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Ministerial organization and the politics of policy integration in parliamentary democracies

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FACULTÉ DES SCIENCES SOCIALES ET POLITIQUES

INSTITUT D'ÉTUDES POLITIQUES

Ministerial organization and the politics of policy integration in parliamentary democracies

THÈSE DE DOCTORAT

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de l'Université de Lausanne

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Docteur en science politique

par

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Lausanne, le 17 juin 2024

Abstract

The capacity to formulate cross-sectoral, integrated policies has become a functional requirement that governments face increasingly but seem ill-equipped to deal with because the organisational structure of ministries induces sectoral logics of policy coordination. The literature on policy integration (PI) suggests that reorganisations of governments, and the fusion of ministries in particular, may be instruments for PI. In this thesis, I combine the literature on PI with arguments from organisational theory, which has long studied the effects of organisational structure on coordination, to explore if the distribution of ministerial policy competences may act as a condition explaining the adoption of PI reforms. To answer this question, this study compares the adoption of PI in three policies: environmental protection, employment, and immigrant integration. Based on two novel datasets that cover ministerial organisation and PI reforms in nine parliamentary democracies (Australia, Austria, Canada, France, Germany, Netherlands, New Zealand, Sweden, United Kingdom) between 1970 and 2016, the study applies Qualitative Comparative Analysis (QCA) to identify the complex combinations of political and organisational conditions under which governments adopt PI reforms. The findings show that organisational structure interacts with the preferences of the governing parties and governments' executive capacity in complex patterns that vary between the policies, and are elucidated by case illustrations.

Résumé

La capacité à formuler des politiques intersectorielles et intégrées est devenue une exigence fonctionnelle à laquelle les gouvernements sont de plus en plus confrontés, mais pour laquelle ils semblent mal équipés, car la structure organisationnelle des ministères induit des logiques sectorielles de coordination. La littérature sur l'intégration des politiques publiques (PI) suggère que les réorganisations, et la fusion des ministères en particulier, peuvent faciliter l'adoption de réformes intégrant des politiques publiques. Dans cette thèse, je combine la littérature sur PI avec des arguments de la théorie organisationnelle, qui étudie depuis longtemps les effets de la structure organisationnelle sur la coordination, afin d'explorer si la répartition des compétences ministérielles peut constituer une condition expliquant l'adoption des réformes de l'IP. A cette fin, cette étude compare l'adoption de réformes de PI dans trois politiques publiques : la protection de l'environnement, l'emploi et l'intégration des immigrants. En se basant sur deux nouveaux ensembles de données couvrant l'organisation ministérielle et les réformes PI entre 1970 et 2016 dans neuf démocraties parlementaires (Australie, Autriche, Canada, France, Allemagne, Pays-Bas, Nouvelle-Zélande, Suède, Royaume-Uni), elle applique la Qualitative Comparative Analysis (QCA) pour identifier les combinaisons complexes de conditions politiques et organisationnelles dans lesquelles les gouvernements adoptent des réformes de PI. Les résultats montrent que la structure organisationnelle interagit avec les préférences des partis au pouvoir et la capacité exécutive des gouvernements dans des schémas complexes qui varient d'une politique à l'autre, et sont élucidés par des illustrations de cas.

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Iris Meyer

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INTRODUCTION

In governments around the world, the policy-making functions of the executive are distributed across a number of ministries. The traditional specialisation within government apparatuses, whereby ‘sectoral’ ministries are in charge of tasks concerning specific policy sectors, has been increasingly challenged, however. To the extent that policy-makers and scholars have become aware of the complexity and ambiguity of most policy challenges, the capacity to formulate cross-sectoral, integrated policies has also become a functional requirement that governments, and individual ministries, face increasingly but seem ill-equipped to deal with (Head & Alford, 2015; Peters, 2017). A somewhat intuitive solution to coordination problems consists in the reduction of organisational fragmentation and the integration of competences for different policies within single organisations, a setting in which coordination is arguably easier to achieve (Lægreid, Randma-Liiv, et al., 2014; Peters, 2015). In recent decades, governments have thus merged ministries to combine, for instance, environmental policy functions with those for energy, construction, or transport, or have created ‘super-ministries’ that unite competences for employment and social policies in the context of the ‘activation’ of the welfare state (Cole & Eymeri-Douzans, 2010).

The fragmentation of governance structures and the resulting coordination requirements and dilemmas are a key concern of the literature on policy integration (PI). Policy integration, which refers to the horizontal integration of policies at one level of government, contradicts the logic of highly specialised sectoral institutions and challenges the interests of the clienteles surrounding these administrations (Giessen & Krott, 2009; Peters, 2015; Cejudo & Michel, 2017; Cejudo & Trein, 2023a). Large political-administrative systems need to be divided into separate departments in order to specialise and concentrate expertise, but the sectoral organisation of governments and the multidivisional organisational structure of ministries does not match the requirements of cross-sectoral coordination and integrated policy-making easily. The literature on policy integration and coordination regularly identifies departmentalism, fragmentation and the ‘silo’ organisation of governments as problems when it comes to addressing ‘boundary-spanning’ policy problems that cut across established fields of public policy.

PI has become a central concept in policy research (Cejudo & Michel, 2017; Trein et al., 2018; Runhaar et al., 2020; Knill et al., 2022) and there is a strong case for a more explicitly theoretical turn (Candel & Biesbroek, 2016; Trein, Biesbroek, et al., 2021) to boost the “explanatory ambition” (Biesbroek & Candel, 2020, p. 64) of a research strand many consider conceptually and theoretically underdeveloped (Candel, 2017, p. 535). In the literature on environmental policy integration (EPI), which constitutes the backbone of the PI literature,

many scholars identify the organisational fragmentation of governments as a fundamental problem for achieving EPI. Based on the notion that policy-makers' attention is selective (Baumgartner & Jones, 2002; Baumgartner et al., 2018), PI scholars observe that the sectoral specialisation of governments induces fragmented policy-making within bureaucratic 'silos' and hinders the horizontal coordination and integration of policies (Lafferty & Hovden, 2003; Lafferty, 2004; Schout & Jordan, 2008; Weber & Driessen, 2010; Falaleeva et al., 2011; Nilsson & Persson, 2012; Kent, 2014; Catalano et al., 2015; Feiock et al., 2017; Duffy & Cook, 2018). Scholars concur that specialisation tends to segment problems "rather than presenting a more integrated conception of causes and possible remedies for the difficulties" (Peters, 2015, p. 5) and results in fragmented public action at various stages of the policy cycle (Cejudo & Michel, 2017). Some consider that PI presents a solution to the negative implications of this fragmentation (Briassoulis, 2004; Cejudo & Michel, 2017). Others sustain instead that PI is difficult if not impossible to achieve within fragmented organisational settings and that by amending the latter one can achieve progress on PI (e.g., Ross, 2012). For instance, in an early influential study on EPI in Europe, the EEA (2005) noted that 'compartmentalised' government both within Member States and at the EU level hindered the achievement of the objectives of sustainable development, which governments could address by "restructuring and better coordination within organisations", among other instruments.

Scholars find that the traditional mode of organisation of line ministries is not designed to cope with cross-sectoral challenges. While their multidivisional form allows ministries to maintain relationships with various types of clients at the same time (Döhler, 2015), this arrangement makes coordination between units difficult (Den Uyl & Russel, 2018; Duffy & Cook, 2018). According to Hartlapp (2018), sectorally fragmented settings tend to produce sectorally limited policy outputs that reflect the specific interest constellations and policy dynamics of the respective sectors. For Duffy and Cook (2018), organisational fragmentation between agencies responsible for different policies, in this case environmental protection and public health, goes along with these agencies having different regulatory missions and goals; goal conflict results in inefficient policy, regulators working independently from one another and without knowledge of each other's work. Accordingly, Candel and Biesbroek (2016) and Cejudo and Trein (2023b) suggest that traditional forms of subsystem policy-making – in which a discrete set of stable actors decide on policies – do not lend themselves to policy integration.

Organisational fragmentation as a problem, organisational instruments as a solution?

In the literature on PI, the organisation of government appears as both an obstacle and a tool for policy integration. The literature routinely attributes problems related to PI to organisational fragmentation and sectoral compartmentalisation and highlights the contention regarding PI that arises from different cultures and routines in the bureaucratic

segments of the administration and from the rational interest of each segment to protect its field of competences, resources, processes, and clientele from the intervention of other segments (Lafferty & Hovden, 2003; Jordan & Lenschow, 2010, p. 153; Ashford & Hall, 2011; Peters, 2015, p. X; Cejudo & Trein, 2023b). Virtually all scholars working on EPI identify the sectoral compartmentalisation and fragmentation of government as a fundamental organisational problem for EPI (Weale & Williams, 1992; Collier, 1996; Jordan, 2002b; Hertin & Berkhout, 2003). Scholars concur that the fragmentation and specialisation inherent in contemporary bureaucratic organisation are detrimental to the resolution of complex and cross-cutting policy challenges by governments (Nilsson & Persson, 2012; Trein, 2017b; Duffy & Cook, 2018). Jordan and Lenschow (2010) argue that policy integration as a multi-sectoral coordination challenge “arises because contemporary – that is functionally differentiated – governments organize their governance activities into sectoral ministries and (increasingly) decentralized agencies” (p. 150). This line of reasoning is mostly present in early research on policy integration that took specific cross-cutting policy challenges, such as environmental concerns or climate change, as point of departure and analysed the extent to which their objectives are integrated into other policy sectors, focusing on processes of coordination and integration between public organisations (Metcalf, 1994; Peters, 1998; Jordan & Schout, 2006). Duffy and Cook (2018) show that the organisational fragmentation challenges EPI in the US: Not only does the internal fragmentation of the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) into different environmental media lead to media-specific environmental legislation; in addition, the external fragmentation between agencies in domains such as energy and environment pushed regulators to work independently of each other, pursuing different missions and goals.

In public management reform, initiatives such as ‘whole-of-government’, ‘joined-up government’, ‘holistic’ and ‘network’ governance and the like, have emerged to strengthen the coordination and integration of government systems (Perri 6 et al., 2002; Bogdanor, 2005; Christensen & Lægreid, 2007). Practitioners routinely call for reorganisations of government apparatuses when a need for more ‘integrated’, ‘holistic’ policy-making is identified (e.g., Loske, 2016). Reorganisations hold the promise, the argument goes, to facilitate coordination between administrations by moving them closer together organisationally. B. Guy Peters (2015) contends that fusions represent a seemingly logical solution to coordination problems, although the actual gains from implementing them are more apparent than real (p. 86). Practitioners debate issues surrounding ministerial organisation arduously (e.g., Nethercote, 1999). In practice, ministerial fusions, and the creation of ‘large’ ministries in particular, meet with much scepticism and concerns over the rebalancing of power relationships between sectors and issues that they entail. For instance, the fusion of the ministries for Agriculture and Environment following the election of the far-right president Jair Bolsonaro in Brazil

prompted ecologists to voice concerns that the powerful agricultural lobby's access to the environmental policy agenda threatened environmental protection seriously (Le Monde, 2018). Prior fusions of ministries in these areas triggered similar reactions. For instance, in France, a former minister for the Environment accused a new government that fused the ministry for the Environment with the ministry for Equipment in 2008 of terminating the former (Lepage, 2008). Evaluations of past experiences with reorganisations can provide evidence into their premises, costs, and benefits, but evidence is mixed and does not travel easily between countries (Cole & Eyméri-Douzans, 2010; White & Dunleavy, 2010). There is no uniformly applicable guideline to how governments should alter the structure and operations of ministries and rearrange their objectives in order to tackle cross-cutting challenges most effectively.

Parts of the literature on environmental PI, which constitutes the backbone of the literature on PI, are devoted to characterising institutional and organisational structures and procedures as instruments for EPI (Jordan & Schout, 2006). Numerous contributions analyse how strategic, procedural, and administrative instruments for integrating environmental concerns into other policies have proliferated over the decades (Jordan & Lenschow, 2008a; Lenschow, 2002a; Nilsson & Eckerberg, 2007; Wurzel et al., 2013). To a more limited extent, this perspective is also present in the literature on PI in spatial planning and land use policy (Stead & Geerlings, 2005; Stead & Meijers, 2009; Weber & Driessen, 2010) and in the CPI literature (e.g., Adelle et al., 2009; Kivimaa & Mickwitz, 2009; Dovers & Hezri, 2010).

From a policy design perspective, the PI literature looks at different types of instruments associated with different levels and forms of coordination, capacity building, and learning, among others. Organisational or administrative instruments appear alongside other instrument types, such as strategic or procedural ones. This mirrors the more general literature on policy instruments, which lists 'organisation' as a type of governance tool or instrument at governments' disposal (Hood, 1983). Scholars suggest that these instruments have the potential to influence PI policy-making at the policy formulation stage (Jacob & Volkery, 2004; Schout & Jordan, 2008). According to Kivimaa and Mickwitz (2006), who analyse EPI in Finnish technology policy, the policy principle of integration needs to be tied into organisational or process change at all stages of the policy cycle in order for PI to generate results. Howlett and Saguin (2018) propose that PI is strongest when it "involves the creation of permanent roles or institutions" for cross-cutting issues ('policy institutionalisation'), which can be organisations as well as formal or informal policy-making mechanisms (p. 9). Steurer (2007) refers to the role of 'policy hardware' in a similar sense. According to Knudsen and Lafferty (2016), the EPI principle must be "firmly anchored in and through the ongoing political-administrative processes" (p. 359).

In this regard, the OECD (2002) evokes the presence of an “institutional ‘catalyst’” (p. 8) for the implementation of SD strategies, referring to a ministry or a select committee in charge of enforcing the strategy. Other instruments of this category include formal structural tools, such as green cabinets, environmental units and correspondents within other sectoral ministries, and inter-ministerial working groups, as well as more procedural ones, such as bureaucratic rules and standard operating procedures, staff training, specification of output and/or tasks, liaison officers, task forces and teams, and mission statements (Jacob & Volkery, 2004; Persson, 2004; Jacob et al., 2008; Jordan & Lenschow, 2008a; Schout & Jordan, 2008; Ross, 2012). Ross (2012) points to advice and training as well as information flows as mechanisms for PI that are enshrined in government operations (Chapter 7). Portman et al. (2012) mention integration of knowledge across sectors (horizontal) and planning hierarchy and regulatory commissions (vertical) among PI governance instruments.

Various contributions that analyse EPI from the perspective of its instrumentation list changes to government organisation among organisational instruments because they have the potential to counteract fragmentation and sectoral compartmentalisation (Jacob & Volkery, 2004; Persson, 2004, 2007; Schout & Jordan, 2008; Ross, 2012). These authors sustain that the organisation of government and the allocation of policy functions can act as an instrument to encourage and support coordination processes (Ross, 2012; Negev, 2016). Ross (2012) finds that changes to the organisation of government or to the allocation of functions can support PI for SD in the UK. Merging separate and conflicting responsibilities into a single ministry, changes to the allocation of functions, advice, and training, information flows, and policy-making processes, may help remove tensions between conflicting interests. Similarly, the OECD (2002) suggests that issue-oriented organisational structures are better equipped than sectoral ones to support the institutionalisation of SD strategies. Ferry (2021) conceptualises ‘super-ministries’ that integrate different policy fields under one ministerial portfolio among the structural instruments that promote coordination through structural or organisational mechanisms and foster joint working in the management of a crosscutting policy problem that transgresses the boundaries of traditional subsystems. Studying the integration of climate change and energy policy in the EU, Adelle, Pallemmaerts and Chiavari (2009) however argue that the fusion of energy and climate change within a single DG in the EC might well improve the coordination of decision-making, but that improved coordination between climate change and energy may come at the cost of making coordination of climate change with other sectors. In other words, tightening the coordination between two sectors might loosen coordination with other sectors: “this result [enhanced coordination] may well be achieved at the expense of wider cross-sectoral coordination with climate-relevant policy areas outside the energy sector and environmental and sustainable development objectives other than the reduction of GHG emissions” (p. 62).

