1. The term *asiddha* occurs three times in the *Aṣṭādhyāyī*, in the following three sūtras: P. 6.1.86 (*ṣatvatukor asiddhaḥ*), P. 6.4.22 (*asiddhavat atrābhaṭ*) and P. 8.2.1 (*pūrvarāsiddham*). Remarkable is that once this term is followed by the suffix *vat* (in Pāṇinian terms *vati*, meaning ‘as if’), whereas in the remaining two cases it enjoys no such company. Nothing is more natural than to assume that the different utterances *asiddhavat* and *asiddha* have been used in the *Aṣṭādhyāyī* to indicate different things. However, when we turn to the Sanskrit grammatical tradition for elucidation, we are disappointed. Either the question is passed over in silence, or *asiddhavat* and *asiddha* are said to mean one and the same thing.\(^1\)

It goes without saying that an interpretation of the terms *asiddha* and *asiddhavat* (and of the sūtras in which they occur) which explains the use of these two different terms, is to be preferred to an interpretation which does not explain this. In the following pages I shall propose an interpretation of the former kind, and shall further show that this interpretation is supported by certain other features of the *Aṣṭādhyāyī*. Subsequently attention will be paid to some of the consequences which this interpretation of the terms *asiddha* and *asiddhavat* will lead to.

2. Monier-Williams’s Dictionary gives this meaning for the term *asiddha*: “(regarded as) not existing or (as) not having taken effect (as a rule or operation taught in grammar).” In what follows the translation ‘not having taken effect’ will be adhered to throughout, not because the translation ‘not existing’ would not lead us to the desired result, but rather because the former translation does so in a more straightforward, less ambiguous, manner.\(^2\)

This choice of a translation for *asiddha* determines also our answer to the question as to what is *asiddha*, a rule or an operation. It is a rule that takes, or does not take, effect, not an operation. It will become clear when we turn to the sūtras that this our preference for rules over operations allows us to interpret those rules in the most natural way. We shall now deal with the sūtras concerned, one by one.

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\(^1\) For a short discussion of the points of view recorded in the tradition, see Section 2.3 below.

\(^2\) Note that the part ‘(regarded as)’ of Monier-Williams’s translation is dropped altogether. That this is allowed, follows from the fact that this part is placed in parentheses, and is properly speaking not the translation of anything. Clearly ‘not having taken effect’ is closer to Sanskrit *asiddha* than ‘regarded as not having taken effect’.
bhasya is as if it had not taken effect when (another rule contained in) this (section is to take effect.)”

The section where P. 6.4.22 exerts its influence is known by the name ‘Ābhīya-section’. There is no unanimity regarding the question exactly how far it extends; up to P. 6.4.129 (bhāsyā), which is the first rule of the section governed by the adhikāra bhāsyā; or up to P. 6.4.175, which is the last rule of that same section. This question does not concern us at present, for a discussion of one or two examples which illustrate the workings of P. 6.4.22 suffices for our purposes. And these few examples will be chosen in such a manner that we remain safely within the boundaries set by P. 6.4.22 and P. 6.4.129. We shall thus stay away from the disputed territory.

The first example will be the derivation of śādhi, Impv. 2. Sing. of śās ‘teach’. The stage at which this derivation becomes of interest to us, is śās-hi. Here two rules apply. P. 6.4.101 (hujhalbhyo her dhiḥ) prescribes substitution of dhi for hi on account of the fact that śās ends in a sound contained in the pratyāhāra jhal. P. 6.4.35 (sā hau) prescribes substitution of sā for śās when hi follows.

It is clear that both the rules, P. 6.4.101 and P. 6.4.35, find the conditions for their application fulfilled in śās-hi. But a little reflection shows that each of them, when taking effect, removes the conditions for the application of the other. If P. 6.4.101 takes effect first, we get śās-dhiḥ; but here P. 6.4.35 does not apply any longer. And if P. 6.4.35 takes effect first, we get sā-hi; here P. 6.4.101 has ceased to apply. Either way, therefore, the desired form śādhi would not be attained.

It is here that P. 6.4.22 comes to our rescue. To see how, we may note that both the rules considered in connection with the derivation of śādhi, both P. 6.4.101 and P. 6.4.35, belong to the Ābhīya-section, i.e., to the domain of P. 6.4.22. This has as a result, that one of the two rules, P. 6.4.101 and P. 6.4.35, is as if it has not taken effect with regard to the other.

It is self-evident that not much is gained by saying of a rule that it is as if it has not taken effect, when that rule has not taken effect. This would be a truism without value. That is to say, the effects of P. 6.4.22 do not become interesting until a rule from the Ābhīya-section has actually taken effect.

Let us therefore allow one rule, say P. 6.4.101, to take effect in śās-hi; we now get sā-hi. But as far as P. 6.4.35 is concerned, it is as if P. 6.4.101 had not [71] taken effect, i.e., as if we were still at the stage śās-hi. In this way P. 6.4.35 is allowed to come into action, and we get śādhi.

It is important to remember that it is merely as if P. 6.4.101 has not taken effect when P. 6.4.35 comes into action. If P. 6.4.101 had really not taken effect at that point, the outcome of the derivation would have been *śāsdhi, not śādhi. The suffix -vat in asiddhavat is thus seen to play a useful role.

