

Introduction: Four Dialogues on Migration Policy

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Issues relating to immigration and ethnic relations are central to public debates and political decision-making in the contemporary western societies. As a result, the migration research has witnessed a great expansion in recent years. The amount of scholarly work and international conferences is increasing at a very high pace. Much of this work focuses on explanations of policy-making in this field, that is, migration policy. Broadly speaking, migration policy covers the following three aspects: (1) the regulation of traditional immigration flows (i.e., immigration control); (2) the management of ethnic relations and the integration of minorities living in the host society (i.e., minority integration); and (3) antiracism and anti-discrimination policies (including state intervention against the extreme right).

What accounts for variations in migration policy across nations and over time? How has policy evolved since World War Two? Is there a general trend towards more restrictive and exclusionary policies or rather a trend towards more liberal and inclusive policies? Do we observe policy convergence and a Europeanization of this field or do national states keep their strong imprint on these matters? These are some of the crucial questions that scholars have tried and still try to answer. They do so from a variety of approaches and theoretical perspectives: class and economic theories, political economy and liberal theories, theories stressing the role of ethnicity and race relations, institutional channeling and political opportunity theories, neo-institutional theories, post-national theories, and so forth. This variety of perspectives is certainly beneficial to the study of migration, but it sometimes leads to different or even opposing results.

In addition to such a variety of perspectives, underlying the research efforts of students of immigration and ethnic relations politics are a number of theoretical concerns. Let us mention three that seem to us as crucial ones on which scholars often cannot find a consensus. The first one is related to the *role of the national state in a globalizing world*. After the path-breaking contribution of Rogers Brubaker (1992), who has stressed the crucial impact of national citizenship traditions on migration politics, many authors have produced informed studies supporting this argument (Birnbaum 1998; Favell 1998; Joppke 1999; Koopmans and Statham 1999a; Safran 1997; Schnapper 1994). At the same time, other analysts have put forward an opposed argument, stressing that in the postwar era immigration has considerably changed the nature of modern states and, specifically, undermined national sovereignty (Jacobson 1996; Sassen 1998; Soysal 1994). In this view, the main driving forces behind policy changes are not to be seen at the national level, but rather at the supranational level. These (apparently) opposing perspectives on the role of the national state lead to different views on the question of policy convergence or divergence in the migration field (Mahnig and Wimmer 2000).

A second theoretical concern regards the *determinants of policy change*. Some analysts have stressed the impact of economic factors for explaining changes in migration policy. For example, during periods of economic growth, states can be open to the inflow of immigrants, whereas in phases of recession they need to regulate transnational immigration flows and at the same time enact policies aimed at the integration of migrants (Straubhaar and Weber 1994). Other analysts, in contrast, point to the role of political factors in defining and bringing about changes in migration policy (Freeman 1995). Still others argue that the nature and form of policy making largely depend on the national or ethnic origin of migrants (Rex 1996). For example, post-colonial states have enacted different policies than new immigration countries (such as Southern European countries). Finally, several authors stress the impact of (national) institutions on the political responses to immigration flows and settlements (Ireland 1994).

A third theoretical concern bears on the *role of collective interests* for migration policy. Several analysts point out that political parties and their ideological orientation do not impinge upon policy definition. This is the thesis of the "hidden consensus" between leftist and rightist parties that would strongly influence immigration politics (Hollifield 1994; Weil 1995). However, while established parties do not seem to affect significantly migration policy, less institutionalized extreme right actors have been shown to have a more important impact (Schain 1987). More recently, some scholars have stressed the growing role of the judiciary (courts) for the regulation of immigrant flows and especially for the implementation of anti-discrimination laws (Joppke 1998; Guiraudon 2001).

Of course, this way of presenting the literature is exceedingly simplistic. Often existing theories combine more than a single explanatory factor. For example, Hollifield's (1992a) argument about the impact of "embedded liberalism" combines political and economic factors. Similarly, it is difficult to find a purely "globalist" view of migration or a scholar who deny the impact of global changes on policy-making. However, for analytical purposes it is helpful to frame these issues in terms of opposing perspectives, each one stressing a major explanatory factor or a type of actors having the greatest impact on policy. Therefore, this book addresses the general theme of why and how migration policy is brought about through a series of informed debates on the different perspectives that scholars have developed to understand the development of migration policies adopted in receiving countries (specifically, in Europe and North America).

Following this simple but unconventional format, the contributions to the volume divide into four parts, each dealing with one of four theoretical debates or "dialogues": (1) the *scope* of migration policy; (2) the relationship between migration, politics and *economy*; (3) the relationship between migration, politics and *culture*; (4) and the *impact* of certain collective actors on migration policy. Each "dialogue" is made of two main chapters and a commentary-chapter. In each "dialogue," two authors working in different theoretical traditions and with divergent views on the subject matter confront each other on a specific topic of relevance to the general theme of the book. Then a third author gives a commentary based on her/his reading of these authors' views.

While some of the approaches and theoretical perspectives mentioned above can be seen as complementary, others are clearly opposed. As we said, however, we think that such opposition of views is fruitful rather than detrimental to the study of immigration and ethnic relations, for it helps us to highlight both the strengths and weaknesses of each theory. Next we briefly address each of these four issues as a way to introduce the eight chapters and four commentaries that follow. In the final section of this introduction, we shall outline the contours of a research agenda for the future.

THE SCOPE OF MIGRATION POLICY: GLOBAL OR NATIONAL?

