



The Protest that Never Was: Silencing Political Activism at CERN Before and During the Vietnam War

Barbara Hof, Gerardo Ienna and Simone Turchetti*

This article focuses on the history of CERN from the perspective of its staff's political initiatives. Notwithstanding the extensive coverage that the international physics laboratory has received, historians have yet to document these campaigns in full. What follows explains this omission by focusing on provisions that muzzled the activists' initiatives. Since 1955, staff rules and regulations elaborated by CERN managers aimed at curbing efforts to promote political campaigning in the laboratory. Designed to safeguard its special legal status as an international organization in Switzerland devoted to scientific collaborations, these provisions strengthened its public image as a "sanctuary" for pure physics. With the war in Vietnam in full swing, however, it became more difficult to bottle in political initiatives, especially as CERN staff contributed to anti-war protests and supported local solidarity groups. At this critical junction, the laboratory managers muffled campaigns targeting Nobel-prize winning physicist Murray Gell-Mann, and made it seem as if a petition against the US military strikes in Vietnam signed by its staff was never put together.

Key words: Science diplomacy; Vietnam war; CERN; Gell-Mann; International campaigning; Political activism; Silencing.

"It is forbidden to do politics at CERN!" an audience member once shouted during a meeting organized in 1972 at the famed laboratory. Perhaps they had a point, since it is difficult to find instances of political activism in its history.¹ Established in Geneva, Switzerland, and administered through the intergovernmental *Conseil Européen pour la Recherche Nucléaire*, CERN today provides the largest world accelerator complex for physics research. The laboratory is also widely known as a model of science diplomacy, given that its international collaborations played a part in strengthening relations between the states that funded the enterprise, hence working as an instrument of soft power in Western Europe.² Yet the laboratory's apparent shortage of political activities is conspicuous in its history, making it appear as a sanctuary for pure physics untainted by political campaigning of any color.

* Barbara Hof is a postdoctoral researcher at the University of Lausanne. Gerardo Ienna is Marie Skłodowska-Curie Global Fellow at the University of Verona. Simone Turchetti is Professor of History of Science and Technology at the University of Manchester.

The absence of cases of political activism is noticeable in the literature available too. We know a great deal about the laboratory's past mainly thanks to the three volumes on the *History of CERN* representing the chief source of analysis on its evolution in its first three decades. Although "dissent" features in these volumes, it mainly relates to voices that did not have sufficient weight in key decisions, for instance on new development programs. They also document tensions between machines designers and users, but not as an item of political activism per se.³ This is not to say that CERN physicists have always been politically inactive. For instance, Alison Kraft discusses their roles in the Pugwash conferences on science and world affairs, but even these mobilizations did not happen *at CERN*.⁴ Moreover, the portrayal of CERN as the most representative laboratory-scale science diplomacy project in the world has further heightened its image as a space sterilized of grassroots politics. One could thus argue that presenting CERN as a model of European political and techno-scientific integration has led most scholars to overlook challenges to this integration, and hence to leave the alternatives advocated through mobilizations, social movements, and protest activities unexplored.⁵

The radical science movement literature does not offer sufficient details on mobilizations at CERN either. This is somewhat surprising, as in the eyes of radicals protesting during the 1970s, the laboratory was a quintessential example of a "pure" research facility with extensive connections to applied fields in the industrial and military realms. It empowered some of its staff members, allowing them to gain the prestige needed to play leading roles in the physics community, advise governments and find industrial partners.⁶ True, the radical scientist Steve Rose did not have CERN in mind when he claimed that "it is the purest of high energy physics that gave us the bomb," since its 1953 Convention forbade research on atomic weapons at the laboratory.⁷ Yet one of its regular guests, the Nobel-prize winning theoretical physicist Murray Gell-Mann, advised the US government on bombing strategies in Vietnam while researching at CERN on sub-atomic particles and quarks.⁸ While unrelated to the laboratory, his advisory role produced anger across Western Europe, but radical science scholars have not investigated enough how CERN staff related to Gell-Mann's presence at the laboratory. No science and technology studies contribution charts the significance of activism at CERN either, even if the deceptiveness of pure science is a recurring theme of this area study.⁹

There is also a significant lack of studies connecting the CERN laboratory to the radical science scene in Geneva. Bruno Strasser's work is a notable exception since it discusses its history as "atomic city," and a failed 1953 referendum of the local communist party (*Parti du Travail*) against CERN's establishment.¹⁰ Strasser, as well as John Krige, have also investigated the laboratory's association with Switzerland as it gave further public resonance to the Swiss stance on political neutrality through the neutrality of science as this was propagandized as one of the

CERN's guiding principles.¹¹ These reflections, however, have yet to produce studies examining political organizations opposing this association.

We show in this paper that if there is still a great deal more to explore concerning CERN's political activism, this is partly because of its laboratory managers' effort to clamp down on the campaigners' initiatives, which has contributed to making this political activism largely invisible throughout its history.¹² Our analysis of previously untapped records at the CERN archives, the papers of militant organizations operating in Geneva, and grey literature shows that political activism did feature at the laboratory.¹³ Yet, its managers attempted either to prevent these initiatives, or to limit their public visibility for fear of the repercussion that knowledge of these stances could have on CERN's prestige and collaborations. We introduce here the notion of "silencing" to underscore how the chief science diplomacy device its managers used internally consisted in provisions elaborated to restrict what political activists could say and do. We also contend that these provisions and deliberations aimed to safeguard CERN relations with its Swiss hosts, the Western European governments that sponsored its activities, and collaborators in the US and the USSR.

In what follows we first illustrate how since CERN was established, its managers elaborated provisions that made political campaigning frowned upon, if not explicitly prohibited. These provisions played an important role especially in silencing the initiatives promoted by the CERN Staff Association against the war in Vietnam.¹⁴ Drawing on the notion of silencing, we further show how CERN managers succeeded in hushing the mounting protests in the laboratory, examining especially the cases of Murray Gell-Mann's postponed lectures and interventions to forestall a petition against the use of science-based weapons in Vietnam.

Building the Physics Sanctuary by Silencing Political Activism

To understand how the image of CERN as an archetype of science diplomacy and a pristine space for physics research came to be publicly established, it is necessary to trace how its internal rules and regulations took shape. This allows us to better understand the silencing of political activism at the laboratory too. The set of rules governing its activities from 1953 aspired to ensure that researchers engaged in the (silent) pursuit of scientific research without offering political views as staff members. Several laboratory leaders were involved in elaborating them, and two figures in particular: the laboratory's main authority, the Director-General (DG), and the chief authority for staff, the Director of Administration (DA), took responsibility for their implementation in critical moments of CERN's history.

As an international organization in Swiss territory, CERN has always represented a confined space of immunity and privileges from national authority due to an agreement between its member countries (and Switzerland) premised on the laboratory's chief pursuit of conducting pioneering physics research. Rules first approved in 1955 and then revised in 1968 prevented its staff from engaging in

political activism, also requiring the personnel to endorse political neutrality while interacting with audiences outside the laboratory.

Elaborated in the early days of the laboratory's existence, these silencing regulations partly fell in line with the Cold War tenet that a neutrality stance removed political tensions compromising international collaborative work, especially those uniting the Eastern and Western blocs. It also represented a response to the political tensions that the CERN establishment produced. Communist scientists vibrantly protested plans for a European physics laboratory, viewing it as paving the way to a US domination of science in Europe. In 1953, the anonymous pamphlet *Un plan U.S.A. de mainmise sur la science* made a sensation in France and Switzerland by contending that the experimental facility deliberately excluded prominent communist physicists such as Frédéric Joliot-Curie from its administration and employed instead only scientists who displayed allegiance to the United States and the West. The polemic went on for some time as even a year later, the largest international trade union in the scientific community, the World Federation of Scientific Workers (WFSW), still described CERN as "attempt[ing] to deform real international collaboration."¹⁵

The regulations establishing the laboratory's relation to its Swiss host thus materialized in an adverse political atmosphere. These tensions did not comprehensively inform its drafting though, since the regulations were modelled on those available in other international organizations hosted in Switzerland which enjoyed a swathe of privileges otherwise unavailable to local citizens. Begun after the CERN Convention was signed in the summer of 1953, it took two years for the CERN Council to agree with the Swiss Federal Council on new statutes. The CERN Council, meeting twice a year, was (and still is) the supreme decision-making authority at the laboratory, composed of two representatives per member state, whereas the Federal Council represented the Swiss government. Comprising twenty-eight articles and three annexes, the agreement entitled to freedom of meeting, discussion and decision (article 5), inviolability of CERN's archive (article 4) and no censorship of official communications (article 12). Importantly, the laboratory staff enjoyed "immunities and privileges" placing them in a special legal regime ensuring "complete independence in the performance of [the researchers] duties towards the Organization."¹⁶ Swiss authorities could intervene exclusively through the release of an authorization by the DG, and only if there was sufficient evidence that some actions threatened public order and national security.¹⁷ A comprehensive set of circumstances (such as personal arrest, detention, seizure of personal belongings) fell under this regime.

