverse one.

Frame combinations

Having outlined that framing is very diverse for the state, I nevertheless highlight some important combinations with elements of democracy, but also including other elements.

The most important frame combinations include participation with respectively government capacity, mutual constraints and transparency. Table 10.26 in the annex shows that participation and government capacity as well as individual liberties and rule of law are central for combinations.

With regard to other dimensions not related to democracy (Annex, Figure 10.27) that came up during the interviews, social politics are most important, followed by education, the revolution and the pre-revolutionary period. The remaining aspects are rather ministry specific such as the coding of sport related issues. However, like for the organizations, the role of economic aspects, here in the form of development and social politics, is a major point of referral that gets integrated in the framing of democracy.

When comparing the most mentioned frame combinations with frame combinations by organizations (Figure 5.14), then it is the most important frame combination with the UGTT in articles that is similar to the most important one for ministries. When looking at its content the mediatized perspective of the UGTT on participation and government capacity focuses on strikes and the demand for more resources, while the one for civil servants focuses on the role of civil society and influence on government.

Summary on the framing by state actors

To summarize, there are several framings of democracy, very limited ones like the one by the civil servants from the Ministry of Habitation, a state capacity focused one of the Ministry of the Interior – talking even about a Leviathan – as well as several other civil servants emphasizing transparency or good governance that can be located between the extremes.

Some of the perceptions show incomplete pictures of democracy which is problematic when elements like equality are used as a basic referral of argumentation⁶⁰. While I do not speak about undemocratic frames per se, there are effectively framings of democracy that are also compatible with a more authoritarian political system for example when collective rights are emphasized over individual ones or when participation of civil society is not constructed as substantial participation, but as factor for avoiding conflict.

Relatively common is the referral to a participatory democracy as written in the constitution that translates in an obligation to have civil society participate as intermediary of individual citizens. It is an egalitarian conception of democracy that primes for civil servants, with the reserves that participation was the principal topic of discussion. On a very practical level, chances of participation are not equal as ministries work as a filter for participation as outlined above.

The Ministry of Women and the Ministry of Relations with Civil Society hold framings of democracy that are much closer to the organizations, apart from the UGTT. The UGTT perspective is particularly compatible with the focus on state capacity that was often emphasized by civil servants. The FTDES perspective, although in terms of dimensions highlighted resembles a lot the UGTT, appears especially on decentralization close to the state perspective, however, on minority and migrant rights not at all. Thus, it becomes a complicated puzzle.

6.6 Coincidence of interactions and framings?

As we have seen in chapter four (and as will be detailed in chapter seven), especially the UGTT holds close reciprocal contacts towards a variety of actors of the political system. From this data it can be expected that the UGTT framing of democracy, with a slight focus on government control, equality, but also with its connections to economic conditions, is prominent among state representatives as there are many interactions. This is however not the case. While the state capacity framing is indeed present across civil servants, it is not the same perspective that is emphasized. While the UGTT focuses on government stability and

⁶⁰ Although I do not enter the complete discussion on heuristics, Weible et al.'s article inspires to regard democracy as heuristics, something that could be element of further research (Weible et al. 2011). From this perspective it becomes insufficient to reduce democracy to one element.

fighting terrorism, this framing was less found among civil servants. A practical framing on government stability that sees it as more important for the own work gets emphasized.

While the UGTT framing appears as less transmitted to the state there are also examples where framings and interactions resemble a lot. As we have also seen, the Ministry of Women is important for the ATFD, the Ministry of the Interior and the Ministry of Justice for the LTDH. As however not all of those contacts have been evaluated as important by civil servants, the framing is more similar for ATFD and Ministry of Women than for the LTDH and the Ministry of the Interior for example (keeping in mind results from chapter four). It appears that the Ministry of the Interior shares only few framings on democracy with civil society, raising doubts on whether civil society has intensive links with that ministry (one interviewee from the LTDH assigned that it is difficult with the Ministry of the Interior although much better than before). Another explication is that the diffusion of framings on democracy by interaction did not work in this case and one might speculate whether it is just about the issue covered by the ministry. It could also be that given the central position of the Ministry of the Interior at the time of Ben Ali, old habits are still very dominant.

It is also complicated for the FTDES to relate framing and interactions. The FTDES mentioned several ministries as being important, but especially the Ministry for Social Affairs like the UGTT or the Ministry of Relations with Civil Society. Unfortunately, as mentioned earlier, the Ministry of Social Affairs is not included, as it was impossible to interview a leader in this ministry due to reasons I can only speculate over (internal policies and so on). Given its prominent mention for interactions, I do still assume that framings are particularly congruent with the ones of the UGTT. Nevertheless, contacts towards the Ministry of Relations with Civil Society are intense and when comparing the framing one can see that there are several similarities.

Interestingly a framing on rural women, an ATFD topic, has been found for the Ministry of Regional Development. This is also true for ministries where no specific links have been expressed by the ATFD (notably the Ministry of Regional Development). As also other organizations took over the topic it seems that it spread to other organizations. It appears

that this could be an example of indirect transmission, something to be verified by future research in detail.

When taking the combined perspective of movements, the already mentioned elements human rights, participation and economy are prominent. While participatory elements of democracy are mentioned by civil servants, human rights have no prominent role with two exceptions. The focus on economic elements however is something widespread among civil servants.

6.7 Conclusion to chapter six

There is not one approach towards democracy, but several, including also a different degree of acceptance of civil society. Some civil servants prefer associations close to the public sector where people that they already know are included; an aspect facilitated by multi membership (ministry and associations). Others are more open towards the broader civil society without clear preferences.

In some cases, the discussion on democracy was limited as elements of democracy got connected to own projects or to the orientation of the ministry in a utilitarian way. Compared to the organizations this means that it is even more limited than the one-dimensional approach of the LTDH because no dimension of democracy is discussed in detail for some ministries. A limited framing of democracy is on the other hand more compatible with autocracy and can be interpreted as leftover from the Ben Ali period. As one interviewee mentioned, there is no clear common framing of democracy that is shared across ministries.

There is a difference between less politicized ministries and more political ministries⁶¹. Those differences shape the orientation towards civil society as less politicized ministries “must talk” to civil society due to legally binding directives; other ministries promote an open, civil society oriented and more participative form of democracy. Ministries that are rarely targeted by civil society (like the one on Habitation) are rather oriented towards their problem fields and less towards democracy. It is a very utilitarian use of the concept of

⁶¹ As a less politicized ministry I qualify ministries that emphasize the technical aspect of their work and argue less on the basis of aspects of democracy, parliamentary decisions etc. Ministries underlying the administrative aspects of their work qualify as technical.

democracy. For the Ministry for Habitation two elements of democracy are more important, namely participation and transparency. This is exactly what civil society organizations are used for: to ensure legitimacy by providing transparency of procedures. On the other hand, the Ministry of Relations with Civil Society as well as the Ministry of Women are particularly close to civil society and some of the analyzed organizations in terms of a democratic framing (it is still a more egalitarian perspective).

It is not about absolute congruence of framings, but about the perception of similar framings. What I mean here is that – as noted above – frame combinations are not completely similar, but actors insisted that they share values and beliefs. Those two evoked ministries have intense contacts with civil society. Other ministries are in between; between self-oriented concepts and a wider perspective on democracy (like the Ministry of Youth and Sports). It is possible that intensive networks augment the willingness to accept divergent elements in the framing of partners. However, this needs to be verified by further research.

A participatory approach as written in the constitution is accepted, participation occurs through organizations that represent the citizens. However, disruptive protest is partly seen as going too far. Some civil servants accept every form of protest if not violent and encourage the dialogue. Many civil servants made a comparison to the pre-2011 period and how freedom as well as elections were influenced positively due to the referral made by organizations. It is not about human rights as common element between organizations and ministries, but participatory democracy as a key term that is shared. Equally, the importance of civil society is the same when asking civil servants and organizations. Thus, civil society is seen as a constitutive element of the Tunisian democracy.

When it comes to the stability of the government, less change in government is preferred, similar to what organizations described. It thus becomes easier for both sides when governments change less. The economic aspects present in interviews with organizations were related to social politics in interviews with civil servants.

Some similarities came up for decentralization. Most civil servants see it as element of the constitution that has to be realized and see a number of problems. While problems are also

advanced by organizations, the link to the economic development and importance of regional decision making is highlighted more explicitly for organizations; perhaps with the two exceptions, the Ministry for Regional Development and the Ministry for Relations with Civil Society.

No common framing?

The idea of a common framing on democracy that can be found for ministries and organizations did not show true. Effectively, different framings exist and perspectives are not unified. This is less surprising considering that the Tunisian democracy is relatively young and also civil servants need to learn and practice democracy. It is also in line with the different degree of interaction that was found in chapter four.

Two aspects are nevertheless important. First, the civil servants in the Ministry of Women show democratic framings that are highly similar to those found at the ATFD. Especially the right-based approach on women rights and the insistence on a common framing based on equality and parity are shared. Those close framings are facilitated by the entrance of former as well as actual women movement members in the Ministry; something that will be discussed in chapter seven.

Second, the Ministry of Relations with Civil Society has a framing of democracy that is close to the one advanced by civil society with a human rights-based approach. The person interviewed has personal connections to the FTDES and the LTDH that might have supported the framing. Personal but also impersonal contacts as well as the task of the ministry to promote civil society appear favorable to a similar framing. Both ministries are examples for an ideational influence facilitated through intense interaction between ministries and organizations.

Notwithstanding it is to note, that a number of other ministries hold a more general perspective strongly focused on the government capacity that resembles the perspective of the UGTT. There is some evidence that the wide networks of the UGTT also shapes framings, especially for the Presidency of the Government as will be explained later. Nevertheless, evidence for movement and civil society influence on democratic framings is limited. In addition, movements and organizations may adapt their perspectives to government

narratives. In this sense, it is probable that the control and equality-oriented perspective of the UGTT is also shaped by its interactions with the state.

As we have seen in chapter five, especially frames on economic aspects, salaries (for the UGTT), as well as questions of terrorism and security resonate a lot in public. While the economic frame can be found in interviews with civil servants, none of the other framings is relevant to them. Thus, it is questionable whether there is a lot of influence through the media. However, civil servants acknowledge some attention but also skepticism towards traditional media reporting what will be detailed in chapter seven.

From a normative perspective it is not a problem that state and civil society hold different framings of democracy, which is absolutely logic as each emphasizes other dimensions of democracy. However, the very different concepts that are present on the state level can lead to tensions across state actors and hence political conflicts. In addition, it is surprising that some organizations defend even a majoritarian perspective on democracy, while state actors use an egalitarian perspective. A stronger focus on equality and the framing of participatory democracy vis-à-vis state actors may be more beneficial for connections with other ideas. In this sense, especially the LTDH that does not connect equality a lot has difficulties, while the ATFD with a focus on participation and representation is in a far better position because their arguments naturally overlap with some of the framings of civil servants.

As mentioned earlier, results are not generalizable to all civil servants and it is thus up to future research to confirm or falsify the obtained results. The diversity of frames and the presence of different framings across ministries pose problems as mainly only one interview represents a ministry. More interviews with civil servants of one ministry on their bilateral interactions with specific organizations are necessary to put results on a more robust basis. As the original idea was to have as many ministries as relevant as part of this research, I would nowadays focus on some ministries and have more interviews for those where interactions are frequent. However, at the time of writing it appears still as the right choice to search a variety of ministries. It was this approach that allowed to account for the difference across ministries.

Not surprisingly, there appears to be competition among ministries on the realization of ideas with the Presidency of the Government as deciding factor in case of conflict. This central position and its influence on legislation processes is outlined in the next chapter taking a close look on mechanisms of influence that have been identified for the movements. While the ideational influence is limited, the ministries shall be situated a bit more, but also general ways of influencing are outlined. It is possible that those interactions still need time to show results on the state site and thus the identification of mechanisms can allow a future comparison. As we know from chapter four, different networks exist that movements can use. While the UGTT has a limited, state-oriented network, the others spread much more towards other civil society actors.

Chapter Seven

Transmission mechanisms

7 Direct ties and public discourse

Chapter seven shows the mechanisms by which movements can influence state framing and policies. The chapter answers the question: What are the mechanisms used by movements and how effective are those? As we have seen earlier, framings do only play a role in specific contexts of the Ministry of Women for example. Keeping framings of democracy in mind, this chapter connects the question of frame influence with policy influence, so whether specific elements of a democratic framing get promoted through policy proposals or opposition. While we saw in chapter six that framings are quite different, movements can nevertheless influence legislation and democracy. It is expected that social movements use networks to realize their democratic framing directly (direct influence). Movement members enter the state apparatus or have close contacts to the administration. In addition, social movements use the media to influence the population (indirect influence). However, frame resonance in public is rather limited as shown in chapter five, something that will be discussed as well.

As we have seen before, it can be expected that ministries with close ties to organizations have common framing (compare chapter four on networks, for example Ministry of Women

and ATFD). As we have seen degrees of similarities differ between ministries with those with more interaction having some similarity.

While chapter six on the ministerial framing has shown that influence in terms of a democratic framing is limited, except notably two ministries, the general mechanisms and channels to influence the state will be outlined. In addition, the differences between the ministries that are closer to civil society and those that are more distant are outlined in order to identify effective channels of diffusion. It is to recall, that the perspective is ministry oriented, setting aside other actors like political parties.

In line with theory, notably the direct/indirect/joint effect model will be tested, as well as different entry points at different policy stages (Giugni and Passy 2003; Giugni 2004; Giugni and Yamasaki 2009; Amenta 2006). It shows ways to influence especially ministries as those connections are verified through the state representative interviews, but also gives insights on how to influence other actors. In addition, interaction does not automatically mean influence as is shown in this chapter.

Three arguments guide the chapter. First, at different stages of the policy process, influence differs; organizations that place a certain topic and frame it their way, have a higher chance to get it realized. This goes back to agenda-setting and setting a topic as important. This stage bases on emulation where state actors get convinced about a better policy option, and to more limited degree learning.

Second, the direct/indirect/joint effect model has its limits in the Tunisian case because the traditional media sector does not work effectively and there is mistrust in information as we have seen before. In line is mistrust in information and consequentially some limits for learning on the basis of new information. The direct influence model appears as effective. Indirect effects can be achieved via media reporting on protest, and consequentially coercion.

Third, proactive proposals in early phases have a higher probability of getting integrated into policy making and consistent framing of common proposals is important in order to make

positions clearly identifiable. As we have seen from theory, early processes are easier to influence (chapter two). In this phase it is mainly about proactive proposals because it is often too early to oppose legislation where the proposal is not yet written.

The chapter bases not only findings from chapter four on networks, but combines those with chapters five and six on framing and links it with the findings on influencing as outlined in interviews. The question of individual or coalitional influence is discussed in the second part of the chapter.

The chapter starts retracing how movements can influence state framing and policy decisions. A focus is given to legislation processes and at which stage it becomes possible for movements/organizations to influence ministries. The chapter here outlines the possibilities and connects it to ideational and policy influence at the end. The second part answers the question whether public opinion and the media can influence the policy making process. Thereafter, three examples of legislation are used to illustrate degrees of influence. If there is some ideational influence, organizations should be capable to influence legislation processes in a desired way, even if this is limited to the two ministries where influence was shown.

7.1 Ties of actors and possible entry points

Figure 7.1 summarizes influence channels that have been identified with the help of the network structures outlined in chapter four and what interviewees told. Direct arrows show relatively stable and working channel via different relay, while the broken arrows show channels that work partially from a movement perspective/ministry perspective. For example, while organizations use information and education to influence people as part of learning, it is not clear whether this process effectively translates in votes for parties that see a topic as important or whether information or education motivate people to protest. Especially on the latter more research is needed. On the other hand it is doubtful if ministers care a lot about elections if they are technocrats that while being nominated by parties, can still survive in their position without party support. Even for elected parliamentarians it is questionable whether not every parliamentarian has to fear re-election in a party system that still changes a lot.

I differentiate between movements and organization as organized movements can get heard because ministries prefer clear contact persons and clear resources behind (Figure 7.1). From the ministry perspective a difference in treatment between protest and organized claims exists. Equally, a slight difference between the ministries and the Presidency of the Government - officially a ministry itself - is highlighted as the latter plays a special role in legislation processes. Differences in mechanisms are considered in detail later.

I generally identified six relays that can serve as transmission channels and mechanisms for the promotion of ideas. Those are Individuals that entered the state, recruitment processes with civil society participation, institutionalized hearings, hearings by ministries or by parliament, the media as well as the people and thus the general public. When it comes to the media, media reporting on organizational demands, but also on protest is possible. Protest and coercion is consequentially most effective in its mediatized form.

As became clear through interviews, protest appears as something to be avoided for some ministries. It also became clear, that protest is especially regarded when a critical mass in terms of media reporting is reached. Protest passes thus by the media – and thus in an indirect way - in most cases. The threat of protest is to be seen as part of coercion by civil society on state actors. Especially disruptive protest can be perceived as negative (chapter six on ministerial framing), thus, it is questionable whether this type of protest can influence ministries to the same degree. For all ministries, it is questionable whether the relay media can function effectively when media is not perceived as impartial. While civil servants regard media reports, they prefer different sources of information (thus learning through media is seen as improbable, coercion as possible). On the other hand, movements and especially the FTDES use media or press releases in two ways: They try to pose their own information in the media and, more indirect, protest is used to create media attention, but also general public attention in order to influence the government. Media is not without problems: Especially the ATFD leaders have doubts that this works effectively as their positions are not correctly taken over.


As reserves on media exist, diffusion of framing does not work effectively. I therefore argue that the indirect effect model that uses the public sphere does not work well with the

traditional media, as media in Tunisia is not seen as independent. In the Tunisian context, it seems more useful to focus on the direct influence model.

For more open ministries a number of entry points exist, multiplying channels for access. As civil servants outlined, most ministries have to include civil society in one or the other way, while the form of involvement is not unified. While closed ministries focus on consultation for example during recruitment processes or public consultations as Figure 7.1 shows, open ministries have institutionalized consultation bodies or consult regularly with civil society in order to get new ideas or to create transparency. As will be detailed later, recruitment processes are seen as less effective when it comes to promoting ideas, while institutionalized committees are better suited. The different channels are seen as enabling or hindering factors for the diffusion of democratic framing and policies.

Individuals that are part of the civil society can serve as relays for the transmission of ideas. This is a way of influencing that works also on an ideational level linked to emulation and that is the first channel that is presented. Before looking at this channel in detail, I shortly outline the Tunisian legislation processes to create a better understanding on policy processes in Tunisia.

Figure 7.1 Actor based ways of influencing



Note: own figure based on interviews

Legislation process

The legislation process is important to understand when and how movements can influence policies through their framing. It is an additional step towards framing influence and outlines what interactions can influence policies with and without common framing. The legislation process is here described as experienced by the actors involved. While this is similar to the stages of the policy process as outlined in chapter two, I explain it from the perspective of interviewees. Therefore, terms such as agenda setting phase will not appear in this overview.

The initiation of a law proposal normally comes from a ministry, the administration or the parliament including political parties as illustrated in Figure 7.2. In some cases -as will be illustrated later-, movements can pressure ministries to propose a law. Normally one or few ministries are in charge for a law project.

In case of budget implications, the Ministry of Finance needs is included; interviewees also mentioned that formally the Presidency of the Government as well as the Administrative Court are to be informed. The parliament proposes only few laws itself or sends the ideas for elaboration to ministries. According to Youssef from the Presidency of the Government it is especially the missing expertise that makes parliamentarians send law ideas to the administration:

"The parliamentarians prepare the laws but sometimes they do not have for example the knowledge or something like that. They limit themselves to give directives and they trust in the expertise of the administration to help them. They also call us to listening sessions to listen to our opinion" (Presidency of the Government, Youssef)

When a law proposal is initiated, a consultation phase follows. While some ministries consult with other ministries, some have open consultations or consult with the organizations they work with regularly. This process is not unified. The legislation process includes a lot of inter-ministerial coordination:

"And for other texts, decrees or laws, even decrees, generally [...] one must have the opinion of the Presidency of the Government, the Ministry of Finance and the Administrative Court. Generally, in these three instances, they must be notified on the project before being consulted, [...] to pass [...] by the ministerial council." (Ministry of Youth and Sports, Walid)

"It goes through all ministries in the case of proposing laws. Once one has collected all the opinions, one tries to get closer, to solve the various problems one has. Once we have an agreement, we send to parliament" (Ministry of Tourism, Aymen)

When the law proposal passed all involved ministries and when potential conflicts are decided by the Presidency, the law proposal gets published and is sent to Parliament.

The Parliament can have consultation as part of the involved parliamentary commissions. This is another stage where movements and organizations can get involved. As will be shown later through the law examples, once a law proposal is published, protest makes more sense and can be directed towards parliament and government. It is in the second part of policy process when it comes to passage and implementation where protest is seen as effective because consultation mechanisms are missing. When the plenary accepted the law, the president signs the law and once it is published in the official journal, it enters into force. However, the signature by the president, as well as the publication can be delayed; another point where protest can emerge. The law proposal becomes only a law when published in the official journal JORT.

Consultation and conflicts

The processes slightly differ from one ministry to another, especially the moment at which organizations get consulted. The Ministry of Finance for example uses a Council, where also organizations participate, to get early feedback. In most of the cases, consultations are conducted after internal consultation with other ministries:

"The Ministry, the Directorate of Legislation begins to prepare the law on finance. It is sent to all departments, so to all professional organizations to ask if they have proposals to make. And the administration, too, is looking at whether there are texts that have not worked well, whether there is something that is not up to date or something to change, etc. So, we collect all that. [...] And afterwards, this Directorate of Legislation drafts the project. [...] We have what is called the National Council of Taxation. It is a consultative body [...] It is formed of professional organizations, other departments, departments other than the Ministry of Finance. [...] We expose them it and we ask for their opinion [...] if there are relevant remarks, if there are changes to be made, we modify and submit it to the Council of Ministers. [...] by times it is approved by the Council of Ministers. We're doing some new consultations. The most important professional organizations are consulted. UTICA, UGTT, etc. If we can rectify, if it is not quite the opposite [...] So not to disrupt everything, therefore, we take into account. If not, we refer to Parliament and they can go to Parliament to reclaim it." (Ministry of Finance, Cyrine)

"There is a draft text that is prepared in consultation with the other ministries. After having sent the project to the presidency of the government, we have to prepare a modified version, and at this stage, we involve the others. So, in my opinion, we cannot get them involved from the beginning [...] and you know most [of them] are not experts" (Ministry of Agriculture, Safa)

In case of conflict between ministries, ministries first negotiate with each other before making civil society participate. The civil servant from the Ministry of Finance underlines that there were occasions where civil society organizations did not show up although being solicited.

If no consensus on important questions is reached between ministries, it is the Presidency of the Government that takes a decision.