The first debate concerns the scope of migration policy and is addressed in Part I of the book by the chapter of David Jacobson and Galya Benarieh Ruffer, the chapter of Adrian Favell, and the commentary on both chapters provided by Saskia Sassen.

Although migration was by no means a new phenomenon, the decades following World War Two have been characterized by important population movements. In this regard, however, we must distinguish between two

periods: before and after the economic crisis of the mid-1970s. For the former period, Castles and Miller (1998: 67–68) mention three main types of migrations that led to the formation of ethnic minorities in advanced industrial countries (i.e., the western world):¹

- “migration of workers from the European periphery to Western Europe, often through ‘guestworker systems’
- migration of ‘colonial workers’ to the former colonial powers
- permanent migration to North America and Australia, at first from Europe and later from Asia and Latin America”

As far as Western European countries are concerned (especially those that do not have a colonial past), labor force from Southern Europe represents the main stream of migration during this period.

These migratory movements shared a number of typical features (Castles and Miller 1998). The most important is perhaps that they were mostly motivated by economic reasons. This holds both from the point of view of the migrants who moved from the European periphery to Western Europe to escape economic hardship (“push” factors) and from the point of view of the receiving countries who needed cheap labor for their growing economy (“pull” factors). A second, less important feature, but which is more characteristic of the post-1973 period, is the growing diversity of areas of origin as well as the increasing cultural difference between migrants and the populations in receiving countries.

The oil crisis of the mid-seventies and the economic restructuring of the world economy produced many changes to this traditional migratory pattern. Castles and Miller (1998: 79) mention the following main trends:

- labor migration to Western Europe has declined
- family reunion has become a major source of immigration and new ethnic minorities have formed
- certain Southern European countries have shifted from the status of emigration countries to that of countries of immigration
- the economically motivated migration to North America and Oceania have continued, but the areas of origin and the forms of migration have shifted
- new migratory movements have emerged relating to economic and social change in newly industrializing countries
- mass movements of refugees and asylum-seekers have developed
- international mobility of highly-qualified personnel has increased

Some of these changes can be seen as a result of what we may loosely call “globalization.” Indeed, globalization (i.e., broadly defined, the increasing

interconnectedness of economic, social, and cultural relations in time and space across the world) challenges the traditional patterns in a least two ways. On the one hand, immigration flows are increasing in intensity, scope, and diversity. On the other hand, the normative bases for policy making in various political domains—including migration—are increasingly found at a level other than the national one, most notably at the supranational level. With regard to the latter aspect, two positions can be discerned in the literature which are quite opposed, although this opposition is slowly giving place to more balanced statements. As a shortcut, we may call them, respectively, the post-national thesis and the nation-centered perspective. Let us examine each of these two aspects in some more detail.

Boldly stated, the *post-national thesis* maintains that the post-World War period has witnessed a broadening of the scope of migration issues and policies beyond the national level as well as the emergence of a post-national citizenship based on the transnationalization of migrant communities and on the growing importance of supranational organizations and conventions. Among the most well-known proponents of the thesis are David Jacobson (1996), Yasemin Soysal (1994), and Saskia Sassen (1996). Soysal, in particular, has perhaps made one of the boldest statements of this position and has largely contributed to popularize it in the scientific community. She argues that the basis of legitimacy of human rights—including those of migrants—is increasingly found at the transnational rather than national level. More specifically, she maintains that the traditional concept of national citizenship is being supplanted by the emergence of what she calls a post-national citizenship, which is no longer anchored in the national state. As she remarks, in the postwar period the discourse on human rights has taken on a universalistic dimension and crystallizes around the idea of personhood: “[i]n a world within which rights, and identities as rights, derive their legitimacy from discourses of universalistic personhood, the limits of nation-ness, or of national citizenship, for that matter, become inventively irrelevant” (Soysal 1998: 210–211). Discourse on human rights as well as its institutionalization into social norms and practices form the normative basis for an expansion of citizenship. Therefore, if the organization of the incorporation of immigrants in the host society still depends on the national state, its legitimacy is increasingly located in international institutions and conventions on human rights (Soysal 1994). With respect to our subject matter, this shift in the basis of legitimacy of human rights would result in a loss of power on the national state in policy-making on migration issues and a “de facto transnationalizing of immigration policy” (Sassen 1998).

David Jacobson (1996: 8–9) points to the same direction when he states that “[t]ransnational migration is steadily eroding the traditional basis of national state membership, namely citizenship. As rights have come to be predicated on residency, not citizen status, the distinction between ‘citizen’ and

'alien' has eroded" (Jacobson 1996: 8–9). Not less than Soysal, Jacobson stresses a post-national citizenship based on the transnationalization of migrant communities and on the growing importance of supranational organizations and conventions. In this regard, he underscores the role of the European Convention of Human Rights as an international legal basis to which individuals and non-governmental organizations can refer to claim their rights. In his view, these "rights across borders" bring a fundamental challenge to the traditional basis of national membership, that is, citizenship.

Against this view, a number of authors have put forward a *nation-centered perspective*, maintaining that it is much too early to speak of a loss of significance of the national state in this policy area, as dynamics inherent to national politics still affect the saliency and extent of international and transnational developments (Dummet and Nicol 1990; Heisler 1992; Hollifield 1992a, 1992b; Joppke 1998a). Human rights are a constitutive principle of liberal democracies that have a legal-domestic source (Joppke 1997, 2001), and changes in the political culture of liberal democracies have brought about a rights-based politics that, in turn, has impinged upon international norms, rather than the reverse (Hollifield 1992a). In a similar vein, other authors have stressed that citizenship provides the best framework for analyzing relationships between immigrants and host societies (Schmitter Heisler 1992), and that states tend to regulate international migration following their national interests (Weiner 1985).