Research questions

In sum, scholars of policy integration often implicitly or explicitly consider changes to the organisational structure of policy-making institutions as an instrument that has the potential of strengthening coordination and bringing about policy integration. In spite of the recent focus on the impact of subsystems on PI (Cejudo & Trein, 2023a), research still pays insufficient attention to the ways in which organisational arrangements and structures delimit the possibility space for the adoption of PI reforms in different political systems and policy fields and the mechanisms behind their adoption. Changing the organisation of a ministry may well affect sectoral boundaries, and thereby open up or restrain possibilities for the adoption of PI. Yet, the role of these factors has remained theoretically underspecified and our understanding of how the organisational structure of ministries matters for the adoption of policy integration has remained fragmented and incomplete. A more detailed and nuanced understanding of the organisational conditions under which policy integration reforms become adopted is still to be achieved. Seeking to take a closer look at the relationship between the organisational structure of governments and policy integration in Western parliamentary governments, the research question of this thesis is: *Does the formal distribution of policy functions between ministries of government have the potential to explain the adoption of policy integration reforms by governments?*

Although different literatures address the impact of the ‘organisational dimension’ on policy-making, to date scholars’ collective understanding of how the distribution of competences within and between ministries matters for the adoption of policy integration reforms remains fragmented and incomplete. In this thesis I propose to conceptualise the organisational configuration of governments’ policy functions for a specific policy as consisting in two dimensions: on the one hand, the spread (i.e., degree of concentration versus fragmentation) of policy functions across ministries, and on the other hand, the portfolio combination (Hegele, 2021) of these policy functions within ministerial jurisdictions (i.e., the question whether they are combined with substantively related policy functions). Relatedly, the first sub-question reads as follows: *Are governments that concentrate the policy functions for a policy within one ministry or that combine policy functions for several policies within large ministries consistently associated with the adoption of policy integration reforms?*

The choice of integrating and coordinating policy sectors is not made in a political vacuum, but can be highly contested politically (Peters, 1998; Perri 6, 2004; Davies, 2009; Winkel & Sotirov, 2016; Tosun & Lang, 2017). PI is subject to dynamics inherent to any kind of policy process, including organisational routines, turf wars and organisational capture (Peters, 2015; Hustedt & Danken, 2017). PI scholars who identify ‘departmentalism’ in government as a crucial obstacle to PI implicitly assume that PI takes place as early as the policy formulation

stage and that ministerial politics play a crucial role for explaining when and why governments embrace PI. In parliamentary democracies, the government is the key policy-making actor with a dominant role in law-making processes (Bräuninger & Debus, 2009; Lysek & Zbiral, 2022; König et al., 2023; Zbiral et al., 2023). The literature on parliamentary governments generally assumes that the executive, i.e., governments and their administrations, drive the legislative agenda initiate the lion's share of all legislative projects, in particular those legislative projects that are eventually adopted (Mayntz & Scharpf, 1975; Schüttemeyer & Siefken, 2008; Bräuninger & Debus, 2009; Rasch & Tsebelis, 2011; Brunner, 2013).¹ Governments put emphasis on different policy issues and advocate different policy solutions depending on the preferences of the governing parties and on the constraints under which they operate. Concomitantly, the PI literature suggests that the levels of PI adopted may differ substantially between subsequent governments (as Kaplaner et al., 2023, observed for subsequent EU commissions). Political and institutional factors should therefore be relevant for understanding how consistently specific organisational features of government are associated with the adoption of PI. Therefore, the relationship between the organisational integration of policy functions and policy integration reforms must be apprehended as a causally complex one. Rather than on their own, organisational factors should matter depending on how they combine with the political context (Scharpf, 1989; Pollitt & Dan, 2013; Lægreid, Sarapuu, et al., 2014). Therefore, the second sub-question is: *Does the formal distribution of policy functions between ministries of government combined with institutional and political conditions have the potential to explain the adoption of policy integration reforms?*

Answering these research questions contributes to the emerging literature on governments' institutional capacity for policy integration (Domorenok et al., 2021a) by conceptualising and operationalising the formal organisational structure of governments' policy functions for specific sectoral policies and thus putting this rather abstract concept into empirical practice. Moreover, it contributes to the emerging literature on the policy effects of governments' organisational choices (Fleischer et al., 2022; Klüser, 2022). As I will show in the course of the investigation, the link between the integration of the government's organisational structure as regards a policy challenge and the adoption of policy integration reforms depends on how organisational conditions combine with institutional and political characteristics of the government.

¹ Scholars of Westminster systems of government in particular highlight that the government's policy agenda is determined in cabinet and that legislators have limited say over which policies are pursued (Laver & Shepsle, 1996; Kam, 2009). As Kam (2009) puts it, "Westminster parliamentary government is characterized by (...) cabinet's near monopoly of executive and legislative power" (p. 6).

Comparative approach

Within the PI literature, institutional design and organisational factors feature most prominently in the literature on environmental PI. Even before PI emerged as a concept, environmental policy researchers asserted that bureaucratic fragmentation presented a challenge to environmental policy (Weale, 1992), e.g., in the context of the USA (Caldwell, 1975; Davies & Mazurek, 1998) and Canada (Doern & Conway, 1994). Scholars of global environmental governance have suggested that the institutions and organisations active in the field do not live up to the challenges of fragmentation and the lack of coordination (Biermann, Pattberg, et al., 2009). Scholars of environmental politics also highlight that the status of environmental ministries among the ministries of a government is traditionally low (Weale & Williams, 1992).

In sum, the literature on environmental PI has much focused on the challenges inherent to bureaucratic fragmentation. While the literature on environmental PI continues to constitute an important part of the PI literature, the latter has also become much more diverse as regards the policies and sectors studied (Trein et al., 2019). This thesis adopts a comparative approach compares the links between ministerial organisational structure and the adoption of PI reforms as regards three policies: environmental protection, unemployment, and immigrant integration. These three policy challenges present characteristics of what the literature on coordination call ‘wicked problems’, i.e., problems that are transversal and have multiple causes (and solutions) rooted in different policy sectors, and can therefore be addressed effectively only through a ‘holistic’ approach (Head & Alford, 2015; Peters, 2017). That is, all three policy challenges have come to be perceived as multi-faceted by policy-makers and scholars, and ‘holistic’ approaches spanning two or more policy sectors have been developed by the policy communities and adopted by governments as a response. Given that the primary objective of this study is to understand the factors driving the adoption of PI reforms by governments, there was little point in including policy challenges that have not been the object of PI. Although these three policies all tackle complex challenges, they also present differences and similarities. Therefore, one of the research interests of this thesis is also to explore how these differences and similarities between policies intervene in the relationship between organisational structure and PI reforms.

Given the underdevelopment of theoretical perspectives on the link between organisational structure and policy outputs, this research has a predominantly inductive, theory-building purpose. To investigate the relationship between the organisational structure of governments and policy integration in parliamentary democracies, I compare the nine countries Australia, Austria, Canada, France, Germany, the Netherlands, New Zealand, Sweden, and the United Kingdom. I take specific policy challenges as a starting point and investigate both how

governments organise their policy functions with regard to them, and the policy integration reforms adopted by them, over a long period of time (1970-2016). To explore when and why governments adopt PI reforms, I compare policies in which problem pressure was felt across countries and in which governments did embrace policy integration as a solution at some point in time.

How organisational structure matters in the PI literature

Authors who claim that ministerial organisation is a tool for PI argue that a ministry's structure shapes its access to policy processes. A fusion with a ministry responsible for another policy sector, such as transport or agriculture, grants a ministry for the Environment direct access to policy-making in that other sector (Jordan & Lenschow, 2008b). By extending the span of a ministry's competences governments can ensure that this ministry controls a large number of functions and issues related to environmental policy (Müller, 2002). According to Hey (2002), sectoral regulatory capacity and the influence of environmental coalitions in sector policy are necessary for achieving EPI. In studying EPI in transport politics in six European countries and in the EU, Hey observes the influence of environmental coalitions in the supra-national agenda-setting phase, which is frequently responsive to environmental arguments voiced by economists from various DGs as well as environmental groups and academics. Decision-making, however, is sector and status quo oriented because of the unanimity rule, and environmental arguments are widely excluded because ministries for the Environment are generally "marginalized as players in the sectoral decision-making process" (Hey, 2002, p. 144). Therefore, regulatory capacity is low to moderate and tends to produce symbolic policies and trend-enhancing policy decisions that defend vested interests.

In the literature on EPI, scholars link the organisation of the ministry for Environment with its political strength, arguing that a strong ministry for the Environment is necessary for governments to adopt EPI. This is the case of those EPI scholars that explain EPI from the perspective of bureaucratic politics, first introduced in EPI research by Weale (1992, 1998). This view contends that in order to achieve EPI, governments must first strengthen the environmental ministry both politically and administratively (Doern, 1993; Weale, 1998; OECD, 2002a; Jacob & Volkery, 2004; Schout & Jordan, 2008). The OECD (2002a), for instance, defined a strong leading ministry as one among several organisational prerequisites to achieve sustainable development. Similarly, Biesbroek et al. (2010) argue that national CPI strategies require a strong leading ministry that initiates and develops the strategy. According to Storbjörk and Isaksson (2013), a strong environmental administration is necessary for EPI processes to become effective, because "unless sector and environmental concerns have similar weight, the practical efforts of EPI might as well result in policy dilution, diffusion and/or evaporation" (p. 1025). Conversely, in the EPI and CPI literatures the weakness of the

sectoral ministries is a recurrent factor in explanations of why policy integration failed. For instance, Steurer and co-authors hint at the political weakness of ministries for the Environment to explain why sustainable development strategies have failed to change governance processes (Nordbeck & Steurer, 2016, p. 8). In studying the governance and management of such strategies as governance instruments, these authors ask under which conditions these strategies help coordinate across sectors and build a knowledge base for policy formulation (Nordbeck & Steurer, 2016; Steurer & Martinuzzi, 2005). They suggest that the political weakness of the ministry for the Environment combined with little support by other ministries, a lack of political salience, and a marginalisation on the political agenda, hampered the potential of these strategies to effectively influence the policy process in favour of CPI (Casado-Asensio & Steurer, 2015, pp. 96–97). In particular, the balance of power between a weak ministry for the Environment and strong sector ministries is a classical concern. Analysing the Canadian *Department of Environment*, Doern (1993) argued that this ministry “must confront and understand the bases of power of those who are already there” if it wants to become more influential in government decision-making (p. 175). Busch and Jörgens (2005a, 2005b) have pictured ministries for the Environment as an instrument of environmental policy change in some contexts. Conversely, studies tend to show that the interest in and backing of EPI by other ministries is usually weak, as Skovgaard (2013) shows for the negotiation of climate policy targets. In the EPI literature, some contend that a strong ministry for the Environment favours the politicisation of environmental issues and can thus bargain with other sectors on more equal terms, which in turn increases the odds for the adoption of PI reforms (Weale, 1998; Jacob & Volkery, 2004; Schout & Jordan, 2008; Runhaar et al., 2020). Conversely, Nordbeck & Steurer (2016) find that sustainable development strategies failed to change governance processes when there was a lack of political salience and a marginalisation on the political agenda, combined with the political weakness of the ministry for the Environment and little support from other ministries. In the case of climate policy in the UK described by Carter and Jacobs (2014), significant policy entrepreneurship within the government came from ministers who played an active role in creating public concern and pressure that generated the political space it needed to develop a more radical climate policy strategy (p. 134).

Some scholars of EPI reflect about the potential of organisational instruments (in particular, changes to the organisational structure of the ministry for the Environment) to change inter-ministerial power constellations (Jacob & Volkery, 2004; Jacob et al., 2008). They argue that organisational reforms have the potential to alter the ministerial politics through which policy decisions are made. Organisational tools “might seek to strengthen some actors (for example, environmental ministries) at the expense of others, open up existing networks or even create completely new actors to push forward environmental concerns” (Jordan & Lenschow, 2008b,

p. 11; also Jacob et al., 2008, p. 27). Doern (1993), who examines the potential of the Canadian Department of Environment to become a more central agency, argues that the ministry “must confront and understand the bases of power” of its ministerial peers (p. 175). He argues that in order to increase its status, the ministry would need an extended statutory mandate, extended capacity to deal with the increasing volume of decisions, structured contact with other departments, support by external actors in the green policy community, and a convincing analytical and scientific capacity for sustainable development. Some scholars support the idea that a government can alter the power balance between the ministry for the Environment and sectoral ministries for the benefit of the former by fusing the ministry for the Environment with another ministry (Jacob et al., 2008; Jacob & Volkery, 2004; Jordan & Lenschow, 2008b; Schout & Jordan, 2008; Wurzel et al., 2013).

An important part of the PI literature takes a cognitive perspective on PI resulting from processes of context-specific (re)framing of problem definitions, objectives, or organisational processes among actors with potentially diverging belief systems (Nilsson, 2005, 2007; Nilsson & Nilsson, 2005; Nilsson & Eckerberg, 2007; Storbjörk & Isaksson, 2013). This approach emphasises the need to understand how ideas and discourses permeate policies and how PI can be achieved through changes to the mindsets of policy-makers and relevant stakeholders (Nilsson & Nilsson, 2005). The sources of actors’ beliefs and interests that stimulate or impede coordination are thus of main interest in these studies. Scholars suggesting that PI should be approached from a cognitive perspective argue that policy entrepreneurs or advocacy coalitions construct PI through problem definition and policy frames that translate into perceptions about the goals, causal chains and the appropriate solution to a policy problem (Nilsson, 2005; Feindt, 2010; Gabler, 2010; Bocquillon, 2018). At the level of the EU, authors have pointed to a rethinking regarding EPI in several Commission services, often as a consequence of a change of leadership. For instance, environmental ideas infiltrated the Energy and Transport DG and resulted in some novel policy approaches in these areas (Hey, 2002). A similar learning process within the Regional Policy DG resulted in closer cooperation with the Environment DG (Lenschow, 2002a). EPI may be embraced more partially, however, when a unit responsible for policy-making is divided as regards the dominant paradigms (Lauber, 2002). However, this literature also highlights that the emergence of integrated policy frames is constrained by the way in which policy-making is organised within government, i.e., the formal ownership and competences of ministries (Nilsson & Persson, 2003; Nilsson, 2005). Nilsson (2005) shows that EPI in Swedish energy policy was driven by frame evolution but also constrained by “how policy-making is organized in central government”. Conversely, the reorganisation of government ministries may favour the emergence of integrated policy frames (Persson, 2007, p. 40). However, the impact of organisational structure however depends on the existence of other coordination

mechanisms and on the robustness of organisational identities (Eckerberg et al., 2007). Eckerberg and co-authors found that in the case of Sweden, PI stemmed rather from coordination taking place between environmental and sectoral units than from organisational structure. Since significant coordination between ministries routinely takes place in Sweden, the effects of organisational shifts between ministries were limited and did not change policy learning significantly (Eckerberg et al., 2007, p. 113).