"Generally, within this council, these are minimal problems or issues that do not have significant impact at the national level; they are managed through the different technical departments within ministries, of two or three ministries. So, they are managed at the ministerial level. If the problem is significant, normally they are brought back to arbitration before the Prime Minister within the framework of the ministerial council or the restricted ministerial council, as that the decision finally is taken by the President of the Government" (Ministry of Industry, Energy and Mines, Anis)

The Presidency of the Government thus has a decisive position and can influence which laws get promoted and which not. Similarly, a law project can "bounce" between the ministerial council and ministries (Ministry of Youth and Sports, Walid). However, conflicts between ministries are not the only conflicts. Equally, discussions with parliament can arise. Conflicts with parliament get discussed by the Consensus Commission⁶²:

"As soon as the project is transmitted to parliament, it is published on the site. [...] So, at the level of parliament, if there are major discrepancies and everything, there is a commission called the [...] Consensus Commission. We meet the Commission and the ministry to find compromises. [...] If there is a compromise, that's good. If there is no compromise, the Finance Commission reports and transmits it to the plenary. And the vote is in plenary. So, the ministry will defend the project and the others will defend their point of view." (Ministry of Finance, Cyrine)

The Consensus Commission does however not include civil society. Law proposals can even originate from civil society. The movement perspective suggests, that law projects are not only elaborated by ministries or the parliament, but equally by the UGTT:

⁶² The International Crisis Group (2018) recently mentioned this commission as being used extensively for legislative decisions by political parties, also sidelining the complete parliamentary assembly.


"Well, we have just taken the initiative to propose a law on the social and solidary economy because we believe that the development model that is currently being followed does not fully meet the needs of the economy for the promotion of [...] and insertions of young people and women into working life. That's why we have a fight against poverty. We proposed a framework law for promotion and solidarity as the third pillar of the economy because the current economy is lame, if we think of the private sector and the public sector. [...]. So, it is a cross-cutting mission that pushes the major economic issues to big reforms." (UGTT, Aziz)

Of course, the law proposal is not officially proposed by the UGTT, but a ministry that was approached by the UGTT. However, this is only true for the UGTT to this degree. For other organizations it is more complicated to realize law proposal with the notable exception of the women movement as shown later.

"It depends. But we continue. For example, we spent four years to have a law decree with five governments. Because we believe that people change, but the state exists. So there, since 2011, we had a fight to have an inquiry committee [...] on the issue of missing migrants in Italy, so the government before January 14, [...], the government before October 23, the government after October 23, [...], the government of the Democrats, until we arrived at this government. So, five governments. We arrived at a result with the fifth. So, there were blockades, there were people who did not respond to emails, but we continued" (FTDES, Mehdi)

Different ministries work differently as especially civil society is consulted earlier or later in the legislation process. Entry points for organizations are diverse and range from protest at different stages of the policy process, especially to counter law initiatives and augment pressure (coercion) as will be shown later, or participation in open consultations, up to direct consultations between the ministry and the organization. In addition, organizations use different levels within the hierarchy (department, ministry, and presidency), complicating the picture. I now look at the channels in detail and highlight differences and similarities recalling the differences between the ministries as well as the Presidency of the Government to illustrate where movements can place ideas and their framing.

Figure 7.2 Legislation process



Note: own figure based on interviews

7.2 Direct Channels

7.2.1 Civil society members in ministries

The first relay are (former) civil society members that enter the state administration. Examples that came up during interviews concern especially the Ministry of Relations with Civil Society and the Ministry for Women. Especially the ATFD and the women movement have a contact person in the Ministry of Women. The position was funded in relation to the EU project PASC at a time when civil society influence in ministries was limited. This externally financed project helped the Tunisian women movement to become influential. Additionally, interviewees at the Ministry of Industry and at the Presidency of the Government mentioned their involvement in associations.

The interviewed state representative at the Ministry of Women confirmed the direct contacts between the ATFD and the minister. She is herself member of the women movement and holds close ties with diverse women organizations; the entry towards the ministry is not very difficult for the Tunisian women movement. Similarly, Anis from the Ministry of Industry underlines the links due to positions in ministries and associations.

"To talk about the link between the ministry and civil society, I am the concrete example in front of you because [...] I actually came from civil society a very long time ago. I joined the ministry because I was asked by the minister, the former minister of women as civil society to contribute the most in the ministry in the sense that the ministry is a public institution with vision, a history etc. And then cooperation with civil society allows to widen a little the horizon and to have a differentiated vision on things and in this step that one wants to be really democratic we consequentially associate the civil society." (Ministry of Women, Soulayma – b)

"We have a very active civil society in Tunisia. [...] A civil society that has a characteristic that is very special compared to others [...] I think that compared to other countries, the majority of the Tunisian civil societies come from the civil service, from the higher public function. So, generally, they are friends who know each other. The majority of the people who work in these associations are colleagues who are working or who were already working in the public sector [...] who know the problems and who know the solutions and who have a double hat. [...] it is at the limit between the formal and the informal. So, that works" (Ministry of Industry, Energy and Mines, Anis)

"There is already this willingness that is installed. [...] I do not know how it happened before, but what I know is that associations like ATFD [...], which are on the same side in principle, had virtually no connection with the ministry. With the arrival of Minister Samira Merai Friaa [...] But there, sincerely, I saw a request

from civil society to cooperate with the ministry. [...] It's reciprocal. And I would say that [...] with all the modesty, a representative of the civil society within the ministry has given a form of trust; [...] there someone who represents us there, is someone who will fight for our principles, our ideas, etc. And especially I held that at the beginning, now I am obliged to stick to the norms" (Ministry of Women, Soulayma – a)

Other researchers confirm the role of the Ministry of Women. Khalil underlines, that during the tenure of Labidi as minister, experts have been recruited to the ministry (Khalil 2014; see also Norbakk 2016 on the relation between ATFD and Ministry of Women). From the perspective of the ATFD, contacts are seen as personal as well as institutionalized:

"There exist both. But it's not individuals like me who will talk to Ms. X because we are friends. It's really institutional. It's institutional relationships, not just personal ones. But let's say they are both at the same time." (ATFD, Hiba)

"Besides, we have prepared a proposal that is already with decision makers [...] as I told you we are working on the harmonization of laws with the constitution. [...] with the constitution who, at least, recognized equality between women and men. And through this law, we go, we ask for more." (ATFD, Myriam)

The Ministry of Women is known across ministries for its good relations to civil society. While the ATFD generally reported good contacts, it has been refused at least once by the Minister of Women in Mai 2016 and was excluded from participation in the elaboration of a law on women violence as reported by the press (Réalités 2016a).

It is not only the link towards organizations, but also coalitions across ministries that are equally important for legislation processes as Soulayma from the Ministry of Women expressed.

"So, everyone, every minister is doing his best, among the progressive ministers, each one is doing his best to move towards democracy, fighting within the ministerial council to pass some things and so on. And I come back to democracy in Tunisia, it is not a matter of government, it is essentially civil society that will guarantee at least the non-demolition of this nascent democracy" (Ministry of Women, Soulayma-a)

Particular in this citation is the mention of non-progressive ministries, notably the Ministry of Religious Affairs. This is in line with perceptions of the ATFD. Beneath the networks towards other organizations, the ATFD has no contact to religious women rights organizations. As Debuysere describes, cross-ideological cooperation is difficult between women rights organizations (Debuysere 2016). However, Debuysere also argues that a cross-

ideological cooperation may improve the effectiveness of Tunisian women rights associations (Debuysere 2016). Islamists are defined as outgroup. In the case of the ATFD, Islamists and especially Ennahdha are outsiders and it is difficult to integrate their perspectives as those are too different. As the Ministry of Women and the women movement are close, this perspective translates also to the ministerial level.

While not systematically analyzing, Antonakis-Nashif remarked the participation of the ATFD in decision-making processes due to the different alliances that exist and due to its specific expertise (Antonakis-Nashif 2016). It became clear through the interviews that contacts were primarily personal and were institutionalized over time. Another example for personal contacts in form of former members is provided by Antonakis-Nashif, naming former ATFD leader Bouchra Bel Haj Hamida who became Member of Parliament for Nida Tounes providing the ATFD contacts toward parliament (Antonakis-Nashif 2016; see also Moghadam 2018 for more examples).

The degree of involvement is however different from one ministry to another. Kamel from the Ministry of Habitation for example assigns that his ministry does only have links to the sports association of the ministry as well as a support association for the ministry (Ministry of Habitation, Kamel). These links show the different quality as the associations have no political influence.

Beneath the ties towards the Ministry of Women, a tie towards the Ministry of Relations with civil society exists.

"They tell us that they are very aware. We also have relations with Kamel Jendoubi⁶³, who is a human rights activist, who was our ally before. That is to say that we have no difficulty to see them, but to concretize. They can collaborate at some point in certain issues on women, for example. But for the moment [...] the minister of women says that we have the same project, she is aware, she will introduce the law project. She is aware of equality, women's rights and everything." (ATFD, Sarah)

⁶³ Minister for Relations with Civil Society at the time of interviews

It is important to note, that some ministries like the one of Women also restrain cooperation with certain organizations as not all are working on women for example. Ministries have an interest not to cooperate with “irrelevant” organizations working in other sectors.

The Ministry of Relations with Civil Society has close contacts towards the FTDES and the LTDH.

"We have friends among ministers; we have friends, who facilitate a bit the contact. Now we have a minister who is in charge of civil society, is in charge of the institutions. So, it turns out that this minister is a friend of ours. We protested together at the time of Ben Ali. So, it makes a lot of things easier. He is a minister, but on a subjective level, the contact is permanent. But not necessarily about work. We keep the contact as friends. [...] It's not institutionalized. Although we have a Ministry of Relations with Civil Society, this link is not yet institutionalized. It requires reflection, innovation, and time to put in place institutional mechanisms." (FTDES, Nejb)

"On a personal level, I am on the mailing list of the forum, but on a professional level in the ministry they solicit us by their activities, they send us the results of their studies and they invite us to their press conference, to the public activities they invite us also to open or to animate, or for advertising and we are very involved with the forum and the flip side is that we are a very small ministry in the creation phase, lacking staff, we would like to be present everywhere [...]" (Ministry of Relations with Civil Society, Khaled)

"But for us, what we already talked about three weeks ago [...] in a meeting with the minister in charge of relations with civil society, is that we said we need to have mechanisms with the government, creating mechanisms for even a small association can change the reality of people. You do not just rely on the Forum, or the League or the UGTT, because from our point of view, we cannot be everywhere." (FTDES, Mehdi)

Another example for personal contacts through former members concerns the UGTT entering administrative positions:

"No, he quits officially. He remains an ex-militant committed in his spirit, but all his activities, his responsibilities within the UGTT cease. But it will help because he is governor in the region of Siliana, with the general secretary of Siliana as a friend of him; they know each other for a long time." (UGTT, Ahmed)

When it comes to personal contacts and the use of networks, the women movement with the ATFD and their special relation to the Ministry of Women are exemplary. The contacts between the Ministry of Relations with Civil Society and the analyzed organizations are on a personal basis as well. While I consider this to be a direct channel, there is also an indirect

effect as former members could spread ideas towards others. In this sense, former members in ministries combine direct and indirect ways of influence. Through those channels and especially personal contacts, emulation and thus convincing other civil servants about the normative value of a solution seems easier realizable. Similarly, former external actors can bring new perspectives in the ministry and other civil servants can learn. As the exchange bases on trustful exchanges, coercion is seen as playing only a minor role.

One Ministry that was often mentioned, but despite numerous attempts anybody responded on requests, is the Ministry of Social Affairs. Future research should address the perspective of this particular ministry. Given the importance of this ministry for organizations, it is to expect that the framing by civil servants is highly similar.

Due to its wide network, the UGTT has a number of actual and former members that can establish personal contacts in every region of Tunisia. This personal link has a huge influence and can help influencing policies. However, influence on framing is limited, although the interviewees from the Ministry of Women showed a partly similar framing and underlined shared framings and values as seen in chapter six on the ministerial framing.

7.2.2 Institutionalized exchanges

The second channel does not necessarily include personal ties. Institutionalized exchanges include relations between ministries and organizations on a regular basis. Some of these institutional exchanges are even qualified as formal allies. Chapter six on ministerial framing already outlined how civil servants conceptualize civil society participation as well as how they justify their motivation to involve organizations. Examples for the inclusion of civil society are more prominent for some of the ministries. Nizar underlines the importance of civil society inclusion for the Ministry of Women:

"It's because we work in sectors where the presence of civil society is very important. And in addition, it [the women movement] has a history of over 40 years of existence especially on the rights of women [...] Because we speak; we act in the field of human rights, humanitarian rights, equal rights, of women's dignity, of the presence of women and the economic presence of women. So, the human rights league [LTDH] has been in existence for years, but also other feminist associations that have existed since then and have a lot of experience. Certainly, in other ministerial departments, I was in the [anonymized] and frankly

it is difficult to work with civil society in the field of governance and transparency” (Ministry of Women, Nizar)

Similarly, institutional contacts exist for the Ministry of Relations with Civil Society. A change in mindsets enables more involvement of civil society.

“When we drafted the projects, we did not do it alone, we did it with civil society and finally with civil society experts, together with the other ministries. But most importantly we went to the regions to do consultations. We present the project, we have a feedback. We make a report and publish it. There we begin to see that civil society is starting to see that there is a feedback to their proposals. [...] Before 2011, it was with or against the regime. After 2011 this is no longer the case. It was the civil society that has a role to play so the means to give and the results to get. So, the state recognizes the independence of civil society, should no longer consider civil society as an enemy, even at the level of the structures of the state we even start to touch civil society, to listen, this is not obvious that it's all super. [...] On the other hand, civil society sees itself in a better position and seeks to establish closer relations with the state without being an extension of the state and seeks to position itself to advocate and seek claims and support certain segments of the population and causes and so on. So, the life of civil society becomes a little more active, a little less aggressive, because there is an element of trust that is being established within the state and civil society. So, what I'm saying is really embryonic phase.” (Ministry of Relations with Civil Society, Khaled)

The Ministry of Relations with Civil Society functions as coordinator of ministry-organization interaction, because ministries do not know how to interact. This also shows that many contacts directly address the Ministry of Relations with Civil Society.

“We would like to set up a structure that is listening to civil society in each ministry, be it something that as a network in each ministry structured by person [...], or a person besides the minister in his cabinet who is really listening to civil society and who informs the civil society about the [...] needs of the ministry but especially who allows the ministries to be in network with these people, summarize information, this information would be of the type: needs, claims, problems and of the other side if you have things to give, use this channel to disseminate this information or look for relationships. [...] They [the ministries] solicit by choice, then they want to make participation with the civil society but they want not to engage themselves, they ask you for a list, you are in relation to the civil aspect, we are putting a steering committee, we want to involve the civil society, choose for us.” (Ministry of Relations with Civil Society, Khaled)

As a consequence, the Ministry of Relations with the Civil Society serves as gatekeeper for institutionalized contacts.

Examples for mixed commissions are diverse and as the two examples from the Ministry of Finance with an institutionalized as well as from the Ministry of Habitation with a partnership show:

"At the ministry level, in 2013, a joint commission was created. So, mixed, that means it's made up of the ministry, representatives of the ministry, and representatives of civil society. Its objective is financial transparency. [...] So, it's normally chaired by the Minister of Finance and there are interim chairs [...] the general secretary of the ministry and the second of the civil society. And it has two secretaries, two rapporteurs. One from the ministry and one from the civil society" (Ministry of Finance, Cyrine)

"It's a form of partnership and it gives satisfaction if we have the same objectives. That's what we found with ATIT and I Watch. For us it is an apprenticeship but also for them. It is a good collaboration and we are very satisfied. On a large scale we cannot do everything ourselves." (Ministry of Habitation, Slim)

Relations to civil society are more distant for example for the Ministry of the Interior. No common framing plays a role, but a basis for cooperation. Relations for example with the International Red Cross are institutionalized. Local Security Councils are examples of institutionalized civil society participation involving the Ministry of the Interior. The Ministry of the Interior is seen as one of the open ministries towards civil society by civil servants although this perspective is not shared by civil society leaders. Khaled from the Ministry of Relations with Civil Society outlined that although the Ministry of the Interior was completely closed towards civil society under Ben Ali, it is now more open at least on some questions (Ministry of Relations with Civil Society, Khaled). This perspective is supported by the Ministry of the Interior:

"As a ministry we have more contacts, because it is the symbolic context. The consecration to security issues, so we are more solicited. We look at each request and ask what profile the organization has or we ask for coordination. We are always open [...] certain observations are introduced and we are in the process of reviewing the code of ontology. All processes took the necessary time. Each time they were present, their position was taken into account. But in the end, it's the ministry's responsibility. As far as civil society is concerned, it is a discussion within the limits of laws. We must make the institutional forces work. Civil society must work with the institutions so that there is another partner. A bit of criticism, that helps. It's another actor who controls. It is also requested by the security forces." (Ministry of the Interior, Rania)

From the perspective of the LTDH, there is some skepticism towards the Ministry of the Interior as well as the Ministry of Justice.

"There is the Ministry of the Interior, who was the great, the great guru, the ministry that ate us, who persecuted us, who pursued us, and so on. It must be said that in the 70s and 80s, the League of Human Rights had still managed for long periods to have a vis-à-vis inside [...] There have been lucky times, there have been moments of good cooperation. And then very quickly we realized that we could not be treated as equal [...]. So, it was necessary to cut this link [...]. Well, the Ministry of Justice also had ups and downs. But overall all ministries were under the boots of the regime in place [...] We are happy; there is a regulation that respects it now, that is a little bit in the rules of art." (LTDH, Rim)

As interviews suggest, a number of ministries hold contacts without fixed partnership or guidelines. The looser cooperation does not result in shared framings. These loose relations are discussed later under open consultations. This indicates that mechanisms can be the same as for personal contacts in case of trustful relations, but can be more distant and involve also forms of coercion.

The contacts of the ATFD, the LTDH and the FTDES towards government are also present in media reports. The three organizations are among six organizations under the umbrella of the Euromed Human Rights Network, that the Minister for Constitutional Institutions, Civil Society and Human Rights, Kamel Jendoubi, in February 2016 encountered to consult on negotiations with the European Union and that later continued more formalized as part of the ALECA negotiations (Kapitalis 2016b; Kapitalis 2016c; L'Economiste Maghrebin 2016).

The Ministry of Women, the Ministry of Relations with Civil Society, the Ministry of the Interior, the Ministry of Finance as well as the Ministry of Habitation have institutionalized interaction with organizations. However, it is difficult to account for all institutionalized ties between organizations and ministries as no official information or processes exist. In addition, the border between informal or personal contacts that get institutionalized over time is blurred. There is a lot of habit in some of the interactions; other interactions are more distant and occasional. Organizations recognize differences in the level of inclusion by ministries and even persons:

"Sometimes we made an influence on public decisions. [...] So, we changed a lot, we blocked a lot of laws; we changed a lot of laws too. They have adopted many initiatives that we have done. There was blocking too, it depends, because as I told you, there is not a clear policy. So, it depends on time and interlocutor within the government. So sometimes it works, sometimes it does not work." (FTDES, Mehdi)

Institutionalized channels and mechanisms of diffusion have been introduced at a certain time and now prevail because of expertise or agreements. As was shown in chapter six, selection processes for organizations are very diverse and thus especially organizations that became member of commissions at the right time have advantages (thus the older, established ones with the exception of Al Bawsala and I Watch). As became clear in chapter six, inclusion of organizations is in some cases a 'trial and error' process. Institutionalized interactions help to establish a common framing on the base of emulation, but it is complementary to other effects.

One of the analyzed organizations is outstanding. The UGTT already had a consultative function under Ben Ali. Thus, the organization was consulted before the revolution. Now, this position prevails in a post-revolution context. While the UGTT represents eight hundred thousand Tunisians, the inclusion derives from a historic inclusion as is outlined shortly.

The special role of the UGTT

There is disequilibrium between the UGTT and the other organizations. For the UGTT, which has a lot of contacts towards the state and other actors and a well-defined network, the reputation is implicitly or naturally named as important. The historic role of the UGTT and its participation in the National Dialogue is often taken as justification for its inclusion. Similarly, researchers acknowledge that the UGTT played a key role supporting policies during the initial transition time which enabled the success (Wolf 2014a).

"Yes, the UGTT, [...] because finally, the UGTT has a history deeply rooted in the country in the national struggle for the independence of the country, in the construction of the country, and therefore, we cannot give criticism to the union, that it interferes in politics since for a long time, it listened to the cradle of political action and opposition within the country" (Ministry of Industry, Energy and Mines, Anis)

The UGTT has a special position due to its tripartite configuration as labor union. However, the UGTT is more than a labor union and also a national regulator of policies. One may ask whether the UGTT is already a polity member. In the network analysis it became clear, that the UGTT is well connected and interwoven with the Tunisian state. Other researchers found similar results: Antonakis-Nashif argues that the UGTT is part of the core elite due to its role for national dialogue (Antonakis-Nashif 2016). This perspective is supported by my own data, supported by a number of interviews with civil servants.

"Really, the UGTT today and Utica if they want, they could make the law. Nevertheless, this quartet had a good recognition. Tunisians still respect these organizations even though the UGTT has had very hard blows for social and union complaints. And at the international level you know that this quartet was awarded the Nobel Peace Prize, it was for the country and for the quartet and we forget the pride for the civil society and for us Tunisians it's something new." (Ministry of Relations with Civil Society, Khaled)

The UGTT has regular contacts towards ministries and UGTT leaders regularly exchange as the example by Ahmed shows:

"Yes, there is an exchange. In all its forms; even personally. People call each other, whenever it is necessary; they call each other two to three times a day. [...] There is always a direct contact. And for example, the Secretary General can go personally to the Prime Minister, tell him: listen, it cannot pass, it will not pass. And generally, the government also tends to listen a bit. Because they know that if they completely ignore what the UGTT says, they will have a problem afterwards, at the implementation level." (UGTT, Ahmed)

Especially the Presidency of the Government, and thus the instance that decides in case of conflict, reported many weekly exchanges:

"It's the UGTT, [...] we have even weekly meetings and we consider them as social partners and similarly there is pressure from these unions and sometimes, we are obliged to apply these guidelines to [...] the other associations work [...]. We have promulgated a decree that associates the civil society in the recruitment evaluation commissions of candidates [...], to associate a little civil society as a control body. In the other projects we have projects concerning the civil service, the position of the women in the civil service, the rights of the civil servants, we associate the civil society to give ideas on the subjects [...] and after this consultation then the laws are drafted according to the proposals of the civil society" (Presidency of the Government, Mokhtar)

Similarly, the UGTT (and the UTICA) get consulted for fiscal projects, something that originates from historic arrangements (Ministry of Finance, Cyrine).