An important piece of work in this respect is Rogers Brubaker's *Citizenship and Nationhood in France and Germany* (1992) in which the author points to the cultural foundations of national states and how present-day formal definitions of citizenship reflect deeply rooted understandings of nationhood. The author distinguishes Germany's *jus sanguinis* legal tradition based on a conception of the national community in ethnocultural terms and France's *jus solis* rule, which stems from a republican, contractualistic, and political definition of the state, and explains this difference with the divergent history of state formation in the two countries (see Weil 2002 for a criticism). Brubaker points to the cultural foundations of national states and how present-day formal definitions of citizenship reflect deeply rooted understandings of nationhood. He has made a strong statement in favor of this perspective in his book, which is worth reporting here (Brubaker 1992: 3): "[D]efinitions of citizenship continue to reflect deeply rooted understandings of nationhood. The state-centered, assimilationist understanding of nationhood in France is embodied and expressed in a expansive definition of citizenship, one that automatically transforms second-generation immigrants into citizens, assimilating them—legally—to other French men and women. The ethnic-cultural, differentialist understanding of nationhood in Germany is embodied and expressed in a definition of citizenship that is remarkably open to ethnic German immigrants from Eastern Europe and the Soviet

Union, but remarkably closed to non-German immigrants.”² Following the way paved by Brubaker, a number of comparative studies have shown that the modes of incorporation of immigrants are largely dependent on national configurations of citizenship (Castles 1995; Favell 1998; Giugni and Passy 2004; Koopmans and Kriesi 1997; Koopmans and Statham 1999a, 2000a; Koopmans et al. 2005; Joppke 1999; Safran 1997; Smith and Blanc 1996; Soysal 1994).

Thus, this debate focuses on the significance of the concept of national citizenship following the emergence of a post-national citizenship. It also deals with the degree of autonomy and determination that the national state, as well as nation-based actors and processes, have on the political process and policy-making in the field of immigration and ethnic relations. With regard to this second aspect, the state-centered model can be opposed to the so-called multilevel governance model. According to proponents of the multilevel governance model, the political impact of national states is eroding, as they are increasingly forced to share their decision-making power to supranational institutions as well as to other states and subnational organs and actors.

This distinction applies to the debate on EU migration policy, which opposes two positions that reflect the controversy outlined above: a state-centric approach that stresses sovereignty and national interests, according to which the lack of a unified European immigration policy stems largely from the reluctance of national states to give up their sovereignty (together with a stress in national differences in migration policies and inter-governmentalism in European coordination), and a society-centric approach that points to the increasing interdependence of national situations, globalization, and the impact of transnational institutions (Ugur 1995).

From the point of view of immigration control, the latter approach underscores policy harmonization through the creation of power centers and institutions located above the national state. For example, Soysal (1993) argues that, despite the lack of formal EU authoritative rules and structures, there is much standardization at the European and national levels in terms of both policy-making and policy outcomes. Such standardization, as well as the expansion of the EU agenda to include various new issue areas which contributes to the creation of a common discourse and understanding, would point to the Europeanization of immigration policy, not simply the aggregation of national agendas. This view has been challenged by a number of authors who are much more skeptical about the process of Europeanization in the migration political field (Favell 2000; Favell and Geddes 2000; Giugni and Passy 2002).

In sum, this first dialogue engage those who believe that, at least in the field of immigration and ethnic relations, the national state is becoming overwhelmed by emerging actors, structures, processes, and normative standards brought about by globalization and the acceleration of European integration

to those who think that the state remains the main frame of reference in this field. Specifically, while the former stress the emergence of a post-national citizenship, the latter underscore the continuing relevance of the traditional bases of (national) citizenship. Now, many of the statements for the continuing relevance of the state's autonomy and prerogatives in this field have been made in the 1990s or even in the 1980s. Yet globalization and especially European integration have accelerated since, and therefore we need to reassess this question in the light of the new developments.

DETERMINANTS OF MIGRATION POLICY: ECONOMY OR POLITICS?

Another matter of discussion among specialists of migration studies is whether and to what extent policy-making in this field is driven by economic motives than by political forces. In terms of the traditional distinction between immigration policy and immigrant policy (Hammar 1985), this debate deals above all with the former, that is, with immigration control and the regulation of inflows of immigrants, in particular of immigrant workers. This debate is addressed in Part II of the book by the chapter of Etienne Piguet, the chapter of James Hollifield, Valerie F. Hunt, and Daniel J. Tichenor, and the commentary on both chapters provided by Gary Freeman.

As we mentioned earlier, one common feature of the population movements of the post-World War Two period is the predominance of *economic reasons* for migrating. The bulk of the first waves of immigration, both in the traditional countries of immigration (basically, Australia, Canada, and the United States) and in western European countries (most notably, Belgium, France, Germany, Great Britain, the Netherlands, Sweden, and Switzerland) was made of people looking for a job or, in any event, a better situation than the one they had in their homeland. In the European context, this kind of immigration has been subsumed under the guest-worker model, as migrants were considered as temporary "guests" in search for work, not as permanent settlers.

