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Influencing Migration Policy from Outside: The Impact of Migrant, Extreme-Right, and Solidarity Movements

Marco Giugni and Florence Passy

After having been neglected for years in favor of analyses of the rise and forms of protest activities, the study of the outcomes and consequences of social movements has received a strong boost in recent years. The number of systematic works—both case studies and, though less often, comparative analyses—that focus on movement impact is growing at a sustained pace, thus contributing to filling an important gap in our knowledge of social movements and, more generally, contentious politics (see Giugni 1998 for a review). Yet this gap remains very large in the field of immigration politics. In this specific field, scholars have largely avoided to study protest behavior and collective mobilizations (for exceptions concerning the mobilization of migrants and minorities, see e.g., Ireland 1994; Blatt 1995; Fibbi and Bolzman 1991; Giugni and Passy 1999; Martiniello and Statham 1999), and even when they did focus on protest, they have been interested in explaining its rise (in particular, that of the extreme right) rather than their effects on policy making. As a result, we still know very little about the impact of protest activities on the decision-making process in the field of immigration and ethnic relations.

Given this state of affairs, this chapter pursues three goals that are all related to the study of the policy impact of protest activities. Our first aim is empirical and consists in assessing the impact of the mobilization by three social movements that are directly implicated in immigration politics: (1) migrants and ethnic minorities, (2) the extreme right, and (3) pro-migrant or solidarity organizations and groups. We focus on the (potential) substantive effects of these three collective actors on migration policy, intended as their ability to

influence political decisions on issues pertaining to immigration and ethnic relations. Furthermore, we focus on a specific historical period, namely the years from 1990 to 1998. This is a period during which: (1) discussions of the role of minorities in western Europe, especially in regard to the actual or supposed "multiculturalization" of society, have been brought to the fore of public debates; (2) the extreme right has witnessed a growth both in terms of electoral strength and in terms of racist or violent actions; and (3) the solidarity movement has consolidated its position within the civil society and become increasingly active in the migration field. To have an empirically grounded assessment of the impact of these three collective actors and of which actor is more effective is therefore all the more important today.

Our second aim is theoretical and follows two lines of reasoning. On the one hand, we draw from the literature on citizenship and integration regimes to explore the hypothesis that models of citizenship, that is, prevailing conceptions and shared understandings of the criteria of membership in a nation, provide a framework for explaining the varying impact of challenging groups that mobilize in the field of immigration and ethnic relations. Following a theoretical perspective recently adopted in an international research project, we conceive of models of citizenship as a structure of political opportunities for the impact of collective actors on migration policy. Our choice to focus on France and Switzerland, two countries that have two distinct models of citizenship, follows from this opportunity approach. On the other hand, we continue an avenue of research we explored elsewhere (Giugni 2001, 2004; Giugni and Passy 1998), suggesting that we take into account the possibility that the policy impact of these movements is determined by the joint presence of protest activities and contextual factors (i.e., political, economic, and socio-demographic).

Our third and final aim is methodological. Since the literature on social movements still lacks systematic and empirically grounded studies of their consequences, we propose an analysis of the effects of migrant, extreme-right, and solidarity movements on migration policy following a longitudinal approach, more precisely by means of time-series analysis techniques, which are particularly well suited to establish causal relationships among variables of interest. We should note, however, that in this respect our study is largely exploratory, sensitizing to an approach rather than testing a theory.

MODEL OF CITIZENSHIP, POLITICAL OPPORTUNITIES, AND THE IMPACT OF SOCIAL MOVEMENTS

Recent comparative work on social movements and contentious politics points to the decisive role of political opportunity structures for explaining the emergence of protest, the forms it takes, and its potential impact (e.g.,

Brockett 1991; Kitschelt 1986; Kriesi et al. 1995; McAdam 1996; McAdam et al. 2001; Tarrow 1998; Tilly 1978). Typically, scholars identify political opportunities with certain aspects of the institutional context of movements, most notably the degree of access to the political system for challenging groups, the capacity and propensity towards repression by the political authorities, and the configuration of power in the polity (see McAdam 1996).

The underlying assumption in this approach is that the political opportunity structure thus defined applies to all kinds of movements and challenging groups, regardless of the nature of their claims and the policy field they are targeting. Now, this is debatable both on theoretical and empirical grounds. Theoretically, some have shown that the perception of political opportunities varies from one movement to the other and that, as a result, different movement react differently to the same signals (Kriesi et al. 1995: chapter 4). Furthermore, different policy areas yield different sets of opportunities to challengers (Kriesi et al. 1995: chapter 4). Even a cursory look at actual mobilizations by different movements suggests that some movements are more radical than others. While this might in part depend on the propensity to radicalization by certain groups, a more plausible hypothesis is that certain movements and policy areas have specific opportunity structures that impinge on the mobilization of actors who address issues pertaining to those areas.

Together with some colleagues, we have recently begun to specify the concept of political opportunity structure for the field of immigration and ethnic relations.[1] Following the lead of recent comparative work on national regimes for the incorporation of migrants and on citizenship rights (Brubaker 1992; Castles 1995; Favell 1998; Freeman 1995; Joppke 1999; Koopmans and Kriesi 1997; Koopmans and Statham 1999a, 2000b; Safran 1997; Smith and Blanc 1996; Soysal 1994), we look at the ways in which prevailing citizenship and integration regimes provide different sets of opportunities for the claim-making of collective actors in this field. We suggest that collective action in this field is enabled or constrained not only by political institutions, but also by shared understandings and collective definitions of the groups involved and the ways in which their members should be included in or excluded from the national community, in other words by the historically and culturally embedded shared understandings of the rights and duties of migrants and, conversely, of nationals towards migrants.

Models of citizenship can be conceptualized as a combination of two main dimensions: an individual dimension referring to the formal criteria for obtaining citizenship rights or membership in the national community, and a collective dimension referring to the cultural obligations posed on migrants for obtaining such rights. On the first dimension, we may distinguish between an ethnic and cultural conception which on the legal level becomes the *jus sanguinis* rule, on the one hand, and a civic and territorial conception

of citizenship which translates into the *jus solis* rule, on the other (see Brubaker 1992). On the second dimension, we may distinguish between a monist or assimilationist view of the cultural group rights according to which migrants are supposed to assimilate to the norms and values of the host society, on one side, and a pluralistic view in which the state grants and sometimes even promotes the recognition of ethnic difference, on the other.