One special institutionalized form of access is the four plus four/five plus five arrangement. Depending on topics, four/five ministers and four/five representatives from the UGTT discuss topics on a regular basis. This institutionalized consultation and exchange occurs when necessary or as interviewees suggested at least once a month.

"It was at the committee where we had a meeting this morning, at the negotiation committee, there are four representatives of the union and four ministers, Minister of the Public Service, Minister of Social Affairs, Minister of Finance and Presidency of the Government" (Presidency of the Government, Mokhtar)

"We always have a commission, we call it four + four, that is to say four of the executive board and four ministers, [...] we ask for a dialogue with the government, and we have a research office. If we have a case, we take with us all the references, all the data, all the information, and we start negotiating with the government. If we arrive, we arrive. If not the President of the Republic or the President who can decide, otherwise we declare war. But, it's not: it's no equals we go to war. [...] It is a democratic organization. We like to talk before." (UGTT, Mohamed)

The UGTT is consulted in different stages of the legislative process and by the Presidency of the Government and even before other organizations are consulted.

"For example we are now working on the reform of the general status of the public statute, it is a very important law that concerns the entire civil service, [...] we have worked for more than six months with the UGTT, it is a social partner but [...] the second phase we will work in a seminar with the associations that have an interest in the public service to have their ideas and proposals before writing the first draft" (Presidency of the Government, Mokhtar)

A similar role is taken in relations with the Ministry for Education. Often UGTT and UTICA are named together underlining the tripartite configuration. Hamdi highlights especially the role of the two organizations for the reform of the education sector (Ministry of Education, Hamdi). On the other hand, the UGTT approaches different ministries at the same time, also together with partners.

"Of course, the UGTT sometimes alerts the Ministry of the Interior, it alerts the Prime Minister and all that. And so, it makes things move. And we also ask people, normal citizens, so there is first of all the human rights league. It's a league that originated from about forty years [...] you had to make a complaint first, you had to write, not to keep quiet, let's say." (UGTT, Sofien)

The functioning in a coalitional mode is thus used to create awareness on a topic.

The UGTT approaches different levels of the administration:

"We as a sectorial federation have direct relations with the administration, with the ministers, the administration at the central level. The regional unions have a direct relation with the regional leaders, the governors I do not know what. That's at the local level. All that is discussed at the national level is either at the federations or at the trade union headquarters." (UGTT, Moncef)

On the other hand, the perception of the UGTT is not always positive as we have seen before especially for articles. Slim from the Ministry for Habitation underlines the inference by the UGTT:

"Yes, there is contact with the UGTT. They try to change things. They see things and sometimes they intervene in an appointment. I do not like it, because the one who will be blamed is the government and not the UGTT. When it comes to decisions, the ministry is criticized." (Ministry of Habitation, Slim)

The UGTT has much influence, not only proposing as seen earlier but often blocking proposals. The UGTT operates also as veto power.

"Yes of course. Even if the [...] UGTT can block sometimes, even without strikes. It can block by lobbying, by its alliances at the level of the administration, by several forms. But every time one agrees on one point, it goes much easier for everyone." (UGTT, Ahmed)

"We as UGTT have never thought of being in power. This is our way of getting our country out of the crisis, of all the crises that can happen. We are a counter-power; we will remain a counter-power that will create weight and balance. To create a balance as long as the balance is going to fall to the right. And [...] we had difficulties especially at the level of right-wing parties. Especially the fundamentalist parties." (UGTT, Moncef)

This is completely in line with Dakhli's argument that the UGTT acts even as veto player in the Tunisian landscape and filter law projects (Dakhli 2013). Due to the institutionalized character of interactions, the UGTT cannot just refer to emulation, but to coercion with the threat of strikes without risking their inclusion in those committees. The UGTT can serve as horizontal balance to the national government and take over one function of democracy, providing balance. However, the UGTT is a very heterogeneous organization. Different sections show different levels of activity. Especially the teachers and postal workers are seen as more likely to protest during the revolution (Willis 2016).

The UGTT has privileged access to the Presidency of the Government and can enter ideas (or block) on another level. The organization has a different access to all mechanisms of diffusion. While the UGTT also has intense contacts to some of the ministries, the contacts to the Presidency of the Government are to be emphasized because a number of laws pass by the Presidency and thus can be modified or stopped there. In addition, the four plus four/five plus five mechanism is an institutionalized committee where ministers meet with their counterparts at the UGT. In comparison to the other organizations, the UGTT has much more influence on ministries and ministers. It consequentially uses not only the collective level, but also the individual level. This is less caused by common framings, but by the historical role played by the UGTT. This exchange is thus not based on a specific framing of

democracy, but on reputation and perceived power. However, the UGTT as well as the other organizations do not only use institutional access, but also protest as a way to directly influence the state.

7.2.3 Hearings

Another direct influence channel, which was not a focus of research, are hearings in parliament. Those were discussed during interviews and proved to be another relay. Organizations can not only serve as experts to the Ministry, but also to Parliament. The expert role is emphasized and consequentially learning of parliamentarians and to a certain degree emulation are possible. However, the mobilization or responsiveness of parliament is limited. The FTDES for example proposed a law on racism in 2016⁶⁴, together with the Réseau Euro-méditerranéen des droits de l'homme and the Comité pour le respect des libertés et des droits de l'homme (Kapitalis 2016d). Fourteen parliamentarians supported the law proposal (Le Temps 2016). This shows the limited number of parliamentarians that can effectively be mobilized. None of the analyzed organizations (including the UGTT) expressed wide influence on parliamentarians.

Those contacts that exist have not been verified with parliamentarians as it was not focus of research and resources were limited. Thus, the interview statements shall be threatened with caution. However, as parliament was rarely mentioned, it is certainly not an actor to overestimate.

Nevertheless, I show how movements can influence policy via parliament. Official hearings by commissions are one way to influence parliamentarians:

"We propose our [...] for example we pushed [...] since already the old [...] time of Ben Ali, to a law, an integral law against violence against women. We worked like crazy. We made proposals; we participated fully up to the end. There is also the other law, the law on treatment of human persons. Also, we had a hearing there, two weeks ago, at the assembly, to present our proposals in relation to this new law" (ATFD, Nour)

Several interviewees mentioned personal contacts to parliamentarians that are used on a collective level.

⁶⁴ A law on racism was finally passed in 2018 following some incidents.

"There are two members of my federation who are parliamentarians. [...] One who was secretary general of our federation in the 90s. Another was member of our federation until 2014 with me. They are both of the [...] Popular Front. [...] As parliamentarians they can help us, but they are in the minority. They can influence, they can help us in the discussions to better understand each other and make us understand other MPs, but to change [...] it's a bit difficult. Because it's a right-wing majority. It's a bit difficult, Ennahdha and Nida it's like that. [...] there are laws that they discuss in advance to approve them. [...] It's not at the level of the members, it's the chiefs. It's the group leaders." (UGTT, Moncef)

"We have contacts with members of Parliament. We have friends as parliamentarians and we often see them. We pass messages through them. We have the leaders of the social movements, we have contacts with them. There is a large public, by the media." (FTDES, Sami)

Another important element is the notion of independence, probably one reason why most leaders avoid talking about institutionalized contacts.

"We do not have problems with the parties. [...] we distance ourselves from the political parties. So, we do not work with parties. If we are invited by political parties we do not attend. No, we do not attend because our image must not be influenced by attending party conventions. But we, all our reports, are sent to all political parties, without exception." (FTDES, Mehdi)

In addition, relations to parliamentarians only reach to specific groups of parliamentarians as the independents for the FTDES or as the Popular Front for UGTT, ATFD as well as partly the LTDH (FTDES, Nejib and UGTT, Ahmed). The selectivity of contacts towards parliamentarians is expressed by the criticism of neoliberalism as by Sofien from the UGTT who criticizes Ennahdha and Nida for their economic perspective (UGTT, Sofien).

It appears that parliamentarization of national politics is currently under way in Tunisia (on parliamentarization see Kriesi 2009). While the parliament does not yet play an important role for all parts of civil society it will probably be the next step to provide more detailed information (and lobbying) towards parliamentarians.

As none of the organizations has enough impact on majorities, the diffusion via parliament and parliamentary commissions is not that important for the organizations analyzed. It is a channel used, but chances for success are limited. In addition, laws can be influenced without necessarily passing by parliament. As we have seen under 7.1. on the legislation process, parliament and parliamentary hearings enter later than the initial consultations in policy making processes.

7.2.4 Open consultations

Another element being part of the legislation process are open consultations by the ministries. Different to institutionalized mechanisms, those consultations are in most cases open to everyone; although they must be aware of hearings which requires at least being on a mailing list of a ministry or seeing the call for consultation. Consultations can also be demanded by organizations occasionally as in the case of the ATFD and the Ministry for Social Affairs or the Presidency.

"Not regularly. That is to say that we made, we had exchanges with the minister, with the Ministry of Social Affairs [...] but we had contacts, we went to see the President of the Republic who welcomed us two times. So, we have relationships. [...] We make our relations according to their response to our requests. That is to say if we realize that it is useless, we cut the link." (ATFD, Sarah)

"Of course, when we have requests, when we have problems. When, for example, as I told you to change the law, to intervene [...] we even went to the Minister of Social Affairs [...] for perhaps two years to defend a medical file of a girl who needed to be operated abroad. We intervene for social cases." (ATFD, Myriam)

Nour criticized that they get no feedback on open consultations, so no results become visible. On the other hand, for the law against violence against women, the ATFD was alongside the Ministry in different consultations, thus not only using personal contacts but also open consultations.

"The Ministry of Women, for example, we have a whole [...] program for the comprehensive law against violence against women. We have our proposal. And already they have taken this into consideration and we are with them in the commissions, in the preparations, in the negotiations." (ATFD, Myriam)

It is to recall, that access differs from one ministry to another.

"I do not want to name too many. I do not want to spit too much on some but [...] but there are [...] there are departments that are absolutely not used to work with [...]. There are departments. Well, the Ministry of Women has been so much spurred that's okay. But otherwise there are departments that are not used to associate society and all this" (LTDH, Rim)

Participation is not limited to the analyzed organizations as Maher and Safa from the Ministry of Agriculture emphasized. Especially for less politicized ministries I Watch and Al Bawsala positioned themselves as experts.

"Again, as for the media, for associations, in Tunisia, civil society, there are thousands, but at the level of associations that are credible and are organized in a sustainable way, we do not count many. I consider for example [...] "I WATCH",

it is an association, [...] credible which is organized, and which has a Steering Committee” (Ministry of Industry, Energy and Mines, Anis)

"[...] afterwards, the code of the law, the law that was proposed by the government for the vote in parliament, this law contained constraints for access to public information. These constraints were of public interest but the association "I Watch" has put pressure, great pressure on the government to remove this constraint. And the law passed with access to public information without constraint. And it is a great achievement for Tunisia. It's thanks to the association." (Ministry of Youth and Sports, Walid)

Federations of professional bodies serve as experts as well. As Aymen from the Ministry of Tourism underlined, for them the Federations in the sector are partners. Safa from the Ministry of Agriculture acknowledged that in some cases they are solicited on a general topic and in other cases on specific aspects.

Open consultations are generally open to all actors, organized or not. It is mainly about knowledge transfer and learning. Among the four organizations analyzed, especially the ATFD uses open consultations to re-enforce their ideas. During the interviews Al Bawsala and I Watch, two organizations that work on transparency in administration and that were not analyzed, were named as very active in those consultations. These two organizations, founded after 2011, quickly built up a reputation among civil servants and have high chances of being invited for each consultation. As discussed before, civil servants try to create transparency and acceptance, two points that are particularly important for ministries with little experience with civil society participation. At least for ministries, a common perception of a problem or at least a similar framing play a role for open consultations. Open consultations are somehow neglected by the “old” civil society, a gap that is filled by other organizations. It would be interesting for future research to analyze the influence of these organizations on administration via open consultations in detail.

7.3 Indirect and other channels

7.3.1 Protest as mechanism for change

The influence of protest on legislation and policies is limited. The limitations arise especially from the biased role of the media and some reserves on protest. As mentioned, protest passes in principle via the media and is especially regarded when media reporting on protest amplified. As a consequence it is regarded under indirect effects, while some minor direct

effects are possible for large mobilizations. However, protest itself can influence civil servants in particular and policy outcomes:

"Dialogue, that's it. [...]. So, after that, it was stopped. This movement was stopped and we said: We will study these protests. We are going to check is it true or is it not true, what is being criticized [...]" (Ministry of Finance, Cyrine)

As outlined earlier, some ministries try to avoid protest. The real or perceived threat of protest is related to coercion. Consultation is seen as way to avoid protest. Thus, protest can have an effect, but this effect can already be achieved through the menace of protest. Maher from the Ministry of Agriculture for example explained they invite civil society so that they cannot say they were not asked and acknowledged that this is done to avoid protest (Ministry of Agriculture, Maher). Safa from the same ministry expressed that when protest arises on law texts, they will talk to the people protesting (Ministry of Agriculture Safa). Protest can also give inspirations and civil servants tend to respect claims made by protesters or to make organizations participate. In this sense, it is more than coercion and nearly learning as civil servants themselves hold limited knowledge. On the other hand, protest is evaluated either as positive or too much by civil servants, leaving a divided picture.

"Protests are always considered a good sign of health [...] if there are protests means that there are ideas. If these ideas are consolidated clear and acceptable why not revise our laws our texts and it is already the daily business of the Parliament." (Presidency of the Government, Youssef)

"Well, it's too late. But it does not matter in most cases even if we did not involve some associations or some professional organizations, we do it later. And we study the text well. If there is really a need to modify it, then it is modified according to [...] their proposals, which are generally relevant and objective proposals. So, if not, we try to talk to them and, therefore, to [...] how to say to [...] to explain to them" (Ministry of Agriculture, Safa)

On the other side, civil society sees an impact through mobilization, but not in all cases:

"Not just success. But there have always been impacts. That is to say, if an action was held, this action was very probable to succeed, [...]. It [the UGTT] has a huge capacity for mobilization. It knows how to lobby; it knows how to mobilize from north to south and from east to west. It has this presence throughout the Tunisian territory. But if it does not stand an action, even if it is a right action, it does not have much chance to succeed." (UGTT, Ahmed)

The analyzed organizations do not see mobilization and protest as a channel to utilize alone.

An example is the position of the UGTT using strikes when dialogue fails.

"In the majority of cases it is us who asks. Sometimes it's the ministry. Usually when you announce a strike or something like that. That's usually the ministry

that asks. Because it is looking for a solution. It always has proposals to unblock the situation, to seek solutions.” (UGTT, Sofien)

Spontaneous protest is used as indicator of important topics that can be transferred towards political claims as Sami and Mehdi from the FTDES expressed. It does not only give ideas to civil servants but equally to movement leaders. Protest itself does not play an important role alone; it is mainly used to block as shown later or as an additional tool. Coercion is to see as complementary mechanisms of diffusion in the Tunisian case. For the analyzed organizations, protest is secondary to dialogue perhaps with the exception of the FTDES that uses spontaneous movements to enter into dialogue. Thus, it does not make sense to talk about protest as a separate mechanism of influence in the Tunisian national context. While protest does not touch all ministries, they are receptive to claims advocated through protest.

The question emerges, whether direct contacts are not more effective, especially as some forms of protest, for example disruptive protest, is seen as negative, but would nevertheless solicit direct actions by ministries. Some protest can cause local or regional reactions like the provision of certain services or goods. Its effectiveness rests on lower levels than the national one and is more effective in specific cases than to influence legislation. It is much less about influence on democratic framing, but more about expressing contradictions with democracy. It cannot be excluded that public opinion itself plays a role, but the number of exact opinion polls is limited in Tunisia and an evaluation of the separate influence of public opinion alone appears very difficult. This left the media analysis that will be detailed later as important tool for information on public opinion.

Meyer remarks that movements that have policy access will mobilize less (Meyer 2005). I do not support this perspective in the Tunisian case. While the UGTT has clearly policy access, they refer to contentious action, mostly to put additional pressure on policy makers and to strengthen their position. While regional levels are even more active, on a national level I do not agree that inclusion in policy processes alone reduces mobilization in Tunisia.

7.3.2 Media work and public opinion

Traditional media are a limited tool in post 2011 Tunisia. While this does not completely contradict the indirect influence model, as public opinion can be influenced through other means like internal publications, Facebook and so on, the indirect effect model does at least not pass entirely by the media.

From the analyzed organizations, especially the FTDES uses media to influence public opinion. The FTDES also addresses press conferences to authorities (Boats4People 2014). It is part of their repertoire in order to get heard and to create a reputation on topics.

"For example, as I told you, there is a law on finance. So, we do a little study to express a point of view. We are doing a press conference. We are trying to sensitize the public on the choices that emerge from this law, on its shortcomings, on its limitations, and what kind of demands can be made in this context. And we rely a lot on two things: first of all, we have a group of MPs close to us. So, they are fed by analyzes, studies, proposals, so that they can play their role. And they help us to lobby at this level, parliament. And we also have a network of friends at the media, to help us do media campaigns and so on. So, we give them the material for them to publish, but also a direction for the demands and the lobbying. And we have studies, for example phenomena that we spot." (FTDES, Nejib)

"We have a very large media database, which exceeds eight hundred journalists. So, we have the means [...] we do a lot of press conferences. And we have an average of forty-five, forty to forty-five journalists per press conference. [...] we have published a whole critical reading made by lawyers and economists, which shows the shortcomings of this project. [...] and afterwards we made a national coalition. And so, you can push the government not to pass and adopt this project." (FTDES, Mehdi)

While the FTDES tries to influence media to its advantage, others, like the ATFD, are more skeptical towards media and doubt its effectiveness. Sarah for example criticized that her statements in the media have been manipulated (ATFD, Sarah). Comparably, other leaders expressed criticism.

"The media invite very little women, especially women democrats. They are afraid of a critical discourse." (ATFD, Hiba)

"That's why I'm talking to you about the quality of links to journalists. It's very difficult. [...] we talk to people who do not know anything, sometimes. Not even the question of women's rights, no curiosity. That is to say, they come to do interviews, they do not even read. There is no prior investigation work. Journalists who do this kind of investigation are rare. [...] We have already begun to sensitize journalists on the issue of women's rights, especially the issue of

violence [...] so there are journalists who have taken over our demands a bit, who said we will try to improve the situation at the level of the radio, stuff like that. But they expect a lot from us, that's what's terrible. That is to say, we open a point of discussion and we are forced to do all the work" (ATFD, Nour)

While one could argue that this perspective is topic specific, also UGTT leaders criticize the media landscape. There are too many problems to be able to rely on media as a relay.

"That is for example the report of the press to the UGTT. Before, the press was afraid of power and was also afraid of the UGTT. They dared not to criticize the UGTT. Now, at the time of the troika for example, they also supported the UGTT because most of the people were against the troika. Now that the former RCD has returned to power, the press is trying to play a role of support for the ruler, regardless of the opposition and independently of the UGTT. [...] there's still a lack of maturity in the press, and it's coming. But with all that, I support a free press that criticizes us, and that hardens our life all the time, better than a press that is repressed." (UGTT, Ahmed)

"There are journalists who defend the UGTT, who believe in the UGTT, in the principles of the UGTT. [...] There are journalists who defend the UGTT; there are journalists who are enemies of the UGTT. [...] a journalist from Ennahdha should not be expected to defend the UGTT, so it's useless to convince him. But the others are more or less honest, even sometimes they criticize the UGTT but they criticize objectively" (UGTT, Sofien)

The UGTT also expresses that media coverage on them and their topics is huge. Especially Sofien states that the connection towards the TAP (Tunisian Press Agency) works well. This makes the media a bit more valuable to the UGTT.

The media link becomes problematic as media is not seen as independent, neither by organizations, nor by civil servants. Cyrine from the Ministry of Finance for example clearly states, that media outlets close to political parties are well known. Similarly, Mokhtar from the Presidency of the Government expresses that media do not cover questions academically and are thus of limited use. In a similar direction argues Anis from the Ministry of Industry as discussed in chapter six.

Ministries – and the department for communications – respond to media inquiries and the ministers get informed as interviews with civil servants from the Ministry of Habitation, the Ministry for Regional Development as well as the Ministry for Sport and Family indicated. On the other hand, the link via the media is sometimes unnecessary as Khaled as well as Mokhtar expressed:

"It's normal because if there are claims or problems, we will see them directly in the 20h [...], everything is mediatized in public, everything is politicized. So, if there is a problem, a few hours and everyone is aware" (Ministry of Relations with Civil Society, Khaled)

"When a subject issue is covered by more than one or two or three media or when the association chooses or addresses a request when it addresses a request to the Minister of the Public Service regarding a subject of the public service it reacts immediately because it concerns it to explain to people what it is doing, what he is working" (Presidency of the Government, Mokhtar)

Apart of the traditional media outlets, Facebook is equally regarded (Ministry of Regional Development, Marwa). While especially the FTDES relies on media, civil servants are not very receptive towards media reporting and ignore a lot of media coverage.

I already underlined the missing information on public opinion. Especially the UGTT emphasizes links to the broader public:

"We are connected with the people. And the people know very well that the UGTT does not have any interests to have seats or ministers or government, it has political interest that's it. We are with the people, with public opinion, and with the poor, with the poorest regions, we are defending the middle class, the poor class, the unemployed and even the equality of people. Between regions, between people." (UGTT, Mohamed)

As no systematic opinion polls are available and own data collection was limited to interviews and media articles, there is not much additional information on what people think about policies.

Ministries as well as organizations – apart from the FTDES – doubt that media are useful in its current form. This is linked to the use of media as part as coercion as a diffusion mechanisms. The aim is often to put pressure on the state and less to provide new information or to convince the state over a democratic framing. As a consequence, the indirect channel via the media is insufficient not just for diffusing democratic framing, but also for spreading other ideas and policies. Even the FTDES, that are much more favorable towards the use of media, do not use the media as a single mechanism but in combination with others. On the other hand, especially the UGTT underlined its influence on public opinion, which is not surprising given the internal publications of the UGTT that reach wide parts of the Tunisian population. The UGTT has the advantage that the TAP takes over a number of statements directly, making these mechanisms more effective for the UGTT. As

analyzed in chapter five, this is mainly focused on salary negotiations and less on distinct political topics.

It is to note, that frame construction is different when it comes to public frames. Thus, it is easier to identify organizational framing than a public framing related to organizations. There is much reporting on the government. As we will see under 7.5 framing is in some cases more consistent and may change over time, adding an additional layer.