The reader may have noticed that the correct form śādhi also could have been arrived at, had the two rules P. 6.4.101 and P. 6.4.35 been allowed to take effect simultaneously. However, such simultaneous taking effect is not prescribed by P. 6.4.22. What is more, if it
were a general principle of Pāṇini’s grammar that two (or more) rules may, or have to, take
effect simultaneously, then P. 6.4.22 would become superfluous. So even though the
simultaneous taking effect of rules can account for the correct forms, the shape, indeed the
existence, of P. 6.4.22 indicates that simultaneous taking effect of rules is not permitted in the
Aṣṭādhyāyī.

We turn to a second example illustrating the workings of P. 6.4.22. It consists in the
derivation of jahi, Impv. 2. Sing. of han ‘kill’. Here we reach the stage han-hi, where P. 6.4.36
(hanter jah) applies, which prescribes the substitution of ja for han before hi. Nothing stands
in the way of this rule, so that we get ja-hi. It is here that a problem arises. At this stage P.
6.4.105 (ato heṅ) comes into the picture, which demands that hi be dropped after an anga
ending in a. Obviously, P. 6.4.105 finds the conditions for its application fulfilled in ja-hi, and
if nothing would prevent P. 6.4.105 from taking effect, we would end up with the undesired
form *ja.

Again it is P. 6.4.22 which comes to our help. Both P. 6.4.36 and P. 6.4.105 belong to
the Ābhiya-section. They are therefore as if not having taken effect when the other is to take
effect. Here again it needs no emphasis that this property becomes interesting only there,
where the rule concerned in reality has taken effect. In our present example that is P. 6.4.36.
This rule has taken effect when the stage ja-hi is reached. But P. 6.4.105 goes about as if P.
6.4.36 had not taken effect, as if the stage reached were jan-hi, instead of ja-hi which it
actually is. As a result P. 6.4.105 does not take effect, and jahi keeps its ending.

Like in the derivation of śadhi, here also two points must be clearly understood. The
first one is this, that if P. 6.4.36 would really not have taken effect in the above derivation, the
result would have been *hanhi instead of jahi. Clearly P. 6.4.22 would not perform its role
properly, if it would contain the word asiddham in the place of asiddhavat.
[72]

The second point that deserves again our attention, is the circumstance that the correct
form jahi would also have been arrived at if we had laboured under the assumption that rules
belonging to the Ābhiya section must all present themselves simultaneously. In that case both
P. 6.4.36 and P. 6.4.105 would have offered their services to jan-hi; the offer of P. 6.4.36
would there be accepted, the one of P. 6.4.105 rejected: in this way the correct form jahi
would result.

However, it must here be repeated that no translation of P. 6.4.22 will be able to wring
from it the meaning that rules from the Ābhiya-section can only apply simultaneously. The
rule rather presupposes the opposite: that one rule from the Ābhiya-section applies after
another one from that same section has taken effect. Only when a rule has taken effect does it
make sense to say that it is as if it had not taken effect.

But we should not discard too easily the interpretation of P. 6.4.22 according to which
this rule prescribes that all rules contained in the Ābhiya-section must apply simultaneously.
It is true that in no way such an interpretation can be given to the wording of this sūtra. It has
been shown above that this wording requires that rules take effect one after the other. This,
however, does not change the fact that both these interpretations lead to the same results. Both, the correct and the incorrect one, are in this sense equivalent. A little bit of reflection on the words of P. 6.4.22 will convince the reader that this is indeed the case. All the same, if the reader prefers to work with the incorrect interpretation of P. 6.4.22 (against which there can be no objection as long as one merely wishes to reach the correct result of a derivation), he should be careful not to draw unwarranted conclusions from this interpretation, such as, for example, that simultaneous taking effect of two rules is sometimes allowed in Pāṇini’s grammar. Far less should he raise an objection against the thesis defended in this paper on the basis of such an interpretation.

2.2. P. 8.2.1 reads pūrvatrāsiddham. This means: “(A rule occurring in the section beginning with the present rule and extending up to the end of the Ṣṭādhyāyī) has not taken effect when an earlier (rule is to take effect).”

A close inspection of this rule in the light of the translation here offered reveals something which perhaps no one had noticed until now: P. 8.2.1 informs us that the rules contained in the section over which it exerts its influence (this section is known by the name ‘Tripādi’) can only be used in a [73] certain order, viz. the order in which we find them in the Ṣṭādhyāyī. Further, these rules can only be used after rules contained in the remainder of the grammar, not before them.

I request the reader to read my words carefully. I do not say that P. 8.2.1 is merely equivalent to a prescription to use the rules concerned in the order in which they occur. This has been believed long since. What I do say is that P. 8.2.1 is a prescription to use those rules in that order. To say that a later rule has not taken effect when an earlier rule is to take effect, amounts to saying that the earlier rule takes effect before the later rule can take effect.