Combining these two dimensions, we obtain four ideal-types of citizenship and integration regimes (Koopmans and Statham 1999a, 2000b): an ethnic-assimilationist (or differentialist) model, an ethnic-pluralist (or segregationist) model, a civic-assimilationist (or republican) model, and a civic-pluralist (or multicultural) model. Germany and Switzerland are examples of the first type, South Africa under Apartheid of the second type, France of the third type, and Britain and the Netherlands of the fourth type.[2] Thus, according to this typology, France and Switzerland have two distinct models of citizenship. In France, there is a civic and political definition of the nation together with a tendency towards imposing the republican values and norms upon migrants. In Switzerland, the assimilationist view of cultural group rights combines with an ethnocultural conception of citizenship.

In this perspective, the specific structure of political opportunities provided by citizenship and integration regimes channels the claim-making in the field of immigration and ethnic relations. It therefore should favor claims that have greater political legitimacy and public resonance within the larger cultural framework provided by the prevailing model of citizenship (Giugni and Passy 1999; Koopmans and Statham 1999b). Specifically, the shared understanding of the ideal-type of the nation as a civic and political community in France, which has an inclusive definition of citizenship and where all citizens must conform to the principles of the republican state, should provide larger opportunities to actors who mobilize around issues pertaining to the integration of migrants in the host society. Since migrants in France are considered as belonging to the national community, the larger share of their claims bears on the rights and position of resident migrants (i.e., immigrant policy) rather than the regulation of flows (i.e., immigration policy). In contrast, the more exclusive, ethnic-based conception of citizenship in Switzerland, which in this respect resembles to Germany, should favor actors and claims concerning immigration control and the regulation of immigration flows, as this kind of issues is more legitimate in this context and resonates with the larger framework provided by the prevailing model of citizenship.

Table 8.1 shows that this is indeed the case.[3] For all three collective actors under study, the share of claims concerning the situation of resident migrants (minority integration politics and racism/antiracism) is higher in France. In contrast, claims pertaining to the regulation of immigration flows (immigration, asylum, and aliens politics) are more important in Switzerland. To be sure, immigration control claims by migrants are more frequent in France,

Table 8.1. Thematic Focus of Migrant, Extreme-right, and Solidarity Movement Claims in France and Switzerland

	Migrants	*Extreme Right*	*Solidarity Movement*
France			
Immigration, asylum, and aliens politics	26.6	4.0	36.4
Minority integration politics	40.8	8.1	15.3
Racism/antiracism	21.6	22.7	47.7
Other claims (not in the migration field)	11.0	65.3	0.7
Total	100%	100%	100%
N	473	856	426
Switzerland			
Immigration, asylum, and aliens politics	11.9	24.8	53.0
Minority integration politics	11.5	10.5	15.9
Racism/antiracism	15.3	32.0	27.2
Other claims (not in the migration field)	61.3	32.7	4.0
Total	100%	100%	100%
N	261	153	151

but even in this case the ratio between immigration policy and immigrant policy is clearly in line with our hypothesis. Furthermore, we have to take into account the fact that in Switzerland most migrant claims deal with homeland politics issues rather than host society ones, which by the way is also a result of the more exclusive conception of citizenship in this country.

The main goal of this chapter, however, is not to explain the thematic focus of migrant, extreme-right, and solidarity movement claims, but rather to assess the impact of these actors on migration policy and, concerning models of citizenship, to determine to what extent their policy impact depends on the dominant definition of the nation in civic-territorial or ethnocultural terms. Specifically, we hypothesize that claims addressing immigrant policy have more chances to find a political space and to be successful in France, for they resonate with this country's civic-based model of citizenship. In contrast, we think the terrain should be more favorable to claims directed at immigration politics in Switzerland, which are both more legitimate and resonant in the context of an ethnic-based definition of the nation.

POLITICAL, ECONOMIC, AND SOCIO-DEMOGRAPHIC RESOURCES FOR THE IMPACT OF SOCIAL MOVEMENTS ON MIGRATION POLICY

As the social movement literature has shown, movements are relatively powerless collective actors. Therefore, their potential impact is likely to become

greater to the extent that they can exploit certain resources which are available in the larger environment and which may facilitate their task. Political, economic, and socio-demographic resources are certainly among the major ones, and the ones on which we would like to focus in our analysis, in addition to the cultural resources coming from the prevailing models of citizenship. To begin with, students of social movements have often stressed the contribution of political alliances to the movements' cause. Political opportunity theorists, in particular, argue that the presence of powerful allies within the institutional arenas largely facilitates the task of social movements (e.g., Amenta et al. 1992; Burstein et al. 1995; Jenkins and Perrow 1977; Kriesi et al. 1995: ch. 9; Lipsky 1968; Tarrow 1993, 1998). Established parties play an especially important role in this respect (Tarrow 1993), as they can take up movement claims within the institutional arenas and translate them into policy changes.

Political opportunity theory suggests a number of hypotheses regarding the impact of social movements and claim-making in the field of immigration and ethnic relations. Concerning in particular the role of political alliances, the aspect of political opportunity structures which interests us here, migrant, extreme-right, and solidarity movements should be more successful when their potential institutional allies are in power and, more generally, when political alignments are favorable to them. The left (in particular, the Socialist party) is traditionally the most important ally for migrants and the solidarity movement, which therefore should have greater chances of success when the left is gaining power. Furthermore, their impact should go in the direction of liberalizing the admission policy or granting more rights to resident migrants and minorities, as this reflects their interests and demands.