7.3.3 Other activities

Further channels that emerged during interviews and that are used by all analyzed organizations are sensitization campaigns (focused on learning) that are open to many actors. Civil servants participate in seminars in order to enhance their knowledge or to build new contacts. Participation is not inclusive but depends on invitation by the organizations. Interviewees in ministries underlined that they do not follow every call. Exemplary is the description by Sarah, an ATFD leader:

"We are trying to sensitize the police and we are talking to the police, for example when we invited them when we did the seminar on violence against women, we invited them when we worked on trafficking. Ms. [...] is a cadre who works there [...] and sometimes we go to the police station to accompany the women being victims of violence." (ATFD, Sarah)

Other activities include joint programs as outlined by Hamdi from the Ministry of Education:

"So, the communes, [...] after these elections, they will be responsible at the local level in all sectors, education, etc. [...] for the second year, our ministry launched last year „School Month“ [...]. What is School Month? School Month is a program to renovate schools. This program is essentially based on the participation of civil society. [...] Throughout a month, all civil society, individuals, citizens participate in the renovation of schools. This is a good example for us. It has changed many conditions of many schools." (Ministry of Education, Hamdi)

Another element is recruitment processes. Civil society organizations get included in recruitment processes, in order to achieve transparency. This perspective appears particularly utilitarian.

"The transparency of the contest is important. It was a theory. There were regulations; our relationship with civil society is organized by law. Either for financing or we will offer funding for civil society or by the recruitments. The funding dossier is the same for all ministries. We have collaborations with civil society organizations, but it is imposed by law. There was an exceptional decree for 2016 with lighter procedures, but we must involve civil society as a condition.

So, you have to follow the procedures [...] Finally, it was a guarantee for us. Because the image of the administration is deteriorating a little. There are people who insult us and this is an opportunity to show what we do. It was wonderful for them and for us. [...] No, there were not even criteria, but they cannot say this or that organization. We asked in written form and we went to those who work the four to five who work on election observation or the like. We spoke with I Watch, Bawsala and ATIT and we agreed, there are conventions and so on.” (Ministry of Habitation, Kamel)

The use of civil society for legitimacy has only very limited influence on the ministries apart from learning on procedures.

Another activity are international development project. Civil society is a resource especially in relation to international cooperation:

“As international cooperation we have the hat to mobilize more resources. National civil society is present on a limited level. This civil society is financed and at the same time participates in the formulation. Even the security forces participate through the unions that have seen a development since 2011.” (Ministry of the Interior, Rania)

Certainly, other activities that were not covered by the interviews exist as well. The most important tools from the category “other” are perhaps the sensitization campaigns as well as joint projects. However, the influence is difficult to measure for civil servants and the wider society. It is questionable whether any mechanisms of diffusion of a democratic framing can be connected to those activities in an efficient manner. The other activities show that not every contact with the state is equally useful for the diffusion of ideas and policies.

7.4 Summary on channels and mechanisms

7.4.1 Former members and proactive early stage proposal

Having outlined several channels, I now consider those that work effectively in more detail. Movements and organizations use different mechanisms to influence policy decisions, be it through coercion, learning or emulation. I underline especially the personal contacts that are based on a shared perception of problems -not necessarily a completely shared framing of democracy- as well as institutionalized mechanisms that allow organizations to be (officially) part of the legislation process. It is a mixture of individual and collective level contacts (compare Giugni and Passy 1998 on individual and collective contacts).

Many examples refer to the ATFD and the UGTT, as their contacts are particularly functioning well; the ATFD has more ideational influence and focuses more on emulation though. The relationship between the ATFD and the Ministry of Women is outstanding as a number of framings are shared and interactions are frequent. It presents nearly the ideal case of transmission of ideas and framings of democracy while we also have seen that the framing of democracy is not completely similar (chapters five and six).

The LTDH has a more ambiguous relation to the Ministry of the Interior, more distant, more focused on learning as coercion is no option for the LTDH as the Ministry itself is seen as too powerful. The FTDES, on the other hand, focuses on press conferences and protest (mainly coercion), two measures that are evaluated as only partly efficient. Press is perceived as biased by a number of political actors. While it might be useful to influence public opinion, trust in media is limited among civil servants and movement leaders⁶⁵. Protest can be useful and ministries do react, however, it is emphasized that protest is not necessary if protesters start with a dialogue towards political administrators. Protest is going too far for some civil servants leading to a preference for learning.

In line with the framing of democracy by civil servants (see chapter six), civil society has a place in the Tunisian legislation process; however, it depends on ministries, but also on engagement, expertise and reputation for the organizations. Influence is not ever frame-oriented or focused on emulation, but can be distant and utilitarian. Less-organized protest has difficulties to enter decision making circles, notwithstanding how a problem is framed.

The question of single or coalitional influence was temporarily set aside. As we have seen in chapter four, a social movement coalition exists. Having outlined mechanisms, I briefly return to the question whether it is single influence or coalition influence that influences policies.

⁶⁵ There are only few regular surveys that did not allow a detailed comparison on public opinion

7.4.2 Coalitions or single influence

While looking at channels of diffusion the question emerges whether coalitions or single influence by organizations and movements are more efficient. While certain mechanisms like institutionalized contacts are only open to single organizations, coordinated action is possible when several organizations insist on the same aspect at the same time. The same goes for personal contacts that can be solicited at the same time as the UGTT does sometimes. The most obvious coalitions are coordinated protest activities where several movements and organizations demand the same things amplifying the number and type of people they represent. Coalitions are important for coercion.

In the Tunisian case, cooperation occurs on individual and collective levels. The Euromed Human Rights Network is an example where individual and collective levels get intertwined. While membership is organizational, leaders of organizations know each other due to long-lasting relations and common struggles also facilitated by multi-membership. Diani and Moffatt argue for MENA countries that “there were few signs of cross-cutting memberships of interactions among associations that keep together organizational fields in Western societies and provide the basis for social movement modes of coordination”, but the study clearly shows the opposite (Diani and Moffatt 2016:34). At least in the Tunisian case, multi-membership is common and the mix of individual and collective relations keeps the movement coalition together. This means that declarations by a coalition often include the Euromed Human Rights Network as well as the organizations involved, thereby doubling their involvement.

As became clear from chapter four, coalitions are frequent. As coalitions are important for protest and as such for opposing law proposals, it is expected that a wide coalition of actors representing different parts of the Tunisian society and including the UGTT can positively influence the success of protest and coercion. No protest happens without a coalition of organizations. Similar to what Burstein and Hirsh describe, problem importance can be identified through the number of organizations demanding changes or the number of protest activities (Burstein and Hirsh 2007). Thus, protest cannot be ignored if all analyzed movements use the same arguments. However, if protest does not mobilize a crucial mass it

will have no effects. Section 7.5 returns to this question with three examples of law proposals.

7.4.3 Mechanisms, temporality and outcomes

While a number of channels have been identified, there is no guarantee for success. Organizations use different mechanisms more or less effective. While the ATFD uses direct contacts as well as consultation with a focus on emulation towards the Ministry of Women and can claim some success in influencing legislation (section 7.5), the UGTT for example has direct links and institutionalized committees with ministries. It is difficult to evaluate the degree of influence of the UGTT as the content of discussions in those committees is not known, but given its position and networks that are confirmed by both sites, its influence is wide and at different stages for Tunisian legislation processes. Due to this wide integration, I argue that the UGTT has a much more flexible use of coercion, emulation and learning as mechanisms. The FTDES, on the other hand, uses press conferences, reports, as well as personal contacts. It is doubtful whether the mechanism via the media is sufficient to influence legislation or ideas, as traditional media is regarded with skepticism and the media analysis did not show enormous media coverage contrary to the UGTT. The transmission of unfalsified information via the media is seen skeptical by actors. The relation of the FTDES towards the Ministry of Relations with Civil Society is better than towards other analyzed ministries, something similar for the LTDH. As we have seen, influence does not only depend on the stage of the legislation process, but also on whether modes of influence exist for the organization in question. The LTDH is well connected when it comes to human rights, but only towards the Ministry of Justice and the Ministry of the Interior where mechanisms have limited influence. Thus, the LTDH lacks other mechanisms of influence although being expert on human rights.

When it comes to parliament, the channels are not often used and organizations prefer to stay independent. This is related to the missing chances of success. Chomiak argues that parliamentary opposition in Tunisia is weak and unable to demand substantial changes (Chomiak 2016). The reduced role of the parliament may be explainable as the ARP does not yet play its role as resources like offices or assistants for parliamentarians are missing (Cohen-Hadria 2017). From this perspective, organizations do not see the need to convince

all parliamentarians because chances of success are seen as low or their relative importance underestimated. On the other hand, Antonakis-Nashif argues that access to members of the constitutional assembly was important to influence policy processes (Antonakis-Nashif 2016). Indeed, the referral to participatory democracy as in the constitution is important not only for organizations but also for civil servants. While the influence appears true for the initial process, members of parliament are no longer the main target of organizational activities, at least not for those analyzed. Thus, I would not overestimate contacts towards elected politicians. This is also in line with a recent report criticizing the parliament as more and more sidelined (International Crisis Group 2018).

While some scholars see media access as important, I would again not overestimate the impact of the media in Tunisia (in contradiction to Antonakis-Nashif 2016). While contacts towards the media exist and are certainly important to put pressure, they are of minor importance when informing about policy proposals and reaching citizens. It is not crucial for approaching the state and influencing policy choices or ideas. Here, other ways of influencing appear more important. This is also the reason why the joint effect model as well as the indirect effect model might operate via public opinion and less via traditional media. However, as the research design focused on media coverage, public opinion could not be assessed by other means. The missing professionalization of the Tunisian media landscape is a limiting factor. While the general distinction between direct and indirect influence is useful, a focus on different detailed channels and mechanisms enables a more fine-tuned analysis qualifying those links.

The ATFD has not the same connections as the UGTT, where leaders expressed; they had some contacts also during the Ben Ali regime while the ATFD was completely excluded. Using this argument, the UGTT stays in a far better position, because it was less repressed under dictatorship. This goes in the same direction as argued by Ratka and Roux. They underline that neither urban or student activists nor young unemployed or poor people from the interior managed to be included in a sustainable way in political decision making and the “establishment”, traditional civil society organizations and especially the UGTT, organized the transition (Ratka and Roux 2016). The UGTT clearly operates on another level than the

other analyzed organizations, also because of their frequent contacts to the Presidency of the Government.

In terms of shared framings and perspectives the ATFD and the Ministry of Women appear as particularly close. At the same time, it is a channel focused on emulation that works effectively, leading to the conclusion that shared framings - not necessarily of democracy - are linked to personal contacts and can re-enforce each other.

The expertise of the four analyzed organizations is evaluated lower by a number of civil servants when it comes to transparency, a field, where other organizations are preferred (I Watch, Al Bawsala and so on). As mentioned earlier, professionalization, taking initiative and showing presence are important to ensure being included. The importance of I Watch and Al Bawsala can be related to the expectations by civil servants that they can learn something from those organizations when it comes to transparency.

Table 7.3 shows the influence of each organization as evaluated on the basis of interviews and network analysis using the distinction by Burstein and Linton (chapter 2.5) that is widely shared. While most of the organizations have either higher levels of access responsiveness for specific ministries or low access responsiveness, the UGTT has a facilitated access. This is also in line with higher agenda responsiveness as UGTT demands are more regarded by civil servants, but also more mediatized as we have seen earlier. On the other hand, the policy responsiveness is not high for the UGTT, because they cannot realize every policy they want; other actors are of importance. The output responsiveness is not very relevant to all organizations as it is mainly about the technical implementation of a law. On the other hand, especially when it comes to the application of legislation and thus impact responsiveness, the UGTT has a high impact especially on social issues as they are also able to demand goods and services for its members from the administration. The surveillance on the application by the UGTT is stronger than for other organizations.

When it comes to the LTDH, access is limited for the Ministry of the Interior and more extensive for the Ministry of Relations with Civil Society. Other ministries play less a role in my analysis. At the same time the LTDH is expert for human rights issues and security issues

and has some agenda setting power as seen in the media analysis. As the relevant ministries have to respect media coverage to a certain degree, the agenda responsiveness will vary considerably between the Ministry of the Interior and others. In this case we see interplay of different mechanisms. When the LTDH criticizes directly, the Ministry of the Interior will normally react. For policy responsiveness the evaluation is rather negative, however the LTDH does promote few own policy proposals. In the case were they were against a policy it changed only in one case something and this result is more related to the UGTT and Ennahdha (law on terrorism, law on reconciliation, to be shown later). As for the others output responsiveness is low, however the LTDH is very active when it comes to controlling prisons and implementation of human rights legislation.

The ATFD has a privileged access to the Ministry of Women, but quasi no access to other analyzed ministries. When it comes to agenda setting, the ministry normally reacts to the topics set by the women movement as they are well integrated. The policy responsiveness by the Ministry of Women is again high as several law proposals and their implementation during the last years show (apart the later discussed law on sexual violence, a law against sexual harassment or a law on heritage are other examples). Again, output responsiveness plays less a role, state administration is mainly involved in the implementation. The impact responsiveness is only medium for some women issues. Generally, the ATFD starts again with agenda setting when a law is not applied or is not in line with the constitution. This emphasis of the constitution is to be interpreted as focus on emulation, by using the normative power of the constitution to demand changes.

The FTDES has a very limited access and succeeds in agenda setting in the media, while it plays no role for the ministries analyzed. The Ministry for Relations with Civil Society is the only one where access is seen, the agenda responsiveness is seen as medium as the FTDES does a lot of media work. Policy responsiveness is again low, although the law on racism accepted in 2018 indicates some responsiveness. The FTDES takes up the demand for goods and services and thus coordinates also protest in order to achieve the application of legislation (as well as additional claims). Due to the diversity of topics the expertise for specific topics is not clear, limiting prospects for the initiation of effective learning.

Other actors are of importance for most of those types of influence and as the examples under 7.5 will show, even protest by the UGTT may not be sufficient to achieve a desired outcome. The impact of the UGTT is however higher than for the other organizations.

Table 7.3 Type of influence according to organizations

Type of influence	Organization	Degree
Access responsiveness (access towards the state)	UGTT	High
	LTDH	Low (for Min. Rel with Civ Soc. Higher)
	ATFD	For Min. of Women high, others low
	FTDES	Low (for Min. Rel with Civ Soc. Higher)
Agenda responsiveness (agenda setting and reaction by state)	UGTT	High
	LTDH	For Min. of Justice/Interior high, others low
	ATFD	For Min. of Women high, others low
	FTDES	Medium (depends on media)
Policy responsiveness (proposing/opposing policy and reacton by state)	UGTT	Medium
	LTDH	Low
	ATFD	For Min. of Women high, others low
	FTDES	Low
Output responsiveness (implementation of legislation)	UGTT	Low
	LTDH	Low
	ATFD	Low
	FTDES	Low
Impact responsiveness (control of the application of legislation)	UGTT	High for social issues
	LTDH	Medium for certain issues like torture
	ATFD	Medium for some women issues
	FTDES	Medium for certain social issues

While the channels mechanisms were outlined in an abstract way so far, I apply the findings from the first part of the chapter on three examples of legislation that were of importance at the time of interviews and that show the influence of movements. Those examples take up the arguments provided earlier to see whether movements are able to influence legislation on the basis of their democratic framing.

7.5 Examples of mechanisms

Building on the identified channels and mechanism of influence, the second part of chapter seven uses three examples that were prominent at the time of the interviews to show different degrees of influence, namely: the law on terrorism, accepted unmodified in 2015 against large protests of civil society groups; the law on reconciliation that was finally accepted in parliament in 2017, which has been postponed since 2015 following wide scale protest from civil society; and the law on violence against women which is a modified proposition of the women movements, which has been promoted by the Ministry of Women and which was accepted in 2017.

The selection of the three laws is data driven. It was not actively searched for the examples, but the law projects emerged naturally as topics during interviews. As they were among the salient topics for the organizations as well as some ministries, the interviewees included them in their argumentation. Following the first interviews that systematically showed the referral to those laws, those were included in the following interviews when prompting for examples. The data from interviews was then supplemented with a media analysis on the three laws including the claims promoted by every organization. In addition, other reports allow drawing a picture on alliances and coalitions for and against the laws that included the analyzed organizations.

The three examples show no, mixed and extensive but still disputable influence on policy processes and realization of ideas on democracy. The chapter relates the democratic framings to connected claims in order to account for a full picture. As the laws themselves were not a focus of interviews, neither with leaders nor with civil society, no detailed questions have been posed. However, as they were important at the time of interviews,

several interviewees mentioned them. The analysis is thus focused on the media resonance of framing as well as interviews.

7.5.1 The law on terrorism (loi organique n°2015-26)

The law on terrorism, adopted by a large majority of the Tunisian parliament in July 2015 and published in August 2015, includes the death penalty for certain acts of terrorism, arrests for fifteen days without access to a lawyer and was criticized especially by the left for including a broad definition of terrorism (France24 2015). Especially the missing safeguards against abuse were a point of criticism (Aliriza 2015b). According to the ATFD it threatens individual liberties:

"Absolutely because the law against terrorism [...] It's true we are against terrorism but this law will destroy everything, we are against that law. But we have to [...] terrorism yes, we have to fight this terrorism, but not with this law which will influence human rights, individual freedom. It's bad for civil society."
(ATFD, Myriam)

"If you have now the two poles, [...] the fight against terrorism and the freedom of speech and all that [...] then it's the freedom of speech who pays for that law"
(ATFD, Yasmine)

The FIDH and the Friedrich Ebert Foundation published a report criticizing the law on terrorism as partially incompatible with the constitution and being too vague on the term terrorism, the notion of human rights and the competencies held by security forces; points that were equally criticized by other civil society organizations (FIDH 2015; Huffpost Tunisie 2015b; Samti 2015). The law also gives additional power to security forces curbing civil liberties, something been criticized by civil society and political parties (Ghribi 2015). In addition, penalties for environmental terrorism and Takfir were included. The law was adopted with only few changes during the parliamentary discussions between March and July 2015 (DCAF 2015).

In April 2015, forty-eight Tunisian and international organizations - among those the UGTT, LTDH, FTDES, ONAT, ATFD, or Al Bawsala- called for the respect of human rights as antiterrorism laws are used abusively, supporting torture and ignoring the right for a fair process (Nawaat 2015; Babnet 2015)⁶⁶. The protest on the law argued to lead to authoritarianism (Gharbi 2015). Among the organizations were eight international

⁶⁶ The complete list can be found in the Annex

organizations including Amnesty International, Human Rights Watch, the FIDH and the Réseau euro-méditerranéen des droits humains (Amnesty International 2015). Al Bawsala for example called to abandon the law completely due to the problems in terms of human rights protection (Déjoui 2015). The LTDH criticized the law as not in line with the Tunisian legal system and international standards when it comes to access to lawyers, at the same time underlining the support for the fight against terrorism (Samti 2015).

The coalition was large and diversified on the national as well as the international level. Given the reputation of the included organizations the protest had the heavyweights on their side. The areas of interest covered by the coalition against the law were very diverse, with especially those working on human rights but also the international actors being highlighted.

In the aftermath of the Bardo attack the parliament approved the law on terrorism with only few modifications and against the protest of human rights organizations (DCAF 2015). Given the low number of parliamentarians that did vote against the law, the question emerges why civil society, although mobilized, could not convince more parliamentarians (ten abstentions, no vote against; Libération 2015; Samti 2015).

Media coverage and movement positions

Given the extensive press coverage on the topic itself (terrorism) and also on the law modifications, especially the UGTT and to a smaller degree the LTDH have had their voice in the media landscape; the ATFD played no role, the FTDES a smaller one than UGTT or LTDH (see Table 7.4). Interestingly, the LTDH has the same ratio of reporting on terrorism compared to the overall reporting on the LTDH as has the UGTT: This is not surprising given that the LTDH covers topics like freedoms, transitional justice and security issues and as the UGTT covers nearly all topics of national importance.

The ideas promoted by the ATFD in media have not been regarded in detail as the ATFD was not covered on terrorism by media, except four mentions (Table 7.4). The ATFD was not included in the debate on terrorism.

Table 7.4 Number of mentions on terrorism in articles

	ATFD	FTDES	LTDH	UGTT
Total mentions (in: La Presse/ Le Temps)	4 (0/4)	27 (23/4)	52 (40/12)	374 (208/166)
Ratio Mentions/ Overall reporting on the organization⁶⁷	0,1	0,2	0,38	0,38

Note: Separate searches for the term terrorism were performed for each organization as part of their claims. The last ratio takes the number of mentions of terrorism as part of claims and divides it with the total number of articles on the organization. Total number of articles: ATFD= 38, FTDES =137, LTDH = 136, UGTT= 991

Given the wide civil society coalition against the law, it surprises that it passed. The framing of the law on terrorism is different according to organizations. Thus, a look at the mediatized perspectives indicates that perspectives have not been clear enough. It can be doubted whether a that diverse framing leads either to emulation, coercion or learning (especially for the latter best practices and alternative policies would have to be highlighted).

The most common aspect visible in articles is the referral towards the Tunisian government, the national fight against terrorism and linking the economic situation and terrorism. When looking in detail at every mediatized framing by organizations, the framings appear as very diverse and partly unfocused.

The LTDH is mentioned in relation to marches against terrorism that took place following the Bardo attacks, socioeconomic factors, repression of marginalized people in the name of terrorism, the fight against terrorism, disputes between police and courts on suspects, as well as the links of smuggling and terrorism. The LTDH demanded a national congress on fighting terrorism and was also named in relation to democracy or development and terrorism. Another topic was a visit of the LTDH president to the French president at that time, Francois Hollande, were they talked about Syria, Libya – in relation to Libya also on takfirist activities - and terrorism. The LTDH criticized torture on suspected terrorists, condemned terrorism and demanded the abolition of the death penalty for terrorists. In addition, the LTDH negotiated with ministries on religious teaching in line with terrorism. The LTDH connects torture and human rights with terrorism. However, few of the combinations are repeated across articles. While the LTDH has relatively the highest ratio of

⁶⁷ For the ATFD, the 4 mentions of terrorism are divided by the 38 articles on the ATFD. The same is done for the other organizations. Numbers on overall reporting are to be found in chapter three.

mentions on terrorism together with the UGTT, the included concepts are diverse and not consistently promoted.

Articles on terrorism and the UGTT cover even more aspects than the ones on the LTDH. They discuss for example solidarity with France following terrorist attacks, the fight against terrorism and mobilization and protest against terrorism. Especially the mobilization of people against terrorism and the call for solidarity were reported several times as was the national cooperation with other organizations and the state to fight terrorism. The framing on the fight on terrorism is diverse itself. Terrorism is seen as opposed to the democratic development, the civic state, economic development, patriotism, freedoms and progress.

The UGTT includes economic elements and connects the fight against terrorism with the fight against poverty in order to solve causes of terrorism. They insist that the costs for fighting terrorism cannot be covered cutting salaries and argue that jobs in education cannot be reduced because of the need to cope with terrorism. This perspective became more and more prominent in 2016 and has been repeated several times but only after the law proposal. It is however no perspective that was actively promoted by the LTDH for example.