So the term asiddha determines in what order rules are to be applied. The term asiddhavat, on the other hand, does no such thing. It imposes no restriction at all on the order in which rules are to be applied. This second term merely states that, once a rule has taken effect first (with or without reason), it is as if it has not taken effect when subsequently certain other rules are to take effect. If, therefore, P. 8.2.1 would have read pūrvatrāsiddhavat instead of pūrvatrāsiddham as it actually reads, in that case the order in which the rules of the Tripādi must be applied would not have been fixed. But P. 8.2.1 reads purvatrāsiddham, and for very good reasons, as I shall show presently.

The examples which illustrate the workings of P. 8.2.1 fall into two groups. There are those which would remain unaffected in case the word asiddham in that sūtra would be

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3 As said above, two interpretations of a rule are equivalent (in the sense adopted here) where both the interpretations lead to the same results in the formation of words.

4 See, e.g., H. E. Buiskool’s remarks (1939: 53): “A sūtra contained in the Tripādi … must not be anticipated”; (1939: 64): “The forms to which a sūtra normally applies are such as arise according to sūtras which are siddha”. That Buiskool did not intend to say what is being said in the present essay, follows, among others, from his following remark (1939: 53): “In regard to preceding sūtras, such substitutes as are asiddha possess, as it
replaced by \textit{asiddhavat}; and there are others which would be affected by such a change. The former of these two groups is undoubtedly the larger one; but it is the existence of the latter group which constitutes the most powerful argument in support of the interpretation of P. 8.2.1 here proposed. I shall in what follows confront the reader with one example belonging to the first group, and then with a number of examples belonging to the second group.

The derivation of \textit{bhugna} from \textit{bhuj-ta} is one that is possible both when P. 8.2.1 contains \textit{asiddham} and when it contains \textit{asiddhavat}. On the first alternative the rules of the Tripādī must take effect in the order in which they occur in that section. This leads to the following derivation: \textit{bhuj-ta} $>$ \textit{bhug-ta} (P. 8.2.30) $>$ \textit{bhug-na} (P. 8.2.45). P. 8.2.30 (\textit{coḥ kuḥ}) prescribes, among other things, substitution of \textit{g} for \textit{j} when followed by a sound contained in the \textit{pratyāhāra jhal}. The sound \textit{t} is contained in the \textit{pratyāhāra jhal}, so that the step from \textit{bhuj-ta} to \textit{bhug-ta} can be made without difficulty. Next P. 8.2.45 (\textit{oditaś ca}) can take effect. This rule prescribes the substitution of \textit{n} for \textit{t} of \text{[74]} \textit{ta} after a root which has the \textit{anubandha o}. The root \textit{bhuj} has indeed the \textit{anubandha o} (the Dhātupāṭha reads: \textit{bhujo kauṭīlye} (VI.124)), so that also the step from \textit{bhug-ta} to \textit{bhug-na} is smoothly made. The two rules from the Tripādī which have played a role in this derivation have taken effect in the order in which they occur in the \textit{Aṣṭādhyāyī}, first P. 8.2.30, then P. 8.2.45.

Let us now see what happens if P. 8.2.1 reads \textit{pūrvatrāsiddhavat}. In that case, as we have seen, there is no restriction on the order in which the rules (here P. 8.2.30 and P. 8.2.45) take effect. If we choose to let P. 8.2.30 take effect first, before P. 8.2.45, there is no work whatever to be done by P. 8.2.1, for P. 8.2.1 (now assumed to contain the term \textit{asiddhavat}) only causes a later rule to be as if it has not taken effect when an earlier rule is to take effect. Such a situation does not now occur, so that the formation of \textit{bhugna} takes place without any kind of interference.

Let us therefore consider the case that P. 8.2.45 takes effect first. This is possible, for in \textit{bhuj-ta} all the conditions for its application are present. We get \textit{bhuj-na}. Here the conditions for the application of P. 8.2.30 are not fulfilled. The reason is that \textit{n} is not included in the \textit{pratyāhāra jhal}. It is only because of P. 8.2.1 (now assumed to read: \textit{pūrvatrāsiddhavat}) that the transition from \textit{bhuj-na} to \textit{bhug-na} can take place.

It is clear that, as far as the derivation of \textit{bhugna} is concerned, it makes no difference whether P. 8.2.1 reads \textit{pūrvatrāsiddham} or \textit{pūrvatrāsiddhavat}. If all examples illustrating the use of P. 8.2.1 would in this respect be like \textit{bhugna}, and if, further, we would accept for P. 8.2.1 the reading \textit{pūrvatrāsiddhavat}, or (what amounts to the same) if we would understand the term \textit{asiddham} in that rule to mean \textit{asiddhavat}, then we might say that P. 8.2.1 is equivalent\textsuperscript{5} to a prescription to use the rules of the Tripādī in the order of their occurrence, though not being such a prescription. In reality, however, P. 8.2.1 \textit{is} such a prescription. I shall now discuss some derivations which support this my claim. They support my claim

\textsuperscript{5} In the sense explained above; see note 3.
because they would not lead to the desired result in case P. 8.2.1 would read pūrvatrāśiddhavat.