The literature on the 'activation turn' in employment policy does not theorise on the impact of ministerial organisation. Heyes and Rychly (2013a) however observe that governments' "efforts to strengthen the link between welfare entitlements and participation in the labour market have also led many governments (...) to locate responsibility for social protection and employment policy within a single ministry" (p. 11). In addition, there are case studies that have provided evidence for causal processes linking specific changes in the organisational structure of the government ministries responsible for unemployment issues and the adoption of activation reforms (Carmel & Papadopoulos, 2003; Wiggan, 2007; Schiller, 2010, 2016). Scholars studying activation policy in Germany have interpreted the German government's move to concentrate all aspects of unemployment policies within the Federal ministry for Employment and Social affairs as signalling the government's willingness to adopt a more far-reaching activation approach to the unemployment benefits system (Schiller, 2010, p. 50; Hassel & Schiller, 2010; Champion, 2013; Schiller, 2016, p. 156). One of the most explicit arguments about the policy effects of ministerial organisation on the activation turn is made by Schiller (2010) who found that the creation of the ministry for Social Affairs and Employment (BMAS) "broke the deadlock" of unemployment policy reform in the Germany of the 1990s, with far-reaching policy consequences. Similarly, Wiggan (2007) concludes that the creation of the Ministry for Work and Pensions by the second Labour government in the United Kingdom was part of a neo-liberal assessment of unemployment and social security policy that aimed at facilitating the introduction of the activation principle in unemployment policy. These studies suggest that the fusions of the ministries were a precondition for the adoption of large-scale policy reform through their effects on decision-making. In countries with a strong principle of ministerial responsibility in particular, the rearrangement of ministerial portfolios may thus pave the way for comprehensive reforms, which had not been successfully coordinated under conditions of dispersed ministerial responsibility (Schiller, 2010, 2016).

In sum, the literature on policy integration suggests that the organisational structure of government ministries can serve as an instrument for PI, but the contextual conditions remain unclear. Organisational arrangements generally take the role of 'second-order' factors in explanatory frameworks in the PI literature (Runhaar et al., 2014). Explanatory factors of an organisational nature have been hinted at, but they have not been explicitly conceptualised

as parts of causal configurations behind the adoption of PI reforms. Organisational factors tend to be confined to a “residual ‘black box’ for EPI” but not to be brought directly into analytical frameworks (Nilsson & Persson, 2003). A recent meta-analysis of EPI literature suggests that “it is not so much specialized versus integrative approaches that are at issue, but how each is applied in practice” (Runhaar et al., 2020, p. 201). That is, the actual detailed design and architecture of specialised or integrated environmental institutions matter to the extent that they translate into practices of integrated policy-making or fail to do so. It is argued here that organisational structure provides an infrastructure for PI (Persson, 2007) that one must study within the context of the political system and the policy sector. By focusing on the organisational dimension of government, this study contributes to recent advances in the analysis of the politics behind the adoption of PI (Candel & Biesbroek, 2016; Cejudo & Michel, 2017; Biesbroek & Candel, 2020; Trein, Maggetti, et al., 2021; Cejudo & Trein, 2023a).

The politics of government organisation

Despite ministries’ central role in the policy process, policy analysis has paid only limited attention to ministries as actors in the policy process (Smith et al., 1995; Mätzke, 2010). The literature studied and recognised the role of ministries especially until the 1980s, before turning ‘inwards’ towards the role and functions of ‘core executives’, ‘downwards’ towards agencies and independent regulators, ‘upwards’ towards supranational bodies and processes of policy-making, and ‘sideways’ towards private organisations and societal actors. As regards heterogeneity within governments, policy analysts focused on the opposition between the ‘elected executive’ and the ‘bureaucracy’ (Howlett et al., 2009, pp. 61-70) rather than between different ministries.

The current state of knowledge on governments’ organisational choices in parliamentary systems is dispersed and often implicit and contained in several bodies of literature from different subfields of the social sciences (Bezes & Le Lidec, 2016, pp. 511–517). An extensive empirical research on the ‘machinery of government’ established the organisation of ministries and governments as a classical object for administrative scientists as early as the 1960s. As regards political science, coalition theory is concerned with portfolio allocation, reshuffle and ministerial selection in the context of government formation in parliamentary systems. When explaining governments’ organisational choices, scholars highlight functional as well as political rationales (Böckenförde, 1964, p. 141; Siedentopf, 1976, p. 2; Derlien, 1996; Fernandes et al., 2016), recur to both environmental and intentional elements (Egeberg, 1994, p. 86), and look how these build on existing organisational and institutional setups (Lehnguth & Vogelgesang, 1988).

Classical studies of the formal organisation of the executive branch of government identified multiple reasons behind governments’ organisational choices. Scholars interested in the

'machinery of government' performed both case studies and longitudinal comparative studies; the former carved out the political and administrative conditions and mechanisms shaping the decision-making processes of specific reorganisations, and the latter identified patterns of and determinants behind reorganisation decisions taken by various successive governments (Chester & Willson, 1968; Hood et al., 1985; Pollitt, 1984; Radcliffe, 1991). An interest in the structure of government existed also in German administrative science of the 1970s, where the federal setting provided fertile ground for comparisons of prevailing ministerial structures (in German: *Ressortzuschnitt*) in the different German Länder (Derlien, 1988, 1996). These literatures established that governments reorganise ministerial structure for multiple reasons (Pollitt, 1984; Wettenhall, 1989; Derlien, 1996; White & Dunleavy, 2010). Most studies established "lengthy laundry lists" (Salamon, 1981, p. 473) of the rationales behind reorganisations but failed to trace the influences of these factors or to articulate them with one another or with a broader theory. Efforts to provide synthesis mainly grouped these determinants into the three classical dimensions polity, policy, and politics (Davis et al., 1999). Derlien (1996) suggests that all reorganisations represent compromises between policy field specific, organisational, and political constraints (p. 550). An oft-cited comparative study of machinery of government change in Anglo-Saxon countries concluded that due to the various policy, politics and administrative implications of reorganisations, "it is difficult, and perhaps impossible, to accurately desegregate [sic]² the motives which inspire any given machinery change. [Reformers] think across categories rather than within the neat boxes necessary for a viable typology of machinery decisions" (Davis et al., 1999, p. 43).

In the 1980s, administrative policy became a tool of government in its own right (Hood, 1983; Bezes, 2002, 2009). Concomitantly, the lion's share of the research on ministries since the 1980s has focused on their organisational structure. Based on systematic data collection on ministries' structural design, scholars have followed both static and dynamic approaches to draw analytic pictures of similarities and differences between types of government organisations or over time. Among the static approaches, the 'bureaumatic' approach set out to quantitatively characterise ministries regarding a large number of indicators (Hood & Dunsire, 1981; Hood et al., 1984), whereas the 'bureau-shaping model' classified government organisations according to the types of budget and other spending characteristics (Dunleavy, 1989a, 1989b). Conversely, longitudinal approaches typically examine patterns of changes in the number and types of public organisations, mainly focussing on agencies. By looking at populations of organisations and showing how population size changes as individual organisations experience change events such as creation, termination, split or merger, this literature captures aspects of structural continuity and change within and across countries

² Read "disaggregate" instead of "desegregate".

(Pollitt, 1984; White & Dunleavy, 2010; Glor, 2011). In recent years, political scientists have picked up these approaches to study the structural design of ministerial organisation from a comparative perspective, while renewing them both conceptually and methodologically. MacCarthaigh, Roness and colleagues build on time-series databases and the concept of organisational life cycles in order to classify different types of change events for comparative purpose (MacCarthaigh et al., 2012; MacCarthaigh & Roness, 2012). The longitudinal perspective allows these authors to paint detailed pictures of the structural evolution of state bureaucracies and differences across countries, while providing insights into the reasons for specific organisational reform events. For instance, longitudinal analyses of continuity and change of the administrative restructuring in Ireland and in post-communist Estonia reveal that in both cases different logics were at play at different moments in time (MacCarthaigh, 2012; Sarapuu, 2012). Bezes, Fleischer and colleagues combine longitudinal and static comparisons to map and analyse organisational reforms in four European parliamentary democracies (France, United Kingdom, Netherlands, Germany). The approach allows these scholars to systematically map intra-organisational units across policy portfolios and countries over time and to analyse reorganisation hazards (Fleischer et al., 2022). For instance, by mapping intra-organisational units of German federal ministries over time, they show that while the basic structure of federal ministries has remained relatively stable, there are increasingly differences between portfolios: some are more volatile than others (Fleischer et al., 2018), and structural differentiation of intra-ministerial units has become increasingly diverse (Bertels & Schulze-Gabrechten, 2020). Carroll et al. (2022) use event history modelling to link macro-level changes in the number and types of organisations with types of transitions of individual organisations at specific moments, thereby combining explanations of structural change in central state bureaucracies with determinants of survival of individual public organisations. However, Smith et al. (1995) found that researchers seemed “content to describe the structural change and problems with implementation rather than dealing with the questions of how these changes affect the internal politics of the department and the policy process” (p. 50).

The structure-policy nexus: challenges for research

The potential for deliberate public policy reform by way of organisational design remains one of the most debated and challenging questions in comparative public administration research (Olsen, 1997; Peters, 2015). Although the relation between organisational structure and policy is an old field of study, it has remained surprisingly under-specified conceptually and theoretically. As Döhler (2015, 2020) observes, political scientists frequently argue that organisation ‘matters’, but exactly when and how it matters remains unresolved (similarly, Toonen, 2012; Bezes & Le Lidec, 2016a). The link between organisational features and policy

outputs is a challenging one in theoretical terms but also in terms of research methodology. How exactly the link between organisational structure and policy can best be analysed is a question that neither policy analysis nor administrative science have so far answered authoritatively. In particular, the marriage of public policy analysis and organisational sociology remains an uneasy one (Musselin, 2005; Bogumil & Jann, 2009; Jann, 2009). Major difficulties lie in both isolating the effect of organisational structure from other potentially influencing factors, such as power shifts beyond the ministerial realm or conceptual learning and frame changes (Scharpf, 1989; Sarapuu et al., 2014, p. 265), as well as in the lack of a counterfactual (Hood et al., 1985, pp. 77–78; Hegele, 2021, p. 7). Christensen and Lægreid (2001) assert that researchers infer from organisational processes to effects too easily. Pollitt's (2009) finding that evaluations of the results of administrative reorganisations are scarce and that information on the processes is much more abundant corroborates this view. He observes that "structural changes are usually connected to outputs and outcomes only by quite long causal chains" that make it difficult to trace the degree to which an outcome, such as an organisation's improved performance, would have happened even if the first step in the chain, a specific structural chain, had been absent (p. 286). This major difficulty boils down to the question exactly what type of mechanism is necessary to demonstrate a causal effect of organisational structures (Scharpf, 1982). Case studies based on observations gathered before and after a reorganisation event seem well-suited for identifying behavioural effects causally related to this event (Vestlund, 2015). Still, Bækgaard (2011) argues that one needs longitudinal data on the working of mechanisms before and after a reorganisation in order to tame the endogeneity problem and enhance internal validity. Some argue that the probability of revealing lasting effects of coordination arrangements increases with time (Sarapuu et al., 2014, pp. 274–275), especially if one wants to trace changes on informal dimensions of organisation (Christensen & Lægreid, 2013).

Structure of the thesis

The thesis is structured as follows. The theoretical framework in **Chapter 1** conceptualises PI as an output of policy-making processes at the agenda-setting and decision-making stage in which ministerial policy coordination plays a central role. It argues that the formal distribution of policy functions influences the policy logics of coordination, which interact with political logics. The latter are structured through party-political competition and favour political solutions that help achieve electoral success. The description of the theoretical framework allows to substantiate the argument that the relationship between organisational structure and the outputs of policy-making processes is apprehended as a causally complex one. The framework addresses several gaps in the literature. It aims to contribute to a more precise and purposeful conceptual development of the organisational dimension in political science

in general (Bogumil & Jann, 2009; Döhler, 2015, 2020) and in the analysis of policy processes in particular. It also contributes to the literature on the ‘politics of policy integration’ (Cejudo & Trein, 2023a) by conceptualising the interplay between different causal conditions – those related to the administrative and the political sphere of government – and their combined impact on the adoption of policy integration reforms. **Chapter 2** is dedicated to framing the comparison between the three policies. It clarifies how PI is defined with regard to each of the policies, elaborates on differences and similarities of the policies that may explain patterns in the empirical results, and defines the ministerial policy functions for each policy. The operationalisation, research design, and methodology are presented in **Chapter 3**. In addition to shedding further light on the organisational and political conditions that explain when and why governments adopt policy coordination and integration reforms, this research takes advantage of a compound research design comparing cases nested in political systems and policy sectors (Levi-Faur, 2006). The countries chosen to be examined in this study (Australia, Austria, Canada, France, Germany, Netherlands, New Zealand, Sweden, United Kingdom) are all parliamentary democracies and chosen in a way to keep the institutional context relatively constant. To explore the expectations empirically, this research makes use of two novel and comprehensive datasets that both cover the nine aforementioned parliamentary democracies between 1970 and 2016. The first one contains all PI reforms in these three policies adopted at the national level. The second dataset describes the ministerial organisation of policy functions for these three policies. Given that the theoretical framework expects the relationship between the conditions and the outcome to be a causally complex one, the study uses the methodological approach and techniques of Qualitative Comparative Analysis (QCA), complemented with extensive illustrations of cases nested in the solution paths.

Chapters 4 to 6 contain the empirical part of this research. In a first step, **Chapter 4** presents the data gathered in the course of this research from a descriptive, longitudinal perspective, providing detailed descriptions of how the ministerial organisation of policy functions for the three policies evolved between 1970 and 2016. **Chapter 5** presents the results of the configurational analysis. In identifying the configurations of organisational and political conditions consistently associated with the adoption of PI reforms, the analyses allow to identify distinct paths leading to the adoption of PI reforms in each of the three policies and two time periods (1980s-1990s and 2000s-2010s). The analyses show considerable variation in the combinations of conditions that lead to the adoption of PI both between policies and the two time periods. They are complemented with extensive illustrations of typical, deviant, and counterfactual cases that assess the plausibility of the results by elucidating how the conditions of each of the paths interact. **Chapter 6** discusses the results by comparing the main findings on each of the three policies and also discussing additional explanatory conditions. Finally, the **Conclusion** discusses how the results of the study fit into the literature,

especially on PI, how they relate to previous findings, and what we learn from them, and also reflects on methodological choices.

This study is accompanied with an **Appendix** containing supplementary materials. Appendix A contains the data collection for the two data sets. Appendix B contains the analytical material that accompanies the QCA analyses.

CHAPTER 1: THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK

“Behind any study of public policy processes is a theory of organizations.” (Jones et al., 2006, p. 49)

When do governments adopt policy integration as a solution to a policy problem at hand? A premise of theories of the policy process is the idea that policy solutions may be decoupled from the policy problems that they are presumed to tackle. For instance, in the multiple streams framework, the identification of a problem and the development of a policy solution are “relatively independent streams” (Herweg et al., 2018, p. 39). In order to understand the conditions under which governments adopt policy integration as a solution to policy problems, in this study I understand PI as an output of agenda-setting and decision-making processes in which actors from policy subsystems as well as the government play a key role (Cejudo & Trein, 2023b). Governments in general and ministries in particular can be considered key actors for the adoption of policy reforms in parliamentary democracies.

How consistently is the organisational integration of policy functions within ministries of government associated with the adoption of policy integration reforms? Is the combination of policy functions for two or more related policies within large ministries a condition for the adoption of policy integration reforms by governments? The theoretical framework serves the purpose of conceptualising the argument that specific organisational configurations of policy functions located in ministries, when combined with conditions that capture the institutional and political environment within which ministries operate, have the potential to explain the adoption of PI reforms. Based on organisational theory and policy theory, I will argue that the distribution and combination of policy functions for a specific policy issue across ministries of government has policy consequences because it structures the policy venues through which actors intervene to coordinate, influence, or oppose policies. The theoretical framework expects that PI reforms may result from processes dominated by the policy logic as well as the political logic of coordination. Section 1 conceptualises the outcome of interest of this thesis, policy integration. Section 2 draws on the distinction between policy and political logics behind policy coordination processes. It conceptualises different ways in which the competences for specific policies (policy functions) may be distributed between ministries by means of formal organisational structure and the impact of these structural variations on the policy logic to policy coordination. Conversely, as regards the political logic of coordination, it argues that the goals or electoral objectives of political actors may explain the adoption of integrated policy outputs (Hustedt & Danken, 2017; Sarti, 2023) even when logics of turf protection and organisational capture inhibit positive administrative coordination (Peters, 2015). Section 3 situates this argument within the literature on partisan preferences as

regards ministerial organisation, and in section 3.2 delves into the literature on recent coordination reforms, establishing the temporal framework for the study.