The archival documents available highlight that CERN management duly recalled the immunity regulations with Swiss authorities in instances when staff might be involved in court proceedings. For instance, on September 13, 1971, a worker entered an open storage tank for liquids prepared for the neutrino-detecting Gargamelle bubble chamber, suffocated in a mixture of gasses and died shortly thereafter. When staff members were notified that they had to appear as

The Protest that Never Was

witnesses before a Swiss magistrate, the DA recalled in correspondence with the local Department of Justice that no staff member should testify without prior DG authorization. He also notified to another officer that the laboratory management had no obligation to facilitate the judiciary proceedings of any of the countries represented in the CERN Council.¹⁸

These concessions also came with the proviso that political activism would be severely contained at the laboratory in line with Article 1, Section 3 of the 1955 CERN Staff Regulations. This section likely originated in the tensions distinctive of the period of political turmoil predating the CERN establishment, since it stated that “every member of the staff of the Organization must refrain from any act and in particular any public political declaration or activity and from publishing anything incompatible with his duties and obligations towards the Organization, or which would be prejudicial, morally or materially, to it.”¹⁹ Crucially any staff member wishing to engage in any political activity needed DG approval.

Moreover, if this regulation offset the other libertarian principles contained in the 1953 Convention, the archival documents reveal that during CERN’s first fifteen years it was scrupulously enforced to quash its staff’s activism. In other words, if the laboratory managers were eager to protect their staff from outside interferences, they were equally committed to stifling political activities *within* the laboratory. Two managers active in the 1960s, the Austrian-born US theoretical physicist Victor Weisskopf (DG from 1961 to 1965) and the Briton George Hampton (DA from 1963 to 1975), were particularly eager to clamp down on staff’s initiatives. Weisskopf took on the role of director after an unsettling period for the organization since the previous director, the Dutch Cornelis Bakker (1955–60), died in a plane crash and the Briton John Bertram Adams hastily replaced him in an interim role. A Jewish academic refugee, Weisskopf had fled Europe in 1937 and moved to the United States, where he later worked in the theoretical division of the Los Alamos-based atom bomb project. Employed at MIT after the war, when he was appointed as CERN Director General in 1961 he had to focus on critical issues regarding availability of personnel and experimental equipment with a relatively limited budget. He also fostered collaborative links with the Soviet Union premised exclusively on political neutrality and the joint pursuit of high-energy physics, particularly by initiating the expansion of the previous exchange arrangement with the Joint Institute for Nuclear Research (JINR) in Dubna to the new Institute of High Energy Physics (IHEP) in Serpukhov.²⁰ All these elements committed him to restraining political activities to prioritize the laboratory’s growth and international collaborations.

The officer called in to operationalize these restraining operations was George Hampton. A scientist by training, Hampton came from the administrative sector of the UK Atomic Energy Authority and had previously worked in the International Civil Aviation Organization. He orchestrated relevant administrative issues for the Serpukhov collaboration (from the initiative in 1965 to the signing of the exchange

protocol in 1972) and was also given the responsibility of handling difficult political cases in CERN. Whether because of a particularly acute sense of his administrative responsibilities or not, he was also involved in most silencing cases discussed in this paper, since he was the DA at CERN for thirteen years.²¹

Weisskopf and Hampton ran the laboratory with firm hand, shutting down political activism right from when they began to be relevant to its administration, namely when there was a risk of externally leaking information on political campaigns that could jeopardize CERN's image. They blocked a campaign against apartheid, when in 1964, nine-hundred CERN workers signed a petition in support of a UN resolution pledging for the release of political prisoners in South Africa. Weisskopf and Hampton banned its promoter, the South African-born physicist and former British Communist Party member, Michael John (Mike) Pentz, from publicizing the initiative, which aimed at setting up an anti-apartheid lobbying group in Geneva, to which a few other staff members contributed.²² The Director General—Hampton informed Pentz—“feels very strongly that it is wrong for international officials, no matter what their nationality,” to organize such a lobbying group at CERN, similar as they were also founded in other European cities.²³ Pentz had previously claimed that staff should instead be free to join human rights campaigns, especially given that the UN General Assembly and the British Parliament had already condemned South Africa's racist stance. Even so, the dispute went on through 1965, and Weisskopf vetoed Pentz's plans to give an interview to a Swiss TV because CERN, as he wrote him, “must remain neutral.”²⁴

Neutral it was not, actually. In his reply to Pentz, Hampton clarified that the petition represented a problem as it called into question the Swiss government's “friendly relations” with the South Africans; relations that were strengthened after Switzerland's refusal to enforce UN Resolution 182 of 1963, which called for the abandonment of apartheid policies and the cessation of the supply of arms. This refusal encouraged the trade of Swiss companies with South Africa.²⁵ While unaware of these consequences, Hampton sent a rather sheepish reply to the complaining personnel of the South African embassy, stressing that the initiative for an anti-apartheid lobbying group was not “under the auspices of the organization.”²⁶ CERN eventually warned Pentz against circulating political materials through internal mail. Described in one of Hampton's memos as an “arch-performer, both as communist and strong anti-apartheid worker,” he was also forbidden from holding “office in the local anti-apartheid organization, or speak[ing] in public meetings on the subject.”²⁷

Pentz's muzzling coupled with Hampton and Weisskopf's efforts to ban an active participation of staff members to the French municipal elections of March 1965. The poll represented an important test for the stability of the recently established Fifth Republic in France (also paving the way to the direct presidential vote of the following December, when Charles de Gaulle was re-elected as President). The fear that the elections could destabilize the country made Hampton eager to recall in a laboratory-wide note that “whilst neither expressly

The Protest that Never Was

barring nor expressly permitting staff members to hold civic office,” the DG ought to provide “authorization for these activities.” He would give approval only if he was “satisfied that this is not in conflict with the interests of the Organization.”²⁸ Eventually Weisskopf agreed to let only junior staff be involved in the election campaign.²⁹

The CERN managers’ explicit opposition to letting staff engage in political activism continued in the years after Weisskopf’s reign at the laboratory, although in the second half of the 1960s it became more difficult to stop researchers and auxiliaries from being politically active, with the May 1968 upheavals in Western Europe, the Prague Spring, and especially with the US entry in the war in Vietnam. This led several CERN staff members to contribute to new campaigns, especially as many scientists had visited Vietnam from 1966 to gather evidence on US bombing against civilians in the context of initiatives promoted by the International War Crimes Tribunal (known as the Russell Tribunal), the WFSW, and other anti-war organizations.³⁰

The CERN Staff Association

From 1965, the laboratory management worried especially about the initiatives of the CERN Staff Association. Established in 1955, it traditionally offered a forum for extra-scientific initiatives such as sport and culture, including the organization of evening lectures. While not a union as such, and not an organization that CERN staff were compelled to join, it became a de facto representative organ for personnel, also negotiating contracting policy, salary increases, and other matters of significance to the laboratory’s personnel including provisions regarding its political initiatives.³¹ It also published a bulletin, the *Staff Association Journal*, which featured as an important channel for its promotion.

With the Vietnam war ongoing, the association became a more visible political vector in the laboratory, and its representatives openly disputed the management’s right to silence political initiatives because of the 1955 provisions. Correspondence between the association’s administrators shows that while they agreed that “nobody should desire to transform CERN into a ground of hot political activities,” they also wished for new regulations to be introduced to let staff engage with issues such as racial prejudice (as shown by the anti-apartheid campaign) and nuclear proliferation. Vietnam inevitably came to the fore in these exchanges; the Italian engineer Giovanni Muratori pointed out in a letter to the association president, Pierre Lazeyras, “if somebody asks me in public what I think of the Vietnam war, shall I reply that article A1, [section 3] of our staff regulations does not allow me to answer?”³²

Until 1968, the association’s attempts to negotiate more liberal regulations were unsuccessful, partly due to the directives of Weisskopf’s successor, the French Bernard Gregory (1966–70). An expert in the design and use of detectors, Gregory was a rising star in the physics community having completed a PhD on cosmic rays

in 1950 at MIT before returning to France (to the École Polytechnique). He then shifted to accelerators research and oversaw the building of the bubble chamber installed on CERN's 28 GeV Proton Synchrotron. He went on to replace Weisskopf as DG to lead on the construction of the Intersecting Storage Rings and the 300 GeV (Super) Proton Synchrotron.³³ His approach to political activism differed little from that of his predecessor, especially as under Gregory the exchange with the Soviets intensified as physicists at Serpukhov planned the worldwide largest Proton Synchrotron there, which CERN managers sought to access. Under the terms of an agreement Gregory signed in Moscow on July 4, 1967, CERN provided materials and know-how and agreed to collaborate as soon as its equipment was installed.³⁴ To dampen any negative impact to be derived from the personnel's political activism on CERN's external relations, Gregory reminded staff about their commitment to the laboratory's neutrality in his circulars, also instructing against publications with political content after unauthorized messages "of a political tendency" had appeared on CERN's internal communications.³⁵ It is further evidence of his silencing approach that when in 1968 the WFSW proposed to Gregory the organization of an event to commemorate Frédéric Joliot-Curie, the CERN director emphasized the need for the tribute to focus exclusively on his scientific achievements.³⁶

Months before the May 1968 protests erupted in Paris, the CERN managers agreed to revise the staff regulations, recognizing that a host of future political activities would not need full DG approval but only to be communicated by the organizers. The 6th edition of the staff rules and regulations put in force on January 1, 1968 recognized therefore that "any staff member wishing to engage in a political activity, shall inform the Director-General in advance." These activities included "amongst other things the exercise of a public function, the conduct of an electoral campaign and public participation in the life of a political party." However, it was also specified that opinions could only be expressed "on matters not connected with the Organization". And the ambiguously phrased "amongst other things" meant that the DG and DA could still decide if a political initiative required authorization.³⁷