Let us first look at the derivation of vakti, Pres. 3. Sing. of vac ‘speak’. The part of this derivation that interests us is: vac-ti > vak-ti (P. 8.2.30). We are already familiar with the rule employed in this derivation, P. 8.2.30. Here it prescribes substitution of k for c, because t (which is included in the pratyāhāra jhal) follows. However, P. 8.2.30 is not the only rule that finds the conditions for its application fulfilled in vac-ti. Another rule does the same [75] thing. This is P. 8.4.40 (stoḥ scunā ścuḥ) This last rule prescribes substitution of c for t on account of the preceding c.

In this situation P. 8.2.1 (interpreted in the way advocated in this paper) tells us that the rule which comes earlier in the Aṣṭādhyāyī takes effect first. This is P. 8.2.30. But once P. 8.2.30 has taken effect, and we have reached vak-ti, the conditions for the application of P. 8.4.40 have vanished. No longer is t preceded by c, nor indeed by any other sound indicated by ścu in the sūtra (ścu stands for s, c, j, ch, jh, ñ). There is therefore simply no place for P. 8.4.40 in this derivation.

Let us now assume that P. 8.2.1 reads, or at any rate means, pūrvatrāśiddhavat. In that case we are free to choose which of the two rules, P. 8.2.30 or P. 8.4.40, will take effect first. If our choice falls on P. 8.2.30, the derivation will develop as described above, but P. 8.2.1 will not have any role to play in it. Let us therefore see what happens if P. 8.4.40 takes effect first. Now vac-ti will change into vac-ci. Here, in vac-ci, the conditions for the application of P. 8.2.30 are fulfilled (c belongs to jhal), but this does not interest us. P. 8.2.30 will go about as if instead of vac-ci still vac-ti were found here. The result is that P. 8.2.30 takes effect. It substitutes k for c of vac. But P. 8.4.40 (in the present interpretation of P. 8.2.1) is merely as if it has not taken effect, in reality it has taken effect. The result of the derivation is therefore an undesired *vakci, not vakti.6

The reader is advised to compare the above (faulty) derivation closely with the examples illustrating P. 6.4.22 discussed earlier, in Section 2.1. He cannot but come to the conclusion that if asiddha in P. 8.2.1 is accepted to mean the same as asiddhavat in P. 6.4.22, then the derivation of the undesired form *vakci cannot be prevented by P. 8.2.1. If, on the other hand, P. 8.2.1 is interpreted as explained above, then this faulty derivation cannot take place. What is more, it then becomes clear why two different terms were used, asiddhavat in P. 6.4.22, asiddha in P. 8.2.1.

The correct interpretation of the term asiddha is important enough to warrant the discussion of two more examples. Both are derivations which would go wrong if P. 8.2.1 is not interpreted in the way here advocated. First manassu, Loc. Plur. of manas ‘mind’. The derivation runs as follows: manassu > mana-rU-su (P. 8.2.66) > mana-ḥ-su (P. 8.3.16) > manassu (P. 8.3.34). Needless to add, this is how the derivation is bound to run if we accept

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6 Buiskool justifies the correct formation of vakti by assuming pūrvapratīṣṭhāna (1939: 57). It is not clear how he thinks to reconcile this with his earlier statement that substitutes which are asiddha possess complete sthāṇivadhāva (1939: 53; reproduced in note 4 above).
that rules of the Tripādi must take effect in the order of their occurrence, in accordance with our interpretation of P. 8.2.1. If, on the other hand, we drop this requirement and understand asiddha in P. 8.2.1 to mean the same as asiddhavat, troubles are near by. For at the stage mana-rU-su not one, but two rules are waiting to exert their influence. In the first place there is P. 8.3.16 (roḥ supi). This rule prescribes substitution of h for rU on account of the following su. But further there is P. 8.3.59 (ādesaprtyayavoh), which prescribes substitution of ś for s on account of the preceding r. It is clear that if P. 8.3.16 takes effect first, the condition for the application of P. 8.3.59, viz. r, disappears. But in the present (wrong) interpretation of P. 8.2.1 there is nothing which would compel P. 8.3.16 to take effect first. So let us see what happens if P. 8.3.59 takes effect first. mana-r-su now becomes mana-r-śu. Subsequently P. 8.3.16 takes effect, thinking (on account of P. 8.2.1) that the situation is still mana-r-su. So r is replaced by h. But the ś of su is merely as it is not there; in reality it is there to stay. Clearly the desired form manassu will in this way not be obtained.7 Again we see that asiddha and asiddhavat cannot but differ in meaning.

The third example is the derivation of apsarāh, Nom. Sing. of apsaras. The part of the derivation that interests us is: apsaras-su > apsarās-s (P. 6.4.14) > apsarās (P. 6.1.68). P. 6.1.68 (halīyābhhyo dirghāt sutisy apṛktam hal) causes the elision of the final s of apsarās-s, on account of the fact that it follows a consonant. But there is another rule, which would be all too happy to be allowed to take effect in apsarās-s. This is P. 8.2.29 (skoḥ samyogādyor ante ca), which prescribes the elision of the first s of the conjunct consonant. If we accept the wrong interpretation of P. 8.2.1, we can permit P. 8.2.29 to take effect. Subsequently P. 6.1.68, being under the illusion (owing to P. 8.2.1) that apsarās-s is still there, will cause elision of the final s. The result will be *apsarā, not apsarāh.8

No further examples are required at this point. Asiddha and asiddhavat do not mean the same thing. If asiddham in P. 8.2.1 would be replaced by asiddhavat, incorrect forms would result. Similarly in P. 6.4.22: if here asiddhavat would be replaced by asiddham, incorrect forms would result. Further, the translation ‘not having taken effect’ for asiddha is pre-eminently suited to bring out the difference between asiddha and asiddhavat.