1 Conceptualisation of policy integration

Policy integration as a concept has different meanings in the scholarly literature. This section conceptualises policy integration (PI) as an output of processes of political agenda-setting and decision-making. Although it concurs with the recent processual perspective on PI that “policy integration is more than policy design and decision-making” (Cejudo & Trein, 2023b, p. 11), it proposes to focus on the stage of policy adoption, i.e., policy as an output of agenda-setting and decision-making by administrative and political actors. To do so, it builds on literature on PI at the national level of government, as well as contributions to the literature on PI at other levels of government than the national one if they explicitly address the link between government organisation and PI.³

1.1 Horizontal PI: a multi-dimensional concept

Major challenges arise when the object of inquiry shifts away from the focus on individual policy fields that is typical for classical public policy analysis. Producing a clear conceptualisation of PI is still a key difficulty of the study of PI and in this regard the concept is far from established (Bornemann, 2013, p. 63; Cejudo & Michel, 2017). To start, it is necessary to conceptualise ‘policy’, which is the object of integration, but also, as Åsa Persson (2004) put it, a “slippery object to integrate” (p. 10). According to Parsons (1995), public policy is the effort by governments and civil society “to define and structure a rational basis for action or inaction” on societal challenges (p. 16). A public policy is a course of (non)action taken by public actors with regard to a particular challenge (Howlett & Cashore, 2014; Knill & Tosun, 2010, p. 4; Henry, 2021).

Like policy itself, PI is a multi-dimensional phenomenon. Definitions invariably highlight different dimensions of PI, in particular its “process and product components” (Knill et al., 2022; similarly, Rietig & Dupont, 2021), or in other words, its procedural and substantive elements (Liberatore, 1997; Briassoulis, 2004; Kivimaa & Mickwitz, 2006; Knudsen & Lafferty, 2016; Alons, 2017; Biesbroek & Candell, 2020; Cejudo & Trein, 2023a). As a process, PI is a procedural principle of policy-making (Knudsen & Lafferty, 2016, p. 339), i.e., a ‘meta-

³ The latter are within sub-national governments in federal states or supranational organisations such as the European Commission (EC) whose structure is very much similar to that of national governments. This focus on the national level is due to feasibility concerns related to the mere extent of the PI literature but also to the relevance of the included literature for the research question. Contributions that focus on integration at the subnational level as well as on the implementation of PI reforms are thus mostly disregarded. Inevitably, this focus entails some limitations that are discussed in the Conclusion.

instrument'⁴ (Hood, 1983) that consists in triggering reform of two or more policy sectors simultaneously in order to achieve a cross-cutting objective that could not be achieved unilaterally by any one of the fields or sectors alone. As a process, horizontal PI is a meta-instrument whose objective is twofold: to trigger the adoption of reforms that go beyond the realm of one sector and to bring about a balanced progress towards possibly contradictory policy objectives (Dehousse, 2004, p. 335).

Others studied PI through a top-down design-oriented lens, but focussed either on the policy process, the substantive result (output), or the performance (outcome) (Persson, 2007; Bornemann, 2013). At the same time, PI research long remained isolated conceptually from adjacent strands of research, such as research on policy coordination and more general theories of the policy process (Cejudo & Michel, 2017; Domorenok et al., 2021a). The (early) public administration and public policy literatures on PI often conceptualised PI through the lens of policy coordination and conflated both concepts into single scales of measurement in which 'policy integration' referred to the highest level of inter-sectoral interaction (Metcalf, 1994; OECD, 1996a; Meijers & Stead, 2004; Perri 6, 2005; Stead & Geerlings, 2005; Braun, 2008; Stead, 2008; Runhaar et al., 2009). For a long time, many scholars of PI also rather used these adjacent concepts interchangeably (Tosun & Lang, 2017; Candel, 2021). For instance, scholars conceived integration and coordination either as different instruments within coordination strategies (e.g., Mickwitz & Kivimaa, 2007; Verhoest et al., 2010, pp. 17-18) or as different degrees on scales of coordination and integration (e.g., Perri 6, 2004; Stead, 2008).

The PI literature has only recently conceptualised the different dimensions of policy integration explicitly as parts of integrated conceptual frameworks (Dupuis & Biesbroek, 2013; Runhaar et al., 2014; Candel & Biesbroek, 2016; Alons, 2017; Cejudo & Michel, 2017; Howlett & Saguin, 2018; Knill et al., 2022; Cejudo & Trein, 2023a; Kaplaner et al., 2023). More than before, scholars concur today that the concept of horizontal policy integration refers to the process, output, and/or outcome of the 'integration' of policies at one level of government.⁵ The horizontal integration of policies transcends the division of the political sphere into policy fields and sectors that differentiate political activities into (more or less strongly) institutionalised domains of public action (Casado-Asensio & Steurer, 2014; Berthet & Bourgeois, 2016; Bornemann, 2016; Cejudo and Trein, 2023b).⁶ In other words, at the centre

⁴ Meta-instruments are about the way sectoral policies are governed, in other words, ways of connecting policy problems and solutions ('stratagems', according to Charles Lindblom).

⁵ Conversely, vertical policy integration refers to the integration of policies directed at the same policy problem at different levels.

⁶ Public policy embraces different scopes (Knill & Tosun, 2020, p. 5). Public policy at the most abstract level is structured into policy fields such as health, the environment, or the economy; such a policy field is both a substantive area of policy and a strategic action field, i.e., an institutional order that structures authority (Fligstein & McAdam, 2015). Policy fields have "integrative properties" (May et al., 2006, p. 382), such as a

of policy integration is a transversal policy challenge that is subject to interdependences between policy sectors (Ugland & Veggeland, 2006; Metz et al., 2020). Interdependence can be understood in the sense of sectoral externalities (Aoki, 2007; Mewhirter et al., 2018) and means that “causes or effects of issues and political solutions in one policy sector impact issues and political solutions in other policy sectors” (Bolognesi et al., 2021, p. 914). A policy solution is ‘integrated’ if it addresses such a cross-sectoral challenge in a way that “align[s] the policy variables” (Candel, 2021, n. 1) pertaining to the different policy sectors concerned. Following scholars who distinguish “intra-policy” and “inter-policy” coordination (Ugland & Veggeland, 2006; Bührs, 2002a; Knoepfel et al., 2010, Ch. 19), PI takes place *within* a policy field if it concerns a “small number of relatively close sectors within a single policy field” (Trein & Maggetti, 2020, p. 200), and conversely it takes place *across* policy fields if it implies bringing together policy sectors that “span across policy fields” (ibid.).

1.2 Conceptualisation of PI as an output

If PI entails both “product and process” components (Knill et al., 2022), then this research concentrates on the former. Institutional approaches to PI typically conceptualise PI as an output (Jordan & Lenschow, 2008a; Briassoulis, 2011). For the purposes of this research and considering that the output dimension is a distinctive dimension of PI (Kaplaner et al., 2023), I conceptualise PI as an output. Thereby, PI as an output is defined as an integrated policy solution that becomes adopted as an output of a policy process – i.e., “the direct result of the decision-making process, which usually involves the adoption of a certain programme, law or regulation” (Knill & Tosun, 2020, p. 25). As a substantive policy output, PI corresponds to outputs of legislative, regulatory and/or strategic acts, i.e., “the statements, objectives, strategies, actions and regulatory instruments put in place” (Nilsson & Persson, 2003, p. 335), that “attempt to align policy variables” (Candel, 2021, n. 1) pertaining to different policy sectors or fields. According to Cejudo and Michel (2017), the formulation and adoption stage of the policy process is where the quest for policy coherence mostly occurs (p. 755). In the policy-centred literature, PI is about policy solutions that typically take shape through an integrated legal framework (i.e., laws and regulations) that regulates a cross-sectoral policy challenge (Ross, 2010). Metz, Angst and Fischer (2020) label this dimension of PI “law-based integration”. As an output, PI institutionalises an overarching policy objective or instrument

commonality of perceptions and ideas for a given policy area (Baumgartner & Jones, 1993) or a common language for describing policy problems. Within any policy field, public policy is indissociably linked with the activities of particular distinctive policy sectors, also called ‘subsystems’ or ‘policy communities’. At a more precise level still, public policy consists in activities related to a specific functionally coherent issue or challenge; behaviour or groups that the public activity targets; and finally, the instruments, i.e., means by which the target is regulated.

that connects policy issues and restrains the room for manoeuvre of sectoral policy making (Persson et al., 2018; Schmidt & Fleig, 2018).

PI measures may make use of different types of policy instruments (Kivimaa & Mickwitz, 2006; Adelle & Russel, 2013; Candel & Biesbroek, 2016; Howlett & Saguin, 2018).⁷ Strategic PI instruments involve a cross-cutting policy objective that could not be achieved without the contribution of all the involved policy fields or sectors or that accommodates different sectoral policy goals in order to make them compatible by removing contradictions or realising mutual benefits (Thomas, 2003, p. 203; also, Collier, 1996; Briassoulis, 2004, p. 16). Especially in EPI, PI is often (implicitly) operationalised as the incorporation of a specific (environmental) objective into other policies (Geerlings & Stead, 2003; Lafferty & Hovden, 2003, p. 9; Mickwitz & Kivimaa, 2007). PI reforms may also work at the level of implementation instruments by creating a new policy instrument, or instrument mix, or changing the scope of existing instruments (Vieira et al., 2007). Existing instruments may be made compatible or complementary (Michaelowa, 2004) in a way that fosters the coherence between policies within one policy field (Geerlings & Stead, 2003, p. 188; Nilsson & Persson, 2012, p. 63) or across policy fields. New ‘integrative’ instruments may be created (Briassoulis, 2004) or several instruments combined (Vieira et al., 2007; Adelle & Russel, 2013). Governments can also replace an existing instrument mix that developed incrementally over a longer time (Adelle & Russel, 2013) with an entirely new and coherent instrument mix (Howlett & Rayner, 2006, 2007). Other studies conceive of integrated policy strategies as more far-reaching still (Vince, 2015; Candel, 2017). For instance, some authors use the concept ‘integrated strategy’ to designate a “new kind of governance design, (...) where in addition to the substantive policy objectives that they pursue, governments also attempt to create or reconstruct a policy domain with coherent policy goals and a consistent set of policy instruments that support each other in the achievement of the goals” (Rayner & Howlett, 2009, p. 101). For Rayner and Howlett (2009) “integrated strategies often represent conscious efforts to combine multiple policy elements in a more coherent way and overcome the disorganized character of the existing policy system” (see also May et al., 2005, 2006). Bornemann’s (2016) ‘integrative policy strategies’ emerge through policy actors’ initiatives at ‘integrative’ forms of problem solving that bring differentiated policy areas together within a new policy field (rather than an operational policy program) that has ‘flexible’ strategic (instead of institutional) boundaries. Other authors also conceptualised such strategies as “new pattern[s] of strategy formation in the public sector” (Steurer & Martinuzzi, 2005), “integrated policy strategies” (Rayner & Howlett, 2009), “integrated strategies” (Casado-Asensio & Steurer, 2014) or “multisectoral

⁷ For a discussion of the relationship between policy instruments and ‘integrative instruments’, see Briassoulis (2004, pp. 17–18), and on the relationship between substantive and procedural instruments, see Candel and Biesbroek (2016, pp. 223–225).

strategies” (Nordbeck & Steurer, 2016). Finally, PI instruments may also entail mainstreaming, which consists in the “systemic horizontal incorporation of a particular political priority (...) at the core of all public policies” (Halpern et al., 2011, p. 1; see also Verloo, 2005, p. 12; Pollack & Hafner-Burton, 2010; Massey & Huitema, 2012). Mainstreaming aims at achieving that a formerly sector-specific objective be henceforth pursued by all policy sectors, i.e., a polity as a whole,⁸ and some therefore consider mainstreaming as the most ambitious form of PI (Candel, 2017). Mainstreaming can occur explicitly or implicitly. Explicit mainstreaming corresponds to ‘in all policies’-approaches, such as those related to health (‘health-in-all-policies’) (Puska, 2014), or water (Varis et al., 2014). Policies may also follow the mainstreaming logic more implicitly. This is the case of area-based approaches, e.g. in the field of rural development where policies have shifted from sectoral policies to policies for rural areas as functional units integrates the different policy responses and programs into one rural development strategy (Giessen & Böcher, 2008).

Policy strategies and implementation tools are complementary and may advance at similar or different paces. Previous research has also shown that policy strategies are not necessary for PI to occur through specific policy programmes or instruments (Kivimaa & Mickwitz, 2006, pp. 740-741). Official strategies and legislative acts do not always translate into actual policy change in terms of outputs and/or outcomes, and may even overstate the policy change to be expected. Some PI reforms may not proceed beyond symbolism, e.g., to legitimate existing practices (Alons, 2017), but even symbolic reforms may have a value of their own (Candel, 2021; Dupuis & Biesbroek, 2013). Conversely, the adjustment of instruments may lag behind PI strategies or fail entirely, as various studies report (Nilsson et al., 2009; Russel & Jordan, 2010). For instance, in the case studied by Kivimaa and Mickwitz (2006), environmental concerns were rather well integrated into Finnish technology policy strategies, but integration was less comprehensive at the level of related instruments, such as the financing of R&D projects or technology programs.

This conceptualisation of PI accommodates diversity in how policy integration takes shape not only in different policy fields but also in different countries. The path dependent evolution of the institutions and logics of policy fields in different (national) settings may make that PI reforms in different countries may be different from one another (Trein et al., 2018). Observable, positive meanings of PI may be sector-specific (Adelle & Russel, 2013, p. 5), situated in particular contexts of problem pressure or political support (Jordan & Lenschow, 2010, p. 150), oriented towards specific trade-offs and synergies (Ross, 2008, p. 297; Jordan

⁸ Scholars do not use the concept uniformly, though. For instance, especially in the CPI literature some scholars treat mainstreaming as synonymous with the integration of climate objectives and instruments into other policy sectors (e.g., Dovers & Hezri, 2010; Uittenbroek et al., 2012; Brouwer et al., 2013, p. 135; Runhaar, 2016; Runhaar et al., 2018).

& Lenschow, 2010, pp. 148–149), and have different degrees of reciprocity, or directionality, between the policies that are integrated: sometimes, the objectives of one policy may be given priority, and sometimes, integration between both policies may be mutual (win-win) (Liberatore, 1997, p. 119).⁹

The variation on the outcome is defined as the extent to which governments formulate and adopt policy integration reforms. This is in line with some recent studies, e.g., Maggetti and Trein's (2021) conceptualisation of the "intensity of policy integration reforms" which these authors define as the frequency of PI reforms within a specific period of time. The outcome is absent if governments are *inactive* as regards the (formulation and) adoption of PI reforms as defined above, i.e., when governments refrain from formulating and adopting integrated policy solutions. The absence of the outcome entails both "non-integration" as well as "disintegration". PI scholars speak of the former to denote fragmented, sectoral policy-making (Koschinsky & Swanstrom, 2001; Biermann, Pattberg, et al., 2009; Cejudo & Michel, 2017), or, as Barling et al. (2002) call it, 'policy confinement', meaning the absence or comparatively small number of PI reforms that are prepared or adopted (Candel & Biesbroek, 2016; Maggetti & Trein, 2021; Trein et al., 2021; Kaplaner et al., 2023). "Disintegration" following Candel and Biesbroek (2016) means that under different circumstances PI may decrease from a high level once achieved: for instance, integrative arrangements may be scaled down or integrated paradigms replaced with sectoral ones, as in the case analysed by Vince (2015) showing that the failure of an integrated strategy may lead to its unmaking.