The May 1968 protests did not produce a substantial change in CERN laboratory's relations. The recent concessions were presumably a way to take the sting out of a possible staff mobilization in the laboratory. A few weeks after the beginning of the protests in the French capital, the *Staff Journal's* editorial "Revolution at CERN?" hinted at the possibility that the protests might affect operations at the laboratory too.³⁸ If they did not, it was partly because Hampton supported Gregory's action as he had previously done with Weisskopf. He authorized at the height of the Vietnam war that staff could sign petitions elaborated outside the laboratory, but only if CERN was not mentioned in this political documentation, and its mailing and printing facilities were not used for propaganda work.²⁷

The Protest that Never Was

To circumvent the new provisions, the CERN Staff Association disguised some of its internal campaigning events as information briefs with politically neutral content. The Association invited for instance the Italian communist physicist Marcello Cini, who reported on his recent visit to Vietnam, where he had investigated the use of cluster bombs targeting civilians in the context of the activities of the Russell Tribunal. To display the organizers' effort to be politically neutral and exclusively informative, the staff association also agreed to invite the US attaché at the United Nations, so that he could discuss the same topic from a competing viewpoint.³⁹

However, Hampton kept vetting and vetoing the association's initiatives to host such events. In 1971, he attempted to cancel a lecture in favour of political prisoners in Brazil, once again to please CERN's Swiss hosts since its federal administration had just expelled two Brazilian exiles.²⁷ Only when 210 staff members signed a petition to hold the lecture did Hampton let the socialist Daniel Raphaël Mayer, president of the Human Rights League and member of the Workers' International, deliver it. It is evidence of the staff disappointment about the revised CERN provisions that, to conclude Meyer's presentation, a group of people proposed a petition to protest the imprisonment, and this is when someone in the audience shouted that politics at CERN was actually forbidden.⁴⁰ The petition was nonetheless launched, this time calling more openly to end repression and torture in Brazil, which was eventually reported in the Geneva communist journal *Voix Ouvrière*.⁴¹

A year later, Hampton attempted to reduce the number of left-wing speakers invited to give talks at the laboratory, especially when he found out that several focused on the Vietnam conflict.⁴² The French radical physicists Alexandre Grothendieck and Jean-Marc Lévy-Leblond had received invitations to talk. Grothendieck had given lectures on mathematics in Hanoi in 1967, while Lévy-Leblond was involved in the May 1968 protests in Paris.⁴³ Cini was invited to speak again, and in 1974 Bruno Vitale, another Italian physicist active in the campaign against the Vietnam War, delivered an evening lecture.⁴⁴

Despite the CERN managers' silencing strategies, the Staff Association found a way to transform the laboratory into a space where researchers had a few more opportunities to present their political views. Yet by 1972, when European physicists mobilized following the revelation that their US colleagues had contributed to designing the bombing strategies used in Vietnam, more tensions antagonized CERN staff and management, hence calling for more interventions to prevent or quell agitation work.

Deferring Gell-Mann

Starting from June 1971, the *New York Times* revealed the content of the leaked Pentagon Papers. It emerged that a selected group of scientists had contributed to the design of the bombing strategies deployed in Vietnam in the context of a secret

advisory unit called JASON working for the US Department of Defense (DoD). The revelations caused a sensation, since prominent physicists had authored secret reports advising on civilian bombing.⁴⁵ This ignited new protests in a period made still more tense following the Easter Offensive (Operation Linebacker; when North Vietnam was massively bombed and South Vietnam virtually cut in two), the peace talks of Nixon's special adviser Henry Kissinger and the US President's campaign for re-election. Importantly for CERN internal affairs, in 1972 one of the JASON physicists, the Nobel Prize-winner Murray Gell-Mann, stayed at the laboratory to work on his theory, also having plans to deliver lectures and attend summer schools in Europe. Due to Gell-Mann's controversial stances, his visit thus complicated the relations between CERN managers and staff again.

If the CERN laboratory was a sanctuary of pure physics, then Gell-Mann was one of its most revered ministers. His first extended research stay in Geneva took place in 1962 at the invitation of his doctoral advisor Weisskopf.⁴⁶ A descendant of Ukrainian migrants, Gell-Mann graduated from Yale University before studying at MIT with Weisskopf. He then spent most of his career at the California Institute of Technology in Pasadena travelling frequently to Europe and visiting CERN's theory division several times. In the 1960s he went on to elaborate a new model for subatomic hadrons postulating the existence of quarks, a more fundamental constituent of matter, for which he was awarded the Nobel Prize in 1969. Soon after he agreed to an appointment as Guest Professor at CERN, where he intended to elaborate his theory further and exchange ideas.⁴⁷

Starting from September 1971 Gell-Mann was therefore a well-regarded CERN guest. Yet, the leaks on his contribution to JASON made him far less admired. Gell-Mann, as eventually revealed, contributed to drafting report S-255 setting the plan for the anti-infiltration barrier on the Ho Chi Minh trail that had contributed, through the associated strategic bombing, to increasing the number of Vietnamese civilian casualties.⁴⁸ While one of his biographers described Gell-Mann as an "opportunist" rather than a scientist with definite political views, the leaks made him a target for radical scientists and protesters. The fact he had refused since to offer any explanation on his involvement in JASON worsened the situation, even if he justified this stance with the trauma of confronting protesting students in a US university campus in 1967.⁴⁹

Right after his arrival at CERN, Gell-Mann agreed to teach at the annual school of physics due to take place in the sea town of Grado, off the Adriatic coast.⁵⁰ Grado was selected as the school's venue because the event was jointly organized with the International Centre for Theoretical Physics (ICTP) directed by the Pakistani physicist Abdus Salam and based in nearby Trieste (Italy). Since 1970, the JINR of Dubna was another partner in the annual school, which made the organizers anxious that participants stick to political neutrality notwithstanding the outrage of many for what the Pentagon Papers had revealed.⁵¹ Gell-Mann could therefore give a lecture on "partons and light-cone algebra" in Grado without any problem. This was, however, the last time that he could deliver a

The Protest that Never Was

lecture in Europe without contestation, as a wave of demonstrations against the JASON physicists hit the old continent immediately afterwards.⁵² On 13 June, Gell-Mann could not talk at the Collège de France in Paris due to the protest of the local Collectif Intersyndical Universitaire d'Orsay Vietnam-Laos-Cambodge (CIU). Gell-Mann's attempt to nonchalantly deliver a talk on quarks without offering first an explanation on his involvement in JASON angered the protesters, and it was even reported (erroneously) that he had to leave the lecture hall to avoid confrontation.⁵³

After the tensions in Paris, Gell-Mann returned to Geneva. CERN now worked as a haven for him as its managers shielded him from internal contestation too. He continued evading questions about his role in JASON which unsurprisingly angered the CERN Staff Association. Its members had received CIU agitation materials inviting to stop JASON physicists (now dubbed "war professors") visiting European universities and laboratories from delivering lectures unless they offered first an explanation about their role in the DoD unit.⁵⁴ The association initially dealt with this request with restraint, hence asking Gell-Mann to offer a justification for his contribution to JASON and reply to the widely publicized accusations regarding this involvement.⁵⁵ As he refused again, this stance now made the CERN managers anxious too, as Gell-Mann's lectures at the laboratory were scheduled for June 20 and 21, 1972. In the absence of a more collaborative attitude, the laboratory managers feared that the association would organize a protest at the laboratory.

The only way to prevent a contestation was deferring the lectures, but by then it was no longer the case that the DG and the DA could single-handedly manage cases of political activism. The previous year, CERN underwent an important transformation, as, after Gregory's departure, the Council assigned the construction of the 300 GeV (Super) Proton Synchrotron project to John Bertram Adams as co-Director General of an ad hoc "Laboratory II." Austrian-born German co-director Willibald Jentschke managed instead existing CERN operations, including those of the Intersecting Storage Rings available from 1971, from what was now renamed Laboratory I. His controversial past (his association with the German *Uranvein* project during World War II) had not prevented him from playing a leading role in the development of particle accelerators.⁵⁶ As CERN co-director, Jentschke was also entrusted with the new Soviet exchange programme. On June 8, 1972, he symbolically inaugurated the equipment provided by CERN to the Serpukhov laboratory and then signed a protocol to establish the scientific collaboration with the IHEP.⁵⁷

Hence, even though the definition of a double DG-role and the re-structuring of CERN did not lead to a radical policy change regarding activism, it now compelled to route decisions regarding the silencing of political initiatives in a different way. In the case of Gell-Mann's lectures, Jentschke, Adams, and Hampton agreed that a decision ought to be made by the Board of Directors (the intermediary authority representing the research divisions). The board eventually

concluded that the lectures needed re-scheduling without offering further explanation. It also agreed to announce the postponed lectures later in the month so as not to give opportunities to the Staff Association to plan a protest against an event already scheduled. The *CERN Bulletin* thus vaguely informed readers of the postponement without offering more details.⁵⁸ While it is unclear what decisions staff took after that, the following year radical physicists Lévy-Leblond and Alain Jaubert indicated that the JASON physicist's presence at CERN enraged the personnel and that they wished "to ask a few questions to Mr. Gell-Mann—probably not about physics!"⁵⁹