This choice of translation, incidentally, has a consequence which is worth being mentioned. In the Tripādi, as we know, later rules are asiddha with respect to earlier rules. Similarly, all rules of the Tripādi are asiddha with respect to rules belonging to the earlier

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7 Buiskool (1939: 64) mentions this derivation, but does not see that it conflicts with the traditional interpretation of P. 8.2.1.
8 Further instances of derivations that might take a wrong turn in case asiddha in P. 8.2.1 is understood to mean asiddhavat include the following: (a) praśna. The correct derivation is: prach-naṇ (P. 3.3.90) > praśna (P. 6.4.19). Substitution of n for r by P. 8.4.40 is prevented by P. 8.4.44. At the earlier stage prach-na, however, nothing would prevent such a substitution, and the incorrect form *praśna would result.
(b) rāśu. Correct derivation: rāś (kvip)-su > rāś-su (P. 8.2.36) > rāś-su (P. 8.2.39) > rāś (P. 8.4.56). Substitution of s for s by P. 8.4.41 (at the stage rāś-su) is prevented by P. 8.4.42. But nothing would prevent P. 8.4.41 from taking effect at the earlier stage rāś-su. This would result in *rāśu.
(c) upagamyaya. Correct derivation: upa-gaṁ-tā > upa-gaṁ-ya (P. 7.1.37). Substitution of m for m by P. 8.3.24 does not take place, for y is not included in the pratyāhāra jhal. However, t is included in jhal, so that the wrong interpretation of P. 8.2.1 would give rise to *upagamyaya, or even *upaganyā (by P. 8.4.58).
parts of the grammar. This does not mean that those earlier rules are *siddha* with respect to the later rules.\(^9\) Why [77] this is so can be seen when we replace *asiddha* and *siddha* by their translations. That a later rule has not taken effect when an earlier rule is to take effect, does not mean that the earlier rule *has* taken effect when the later rule takes effect. It may, or it may not. I shall give an illustration to clarify this.

P. 8.3.59 (*ādesapratyayayoḥ*) has not taken effect whenever P. 8.2.30 (*coḥ kuḥ*) is to take effect, be that in the derivation of *vakṣi* (out of *vac-sī*; here P. 8.3.59 takes effect later) or in the derivation of *bhugna* (out of *bhuj-ta*; here P. 8.3.59 plays no role whatever). On the other hand, P. 8.2.30 has taken effect when P. 8.3.59 is to take effect in the derivation of *vakṣi*, but in the derivation of *kartṛṣu* (out of *kartṛ-ṣu*) P. 8.2.30 *has not taken effect* when P. 8.3.59 is to take effect, for the simple reason that P. 8.2.30 plays no role in the derivation of *kartṛṣu*.

2.3. So we found the difference between *asiddha* and *asiddhavat*. It is from the vantage-point of this our superior understanding that we shall cast a quick glance at what some of the authors belonging to the Sanskrit grammatical tradition had to say about the matters we are investigating. Remarkable is that neither Kātyāyana nor Patañjali, i.e., neither of the two munīs whose words were held in the highest esteem by all later scholars in the field, said anything in order to elucidate the use of the different terms *asiddha* and *asiddhavat*. The reason is simple. Neither Kātyāyana nor Patañjali were of the opinion that the two terms differed in meaning. This is clear from the way they comment on the sūtras concerned. A vārttika on P. 6.1.86 (*ṣatvatukor asiddhaḥ*) explains the implications of the term *asiddha*. We shall have occasion to study it below. This vārttika is referred back to in a vārttika on P. 8.2.1 (*pūrvatraśiddham*) and also in a vārttika on P. 6.4.22 (*asiddhavad atrābhāt*). This means that the effects of using the terms *asiddha* and *asiddhavat* were deemed to be the same by Kātyāyana. Patañjali confines himself to explicating and illustrating these vārttikas, and does not add anything of his own in this regard.

It is Kaiyāṭa, the principal commentator on the *Mahābhāṣya*, who feels that some remarks about these two terms are justified. More interesting than Kaiyāṭa’s own opinion in this respect is the opinion which he ascribed to ‘others’. It shows that not everyone was ready to accept the use of two different terms, *asiddha* and *asiddhavat*, as a feature of the *Aṣṭādhyāyī* which has no deeper significance. But it also shows that, for one reason or another, no one was able to hit upon the correct solution.