2 Logics of policy coordination and conditions for PI

Policy coordination is at the heart of the policy-making processes preceding the agenda-setting and decision-making of PI reforms. I understand PI as conceptually different from policy coordination and cooperation in policy-making (OECD, 1996a; Perri 6 et al., 2002, p. 6; Meijers & Stead, 2004); i.e., PI as a policy output is analytically separate from the processes of coordination that precede PI reforms (cf., law-based integration vs. actor-based integration in

⁹ Establishing the relative importance of the integrated policies was a key challenge for scholars and different ways of conceiving the relation between the integrated policies co-exist in the literature. This relation can be one of principled priority (Lafferty & Hovden, 2003), reciprocity (Liberatore, 1997, p. 119), "unity of purpose" (Thomas, 2003), trade-offs, policy coherence, policy consistency, balancing/synergy (Briassoulis, 2004, p. 13), the removal of contradictions and the creation of mutual benefits (Collier, 1996). Early definitions of PI were often policy-specific and contain prescriptive elements. In particular, definitions of EPI that postulate the principled priority of environmental objectives over the objectives of other policy sectors are prominent in the EPI literature (e.g., Lafferty & Hovden, 2003, p. 9; Lafferty & Knudsen, 2007, p. 25). They have also influenced the literature on CPI (Adelle & Russel, 2013), where CPI is often defined as (unidirectional) integration of climate policy objectives into emitting sectors (e.g. Runhaar et al., 2009; Steurer & Clar, 2014, 2015). Moderate understandings, such as one that interprets EPI as "an approach which requires the inclusion of the environment amongst the set of values being considered" neglected (Collier, 1996, p. 35) were more marginal in the early EPI literature.

the study by Metz et al., 2020). Koop and Lodge (2014) define policy coordination as a process that attempts to adjust actions and decisions among interdependent actors to achieve specified goals (p. 1313). Coordination from this perspective is instrumental behaviour without a determined outcome (Senninger et al., 2021). Recent advances in the PI literature that strengthened the theoretical and conceptual baggage of PI research have emphasised this actor-based dimension of PI as a political process (Candel & Biesbroek, 2016; Cejudo & Michel, 2017; Cejudo & Trein, 2023a).¹⁰

The framework builds upon work by Hustedt and Danken (2017) who, building on Czerwick (2001), conceptualise political and policy logics and the interaction between both at the heart of policy coordination processes in governments. Each of these logics, these authors argue, provides “specific frames according to which the actors involved orient their behaviour” (p. 731) and shapes the interactions between them. In a nutshell, the two logics unfold as follows. Following the policy logic, turf protection and organisational proximity between bureaucrats and interest groups prevail, which explains that negative coordination is the likely output of coordination processes that are dominated by a policy logic. Following a political logic, the policy goals and electoral objectives of political actors may explain why positive coordination emerges out of coordination processes that are dominated by a political logic. These arguments echo with Cejudo and Trein’s (2023b) recent theoretical contribution to the PI literature according to which policy integration may be an outcome of different pathways, at the heart of which are different agenda-setting dynamics that originate from above or from below (cf. Princen & Rhinard, 2006), and with the literature that ascribes PI outputs to logics of ‘integrative’ capacity’ or ‘integrative leadership’ (Candel, 2021).

Scholars of policy coordination have argued that organisational factors do not matter so much on their own as they do when embedded in their political context (Scharpf, 1989; Pollitt & Dan, 2013; Lægreid, Sarapuu, et al., 2014; Hegele, 2021). Recent contributions to the PI literature have demonstrated that in order to understand when and why PI reforms, we must look at how organisational and political factors operate together (Knudsen & Lafferty, 2016; Kaplaner et al., 2023; Cejudo & Trein, 2023a, 2023b). According to Knudsen and Lafferty (2016), the PI principle must be strongly endorsed by the heads of government and “firmly anchored in and through the ongoing political-administrative processes” (p. 360). Similarly, Candel (2021) posits that either integrative capacities or integrative leadership are necessary for the adoption of PI.

¹⁰ According to these authors, PI as a process “entails the coordination of actors and agencies across policy subsystems, the combination of instruments from different policy sectors, as well as arrangements for their consistent implementation and evaluation, as a response to a complex policy problem that not one policy sector, policy instrument, or agency can solve” (Cejudo & Trein, 2023a, p. 9).

2.1 The policy logic of coordination and the effect of structure on policy integration

We know from the literature on the interactions between policy-making and public bureaucracies (e.g., Peters, 1978; Page, 1992; Pollitt & Bouckaert, 2004) that the behaviour of bureaucracies that are in charge of drafting policies – typically ministerial ones – is geared towards the development of “new rules in response to political or societal demands. It is the central institutional interest of ministerial bureaucracies to expand their competences and strengthen their institutional statutes by constantly developing proposals for new rules” (Adam et al., 2017, p. 245). Bureaucratic capacity enables the process of drafting legislation (Klüser, 2022) and coordination counters the “bottlenecks” at various stages of ministerial policy making (Page, 2003). The policy logic to policy coordination refers to the substantial policy and procedural expertise “embedded in the respective area of competence” (Hustedt & Danken, 2017, p. 732; also, Hustedt, 2013). It emphasises policy solutions that have substantial capacity to solve policy problems on the mid to long term, that are technically correct and feasible, and that serve and protect the departmental interest (Czerwick, 2001).

In the multiple streams framework, the policy stream has to do with the technical feasibility of policy options and only options that are compatible with existing institutional structures are eligible (Spohr, 2016). These issues are evaluated from a sectoral, expertise-based point of view as manifested by a departmental remit (Czerwick, 2001; Hustedt, 2013). Turf protection and mutual non-interference with the interests of other ministries guide behaviour according to a policy logic to coordination (Hustedt & Danken, 2017; Senninger et al., 2021). In this logic, the bureaucracy acts as a filter between political preferences and legislation (Schnapp & Willner, 2013).

Ministries: definition and role in the policy process

Within the executive, ministries are the key institutions for the elaboration of public policies (Müller, 1986; Smith et al., 2000; Jordan, 2002a; Aklin & Urpelainen, 2014). Ministries hold a key role in the policy-making process because of their responsibility for the preparation and decision of government policy within their jurisdiction (Smith et al., 2000, p. 146) and their discretion is generally considered to be important (Laver & Shepsle, 1996; Martin & Vanberg, 2004). Laver and Shepsle (1996) therefore depict ministries as ‘policy dictators’ in their jurisdiction (p. 888). The lead ministry has a significant leeway to bias its legislative proposals towards its own preferences (Hartlapp & Lorenz, 2012; Hartlapp et al., 2013; Garritzmann & Siderius, 2024).

Ministries¹¹ are both political and administrative organisations; more particularly, they are bureaucratic organisations in a political environment (Fleischer et al., 2018, p. 7). Ministries are organisations that are composed of professional bureaucracies and headed by a member of the government, and that perform policy functions for one or more policy sectors or subfields on behalf of the government. An organisation is, according to Barnard's (1968) influential definition, "a system of consciously coordinated personal activities or forces" (p. 72). Following Döhler (2020), organisations are collective actors with generic properties such as an internal structure, boundaries, routines and procedures. They have physical qualities such as members, headquarters, resources, a formalised leadership based on an accepted authority system that governs decisions, and a common goal (Tolbert & Hall, 2009, p. 27). A ministry is composed of a professional bureaucracy (Mintzberg, 1980, 1983), which means that it relies on the work of highly specialised, skilled, and trained civil servants. Within ministries, bureaucracies operate with considerable autonomy in developing legislative proposals (Page, 2003) and influence agenda-setting and policy decision-making (Aberbach et al., 1981; Page, 2012; Schnapp, 2001, 2004; Schnapp & Willner, 2013; Bonnaud & Martinais, 2014). In the German political system, for instance, ministerial subsections play a pivotal role for the development of policy initiatives (Mayntz & Scharpf, 1975).

The minister embodies the political aspect of ministerial organisation.¹² The doctrine of ministerial responsibility implies that the minister is answerable and accountable for all activity of her or his ministry (Derlien, 1996; Kam, 2000). As head of the ministry's administration, the minister further connects the political and bureaucratic elements of the ministry (Blondel, 1985, p. 8; Chenot, 1986; Rose, 1987, p. 18; Andeweg, 2000; Marsh et al., 2000; Koch, 2005). A ministry's "policy functions" (Mätzke, 2010) include the preparation and implementation of policy-specific decisions, regulations and legislation, the adoption of programmes, coordination of policy in government, research and reporting, inspection and impact assessment on a policy, and the representation of domestic policy-specific interests in international policy processes (also Ben-Gera, 2007). Ministries also effectively coordinate

¹¹ I use the terms 'ministry' and 'minister' although some of the countries included in this study use synonyms. Westminster countries commonly use the term 'department' (e.g. United Kingdom, Australia) or 'cabinet office', and, instead of 'minister' the term 'secretary of state' to address the political appointees that head them (e.g. United Kingdom, United States of America). The terms 'ministry' and 'minister' are privileged here because they are used in most of the countries and are the most unequivocal. The term 'department', for instance, is also employed for intra-ministerial units at different levels of hierarchy in the United Kingdom (see Hood et al., 1985, p. 73, for details on this nomenclature). In some Westminster countries (Australia, UK) the term 'ministry' is also used to designate the total group of ministers constituting a particular government, e.g. the 'Whitlam Ministry' instead of 'Whitlam government' or else 'Whitlam administration' (US variant).

¹² Entities that are not headed by a minister, such as regulatory agencies, are excluded from the definition. Regulatory agencies are commonly not endowed with ministerial responsibilities, although they may sometimes perform policy-making functions alongside 'their' ministries. Among the countries included in this analysis, the role of agencies is particularly important in Sweden.

policies in multiple subfields, empower sectoral interests, and coordinate policy implementation (Aklin & Urpelainen, 2014).

Horizontally, the formal structure of government delimits each ministry's sphere of competence and regulates the formal relationships between peers. Vertically, formal structure determines the hierarchy both within government, i.e., ministries' formal relationships upwards with the head of government and downwards with agencies, as well as between the different levels of the intra-ministerial organisational hierarchy. As regards their internal structure, ministries are usually characterised by a multidivisional organisational structure that divides labour and specialised expertise horizontally (Döhler, 2015). Vertically, ministerial bureaucracies are typically organized on a maximum of three formal hierarchical levels (Fleischer et al., 2022, p. 6). The main organisational units are called directorates general in the Weberian bureaucratic model and departments in the Westminster entrepreneurial model (Gualmini, 2008). For the sake of uniformity, I will use the term 'division' to refer to the units at the highest organisational level of a ministry.¹³ Divisions are subdivided into sections, which are again divided into offices. Offices are the basic working units of the ministerial organisations where most of the working capacity is concentrated and where policy work takes place (Mayntz & Scharpf, 1975; Bodiguel & Le Crom, 2007; Bonnaud & Martinais, 2014).

Ministries: organisational configurations of policy functions

The formal allocation of policy-making responsibilities for particular policy challenges to specific ministries follows the departmental principle whereby 'line ministries' are traditionally designed from a functionalist perspective in order to assume responsibilities for specific sectoral policies (Daintith & Page, 1999; Koch, 2005). However, the de facto ministerial division of competences and power is more complex than the departmental principle leads to assume (Hernes, 2021; Senninger et al., 2021; Klüser & Breunig, 2022). Neither are *all* environmental policy functions necessarily carried out by the ministry for the Environment, nor does a ministry for the Environment perform necessarily only environmental functions (Weale et al., 1996). This straightforward claim lays the ground for the argument that a configurational approach (Meyer et al., 1993; Fiss, 2007, 2011) is warranted for assessing governments' organisational set-ups for a specific policy. The configurational approach to organisational analysis is well established in organisational studies, but has not to my knowledge found any echo in the political science and public administration literatures that are interested in the organisational dimension of government. Organisational theorists define the notion of an "organisational configuration" broadly as "any multidimensional constellation of conceptually distinct characteristics that commonly occur together" (Meyer

¹³ This term translates, e.g., the German "Abteilung" and the French "Direction" or "Direction Générale".

et al., 1993, p. 1175). From a configurational perspective, I argue that the organisational set-up of policy functions for a specific policy challenge within government can be understood as the combination of two factors: on the one hand, the spread, i.e., the degree of concentration of a government's portfolio of policy functions for the policy challenge in question; on the other hand, the extent to which the policy portfolio in question is isolated or combined within the jurisdiction of the ministry that has the most policy functions for the policy in question.

Traditional models of ministerial control in parliamentary systems tend to assume that ministries detain clear and exclusive policy responsibilities. The policy dictator model and the principal-agent-model, for instance, suggest an exact departmentalisation of policy areas whereby a specific policy portfolio is steered by one ministry rather autonomously (Laver & Shepsle, 1990, 1996; Andeweg, 2000). The notion of "portfolio" in this context refers to the entirety of the policy functions with respect to a specific issue (e.g., immigration, the environment) at one level of government; i.e., it captures the extent of the association between individual policy issues and ministries, or, in other words, the extent to which a specific ministry dominates a particular policy (Klüser & Breunig, 2022).¹⁴ Empirical studies, however, show that this association is more diffuse than the models above suggest. The extent to which ministries dominate a particular policy domain is an empirical question (Weale et al., 1996; Saalfeld & Schamburek, 2014; Klüser & Breunig, 2022) and there can be both considerable fragmentation (Klüser, 2022) as well as overlap (Senninger et al., 2021). Comparing the structural characteristics of the ministerial environmental administration in Germany, Greece, Italy, the Netherlands, Spain and the UK, Weale et al. (1996) observe that the degree to which environmental functions and structures match varies significantly between countries and over time. Klüser and Breunig (2022) study the ministerial origins of parliamentary bills in Denmark, Germany, and the Netherlands, and find that bills on similar issues are regularly drafted by different ministries that have policy functions for some aspect of the issue. In other words, as Weale et al. (1996) argued, a ministry for the Environment does not necessarily carry out all of a government's environmental policy functions since these can instead be located in different units that are dispersed across several ministries. Concomitantly, the PI literature distinguishes a centralised and a decentralised approach to PI policy-making in government (Jacob & Volkery, 2004). The centralised approach consists in strengthening the lead ministry so as to enable it to integrate its concerns in other ministries' policies. The decentralised approach, conversely, rather sees the establishment of mirror units or correspondents for a policy in other ministries. Based on these authors, I define 'portfolio concentration' as the degree to which the governmental policy functions for a policy issue are

¹⁴ This definition of a "portfolio" remains the same even if the size of a policy issues varies (e.g., immigration policy > asylum policy > asylum seeker policy > regulation of asylum seekers' access to the labour market).

spread across different ministries of the government: on one extreme, all policy functions for the issue in question can be concentrated within the remit of one particular ministry, while on the other extreme, they can be fragmented or spread relatively widely across different ministries of the same government. As regards the policy issue of environmental protection, for instance, a government's policy functions for this issue can be concentrated within one ministry, or, conversely, fragmented across ministries, to different degrees.

Following again the argument by Weale et al. (1996) above, a ministry for the Environment does not necessarily perform *only* environmental policy functions, but can, in addition, perform policy functions relative to other policy fields or sectors: in other words, the jurisdiction of a ministry can be specifically and exclusively dedicated to only one policy, or combine policy functions for two or more policy fields (Saalfeld & Schamburek, 2014, p. 202; Hegele, 2021). This is what Hegele (2021) calls 'portfolio combination' and constitutes the second dimension of the organisational configuration: the distinction whether the jurisdiction of the lead ministry for the policy issue in question has either policy functions *only* for the issue in question, or, conversely, has also policy functions for other policy issues. A ministry that corresponds to the former category is often called a 'single-issue' or 'silo' ministry. If a ministry's jurisdiction is composed of policy functions for two or more different issues, the latter can be either interdependent or independent substantively, i.e., regarding their objectives, target groups, types of instruments, etc. If the policy sectors are interdependent, the policy activities and decisions of the different divisions have functional implications for those of the others (Hult, 1987; Saalfeld & Schamburek, 2014). In her study on the effects of agenda mergers in the USA, Hult (1987) distinguishes mergers with respect to the similarity of the policy jurisdictions of the predecessor agencies, into "coordinative" fusions of agencies with relatively similar policy jurisdictions, "interdependent" fusions of agencies "whose activities and decisions have implications for those of the others" and "garbage-can" fusions which bring together units "with diverse jurisdictions and heterogeneous policy objectives" (Hult, 1987, pp. 27–28) that are substantively independent from one another. I define 'large ministries' as those ministries with jurisdictions that are composed of policy functions for policies that have mutual functional or substantive interdependencies; in contrast, I define 'garbage-can' ministries as ministries with jurisdictions that bring together policy functions that are substantively unrelated or independent from one another.