The wave of protests across Europe continued and took a turn that concerned the CERN co-directors even more. In July, Gell-Mann travelled to Erice, in Sicily, to take part in the local physics summer school together with JASON associate John Wheeler. The meeting produced more tensions as Gell-Mann still refused to talk about his advisory role. Meanwhile, SLAC physicist Sydney Drell, also involved in JASON, refused to answer questions at the theoretical physics school organized at the Corsican village of Cargèse, thus forcing its organizers to end it in advance.⁶⁰ Drell had also to cancel a lecture at the Institute of Physics in Rome, before visiting the CERN laboratory, where he finally agreed to discuss with colleagues his participation in JASON. This opening set an important precedent exactly because it contrasted with Gell-Mann's unmoving stance.⁶¹

The protest against JASON continued in August when physicists attending the Italian Physics Society International Summer School in Varenna, Lake Como, drafted a statement on the Vietnam War. Many travelled the following month to Trieste where the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) had sponsored a workshop at the ICTP with JASON associates Eugene Wigner and John Wheeler as speakers. The university's lecture hall was occupied by students and militant scientists forcing the organizers to move the conference to ICTP's Miramare headquarters, which was guarded by armed security.⁶² Although Gell-Mann was not involved directly, what happened in Trieste likely persuaded the CERN managers to postpone his lecture again, since it was in fact rescheduled. As the Nobel-Prize winning physicist was due to return to the United States in September, his talk was now set for December 7, but another last-minute cancellation led to another postponement so that the lecture took place only on January 25, 1973.⁶³

A look at ongoing political campaigns in the city of Geneva further explains this decision. The CERN managers were aware that if Gell-Mann were to talk, there was an additional risk of disruption by anti-war organizations operating outside the laboratory. Vietnam had by then become a flashpoint of anti-war campaigning in the city. Importantly, after the 1969 elections, Geneva had a significant number of communists, with eighteen percent *Parti du Travail* representatives in the cantonal government (the highest number in Switzerland).⁶⁴ Since 1966, Geneva activists, including the communist party, were campaigning for self-determination of Vietnam by means of elections, which was originally planned when it was

The Protest that Never Was

divided in North and South in 1954. While the local activists did not target CERN, even after Gell-Mann's invitation, they distributed brochures among staff.⁶⁵

May 1968 had radicalized the Geneva protest scene, but after the Pentagon Papers revealed the extent of the scientific advisory work of physicists for the US government, "les Genevois/es" seized on science as a motif in their anti-war campaigns. The CERN staff liaised with them so that the city eventually hosted several solidarity groups. Shortly after the physicist and campaigner Bruno Vitale gave a presentation by invitation of the Staff Association, a Science for Vietnam collective was founded in Geneva, with one of three subgroups sited at CERN, providing material aid to research institutes and universities in Hanoi.⁶⁶ Meanwhile, the mutual aid organization *Centrale Sanitaire Suisse* (CSS), created by physicians during the Spanish civil war, took action to help the Vietnamese, and its Geneva section sent antibiotics and surgical instruments to North Vietnam.⁶⁷ On April 25, following the Easter Offensive, when Gell-Mann was already a visiting scientist at CERN laboratory, the CSS organized a demonstration against the Vietnam war in collaboration with the socialist and communist parties and trade unions.⁶⁸ While the CERN laboratory continued to appear as a politically neutral island in the city, its staff connected to local political initiatives, as shown by the petition that they circulated internally and that, once again, produced more strains.

Making the Petition Invisible

While working toward re-scheduling Gell-Mann's lectures and preparing the inauguration of the Serpukhov collaboration, the DGs Adams and Jentschke also attempted to prevent criticism from the CERN Council about how the managers had dealt with this situation. In December 1972, Jentschke reported to the Committee of Council (the executive authority comprising the Council's member states representatives with CERN officials and heads of services) that there had been "notable unrest in several laboratories during the summer." This unrest had affected lectures and seminars (including Gell-Mann's as we have seen). He reassured them that he and Adams were in control, however, and that "scientific talks should proceed undisturbed" and that, in any case, "no clashes had occurred."⁶⁹ One item Jentschke neglected to recall, however, was an important petition launched against the Vietnam war that staff had signed since the summer of 1972 and had made Committee of Council members particularly anxious. Indeed, the DGs now acted to ensure avoiding not only that the petition was publicized outside the laboratory, but that no one outside could lawfully claim that CERN staff was involved in preparing one.

The staff appeal aimed to put pressure on the governments of CERN member states, following the increasing bombing of North Vietnam in the summer of 1972, when civilian areas became the target of military attacks, and the stalling of Kissinger's peace talks in Paris.⁷⁰ Now public petitions were taken and signed in France and Switzerland, calling for an end to the bombing, the spraying with

defoliants, and the dropping of napalm.⁷¹ The CERN petition stressed that “the havoc wrought in Vietnam by the world’s most developed nation furnishes a dire illustration of the worst fears that Science has raised.” It thus contended that the CERN staff “as members of the scientific community” felt “particularly disturbed by this abuse of modern technology.” “We therefore urge your immediate intervention with the government of the United States of America, to bring about the cessation of such military activities, which show an absolute disregard for the lives, the property, and the soil of the Vietnamese people,” the appeal concluded.⁷²

Three staff members had drafted the petition: the Polish theoretician Jacek Prentki; the soon-to-be head of the theory division, the Italian Daniele Amati; and the Polish-born French detector specialist (and later Nobel laureate) Georges Charpak. They were all CERN veterans who had gone through most of the political tensions discussed in this paper, including those associated with Gell-Mann’s visit. Prentki had joined CERN in 1955, while Charpak and Amati arrived in Geneva four years later. None of them was a radical scientist as such, although Amati had worked with Bruno Vitale who exposed him to his agitation work. Charpak had been involved in political activism though, as in 1967 with eight other staff members he made a donation for the WFSW Scientists’ Appeal for Vietnam and signed a WFSW open letter to US university staff against the war.⁷³

That even physicists who often shied away from political campaigning had now become politically active revealed to the CERN managers the level of ongoing radicalization in the laboratory. During the summer of 1972 Jentschke requested that Amati, Prentki and Charpak seek a DG authorization first for circulating the appeal outside its perimeter, since he judged it outside the list of political activities that the revised 1968 staff regulations indicated as not in need of his permission. When they approached Jentschke with a draft, he pushed for a revised version stressing that the undersigned were expressing personal views, hence bearing no relation to CERN. Only after a revised draft was available, he allowed its circulation among staff. Like the Brazil campaign of the previous year, the appeal was popular and between one third and one fourth of the personnel in various roles supported it.⁷⁴ The letter accompanying the petition in which the authors invited their colleagues to sign the appeal also urged them to donate to the CSS to send medical aid to Vietnam, illustrating the ties uniting CERN staff to Geneva’s activists.⁷⁵

The appeal’s publication represented an unsurmountable obstacle, especially as it now drew in other CERN authorities. The (intermediary) Board of Directors discussed the petition at their meeting of July 1972, agreeing that it could be published only if it had no reference to CERN. Its Council had to approve it first, but members met only twice a year which meant that a solution would not be found in the next six months.⁷⁶ The two DGs now agreed to discuss these matters again with the two petitioners Amati and Charpak, who pressed ahead for a publication acknowledging the appeal came from the CERN staff (even if in a personal capacity). Jentschke and Adams thus forwarded their formal application

The Protest that Never Was

to the Committee of Council to be reviewed before submission to the Council, CERN's highest authority.⁷⁷ By selecting the items to be discussed by all country representatives, the Committee of Council thus predetermined their decisions. In preparation for their next meeting in November, its members blocked the appeal's publication, arguing that "such an action might constitute a dangerous precedent." They also felt that "whilst political activities at universities were nothing unusual, an international organization must not be used as a center for political activities."⁷⁸ This position was clearly in line with policy provisions adopted since the 1950s, as CERN's special status allegedly made it unsuitable to host political initiatives.