In the scholarly literature, this view has translated in an approach and explanatory framework derived from economics and stressing the political economy of immigration. According to this approach, which has become dominant in migration theories, migration stems from a combination of "push" factors that incite people from poor countries to look for a job in richer countries and "pull" factors that makes host countries willing to use foreign workers to fill the needs of their economies. In other words, immigration is understood mainly in terms of supply and demand of labor. Among the push factors in homelands, one can mention demographic growth, weak standards of life, a lack of economic opportunities, but also

political repression). Pull factors in host countries include demand of labor, land availability, economic opportunities, but also political freedom). Thus, labor has become the principal concern of immigration policy in industrial democracies during the postwar period (Hollifield 1992a).

Explanations of migration policy—in particular, immigration control policies—have reflected this push/pull perspective. The dominant framework for analysis has followed such an economic perspective (see Castles and Miller 1998 for a review). Explanations inspired by neoclassical economics have stressed the importance of economic equilibrium, self-regulation through the (labor) market, and the law of supply and demand for understanding changes in migration policy.

Push/pull theories have been criticized for being individualistic and largely ahistorical, for relying on a doubtful assumption of the maximization of utility by both migrants and policy-makers, by being too simplistic and incapable to explain and predict migration flows. Furthermore, these theories often conceive the state as a distortion of the correct functioning of the market, while it can easily be shown that the state plays indeed a big role in formulating and implementing policies, both in the field of immigration control and minority integration.

More specifically, push/pull theories have been questioned on the basis of a simple observation. If international migration is mainly driven by economic reasons and can be explained through a push/pull framework, one should expect immigration flows to reduce and even reverse in times of bad economic conditions and a tight labor market in the host societies. In such a situation, host country governments should stop immigration and foreign workers should go back to their homeland. This has not occurred, at least not to the extent that this explanatory framework would have predicted and policy-makers in host countries societies would have wanted. Why is it so?

Political scientists have stressed the importance of *politics* to explain why the regulation of immigration has largely failed (e.g., Hollifield 1992a; Joppke 1998a; 1999). James Hollifield (1992a), for example, has stressed the role of political factors to explain the persistence of immigration in spite of the willingness of host countries to diminish it in times of bad economic conditions, when therefore foreign labor is no longer needed. In his view, the persistence of immigration in industrial democracies—and therefore the failure of these countries to effectively control immigration—comes above all from political liberalism and the emergence of a rights-based regime. Political liberalism provides for the extension of civil, political, and social rights to every member of the society (including migrants). This has made the use of the foreign labor force as a “shock absorber” difficult and has increased the impact of both family reunification and asylum-seeking as a source of international migration in the past few decades.

More generally, migration policy must be viewed both in terms of economic liberalism (i.e., the creation and protection of relatively free markets) and in terms of political liberalism (the extension of rights). Hollifield has nicely summarized this argument as follows: “The confluence of open (unregulated) international markets for labor and rights-based politics in domestic regimes explains the surge in immigration in the postwar period, and it has created the conditions for the emergence of international migration regimes. Such regimes, which are evolving at a regional level in Europe and North America, are confronted with the task of resolving the liberal tension between rights and markets. In these regimes, legitimacy is derived both from ideas of justice and from the legal protections of due process and equal treatment guaranteed through the judicial systems of liberal democracies” (Hollifield 1992a: 28).

DETERMINANTS OF MIGRATION POLICY: ETHNICITY OR POLITICAL CHANNELING?

If the economy/politics debate concerns immigration policy, another, very important debate deals above all with immigrant policy, that is, the management of ethnic relations and the integration of minorities living in the host society. Indeed, this is perhaps the most crucial issue relating to immigration today. This debate is addressed in Part III of the book by the chapter of John Rex, the chapter of Patrick Ireland, and the commentary on both chapters provided by Paul Statham.

The population movements that have occurred since the end of World War Two have contributed to the formation of ethnic minorities in western countries. As we said, furthermore, especially in recent periods, the diversity of migrant groups has increased. This has forced the governments—and the public opinions—of these countries to deal with ethnic diversity. The question is how they did so. Thus, the crucial question here is what explains the approaches and policies that states have followed in order to deal with such ethnic diversity and, more specifically, in order to integrate immigrants in the host society. This is the question of citizenship and membership in democratic societies, which includes the legal definition of who is entitled to become a citizen, but also issues relating to assimilation, ethnicity, race, and culture.

Existing theories to explain minority political integration in western countries can be divided in three broad categories (Ireland 1994; Welch and Studlar 1985): class theories; ethnicity and race theories; and institutional channeling theories. Each has its own view about the ways in which western countries have dealt with the integration of migrants and ethnic minorities, and each stress a specific explanatory factor. Class theory stresses socio-

economic factors and sees integration policy as a result of class conflict. Accordingly, policy stems above all from the need of the state for cheap labor force and, therefore, the lack of incorporation when the state does not need foreign workers. This brings us back to the discussion above concerning the role of the economy. Ethnicity theories stress sociocultural factors. Here integration policy is explained in terms of the (national) origin of migrants and in terms of ethnic diversity. Therefore, the state enforces different measures according to the origin and statute of migrants, their number and variety. Finally, institutional channeling theories stress political and institutional factors. In this view, migrant incorporation depends on the institutional context of the host country, regardless of the type of migrants.