The UGTT insists that the fight against terrorism has to be a priority of the state. The opposition to the law linking it to human rights has been reported much fewer on although human rights are one of the common elements of the coalition as outlined in chapters four to six. The UGTT connects the fight against terrorism with its role as protector of the Tunisian democratic state. It called to stand united against terrorism and urged the Tunisian state to take over its responsibilities supporting the government capacity as well as security forces. The UGTT issued a number of declarations together with for example the parliament and calls to support the state. This framing is much in line with the focus on the government capacity, but is also not a dimension other organizations stressed a lot.

The unionists underscored the role of the media when journalists got arrested and accused of supporting terrorism. In addition, the UGTT criticized that protest was discussed to be prohibited to fight terrorism and that the Lebanese Hezbollah was declared as terrorists. Like the LTDH, the UGTT called for a national congress on terrorism.

Looking at the diversity of topics shows that even UGTT framing on terrorism has not been consistent. The UGTT is named in line with national development without terrorism or with religious teaching to prevent terrorism. It demands international negotiations on how to cope with terrorism as well as international programs to counter terrorism on a cultural, educational and social level. The UGTT section on culture proposed cultural activities to fight terrorism. Another article links the juridical processes on the death of Chokri Belaid with fighting terrorism. Like the LTDH, the UGTT connected smuggling with terrorism. Education, the protection of children from terrorism and a culture of living have been opposed to terrorism and its culture of death.

Mainly La Presse published declarations by the UGTT, while Le Temps often only recalled UGTT positions when reporting on the government. Le Temps criticized the ongoing mobilization of the UGTT that took resources from the fight against terrorism, but also the UGTT postponed some strikes to give more time for fighting terrorism. The public discussion of arguments in line with terrorism in the media is diverse and few aspects like mobilization, economic problems and terrorism as well as the call for solidarity are covered several times.

The articles where the FTDES and terrorism were mentioned cover the World Social Forum, but also the criticism of the State of Urgency under the pretext of the fight against terrorism. Terrorism was mentioned in line with strengthening the state administration to counter it or with torture, socioeconomic conditions that favor terrorism, suicides, strategies or research against terrorism.

Why did the civil society perform badly? Comparing the frame combinations of terrorism in media shows that apart from a focus on national fight against terrorism, there are few other key concepts that are consistently shared among movements and that get repeated across actors. There is also missing consistency of media coverage on terrorism in relation to the organizations. Only the UGTT has developed a relatively consistent framing that connects terrorism with the fight of poverty and economic development, however the organization also connects many other aspects to terrorism. Framing on terrorism and the law proposal were not related to another key frame that focused for example on rights and liberties as

was expected. It shows either nor common or only a bad involvement in terms of framing and poses questions on emulation.

Interviews and why civil society performed badly

Some extracts of interviews show that a law on terrorism was accepted, even though the implications for freedoms were criticized by organizations:

"We are in favor, it's necessary to fight terrorism, rigorously. We are in favor of it, but it does not give the government the right to [...] that the people keep silent or what. It's not in the name of [...] Let's say fighting against terrorism would mean applying dictatorship. That's the duality they want to impose on us. Either terrorism or dictatorship." (UGTT, Sofien)

"No, we weren't [...] we discussed and eventually we saw that it was quickly done, but overall the country needed this law [...] overall, we consider that the country needed a law that allowed fighting terrorism, but nevertheless resecting human rights." (FTDES, Sami)

While the missing common framing and general acceptance for the fight on terrorism can explain the failure of civil society to change the law project, the organizations themselves tried to explain the process. Especially the ATFD has not been heard on the topic, although the ATFD positioned itself against the law:

"Currently, for example regarding terrorism, there was a mobilization by the parties of democratic force as well as by associations to say that okay, we are against terrorism, we fight against terrorism, we need a law against terrorism, but it is not in the name of the fight against terrorism that one needs to limit individual liberties. It's not in the name of terrorism, that one will arrest the youth while telling them what do you do with that guy, you are not married. So, it is not with this slogan that one will stop the freedom of speech of journalists. So, there was this fear, we expressed it, to not touch the freedoms in the name of the fight against terrorism." (ATFD, Sarah)

Sarah relates the fight against terrorism to hindering money laundering as well as to better social-economic conditions, another referral to economic elements that has also been found in other interviews. Leaders of movements are critical on the targets they approach as well as regarding the mobilization, especially in relation to other laws.

"The law has been accepted because those who govern us are massively represented in parliament. So, it's normal that they count on their alliance to make [...] but because at the end of payoff there was a mobilization but which was not as important as for changing the constitution for example. The people did not feel as they felt it during the first-time during terrorist actions. And for the national reconciliation, there was a large resistance. In addition, that what happened, until now, it has not been presented, we still wait. If there is no

important mobilization, no important pressure by the political opposition, by the civil society [...] we wait, we wait to see.” (ATFD, Sarah)

“It passed because we are not, we are not participants in parliament. There are the parties. Always, we defend a principle that is the autonomy and independence of the UGTT. And we start to have relations with the parties, we tell that we are against [...] we tell many things.” (UGTT, Mohamed)

“It’s a failure, yes. Because it passed. Why hasn’t it been possible to [...] because the parliamentary majority was in favor of the law. The parliamentary majority that we were not able to change [...] we have not been sufficiently heard. It was also rashly. Every social movement needs time to position itself and to make some pressure” (ATFD, Yasmine)

The law on terrorism contradicts partially the assumptions made before in line with coercion, that a wide coalition can influence policies and ideas. Despite major coalitional protest activities and criticism by important heavyweights of the Tunisian civil society, the law passed with only few changes. Public opinion as well as parliament appeared more favorable towards the law than the named civil society organizations which nevertheless tended to accept the fight against terrorism as being important. This tacit acceptance has potentially undermined the conviction of organizations and thus the potential for emulation.

Opinion polls showed that seventy percent of the Tunisian population perceived the threat of terrorism as too high; other polls show that forty seven percent of Tunisians saw in terrorism the most urgent problem (Guizani 2015; Samti 2015). The fighting terrorism frame appeared as more powerful than the democracy frame, while some actors tried to align the two. Youngs assigns that especially the government preferred the security narrative to the democracy narrative (Youngs 2015). The call for more security forces in the fight against terrorism was a narrative also used under Ben Ali as Yousfi recalls (Yousfi 2015).

Framing has not been consistently focused on key concepts that could have been connected to terrorism. This is particularly surprising as the fight against terrorism was already used under Ben Ali to justify the persecution of Ennahdha and other actors. Given the final outcome, one additional argument that could be added is that the coalition eventually became too large and that the mechanisms used for influencing (street and media via coercion) were not enough. Another aspect highlighted by the interviews was the speed by

which the law was passed which left few opportunities to organize protest and quasi excluded involvement in consultation.

7.5.2 The law on reconciliation (loi organique n°2015-49)

The law gives amnesty to a number of those who committed financial and economic delicts under Ben Ali revealed after 2010, raising the suspicion of forgiving corruption and touching the question of transitional justice as well as economic development (Chellali 2015; Yardimici-Geyikci and Tür 2018). Estimations suggest that it takes between seven to thirteen thousand dossiers away from the Truth Commission which is currently responsible for those cases (Bobin 2015; Dahmani 2015; Delmas 2015). Those, who see the law positive, emphasized that economic activities foster if there is no longer the fear of persecution and that money hidden abroad can return (International Crisis Group 2016⁶⁸).

The law first emerged in July 2015 and was put again on the agenda of parliament in June 2016, what raised criticism especially from organizations such as Al Bawsala or I Watch (Huffpost Tunisie 2016d). Already in 2015 protest rose against the law but has been hindered by police forces in September 2015 under the State of Emergency after the Bardo and Sousse attacks (Bobin 2015; Delmas 2015). The law project was not considered urgent by parliament in 2016 and postponed with modifications demanded (Directinfo 2016b; Mosaïquefm 2016). It re-emerged in 2017 in a very modified and reduced form where for example businessmen were not included when it was accepted by the parliamentary commission on general legislation and referred to further discussion in other commissions (Krimi 2017). It was finally accepted by parliament in September 2017 with one hundred seventeen to nine votes (Huffpost Maghreb 2017).

Already with the first discussion in parliament, the UGTT, the FTDES and opposition parties were against the law (Delmas 2015; Bellamine 2015; Marks 2017; International Crisis Group 2016). In July 2016, civil society mobilized in Tunis against the law, still criticizing the project as going against the aims of the revolution and protest across the country continued (Huffpost Tunisie 2016a; Chaouch 2016). Among those protesting were the LTDH, I Watch, Al Bawsala, the FTDES, the Observatoire tunisien de l'indépendance de la justice, ASF, Amnesty

⁶⁸ The International Crisis Group provides a detailed discussion around the law project and its links with transitional justice, International Crisis Group 2016

International and the Centre international de la justice transitionnelle (ICTJ) together with opposition party members (Chaouch 2016; Bellamine 2016). In a different petition, organizations like the SNJT, FTDES, Al Bawsala, the OCTT, the ATFD, ADLi, Al Karama, ATDD, ADDH, Labo' Démocratique, OTE, ASF, OMCT and EUROMED aligned in opposition against the law (Shemsfm 2016). In 2017, an open letter by civil society organizations like Al Bawsala, Kolna Tounes, I Watch, the Observatoire tunisien de l'économie, Voix de Femmes, the OCT, the FTDES and others demanded the rejection of the law (Maghrebemergent.com 2017). The FTDES established an informal cooperation with Nawaat to provide Nawaat with reports and arguments against the law on reconciliation (Gordner 2016).

The role of a coalition against the law on reconciliation is underlined by an ATFD leader:

"During our discussions around the law against terrorism, the law against reconciliation, the law on transitional justice, we have been in the group that fought for modifying the law on transitional justice, to allow a real transitional justice which takes into account the rights of women, which takes into account the different stages that have to be followed. The understanding of truth, that it shall be judged, [...] the judgement, [...] the necessity to be questioned, to be judged and then the reconciliation." (ATFD, Nour)

The protest was organized under the label "Manich Msamah" (I do not forgive) since 2015 and organized protest such as on the 15th of July 2016 started in front of the headquarter of the UGTT (Chaouch 2016; Hmed 2016; La Presse 2016). As for the law on terrorism, coercion played a major role. However, polls show that around half of the Tunisian population had no idea about the law (Directinfo 2016c). Given the limited knowledge it is doubtful that unfavorable public opinion played a role for postponing the project which has been considered as a – temporary - success for Tunisian movements.

The UGTT operated on another level, it was not part of the named declarations by organizations, but was among those protesting. Scholars like Marks remark that the UGTT could have stopped the law by threatening with a general strike (Marks 2017). The coalition(s) include organizations working on transitional justice (such as the LTDH), but shows a wider coalition across areas.

Media coverage and movement positions

Similar to the law on terrorism, the ATFD gained only very little media coverage, while the larger organizations achieved more coverage, with the UGTT in lead on the question of reconciliation as Table 7.5 shows. However, in relation to the overall number of articles, FTDES and especially LTDH have been more prominently covered on reconciliation (Table 7.5).

Table 7.5 Number of mentions on reconciliation

	ATFD	FTDES	LTDH	UGTT
Total mentions (La Presse/ Le Temps)	4 (2/2)	23 (18/5)	41 (29/12)	155 (44/111)
Ratio Mentions/ Overall reporting	0,1	0,17	0,3	0,16

Note: Separate searches for the term reconciliation were performed for each organization as part of their claims. The last ratio takes the number of mentions of reconciliation as part of claims and divides it with the total number of articles on the organization. Total number of articles: ATFD= 38, FTDES =137, LTDH = 136, UGTT= 991

The media reports on the ATFD and reconciliation suffer from low numbers of articles; the articles including the ATFD see reconciliation as linked to violence against women and aggressors - so with a different meaning - or are generally covering reconciliation with what happened under Ben Ali.

The articles on the FTDES report on press conferences on the civil society criticism of the law going against the revolution and the constitution. The connection with the revolution and the constitution has been repeated in press communication. The FTDES equally supported the Instance Vérité et dignité (IVD) in its work. The law on reconciliation is connected to corruption and reform of the institutions. The FTDES called prominent persons and the people to peacefully mobilize and protest against the law and created commissions to work against the law in terms of argumentation and communication. In line with transitional justice, the law is criticized as serving some business men. Especially the movements and mobilization against the law – and the determined civil society - have been highlighted several times during FTDES press conferences. Reports on the FTDES and reconciliation also cover national social reconciliation in terms of equality which is not linked to the law.

The LTDH called to reform reconciliation and transitional justice, but also the law. The LTDH sees the law as linked to corruption and against the constitution. Those two elements have

also been evoked during a meeting of the LTDH with the parliamentary commission on general legislation. In addition, the LTDH saw the danger of confiding transitional justice. The LTDH consulted with the UGTT and the ONAT on that issue. At this occasion, the role of the national dialogue (without the Utica) on the law and the criticism by the organizations has been stressed. Equally, the LTDH showed support to modify the laws on the IVD and the process of transitional justice. LTDH and UGTT equally criticized that protest against the law was stopped by security forces.

Arguments of the UGTT against the law on reconciliation focused on the link to the constitution and the need for transitional justice. The UGTT emphasized that every law on reconciliation should have a consensus within society. The three elements constitution, transitional justice and consensus are repeated and made the UGTT opposing the law in its form. The UGTT saw the danger of national political instability. It was named in connection to Manich Msamah which effectively underlines the role of the revolution, the constitution and corruption, but also inequality. Another aspect was the question of archives and that some of the archives should be resituated to allow real reconciliation. Reconciliation was demanded for the victims of January 1978. The international dimension as well as social reconciliation were named. The UGTT criticized that parts of the law on economic reconciliation have been included in the law on finance and that civil society was not part of the proposition process. There were also articles on reconciliation in Libya or salary negotiations, which were disregarded.

The constitution, the revolution and corruption are re-emerging elements showing overarching combinations of arguments across organizations. As we have already seen, the constitution and arguably also the revolution are topics that can be mobilized for emulation due to their normative load.

Interviews and the criticism of the old regime

Some factors like the referral to corruption or the achievements of the revolution and the constitution can also be found in the interviews.

"With this law on [...] reconciliation [...] so the corruption still exists. The blocking, it's still there; the profiteers are still the same. We still see them. And this, it requires a lot of time for changing." (ATFD, Myriam)

"In addition, today during this struggle which was conducted these days to question the law on reconciliation, are the young militants of the revolution, are also the women and men who fought against Ben Ali [Interruption] are the militants of human rights who are now threatened [...,new interruption] So today it's the law against terrorism which will give catastrophes, finally it will have disastrous consequences on human rights, on freedoms." (ATFD, Yasmine)

The already named interdiction of protest against the law in 2015 is seen particularly critical:

"Because they did yesterday [...] yesterday it was a gathering at the place Mohamed Ali, there at the UGTT to contest against the law on reconciliation. It is introduced by the President of the Republic, and that the police intervened to prohibit protesters to enter the Avenue Habib Bourguiba, in addition they verified a lot of identities of people, among those verified were the leader unions." (UGTT, Moncef)

"Yes, there is a lot of fear. For example, now, there is the Popular Front which asked for a demonstration against the law on reconciliation on Saturday, it was prohibited. And they aggress, he is very aggressive the Minister of the Interior and he says that they have information that there are terrorists which would infiltrate this demonstration." (ATFD, Yasmine)

The protest is linked to freedom of association. During interviews, the law was also framed as return of the old regime:

"That's it, yes. They want to impose a law like this, and one turns a page and like nothing happened. So, everything they want that's [...] the businessmen you give me some money and that's it, one is settled [...] Now, especially during the last months, there is the civil life [...], it encountered a small weakness, a small loosening. With the new law of Mister Essebsi [...], so we tried to, the civil society, the progressive forces are on the way to unite again to struggle against this famous law which will [...] it's another way to make the corrupt people of the old regime come back. And that's another way to establish themselves step by step." (UGTT, Sofien)

The actions included not only the mentioned protest activities, but also reports for example by the FTDES:

"There are a lot of things to do. So, ok there is [...] a press release, one. Two, we do a critical lecture, that means every time for example there is a problem concerning the law on reconciliation, we, we do not agree. It's simple; one shouldn't say that I do not agree. Simply. No, we published a critical lecture elaborated by lawyers and economists, which shows the gaps of these projects. So, this is a substantive work. And you present it in public, [...] now and later we made a national coalition. And by this you can push the government to not pass and adopt the project." (LTDH, Medhi)

Not only civil society was against the law, but also some political parties. One UGTT leader underlined the role of Ennahdha against the law:

"We are against. Yes, that's it [...] Now for example; the UGTT knows very well that on the form as it is, it will not be accepted. Because even Ennahdha being party at power will not accept it as it is now. So, there will be a modification of this [...] for this modification there, the UGTT will participate in one or the other way. To create an acceptable version. If we arrive there, the UGTT certainly will be for it, will change position. Otherwise it will lead towards mobilization" (UGTT, Ahmed)

The protest against the law on reconciliation was widespread in civil society. Not only the "old" civil society including organizations such as the UGTT, LTDH, SNJT or AFD were included, but also newer civil society organizations such as Al Bawsala or I Watch. In addition, the protest had not only a national, but also an international dimension with the inclusion of Amnesty International or Euromed. The coalition was a bit smaller than the one against the law on terrorism.

Framing was more consistent with a focus on corruption, the constitution, transitional justice and a return of the old system, reinforced by the repression by security forces. In addition, the law on reconciliation is a case where civil society posed a veto (reactive implementation), which was equally supported by an important bloc in parliament (Ennahdha). While the preconditions are similar to the law on terrorism, it was eventually not only the mobilization that achieved the delay and modification of the law, but the connection with a wider opposition. However, the mechanisms used were similar to the law on terrorism (coercion; protest and media) with more normative load (indicating emulation), this time with a temporary success of movements. It would be interesting to see, whether the position of Ennahdha would have been sufficient to block the law regardless of the positions of civil society.

7.5.3 The law on sexual harassment (loi organique n°2016-60)

The law was initially presented by the Ministry of Women; including different points like domestic violence, equality of women at the workplace and the creation of specialized institutions (Directinfo 2017). The law on sexual harassment was proposed in cooperation between civil society groups and with support of the EU, the UNFPA, and CREDIF with support by the Ministry of Women (Ben Taieb 2016). In July 2016 the law passed the ministerial council with higher punishments foreseen (up to 6 years prison) as well as modified articles especially in case of sexual harassment by relatives or in relation to the

current impunity in case of rape when the victim gets married to the aggressor (Businessnews 2016; Réalités 2016b). The law was discussed in parliament in February 2017 with support from the Commission on Women and Family as well as the commission on rights, freedoms and external relations and was adopted without contestation on July 26th 2017 (Kapitalis 2017; France24 2017).

As Chennaoui outlines, the law on sexual harassment was in preparation since at least 2013 and she highlights the conflicts between the Tunisian civil society and more conservative positions within Ennahdha and Nida Tounes (Chennaoui 2016). In addition, ATFD leaders (like Hiba or Nour) recall that there were previous law proposals and that they fought for such a law for a long time (ATFD, Hiba; ATFD, Nour). Hiba for example related the first proposal for a law on violence against women to the 1990s and outlined the continuous efforts by the women movement (ATFD, Hiba). Nour underlined that they worked for years to have the law against violence against women (ATFD, Nour). Not surprisingly, feminist activists and the ATFD welcomed the law, while still criticizing aspects like the unpunished rape under married people (Chennaoui 2016). The coalition for the law was relatively narrow and focused on the Tunisian feminist movement, as these were perceived as the experts.

Media coverage and movement positions

Compared to the other laws the law on sexual harassment achieved by far less media coverage as shown in Table 7.6; while the ATFD was covered in most articles. The ATFD even overturned the UGTT, which was named less frequently as can be seen in Table 7.6. Comparing the ratios, the media coverage of the ATFD on harassment is as high as the ratio of the LTDH on reconciliation. One can argue that the debate was shaped by the ATFD. This is less surprising given their specialization and focus on women rights. FTDES and LTDH played nearly no role in relation to the law, while the UGTT was of minor importance.

Table 7.6 Number of mentions on sexual harassment

	ATFD	FTDES	LTDH	UGTT
Total mentions (La Presse/ Le Temps)	23 18/5)	5 (5/0)*	3 (2/1)	11 (4/7)
Ratio Mentions/Overall reporting	0,6	0,04	0,02	0,01

Note: Separate searches for the term sexual harassment were performed for each organization as part of their claims. The last ratio takes the number of mentions of sexual harassment as part of claims and divides it with the total number

of articles on the organization. For the FTDES the search word has been modified towards “violence sexuelle” to get a proxy as the original search showed no result. Total number of articles: ATFD= 38, FTDES =137, LTDH = 136, UGTT= 991

In media articles on the ATFD, discrimination was connected with parity and equality, as well as the need to protect women by law. The ATFD has published micro-studies on the frequency of harassment and discrimination illustrating the scale of the problem (combination of learning and emulation). The demand for the law was repeated each time harassment is covered. The demand is accompanied by a sensitization of society on the issue of discrimination of women, as well as by diverse civil society activities. The ATFD also problematized the voluntary touching of women in public transport⁶⁹. Throughout a theater play they showed the atrocities and discrimination against women and the links and utilization of cultural activities as argued earlier.

The arguments of the ATFD include consistently a demand for the law on sexual harassment. Although the number of articles on harassment is not very high, the demand for a new law was mediatized. It cannot be said with certainty that the arguments used by the four organizations were very consistent apart from the key words women and violence. Given the low number of media mentions it is doubtful whether public opinion and the diffusion via media played a role. Nearly only the women movement advertised the project and mentions in media remain limited. Compared to the other laws, media reports did not play a role.

For the FTDES and the LTDH reporting on harassment is very restrained and thus difficult to interpret. When named in relation with sexual violence, the FTDES linked it to values and missing sexual education, familial violence but also illegal behavior. It also underlines sexual violence against children in rural areas. The LTDH is only mediatized in relation to harassment and the International Women Day, where they participated in activities with a coalition of women associations including the ATFD. The word search for harassment leads to articles criticizing the harassment of journalists. Given the close interaction of LTDH and ATFD as seen in chapter four, it is surprising that the LTDH was not more heavily involved.

⁶⁹ At the time of writing in end 2018, the ATFD started together with other organizations large scale campaigns in relation to harassment in public transport.

The UGTT organized a conference on violence against women that caught the attention of journalists. Harassment is seen connected to the work place or public places and is linked to a demand for legislation in line with international conventions. The UGTT focused on harassment in public transports, which caused repeated media echo and complements the coverage of the ATFD. The search also gave results for harassment of journalists, workers or Tunisian regions which should be named, but which have not been analyzed as they were not related to violence against women. When harassment of women is meant, ATFD and UGTT seem to be close, but it is difficult to evaluate given the low number of articles. The public discussion of harassment of women remains very low.