Waiting for the Council's deliberations in December, CERN's managers succeeded in avoiding that these tensions leaked outside the organization, as they noted with satisfaction, writing to the Committee of Council.⁷⁹ At their meeting in November, however, several members criticized the appeal, once again stressing the role of CERN as an entity that should stay neutral. The West German representative took the view that it was "an attempt of the CERN staff to influence Member States to give up neutrality in the Vietnam conflict, to adopt a certain attitude and to take political action in order to make a third State change its policy." He appealed to Article VI of the CERN Convention, whose definition as "exclusively international in character" compelled staff to observe strict neutrality.⁸⁰ The Greece representative even instilled the doubt that the petitioners had used their positions to influence their collaborators' decisions. "When the number of signatures exceeds a small number and is collected mainly from closed community, where these scientists are heads of division, group leaders, or in some place of authority from which they may be able to influence the opinion of the people working under them, then this collecting of signatures becomes an endeavor of doubtful value." He concluded therefore that "any activity that may place in doubt that the action of an individual has been taken on his own free will, should be condemned and not be allowed to happen."⁸¹

Nobody could stop the circulation of the petition outside CERN, but, considering what Committee of Council members stressed, co-DG Adams agreed to use these adversarial views to stipulate that CERN should not be mentioned in the petition and its content should never be discussed outside unless the DG authorized divulging it.⁸² Meanwhile, the Committee of Council concluded that "it was at least doubtful" whether the petition was even in line with staff regulations. Hampton played a part in this as he kept writing to members that since 1968 the rulings "allowed a staff member to take part in the public and political life of his own country but not inside the Laboratory."²⁷ The in-house Coordinating Committee of CERN Lab I and Lab II went a step further. It indicated that "under no circumstances" could the petitioners give publicity to the petition, which also excluded any reference in the *Staff Association Journal*.⁸³ Indeed, we now know about the appeal mainly because of agitation literature collected in the archives. Nobody ever announced or discussed it in any CERN publication, and not even at the official Council meeting held in December 1972.⁸⁴

These decisions also informed a re-thinking about the silencing of political activism at the CERN laboratory. In a confidential note to Committee of Council members, Adams and Jentschke identified two future courses of action to kill the petition. They could either interpret CERN's regulations rigidly, preventing any kind of political expression by the staff. Alternatively, they could make concessions within the bounds of the general rules that everyone was to speak on his or her own behalf and not on behalf of the CERN institution. They eventually opted for the second option fearing that the staff would openly and publicly protest the first if it was implemented.⁸⁵ In any case, the confidential note had more negative comments, also setting the petition's fate. The President of the European Committee for Future Accelerators stated that it was ridiculous and irresponsible that "scientists who had the privilege of working at CERN" engaged in political activities.⁸⁵ The French representative abruptly refused to forward the petition to his authorities.⁸⁵ The Belgian one shared others' opinion about "the impropriety of such a petition by CERN staff members." The Swedish representative recognized that "trying to stop it completely would have an adverse effect." But the Italian representative contended instead that while "CERN scientists were, of course, entitled to freedom of opinion" their position "did not confer on its holder the right to express any opinion on the Vietnam conflict."⁸⁵ Probably alongside their official meeting, country representatives decided not to discuss the issue further. They supported Adams and Jentschke, agreeing that the DGs had taken the best line of action by avoiding any leak on the petition outside CERN.

The European governments thus never received the staff petition to urge them to take a stand in the US war against Vietnam, while the protests in Geneva continued. Local activists advocated an unconditional end to the war and the provision of medical aid.⁸⁶ Nixon's successful re-election in November 1972 led him to promise an immediate end to the war, while the devastating destruction of Vietnam continued thanks to the Christmas bombing (Operation Linebacker II). Anti-American resentment grew among activists protesting a few kilometres away from the CERN laboratory, and their actions became more consequential.⁸⁷ Their slogans and militant actions branded Switzerland as a disguised ally of the US government, with neutrality being a prominent motif in the local radical imagination. Radicals accused Switzerland of no longer being neutral, as its government had only recognized North Vietnam in 1971, almost twenty years after the country's division.⁸⁸ Radicals also pointed out that Geneva was the host of many international organizations, calling the Red Cross (ICRC) a non-neutral "Western agent" as it would treat the people from North and South Vietnam differently.⁸⁹ While the neutrality of CERN appeared as the reason for silencing the staff petition, the very notion of Swiss neutrality was now the subject of street protests outside the laboratory.

Epilogue: The Protest that Never Was

This study has charted episodes of political activism at the CERN laboratory from 1955 until 1972. If the laboratory appears as a space lacking political activism and uniquely intent on exploring the fundamental constituents of matter, it is not because this political engagement did not exist, but rather because its provisions and regulations deliberately limited the internal growth of these political initiatives in the laboratory, and publicity to the outside. We have highlighted three important reasons for this hushing: first, an ambition to keep in line with the CERN governments' stipulation that the pursuit of inter-governmental scientific research came with a commitment to political neutrality (also given the laboratory's siting in neutral Switzerland). Secondly, the restricting provisions and deliberations mirrored the system of immunities and privileges granted to the staff. While CERN managers were eager to defend this system from the outside interference of Swiss authorities, they combined it with internal regulations that, by limiting political work, gave no reason for these authorities to intervene. Finally, the regulations (and their implementation) had the ambition to expand CERN's network of scientific collaborations between physics organizations of European member states, as well as those of the Soviet Union in the belief that explicit political stances adopted by its staff could harm them.

The paper also shows that in their application these silencing provisions combined with contingent imperatives. In the early days, they targeted political activism, possibly due to the antagonism that had opposed the French and Swiss communists to the creation of the CERN laboratory. During the 1960s, Hampton's efforts to mute CERN campaigners often fell in line with an ambition to protect Switzerland's international partners, even controversial ones such as the regimes of apartheid-ruled South Africa and Brazil's *ditadura militar*. Because of these interests, the CERN managers also did not distinguish between political and human rights campaigns in their restraining orders, hence even going against the condemnation of these regimes by authoritative international forums, including the United Nations. The existence of these contingent factors suggests therefore that the political neutrality principle underpinning silencing rules and provisions at CERN hid the managers' vested political agenda, and, at times, that of the laboratory's Swiss hosts too.

The spreading of radical stances among the scientific community at the end of the 1960s caused a sea change in the relationship between CERN staff and managers, also unsettling these silencing principles and operations. The unrest of May 1968 made the CERN Staff Association less eager to accept gagging orders especially in light of the Vietnam War and some physicists' contribution to US military operations. While there is a great deal more to be ascertained about the unfolding of political campaigning at CERN in the aftermath of the May 1968 demonstrations, it is now clear that its staff liaised closely with local campaigners and solidary groups. Following a revision of the stringent regulations at the laboratory, staff were able to speak more freely about the Vietnam conflict. As we might expect, the war antagonized staff and management for several years too, and this antagonism took an important turn in 1972. Staff members

had now to confront Gell-Mann whose reluctance to offer an explanation about his role in JASON angered many across Europe. His visit to CERN thus marked the first effort ever by the laboratory managers to *prevent* political campaigning rather than simply restraining it. This is why they ultimately agreed to postpone his lectures. It also materialized an effort to make less visible (or not visible at all) the anti-war petition that the staff had elaborated. This was especially to appease CERN managers who wished to stifle the criticism of the US administration, which had been a willing supporter of the European laboratory since the end of World War II. It is further evidence of the conflict's importance in shaping staff-management relations at CERN that even staff members like Charpak, Amati and Prentki who had until then rejected radicalism, now agreed to drafting and distributing a political appeal.

The conflict on political engagement dividing CERN staff and managers continued after the withdrawal of US combat troops from Vietnam following the signing of the Paris Peace Agreement on January 27, 1973.⁹⁰ In the second half of the 1970s the CERN Staff Association requested that it could conduct more political activities without restrictions, particularly with regard to their campaigns on working conditions especially as economic inflation eroded salaries and rendered employment more precarious.⁹¹ In May 1975, the policy group discussed the association's status with the view to partly make concessions and increase participation without making it a trade union.⁹² In the context of strike waves in Geneva, including at the United Nations, the CERN managers even questioned if the "right to strike" was in accordance with the law concerning international organizations. CERN's special status was once again recalled as under the terms of Article 3.1 of these arrangements, the DG had the right to designate a requisition of persons who must be on duty on the site during a strike.⁹³ Solidarity actions also continued, most apparently in the Yuri Orlov Committee. Named after the particle physicist and human rights defender arrested in 1977, this group was founded by the petitioner Charpak and others in support of a persecuted dissident scientist.⁹⁴ Yet, not indifferently from the Vietnam petition case, in 1978 and again in 1981, the Committee of Council decided to address the question of whether the human rights situation in the Soviet Union should affect scientific exchange with this nation only *outside* official meetings, and prevented placing the item on the agenda of the Council.⁹⁵ Another year was to pass before the campaigning of the Yuri Orlov Committee seriously jeopardized the exchange programmes. Despite concerns about human rights, but with regard to access to the accelerating-storage complex (UNK) planned at Serpukhov, in December 1982 the Committee of Council recommended continuing cooperation with the Soviet Union.⁹⁶

Hence from the mid-1970s political activism at CERN was apparently not as suffocated as it had been up to that point, assuming, of course, that there are no more sources revealing silencing efforts. The few episodes discussed here make it plain that the image of the celebrated CERN laboratory as a sanctuary of pure physics that is prevalent in the literature results from lack of external visibility of its international campaigning, combined with the lack of sources documenting

them. In turn, the pristine image of the CERN laboratory as committed to political neutrality is what contributed to erase from history many of the political activities that it hosted.

Acknowledgements

We are grateful to Bruno Vitale and Daniele Amati for discussing with us the historical events described in this article. We also thank Sandrine Reyes and Jens Vigen (CERN Archives) and Géraldine Beck and Frédéric Deshusses (Archives Contestaires) for their tremendous help with the consultation of the relevant archival papers. Ienna has received funding from the European Union's Horizon 2020 research and innovation programme under the Marie Skłodowska-Curie grant agreement No 101026146. Turchetti has received funding from the European Union's Horizon 2020 research and innovation programme under the ERC grant agreement No 101021098. We thank the University of Lausanne for its support in making this article freely available.