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Others, Kaiyāṭa tells us,\(^{10}\) say that *vat* in *asiddhavat* enables rules of the Ābhiya-section at certain occasions to take effect on a form where already another rule of that section has

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\(^{10}\) *Mahābhāṣyapradīpa*, Rohatak ed., vol. IV, p. 686: *anye tv aḥuḥ — svāśrayam api yathā syād ity evamartham vatkaraṇam / tena debhatur ity atra svāśrayatkāhalmadhyagatāśrayāv etvābhyaśalopau bhavata iti* /
taken effect. In that case the rule which has taken effect will not be asiddha, but siddha. A derivation which can thus be explained is the derivation of debhatuḥ out of danbh-atus. In this derivation the n of danbh is dropped by P. 6.4.24 (aniditaṃ hala upadhāyāḥ khit); this results in dabh-atus. Here P. 6.4.120 (ata ekahaladhyenādesāder liṭi) finds the conditions for its application fulfilled. It takes effect, and we get debhatuḥ. The problem is that the conditions for the application of P. 6.4.120 are fulfilled in dabh-atus, but not in danbh-atus. This is therefore problematic that, since both P. 6.4.24 and P. 6.4.120 belong to the Ābhīya-section, the elision of n by P. 6.4.24 should be asiddha with respect to P. 6.4.120. Consequently P. 6.4.120 should not be able to take effect, on account of P. 6.4.22. However, the suffix vat in asiddhavat brings it about that P. 6.4.22 becomes a bit more lenient, as it were. In special cases, like the derivation of debhatuḥ, we may forget the stipulation that rules from the Ābhīya-section are asiddha with respect to each other.

This solution of the problem is as unconvincing as it is ingenious. Kaiyaṭa does not accept it, and brings in another category of speakers, who criticize it. They also propose another way to account for the formation of debhatuḥ. We do not need to follow their arguments, for they contain little that is of interest to us at present. Here it may be remarked that according to Kaiyaṭa the use of both asiddha and asiddhavat is another instance of the well-known practice of sometimes identifying, and sometimes not identifying the object and subject of comparison. The sentence “this one is Brahmadatta” is used besides “this one is like Brahmadatta”; both sentences mean the same thing. Kaiyaṭa gives further illustrations from grammar. Clear is that according to him asiddhavat, more precisely than asiddha, expresses the intended sense in all the three rules that contain the word asiddha.\(^\text{11}\)

\(^{11}\) Loc. cit.: iha kvacid upamānopameyavor abhedam vivaksitvā śāmāyadhikaranyena nirdeśāṁ kriyateyam brahmadatta iti / sāstrepi satvatukor asiddhāḥ hit hiti gota niś iti ca / tatra samarthāh atidēśapatipattiḥ / kvacit tu pratipattilghavāya bhedopakrame vatina nirdeśāṁ kriyate brahmadattavad ayam iti / ihāpi asidhavat atrā bhūt iti /

\(^{12}\) Hyderabad ed. II, p. 904: …asiddho bhavati asiddhavat bhavati / A footnote tells us that the last part asidhavad bhavati is absent in one Ms. But this reading was already there at an early date, for the Nyāsa explains it. See the following note.

\(^{13}\) Nyāsa, vol. VI, p. 330: siddhāśabdō nispavavacanāh / siddham nispavanam ity arthāḥ / na sidham asiddham, anispavam ity ucyate / pariṣṭā ca sāstrām yac ca nispavanam tan na śakvam vacanaṣṭhitvā anispavam [the edition reads anispavasattvāṃ] ṣāṭayāṃ / apadāyāṃ / anyathā na kaś cid duḥkhavivaśāṃ duḥkam anubhavet; asiddhavacanaṇāvā na duḥkhasyāṃ nispavatāt pādanāt [the edition reads -pādanāt] / tasmād yathā
What is remarkable is that the Nyāsa was so close to the truth. But instead of attempting to find out how the Asṭādhyāyī works on the basis of the wording of its sūtras, it here does the opposite: on the basis of an assumed knowledge of the workings of the Asṭādhyāyī, it interprets the rule (wrongly, as we now know).

The cause of all the confusion lies with Kātyāyana. It is true that Kātyāyana says nothing to explain Pāṇini’s use of the two terms asiddha and asiddhavat. But Kātyāyana gives an explanation of the effects of the term asiddha in the first vārttika on P. 6.1.86 (śatvatukor asiddhah), and refers back to that explanation both in the context of P. 6.4.22 (asiddhavyad atrā bhāt) and in that of P. 8.2.1 (pūrvarāssiddham). This indicates already that for Kātyāyana the two terms asiddha and asiddhavat carried the same meaning. What is more, his explanation is such that it merely fits the word asiddhavat (as interpreted by us), not the word asiddha. No wonder that traditional scholars who reflected upon the words asiddha and asiddhavat, taking as point of departure the words of Kātyāyana (and of Patañjali, who follows Kātyāyana), came to the conclusion that asiddha really means asiddhavat.

The word asiddha, according to Kātyāyana, is there to prevent rules from taking effect which depend on the substitute, and to bring it about that those rules take effect which depend on the substituent (asiddhavacanam ādesalakṣaṇapratiṣedhārtham utsargalakṣaṇabhāvārtham ca, V.6.1.86.1). It is easy to see that this explanation fits beautifully the rule P. 6.4.22 as we have come to know it. Indeed, the two parts of Kātyāyana’s statement can be illustrated with the help of jahi and sādhi respectively. This is what Patañjali actually does (Mahābhāṣya, Kielhorn’s edition, III. 187. 6-9). With both these derivations we are already familiar, so that no further elucidation is here needed.