Interviews and several mechanisms

Interviews with leaders of the ATFD suggest that mechanisms different than public opinion are at work (compare section 7.3):

"We had direct contacts. First of all, we invite her [the minister] to our actions, we write and we had some contacts, we visited them. For example, for the law, in order to have a framework law against the discriminations and we are ready to work together. Because we are the organization with the most expertise in the domain of violence against women. So, we are the experts which elaborated first, for the ministry, we are the experts who did the proposition of the integral law on violence against women. And we want, as partners, we try to lobby and put pressure in order to be integrated as real partners that are susceptible to become involved. And currently we are part of certain structures, for example within the ministries that work on [...] for example the violence against women, on rural women, on the conditions of rural women. We are also in some commissions that work on development." (ATFD, Sarah)

However, the influence via ministries was not without changes of the intentions of the women movement:

"So, I wanted to give you the example of the law framework for which we struggle, the integral law against the violence against women. It has been deformed, the project was very good. And now the projects risks passing before [...] parliament, it's a deformed project. Because in the ministries, there have been discussions around that project and they proposed a modification. We do not know the text now. But we know, through the information that we have, that the text has been deformed. So that the discriminations persist. So that the laws in favor of violence persist. For example, I don't know, the rape conjugal or the marriage with [...] the law that states that the marriage with the rapist will allow him not to pass before court, will stay eventually. And that's a battle which will be strong and we hope to win it." (ATFD, Yasmine)

While media reports showed no involvement of the LTDH, in interviews they expressed support for the law.

"We currently create a coordination to invest our weight into civil society, in every case invest our weight for the announcement of the law [...] the integral law proposal against violence against women. This coordination is guided by the feminist associations and we are under way to join by trying to, really, by trying to, to put in our weight because we have nevertheless 26 sections and if in the case that all the sections align, first take notice of the law proposal and understand the importance of that law proposal to avoid that women continue to be subject of discrimination." (LTDH, Rim)

Given the very small movement coalition behind the law, theory on coalitions would expect the law to fail. However, coercion is less relevant and other mechanisms are in place a because ATFD as well as the women movement are perceived as experts for the topic. The inclusion of former members of the women movement in ministries and other positions allowed placing the law. Soulayma, from the Ministry of Women acknowledges, that the law was elaborated in interaction with civil society:

"Something that we did with the civil society, which was totally hostile [...] for example, I do not know, an approach [...] for the enactment of a comprehensive law for the fight against violence on women, which was done by experts who themselves are in civil society, but there was a vision that may offend certain sensibilities, and that may hinder the path [...] and the process of this law. And who stayed for more than a year in the lockers, it could not be promulgated for that. So, for civil society, the point of assurance is that the strategic vision is that, today we ask this because there are emergencies. Once we have this law, we have a plea to convince everyone, we can go step by step for things, for issues that are problematic and use mainly advocacy before going to action." (Ministry of Women, Soulayma - a)

The current situation with rapists escaping punishment when marrying their victim, which was also discussed in media, might be another aspect that could have influenced public opinion⁷⁰. The strong normative focus of the campaign stands for a focus on emulation. The targeting of ministries and parliament commissions played a more important role than any influence via the traditional media. It was nearly exclusively the women movement without the help from a coalition that achieved the acceptance of the law. A comparison with the other laws shows a very different mode of influencing and a reduced focus on coercion. It was the women movement with particular expertise in the field that proposed and pushed

⁷⁰ As mentioned earlier, few information on public opinion is available

for the law connecting several key concepts. It was proactive and started from the beginning to lobby for that law.

7.5.4 Conclusion on the laws

The three law examples show different channels and mechanisms. Given the focus on coalitions and outcomes, the results indicate that several channels and mechanisms and their combination can lead to a desired policy outcome and are not always focused on large coalitions.

As different channels are used to influence, chances of success vary, as do different policy areas. The law on terrorism has been adopted because movements failed to convince parliamentarians, especially those not close to the left. The law on reconciliation can be interpreted as temporary success of several coalitions against it, be it movement coalitions or parliamentarian actors, and as an example for reactive mobilization (coercion and emulation). Framing was more consistent against the law on reconciliation as Table 7.7 shows.

Only taking the first two examples would leave us with the conclusion that not movements themselves matter, but probably majorities in parliament or at least the combination of both. In addition, public opinion seemed favorable towards new laws on terrorism in the aftermath of the Bardo and Sousse attacks.

The law on sexual harassment shows a different mechanism and long-term lobbying by Tunisian women movements. Thus, it can be interpreted as success enabled through the contacts towards administration and especially ministries (and not through public opinion). The normative focus of the campaign shows emulation. It has been shown that movements use relays not necessarily to promote their visions of democracy, but their policy claims. The size and resources of the coalition do not seem to be a decisive factor as representation and resources were higher for the other two examples.

Table 7.7 provides a short summary of results from this comparative case study focused on the coalition and its reputation as well as consistency of media framing and main

mechanisms used. As is also to note, protest achieved only a postponement of a law project, but did not stop it as demanded by some mobilizing organizations.

Table 7.7 Summary of results

	Law on reconciliation	Law on terrorism	Law on sexual harassment
Coalition	At least 20 org. (mostly national)	At least 48 org. (nat. and international)	Tunisian women movement and Ministry of Women and Family
Reputation/ Specialization	A number of high reputation organizations included (quartet without UTICA), but also Ennahdha (pol. party), specialization in many areas	A number of high reputation organizations included (ONAT, LTDH and so on), specialization in many areas	ATFD, AFTURD with high profile on women issues
Media	Mov. perspective on: Economy, corruption, revolution and the constitution. Mainly consistent across organizations.	Mov. perspective diverse, reporting on: National solidarity, mobilization against terrorism, economic situation and terrorism – no clear common perspective	Mov. Perspective on equality, parity, protection, mainly by the ATFD, effectively no alternative perspective in media
Main mechanism	Coercion (protest)	Coercion (protest)	Emulation (direct contacts with Ministry)
Desired outcome of the four movements	No, but modified law	No	Yes

With the three examples it has not necessarily been shown that earlier stages of the legislation process are easier to influence -although it is the only really successful case-, but that different stages of the policy process have different chances of success depending on the channels and mechanisms used.

Kriesi’s distinction between reactive and proactive movement success is particularly useful. It allows to distinguish different strategies. When listening to movement leaders, they see especially the reactive element of public opinion and mobilization as crucial. In order to not

fall back to a lower level for example for human rights protection, public opinion and pressure from the street as part of coercion play a role. However, when it comes to proactive policy changes especially the personal contacts towards ministers are important. The law on violence against women presents an example of proactive policy implementation. It is a counter example towards the influence of large movement coalitions but might serve as example for specialized coalitions as the ATFD was not alone, the AFTURD as well as other organizations similarly promoted the law. It shows that resources or a large number of members is not necessary for influence on legislation.

I argue that it is no coincidence that the Ministry of Women and the women movement that have been identified to be particularly close in terms of framing are part of the efficient channels via personal contacts and commissions as well as through emulation. This reminds the findings of Banaszak, who argues that members of the women movement that enter administration are increasing the chances for outcomes (Banaszak 2005). In a similar vein, especially the Ministry of Relations with Civil Society and LTDH and FTDES have close ties that translate in a similar vision, but this Ministry has less policy proposals.

While the first two examples on law proposals show opposition towards a law, the last shows a law proposed by civil society. Given the different stages of policy development, direct contacts towards ministries play an important role in the first stage of the process, while at a later stage parliament and protest become more important. In terms of action repertoires, the street is often not the first mean of protest, as especially the UGTT enters first in dialogue and later – following failures in influencing the decision makers – opts for sit-ins or strikes. This sequencing of mechanisms is probably another point that made the law on reconciliation be accepted as a modified version after negotiations.

It is not in every case about reputation and specialized contacts. Influence is not the same for the LTDH whose influence on for example the Ministry of the Interior appears as quite limited although having a very specific state-oriented network. The LTDH has not the same relays in the Ministry as has the ATFD. Similarly, the wide ties towards a number of ministries by FTDES and UGTT are no guarantee for implementing policy proposals leaving a lot of unsolved puzzles. Contacts do not automatically influence.

The public discussion in media is not that important as in Western contexts. I raised a lot of doubts on the efficacy of media. Indirect effects do not play a major role. Although movements focus on different core elements, it became not clear how those different positions work within movement coalitions. Further research on the delimited positions within the Tunisian civil society could confirm or infirm the argument, that specialization is important for Tunisian movements. In the case of the most specialized coalition a success can be seen, while the most diverse coalition was not successful.

It might be that theories on social movements do not fit well with the Tunisian context, although not all arguments go against their use. Another interesting point might be whether counter mobilization existed; something that would have been noticed when mentioned in articles on the organizations, but not if the organizations of interest were not mentioned. This can become a point of future research.

Another question remains to be solved. Movements use the media to generate pressure on the government while the government ignores media reports. This may be a reality during the first years following any revolution. However, the government appears more and more responsive towards media reports; but again, especially digital media like Facebook have been highlighted. In this sense, a higher professionalization of the Tunisian media would enforce the mechanisms especially used by the FTDES, the active media work. While I would expect that the media sector could develop towards more professionalization having then consequences on policy processes, it is something to be verified in the future.

7.6 Conclusion to chapter seven

Chapter seven provides us with different insights. Different mechanisms are at work which need different types of channels. The channels identified refer to personal contacts or former members in important positions, occasional contacts that do not work perfectly, as well as institutionalized meeting structures (especially UGTT). Emulation in line with ideational impact is emphasized; however it is often about combinations with coercion or learning.

What are important channels and mechanisms? While for positioning a law personal contacts in ministries play a role, veto initiatives do not only rely on personal or institutionalized contacts, but also on public pressure and contacts towards parliamentary majorities, using several mechanisms at the same moment. As I argued at the beginning of the chapter, depending on stages of the policy process, influence is possible by the use of different channels and mechanisms. The influence through the traditional media appears as relatively limited in the Tunisian case at least when it comes to ministries; it might be different for politicians. The problems in the media landscape translate consequentially in an orientation towards the direct effect model.

The joint effect model has a limited fit for Tunisia as traditional media outlets are seen as biased in terms of promoting particular interests and lacking professionalism. The traditional media does not play the most important role in terms of public opinion but creates pressure, suggesting that the direct effect model is most adequate for the Tunisian context. It can be argued, that especially for the big questions, public opinion can play a crucial role and may be as important as the direct ties between ministries and organizations (see 7.5 on examples).

Some ministries are easier to influence like the Ministry of Women, especially due to former movement members in the ministries. For other ministries, mechanisms are limited by very few channels, which consequentially limits the possibility of influencing framings, policies and processes. In addition, different stages of the legislation process create different access points. While the degree of openness differs from one ministry to another, resembling much political opportunity structure approaches, common framings and dense networks will together shape the capacity of organizations to influence legislation. The influence of the UGTT is certainly on another level and less oriented towards a similar framing. It appears that the UGTT is either not active in promoting its framing -although some similarities exist- or not efficient. However, civil servants acknowledge the organizational influence.

During the proposal phase even narrow coalitions or individual organizations can influence legislation, while during the implementation phase broad coalitions of protest are more important. Amenta is right claiming that chances of influence are highest during the

proposal phase (Amenta 2006). However, this is not the only stage and might become irrelevant if a proposal is blocked later. I argue, that the possibility to influence is linked to whether it is a proactive or reactive approach as Kriesi or Kolb outlined (see chapter two). Proposal and opposition go hand in hand with different channels, mechanisms and repertoires.

It appears that policy processes can be described as chaotic processes in Tunisia. There is not one actor that can influence legislation, but effectively several ones that make it difficult to account for the influence of movements and civil society. Similarly, pathways for movement influence are multiple, similar to the findings by Cress and Snow (Cress and Snow 2000). The most surprising element is nevertheless the reduced importance of parliament in a representative political system. Interviewees expressed a tendency towards approaching civil servants for changes instead of parliamentarians or politicians which might be a specialty for the Tunisian system.

Given the missing resources in a number of administrative bodies, administration (and parliament) seems to depend on civil society in terms of expertise. Thus learning is particularly relevant. I agree with what Kriesi wrote about different contexts in relation to interest groups preventing others from entering: "The dependency will, however, not automatically open up the state to outsiders in the social movement sector; this will only be the case if the established interest groups are equally weak. On the contrary, a well-resourced, coherently structured, and professionalized system of interest groups may also be able to prevent outside challengers from having access to the state" (Kriesi et al. 1995:31). In this sense, the more stable inclusion of for example the UGTT poses problems for the inclusion of other, especially younger organizations. The Tunisian case shows an action field with uneven resource distribution that leads to more hierarchies (on uneven resources: Fligstein and McAdam 2011; Jasper 2014). As the old civil society holds more resources and hold a reputation, they are in a better position faced with newer emergent. This is confirmed by Ayari who states that former activists under Ben Ali are now playing an important role in the Tunisian political system (Ayari 2016).

While Martin sees the danger that movements and professionalized activists may take too much influence on state actors, because of increased state openness towards civil society the situation in Tunisia is different (Martin, G. 2015). The state consults with civil society including movement leaders, but this does not automatically translate in the desired outcomes. Ministries show a different degree of openness towards movements and specific actors leading to a very diverse picture. As mentioned earlier, the UGTT was named much more frequently - although not always positively - by civil servants. The FTDES was not mentioned at all as a partner by ministries and the LTDH was mentioned with reserves by the Ministry of the Interior.

Is there an impact of movements? I see that there is effectively an impact of movements, especially of the women movement, while further impact is mitigated by other actors' influence. In this sense one can argue that the law on sexual harassment was less discussed than the other laws, including fewer different actors. When a law project was more discussed, it was finally the parliament that had the last word and that turned against civil society. The law against sexual harassment is a case that relatively smoothly went through and that was a proactive mobilization of the women movement. One can speculate whether the Tunisian system does function better from the perspective of civil society when no or minor conflict occur. In the Tunisian case, there are also processes that have been described by Filali-Ansary as "Tawafuq", building consensus or tacit acceptance among all actors involved through informal processes that base on citizens' interests (Filali-Ansary 2015; International Crisis Group 2018). This sense of consensus seeking is widespread in the Tunisian political system. It helps civil society groups as it poses an opportunity to shape policies in order to reduce disagreement and protest. While it de-emphasizes coercion it also confirms an important role of civil society.

Newer examples go in the same direction as my findings. The examples I gave show cases where especially the reactive mobilization was not or only partly efficient in changing law proposals. The proactive proposal however was successful. More recent examples on discrimination in public transport, equality in heritage and several other elements that were demanded by the women movement at the time of interviews and that get now realized are additional examples of an efficient cooperation between the Ministry of Women and the

women movement. In this sense, the women movement currently realizes many of their demands.

This chapter also identifies many elements for future research. Future studies should investigate the role of personal contacts in more detail as well as their interaction with other mechanisms. Data needs to be collected on public opinion. This could emphasize the role of public opinion as mechanism for achieving outcomes which came too short due to data availability. The present data warns however on a too extensive use of traditional media data as proxy for public opinion. While bigger organizations receive more media coverage, the underlying mechanisms of influence may be different and not identifiable via media analysis. Research can however monitor the professionalization of journalists that can make the mechanisms via media more effective or assess the role of social media that was not a focus of this thesis.

Chapter Eight

Conclusion

8 Reflections and Conclusion

Chapter eight is divided in five sections. The first critically presents the findings that have been outlined in the previous chapters. The second elaborates on the lessons that can be learned from the research. The third section then reflects on how the research has been conducted. The fourth section recalls some of the limits on the basis of reflections and evaluates the robustness of the research. The final short section is to see as some concluding remarks.

8.1 Findings

Chapter 8.1 summarizes the results of the former chapters. I first recall the research question: How does a democratic framing diffuse across actors in Tunisia? I similarly recall that the idea from the beginning was to retrace ideational impact, concretely the impact of movements through framing practices.

The results show that ideational impact in terms of a diffused democratic framing is limited to dyadic constellations between organizations and specific ministries. However, notably one element of democracy, participatory democracy and an element that gets linked (economic factors) are factors that are found across actors; economic elements are also

present in the public debate. The research similarly showed that there is neither a clear common framing across organizations neither directly nor in public and that if there are common elements; those get linked to human rights, economic elements and participatory democracy. An even greater diversity is present on the state side where framing is much more limited with an emphasis on participatory democracy; social politics and economic development as common elements play also a role.

Points of contacts by which frames can get diffused are diverse and of different effectiveness. Personal relays, official regular contacts, institutionalized forms of contacts and the public opinion are used, while especially the media is not that often used by organizations (except the FTDES). It became evident, that organizations mainly try to convince state actors, but can complementarily exercise pressure through protest (emulation and coercion). There is limited evidence that movements spread their framings of democracy towards ministries, although some representatives with many interactions showed a similar framing. This similarity is notably related to former members in ministries and as outlined earlier to the perceived evaluation as ally.

Before returning to the concluding findings, I recall the separate findings from chapter four to seven.

8.1.1 Findings by Chapters

Results from Chapter four on networks

The first empirical chapter assessed the network configuration among civil society and towards the state. A movement coalition exists among the old Tunisian civil society including the analyzed organizations with the FTDES in a reduced role. The UGTT can serve as decisive element for mobilization of the coalition. The organizations are well established in the international human rights network. While there are regular contacts towards ministries, relatively few contacts to parliament exist. The UGTT is best integrated into the policy circle and has an outstanding position that was underlined in chapter four and discussed in chapter seven.

Organizations have their specific roles in a network, which translates in contacts towards specific ministries. When it comes to the relations of ministries, civil society in general was mentioned very often as ally. Ministries mentioned most prominently the UGTT that takes a central position in cooperation with ministries. All of the analyzed organizations have regular contacts to some ministries, however not all organizations got mentioned by ministries, the FTDES not at all as a partner or accepted actor, meaning that the options for influencing civil servants is reduced for the FTDES. The chapter showed that there is nevertheless interaction, however often very specific to one ministry and thus allowed to go on with the comparison of framings.

Results from chapter five on framings on democracy hold by movements

Chapter five looked at the framing of organizations and compared those with each other. Although movements are highly interconnected, they do not share a common framing of democracy. While human rights are at the core of the framing of democracy, movements set different foci of attention. While the ATFD and the LTDH are freedom oriented, the FTDES has an equalized profile with a slight focus on equality and the UGTT is slightly control oriented. Economic aspects play a role across organizations and a distinction between individual and collective rights can be made. A participatory democracy, where movements serve as intermediate between the people and the state, came up during interviews. It is not one framing of democracy, but several framings of democracy that are promoted, with specific roles taken over by each organization within a network. This supports the perspective that there is less common influence but more influence in bilateral interaction between an organization and specific ministries.

Results from chapter six on framings on democracy hold by civil servants

The sixth chapter analyzed the democratic framing of civil servants. The chapter poses doubts on common framings of democracy across ministries. For some ministries very limited framings of democracy exist only focusing on few elements. On the other hand, especially two ministries share a focus on human rights, namely the Ministry of Relations with Civil Society and the Ministry of Women. Those two ministries are also those where interaction was frequent with LTDH/FTDES and ATFD respectively.

When looking at all ministries together, especially the equality dimension and participation in a sense of a participatory democracy are highlighted. However, the results are probably overestimating the participation dimension as this was the main topic of the interviews. On the other hand, this bias cannot account for the dominance of this dimension over others. Participatory democracy plays an important role in line with its codification in the constitution and decrees. Some ministries and especially those rarely targeted by organizations have a utilitarian perspective on democracy focusing on participation and transparency. At the same time it is a very limited democratic framing.

The strong presence of economic factors and economic development is similar to interviews with movements. Some framings emphasizing for example state capacity appear closer to the UGTT. Ministries show a heterogeneous picture in terms of democratic framing; there is little evidence that the same framings can be found across ministries. This means that the state as represented by civil servants does not have one perspective on democracy, but several ones.

Results from Chapter seven on mechanisms of influence

Chapter seven regarded the mechanisms behind ideational and policy influence. As overall influence is seen as limited, the focus shifted towards the channels of diffusion that are effective as well as the moments where civil society and state interact. The analysis shows that direct ways of interaction are more effective than indirect ones. In addition, chapter seven showed that most organizations try to convince the state that their perspective is normatively better (emulation) while similarly using pressure when necessary (coercion). Also learning through the provision of information is used.

During different phases of the legislation process, different mechanisms of (ideational) influence are important. While the ATFD relatively successfully - as the example on the law on violence against women shows – uses personal contacts through relays in ministries and consultation mechanism for placing law proposals, the FTDES relies on the less effective mechanism of media and public opinion. In connection with the missing acceptance by ministries as a partner, the influence of the FTDES is limited. Their provision of information

whether respected by ministries or not can be interpreted as moves to increase learning of ministries.

The UGTT is highly integrated into policymaking and uses institutionalized mechanisms, but also protest and public opinion when necessary. Due to its wide reach it has an exceptional position in the Tunisian system and is a strong veto-player and coercion plays a major role. The LTDH mostly uses direct contacts towards ministries that do not seem to work well due to reserves at the Ministry of the Interior. The LTDH tries to enforce learning when it comes to torture; combined with emulation.

Indirect influence at least through the media is seen with skepticism. It is doubtful whether media can be a multiplier of movement positions. Organizations, a part of the FTDES, are less convinced and also civil servants in ministries are skeptical. Direct interactions appear as crucial in the Tunisian case.

As the chapter demonstrated, civil society has a place in legislation processes and ministries have to consult, although they do at different stages of the legislation process. It is argued that movement coalitions are especially important for reactive mobilization, thus for protesting and opposing, while narrow coalitions and experts are able to influence early phases of the legislation process. Civil servants tend to be aware of coercion, thus the possible pressure from the street. Some civil servants like those from the Ministry of Women and the Ministry of Relations with Civil Society apply a wider normative background that is not used by many of the other civil servants. Once used, emulation appears as effective in combination with direct interaction. Learning equally plays a role for many civil servants, reason why the expertise of organizations is something much appreciated.

The three law examples showed, that especially for reactive demands, thus for opposing laws, civil society mobilization and coercion, even if it is widespread, is not sufficient alone. In the case of the three law projects, a more consistent framing across organizations – as for the law on reconciliation – appears to have caused at least the postponement and modification of the law. On the other hand, the two first examples raised the question on the influence of other actors, especially parliament. Given that parliament is neglected by

organizations to a certain degree, the influence of movements on parliamentarians is limited. The last example showed a successful formula of the women movement facilitated by the relay of a former member in the ministry, by similar views (emulation) and by their expertise (learning).

8.1.2 Between euphoria and disillusion

This section takes up the findings and highlights some elements for discussion. The section elaborates on examples where the diffusion of framing worked and others where there was up to no diffusion.

Diffusion of democratic framing through interaction?