Open Access This article is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution 4.0 International License, which permits use, sharing, adaptation, distribution and reproduction in any medium or format, as long as you give appropriate credit to the original author(s) and the source, provide a link to the Creative Commons licence, and indicate if changes were made. The images or other third party material in this article are included in the article's Creative Commons licence, unless indicated otherwise in a credit line to the material. If material is not included in the article's Creative Commons licence and your intended use is not permitted by statutory regulation or exceeds the permitted use, you will need to obtain permission directly from the copyright holder. To view a copy of this licence, visit <http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/>.

Funding

Open access funding provided by University of Lausanne.

Data availability Not applicable.

Publisher's Note Springer Nature remains neutral with regard to jurisdictional claims in published maps and institutional affiliations.

References

- ¹ "Les droits de l'homme," *Le Proton Déchaine*. *Staff Association Journal* no. 100 (1972).
- ² Royal Society/AAAS, *New Frontiers in Science Diplomacy: Navigating the Changing Power of Science* (London: Royal Society, 2010), 11. Available at: https://www.aaas.org/sites/default/files/New_Frontiers.pdf.

- ³ Armin Hermann, Ulrike Mersits, John Krige and Dominique Pestre, with a contribution by Lanfranco Belloni, *History of CERN, Vol I: Launching the European Organization for Nuclear Research* (Amsterdam: North-Holland, 1987); Armin Hermann, Dominique Pestre, Ulrike Mersits and John Krige, with a contribution by Laura Weiss, *History of CERN, Vol II: Building and Running the Laboratory, 1954–1965* (Amsterdam: North-Holland, 1990); John Krige, ed., *History of CERN, Vol III*, (Amsterdam: Elsevier, 1996). The third volume covering the mid-1960s to early-1970s is particularly relevant for the content of this paper. On Vietnam see pages 81–82 and 183; on machine designers/users see pages 95 and 197.
- ⁴ Alison Kraft, *From Dissent to Diplomacy: The Pugwash Project in the 1960* (New York: Palgrave, 2022), 52. There was never a Pugwash conference at CERN, but the Geneva Pugwash group met at CERN as documented in the CERN DG files. See J. P. Street to W. Jentschke, 17 October 1975, DG-FILES-512.
- ⁵ Roberto Lalli, “Crafting Europe from CERN to Dubna: Physics as Diplomacy in the Foundation of the European Physical Society,” *Centaurus* **63**, no. 1 (2021), 103–31. On the role of CERN in European integration see Martin Kohlrausch and Helmuth Trischler, *Building Europe on Expertise. Innovators, Organizers, Networkers* (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2014), 208–14.
- ⁶ The expression is used by Bruno Vitale in “Scienza e scienziati nella società capitalistica,” 11, AC, AP-S08-3/4. See also Giovanni Ciccotti, Marcello Cini, Michelangelo de Maria, “The Production of Science in Advanced Capitalist Society,” in *The Political Economy of Science*, eds. Hilary and Steven Rose (London and Basingstoke: Macmillan, 1976), 32–58. On the notion of purity see Barbara Hof, “Particles, Purity, Politics: Expanding International Exchange in High Energy Physics during the Cold War,” in *Globalizing Physics: One Hundred Years of the International Union of Pure and Applied Physics*, eds. Roberto Lalli and Jaume Navarro (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2024), 192–208.
- ⁷ Steven Rose cit. in Sigrid Schmalzer, Daniel S. Chard and Alyssa Botelho, eds., *Science for the People. Documents from America’s Movement of Radical Scientists* (Amherst and Boston: University of Massachusetts Press, 2018), 29. CERN, “Convention for the Establishment of a European Organization for Nuclear Research,” July 1, 1953. Available at: <http://cds.cern.ch/record/480837/files/cm-p00047703.pdf>.
- ⁸ George Johnson, *Strange Beauty: Murray Gell-Mann and the Revolution in Twentieth-Century Physics* (New York: Vintage Books, 1999), 256–57.
- ⁹ Peter J. Taylor and Karin Patzke, “From Radical Science to STS,” *Science as Culture* **30**, no. 1 (2021), 1–10; Pascal Germann, Lukas Held, and Monika Wulz, “Scientific Political Activism—Eine Annäherung an das Verhältnis von Wissenschaft und politischem Engagement seit den 1960er Jahren,” *NTM Zeitschrift für Geschichte der Wissenschaften, Technik und Medizin* **30** (2022), 435–44; Susanne Schregel, “Introduction,” in *Social Movements, Protest, and Academic Knowledge Formation. Interactions since the 1960* (Essen: Verlag, 2018), 5–26, on 21.
- ¹⁰ Bruno Strasser, “The Shapes of Dissent: Masculinities, Protest, and Nuclear Expertise,” *Engaging Science, Technology, and Society* **8**, no. 1, (2022), 110. See also Kelly Moore and Bruno Strasser, “Science & Dissent: Alternative Temporalities, Geographies, Epistemologies,” *Engaging Science, Technology, and Society* **8**, no. 1 (2022), 53–71; Bruno Strasser, *La Fabrique d’une Nouvelle Science. La Biologie Moléculaire à l’Âge Atomique (1945–1964)*, (Florence: Olschki, 2006), 12–13. On Geneva as a dissenting space see Dominique Gros, *Dissidents du quotidien: La scène alternative genevoise 1968–1987* (Lausanne: Edition d’en bas), 21–37.
- ¹¹ Bruno Strasser, “The Coproduction of Neutral Science and Neutral State in Cold War Europe: Switzerland and International Scientific Cooperation, 1951–69,” *Osiris* **24**, no. 1 (2009): 165–87; John Krige, “Science, Technology and the Instrumentalization of Swiss Neutrality,” in *Wissenschaft Und Aussenpolitik. Beiträge zur Tagung anlässlich des 50. Jubiläums der Schaffung des*

The Protest that Never Was

ersten Postens eines Schweizerischen Wissenschaftsattachés, eds. Antoine Fleury and Sasche Zala (Bern: Dodis, 2012), 65–71.

^{12.} There is one notable exception, namely the labor strikes at the CERN laboratory, peaking at the construction sites, see Jacques Grinevald, André Gsponer, Lucile Hanouz, Pierre Lehmann, eds., *La Quadrature du CERN: Essai indisciplinaire publié à l'occasion du 30e anniversaire du CERN* (Lausanne: Edition d'en bas, 1984).

^{13.} The following repositories have been consulted: Archives Contestataires Genève [AC], Archives d'Etat de Genève [AEG]; CERN Archives [CERN-ARCH; included in this article: DG-Files (Director General), DIR-ADM (Director Administration), DGR (Director-General Research), WOL (William Owen Lock), TH (Theory Division), SCSA (Scientific Conference Secretariat)]; Murray Gell-Mann Papers 1931–2001, Caltech Archives and Special Collections [GMP], World Federation of Scientific Workers, University of Warwick [WFSW-ARCH]. We have used digitized materials from the CERN Document Server: Audio Archive, CERN Bulletin, CERN Courier, Council and Committee of Council, Staff Association Journal.

^{14.} On the European physicists' protests see Gerardo Ienna and Simone Turchetti, "JASON in Europe: Contestation and the Physicists' Dilemma about the Vietnam War," *Physics in Perspective* **25**, no. 3 (2023), 85–105.

^{15.} The Third General Assembly, Budapest 12–14 September 12–14, 1953. Report of the S.N.T.E.A. by Dr. Biquad, WFSW-ARCH, MSS.270/2/3/3; Draft Minutes of the Thirteenth Meeting of the Executive Council, Held in Vienna September 10–12, 1954, WFSW-ARCH, MSS.270/2/2/9. On the Communist pamphlet see Simone Turchetti, "Contesting American Hegemony: Attacks to US Scientific Initiatives in Cold War Europe (and Means to Secretly Defy these Challenges)," *History and Technology*, 40(1–2), 109–128. See also Dominique Pestre, "French Attitudes to the European Laboratory, 1949–1954," in Hermann et al., *Vol I* (ref. 3), 335–39; John Krige, *American Hegemony and the Postwar Reconstruction of Science in Europe* (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 2008).

^{16.} Agreement between the Swiss Federal Council and the European Organization for Nuclear Research concerning the Legal Status of that Organization in Switzerland, CERN/II5 Rev. 3, 20 June 1955, <https://cds.cern.ch/record/22996/files/CM-P00074865-e.pdf>, Article 14.

^{17.} Agreement (ref. 16), Article 2.

^{18.} G. H. Hampton to H. Schmitt, 10 February 1972, and G. H. Hampton to Pierre Collet, 2 November 1972, in DIR-ADM-01-CHRONO-20. For the accident see The Safety Policy Committee to G. H. Hampton, 27 April 1972, DG-FILES-473.

^{19.} "Staff Regulations, approved by the Council of the Organization," 24 February 1955, DG-FILES-253.

^{20.} V. Weisskopf to A. M. Petrosyants, 22 June 1965, DG-FILES-194.

^{21.} The CERN recollections on his career suggest that he worked towards suppressing political activism as a "necessary evil," see "Who is Who in CERN: George H. Hampton," *CERN Courier* **3**, no. 9 (1963), 118.

^{22.} Mike Pentz, "Memorandum to the United Nations on Political Detainees and Political Prisoners in South Africa," *Staff Association Journal* no. 59 (1964), 23; Comité du Movement Anti-Apartheid de Genève, undated, AEG, Archives privées 210.1.2. Back in 1961 Pentz was targeted by US authorities who forbade him from entering the country to attend an international conference on accelerators at the Brookhaven Laboratory, see R. E Marshak to M. J. Pentz, 19 September 1961, DG-FILES-339.