The picture is somewhat more complicated for the extreme right, as established parties (included those of the right) do not always support far-right positions and groups. Nevertheless, at least when it comes to migration policy, the traditional right can still be considered as a potential ally of the extreme right, in spite of their often ambivalent relationship. As a result, extreme-right mobilization should have greater chances of success when the right gains power and, of course, even greater when extreme-right parties themselves benefit from an electoral growth. Furthermore, its impact should consist in tightening both immigration policy and immigrant policy, the typical demand of the extreme right. However, as some have argued in particular for the French case (Favell 1998; Hollifield 1994; Weil 1995), in the migration political field there is often a sort of "hidden consensus" among political parties which results in similar positions by left and right parties, especially with regard to the regulation of immigration flows. Therefore, at least in the case of immigration policy, political alignments should not matter that much. The question is open to empirical scrutiny.

Institutional allies are a political resource for migrants, extreme-right, and solidarity movements. However, students of immigration politics have often underscored the role of certain contextual factors such as economic (e.g., unemployment), socio-demographic (e.g., immigration flows), cultural (e.g., models of citizenship), and legal-normative (e.g., the existence of domestic or international courts and the emergence of transnational normative frameworks) factors. All these aspects represent external resources that can be exploited by the movements under study to increase their chances of successfully influence migration policy. Here, in addition to political alliances and models of citizenship, we look at economic and socio-demographic resources, two aspects that are likely to strongly affect short-term changes in migration policy at the domestic level.

The economic situation of the host country is among the most significant factors affecting migration policy (see e.g., Hollifield 1992; Straubhaar and Weber 1994). A good or bad economic situation can provide crucial resources to social movements that try to influence policy making in the field of immigration and ethnic relations. When the economy is bad and unemployment high, governments typically respond with restrictive policies. In contrast, in times of economic growth and low levels of unemployment, liberal measures are more likely to occur. This argument applies in particular to immigration policy and much less to immigrant policy, i.e. it concerns above all the regulation of immigration flows as well as the criteria of admission of foreigners to the country in general and to the labor market in particular. In this respect, we can make different predictions as to chances of success of the three movements under study. On the one hand, liberalizing immigration policy is not a feasible option in periods of high unemployment. Immigrant policy, on the other hand, is relatively independent of the situation of the labor market. We therefore expect both migrant and solidarity movements to have an impact on immigrant policy (but not on immigration policy) when unemployment increases. Such impact, furthermore, should manifest itself in measures favorable to the situation of migrants in the host society, as in periods of economic recession or stagnation states typically close the borders and, at the same time, are more willing to act to improve the integration of resident migrants. On the other hand, even in a civic-assimilationist context such as France's, which tends to channel the claim-making of collective actors towards minority integration politics, during times of rising unemployment the extreme right should have a restrictive impact on immigration policy (but not on immigrant policy), as claims for such measures may take advantage of the general policy orientation in times of bad economic conditions.

The pressure coming from immigration flows and ethnic diversity is a further potential determinant of policy change in the field of immigration and ethnic relations (see e.g., Miller 1981; Rex and Tomlinson 1979; Richmond

1988), and hence another external resource that may increase the chance of success of social movements aiming to influence policy making in this field. This factor is partly linked to the previous one, as the impact of immigration flows generally depends on the economic health of a country, in the sense that the pressure coming from immigration tends to diminish when the labor market is unfavorable to recruiting new labor force. Therefore, the predictions we make about socio-demographic factors follow a reasoning similar to that concerning economic factors. On the one hand, high levels of immigration express a strong socio-demographic pressure that tends to lead to a stricter border control. At the same time, however, measures for the integration of resident migrants are more likely to be taken. We therefore expect that, when immigration flows are perceived as being too high, both migrant and solidarity movements will have an impact on immigrant policy (but not on immigration policy). Such impact, furthermore, should be favorable to the migrants' situation in the host society, as a strong socio-demographic pressure in terms of increasing immigration flows pushes state authorities to restrict the access to the country and makes measures for the integration of resident migrants more likely. On the other hand, in a similar situation, we expect the extreme right to have a restrictive impact on immigration policy (but not on immigrant policy), as policy makers often respond to extreme-right mobilization in the simplest possible way: by tightening immigration control.

DATA RETRIEVAL AND METHODS OF ANALYSIS

To assess empirically the impact of the mobilization of the three movements under study on migration policy we use a technique based on time-series analysis. This approach allows us to incorporate time into the explanation of the effects of protest activities on public policy. In spite of the obvious fact that political and decision-making processes are time-dependent, only rarely has previous work analyzed the effects of social movements and other collective actors with a method that takes time into account (but see Burstein and Freudenburg 1978; Costain and Majstorovic 1994; Giugni 2001; Giugni and Passy 1998). Yet an approach that allows the researcher to capture the dynamic nature of movement outcomes has clear advantages over a static approach. Specifically, the chronological ordering of observations in time-series analysis yields a stronger case for causal inference than cross-sectional approaches (Janoski and Isaac 1994), especially if a temporal lag is introduced in the models. This is all the more important when one is studying the outcomes of protest, as establishing the causal relationship that links social movements to their alleged outcomes is one of the major reasons that have hindered previous research in this field.

The unit of analysis consists in three-month periods that aggregate the observations on the variables of interest concerning the political claim-making (both by the three movements under study as well as other actors), the economic situation (unemployment rate) and the socio-demographic pressure (immigration flows). The data on claim-making come from the international MERCI research project.[4] Claims were retrieved by content analyzing every second issue of one national newspaper in each country for the period from 1990 to 1998.[5] From the original, event-based file, the data were then aggregated into three-month counts of claims and stored into a new file specifically organized for time-series analysis, that is, with chronologically ordered observations.

Appendix 8.1 gives the description of all the variables used in the analyses that follow. We use claim-making data to measure most of the variables concerning the intervention of collective actors in the public space on issues pertaining to immigration and ethnic relations: the mobilization of migrants (MINACT), that of the extreme right (ERACT), and that of the solidarity movement (SOLACT); pro-minority and anti-minority claims (PROMIN, ANTIMIN);[6] and pro-minority and anti-minority claims by parties (PROPART, ANTIPART), as a way to operationalize the political alliances of the three movements under study. In addition, our indicators of changes in migration policy are also based on the claim-making data, specifically on the subset of claims represented by political decisions: one measure of migration policy in general (MIGRPOL); two measures for the two more institutionalized issue fields, i.e. immigration control policy (IMMPOL) and minority integration policy (INTPOL);[7] and finally two measures for the position of policy, regardless of the issue field to which they refer, i.e. pro-minority and anti-minority political decisions (PROMP, ANTIMP).[8]

In addition to the indicators of claim-making, we have two variables that allows us to control for the effect of the economic situation and the socio-demographic pressure: the unemployment rate (UNEMP) and the immigration rate (IMMRATE).