Having conceptualised 'portfolio concentration' and 'portfolio combination' as the two dimensions that form the organisational configuration of ministries' policy functions for specific policy challenges, in the following sections I draw on arguments from organisational theory and policy process theory to conceptualise the impact of these organisational configurations on the policy process in general and policy coordination in particular.

Organisational theory: the effect of structure on coordination

Ever since Luther Gulick (1937), the literature on organisational structure in the public sector has recognised how organisational structure affects organisational behaviour at the micro-level. Formal structure is a central element of bureaucratic organisation (Weber, 1922; Meyer & Rowan, 1977) and its implications are a key research area of organisational theory (Simon, 1953; Blau & Scott, 1962; Mintzberg, 1979; Tolbert & Hall, 2009; Du Gay & Vikkelsø, 2017). After decades of “parallel agendas and mutual disregard” (Olsen, 1991) between organisation theory and political science (LaPalombara, 2009; Döhler, 2020), the past decade has witnessed a renewed interest of political scientists in what Egeberg and colleagues call the “organisational dimension” of government (Egeberg et al., 2016). This approach is “solidly anchored in political science” and defines organisational structure broadly as a “collection of role expectations with regard to who is supposed to do what, how and when” (Egeberg et al., 2016, p. 32). Public administration and public policy scholars have made the structural perspective their own to understand policy decisions.

Formal organisational structure can be narrowly defined as an organisation’s “official, explicit division of responsibilities” (Tolbert & Hall, 2009, p. 35) and is expressed through the organisational chart, i.e., “a listing of offices, departments, positions, and programs. These elements are linked by explicit goals and policies that make up a rational theory of how, and to what end, activities are to be fitted together” (Meyer & Rowan, 1977, p. 342). Structure provides a “blueprint for activities” (Meyer & Rowan, 1977, p. 342) by defining the principle according to which work is parcelled out among the different units and their members (Stevenson, 1990). Organisational theory distinguishes four fundamental principles according to which functions can be divided horizontally between organisations and organisational units: territory, purpose/sector, process/function and clientele (Gulick, 1937; Peters, 1978). Each of these principles stipulates a distinct framework for structuring knowledge, for problem-related learning, contact patterns and conflict resolution (Hammond, 1986, 1990).

Organisational theory has well established that in a context of bounded rationality, the structure of an organisation provides a normative selection bias to individuals in need of simplification as well as incentives and moral reasons for satisfying the expectations connected with one’s role within the organisation (March & Olsen, 1989; Egeberg, 1999, 2012). Organisational structure aids individual members in focusing their attention on particular problems and types of information, and in using this information in making trade-offs among conflicting demands and functional requirements (Jones, 2001; Jones et al., 2006). Organisational theorists generally apprehend organisational structure as boundaries that work as cognitive constraints that structure organisational behaviour, interests, and interactions both internal and external (Santos & Eisenhardt, 2005).

Since organisational procedures and decisions prepare the ground for policy-making, scholars of various backgrounds have defended the view that the organisational structure of bureaucracies matters for policy (Scharpf, 1977; Egeberg, 1999, 2012; Whitford, 2012; Döhler, 2015, 2020). The literature on the 'organisational dimension' in political science pinpoints bureaucratic structures as a central 'tool of government' that allows governments to "shape how government policies are processed within governments" (Fleischer et al., 2022). Bezes and Le Lidec (2016a) argue that organisational structure affects policy objectives and instruments by imposing categories that guide the division of work, determine which expert knowledge is consulted and considered, and the professions that are deemed legitimate (p. 428). Organisational scholars have accumulated massive evidence on the impact of structure on interactions within and across organisations both vertically and horizontally (Stevenson, 1990; Johanson, 2000; Döhler, 2015). They highlight that formal structure affects other formal organisational features, such as formal rules and procedures regulating relationships within organisations,¹⁵ between them, and with their environment, as well as organisational behaviour as expressed, for instance, in information processing and decision-making. It identifies various mechanisms: formal structure allocates authority and responsibilities within and between organisations, distributes resources, encourages specialisation and the development of expertise, and helps outsiders identify relevant points of contact within an organisation (Grønnegård Christensen, 1997; Egeberg, 1999, 2012).

The public administration literature finds that considerable challenges arise from the properties of administrative structures and cultures when organising coordination across government. Lægreid and Olsen (1984) find that policy issues are less conflictual within than across organisational units. Egeberg (1999) cites considerable evidence that patterns of contact and flows of information in public administrations closely reflect the formal organisational structure of the administration and reports that the use of digital technologies since the 1990s does not seem to have altered this relationship (pp. 162-163). Suvarierol (2008) finds that the networking behaviour of officials in the European Commission is much more influenced by organisational structure, technical expertise, and portfolio logic rather than, e.g., officials' nationality. Egeberg and Stigen (2021) report survey results according to which central government officials themselves explain their decision-behaviour with their organisational position rather than their background or political attitudes. Analysing both formal and informal networks in multi-national corporations, Rank (2008) finds that actors build and maintain informal ties to run alongside their formal relationships instead of replacing them. In the European Commission, coordination is globally perceived to work more

¹⁵ Egeberg defines formal organisational structure as "those impersonal and explicitly given norms which specify rights and duties for different positions and prescribe how the relationships between them should be arranged" (Egeberg, 1994, p. 86).

effectively within units than between them (Hustedt & Seyfried, 2016; Kassim et al., 2013, pp. 188–189).

Similar insights emerge from diachronic organisational studies that delve into the effects of reorganisations and show that transfers produce significant changes to patterns of interaction and policy focus even when units are transferred intact (Bonesvoll, 1997; Egeberg, 1999; Vestlund, 2015). A reorganisation of the Norwegian agricultural administration in which sectoral regional units became integrated into the territorially organised prefect system suggests that new patterns of interaction arose connecting the sectoral units more tightly to other sector administrations already incorporated in the territorial portfolios, regional concerns and coherence became more salient while less importance was attached to national standardisation efforts (Bonesvoll, 1997, cited in Egeberg, 1999, p. 165). In the same vein, a recent study of a transfer shows that the affiliation of a unit from one DG of the European Commission to another has an impact on the policy focus and on the external environment. When the European Commission's pharmaceutical unit was transferred from DG Enterprise and Industry to DG Health and Consumers, several changes ensued. Not only the unit's policy focus changed from being biased towards business interests to becoming more attentive to patient and public health concerns, also its external environment changed from one being dominated by industry organizations to one being more populated by patient and consumer groups (Vestlund, 2015).

Institutionalists look at the rules and processes at the level of the involved organisations, how they interact with individuals, and how they shape policy processes and their outcomes (March & Olsen, 1989; Smith & Larimer, 2017). There are various institutionalisms, each focusing on different features of 'organisation-as-institution' – norms, knowledge, rules and incentives, interests, agenda, culture, professional language – and how members behave in response to them (Peters, 2000). In sum, 'organisations-as-institutions' affect policy decisions and outputs by empowering certain actors and constraining others, and they are capable of changing and adapting to changes in their environment. In so doing, they are mainly oriented towards maintaining their routines (Allison, 1971). Neo-institutionalists have further refined this theory (March & Olsen, 2009). In their view, organisational structure is itself susceptible to contain irrational elements. They view organisations as open systems that react to unpredictable stimuli from the environment and can gradually 'emancipate' themselves from the original intentions behind their design. This process results in a unique institutional identity formed by norms and values guiding decision-making behaviour (March, 2008; March & Olsen, 1976, 1989; Musselin, 2014).

The organisational literature finds, in sum, that formal structure influences policy processes via its impact on information flows, by empowering certain interests over others, and by

enabling certain relationships and disabling others (Egeberg, 2012; Egeberg et al., 2016). Concomitantly, theories of the policy process view institutions as long-lasting arrangements that strengthen policy stability and constrain the possibilities of policy change. In the punctuated equilibrium theory, for instance, rigidities induced by institutions delay and restrain policy responses until ‘frictions’ eventually trigger punctuations (Baumgartner et al., 2018). Recent advances in organisational theory have linked the institutionalised nature of organisations to the occurrence of ‘blind spots’ in organisational attention and incomplete information processing that engender coordination problems (Bach & Wegrich, 2019).

Organisational structure as venues for policy making

The conceptual work of the ministry that has the lead on an issue is of crucial importance for policy initiatives and agenda-setting, policy formulation, and adoption (Müller, 1986, p. 271) and depending on the ministry within which a policy is handled, a specific policy issue is conceived and solved differently (Klüser & Breunig, 2022). The literature on issue preferences argues that the horizontal organisation of government structures issue attention, i.e., the chances of issues to enter the institutional agenda and receive “serious consideration” from political decision-makers (Cobb & Elder, 1971, p. 906). Horizontal organisation impacts issues’ chances to enter the legislative agenda, i.e., to become the object of a legislative mandate by which the government asks the administration to draft a legislative project (Kingdon, 2014), and structures which aspect of a policy issue will be given attention.

And yet, policy process theories refer to organisational structure only indirectly. In spite of the wealth of organisational literature that hints at the potential effects of structure on policy-making, the major theories of the policy process do not conceptualise organisational structure explicitly. As Feiock, Krause and Hawkins (2017) observe, coordination within and between organisations has long been an important concern of public administration; contemporary policy theories, in contrast, have not explicitly emphasised the functional collective action problems that arise from the fragmentation of authority. Following the PET, the impact of organisational structure on policy coordination processes can be conceptualised with the help of the policy venues concept. The PET conceives policy venues as institutional arenas for policy-making where decisions on an issue can be taken and that provide opportunities and constraints for actors seeking to make or obstruct reform (Timmermans, 2001; Pralle, 2003; Walgrave & Varone, 2008).¹⁶ Venues have particular formal or informal rules governing access and participation, competences, information exchange and decision-making (Timmermans, 2001, p. 315). Policy venues are coupled with policy images, i.e., policy communities’ shared

¹⁶ Although initially developed by US scholars to explain policy change and stability in presidential systems, numerous studies have demonstrated the usefulness of PET for studying parliamentary systems (Walgrave & Varone, 2008; Baumgartner et al., 2009; Nohrstedt, 2011; Carter & Jacobs, 2014; Torfs et al., 2023).

ideas about a given policy issue and appropriate solutions – they are “institutional loci in which images are turned into authoritative policy decisions” (Timmermans, 2001, p. 314). That is, they have different bias structures, respond to different images of an issue, and are directly tied to policy solutions and the means to attain them (Pralle, 2003).

Empirical studies have amply demonstrated that variations in the nature of political venues affect policy dynamics (Timmermans, 2001; Timmermans & Scholten, 2006; Cashore & Howlett, 2007; Chaqués & Palau, 2009; Jensen, 2011; Jennings et al., 2020). In particular, the idea is prominent that the number of different policy venues available for an issue influences policy dynamic (Pralle, 2003; Baumgartner et al., 2018). Based on these literatures, I argue that the structure of ministerial jurisdictions (i.e., the way in which the functions for a policy issue are organised within a government, among and within ministries) creates different venue structures for the policy issue at hand. Although PET is little explicit about how the organisation of government shapes policy venues, jurisdictional changes that lead to a reassignment of policy responsibilities among ministries are conceptualised as venue shifts in PET studies (e.g., Nohrstedt, 2011).

PI research holds that the sectoral logic of policy-making in subsystems is the main obstacle to the adoption of PI (cf. Introduction). In the words of Cejudo and Trein (2023b), “policy integration is in permanent political tension with the sectoral (subsystem) logic of policy-making” (p. 10). Studies suggest that the concept of policy sector is key to understanding the dynamics behind policy integration (Giessen & Krott, 2009). A policy sector is “a component of a political system that is organised around substantive issues” (Burstein, 1991, p. 328). Although the exact conceptualisations diverge, policy subsystems are globally conceptualised as policy arenas that are concerned with a particular policy issue and that are narrower and more formally institutionalised than policy fields. Policy sectors or subsystems¹⁷ structure a political system along the lines of issue areas, enabling parallel problem-solving “out of the political spotlight” (Baumgartner et al., 2018, p. 58). Muller (2011) hence defines public policy as the “means for managing inter-sectoral antagonisms” (p. 11). Policy sectors are socially constructed by actors from a variety of public organisations that represent homogeneous interests as regards an issue at hand (Baumgartner et al., 2018, p. 58) and are actively concerned about a set of substantive problems (Laumann & Knoke, 1987, p. 10; Sabatier & Jenkins-Smith, 1999, p. 192). Among these actors are public officials of the ministerial bureaucracy, interest groups, parliamentary committees, but also researchers and journalists. They “regularly seek to influence public policy in that domain” (Sabatier & Jenkins-Smith, 1999, p. 192) and take each other into account when formulating and promoting policy options (Laumann & Knoke, 1987, p. 10). Policy communities (the functional equivalent to

¹⁷ I use the two terms as synonyms.

policy subsystems in the Multiple Streams Framework) are less formalised than subsystems; they are the “loose connection of civil servants, interests-groups, academics, researchers and consultants (the so-called hidden participants), who engage in working out alternatives to the policy problems to a specific policy field” and thus generate policy alternatives (Herweg, 2016). The literature grants policy subsystems substantive autonomy and even a monopoly on agenda-setting with regards to their policy issue (Jones et al., 1993). According to PET, “most issues, most of the time, are treated within such a community” (Baumgartner et al., 2018, p. 58). In the ‘sub-government’ model, they constitute ‘iron triangles’ that use the institutional norms and rules to maintain policy dominance (Lowi, 1969; McCool, 1987). Policy sectors strive to preserve boundaries by maintaining both distinctive belief systems that give meaning to problems and established patterns of coordination among regular participants (Sabatier & Jenkins-Smith, 1993; Weible & Sabatier, 2009), as well as through specialisation processes not unlike those in professional fields (Pinell, 2005).

PI research suggests that policy subsystem logics are most likely to emerge in organisational settings that are organised along sectoral lines (Cejudo & Trein, 2023b). According to Hartlapp (2018), sectorally fragmented settings tend to produce sectorally limited policy outputs that reflect the specific interest constellations and policy dynamics of the respective sectors. Ministries are traditionally organised around – and dominated by – the interests of policy sectors or subsystems and such an horizontal organisation of government reflects – and sustains – the control of subsystems over policy domains (Döhler, 2015). Studies of British energy policy show empirically how the organisational structure of the ministry for Energy determined the influence of policy networks gravitating around the ministry and the importance given to specific issues in government policy (McInnes, 1991; Russell, 1993). Networks focusing on the ministry for Energy gave a privileged position to the large energy producing sectors and the absence of a specific branch for alternative energy sources within the ministry led to an underdevelopment of renewable energy sources (McInnes, 1991).