^{23.} G. H. Hampton to M. Pentz, 20 May 1965, DIR-ADM-01-DIV-PE-PERS-03.

24. G. H. Hampton to M. Pentz, 10 October 1965, DIR-ADM-01-DIV-PE-PERS-04; Mike Pentz, “The Rivonia Trial,” *Staff Association Journal* no. 58 (1964), 24–28.
25. Peter Hug, “Aligning with the Apartheid Government against Communism: Military, Armaments Industry, and Nuclear Relations between Switzerland and South Africa and the UN Apartheid Debate of 1948–1994,” *NRP* 42+ (2005) Available at: https://www.snf.ch/media/en/BVPIGHJt188Za9YN/nfp42p_hug-e.pdf. The resolution is available at: <http://unscr.com/en/resolutions/doc/182>
26. G. H. Hampton to J. J. Olivier, 22 March 1965, DIR-ADM-01-DIV-PE-PERS-03.
27. Note by G. H. Hampton on political activities within the laboratory, 7 November 1972, DG-FILES-255.
28. G. H. Hampton to Division Leaders, 25 February 1965, DIR-ADM-01-DIV-PE-PERS-03.
29. Victor Weisskopf to Charles Mottier, 12 February 1965, DIR-ADM-01-DIV-PE-PERS-03.
30. Ienna and Turchetti, “JASON in Europe” (ref. 14). See also Harish C. Mehta, “North Vietnam’s Informal Diplomacy with Bertrand Russell: Peace Activism and the International War Crimes Tribunal,” *Peace & Change* 37, no. 1 (2012), 64–94.
31. According to article 2 of the 1955 statutes, see “Statutes of the CERN Staff Association,” undated, WOL-108.
32. “G. Muratori to Lazeyras,” *Staff Association Journal*, special no. 66 (1966) np. The letter refers to the regulation as cited in ref. 19.
33. CERN Scientific Information Service, *Bernard Paul Gregory (1919–1977)*, last modified 17 July 2020. Available at: https://sis.web.cern.ch/archives/history_CERN/DG/Gregory.
34. “Visit to Serpukhov,” *CERN Courier* 6, no. 4 (1966), 69–72; “Collaboration with Serpukhov,” *CERN Courier* 7, no. 7 (1967), 123–25.
35. Bernard Gregory à tous les membres du personnel, 9 June 1967, DG-FILES-255.
36. Due to the Soviet invasion of Czechoslovakia, the organization of such a commemoration could not take place as the Swiss government stopped releasing visas. Letter from E. H. S. Burhop to Biquard, 16 July 1968, MSS.270/2/3/32, WFSW-Arch; WFSW Circular Letter to Affiliated Organisations, to Members of the Executive Council, to Corresponding Members, 19 September 1968, MSS.270/2/3/32, WFSW-Arch.
37. “Staff Rules, Chapter 1, Section 3,” 1 January 1968, “Staff Regulations (Staff Members), Chapter 1, Section 3,” 1 January 1968. Available at: <https://cds.cern.ch/collection/Staff%20Rules%20and%20Regulations?ln=de>; See comments in “Staff Rules and Regulations,” *Staff Association Journal* no. 80 (1968), 5.
38. “Revolution at CERN?,” *Staff Association Journal* no. 81 (1968), 2.
39. Audio Archive, “Vietnam- Prof. Cini.” Available at: <https://cds.cern.ch/record/880375?ln=en>; “Eye Witness Report on South Vietnam.” Available at: <https://cds.cern.ch/record/880996>.
40. To which Mayer replied “so do it anyway,” see “Les droits de l’homme,” *Le Proton Déchaine. Staff Association Journal*, no. 100 (1972). A later issue of the Journal added that “time has come to demystify a word we are afraid of at CERN: ‘politics.’ But what is politics? Everything, I would say even and especially the choice not to be political,” see “Rubrique Culturelle,” *Le Proton Déchaine. Staff Association Journal* no. 105 (1973), 22.
41. “Pétition d’un millier de travailleurs du CERN contre la répression et la torture au Brésil,” *Voix Ouvrière*, 23 December 1971, AC, AH-2200, D0022.
42. Note by G. H. Hampton on political activities within the laboratory, 7 November 1972, DG-FILES-255. G. H. Hampton to G. Maurin, 9 May 1972, DIR-ADM-01-DIV-PE-STAFFASS-05. Memorandum G. Maurin to G. H. Hampton, undated, DG-FILES-255.

The Protest that Never Was

43. “Allons-nous continuer la recherche scientifique?,” *Le Proton Déchaine. Staff Association Journal* no. 100 (1972). Lévy-Leblond presented at CERN the volume co-edited with Alain Jaubert, see *CERN Bulletin* no. 46 (1973), 11; “(Auto)Critique de la science,” *Le Proton Déchaine. Staff Association Journal*, no. 106 (1973), 19–20. Recently Grothendieck has received press attention because his studies are exploited for the development of frontier AI research, see: Phil Hoad, “‘He was in Mystic Delirium’: Was this Hermit Mathematician a forgotten Genius whose Ideas could transform AI – or a lonely Madman?,” *The Guardian*, August 31, 2024. However, we know far less on his political activism in the context of the Vietnam war, which indirectly confirms our main argument.
44. Audio Archive, “Teaching in Vietnam.” Available at: <https://cds.cern.ch/record/921674?ln=de>.
45. Ann Finkbeiner, *The Jasons: The Secret History of the Science’s Postwar Elite* (New York: Viking, 2006).
46. Victor Weisskopf to Murray Gell-Mann, 5 June 1962, Folder 16, Box 22, Series 1, GMP.
47. Bernard Gregory to Murray Gell-Mann, 6 October 1970, Folder 4, Box 34, Series 3, GMP; “Fellows and Visitors to TH division, Computer List 1970–71,” undated, TH-115; “Progress Reports Presented to Council by the Director-General of Laboratory I,” CERN Council, 4 December 1972, 61; Part of Gell-Mann’s work at CERN was published as: H. Fritzsche, Murray Gell-Mann, H. Leutwyler, “Advantages of the Color Octet Gluon Picture,” *Physics Letters* **47B**, no. 4 (1973), 365–368. A year before his invitation to CERN, he was a John Simon Guggenheim Memorial Fellow, working on a study completed at CERN: “Murray Gell-Mann ‘Quarks,’” in *Elementary Particle Physics*, ed. Paul Urban (Wien: Springer, 1972), 733–61.
48. Ienna and Turchetti, “JASON in Europe” (ref. 14), 97.
49. On his political profile see Johnson, *Strange Beauty* (ref. 8), 257. On the trauma see Gell-Mann’s oral history interview with Finn Aaserud. Available at: <https://www.aip.org/history-programs/niels-bohr-library/oral-histories/31110>.
50. Draft, second meeting of the organizing committee of the 1972 CERN school of physics held at Geneva, signed 20 October 1972, SCSA-102.
51. Owen Lock to Abdus Salam, 2 September 1970, SCSA-102; “L’école de physique du CERN 1972,” *CERN Courier* **11**, no. 11 (1971), 326. The first joint school was in Finland, the second in Bulgaria, see “JINR School,” *CERN Courier* **11**, no. 1 (1971), 18.
52. On the school see Amendments to the programme, 22 May 1972, SCSA-102. It was held without disturbance, see “Studiosi a Grado,” *Il Piccolo*, Sunday, May 14 (1972), 4; “Da ieri a Grado il symposium nucleare,” *Il Piccolo*, Tuesday, May 16 (1972), 4; “Alla ricerca del meraviglioso,” *Il Piccolo*, Thursday, May 25 (1972), 7; “Cento fisici stranieri a ‘scuola’ con il CERN,” *Il Piccolo*, Wednesday, May 31 (1972), 5.
53. “The College de France, the JASON Division, and the War in Indochina,” CIU leaflet translated and published in “Science for the People, copy in Bruno Vitale, ed., *The War Physicists. Documents about the European Protest against the Physicists Working for the American Military through the JASON Division of the Institute for Defense Analyses* (Naples: Liguori, 1976), 73–74.
54. “War Professors,” poster by Collectif Intersyndical Universitaire d’Orsay “Vietnam-Laos-Cambodge,” DG-FILES-255.
55. Anonymous, undated (handwritten on copy of *Le Monde* from 15 June 1972), DG-FILES-255.
56. He did so at Hamburg, where from 1956 he led the project to build the Deutsches Elektronen-Synchrotron (DESY). On Jentschke’s contribution to the German atomic project see Christian Forstner, “Laboratory Life Instead of Nuclear Weapons: A New Perspective on the German Uranium Club,” *Physics in Perspective* **24**, no. 4 (2022), 181–207.
57. “Serpukhov inauguration ceremony,” *CERN Courier* **12**, no. 6 (1972), 205–6.