The most interesting distinction for our present purpose is that between ethnicity and institutional theories. These two theoretical perspectives represent perhaps the two main competing theories explaining integration or immigrant policy. Most importantly, they lead to contradictory predictions concerning the incorporation of migrants and ethnic minorities in western countries as well as their political participation in the host society. According to *ethnicity theories*, the main driving force of integration is not class interests (as maintained by Marxist approaches to immigration; e.g., Castles and Kosack 1985), but ethnic and racial identities (e.g., Miller 1981; Moore 1975; Rex et Tomlinson 1979; Richmond 1988; Royce 1982). In this perspective, the immigrants' ethnic identity is of fundamental importance. Immigrants' interests are organized and articulated along ethnic or racial lines. Therefore, each ethnic group has its own mode of participation and integration in the host society, which has developed from socialization processes and in response to discrimination (Ireland 1994: 7). As a result, this theory predicts that migrants of the same national origin or coming from the same region will have similar forms of political participation and integration.

Institutional channeling theories make completely different predictions. They maintain that the incorporation of migrants in the host society is context-sensitive. In other words, there are important cross-national variations in the ways the state engage in activities aimed at improving the integration of immigrants, and that such variation explains fundamental differences in the degree and forms of integration as well as in the degree and forms of the political participation of migrants in the host country. In this view, migrant incorporation stems not from class interests or ethnicity, but above all from the characteristics of the institutional context as well as from the interaction between such context and migrants, which express itself through the political process (Koopmans and Statham 2000a).

When it comes to the political participation and integration of migrants, this perspective stresses the role of political opportunity structures, a concept that has been developed by students of social movements and contentious politics. Political opportunities refer to "*consistent—but not necessarily formal,*

permanent, or national—signals to social or political actors which either encourage or discourage them to use their internal resources to form social movements” (Tarrow 1996: 54; emphasis in original) and can be summarized in the four following aspects: (1) the relative openness or closure of the institutionalized political system; (2) the stability or instability of that broad set of elite alignments that typically undergird a polity; (3) the presence or absence of elite allies; and (4) the state’s capacity and propensity for repression (McAdam 1996: 27). To these general aspects of opportunity, other authors have added aspects concerning more directly the specific framework of immigration and ethnic relations. One of them is Patrick Ireland (1994: 10): “[t]he political opportunity structure includes the immigrants’ legal situation; their social and political rights; and host society citizenship laws, naturalization procedures, and policies (and nonpolicies) in such areas as education, housing, the labor market, and social assistance that shape conditions and immigrants’ responses.” In addition, this approach also stresses the role of (country-specific) actors other than the state: “[I]ndigenous trade unions, political parties, and religious and humanitarian ‘solidarity groups’ have acted as institutional gatekeepers, controlling access to the avenues of political participation available to the immigrants” (Ireland 1994: 10).

Given their stress on contextual factors, institutional channeling theories have opened the way to a truly comparative perspective. Specifically, recent comparative work on national regimes for the incorporation of migrants have stressed the importance of citizenship rights in this context, often following a neo-institutional framework of analysis (e.g. Brubaker 1992; Castles 1995; Favell 1998; Giugni and Passy 2004; Koopmans and Statham 1999a, 2000a; Koopmans et al. 2005; Smith and Blanc 1996; Soysal 1994). These works stress the existence of at least three basic institutional approaches through which states deal with immigration, which can be seen as three distinct types of integration or immigrant policy (e.g. Altermatt 1999; Castles and Miller 1998; Soysal 1994). They correspond to models or configuration of citizenship, that is, dominant conceptions of what to be a citizen is and what are the rights and duties attached to it (Koopmans et al. 2005). The ethnic-based or differentialist approach is characterized by a virtual absence of any substantial integration policy. Immigration, following a guest-worker model of immigration control, is considered to be a temporary matter. Germany and Switzerland are often taken as examples, although the former country has recently moved away from a strict differentialist view of immigration, above all through a softening of its citizenship regime. The pluralist or multicultural approach is, in a way, the opposite of the differentialist model. It is more open as regards both the individual citizenship rights (i.e., the formal rules for the acquisition of citizenship) and the cultural group rights (i.e. the recognition of ethnic and cultural difference). The recognition and promotion of ethnic difference is what best distinguishes this approach

from the other two. The old immigration countries (Australia, Canada, and the United States) and, in Europe, countries such as the Netherlands and to some extent the United Kingdom are often cited examples. Finally, the assimilationist or republican approach stands somewhere in between these two extremes, as it is relatively open as regards the formal access to citizenship, but very close as regards the recognition of ethnic difference, which is largely denied to the benefit of an assimilationist view of citizenship. France is perhaps the paradigmatic case of this kind of approach, but Italy, Spain and other new immigration countries seem to follow a similar model.

What we should keep in mind is that each of these three institutional approaches entails a distinct way to deal with immigration and, in particular, the incorporation of migrants, and that such differences have important implications for the current debate about the pro and contra of a more active integration policy in order to deal with the problems caused by the presence of a growing migrant population in western European countries.³ In other words, each approach provides a different answer to the fundamental issues of citizenship and multicultural democracy.

INFLUENCE ON MIGRATION POLICY: MEMBERS OR CHALLENGERS?

Policies, in the end, are made by actors, not by institutions or economic trends. To explain migration policy, therefore, we must look at the behavior and impact of those actors who are involved in this field. This debate is addressed in Part IV of the book by the chapter of Triadafilos Triadafilopoulos and Andrej Zaslove, the chapter of Marco Giugni and Florence Passy, and the commentary on both chapters provided by Hanspeter Kriesi.