Various organisational studies engage with the specialisation of organisational units, i.e., the principle that formally divides work horizontally between organisational units. Scholars tend to agree that a horizontal organisation along sectoral lines undermines integrated perspectives (Egeberg, 1995; Schout & Jordan, 2005; Trondal, 2011; Kassim et al., 2013; Hartlapp, 2018) and that it enhances the units’ autonomy: it enables multiple functions in a single organisation and hinders cross-cutting strategies, provokes operational sub-goals and micro-management of divisional operations, as well as enables relations with different clienteles that can lead to clientelism or organisational capture (Döhler, 2015). Trondal (2011) shows that those directorates that are organised according to the sectoral principle have the strongest portfolio logic. This argument can be applied to the functional specialisation and division of labour between ministries, which is usually considered to lead to problems of

horizontal coordination in government because it exacerbate turf wars that emerge when ministries protect and promote their particular interests (Peters, 1998, 2015; Hustedt & Danken, 2017). In the boundary-spanning policy regimes (BSPR) theory, boundaries derive mainly from governmental structures (Jochim & May, 2010; May et al., 2011). This is congruent with the broader policy literature that argues that if public policies are produced in departmental and silo structures that do not match the cross-sectoral nature of problems, they are unlikely to solve the problem and may instead lead to internal contradictions and (negative) interactions of policy instruments across different subsystems (Adam et al., 2017; Howlett & Del Rio, 2015).

Policy subsystems need not be completely contained, though. Jones and Jenkins-Smith (2009) argue that subsystems can operate in a permeable fashion and be linked together by networked relations, strategically overlapping policy considerations, and public opinion disruptions. Dramatic policy change can occur when policy subsystems intersect (Hoberg & Morawski, 1997). Recent studies examined the role of actors for integration through network approaches that picture integration based on actors dealing with and connecting issues (Metz et al., 2020; Brandenberger et al., 2020). Some argue that PI requires strong coordinative capacities of inter-ministerial policy networks (Jordan & Schout, 2006; Schout & Jordan, 2005). According to Schout and Jordan (2005), a good flow of information within the course of daily policy making is an essential condition for EPI (p. 215). A growing research on policy integration has brought forward the 'integrative capacity' or 'administrative entrepreneurship' of administrations and explored their potential to help understand the role of the administration for policy integration (Briassoulis, 2004; Söderberg, 2011; Bocquillon, 2018; Howlett & Saguin, 2018; Christensen et al., 2019; Svensson, 2019; Domorenok et al., 2021a). Some scholars point at organisational features, such as clearly assigned formal responsibilities for a policy issue and institutionalised horizontal coordination mechanisms, as strengthening integrative capacity (Briassoulis, 2004; Domorenok et al., 2021b). Formal structure arguably has the potential to strengthen the administrative capacity for PI (Briassoulis, 2004).

The policy integration literature has shown that the organisational structure of government may create "bottlenecks" that foster a sectoral logic to policy making, or conversely, foster PI if it favours processes of administrative coordination within or between ministries. Based on the insights from organisational theory about the impact of structure on behaviour on the micro-level, the following section argues that the organisational configurations of policy functions for a policy issue make different dynamics beyond turf protection possible within a policy logic of coordination that can lead to PI.

Portfolio concentration vs. fragmentation

In a nutshell, the organisational configuration of a government's policy functions for a policy issue has two dimensions, an internal and an external one. The internal dimension concerns the degree to which the portfolio of policy functions for the issue is concentrated within one ministry, and the external dimension concerns the extent to which the ministry's jurisdiction combines these policy functions with those for other policy issues.

Concentrated portfolios enshrine policy field specific logics within the administrative structure; i.e., bureaucratic capacity is structured along the lines of policy fields. They should allow ministries to formulate policy proposals that are more internally coherent insofar as potential contradictions and externalities can be identified and eliminated at the intra-ministerial stage; e.g., the more policy functions for environmental protection a ministry concentrates, the more it will be in a position to prevent problem shifting between different environmental media. Some argue that the internal integration of sectors of a specific policy field is necessary for the external integration into other policy fields (Ugland & Veggeland, 2006). The concentrated approach has advocates in the literature on the global environmental governance architecture. Biermann and colleagues assess different reform options as regards their potential to foster EPI globally (Biermann, 2000; Biermann, Pattberg, et al., 2009; Biermann & Kim, 2020) but also their risks (Biermann, 2017). They conclude that the upgrading of the UN Environment Programme to a specialised agency combined with additional concentration of other bureaucracies' competences into the agency offers the biggest "potential for increasing environmental PI at the global level" (Biermann, Davies, et al., 2009, p. 365) as regards both internal environmental PI and external integration with other policies.

As elaborated in the Introduction, the PI literature predominantly associates the fragmentation of the government apparatus with difficulties for the development and adoption of integrated policies. A recent study finds a negative effect of fragmentation on policy-making activity: although governments that devote more bureaucratic capacity to specific policy issues are also more active in addressing these issues via legislation, this effect of bureaucratic capacity diminishes if the ministerial responsibilities and resources are diffuse, i.e., numerous ministries have the potential to address a policy issue (Klüser, 2022). This is in line with Lindblom's (1968) argument that political systems with multiple policy venues offer numerous settings where veto players can intervene trying to stymy or reverse policy reforms.

Some scholars make similar arguments when it comes to PI of other policies. For instance, in spite of high-level commitment, policy integration in UK development cooperation policy was undermined by the different historical cultures and missions of the relevant ministries with competences on the matter (Prontera, 2016). In the case of food policy integration in the Netherlands, Biesbroek and Candel (2020) found that food policy remained "implicit" because

various ministries were responsible for specific food policy-related issues and handled those through sector-specific policy goals and instruments with very little coordination between them (pp. 67-72). The introduction of a fragmented structure may exacerbate the mutual demarcation between policy sectors, as in the case of the organisational reform whereby the immigrant integration policy was split off the Ministry for the Interior that was also responsible for migration and immigration policy in 2014 researched by Gruber and Rosenberger (2015). They find that the introduction of a demarcation between integration and immigration helped raise the status of integration policy within the Austrian federal government and make it visible to the media and the public as an independent field of public action. The split further allowed the State Secretary to break free from long-standing negative connotations and to develop a focus on 'soft policies' and a dialogue-oriented policy style which differed from the immigration police's approach to migration. The authors conclude that the decoupling from migration and asylum policy allowed integration to form as a policy field in Austria but do not identify an ensuing shift of policy content (Gruber & Rosenberger, 2015).

Other PI scholars in contrast advance reasons why fragmentation, or at least a moderate degree thereof, might be beneficial for PI. Candel (2021) in particular cautions against considering fragmentation as "undesired by definition" for PI (p. 351). Fragmentation, although it can be conflictive, can also have synergistic or cooperative effects (Biermann, Davies, et al., 2009, pp. 20-21). Portfolio fragmentation may have a cooperative effect as it allows cooperation between ministries at the inter-ministerial level. Fragmentation gives like-minded directorates from different ministries the possibility to form coalitions to support each other's positions in inter-ministerial negotiations or to act as an intermediary in case of conflicting interests (Osborn, 1997, p. 21; Müller, 1986, pp. 160-161 and 311-312). Biesbroek et al. (2010) argue that climate PI requires a strong leading ministry that initiates and develops the policy, but that distributing clearly defined competences on climate policy to (sub)units of leading sector ministries may help strengthen the integration of climate policy in decision-making. They conclude that under the condition that the distribution of policy functions and competences is clearly defined so as to prevent policy competition, some fragmentation may actually favour PI outputs. Nilsson (2007) suggests that boundaries between ministries for the Environment and those for sectors become more "passable" once the environmental bureaucracy cedes some competences to sectors (p. 167).

When the portfolio of policy functions for an issue is fragmented among two or more ministries that share competences for an issue, each of these ministries provides a potential policy venue for the issue within a government. Following PET, such a configuration of multiple venues may favour dynamics of venue shopping and venue shift that the proponents of PI reforms may exploit at their benefit. The theory of venue shopping advances that a plurality

of venues benefits advocacy groups who can use alternative venues to gain access to decision-making and promote policy change (Baumgartner & Jones, 1993; Pralle, 2003), to “air their grievances with current policy and present alternative policy proposals” (Pralle, 2003, p. 233). The concept of ‘conflict expansion’ describes a dynamic where issue entrepreneurs shift their activities to another venue in order to weaken subsystem dynamics and help an issue spill over into the broader macropolitical arena (Sheingate, 2000; Pralle, 2003): “If successful, the policy conflict moves into a venue where these challengers compete more equally with their opponents, or to an arena where their opponents are not yet mobilized. Policy change often follows if alternative definitions of a policy problem are accepted and promoted in the new venue, policy participation expands as a result of venue shifting, and new rules are articulated and enforced in the policy arena by new institutional actors” (Pralle, 2003, p. 236). For instance, overlapping committee jurisdictions offer opportunities for issue entrepreneurs to change jurisdictions by emphasising particular issue characterisations (Baumgartner et al., 2000). Within a given set of political institutions, venues may favour one subsystem’s interests while other venues may serve as avenues for those opposing this subsystem’s policy (Baumgartner & Jones, 1993).

Müller (1986) argues that directorates in different ministries may engage in competitive relations if they have similar competence fields (p. 397). This echoes some arguments about the effects of fragmented competences in the organisational literature. Organisational scholars tend to argue that redundancy in the administrative system may foster healthy competition between entities that can actually benefit a government’s ability to manage risks and shocks (Landau, 1969). Some find that redundancy and overlap between organisations enables systems to respond more flexibly and reliably when faced with change (Miranda & Lerner, 1995; Termeer et al., 2015). Hollman’s (2018) comparative analysis of the specialisation principle prevalent in the internal organisation of interest groups shows that the latter process their European affairs more effectively when it is a task of all divisions and not one specific division. In a similar vein, Moses and Knutsen (2006) argue that globalisation has rendered the existence of a separate ministry for Foreign Affairs obsolete and advocate a fragmented approach to organising foreign policy functions which should be decentralised in sectoral ministries across government instead. When policy functions are fragmented, competitive behaviour is most likely to lead to policy coordination when the issue is salient. Senninger et al. (2021), who study the relationship between overlapping policy functions and coordination, find that when policy functions are fragmented between ministries with a high degree of overlap, the lead ministry is highly likely to engage in policy coordination especially if the issue to be coordinated is highly politically salient.

In fragmented settings where a stable sector-specific structure prevents wholesale legislative or organisational reform for PI, procedural administrative instruments can help overcome

sectoral resistance to more integrated policy decisions within and among agencies (Söderberg, 2011; O’Leary & Vij, 2012; Duffy & Cook, 2018). Söderberg’s (2011) case of Swedish bioenergy policy allows to identify environment-sectoral and inter-sectoral policy coordination among several policy-making procedures that allowed to achieve PI outputs in an organisationally fragmented government setting. Inter-organisational coordination may be facilitated by transversal bodies such as secretariats, committees, and official horizontal cooperation and agreements that help overcome the functional specialisation of bureaucracies (Rogers & Whetten, 1982; Oberthür, 2009; Kent, 2014). The public administration literature has hailed collaborative public management as an instrument helping to overcome bureaucratic fragmentation and policy-making across organisational borders (O’Leary & Vij, 2012). Therefore, a fragmented organisational setting may favour the adoption of PI when the government is politically favorable to an integrated approach.

Large ministries vs. silo ministries

The extent of an organisation’s jurisdiction has an incidence on the global amount of financial and human resources that the organisation is endowed with and which translate into an organisation’s “capacity to initiate policies, develop alternatives, or to implement final decisions” (Egeberg, 2012, p. 5). The extent of a ministry’s jurisdiction also has implications for the policy process because it affects the degree to which coordination is internalised within specific ministries or else takes place at the inter-ministerial level. In the EPI literature, Lafferty (2002) argues that a separate authority (ministry) for environmental policy poses a structural problem for EPI since it would “rarely, if ever, have the authority necessary to impose environmental objectives into the decision-making premises of other sectoral authorities” (p. 22). For Duffy and Cook (2018), organisational fragmentation between agencies responsible for different policies, in this case environmental protection and public health, goes along with these agencies having different regulatory missions and goals; goal conflict results in inefficient policy, regulators working independently from one another and without knowledge of each other’s work. Biermann and colleagues however believe that upgrading the UN Environment Programme to a specialised agency would present the best solution with regard to the programme’s potential to foster environmental PI globally (Biermann, 2000; Biermann, Davies, et al., 2009; Biermann, Pattberg, et al., 2009; Biermann & Kim, 2020). Since the performance (or the lack thereof) of an organisation is spotted more easily in single-purpose organisations (James et al., 2016, p. 231), ‘single-issue’ ministries incentivise the minister to achieve something for this particular policy in order not to jeopardise her political career (Pehle, 1998, p. 107). Therefore we might expect ministers to behave according to ‘making one’s mark’ mechanisms akin to those observed by Biesbroek and Candel (2020). With regard to the situation of the German ministry for the Environment before and after energy policy

was split off its jurisdiction, Töller (2019) observes that the ministry's environmental positions became much more ambitious once it did not need to compromise with the conflicting interests of the energy sector at the administrative stage anymore (p. 583).

The larger the extent and diversity of a ministry's jurisdiction, the higher the internal horizontal complexity of its organisational structure. The organisational literature commonly associates the extent of a jurisdiction with the 'span of control' problem, i.e., the difficulty for the political head of the ministry to effectively communicate with and supervise all units personally (Peters, 1978, p. 115; Willson, 1978, p. 45; Derlien, 1996, pp. 566–567), a difficulty that some find can be overcome (Shalala, 1998). The bigger a ministry, the more a minister depends on both her staff of advisors and the senior civil servants that head the directorates, and their autonomy in policy development should be significant. 'Large' ministries, i.e., ministries that combine policy functions for interdependent or substantively related policy issues (cf. above), have two further implications for policy coordination processes. First, they may favour the agenda-setting of integrated policy proposals because policy coordination may take place early on in the policy process and ministries will strive for coherent policy proposals within their field of competences (Hegele, 2021, p. 7). Lægreid, Randma-Liiv and colleagues (2014) argue that while coordination instruments may work across organisational boundaries, the realignment of these same boundaries through a fusion transforms these boundaries into internal ones, a framework in which coordination is arguably easier to achieve (p. 4). 'Large' ministries favour the joint elaboration of policy drafts through intra-ministerial administrative coordination between the directorates (Müller, 1986, p. 28) and bear the possibility that divergent interests be conciliated through compromise at an early stage of the legislative process before the conflict enters the political sphere (Müller, 1986, p. 422). For instance, 'large' ministries might facilitate the establishment of dedicated funds for joint projects or programmes across sectors or levels. Such funds may prove critical for the such initiatives to emerge (Drimie & Ruysenaar, 2010; Vince, 2015). In 'large' ministries, arbitration between the interests of different subsystems takes place internally (at the intra-ministerial level) if these sectors have diverging positions. This grants the minister and her staff of advisors a strong arbitrator role and leads to a de-politicisation of governmental decision-making, which takes place at the intra-ministerial level. Directorates must arrive at a common position for inter-ministerial coordination and find a solution to conflicting interests "in-house"; if the interests of the ministry's directorates diverge, the ministry's position is therefore more likely to be a compromise. Organisational scholars studying the organisational consequences of fusion events generally find that fusions lead to the internalisation of arbitration on policy decisions from the inter-ministerial (government) level to the intra-ministerial level (Egeberg, 1999). Concomitantly, in large ministries political decisions that affect several policy sectors are internalised, i.e., taken not at cabinet level but by the minister and his advisors, who obtain

more power to arbitrate policy decisions. In 'large' ministries the minister may have to act as an arbitrator between the interests of the different units and associated policies, in line with her interests, priorities, and political strategy; here, the vertical coordination within the ministry and each of the directors' and directorates' "access" of to the minister will be crucial if internal conflicts of interest between directorates remain unresolved at the administrative level of internal coordination (Müller, 1986, p. 316).