There is limited evidence for the diffusion of democratic framing across actors. While there are some examples with the Ministry of Women and the Ministry of Relations with Civil Society, it became clear that individuals brought those framings in ministries.

Movements are able to influence the Tunisian legislation process. However, they have only limited influence on the framings of democracy in most ministries with few exceptions. On the other hand, framings of democracy are not similar across ministries, as are the ways how movements can influence ministries. Each ministry has its own processes guided by the obligation for civil society participation. Organized movements can influence directly, while protest itself at least creates attention. The interaction between civil society and state reminds a lot on Gramsci's perspective on democracy where a developed civil society interacts with the state and can transform the state, meaning that political initiatives are in the hand of movements (compare Morera 1990).

Status and especially reputation from the Ben Ali era do play a role, while resources do not. The women movement for example, although being relatively small in size and resources in comparison to the UGTT, is having an impact due to a perceived similar framing and personal as well as institutional contacts. Recalling the possible configurations presented in section 2.7, Figure 8.1 shows the degrees of interaction that are found and sets it in relation to the framing. Nearly all configurations exist on the continuum between interaction and degrees of framing similarity. The combination of few exchanges and different framings is rare (one example is the Ministry of Habitation). No exchanges and same framing were not a

focus of research; however, some organizations like the FTDES are not included in interactions with several ministries. Nevertheless, it is often a mix. One exception is the interaction between LTDH and the Ministry of the Interior that was confirmed by both sites but framings differ substantively. The framing of the civil servant from the Ministry of Education should be considered with caution as outlined earlier. Figure 8.1 clearly shows that the UGTT holds intensive contacts towards actors without sharing a completely similar framing. Thus, I argue that relations of the UGTT are less dependent on common framing, but exist due to its historic role and notwithstanding divergent framing of problems. This is in line with its role as labor union for some ministries where it is much more about salary negotiations. However, the Presidency of the Government and the Ministry of Finance for example discuss general political or fiscal questions with the UGTT.

Figure 8.1 Configurations of framing and interaction



Undemocratic framing

I mentioned earlier that frames less in line with democracy do exist. Those framings compatible with autocracy are still observable. One example is the partial ignorance of minority rights by for example the UGTT, but also by many ministries. This is in line with the focus on collective rights that often gets emphasized. LGTB rights are not acknowledged and are framed as something “not common” to Tunisia. Exemptions are the ATFD and the FTDES where especially the ATFD works with organizations on LGTB rights. Those are easier combinable with the ATFD framing that focuses on a free conduct of life, free choices for sexual orientation and practice. While LGTB rights are the most striking example, one can enlarge this problem to neglect for minority rights and even women rights. Among many civil servants and especially UGTT representatives minorities do not exist, thus creating no need for the respect of minority rights.

Another aspect going in the direction of undemocratic framing is the partial ignorance of elections. While this can be in line with the timing, where no elections were closed, elections were rarely emphasized and often discussed in line with decentralization. In line with this point is a few emphasized parliament. Due to the numerous problems discussed earlier (resources, shifting party alignments and so on), parliament is neither seen as important actor, nor does it get an important function attributed. From a civil society perspective it seems even that counter-powers in form of independent institutions are often seen as more important than parliament. It shows that parliament has yet to find its place in the political landscape and get a greater acceptance.

Terrorism and how to cope with it is not just an issue discussed in Tunisia, but also across Western countries. The same discussions on the restriction of individual liberties and press freedom to ensure a better fight against terrorism are a much discussed issue in Tunisia. A strong state is for example emphasized by UGTT leaders (but often referred to a financial perspective) and of course by the representative from the Ministry of the Interior. Like in other countries, the fight against terrorism can have negative consequences on other dimensions of democracy.

From the analyzed organizations, the UGTT with its strong referral to state capacity and collective rights has a framing more compatible with autocracy than the other organizations. This may be explained by the missing complete rupture with the past and its ambiguous role under Ben Ali. This said, it is nothing dangerous to Tunisian democracy at the moment, as democracy as such is widely accepted among UGTT leaders.

From the civil servants especially those from the Ministry of Women and the Ministry of Relations with Civil Society show a very democratic framing, while other framings are more compatible with autocratic political systems. The most striking example was when the civil servant from the Ministry of Tourism mentioned that it was more stable under Ben Ali emphasizing that the autocratic political system had a positive side. Other less democratic framings are relatively difficult to identify, the limited framing of democracy itself can nevertheless be interpreted as something dangerous to democracy. As civil servants do not have clear pictures about democracy apart the participatory elements, they cannot clearly defend it. While some representatives are capable to cover all dimensions of democracy, some are simply not, be it due to a strong administrative focus or a probably less politicized position that might persist from the Ben Ali period. Thus, the Tunisian state currently fails to build a clear vision of democracy that could orient its civil servants towards one or another direction. It is less about the desired form of democracy, but simply about a clear framing of democracy. Through this argument, I see limited framing of democracy as a real danger to Tunisian democracy.

8.2 Lessons from the results

As literature assigned from the beginning, influence and especially ideational influence is difficult to retrace. What however was found across interviewees was a referral to participatory democracy and elements of economic development. I argue that movements and civil society are heard because they achieved a participative approach based on consultation with civil society anchored in the constitution and legislation. Thus, civil servants have to consult, which facilitates access. Notwithstanding this access, it does only translate into ideational influence in few cases. Discourses between ministerial administration and organizations do not always use the same language. The sensitivity for

each other's vocabulary is not always present as different elements of democracy get emphasized in interaction.

Back to the research question

I recalling the research question: "How does a democratic framing diffuse across actors in Tunisia?" Framings of democracy are not often transmitted to the state as such. While some ministries have comparable positions to movements, there is no influence on the state but on specific ministries. Influence of the UGTT exists, even if the perspective on democracy is not similar. Given that the UGTT was already included – to a certain degree – under Ben Ali, this interaction is less dependent on framings of democracy. The opposite goes for the ATFD, where framing of women problems and of democracy resemble the ministerial perspective and where interaction is intense achieving even a desired policy outcome. The FTDES focuses on the "wrong" channels using mostly press, but could at least create attention for problems through protest. The LTDH is faced with at least one ministry with a very specific framing of democracy and a control-oriented perspective that absolutely not resembles the one of the LTDH. Although interactions exist, they are not very influential and do not, or only in a very limited way, shape perceptions of the Ministry of the Interior. There is no wide-reaching framing of democracy that gets promoted as a consistent (master) frame across movements and society as we have seen in the media analysis. However, several sub-elements are highlighted in interviews with few common elements like human rights or participatory democracy. There is still a lot of work for movements to convince Tunisian state actors on their perspective of democracy. Democratic framing diffuses not in general, but only in specific cases.

Economic aspects and thus the output dimension play a role. The Tunisian democracy is not only judged on its outcome in coastal areas, but also on whether it can reduce protest, create economic development in the interior or shift protest towards conventional political participation such as voting instead of protest activities on the road.

Networks and coalitions

When it comes to channels for possible influence on ideas and policies, several channels like committees, former members in ministries, media work of protest exist. None of the selected organizations is a complete challenger that only uses protest in complete

opposition. All organizations comply with procedures of authorities to guarantee access. The UGTT performs on different levels. Not surprisingly, most of the interviewees underlined their independence from state authorities. This UGTT is at the same time regarded as too close to the government and as making politics but also as organizing too much protest as seen in media reporting. This permanent struggle translates into the internal functioning with the well-known differences between regional and sectoral branches and the national committee which was already present at the time of Ben Ali.

Insights in relation to theory especially on coalitions remain limited. The questions in the literature related to coalitions - whether large or narrow coalitions are more effective or who works with whom - cannot be answered. Already the literature review was ambiguous on coalitions, something similar to the findings especially in relation to the law examples. From the three law examples, a narrow coalition, where all organizations were experts in the field, was successful. The very diverse and large coalition including the UGTT as well as the "old" civil society did not make a decisive effect but achieved important modifications of a law. While perceived coalitions were clear in interviews, the media analysis did not confirm the same links to the same degree. A distinction between the perceived networks and the networks identified through media analysis is made. Other elements of network theory like centrality of the UGTT as well as roles were identified throughout this research.

Network structures were analyzed on a collective level, however, personal, not institutionalized contacts, are important as well. The networks of individuals could be detailed and compared to organizational ones enriching the analysis of outcomes and mechanisms. There is a clear interplay of personal and organizational contacts that became clear through the examples of all organizations.

The policy making phase in which influence can be successful may be influenced by the size of a coalition. Influence in the draft phase of legislation does not need a wide basis but experts, while legislation in later phases can be influenced by the size and composition of protest. It is not the type of networks as such that shapes influence, but the type of networks in combination with the stage of the policy process. Similarly coercion is facilitated by a coalitional mode, while learning and emulation are independent. At the same time,

protest and the referral to treaties for the revolution are the most visible sign of a democratic framing that searches to change legislation. The content of the other interactions, be it in committees or direct contacts remains largely invisible. This is first of all a methodological problem of the research on ideational as well as policy impact, as the more important interactions and the diffused content is more difficult to access when meetings are not public or without documentation.

Diversity of democracy and looking beyond Tunisia

Framings of democracy are diverse. The participation of civil society was an overarching topic that came up in most of the interviews, also because it was one of the main topics. Human rights and individual liberties play an important role as well. Hinnebusch criticizes that democracy in the MENA region meant just elections and independent judiciaries without political equality (Hinnebusch 2015). This is not the case in Tunisia where especially equality is underlined as important dimension of democracy. It is perhaps this difference towards other cases in the Middle East - that important organizations actively promoted not only electoral democracy, but also the equality dimension and human rights - that makes the Tunisian example successful.

After some years in a democratic system, ministry employees do not always have a clue about new directives and on how to implement the new constitution. It is still a phase of cleaning up old legislation that needs to be brought in line with the new constitution. This will continue until this process is nearly finished which will be marked by the inauguration of the constitutional court as politicians will want to avoid too frequent referral to the court. What does all that mean for democracy in Tunisia? Democracy is not yet well anchored across the Tunisian state. There are very divergent and many limited perspectives on democracy that do not necessarily go in the same direction. There is no culture of democracy within most of the ministries. The mechanisms for civil society to participate are not transparent and open the possibility to specific actors taking over tasks as demanded by the government without transparent reasoning. It cannot be said that Tunisia is a majoritarian, egalitarian or freedom-oriented democracy. As in every state there are different tendencies, in the case of Tunisia very limited perspectives on democracy for some ministries. When it comes to frames, I argue that organizations are indeed “stronger” in

comparison to the state as frames are more consistent. The state administration lacks knowledge and often arguments. This has consequences of the causal direction as the state misses capacity to share organizational and movement's framing and is consequentially not less capable to influence organizations in term of democratic framing. While limited democratic framing presents a danger for democracy as support may not be extensive in the administration, it is quite logic given the long-term processes of democratization.

The presence and inclusion of civil society is also caused by the weakness of political parties especially in the years directly following the uprisings. This shows similarities to the Brazilian case where Hipsher analyzed that movement were active due to the weakness of political parties (Hipsher 1998). Thus, the future of political parties may determine whether mobilization and inclusion of civil society continues in the same way. Given the current wide acceptance of civil society among civil servants is a good sign for the strength and possibilities for the Tunisian civil society. At the end, it may however not necessarily translate in ideational or policy impact.

The role of the economy is to underline. The framing of democracy in Tunisia may not be linked to liberalism as economic development model, but a more equal economic model, at least when it comes to organizational framing. This strong criticism of the economic system is even present among UGTT leaders that are seen as closer to the state. By linking democracy and economic development, argumentation takes a different direction then in Western countries where both are not necessarily seen as linked (see 2.4). While the relation towards economy is a difference towards Western countries, the criticism that social movement theories only fit to Western contexts, is not true. The framework on movements, framing and networks produced valuable results, without ignoring major aspects.

One additional step: Influence on policies

While I originally searched for ideational influence, networks and their qualification equally showed the channels for taking influence on policies. The success of a law proposed by the women movement without greater public debate, as the media analysis showed, contradicts a number of theoretical assumptions. Theory would expect a large but not too large

coalition to be more successful and media and public opinion to have an influence. As the law was not discussed in public, the question arises whether it is more about tacit acceptance or whether other actors than the ones identified by theory play a role. The absence of counter-movements is only partly convincing as especially Ennahdha with a more religious-conservative perspective has a great number of seats in parliament. Specific mechanisms, and in this case personal contacts and networks, allowed placing the topic on the agenda. That the perspective of women as a major group of voters is satisfied by the law might have helped, but this is only speculation and would need verification by insights on party strategies in Tunisia.

The ATFD uses the texts of the constitution as a legal basis that stipulates the participation of civil society and the equality of men and women. Thus, the codification of civil society inclusion as well as basic values of equality helps the ATFD to get heard. Codification is a support for democratic frame diffusion in the case of the ATFD. The example showed that it is useful to identify mechanisms that are conditional or influenced by other factors like proactive or reactive activism or in other words whether emulation or coercion is preferred.

When coming to decision making, movements have some veto power as consensus plays an important role in the aftermath of the revolution (Beau and Lagarde 2014). From a Gramscian perspective this finding indicates that civil society is on an equal level vis-à-vis the state, as the state is not able to dominate civil society as such (Morera 1990). This notion of consensus might be a specialty of the Tunisian political system, something to show by cross-country comparison. It leads to an additional idea: The results from this research distinguish between reactive and proactive actions when it comes to policy proposals. It mentions especially the UGTT as a veto player, but the UGTT has at the same time not a shared framing with ministries they approach. At the same time this remark is in line with a focus on coercion as mechanisms, that not necessarily includes the promotion of democratic framing. As the UGTT operates mainly on this dimension, it appears logic that common framings would be less important. On the other hand and when it comes to emulation, proactive actions and eventually learning, common framing might be of importance, because actors need to become convinced of proposals. This discussion is a point to re-discuss as part of future research.

Unexpected findings and points for discussion

While it was not expected that influence of civil society is enormous, the analysis reveals large differences between civil society and ministries. Given the importance scholars ascribe to civil society in Tunisia, it is surprising that only few ministries intensively interact with civil society. Apart from the UGTT, ministerial influence is very specific (ATFD) or nearly not existent (LTDH, FTDES).

The framings on democracy of the LTDH are limited to one dimension which surprising given that they should be able to adapt to a democratic political system. It expresses a weakness of the LTDH, as they only cover very specific elements and has little access to other issues. It was not expected that the framing was limited to only one dimension.

The diffusion of ideas on democracy does not only depend on networks and interactions, but on very specific elements such as former movement members in the administration. Common framings and values are highlighted when interaction is intense. The placement of former movement members in ministries enables a stronger diffusion of ideas. One can argue that inside actors are important relays for the diffusion of ideas, but also of policies. Emulation is consequentially favored by personal contacts, while we have seen that the importance of reputation can be associated with expectations about learning.

In addition, ministries hold specific conceptions of democracy in the Tunisian context. The state itself does not know what it wants in terms of democracy, meaning that there is not (yet) an overarching vision on democracy. While there is some evidence for the diffusion of framings of democracy, this remains limited taking all ministries together. It is less surprising from a theoretical point of view, where democracy in Tunisia is not yet seen as completely stable.

Another point, less surprising, but still some food for thought is the framing of impact and failures. Especially failures are often not framed as failures, but in line with a continuous struggle that has not (yet) been successful. This is in line with retrospective – more positive – framing in the form of storytelling to avoid the term failure. The framing of own actions stays positive. It poses at the same time limits for identifying especially failure, as not every

failure is framed as such. Framing is useful for analyzing success, but less for failure, because an outcome is often framed in a positive way in interviews.

Ideas for future research

To detail the influence of movements, further research is needed. For detailing on ideational influence of civil society, further research on the content of direct interaction is seen as important. While it often appears easier to rely on media, media reporting does not replace accounting for direct influence. While it is difficult to assess the content, more detailed interviews, concretely on specific channels for diffusion like the 4+4/5+5 arrangement are useful. Another way that is taken by this research is to use the proxy of policies that get implemented in the sense of an actor; however, the results still revealed a number of questions to be answered concerning the effectivity of coalitions, the role of influence of perceived influences that create entry points or policy influence of movements. My research focused on examples from legislation that have been mentioned in interviews. While this showed particularly useful, a more detailed analysis of policy areas would be another point to be researched. The analysis, while showing interesting results, rested on a general level. The interviews could focus on one specific ministry and show the influence there instead of showing a cross-ministerial perspective which included a number of problems outlined earlier. A more detailed case of each ministry can clarify the obtained results and is necessary to gain a better understanding of effective mechanisms for each ministry.

It would be interesting to research more on the framings in coalitions and how frames change in a coalitional mode. While it can be expected that organizations put forward original frames in their own actions, it could be necessary to adopt frames in coalitions as those rely on a common determinant that could be a more widely accepted frame that is not specific. Entering into a coalition may require (or not) a certain adaptation of other framings. This change of positions in coalitional modes is not researched yet and could have wide consequences in the Tunisian context as protest is nearly exclusively organized in networks, at least on a national level, requiring common positions in order to achieve influence. The interplay between different levels of organization may require a (limited) homogenization of framing.

Another interesting aspect is counter mobilization. As we have seen with the three examples for legislation, the women movement was particularly successful implementing their claims. One aspect that I did not discuss in detail, because only little information exists, is whether counter mobilization took place, so whether for example Ennahdha and related organizations mobilized against the law. For the other two examples with less success it can at least be expected that large parts of Nida Tounes and the UTICA were favorable and mobilized for the laws. This counter framing might have consequences that are not yet taken into account.

An idea for future research is linked to the nature of my research when analyzing a specific point in time. While we speak about democratization processes, I only regarded one moment in time, and so additional research over the process of democratization can deliver further insights. I embedded the findings in democratization processes, but a systematic analysis on different moments of democratization is a very interesting point. Like democratization bases on several possible pathways, movements influence depends on several channels and mechanisms. Is this simply a coincidence? We know that participation of civil society shapes democratization processes, however not as only factor. The differences in diffusion mechanisms and influence may be correlated to the uncertainty that accompanies democratization processes. Especially in the beginning, movements may or may not be included. It may be that this is effectively linked to the degree of activity of movements in terms of contributing to the build-up of a new political system. Once civil society ensured a certain access like in my case, it may be easier to have access to the state at least for established actors. A more detailed analysis of the whole democratization process and a comparison with other waves of democratization can deliver interesting results.

Linked to my research as a specific moment, is the question of longitudinal data. Longitudinal data could help retracing changes in perceptions, network configurations and accesses. It would for example be interesting to use the archives of La Presse and Le Temps to assess the time before the Uprisings and see whether framing of democracy changed over time (keeping also the problems with media in mind). Longitudinal media data might, once

media is more professional, help to identify salient topics, something that was not possible for this thesis (however salary negotiations in the education sector is a salient topic at the time of analysis as were the three law examples). As outlined earlier, salient issues may have influenced the results, but there is no long-term data available to see what topics are salient for a specific period in Tunisia. An example might be the discussion of terrorism that caused an increased amount of framing on terrorism and individual liberties at the time of analysis. Longitudinal data can be interesting for the development of framings of democracy in ministries. It is to expect that a framing of democracy including at least some more common points than participatory democracy should develop in the years to come and retracing this development could help identify elements that led to a stabilization of democracy.

There are many additional elements that could equally be regarded. Given the regional cleavages in Tunisia, a spatial comparison appears interesting and could be a point for future studies. While I analyzed the national level, it does not mean that organizations do not cover regional or local problems and those alliances and mechanisms can differ.

8.3 Reflections

Instead of summarizing reflections on theory and method under sections for each, I discuss both aspects in line with empirical results in several thematic sub sections. Those thematic subsections on ideational influence and more concretely on the impact on state actors' decision making. Together with the ideas outlined earlier, this section evaluates the own approach and gives recommendations on improvements.

8.3.1 Ideas and Impact

Few consistent framing is not a weakness per se

Common framings on democracy are difficult to identify although some elements were highlighted. The framing approach highlighted well the *differences* across organizations and towards the state. It was also useful for identifying specific orientations towards democracy. At the same time, it generated very diverse – though interesting – results.

That framing did not generate more results is not a weakness of the approach as it showed the diversity of democratic framing. This important finding allows qualifying mechanisms remarking that not all mechanisms are based on common framings or shared perspectives.

The combination of networks and framing enables identifying key partners in interaction and evaluating links. An additional argument is important: A focus on political processes and opportunities could have been fruitful if more information on the Tunisian political system would have been available from the beginning in order to identify those processes and opportunities. While the thesis generated much of the required knowledge it is not to forget that knowledge on the Tunisian political system was rather limited before. I will turn to this argument later when discussing inductive and deductive reasoning.

The limited findings do not mean that framing is irrelevant. Compared to the research by Cress and Snow, who underlined the importance of framing, my findings does neither contradict nor confirm the overarching importance of framing (Cress and Snow 2000). The findings let simply add some conditions for the importance of framing, mainly having relays that can directly diffuse framings. My results show that framing is specific for targets and that a consistent framing like the one by the women movement helps.

The framing approach has its limits when it comes to analyzing coalitions and roles within those. While movements build coalitions, it became not entirely clear which framing elements are taken over as a common framing and which are not as introduced in 8.2. Among the four organizations human rights, economic problems and participatory democracy are elements widely shared. Other framings are quite different. It is an open question why those elements became more shared than others. Literature on coalitions and roles within coalitions should insist on how to determine the unique elements as well as the common elements within coalitions and how those influence outcomes. The question on when coalitions collapse or the choices of coalitions for the promotion of claims should be detailed in future research. The position of organizations needs to be better explained. One example is the FTDES. It could be that the FTDES is not excluded due to its slightly different framing, but due to very different repertoires used that make the old civil society hesitate. Related to coalitions, one can imagine different movements as clusters that approach and distance themselves from each other and that are always in move. This approaching and distancing would thus not only be determined by different framing, but also by different repertoires. The press work and the direct support for emerging movements could scare the old civil society as it was not part of their repertoires. Thus, to answer the question on roles,

specialization and what coalition mobilizes on what, to regard only the framing is not enough. Probably a much more interactive – and fluent – approach on actors continually being closer or more distant in terms of frames, repertoires and other factors is more adequate.

Framing or political process theory?

Could the framing approach have been replaced effectively by a political process theory approach? This would have missed the detailed analysis of the framing of democracy. On the other hand, it would perhaps have had the advantage of a more detailed approach on interactions between movements and the state as political process theories place social movements in relation towards the challenged institutional actors (McAdam and Schaffer Boudet 2012). Political opportunity structures, defined as “favorable political opportunities and access to mobilizing structures (established groups or networks) independent of elite control” could have been a focus as well (McAdam and Schaffer Boudet 2012:15). Political process theory can add useful insights. Especially regarding established networks and groups, they offer a framework that helps to explain persistent relations in civil society. My approach was very sensitive towards opportunity structures and political processes; however there are some arguments that went against it. I shortly recall those reflections that go hand-in-hand with the limited knowledge on the Tunisian political system when beginning the research.