The time-series analysis performed here aims to find significant relationships between various independent variables measuring the mobilization or claim-making of collective actors, the economic situation, and the socio-demographic pressure, on the one hand, and various indicators of migration policy, on the other. This analysis has three important features. First, it is longitudinal, that is, we look at the impact of changes over time in the variables of interest on policy changes. This allows us to take into account the inherently dynamic nature of the political process. Second, we look at lagged dependent variables. Including a temporal lag (in this case, a three-month time unit) is a way to strengthen causal inference. Third, in some of the analyses, we include a number of interactive terms. We do so with the aim of gauging the role of certain external resources (political, economic,

socio-demographic) that might facilitate the movements' task. In other words, we want to determine if the potential impact of the three movements under study is facilitated by the simultaneous presence of their action and by the external resources provided by the claim-making of political allies, the economic situation, and socio-demographic pressure. Appendix 8.2 gives the list of all the interactive terms used in the analyses. These interactive terms were created by multiplying, for each movement, the variables concerning their mobilization with the variables referring to the claim-making by parties (favorable to migrants in the case of migrants themselves and the solidarity movement, unfavorable to migrants in the case of the extreme-right, so as to capture the action of the political allies of the three movements), the unemployment rate, and the immigration rate. Thus we obtain three variables for migrants (MINPART, MINIMM, MINUNEM), three for the extreme right (ERPART, ERIMM, ERNUNEM), and three for the solidarity movement (SOLPART, SOLIMM, SOLUNEM).

THE POLICY IMPACT OF MIGRANT, EXTREME-RIGHT, AND SOLIDARITY MOVEMENTS

In this section, we try to answer three interrelated questions: (1) What is the impact of migrant, extreme-right, and solidarity movements on migration policy, controlling for political, economic, and socio-demographic contextual factors? (2) Which of the three movements was more successful in its attempt to influence political decisions on issues pertaining to immigration and ethnic relations? (3) Which factors better predict changes in migration policies in France and Switzerland? To answer this questions, we perform a number of regression analyses that test for the existence of a significant relationship between the indicators of claim-making, economic situation, and socio-demographic pressure, on the one hand, and the various measures of changes in migration policy, on the other.[9]

Table 8.2 shows the impact of migrant mobilization on migration policies in France and Switzerland, controlling for four other factors: pro-minority claims by parties (political allies), anti-minority claims by parties (political opponents), the unemployment rate (economic situation), and the immigration rate (socio-demographic pressure). The upper section of the table refers to France, the lower section to Switzerland. The results are clearly unfavorable to a potential impact of migrants on migration policy, as none of the coefficients for this collective actor are statistically significant. This holds for migration policy in general (MIGRPOL), for the two institutionalized issue fields—immigration control policy (IMMPOL) and minority integration policy (INTPOL)—and both for policy favorable (PROMP) or unfavorable (ANTIMP) to migrants. In contrast, we have some evidence of an effect of the

Table 8.2. Impact of Migrant Mobilization on Migration Policy in France and Switzerland

	MIGRPOL (t_1)	*IMMPOL* (t_1)	*INTPOL* (t_1)	*PROMP* (t_1)	*ANTIMP* (t_1)
France					
MINACT (t_0)	.14	.24	−.13	−.02	.31
PROPART (t_0)	−.03	−.14	−.03	.29	−.38*
ANTIPART (t_0)	.37*	.19	.43**	.32	.18
UNEMP (t_0)	.12	.50*	−.20	−.11	.32
IMMRATE (t_0)	.21	.48*	−.11	.04	.23
R^2	.21	.22	.18	.31	.24
Durbin-Watson	1.86	1.83	2.13	1.88	2.04
Switzerland					
MINACT (t_0)	.07	−.04	−.01	.10	−.01
PROPART (t_0)	−.08	−.07	.12	−.07	.25
ANTIPART (t_0)	−.28	−.08	−.36*	−.30	−.05
UNEMP (t_0)	.81***	.49*	−.00	.64**	.30
IMMRATE (t_0)	.68**	.40	−.06	.81***	.19
R^2	.33	.13	.11	.34	.13
Durbin-Watson	2.10	2.02	1.69	2.06	2.00

*p < .10; **p < .05; ***p < .01

NOTE: Standardized regression coefficients generated with a generalized least-squared method of estimation (Prais-Winsten) assuming a first-order autoregressive process. All variables are time series with a three-month period as the unit of time (n=35). All independent variables include a three-month lag. See Appendix 1 for variable labels and the number of cases in each original variable.

claim-making by parties. Both in France and Switzerland, this effect seems to be on decisions concerning minority integration rather than immigration control. Yet, as we can see in the second line of the table, only in France it goes in the same direction than the parties' demands, for pro-minority claims at time t_0 are related to a decline in anti-minority decisions at time t_1. Finally, both the unemployment rate and the immigration rate have a positive effect on migration policy, attesting that both the situation on the labor market and incoming flows of immigrants play an important role in the decision process in the field of immigration and ethnic relations.