If the three dialogues discussed so far oppose sometimes divergent views (especially the first one between “globalists” and “nationalists”), this one is less “contentious” and deals with the issue of influence of collective interests on migration policy. Which (collective) actors are influential and have an impact on legislation and policy measures in this field? Obviously, *legislators and policy-makers* ultimately take the decisions—except in a situation of direct democracy—and therefore have the greatest impact by definition. Among state actors, in addition, the *judiciary* emerges today as one of the most influential actors in this field (Joppke and Marzal 2004). We have mentioned earlier the role of supranational fora such as the European Court of Justice in the creation of a juridical and normative ground on migratory matters (Jacobson 1996; Soysal 1993). Such supranational fora often had a liberalizing effect on migrants’ rights, functioning as a court of appeal to which they could resort when possibilities at the national level had extinguished. European integration, of course, strengthens the role of European tribunals. Yet national

courts play a role as well, perhaps a greater one (Guiraudon 2001). As we have mentioned earlier, policy-making in the field of immigration and ethnic relations still depends more on dynamics inherent to the national state than on transnational processes or supranational structures. Among such national dynamics, state courts can sometimes have a substantial impact. Their effect, of course, varies according to the degree of separation from the executive and legislative powers, but should not be underestimated. Again, they have been shown to be instrumental in particular in pushing forward migrants' rights even when the governments are more inclined to follow restrictive policies (Hollifield, 1992a, 1992b; Joppke 1997, 1998a).

The most interesting task, however, consists perhaps in assessing the effect of collective actors other than state actors who have an interest in migration issues and who try to influence the decision-makers. In this regard, a cursory look at the existing literature yields a range of actors that potentially may have a big impact on migration policy. Here we may distinguish between three types of collective actors according to the main arena in which they intervene and their privileged—though not exclusive—form of intervention: political parties, interest groups, and social movements. Parties act primarily in the parliamentary (and sometimes governmental) arena through legislative action, interest groups in the administrative arena through lobbying, and movements in the public domain through protest actions. Of course, both parties and interest groups sometimes also use the public domain and adopt more “aggressive” forms of action to make their claims. For example, unions engage in strike activities, especially so when institutional channels are closed. Yet each of these three collective actors (or forms of representation of collective interests and identities) has its own main arena.⁴

The specific literature has more often dealt with the role of parties and interest groups than social movements. As far as *parties* are concerned, most of the existing studies look at extreme-right parties (e.g., Minkenberg 2001; Schain, forthcoming; Schain et al. 2002), largely neglecting the impact of other parties, especially those of the left-side of the political spectrum. This is quite astonishing, if we think of the central place this type of organization has in liberal democracies, not only for migration politics. Parties are the main organizational form between the citizens and their representatives within the polity. As such, they play a crucial role in transforming societal demands into political decisions and measures, including those demands that concern immigration and ethnic relations.

Although some have argued that mainstream parties, for a number of reasons, tend to manage this issue rather consensually and on the backstage (Freeman 1995; Hollifield 1994), immigration is today a major issue on which parties confront each other and compete for public (electoral) support. This is certainly true for extreme-right parties, which in recent years have made of the immigration (control) issue one of their favorite battlegrounds, one in

which they try to distance themselves from mainstream parties. If the effectiveness of this demarcation strategy seems clear in terms of electoral breakthrough and voting gains (Schain 1987, forthcoming), much less clear is whether extreme-right parties have actually succeeded in influencing policy-making in this field. Take the Swiss example. Here the major party of the right (the Swiss People's Party) has made frequent use of the direct democratic instruments (popular initiative and referendum) to strengthen the existing legislation on both immigration and immigrant policy. Most of the time, the party's proposals were defeated by the popular vote, which suggests a lack of effect. However, if the major changes it asked (such as, for example, introducing a limit to the number of foreigners living in the country) were not accepted, they succeeded in pushing the governmental agenda toward more restrictive policies. This example also shows the importance of direct democracy as a fourth arena in which political and social actors can intervene to address issues relating to immigration and ethnic relations.

Apart from the importance of parties, the migration field is often governed by interest-based politics, and *interest groups* are crucial actors in this field (Hollifield 1992a; @@ [AU: MEANING??]). The two most important such type of actors are employers' associations and trade unions, which are among those intermediary organizations that have high stakes in immigration control. These organizations have a specific interest in relation to the presence of foreigners on the labor market. Obviously, seen like that, employers' associations and unions have divergent interests in this respect. While the latter usually push for more liberal policies to the extent that foreign workers often represent a cheap labor force, the latter often ask for more restrictive measures as they see them as contributing to a deterioration of the situation of the labor market, both in terms of wages and unemployment. Therefore, the success of these actors in opening up the nation's doors, respectively in protecting the indigenous labor force, is likely to be highly contingent on the state of the economy in the host country, as we discussed earlier.

Where research is less advanced is on the impact of *social movements* and protest activities on migration policy. This holds not only for the specific field of immigration and ethnic relations, but applies more generally to the study of contentious politics. Indeed, the consequences of social movements only recently have come to capture the attention of scholars in a systematic fashion (see Giugni 1998 for a review). Previously, apart from a number of remarkable exceptions (most notably, Gamson 1990), scholars had paid much more attention to the origin and mobilization of movements than to their effects, including their policy effects.