- ⁵⁸. Provisional summary of discussion, board of directors, 6 July 1972, DG-FILES-255, “Enseignement, Academic Training,” *CERN Bulletin* no. 15 (1972), 1; “Enseignement, Academic Training,” *CERN Bulletin* no. 25 (1972), 3; “Enseignement, Academic Training,” *CERN Bulletin* no. 26 (1972), 3.
- ⁵⁹. Jean-Marc Lévy-Leblond and Alain Jaubert, (*Auto*)*Critique de la Science* (Paris, Édition du Seuil, 1973), 187.
- ⁶⁰. “Statement by a group of students of the 1972 Cargèse Summer School in Theoretical Physics,” in Vitale, *The War Physicists* (ref. 54), 92.
- ⁶¹. It is further evidence of these competing approaches that in October both Drell and Gell-Mann were asked by the editors of *Physics Today* to reply to a letter by Cini and colleagues criticizing JASON, but only Drell offered one. The previous month, Hans Bethe had praised the approach while criticizing Gell-Mann, see Bethe to Vitale, 12 September 1972 in Vitale, *The War Physicists* (ref. 54), 120.
- ⁶². The Trieste Letter, 25.8.1972 in Vitale, *The War Physicists* (ref. 54). CIU to A. Kastler, 6 July 1972 and Kastler to CIU, 7 July 1972 in Vitale, *The War Physicists* (ref. 54), 106–10.
- ⁶³. “CERN Particle Physics Seminars,” *CERN Bulletin* no. 49 (1972), 2; “CERN Particle Physics Seminars,” *CERN Bulletin* no. 50 (1972), 2; “Progress Reports Presented to Council by the Director-General of Laboratory I,” CERN Council, 28 May 1973, 34. Murray Gell-Mann to Claudio Rebbi, 4 January 1973, Folder 4, Box 34, Series 3, GMP.
- ⁶⁴. Federal Statistical Office, 16 May 2023, *Elections des parlements cantonaux, de 1968 à 1971: répartition des mandats par parti et par canton*. Available at: <https://www.bfs.admin.ch/bfs/en/home/statistics/catalogues-databases.assetdetail.24385276.htm>. Every Swiss canton has some legislative authority over its territory.
- ⁶⁵. Mouvement genevois pour la paix et l’indépendance du Vietnam, “Vietnam 2,” 31, AEG, AP 210.20.32.
- ⁶⁶. Anonymous, “Science pour le Vietnam Genève,” 30 January 1975, AC, AP-S08-3/4. It collected at least half a ton of books and magazines to be sent to Hanoi. Collective Science pour le Vietnam Genève, 30 April 1975, AC, AP-S08-3/4. See also Barbara Hof. “Science for Vietnam: Grassroots Activism in East-West Relations in the 1970s,” in *The Palgrave Handbook of Non-State Actors in East-West Relations*, eds. Péter Marton et al. (Cham: Palgrave Macmillan, 2024).
- ⁶⁷. “Qu’est-ce que la Centrale Sanitaire Suisse?,” undated, AC, AH-2200, D0022.
- ⁶⁸. “Défilé et manifestation contre la guerre en Indochine,” *Voix Ouvrière*, 26 April (1972); “Drapeaux rouges dans la bise et vitrines fracassées,” *La Suisse*, 26 April (1972); “La manifestation de soutien pour l’Indochine réunit plus d’un millier de personnes,” *Le Courrier*, 26 April (1972), AC, JM-S02-D016.
- ⁶⁹. Confidential note to committee of council members, restricted distribution, 7 December 1972, DG-FILES-255.
- ⁷⁰. “Nixon, armement offensifs,” *Tribune de Genève*, 22 June 1972, 5; “Bombardement américaine à deux km du centre du Hanoi,” *Tribune de Genève*, 26 June 1972, 5; “Vietnam: l’optimisme de Saïgon et Washington justifié?,” *Tribune de Genève*, 10 July 1972, 3; “Conférence de Paris sur le Vietnam: nouvelle séance pour rien,” *Tribune de Genève*, 13 July 1972, 5.
- ⁷¹. Anonym, “L’appel suivant,” undated, AC, JM-S02-D016; “Contre les bombardements des digues du Nord-Vietnam par l’aviation américaine. Appel de personnalités Suisses,” *Voix Ouvrière*, 5 August (1972), AC, CP-S13-SS151; “Appel contre les bombardements des digues du Vietnam par l’aviation U.S.,” *Le Monde* 9 no. 10 July (1972), AC, CP-S13-SS151; A. Stitelmann, “Vietnam-Urgence. Appel contre le bombardements des digues au Vietnam,” undated, AC, CP-

The Protest that Never Was

S13-SS151; Untitled draft of the report about the success of the petition “contre les bombardements des digues du Vietnam par l’aviation U.S.,” AC, CP-S13-SS151.

^{72.} Letter addressed to the governments of the CERN member states, undated (annex to letter by G. Charpak and D. Amati to Willibald Jentschke, 20 October 1972), DG-FILES-255.

^{73.} Scientists’ Appeal for Vietnam, money received in London, MSS.270/4/5/1; An open letter to the staff of the universities of the U.S.A., MSS.270/4/5/2, WFSW-Arch.

^{74.} About 1,200 signed the petition. At the end of 1972, the workforce at CERN was 3,264 (if we include visitors and auxiliary staff: 4,531), see CERN Personnel Division, *Personnel Statistics, 1972* (Geneva: CERN, February 1973), 1.

^{75.} Untitled letter from the authors of the statement to their colleagues, undated, DG-FILES-255.

^{76.} Forty-Eighth Session of the Council on 15 and 16 June 1972, 1 November 1972.

^{77.} “Provisional summary of discussions,” Board of Directors 6 July 1972, DG-FILES-255; Willibald Jentschke and John Adams to Committee of Council, 17 October 1972, DG-FILES-255.

^{78.} Timetable of Council Sessions and Committee Meetings 1973, draft 4 October 1972, DG-FILES-255.

^{79.} Willibald Jentschke and John Adams to members of the committee of council, 17 October 1972, DG-FILES-255.

^{80.} Statement by Lehr, 9 November 1972, DG-FILES-255.

^{81.} Personal views by Th. Kouyoumzelis, 2 November 1972, DG-FILES-255.

^{82.} Memorandum to George Hampton and Willibald Jentschke by John Adams, 1 November 1972, DG-FILES-255.

^{83.} CERN Co-ordinating Committee, Fifteenth Meeting, 10 November 1972, DIR-ADM-01-COMMITTEE-02.

^{84.} Forty-Ninth Session of the Council on 20 and 21 December 1972, 23 March 1973.

^{85.} “Confidential note to committee of council members, restricted distribution,” 7 December 1972, DG-FILES-255.

^{86.} “Genève: manifestation pour le Vietnam dans la nuit de Noël,” *ATS*, 26 December (1972), AC, AH-2200, D0022.

^{87.} “La manifestation anti-américaine,” *Tribune de Genève*, January 15, (1973); Centre de liaison politique, 14 January 1973, AC, CP-S13-SS151. For the election in the context of peace negotiations see “M. Rogers: les négociations Washington-Hanoi vont reprendre bientôt,” *Tribune de Genève*, November 6, 1972, 3; “Nixon: Règlement de paix au Vietnam prochainement conclu,” *Tribune de Genève*, November 7, 1972, 3; “Raz de marée pour Nixon,” *Tribune de Genève*, November 8, 1972, 1; “Nous sommes unis dans notre désir de paix,” *Tribune de Genève*, November 8, 1972, 3.

^{88.} Ligue Marxiste Révolutionnaire Lausanne, undated, AEG, AP 210.20.32; “Pour la libération des 300’000 prisonniers politique de Saïgon,” Centre d’Information sur le Mouvement de Libération, AC, Broch 0120; “Le génocide U.S., ses racines, la réponse socialiste,” Comités Indochine vaincra, September 1972, AC, Broch 0588; For the recognition, see “La Suisse reconnaît le Vietnam du Nord,” *Tribune de Genève*, September 2, 1971: 2.

^{89.} Cercle Ho-Chi-Minh, 8 March 1974 and Centre de liaison politique, 14 January 1973 both in AC, CP-S13-SS151.

^{90.} “Vietnam: L’Accord,” *Tribune de Genève*, January 27/28, 1973, 2.

^{91.} Ch. Roy to Jentschke, Adams, van Hove, Hampton, 25 September 1975, DIR-ADM-01-DIV-PE-STAFFASS-05.

^{92.} PE Policy group, meeting 26 May 1975, DIR-ADM-01-DIV-PE-STAFFASS-05; “Collaboration between Management and the Staff Association,” *CERN Bulletin*, April 19, 1976, 1.

^{93.} “Strike Action in other International Organizations,” *Staff Association Journal*, March 1976; The Director-General to the CERN personnel, 22 April 1976, DGR-LVH-006.

^{94.} For the activities of the Yuri Orlov Committee see the *Staff Association Journal*, April 1981.

^{95.} Committee of Council, 132nd meeting, 22 June 1978 and Committee of Council, 147th meeting, 25 and 26 June 1981. The precision of the content was only latter added: Committee of Council, 148th meeting, 18 September 1981.

^{96.} Committee of Council, 155th meeting, 5 November 1982, and Committee of Council, 156th meeting, 15 December 1982. The CERN Council approved the prolongment of the exchange half a year later, see Seventy-fourth meeting of the Council, 23 and 24 June 1983.

University of Lausanne
Bâtiment Anthropole
1015 Lausanne, CH, Switzerland
e-mail: barbara.hof@unil.ch

Accepted: 1 August 2024