Table 8.3 shows the impact of extreme-right mobilization on migration policy, again controlling for political, economic, and socio-demographic factors. Judging from our data, the effectiveness of the extreme right does not seem to be much stronger than that of migrants. However, here we have some evidence of an impact on political decisions, as the coefficient concerning changes in minority integration policy in Switzerland is statistically significant. Furthermore, even though none of the regression coefficients for the case of France are significant, we find a negative effect on pro-minority decisions if we include in the measure of the latter also repressive measures

Table 8.3. Impact of Extreme-right Mobilization on Migration Policy in France and Switzerland

	MIGRPOL (t_1)	*IMMPOL* (t_1)	*INTPOL* (t_1)	*PROMP* (t_1)	*ANTIMP* (t_1)
France					
ERACT (t_0)	−.25	−.22	.25	−.40	−.07
PROPART (t_0)	.15	−.01	−.22	.60**	−.36
ANTIPART (t_0)	.46**	.32	.33	.39**	.36*
UNEMP (t_0)	.06	.38	−.16	−.18	.22
IMMRATE (t_0)	.15	.41	−.07	−.07	.23
R^2	.21	.17	.17	.36	.17
Durbin-Watson	1.79	1.73	2.13	1.90	1.99
Switzerland					
ERACT (t_0)	−.04	.11	−.44**	.03	−.07
PROPART (t_0)	−.03	−.13	.30	−.04	.27
ANTIPART (t_0)	−.29	−.09	−.23	−.34*	−.04
UNEMP (t_0)	.79***	.50*	.06	.60**	.32
IMMRATE (t_0)	.65***	.40	.08	.74***	.21
R^2	.32	.15	.23	.33	.13
Durbin-Watson	2.08	2.04	1.81	2.04	1.99

*p < .10; **p < .05; ***p < .01

NOTE: Standardized regression coefficients generated with a generalized least-squared method of estimation (Prais-Winsten) assuming a first-order autoregressive process. All variables are time series with a three-month period as the unit of time (n=35). All independent variables include a three-month lag. See Appendix 1 for variable labels and the number of cases in each original variable.

against the extreme right (results not shown). Once again, the role of more institutionalized actors such as parties appears to be stronger than that of outsiders, especially in France and when they address anti-minority claims.[10] Finally, the impact of the economic situation and socio-demographic pressure is confirmed, although the significant effects of these variables disappear in the case of France (but the value of the coefficients concerning immigration control policy remains strong).

Table 8.4 shows the impact of the solidarity movement on migration policy, always controlling for the unemployment rate and the immigration rate. If migrants had no impact at all and the extreme right only a limited one, at least in the period under study, the solidarity movement apparently was somewhat more successful, particularly so in France. However, in the French case, the sign of all statistically significant coefficients is negative. This means that political decisions at time t_1 have decreased when the mobilization of the movement at time t_0 has increased (or vice versa). As far as the indicator of pro-minority decisions is concerned, this suggests that the movement was clearly unsuccessful, for a decline in decisions favorable to migrants has followed a growth of the mobilization or claim-making of the solidarity move-

Table 8.4. Impact of Solidarity Movement Mobilization on Migration Policy in France and Switzerland

	MIGRPOL (t_1)	*IMMPOL* (t_1)	*INTPOL* (t_1)	*PROMP* (t_1)	*ANTIMP* (t_1)
France					
SOLACT (t_0)	−.49**	−.36*	−.34	−.32*	−.31
PROPART (t_0)	.20	−.01	.18	.45**	−.25
ANTIPART (t_0)	.52***	.34*	.47**	.39**	.42**
UNEMP (t_0)	.19	.49*	−.06	.01	.43
IMMRATE (t_0)	.21	.48*	−.07	.09	.36
R^2	.35	.21	.26	.38	.20
Durbin-Watson	1.49	1.58	2.13	1.78	1.94
Switzerland					
SOLACT (t_0)	.21	.24	−.01	.43***	−.11
PROPART (t_0)	−.06	−.10	.12	−.04	.25
ANTIPART (t_0)	−.26	−.02	−.36*	−.24	−.07
UNEMP (t_0)	.67***	.42	.00	.38*	.36
IMMRATE (t_0)	.52**	.33	−.05	.53**	.24
R^2	.36	.19	.11	.51	.15
Durbin-Watson	2.00	2.02	1.70	2.03	2.04

*p < .10; **p < .05; ***p < .01

NOTE: Standardized regression coefficients generated with a generalized least-squared method of estimation (Prais-Winsten) assuming a first-order autoregressive process. All variables are time series with a three-month period as the unit of time (n=35). All independent variables include a three-month lag. See Appendix 1 for variable labels and the number of cases in each original variable.

ment (or vice versa). In contrast, the Swiss solidarity movement seems to have been able to produce a real substantial improvement in the rights and position of migrants (as measured through the number of pro-minority political decisions by state actors). Yet we cannot say which specific issue field (immigration control or minority integration) is affected by this improvement. The general impact of parties, especially in France, is one again confirmed, yet with the ambivalence mentioned earlier concerning the direction (sign) of the relationship for anti-minority claims by parties in France, while the real effect of pro-minority claims by parties remains. The same holds for the real effect of anti-minority claims by parties on minority integration policy in Switzerland. Similarly, the findings regarding the impact of the unemployment rate and the immigration rate are consistent with those observed above.

Tables 8.2, 8.3, and 8.4 focus on the mobilization of three specific collective actors (migrant, extreme-right, and solidarity movements), controlling for the effect of certain aspects of their political, economic, and social environment that are plausibly related to changes in migration policy. Generally speaking, these three movements express either a favorable (migrants, solidarity) or unfavorable (extreme right) position towards migrants. Yet other

Table 8.5. Impact of Pro-minority and Anti-minority Claims on Migration Policy in France and Switzerland

	MIGRPOL (t_1)	*IMMPOL* (t_1)	*INTPOL* (t_1)	*PROMP* (t_1)	*ANTIMP* (t_1)
France					
PROMIN (t_0)	−.25	−.21	−.28	.18	−.54**
ANTIMIN (t_0)	.59***	.26	.72***	.29	.65***
UNEMP (t_0)	.25	.48*	.04	−.04	.57**
IMMRATE (t_0)	.29	.48*	−.00	.14	.40
R^2	.27	.13	.38	.24	.29
Durbin-Watson	1.67	1.66	2.09	1.94	1.91
Switzerland					
PROMIN (t_0)	−.06	−.10	.06	.03	.15
ANTIMIN (t_0)	−.21	.01	−.31	−.36*	.08
UNEMP (t_0)	.73***	.47*	-.03	.55**	.30
IMMRATE (t_0)	.68***	.40	.02	.88***	.13
R^2	.27	.12	.09	.32	.11
Durbin-Watson	2.06	2.02	1.71	1.98	2.01