Three collective actors have a particular interest to form social movements engaging in protest activities in the field of immigration and ethnic relations politics. The first and most obvious one is *migrants* themselves. The political mobilization of migrants and minorities have not been devoted the place

it deserves in the literature (but see, among others, Ireland 1994; Blatt 1995; Fibbi and Bolzman 1991; Giugni and Passy 2004; Koopmans 2005; Koopmans and Statham 1999a; Martiniello and Statham 1999), perhaps because often they are not considered as political actors. This gap has also begun to be filled by an increasing number of studies that look at the political participation of ethnic minorities as a sign of their political integration in the host society (Berger et al. 2004; Fennema 2004; Fennema and Tillie 1999, 2001; Jacobs and Tillie 2004; Tillie 2004). Thus, the emerging debate on minority integration and the parallel interest shown by students of migration in this issue has contributed indirectly to revamp the study of the political participation and mobilization of immigrants and ethnic minorities. No matter how positive this trend is, however, this still does not tell us anything about their impact on policies that concern them most directly. How effective are organized minority groups when they take the streets or act through other unconventional means and how responsive are the public and political authorities of host countries to these mobilizations? To give an answer to this question is all the more important to the extent that minorities are the less powerful actors among the three considered here and those whose lack of institutionalized channels of access to the polity is greater.

The interests and identities of migrants are most directly threatened by the mobilization of the *extreme right*. The main difference between this collective actor and migrants is that it often has a direct access to the parliament and sometimes even to the government. Indeed, the far-right as a collective actor is characterized by the presence of a partisan form together with an extra-parliamentary form (i.e., a social movement) which often express itself through violent actions (for example, through racist attacks to foreigners and minorities). This, of course, is not to say that the two constitute a homogeneous actor. On the contrary, it may well be that extreme-right parties and, say, groups of naziskin have no ties to each other whatsoever and certainly have different constituencies. Yet they share a fundamental rejection of migrants and the willingness to push for more restrictive migration policies. Again, how effective they are in this effort and how responsive are governments to their demands are questions whose answers have important implications both from a scholarly and a political point of view.

If the extreme right carries an anti-migrant position—or at least a position that asks for more restrictive migration policies—there is a third collective actor that mobilizes on issues relating to immigration and ethnic relations, but defending the rights of migrants and pushing for more liberal policies. This is what we may call the *solidarity movement*, that includes a range of organizations and groups going from general welfare associations and human-rights organizations to pro-migrant organizations dealing with specific aspects of this issue (asylum, particular minority groups, etc.). It also includes antiracist organizations and groups. This movement clearly is an ally of organized mi-

grants, attempting to improve their rights and living conditions. Yet often they do more than that. When, as it is often the case, migrants do not have the opportunity or the means to organize and form a social movement and engage in protest activities, solidarity organizations and groups take up the issue and mobilize on their behalf. Thus, this movement represents an important external resource for migrants, both to make their life in the host society easier and to put their claims on the political and public agendas.

In sum, the question of the influence of collective interests on migration policy can be narrowed down to the issue of the impact of *members* and *challengers* of the polity. In particular, both the role of political parties and that of other organizations such as interest groups and social movements mobilizing on migration-related issues (migrant, anti-migrant, and pro-migrant movements) need to be studied in much more detail than has been done in the past.

A RESEARCH AGENDA

The four dialogues just outlined bring to the fore a number of theoretical and empirical issues that can be seen as avenues for future research. To complete this introductory chapter, let us briefly address those we see as the most relevant ones and which could form a research agenda for the future. They were inspired by the reading of the chapters and commentary-chapters included in the present book. Therefore, they can also be taken as a sort of conclusion to the volume after having read the other chapters.

1. *We need to distinguish between different groups of migrants.* Sometimes in the literature migrants have been treated as if they were a homogeneous entity, behaving in the same way and having a sort of common identity. However, as works on ethnic diversity have shown, different groups of migrants can display diverse patterns of behavior. In addition, states can address different policies and measures to different types of migrants, the former aspect being strongly influenced by the latter. Much of the debate here, of course, is about how and to what extent ethnicity matters. Further research should pay a lot more attention to how migrants of different origins and entering the host societies with different statuses and identities are treated locally, nationally, and transnationally.

2. *We need to take into account actors other than state actors, institutional policy-makers, or political parties.* Studies of migration policy have focused on state actors and political parties. The role of the courts (both at the national and international levels) has recently been examined in a thorough way as well. We think it is important to broaden the scope of analysis to include other collective actors as well, such as interest groups and social movements, who may become decisive in influencing migration policy. Interest

groups have received relatively much attention. What is still lacking, in our view, is a systematic investigation of the role of social movements and collective mobilizations. How can they impact on migration policy? Which policies are they more likely to affect? These are important questions that remain largely unanswered.

3. *We need to examine the crucial role played by politics.* Most, if not all, of the chapters in this book point to the importance of political factors in shaping migration policy. This seems quite obvious, almost a tautology. However, the state is often missing in migration studies. The role of politics is not always taken into account as it should. Of course, culture, ethnicity, economy; all this matters. Yet all these factors, at least in our view, are mediated or filtered by politics, in a way or another.

4. *We need to reconceptualize the national state.* The national state is central in most of the chapters in this book as well as more generally in the literature in migration politics. It frames the debates in this field and intervenes as a crucial actor. The study and practice of migration policy are still framed nationally. The national state, for example, defines the indicators for research immigration politics. The notion of the national state is so pervasive that it tends to constrain researchers into a sort of conceptual prison. We therefore should reconceptualize the notion of the national state, for example by taking more seriously into account the impact of both global and local levels. Above all, we should study more thoroughly the interplay between these levels.