Kātyāyana’s explanation can also help us in certain cases to arrive at correct forms in the domain of P. 8.2.1, e.g., in the derivation of bhugna, which we have studied above. But here we must be careful: the result would be correct, but the derivation would be wrong. This the reader can easily verify for himself. And what is worse, Kātyāyana’s explanation leaves us in the cold when we want to derive vakti. After the change from vac-ti to vac-ci by P. 8.4.40, this explanation would guide us to the incorrect form *vakci.

2.4. Instead of paying more attention to the mistakes that are part of the traditional interpretation of the sūtras we are studying, we shall draw the conclusion that the Sanskrit grammatical tradition is unreliable in this respect. We shall therefore part company with it and proceed to the last sūtra that we have to study.

P. 6.1.86 reads śatvatukor asiddhah [ekah pūrvarayoh 84]. This means: “(The substitution of) one (sound) in the place of a preceding and a following (sound) has not taken effect when (substitution of) ś and (augmentation of) tuk (are to take effect).”
After our study of P. 8.2.1, it is clear that P. 6.1.86 also prescribes an ordered application of rules. In order to see which rules fall under the jurisdiction of P. 6.1.86, we shall have a close look at two examples: the derivations of adhītya and kosicat.

The part of the derivation of adhītya that interests us at present, begins at the stage adhi-i-LyaP. Here two rules apply. P. 6.1.101 (akaḥ savarpe dīrghaḥ) prescribes the substitution of i for i-i. P. 6.1.71 (hrasvasya piti kṛti tuk) prescribes augmentation of tuk after the second i. P. 6.1.86 tells us that P. 6.1.101 has not taken effect when P. 6.1.71 is to take effect; in other words, P. 6.1.71 takes effect first. This leads to adhī-ya. Next P. 6.1.101 takes effect, and we get adhītya. What P. 6.1.86 has effected here, is an ordering of the rules P. 6.1.71 and P. 6.1.101. A study of the derivation of pretya (out of pra-i-ya) would bring to light that P. 6.1.86 similarly effects the ordering of P. 6.1.71 and P. 6.1.87.

This part of our discussion is, though different from what has been said regarding P. 6.1.86 up to this date, not in any way problematic. A difficulty arises in connection with the derivation of kosicat ‘who sprinkled?’ out of ko-asicat. It is true that this difficulty has nothing to do with the particular interpretation given to the word asiddha in this paper. In point of fact, the same difficulty is there for those who stick to the traditional interpretation of that word. But the difficulty is connected with the device, used by Pāṇini, which found expression in the use of the word asiddha. I therefore think that this paper cannot be well brought to a close without paying some attention to it.

In ko-asicat P. 6.1.109 (eṇaḥ padāntād ati) takes effect, and replaces o-a by o. This leads to kosicat. At this stage P. 8.3.59 (ādeśapratyayayoh) finds the conditions for its application fulfilled, and would take effect (which would lead to *kośicat), were it not for P. 6.1.86. P. 6.1.86 stipulates that P. 8.3.59 [81] and P. 6.1.109 can only both take effect in this order, not therefore in the reverse order. There is consequently no possibility for P. 8.3.59 to take effect in kosicat, and this last form remains unchanged, as desired.

All this seems simple enough. The difficulty I talked about is this: If P. 8.3.59 and P. 6.1.109 can only both take effect in this order, why then has P. 6.1.109 not been placed in the Tripādi after P. 8.3.59? In that case the mutual ordering condition of the two rules would already have been known through P. 8.2.1, and no separate mention of it would have been required in P. 6.1.86. What is more, by bringing together in the Tripādi as many as possible of the rules regarding the ordering of which certain conditions exist, a more homogeneous impression would be attained. As it stands, P. 6.1.86 does not give us the impression of being the outcome of profound thoughts on the ordering of rules in this grammar.

Reality belies this impression, as I shall try to show now. In order to understand my solution to the problem at hand, the reader may recall that the Tripādi is built in accordance with a linear ordering of rules. My suggestion is that, if P. 6.1.109 would be placed in the

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14 This our result is the exact opposite of what the Bhāṣya says: adhītya pretya / ekādeśe kṛte hrasvasyeti tug na prāpnoti / asiddhatvād bhavati // (Kielhorn’s ed. III, 65.12-13). Similar disagreement exists regarding kosicat (kosiñcat, as the Bhāṣya says III, 65.11-12).
Tripādi after P. 8.3.59, the linearity of that section would be put into danger. In practical terms, P. 8.3.59 would have to precede itself.