*p < .10; **p < .05; ***p < .01

NOTE: Standardized regression coefficients generated with a generalized least-squared method of estimation (Prais-Winsten) assuming a first-order autoregressive process. All variables are time series with a three-month period as the unit of time (n=35). All independent variables include a three-month lag. See Appendix 1 for variable labels and the number of cases in each original variable.

collective actors, in addition to these three movements and in addition to political parties, may have—and indeed do have—either a pro-minority or an anti-minority stance. One may therefore want to ascertain the policy impact of these two political "camps" in their entirety. The results are shown in table 8.5. Taken as a whole (i.e., including parties as well as any other collective actor) and net of the effect of economic and socio-demographic constraints, political claim-making in the field of immigration and ethnic relations appears to have been successful. This holds both for France and Switzerland, attesting to a certain degree of responsiveness of these two democracies. The only difference, yet a significant one, is that, while in France pro-minority claims have produced a decrease in political decisions that basically deteriorates the rights and position of migrants, in Switzerland anti-minority claims have caused a decrease in decisions that improve their situation. Thus, in a way, a similar path has led to two substantially opposed outcomes: one favorable and the other unfavorable to migrants and minorities.

In sum, our analysis so far suggests a number of tentative conclusions about the impact of migrant, extreme-right, and solidarity movements on migration policy in France and Switzerland. First, migrants do not seem to have had any substantial impact on political decisions concerning immigration and ethnic relations. Second, the extreme right was somewhat more suc-

cessful in Switzerland, but not in France. However, we do not have evidence allowing us to ascertain the direction of its impact. We know that its mobilization tends to produce a decrease in the number of political decisions concerning minority integration policy. This may indicate a deterioration of the situation of migrants, as usually minority integration measures aim at creating better living conditions for resident migrants, but we cannot draw a firm conclusion in this respect. Third, the solidarity movement displays ambivalent results. On the one hand, immigration control policy is affected by its mobilization, yet in a direction apparently opposed to the movement's goals. On the other hand, the movement seems to have been able to obtain a real positive impact, but we do not know which specific issue field is affected by its mobilization. Fourth, our analysis underscores above all the important role played by institutional actors such as political parties to produce changes in migration policy. Fifth, the claim-making by all types of actors in the field of immigration and ethnic relations seems to influence the political decision making in this field. However, while in France both pro-minority and anti-minority claims have had an impact (especially on minority integration policy), in Switzerland only anti-minority claims have mattered. Sixth, we have shown the strong impact of economic and socio-demographic constraints (as measured through the unemployment rate and the immigration rate) on migration policy. Furthermore, this impact concerns above all immigration control policy, that is, the regulation of immigration flows.

THE ROLE OF POLITICAL, ECONOMIC, AND SOCIO-DEMOGRAPHIC RESOURCES

Thus far, the claim-making by political parties, the economic situation (unemployment rate), and the socio-demographic pressure (immigration rate) have been treated as other potential factors, in addition to the mobilization of the three movements under study, that may affect migration policy or, to use the social science jargon, as control variables. In this section, we consider them as potential resources for migrant, extreme-right, and solidarity movements, and would like to test the hypothesis that the chances of success of these movements are greater when they can exploit such resources. In other words, here we test the hypothesis that their impact on migration policy is facilitated by the presence of these resources. Accordingly, the questions we try to answer are the following: (1) Is the impact of migrant, extreme-right, and solidarity movements on migration policy facilitated by the resources provided by the presence of parties as political allies, by the economic situation as measured through the unemployment rate, and by the socio-demographic pressure as measured through the immigration rate? (2) Which of these three types of external resources are more likely to improve

the chances of success of the three movements under study? (3) Which of the three movements was more ready to exploit these resources to influence political decisions in the field of immigration and ethnic relations?

Table 8.6 allows us to give an answer to these questions, though a very tentative one. This table shows the results of regression analyses with the interactive terms combining the mobilization of the three movements with the indicators of, respectively, the political, economic, and socio-demographic resources. The results for France and Switzerland are very different. The most important finding concerning France is that migrants seem to take great advantage of all three types of resources, as all three coefficients on pro-minority political decisions are positively significant. The other two movements, in contrast, have not benefited from the resources available in their environment. The significant coefficients for the extreme right could suggest that there is an interactive effect with the claim-making by parties and the economic situation, but the positive sign of the relationships prevents us from speaking of a real effect, for an increase in the mobilization of the extreme right produces an increase in pro-minority decisions, which in principle goes against the movement's goals. Finally, no significant coefficient is observed for the interactive terms referring to the solidarity movement.

The picture is in a way reversed in Switzerland. Here migrants do not seem to have taken any advantage of the resources available in their political, economic, and social environment. The most straightforward findings, however, are those referring to the extreme right. All three regression coefficients for this collective actor are statistically significant on minority integration policy. Furthermore, the sign of the coefficient is negative. If, as we mentioned earlier, this does not allow us to conclude that the impact of the extreme right goes in the direction of its goals, a decline in political decisions concerning the integration of resident migrants could well result in a deterioration of their rights and position. Finally, we also observe a positive effect of the solidarity movement in combination with changes in the unemployment rate and the immigration rate.

In sum, the short analysis of the role of external resources in facilitating the policy impact of the three movements under study suggests that the presence of institutional allies which share the goals of the movements, the situation on the labor marker, and the pressure coming from immigration flows are all important resources which the movements can exploit to become more successful in their attempt to influence migration policy. In other words, the impact of migrant, extreme-right, and solidarity movements seems indeed to be facilitated by political, economic, and socio-demographic resources. Furthermore, all three types of resources have contributed, in combination with mobilization, to policy change in the migration political field. Yet the answer to the question which of the three movements was more ready to exploit these resources depends on the country: migrants and the extreme right in France, the extreme right and the solidarity movement in Switzerland.