The focus on perceptions and framings and not on opportunity structures appears useful as civil society organizations and movements shape the political system themselves although they are partly restricted by the same system. The most important factor from political opportunity structure approaches is the openness of ministries that effectively influences the possibilities of movements to gain access. In the Tunisian case it is however strongly influenced by the legal requirements to make civil society participate, introduced on demand of civil society when drafting the constitution. Another reason not to use political opportunity structures as a basis was the missing potential to explain the initial Uprisings that started without perceived political opportunity. The threat by police forces existed, for example in September 2015 when protesting against the law on reconciliation, but that even

motivated more protest as leaders expressed. From this perspective, at least some organizational leaders do not feel restricted by opportunity structures.

Literature working on political opportunity structures can explain relations between state and social movements from a different perspective. However, a too general focus on political opportunity structures risks to focus on (perceived) structures and to be too focused on the state level. The results of this study show that political opportunity structures play a role, but not exclusively. The important dialogue of the UGTT with ministers for example is the product of mutual interactions and long-standing traditions. It is not only in the interest of the UGTT, but also of ministers as these get information they would not get without. Thus, if the opportunities would fall away, it would not only be disadvantageous for the UGTT, but also for the state. One can argue that theories on political opportunity structures are better to explain situations with clear power relations where one actor is stronger than another and can guide the behavior of other actors. For my research, I argue that indeed the approach on framing was useful to discover the (often limited) ideational influence.

Observing internal and public discussions

The methods chosen to analyze the different parts of the thesis showed partly adequate. While interviews generated interesting insights with limited generalizability, media analysis was used for the analysis of influence on public opinion. The interviews allowed having an authentic framing of democracy compared to the one that is available in the media and that is not ever similar, in the Tunisian case often dominated by reporting on the state. The media analysis allowed identifying frames that resonate in the public as well as who works with whom, but it covers only part of the discussion.

The choice of types of media could have been better. Given the missing information at the beginning it seems reasonable that preference is given to information available and thus to traditional media. Facebook and social media played a role since the beginnings of the Uprisings and have been equally mentioned by civil servants and civil society leaders. It would have made equal, perhaps even more sense, to analyze Facebook and social media data on resonating frames. While newspapers were chosen because of more expected professionalization, this did not show true and social media data might have generated

better results. Detailed opinion polls could help to analyze the influence on public opinion, but were not available, leading to a preference for qualitative data collection.

Interviews showed useful due to the exploratory nature that was caused by limited knowledge on the Tunisian context. Interviews were particularly helpful for the double purpose of identifying first a framing with a mixture of deductive and inductive elements as well as the focus on networks and allies. Interviews allowed the flexibility to insist on some points and clarify others. One limitation is however the duration of interviews that could ideally be longer to include more questions. Questions were oriented towards the collective level, while some more questions on the individual background could have been added. With the now available knowledge some more questions on the economic elements linked to democratic framing would be desirable.

8.3.2 Tunisian democratic framing: fit of the Democracy Barometer

What does democracy mean in a Tunisian context?

The model of the Democracy Barometer fits with one notable exception, the role of the economy. As several scholars argued earlier, the economy is an important dimension that is connected to democracy (as is education that was found much less in framing). While the economy has not been completely excluded in the questions on democracy (it is seen as one of the outcomes), the role of those who are wealthy and their related power emerged regularly. While this is in line with Bühlmann et al.'s factor on transparency, the question re-emerges, whether economic power should be placed more prominently, as it is perceived as main hindrance for democracy in Tunisia.

The Uprisings connected the demand for jobs with the demand for more rights and democracy, so the prevailing importance of economic factors is logic. The question is, whether economic aspects are a constitutive element of the Tunisian democracy or are just connected because of its salience. Schmitter and Sika recently suggested that the demand for job security, social equality of economic development is linked to democracy in the whole MENA region (Schmitter and Sika 2017). The issues under economic aspects discussed range from salaries, to economic development and a modified economic system. It can be argued that especially economic output is used to evaluate the performance of the Tunisian

democracy. Thus, responsiveness of political actors becomes of even more important as there are still seen deficits among interviewees. The Democracy Barometer lacks a stronger output related element that would probably fit with the control dimension and could be interpreted in line with the government's capacity to fulfill economic, social and other needs (Munck and Verkuilen 2002). At the same time, the transcending influence of economic elements on equality and corruption is to emphasize in the Tunisian case. Beneath the importance of economic factors, the analysis showed different connections between dimensions. While scholars like Lauth and Schlenkrich showed that egalitarian, majoritarian and freedom-oriented versions of democracy exist, some of the sub dimensions are connected more often in specific countries. For some of the organizations especially representation and participation are connected (ATFD, FTDES). Another example is the link of corruption with fiscal regimes of the state under government capacity (UGTT). Further connections exist between human rights and rule of law.

Connections across dimensions and few intra-dimensional connections might indicate that an element does not fit well in the dimension. Intra-dimensional relations are less surprising as they are part of the same concept; not-existent connections within one dimension can indicate a misfit. In the Tunisian case for example, public sphere was less connected to individual liberties and rule of law than the two to each other. Similarly, transparency got more connections towards the government capacity than to participation and representation. Thus, it might be more useful to summarize transparency in line with government capacity than with equality and representation and to more explicitly include economic elements under equality. This study delivered some insights, but a detailed analysis of correlations of sub dimensions could enable modifications to improve the Democracy Barometer and other measures of the quality of democracy. The consequent analysis of combinations of dimensions is crucial to better account for relations between concepts. Especially cross-country comparison becomes important to allow a wide applicability of the concept.

When applying the concept of the Democracy Barometer, it can be difficult to clearly distinguish dimensions as they are overlapping and interacting. It makes it difficult to code. There are some additional problems with the Democracy Barometer as point of orientation.

In reality, it was easier to apply the three dimensions and then elements and not to use the third level. It is easier to identify especially the egalitarian perspective that is well expressed among the interviewees, other dimensions are more implicit.

I used a mix of content and discourse analysis for assessing democratic framing as outlined in the method chapter. While this approach was seen as useful, it raises the question on whether statistics are adequate to account for qualitative data. This problem needed more elaboration and consequentially it was verified whether numbers represent perspectives across interviews or whether those represent only specific interviews and may have caused biases. This said, while potential and real problems have been indicated systematically, the data would be generally open towards a more detailed content analysis if more interviews would be included. For the articles, the analysis was much more content analyses oriented and used much more the numbers, while not neglecting the manual verification in each article.

Democratization and movements

The Tunisian case showed some results with regard to democratization that were already highlighted by other researchers. Among those are the role of movements and civil society not only for the initial mobilization, but also for consolidation. It remains discussable whether political parties or movements had or have a larger influence on democratic consolidation (as parties have not been analyzed in detail, it would be speculation to compare both). However, the inclusion of movements in the development of the new constitution enabled a participatory approach in the constitution. This demands ministries to consult and gives civil society more prominent roles in legislation processes. Thus, the Tunisian example shows that a codification of access can be a fruitful mechanism to make civil society participate from the beginning and to ensure a balance and wider inclusion.

The impact of movements for democratization in Tunisia should neither be over- nor underestimated. While there is no general consistent framing of democracy that is promoted across organizations, several sub elements are demanded and democracy is reinforced. There is influence, however, it is not an exclusive influence as parliament and other actors have their say. A more differentiated perspective should be taken, including

movements having some influence (especially when participation is demanded by law), but not being the only actor influencing legislation. The question how a (fast) changing party system interacts with civil society and movements is a very interesting question for Tunisia that appears as crucial for better determining the influence of civil society.

8.3.3 Do mechanisms of diffusion impact state actors decision making?

As outlined under 8.1 ideational impact is limited. What even is more interesting is that the UGTT with a mostly compatible framing towards the state, although highlighting many differences is able to influence actors where ministries have limited or partly different framing. First, it is about perceived influence and second, it was mainly the network approach that highlighted those connections between the UGTT and the Tunisian state. The possible influence via interactions is not bound to ideational influence, but may translate in policy influence, especially when it comes to vetoes and coercion.

Networks

Networks and how actors are linked was very useful in identifying possible channels of influence-taking, so to see by which way ideas (or policies) can be transmitted. However, networks do not correlate with framings in all cases; like-minded actors or the compatibility of ideas is a facilitating factor.

Another element already highlighted in the literature review, is the path-dependency of network structures. The network analysis gave an idea about network structures and explains why large parts of the younger civil society are excluded. The good position and the limited openness of the old civil society hinder access for younger organizations. If they find a niche, like Al Bawsala or I Watch (transparency), that is not well covered by other organizations and where a need by ministries (transparency for legitimacy) exists, access is possible. Thus, specialization is important, especially as civil servants underscored this element.

Reputation plays a role in relation to inclusion. The inclusion of networks in the theory does not only enable to establish effective mechanisms of influence, but also to show inter-movement interaction. The focus on networks was particularly useful, however the network analysis was only movement and ministry centered and did not regard the whole political

system. An extension of the network analysis towards the whole system can thus enable a more wide-reaching analysis. Changing network structures can become another point for future research.

Reflections on diffusion

With regard to diffusion, looking for a joint effect approach showed useful, but also highlights limitations. As detailed survey data is limited, the referral to media analysis was the only way to account for resonance of frames in public. The link via the traditional media does not (yet) function effectively as a number of reserves exist. Thus, the direct influence approach appears more useful in the Tunisian context, something that can change in the future with more professionalization of the media. The missing “effectiveness” of the media as indirect mechanism does not only have consequences for this research. The reporting on some national organizations is more limited than on others causing problems for the media analysis of Tunisian organizations. If media does not adequately cover protest or is marked by limited professionalism, the effectiveness of media analysis poses problems in terms of validity as only specific elements of protest are highlighted. It raises doubts on research focused on protest event analysis in media as done by della Porta, when she underlines how protest reduced following the revolution (della Porta 2016). The ATFD is a good example to illustrate the bias towards some outcomes. While media reporting is very limited, they are realizing their claims and organizing protest. On the other hand, the ATFD does not seek media coverage. The problem could be the selection of media outlets; something I doubt, but what will be discussed reflecting on the method.

The stage model for legislation was particularly useful to distinguish the possible diffusion channels and their influence on policies for each stage of the legislation process. I recommend the approach focused on diffusion and mechanisms as it allows highlighting ways of influencing in a context where little knowledge exists and thus in combination with exploratory research. The advantage when analyzing a country in transition is that policy changes, like the law on sexual harassment, are completed within a relatively short time frame and were thus already observable in a time frame of two years. Thus, the analysis of countries in transition and not just Tunisia can be beneficial for the analysis of policy

processes. At the same time more research is needed on the connection between ideational influence and concrete policy influence.

Causal direction

Ministries explained that they respect civil society positions in their legislation. By confirmation from the ministry, the causal direction is verified. As results are not generalizable, some reserves remain. It cannot be excluded that actors like the UGTT are influenced by administration in their framings on democracy, especially when it comes to compatibility of framings. This would probably be less related to democracy, as the framing on democracy by ministries is often very limited. While we have seen that this is not necessarily related to influence, interaction does not go in one direction, but certainly influences the perspective of organizations as well (for example building more trust in the administration as some interviewees expressed). The focus on civil society and networks as topic of interviews helped to gain an idea about influence and the direction of influence. The influence of other actors like political parties that are probably the missing element in the analysis of the examples has not been verified.

8.4 Limits

Although I indicated some shortcomings on methods and theory, the choices made at the beginning of the research appear still reasonable and useful given the limited information available at the beginning. With all the data available from this thesis, much better choices would be possible. It is however to keep in mind that much more research was published the last years also giving additional knowledge. The most foreseeable point was perhaps that Facebook and social media play a role. Other points like the importance of economic factors could have been expected to a limited degree, but not to its real extent. Although I did my best to reduce biases, especially the more Western perspective rests and should be kept in mind when coming to the conclusion. I elaborate more on some selected potential biases and evaluate their influence on results. I start with western biases, with the problems for tracing influence, the individual level and some remarks on the ministries and organizations included.

Biases and Western perspective

The biases outlined earlier are important when it comes to the international perspective and orientation of organizations and civil servants; however, biases are not falsifying the results, but partially influencing these. The perspective on democracy is probably less Western style than mentioned by interviewees⁷¹. As mentioned it is highly probably that the most interested and Westernized participated leading to a potential bias. Some unique Tunisian elements like the strong connection towards economic aspects and representation of civil society have been outlined, so the specific Tunisian perspective of democracy has been shown although it is difficult to identify a widely accepted perspective on democracy. I cannot exclude that there rests a too Westernized perspective on Tunisian democracy although mechanisms have been taken to avoid this. The solution would only be to have a native Tunisian (or someone resembling) for interviews so that this problem would be reduced. A linked element is the influence of participation. Especially for civil servants, civil society participation was the main topic of discussion. I argue nevertheless that the overwhelming referral to this dimension can not only be explained by the topic. Civil society was much more discussed than it would probably have been when just having a normal framing.

Another question is whether civil servants told me what they expected that I want to hear. This is also the reason why I verified across interviews. In addition, prompting questions have been posed through the interviews to see whether there is more “depth” or whether interviewees use only short answers without much content. This verification revealed the problems with one interview with the Ministry of Education that was consequentially threatened with much more caution and only used where the interviewee elaborated more. Beneath those simple answers, the opposite might have happened too. Interviewees were conscious about my role as researcher, which might have created a more elaborated “theorization” of democracy instead of repeating their normal arguments in line with democracy (vulgarized). Taken together, those points have been limited at during data collection and data interpretation, meaning that the incidence on results is minor.

⁷¹ On the other hand it is not that surprising that it is a Western perspective. Researchers such as Badie (1986, 1992) discussed the imported state already some time ago.

For newspapers, it is difficult to estimate whether the inclusion of Arab newspapers would have changed the picture. Both editorial houses analyzed also publish in Arab and I do expect that reporting is based on the same original information. Adding another Arab newspaper would have caused problems in terms of language and would have created additional costs and taken more resources. Thus, the choice of two newspapers in French from two editorial houses appears as most cost efficient. Other research should systematically proof whether discussions in French and Arab-speaking media are effectively similar or not.

The individual level

One of the crucial questions is whether the individual level influenced the collective framing. While I ever insisted on the collective perspective, the answer is that the individual level nevertheless interfered in some cases that were transparently outlined throughout the research (for example the civil servant from the Ministry of Education). The choice at the end was not to use the instances where individual perspectives emerged and to verify the whole interview afterwards. An exclusion of the whole interview appeared unreasonable as nevertheless some collective perspectives got identified. The problem of individual levels is further accentuated for ministries as one civil servant stands basically for one ministry. It is highly recommended that future research focuses on several interviews per ministry. At the same time, the limited number of interviews per ministry poses an important shortcoming that creates additional caution when interpreting the ministerial perspective. The results are more robust for organizations than for individual ministries. Micro-level analysis of the biographies of activists similar to those conducted by Ayari can be of interest as well (Ayari 2016). More research on the individual level can especially show differences between older and younger activists.

The individual level can be a point for future research. As became evident during interviews and as existing research showed, there is a cleavage between the youth and old elites. As other researchers noted, those having negotiated the transition, were part of the older generation or repressed under Ben Ali (Cohen-Hadria 2017). According to Ayari the Tunisian elite had a somehow similar activist socialization (Ayari 2016). Goujon underlines that Tunisia has a lack of elite renewal since the revolution due to missing reforms (Goujon

2015). My data supported those perspectives. The interviewed representatives mostly belong to one social category: older, well-educated and socialized by worker rights activists, while younger activists fall in other categories as some of the additional interviews showed. Therefore, I focused on these old elite, also because they are in leading positions. The differentiation of younger and older activists may equally indicate the possibilities for influence (and be desirable from the perspective of an inclusive democracy). Future research could elaborate in more detail on the profiles of leaders and activists and look especially at younger activists and how those perceive democracy and mechanisms.

Ministries and choice of organizations

While ministries have been approached by using several ways (mail, letter, phone, directly at the Ministry), some ministries responded better than others. The exclusion of the Ministry of Social Affairs is certainly a major shortcoming. As it is particularly important for many organizations, efforts to get an interviewee from that ministry were extensive. However, no interview was possible, suggesting that the ministry might have internal policies that inhibit research as different persons have been approached via different online and offline communication channels. As many intense interactions have been indicated by organizations, it can be expected that the Ministry of Social Affairs would have a perspective similar to the ones by the Ministry of Women or the Ministry of Relations with Civil Society. Interviews with the Ministry of Justice would also have been interesting. For a counter-position, interviews with the Ministries of Religious Affairs can be of interest as none of the organizations indicated contacts and the evaluation of Ennahdha and their closeness to this ministry suggest that a very different perspective on democracy might be taken by civil servants from this ministry.

The focus of analysis could be more fine-tuned, notwithstanding the partly exploratory nature of research. As the analysis showed, contacts towards specific ministries are often more important than towards all or even more than two ministries. While this has been shown through the diversity of ministries included, it would be valuable to analyze the relations between organizations and specific ministries in more detail without covering the whole spread of ideas across ministries. Future research should focus on few ministries, but the initial choice to include all that have been mentioned by organizations appeared

nevertheless useful. The choice to target many different ministries would today – with the knowledge from the research – not be repeated. A preference would be given to at least three interviews per ministry and restrict the ministries even more.

Another option for future research was already proposed by other researchers: According to Kolb, it would be more useful to focus on one policy issue instead of analyzing the domains when looking at outcomes (Kolb 2007). This was intended with the law examples; however, this section originates from data, where interviewees often mentioned the three laws. As it is difficult to foresee trends or to follow laws from the beginning, this was feasible and pragmatic, while more detailed analysis of one policy issue would allow to retrace (or not) a specific influence of movements. Concrete examples include women issues and the relation between the women movement and the Ministry of Women; social issues and the relations between the Ministry of Social Affairs (once accessible) and security issues and the relations between the Ministry of the Interior and the LTDH for example; although the Ministry of the Interior was difficult to convince on interviews and can cause additional barriers.

The choice of organizations was bound to the old civil society with some additional insights from newer organizations. The choice of the FTDES defending environmental issues is not wrong, but environmental issues are not their most important element. As virtually no other organization was available, the FTDES is still acceptable but not an optimal solution. Especially the comparison towards Islamic activism might have been interesting and would add another layer for comparison. This could add another layer of influence when taking Islamic activism and the Ministry of Religious Affairs. In addition, the interviews with the finally not included organizations revealed that access for younger organizations is much more limited. This important finding could be elaborated more in future research where for example possible inclusion of newer organizations can be discussed. The research gave already two potential organizations for Al Bawsala and I Watch; two organizations that via open hearings gained more and more access to the state and that were capable of building a reputation among civil servants.

Tracing influence

Tracing influence is nothing easy due to the numerous problems explained in the theory and method chapter. In addition, while I retraced contacts between civil society it does not mean that there is automatically an impact. Many of the channels used to identify the diffusion of frames are available options. As shown, not all channels of diffusion, nor all mechanisms outlined under 2.5 are used at the same time. I also argue that not all configurations can be known beforehand, so that there is effectively no other option as to collect data on a variety of channels and mechanisms when tracing influence. Even a first endeavor into influence of civil society needs to be repeated some time as configurations change.

For analyzing ideational influence and diffusion numerous problems persist. In the last step of chapter seven I showed the influence on policies. This was intended as a finale step to show the influence of democratic framing on policies, it shows however also that by taking examples of law (projects) the influence of a consistent democratic framing becomes accessible. The analysis of specific law helped a lot to see the limits of a common framing and networks. In the case of Tunisia exists the other advantage that legislation processes happen on shorter time frames than in established democracies, giving an opportunity to observe it on a short time frame.

Still the question arises what other ways to assess the influence of movements exist. One option is to survey perceptions and attitudes on a longer time frame for the relevant actors to see the changes in democratic framing. While relatively time-consuming a long-term observation of democratic framings and their interaction can reveal ideational influence.

The ideal would of course to take all relevant actors that can have an ideational influence into account. As shown in my analysis several possible interferences remain open, be it the influence of parliament as well as more details on each channel of diffusion. The ideal research would control for much more possible factors and more detail, but the question is whether this complete control is possible in political science. Research choices thus necessarily limit the scope of research towards specific elements, in my case towards the interaction of civil society and Tunisian ministries. Taking this perspective, my research cannot be more than a first assessment of those interactions and their influence on democratic framing. It is only one part of a greater puzzle of ideational influence.

8.5 A final word and post-script

The thesis concludes with some final remarks on the overall situation in Tunisia. In the beginning I summarized the surprising Uprisings in 2011 that now build a ground for the analysis of a new political system that is unique in the region, an Arab democracy. This thesis built the ground for future analysis of this political system. When I started the thesis in 2014, little was written about the Tunisian political system and unfortunately this has not changed a lot when it comes to the functioning of the system. Scholars often repeat the original finding that social movements and civil society matter a lot in Tunisia because they look at the initial Uprisings. I showed in this thesis that a lot depends on the Ministries and organizations. We can speak about influence of the UGTT on several levels, but it would be a mistake to generalize on the entire civil society and on all movements.

Towards the end of writing, some external factors for Tunisian democracy emerged. In March 2019, Algerian president Bouteflika, one of the last serving long-time leaders in the region, resigned due to mass protest. The implications for Algeria whether it becomes more democratic or instable are not yet to foresee and may influence neighboring Tunisia. At the same time, conflict intensified in April 2019 in Libya. While the Libyan conflict persists already some time and Tunisia is aware of it, a potential escalation can still cause migration towards Tunisia or destabilize border regions.

Beneath those threats for the Tunisian political system and that is the positive sign for those who advocate civil society engagement, the inclusion of civil society happens regularly. Dependent on how the political system develops and what civil society and civil servants make out of it, this can further augment. A fallback appears unrealistic given the constitutional basis. The Tunisian democracy and perhaps Arab democracy (something difficult to say without other cases) is not that different from Western democracy, at least not when applying the concepts I did. What however is different is the strong connection between democracy and economy that is seen as important. While democracy in a Western context shall not bring jobs but realize the people will, the output of democracy gets connected to it in the Tunisian case. From a normative perspective one can say that this poses a problem for democracy because it is not made to create jobs. The raised expectations may be too high to be achieved and thus create dissatisfaction with the

political system or lead to a not that negative evaluation of the old system; both not the best options for democracy in Tunisia. The elections for parliament and president in 2019 will also show whether the Tunisian political landscape is divided or committed towards democracy. I am neither overenthusiastic nor pessimistic when it comes to democracy in general and civil society participation in particular. Tunisia has everything it needs to become a stable democracy.

Chapter Nine

Bibliography

9 References

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Notes

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