To understand the argument that follows, it must be recalled that the rules of the Aṣṭādhyāyī are arranged, on the whole, subject-wise. That this also applies to the Tripādi, has been shown by Buiskool (1939). The fact is that P. 6.1.109 belongs to a group of sūtras which deal with sandhi of a preceding and following vowel. This group begins with P. 6.1.77 and extends up to P. 6.1.112. If therefore P. 6.1.109 would be admitted in the Tripādi, it would be but natural to expect this whole group to follow. In particular P. 6.1.78 (ecoyavāyāvah) would have to be allowed into the Tripādi, the more so since P. 6.1.109 is an exception to P. 6.1.78. And this rule P. 6.1.78 would have to be placed near P. 6.1.109, i.e., after P. 8.3.59.

But P. 6.1.78 has to precede P. 8.2.80! This is clear from the derivation of amuyā, Instr. Sing. Fem of adas ‘this’. This derivation runs as follows: adas-ṭā > ada-a-ṭā (P. 7.2.102) > ada-a-ṭāp-ṭā (P. 4.1.4) > ada-ā-ā (P. 6.1.97) > adā-ā (P. 6.1.101) > ade-ā (P. 7.3.105) > aday-ā (P. 6.1.78) > amuyā (P. 8.2.80).

P. 8.2.80, in its turn, cannot but precede P. 8.3.59. This can be demonstrated in the derivation of amuṣmai, Dat. Sing. Masc. of adas: adas-نة > ada-a-نة (P. 7.2.102) > ada-نة (P. 6.1.97) > ada-smai (P. 7.1.14) > amuṣmai (P. 8.2.80) > amuṣmai (P. 8.3.59).

[82]

Summing up, if P. 8.3.59 would precede P. 6.1.109 in the Tripādi, it would also precede P. 6.1.78. And in the latter case, the following sūtras would have to occur in the Tripādi, in this order: P. 8.3.59 —> P. 6.1.78 —> P. 8.2.80 —> P. 8.3.59. This means that P. 8.3.59 would have to precede itself in the Tripādi.

If this is the correct explanation of the presence of śatva in P. 6.1.86, our earlier impression that this same word shows the slipshod manner in which the question of rule-ordering has been dealt with in the Aṣṭādhyāyī, disappears as snow in the sun. We are now left with the feeling that this question has been treated with great care in that grammar.

But the presence of śatva in P. 6.1.86 may do more than increasing our esteem for Pāṇini’s grammar. It may further indicate why such a small part of that grammar has been ordered in the Aṣṭādhyāyī. Why, for example, does the Tripādi not cover all the sūtras contained in the last three Adhyāyas of the Aṣṭādhyāyī, which form the part of this grammar where utterances are built up out of the elements introduced in the earlier chapters of the same? (In that case the Tripādi might more appropriately be called the Tryadhyāyī.)

15 A description of the Aṣṭādhyāyī from this point of view can be found in R.S. Bhattacharyya (1966).
17 It must be admitted that the above argument relies heavily on the formation of derivations of adas. But Pāṇini was aware of the dangerous consequences which the formation of certain derivatives of this stem could have on the ordering of rules which he had undertaken in the Tripādi. This is proved by the fact that in P. 8.2.3 (na mu ne) we have a rule which has no other purpose than to lift the ordering imposed by P. 8.2.1 in order to make the formation of amunā possible; amunā is the Instr. Sing. Masc./Neut. of adas.
18 See, e.g., Buiskool (1939: 16).
The answer to this question may well be the same as the one given to explain why P. 6.1.109 was not placed in the Tripādi after P. 8.3.59. It seems that Pāṇini wanted to serve two masters, subjectwise arrangement of rules on the one hand, rule-ordering on the other. And serving two masters could only be done at the expense of pleasing both less. It is true that this answer may not contain the only reason why the Tripādi is so short. But it seems safe to assume that it was one of the considerations responsible for the length of that section.

3. So the Sanskrit grammatical tradition was mistaken. There is a difference between asiddha and asiddhavat. And what is more, the Aṣṭādhya knows the device of rule-ordering, be it only in some of its parts.

It is surprising that Pāṇini could, in this respect, be misunderstood so long. For it is hard to think of a clearer way in which he could have expressed his intentions. This can be shown as follows.

We may assume that Pāṇini had the following two roots at his disposal: 1. sidh ‘take effect’, 2. āp ‘apply’. The second of these two roots (in combination with the preposition pra) is used (at any rate in the grammatical tradition after Pāṇini) to indicate that the conditions under which a rule can operate are fulfilled. This second root can clearly not be used to describe the device of rule-ordering.

It is different with the first root: sidh ‘take effect’. Indeed, a necessary and sufficient condition for rule-ordering is that no following rule has taken effect when an earlier rule is to take effect. In Sanskrit: pūrvatra (sidhyati sati param) asiddham. This expression, as a matter of fact, is less ambiguous than the English one ‘the rules apply in order’. Certainly this English sentence cannot be translated into Sanskrit with the help of the root āp, for the root merely tells us something about the conditions under which rules can operate, nothing about ‘applying’ in an order.

So Pāṇini’s words leave nothing to be desired, nay, are less ambiguous than the phrase commonly used in English to express the same. In spite of that, the tradition managed to grossly misinterpret them. We cannot but express our amazement.

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19 Rule-ordering is limited to the Tripādi; and P. 8.3.33 and P. 8.4.57 are both isolated vowel-sūtras among consonant-sūtras.
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