Table 8.6. Interactive Effects of Migrant, Extreme-right, and Solidarity Movement Mobilization on Migration Policy in France and Switzerland

	MIGRPOL (t_1)	*IMMPOL* (t_1)	*INTPOL* (t_1)	*PROMP* (t_1)	*ANTIMP* (t_1)
France					
MINPART (t_0)	.29 (1.84)*	.09 (1.71)	.19 (2.17)	.52 (1.95)***	−.09 (1.97)
MINUNEM (t_0)	.25 (1.96)	.19 (1.80)	.05 (2.13)	.31 (1.96)*	.28 (1.97)
MINIMM (t_0)	.38 (1.99)**	.34 (1.86)*	.07 (2.13)	.48 (1.98)***	.25 (1.96)
ERPART (t_0)	.35 (1.75)**	.09 (1.69)	.43 (2.15)**	.50 (1.89)***	.03 (1.96)
ERUNEM (t_0)	.10 (1.78)	−.08 (1.65)	.22 (2.16)	.24 (1.97)	−.13 (1.98)
ERIMM (t_0)	.16 (1.77)	.01 (1.67)	.26 (2.13)	.35 (1.94)**	−.14 (1.98)
SOLPART (t_0)	.04 (1.80)	−.09 (1.63)	−.09 (2.11)	.27 (1.97)	−.24 (1.98)
SOLUNEM (t_0)	−.15 (1.74)	−.21 (1.52)	−.15 (2.10)	.06 (1.98)	−.16 (1.95)
SOLIMM (t_0)	−.04 (1.78)	−.03 (1.64)	−.10 (2.12)	.19 (1.97)	−.12 (1.96)
Switzerland					
MINPART (t_0)	−.00 (1.93)	−.08 (1.99)	.17 (1.65)	−.08 (1.84)	.16 (1.95)
MINUNEM (t_0)	.05 (1.92)	−.04 (1.99)	.15 (1.68)	−.10 (1.84)	.14 (1.94)
MINIMM (t_0)	−.18 (1.94)	−.20 (1.99)	.08 (1.68)	−.07 (1.83)	−.10 (1.94)
ERPART (t_0)	−.23 (1.93)	−.09 (1.98)	−.31 (1.75)*	−.21 (1.83)	.01 (1.93)
ERUNEM (t_0)	−.03 (1.92)	.06 (2.00)	−.30 (1.76)*	−.04 (1.83)	.16 (1.97)
ERIMM (t_0)	.07 (1.94)	.16 (2.03)	−.37 (1.80)**	.19 (1.88)	.04 (1.94)
SOLPART (t_0)	.07 (1.93)	.05 (1.99)	.08 (1.66)	.01 (1.83)	.22 (1.94)
SOLUNEM (t_0)	.42 (1.87)**	.27 (2.00)	.06 (1.67)	.38 (1.74)**	.08 (1.93)
SOLIMM (t_0)	.37 (1.86)**	.34 (1.99)**	−.10 (1.70)	.66 (1.87)***	−.05 (1.94)

*p < .10; **p < .05; ***p < .01

NOTE: Standardized regression coefficients (bivariate) generated with a generalized least-squared method of estimation (Prais-Winsten) assuming a first-order autoregressive process. Durbin-Watson test for serial correlation in brackets. All variables are time series with a three-month period as the unit of time (n=35). All independent variables include a three-month lag. See Appendix 1 for variable labels and the number of cases in each original variable. See Appendix 2 for component variables of the interactive terms.

However, some caution must be taken in interpreting these findings. First of all, unlike the previous ones, they are based on bivariate regressions. This calls for wariness in the interpretation of results, as we do not control for the effect of other factors, which was simply impossible because the political, economic, and socio-demographic variables are included in the interactive terms. We therefore cannot exclude that at least some of the relationships may be spurious. Secondly, additional bivariate analyses (not shown) using the same variables, but with the indicators of the mobilization by the three movements instead of the interactive terms, suggest that in most cases the latter have only a reinforcing effect. This holds particularly in the Swiss case.

CONCLUSION

The analysis presented in this chapter is very much exploratory. It was aimed at sensitizing to a given approach to the study of the policy impact of social movements rather than testing a theory of the effect of migrant, extreme-right, and solidarity movements on migration policy. In order to obtain more robust and consistent findings, we will certainly need to complement it with other methods as well as new data. In spite of this cautionary remark, our analysis suggests a number of interesting insights about the impact of social movements within the political field of immigration and ethnic relations.

Previous work on the outcomes and consequences of social movements have pointed to the powerlessness of these collective actors and the difficulty for them to obtain substantive policy gains in the absence of external opportunities and resources. Similarly, specific studies of the mobilization in the migration political field have shown the poor policy impact of protest activities, especially those carried by migrants themselves, which often have difficulties to organize and mobilize (e.g., Blatt 1995; Ireland 1994; Miller 1981). Our time-series analysis confirms this weakness. Migrants, in particular, seem to reflect quite well the label of "poor people's movements" (Piven and Cloward 1979), which have at their disposal little resources to intervene in the political process and to influence policy making. Neither in France nor in Switzerland have migrants been able to produce substantial policy changes. Extreme-right and solidarity movements, the two movements formed by "full citizens," score a little better, but only in Switzerland and only to a limited extent.

If, on the one hand, our study confirms the lack of political influence of social movements, especially those formed by migrants, who are to a large extent excluded from the political game, it shows on the other hand that political, economic, and socio-demographic factors intervene in important ways in the process leading to changes in migration policy. Not only these factors impinge on the political decision-making on their own, but they provide to some extent external resources that the movements can exploit to

reach their policy goals. Although, as we said, the results in this respect should be taken with some caution, sometimes the claim-making by parties, the economic situation, and the pressure coming from immigration flows can improve the chances of success of the three movements we have examined.

The impact of the unemployment rate and the immigration rate shows that political elites take the situation on the labor market and growing immigration into account. Furthermore, these two factors have their effect above all on the regulation of immigration flows, which is the policy aspect that must be modified in order to respond to such economic and socio-demographic "threats." The most consistent finding of our study, however, lies perhaps in the crucial role played by political parties. Quite unsurprisingly given their political status and legitimacy, these institutional actors are often able to influence policy making in the field of immigration and ethnic relations, and sometimes they can also contribute to the impact of challenging groups.