5. *We need to complement in-depth studies of single cases with broader conceptual and comparative approaches.* Many of the chapters in this book are comparative in scope. To be sure, in-depth qualitative case studies are both necessary and provide crucial insights into the mechanisms that account for changes in migration policy. This must be stated clear and loud. However, we think that broader comparative frameworks have much to offer to an understanding of immigration politics. On the one hand, comparisons allow us to make a better sense of a given case and to avoid making a general rule out of a specific situation. On the other hand, comparisons across countries (or across other analytical units) permit to control for various explanatory factors and hence to adjudicate between competing theories, if need be.

6. *We need to ground the study of migration policy on a solid empirical basis.* Empirical evidence is the fuel of social science. Again, this is not to say that theory if not important, of course. Quite on the contrary, data make sense only in the light of a theoretical framework. Yet, in our view, a large part of the dichotomies we find in the field of immigration politics might just disappear or at least be adjudicated if we ground our research on systematic empirical data. We are thinking for example at the debate between “globalists” and “nationalists” or the postnational/national debate. Often the ulti-

mate verdict on opposing paradigms or perspectives can only come from confrontation with the “reality” out there. Good data (especially if comparative) are as necessary as good theorizing.

7. *We need to look at the processes and mechanisms underlying the formulation and implementation of migration policy.* Scholars have often a hard time in unveiling the mechanisms that account for changes in migration policy. Clearly, relations between variables are not enough; what we need is to look at processes, to disentangle mechanisms and dynamics. More specifically, we think it is important to look at the political process that is at work behind migration policy, which can be seen as the outcome of this process. Once again, taking mechanisms more seriously makes us less exposed to the risk of making hurried generalizations or, even worse, producing false results.

8. *We need to go beyond (supposed and/or false) dichotomies in the study of migration policy to integrate and complement different explanatory factors, theoretical perspectives, and methodological approaches.* We structured this book around a number of dichotomies or oppositions: global/national scope, economic/political factors, ethnicity/political opportunity structures, and members/challengers impact. Other dichotomies could be made, and indeed emerge in the various chapters that form this volume. Some of these dichotomies remain and will remain such, at least insofar as there are proponents of them who are willing to defend their position with nails and teeth. However, we think that what this book shows is that not only most of these dichotomies disappear once we look at migration policy through the lenses of sound empirical and, if possible, comparative studies that take mechanisms seriously into account, but also that we will at the same time be encouraged to abandon some of our theoretical bastions in order to search for more integrated approaches.

Some unresolved tensions, however, remain. We think that, in the end, this book brings to the fore a fundamental tension within contemporary societies in regard to the management of ethnic relations and majority/minority relationships: it is what we may call a tension between *opportunity* and *rights*. This tension expresses itself in two ways. First, on a level more strictly linked to immigration politics, it is the tension between *group-specific policies* and *more general policies targeting the whole population*. This difference is institutionally crystallized, respectively, in the so-called multicultural (or cultural pluralist) and assimilationist (or republican) models of integration, incorporation, or assimilation, whatever we want to call it. The central problem is that of finding a good balance of measures targeting specific groups (of migrants) and measures that go to the benefit of the entire population, citizens and non-citizens. On the one hand, countries that have traditionally adopted a group-specific or multicultural approach (e.g., the Netherlands as well as the extra-European immigration countries) are aware of the risk of segregation

inherent in cultural pluralism and of the possible backlash for example by xenophobic and extreme-right milieus, who may react to this kind of policies.⁵ On the other hand, in a de facto multicultural society, traditionally assimilationist and universalist countries (e.g., France) have made some concessions to the republican axiom by moving toward group-specific policies.

Second, on the broader level of the relationship between citizens (and, more generally, subject populations) and the state, it is a tension between the *democratic principle* and the *equality principle*. Modern democracies entail two elements: a democratic element, whereby people must be granted full participation in the political sphere, and a constitutional element, whereby the state must guarantee the fundamental rights to all individuals. Students of immigration politics, in our view, cannot ignore this broader framework when studying the policies that states and other political entities (local, regional, international) enact and implement in order to manage immigration and ethnic relations.

Thus, the challenge for migration research today is, on the one hand, to understand how de facto multicultural (European) societies can best deal and actually deal with the tension of cultural pluralism versus assimilationism, where and how they find the “right” balance between the two approaches in the management of ethnic relations. On the other hand, the challenge is also to disentangle the complex relationship between democracy intended as social and political (and, we should add, cultural) participation, and democracy as the fundamental (constitutional) rights of individuals. In brief, the challenge is to better understand the relationship between opportunities and rights, both in the field of immigration politics and in the field of social relations more generally. As far as the study of migration is concerned, our hope is that the following contributions can shed some light on this relationship as it expresses itself both horizontally within countries and vertically across different political administrative levels.

NOTES

1. In addition, Castles and Miller (1993: 68) mention two other types of migration which however did not contribute decisively to the formation of ethnic minorities: “mass movements of European refugees after the end of the Second World War” and “return migration of former colonists to their countries of origin as colonies gained their independence.”

2. Later on, Brubaker (1999) has relativized the distinction between civic and ethnic conceptions of the nation, acknowledging that this distinction presents problems from both a normative and an analytical standpoint, and proposing to replace it with the distinction between state-framed and counter-state nationalism.

3. This model, for example, is questioned in the Netherlands today.

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4. Where it exists, to these three arenas we should add a fourth one: direct democracy (Kriesi 1998), which is available to all kinds of actors. This holds in particular for Switzerland, where the direct democratic instruments are particularly developed and where they have been used extensively in the migration political field as well.
5. See, for example, the current debate about this going on in the Netherlands.