Finally, contrary to our predictions, we have not found consistent evidence that the prevailing models of citizenship affect the chances of success of movements mobilizing in the migration political field. The influence of citizenship and integration regimes should be felt on three levels. First, the French more inclusive civic-based model should favor the impact of migrants, as compared to the more exclusive ethnic-based model of Switzerland. This has not occurred. However, as can be seen in the analyses with the interactive terms, migrants and minorities in France apparently had a positive impact when political, economic, or socio-demographic resources were available, whereas in Switzerland they have remained unsuccessful even in the presence of such external resources. The more favorable environment in terms of the collective definition of citizenship in France might therefore play an indirect role, at least in regard to the impact of migrants on migration policy. Second, we should observe a greater impact of claim-making in general on minority integration policy in France and on immigration control policy in Switzerland, as claims pertaining to these two issues fields have both greater political legitimacy and public resonance in the respective countries. We did not find evidence of this. It rather appears that both in France and Switzerland claim-making is more likely to influence minority integration policy (whereas economic and socio-demographic factors mostly affect immigration control policy). Third, for the same reason, we expected claim-making in France, to a larger extent than in Switzerland, to influence political decisions that improve the rights and position of migrants. Here there is some evidence pointing to the role of models of citizenship, as in France both pro-minority and anti-minority claims have had an impact on migration policy, while in Switzerland only claims that are unfavorable to migrants seem to really matter. This might depend on the different models of citizenship in these two countries, whereby the civic-based model of France gives greater political legitimacy and public resonance to claims that stress the inclusion of mi-

grants in the national community, while the ethnic-based model of Switzerland makes both more legitimate and resonant claims that underscore the exclusion of migrants from the national community.

Appendix 8.1. Description of Variables Used in the Analyses

Variable Name	*Label*	*N*	
		France	*Switzerland*
MINACT	Claims by migrants on migration issues	417	101
ERACT	Claims by the extreme right on migration issues	298	109
SOLACT	Claims by the solidarity movement on migration issues	428	151
PROMIN	Pro-minority claims by non-state actors	1601	620
ANTIMIN	Anti-minority claims by non-state actors	390	304
PROPART	Pro-minority claims by parties	546	193
ANTIPART	Anti-minority claims by parties	224	167
MIGRPOL	Political decisions on migration issues	373	370
IMMPOL	Political decisions on immigration and asylum issues	200	271
INTPOL	Political decisions on integration issues	106	79
PROMP	Pro-minority political decisions	182	184
ANTIMP	Anti-minority political decisions	101	136
UNEMP	Unemployment rate	—	—
IMMRATE	Immigration rate	—	—

NOTE: Claim variables come from recodings in the original data. The other variables come from the European System of Social Indicators (Social Indicators Department, ZUMA, Mannheim), except for the unemployment rate in Switzerland for 1990 (Statistical Yearbook of Switzerland). The data on immigration flows and the economic situation are available only on an annual basis. The actual values correspond to the first quarter of each year. The values of the other three quarters are estimates by linear interpolation. The number of cases refers to the number of claims in the original variables, which then have been aggregated in the time series.

Appendix 8.2. List of Interactive Terms Used in the Analyses

Interactive Term	*Component Variables*
MINPART	MINACT * PROPART
MINUNEM	MINACT * UNEMP
MINIMM	MINACT * IMMRATE
ERPART	ERACT * ANTIPART
ERUNEM	ERACT * UNEMP
ERIMM	ERACT * IMMRATE
SOLPART	SOLACT * PROPART
SOLUNEM	SOLACT * UNEMP
SOLIMM	SOLACT * IMMRATE

NOTE: All interactive terms have been created multiplying the two component variables.

NOTES

1. We are alluding to the MERCI project (see below in the data and methods section for more details).

2. It should be noted that the term "pluralist" here has absolutely no normative meaning and the resulting system can lead to social and political segregation, as the example of the South African Apartheid regime attests.

3. See below for information on the data sources and methods of analysis. Immigrant politics comprises both minority integration politics and claims regarding racism and antiracism.

4. The MERCI ("Mobilization on Ethnic Relations, Citizenship, and Immigration") project includes the following country studies, in addition to France and Switzerland: Germany (Ruud Koopmans), Great Britain (Paul Statham), and the Netherlands (Thom Duyvené de Wit).

5. *Le Monde* in France and the *Neue Zürcher Zeitung* in Switzerland.

6. Since we want to assess the impact of claim-making on political decisions, pro-minority and anti-minority claims exclude claims by state actors.

7. We exclude racism/antiracism from this analyses, as this is less institutionalized and hence less policy-oriented an issue field than both immigration control policy and minority integration policy.

8. It should be noted that pro-minority and anti-minority claims or decisions here are to be intended in their broader meaning, i.e. as claims or decisions that (if realized, in the case of claims) either improve or deteriorate the rights and position of migrants in the host society, not necessarily as claims or decisions that are overtly in favor or against them.

9. The tables below show standardized regression coefficients generated with a generalized least-squared method of estimation (Prais-Winsten) assuming a first-order autoregressive process among the error terms, that is, a model of a time series in which the current value of the series is a linear combination of previous values of the series, plus a random error. The Durbin-Watson statistic is used to test for the presence of first-order autocorrelation (both positive and negative) in the residuals (or error terms) of a regression equation. It ranges between 0 and 4. In the case of a series with 35 observations (such as those we use here) and 4 independent variables in the equation (tables 2, 3, and 4), the null hypothesis that there is no significant correlation in the residuals can be accepted (at the level of significance of 5 percent) if the test statistics ranges between 1.73 and 2.27 (4 − 1.73). With five independent variables (table 5), the null hypothesis can be accepted if the test statistics ranges between 1.80 and 2.20 (4 − 1.80). When the test statistics ranges between 1.22 and 1.73 or between 2.27 and 2.78 (four independent variables), and when it ranges between 1.16 and 1.80 or between 2.20 and 2.84 (five independent variables), the null hypothesis can neither be accepted nor rejected (situation of uncertainty). When the test statistics is lower than 1.22 (four independent variables) or 1.16 (five independent variables), the null hypothesis must be rejected and it is likely that there is positive autocorrelation. Finally, when the test statistics is higher than 2.78 (four independent variables) or 2.84 (five independent variables), the null hypothesis must be rejected and it is likely that there is negative autocorrelation.

10. Here, however, we must keep in mind that extreme-right parties are included in the extreme right, not among parties.