Some argue that PI is more likely when the policy sectors can be attributed to joint institutions (ministry or administration) (Trein, 2017b; also Grant & MacNamara, 1995). The literature on EPI has highlighted that the location of environmental competences within a 'large' ministry potentially makes it easier for environmental issues to be put on the agenda in a different policy area (such as agricultural policy or urban planning) that falls within the large ministry's jurisdiction. The EPI literature contends that a fusion of a ministry for the Environment with another ministry can alter the inter-ministerial power balance within government in favour of the former (Jacob & Volkery, 2004; Jacob et al., 2008; Jordan & Lenschow, 2008b; Schout & Jordan, 2008; Wurzel et al., 2013). Jordan & Lenschow (2008b) argue that a fusion of the ministry for the Environment with another ministry increases the relative importance of the former and (p. 33). Analysing climate policy integration in Sweden, Nilsson (2005) finds that assigning the policy initiative for developing climate policy instruments to the ministry for Industry actually favoured the integration of climate concerns into sectoral policies: "EPI as a learning process seems to be improved, and the long-term impact on policy is greater through the transfer of ownership and responsibility".

EPI scholars in particular have argued that large ministries may also bring their own drawbacks for EPI (Hertin & Berkhout, 2003; Jacob & Volkery, 2004; Jordan & Lenschow, 2008b; Adelle et al., 2009; Negev, 2016). In particular, depending on the relative size and power of the environmental unit and its counterparts, it can be either beneficial or detrimental for an environmental ministry and its interests in the policy process, marginalise environmental policy-makers within the ministry, lower environmental commitment and competence, and dilute their influence on the policy process (Hertin & Berkhout, 2003; Jordan & Lenschow, 2008b, pp. 33–34). Adelle et al. (2009) observed that "somewhat counter-intuitively, creating a new 'super-DG for energy and climate change, possibly under the authority of a single Commissioner, (...) may well turn out to be detrimental to further integration aimed at promoting sustainable development" (pp. 62-63).

Scholars of coordination seldom highlight the usefulness of organisational boundaries and the benefits associated with the specialisation of tasks explicitly. An exception is Pollitt (2003) who when discussing coordination asserted the detrimental effects of more loosely coupled organisations as follows by arguing that "[m]embership of and loyalty to a single organization

and its activities has often provided a powerful focus for adhesion among public servants at all levels. Strong personal identification with more abstract cross-cutting objectives, or with a temporary multiorganizational team, may be more difficult to cultivate (...)” (p. 39). In other words, the ‘silo mentalities’ that fusions are supposed to challenge exist for some good reasons and while some ‘silos’ can be disrupted, others are immune to organisational reform (Page, 2005). Especially, silos based on political conflict between organisations are unlikely to be amenable to change by administrative means, unless the latter are accompanied with political agreement (Page, 2005).

Finally, it is hard to expect any potential gains for policy integration from ‘garbage can’ ministries, i.e., combined jurisdictions of unrelated policies. In such jurisdictions, the ‘span of control’ problem applies. The minister has a crucial role as an arbitrator especially as regards the (re)distribution of funding, but also smaller organisational remodels within her ministry. The interests and incentives of the minister should play an important role in such a ministry; yet, as the policies under the ministry’s jurisdiction are unrelated, we can assume that there are little to no ‘substantive’ issues on which the minister will have to arbitrate.

Based on the above, the following preliminary expectations are formulated:

Preliminary expectation 1: *No organisational condition – neither portfolio concentration nor a large ministry is necessary for a government to adopt a high number of PI reforms.*

I expect that only in an organisational configuration that combines a concentrated portfolio and a large ministry, this configuration may be sufficient for explaining the adoption of PI reforms. In this configuration, the ministerial bureaucratic capacity for a policy field is contained within one ministry, favouring the internal integration of the policy field (Ugland & Veggeland, 2006), while the large ministry favours the agenda-setting of integrated policy proposals through the bureaucracy and develop integrative capacity to contain policy subsystem logics.

Preliminary expectation 2: *The combination of a concentrated portfolio and a large ministry may be sufficient for explaining the adoption of relatively many PI reforms by governments.*

I expect that when the other organisational configurations are present, these may likewise be associated with the adoption of relatively many PI reforms by governments, but only when combined with conditions that favour the adoption of PI following a political logic of coordination.

2.2 Party political preferences and the politics of policy integration

When policy goals transgress sectoral boundaries, political decisions on how to prioritise between them are crucial for attaining compatibility between sectoral objectives (Hildingsson & Johansson, 2016). We know from policy theory that political entrepreneurs, who hold an elected leadership position and actively support a proposal by trying to obtain majority support for the project, bargaining over the details of the policy, and manipulating, are decisive for decision-making in situations of ambiguity (Zahariadis, 2003). Most early studies of both policy coordination and integration missed the larger political dynamics inherent in policy coordination (Ahmad, 2009, p. 13; Baumgartner & Jones, 2010, pp. 235-251; Jochim & May, 2010), but scholars have recently called for a more explicit attention to the political logics of coordination (Tosun, 2016, p. 584) and investigated the political aspects of PI more systematically (Sørensen et al., 2020; Vogeler et al., 2022; Cejudo & Trein, 2023a; Reber et al., 2023; Sarti, 2023). In doing so, many studies have argued for and demonstrated the benefits that can be reaped from integrating theoretical arguments provided by public policy theories into the analysis of PI (Candel & Biesbroek, 2016; Cejudo & Michel, 2017; Head, 2019; Milhorange et al., 2021; Cejudo & Trein, 2023a).

Political logic of policy coordination

The political logic to policy coordination is structured through party-political competition and favours political solutions that help achieve electoral success (Czerwick, 2001). In policy theory, party political actors play a key role in the policy process where they may act as political entrepreneurs, i.e., key policy-makers who actively support a proposal and are willing to bring together a majority for it during decision-making (Walgrave & Varone, 2008; Carter & Jacobs, 2014; Herweg et al., 2015). The political logic to policy coordination emphasises policy solutions that are able to make programmatic statements and enhance the reputation of the party in the short term, the ultimate goal being gains in popularity and an electoral majority; hence, actors “perceive coordination as a political game relying on knowledge of party-politically shaped conflict areas” and may pay particular “attention to a certain issue because it is considered salient by the general public or at least relevant social groups” (Hustedt & Danken, 2017, p. 734).

Political actors such as political parties are able to counteract the sectoral logic of policy-making (Sarti, 2023). High-level political commitment – i.e., leadership, prioritisation, political will – has been used as explanations for policy integration (Jordan, 2002b; Hogl et al., 2016; Candel, 2017, 2021) to such an extent that Nilsson, Eckerberg and Finnveden (2007) call it a “common trash-can variable” (p. 145). Empirical studies found that the political attention given to PI and the positive meaning attached to it by the leadership depended on the political composition of the government (Maggetti & Trein, 2021), as well as the behaviour of its

leaders (Rietig & Dupont, 2021). For instance, the high level of attention to PI in UK development cooperation policy in the early 2000s was linked to the strong support offered by two leading figures of the government (Prontera, 2016). Similarly, Obama administration's political will for EPI allowed for the adoption of procedural EPI instruments as part of a regulatory approach to EPI in a political context where partisan differences prevented EPI through legislative venues (Duffy & Cook, 2018).

The literature on the role of political parties for policy coordination suggests that parties are major drivers of coordination reforms. Some have highlighted the role of political parties that may provide venues for policy coordination (Bolleyer, 2011) or act as policy entrepreneurs for PI if the latter is congruent with their policy agendas (Trein & Ansell, 2021; Trein, Maggetti, et al., 2021). Bolleyer (2011) provides a causal mechanism for this argument according to which political parties feature organisational linkages that transcend subsystem boundaries and can thereby facilitate policy coordination across government. Political parties can, in other words, facilitate informal coordination and cross-sectoral linkages across functional divides both within and across ministries as well as with policy communities located outside the institutions (also, Kaltenecker, 2023). PI research has also adopted the concept "integrative leadership" from the public administration literature (Bryson et al., 2006; Crosby & Bryson, 2010) to capture the type of leadership that is necessary to arrive at integrated solutions to cross-cutting problems (Candel, 2021). Following Sørensen et al. (2020), it captures how and to what effect "politicians span the boundaries between collaborative governance arenas and policy-making within the traditional institutions of representative democracy".

Ideological positions and PI reference parties

Policy integration studies that approach PI from a top-down perspective have long used partisan ideology as an explanatory factor for PI. In scrutinising the relationship between parties' ideological affiliation with partisan differences in public policies, the focus is on the question whether "parties make a difference" in terms of public policy (Zohlnhöfer, 2023). Arguments about the relevance of ideology for explaining political behaviour and decision-making go back to classical theory of party differences according to which the competition between political parties is structured by the different economic policy preferences of their respective electorates that they try to impose when in government (Downs, 1957; Hibbs, 1977, 1992). Right-of-centre parties are generally associated with closeness to capital owners, which explains their concern for and positions regarding issues such as inflation and labour costs, while left-of-centre parties are generally expected to be closer to the labour base and therefore focus on, e.g., the prevention of unemployment. Concomitantly, the literature on the political attitudes and behaviour of MPs puts partisanship forward as a strong predictor of attitudes towards policy proposals and behaviour in office. These arguments of the

traditional partisan politics theory remain valid although the changing socio-economic electoral constituencies of the post-industrial context impose some scope conditions on a linear direct relationship between the right-left orientation of the party in power and the government's policy output (Häusermann et al., 2013). Research shows that parties' positions on the left-right dimension are strongly related to their positions regarding issues such as European integration (Hooghe et al., 2002), and that governing parties define priorities and produce policies that are consistent with their partisan ideology on the left-right dimension (McDonald & Budge, 2005; Russo & Verzichelli, 2016), although this link may apply to some areas of public policy more than others (Russo & Verzichelli, 2016).

The literature on policy integration rather consistently associates policy integration with the agendas of left-of-centre parties. For instance, Jordan and Lenschow (2010) cite evidence from EPI studies showing that centre-left governments tended to promote EPI reforms, while centre-right governments stalled PI reform activity or dismantled integrated policies already in place (p. 151). Case studies associated left-of-centre parties with the adoption of environmental PI reforms in Sweden (Nilsson, 2005) and Italy (Lewanski, 2002). Similar patterns have been observed for policy integration in development cooperation policy (Prontera, 2016). As regards the integration of social policy with other policy sectors, Trein and colleagues argue that left-of-centre parties' support for the social investment perspective should make them more likely to adopt PI reforms in the field of social policy (Maggetti & Trein, 2021; Trein & Ansell, 2021; Trein, Maggetti, et al., 2021). According to these authors, it is the greater heterogeneity of left parties' policy preferences that explains the adoption of PI reforms by governments controlled by left parties. A cross-country comparison of patterns of policy integration and administrative coordination reforms in four policy sectors by Trein and Ansell (2021) found that left-of-centre parties in government were more likely to adopt policy integration reforms than their conservative and liberal counterparts, although they also observed some PI reform activity among the latter. The analysis of PI reforms in several policy fields in the UK between 1980 and 2014 by Maggetti and Trein (2021) shows that PI reform activity was especially high under the auspices of New Labour governments and linked to this party's policy agendas that favoured integrated approaches to the policy problems at stake. Similarly, Ferry (2021) identifies the left-of-centre Labour government as a key driver for the adoption of an integrated regional policy in the UK and observed that this was replaced with a fragmented mix of instruments by the subsequent Conservative-Liberal coalition government. Trein, Maggetti and Meyer (2021) analyse find that the presence of strong left-of-centre parties in Parliament is associated with the adoption of employment PI reforms at a level close to necessity, whereas conversely the weakness of Green parties in Parliament appears as necessary for governments adopting PI reforms at a high level of intensity.

In a nutshell, therefore, those contributions to the PI literature that analyse the effect of ideology suggest that strong left-of-centre parties favour the adoption of PI reforms.¹⁸ However, the presence of a left-of-centre cabinet in government is not necessary for the adoption of PI reforms (Trein & Ansell, 2021).

Issue preferences and salience

The analysis of party competition is less focused today on structural positioning and instead increasingly concentrates on issue competition, i.e., on the competition between parties about which issues become salient in the political process (Green-Pedersen, 2007). The policy literature considers a government's ideological orientation and its support for particular issues or policy solutions as distinct conceptually and empirically (Lowe et al., 2011; Hohendorf et al., 2021). When analysing the relationship between specific policy positions as formulated in electoral programs and other programmatic statements and parties' policy outputs when in government, the focus is on the question whether parties in government fulfil the policy promises that they make (Zohlnhöfer, 2023).

The literature on political representation in democracies suggests that governments' legislative activity is influenced by governing parties' issue emphases in their election campaigns. Time in government allows a party to demonstrate issue ownership through legislative commitment (Petrocik, 1996; Petrocik et al., 2003). Elected executives thus have incentives to focus their agendas on the issues of which their party has ownership (Green & Jennings, 2019). According to Hjerimitslev and Krauss (2023), introducing legislation allows parties to signal their policy preferences effectively because of the media attention generated by the unveiling of a legislative proposal. Numerous studies on pledge fulfilment report evidence that governing parties generally follow through on the promises that they campaigned with (Knill et al., 2010; Thomson et al., 2017; Brouard et al., 2018; Breunig et al., 2019; Böhmelt & Ezrow, 2022; Gross et al., 2024) and that voters reward parties for doing so (Matthieß, 2020; Plescia et al., 2022). Studies in different issue areas show that the number of policies adopted mirrors the salience of issues in party manifestos (Böhmelt & Ezrow, 2022; Lundquist, 2022). Therefore, a party that claims issue ownership has powerful incentives to actively pursue activities related to these issues when in government.

¹⁸ The PI literature advances alternative factors relative to ideological partisanship that might also be relevant in explaining the adoption of PI reforms. In particular, these alternative factors are the degree of legislative polarisation (Trein & Ansell, 2021), which grasps ideological divisions within a legislature, as well as the turnover between cabinets (Maggetti & Trein, 2021). I privileged a condition relative to governing parties' ideological positions over these other conditions because the PI literature has advanced arguments as regards the effects of reference parties on the adoption of PI reforms more often and has consistently argued that left-of-centre parties favour PI reforms. Conversely, the literature does not lead to similarly clear expectations for the other two conditions. These and other alternative explanatory factors are discussed in more detail and with references to empirical illustrations in Chapter 6, section 3.

Certain contextual conditions may alter parties' incentives to pursue an agenda based on their policy preferences, though. In particular, issue ownership may be contested and a governing party have motives to pursue an agenda normally owned by the opposition (Seeberg, 2013, 2023). Seeberg's (2013) analysis of policy developments in penal policy in Denmark shows that the left-wing government deviated from its previous policy positions by restricting penal policy because of the right-wing opposition parties' repeated insistence to bring this issue owned by them on the government's agenda through questions to the minister. Seeberg (2023) describes a dynamic whereby opposition parties' preferences played an indirect role for initiating legislative processes if governments initiate legislative processes on issues supported by their opponents in order to "silence opposition agenda-setting": when a government wants to avoid issue politicisation, the opposition can influence policy by putting an issue on the agenda and lead the governing party to adopt policy positions normally defended by the opposition. In particular, parties with stronger electoral mandates are under less pressure to demonstrate their policy strength through attention to their owned policy issues and may rather trespass onto issues normally owned by competitors (Holian, 2004; Green, 2011; Green & Jennings, 2019).

The PI literature also proposes that policy punctuations induce demands for policy integration (Cejudo and Trein, 2023b). This occurs in particular when complex crises span the boundaries of policy sectors (Ansell et al., 2010; Ansell et al., 2021) and make the need for policy integration pressing and obvious. Some studies suggest that governments adopt PI reforms if they experience problem pressure from external events. In the study by Trein, Maggetti, and Meyer (2021), problem pressure appears as a necessary condition for the adoption of PI reforms in environmental policy and unemployment policy. Similarly, Kaplaner, Knill and Steinebach (2023) find that sectoral differences in PI align with shifts in political salience and the varied impacts of crisis events on different sectors. This is in line with arguments from Punctuated Equilibrium Theory, where external events such as crises can trigger politicisation resulting in policy change (Baumgartner & Jones, 1993; Baumgartner et al., 2018), as well as the ACF, where events may change the policy agenda (Jenkins-Smith et al., 2018).

However, Punctuated Equilibrium Theory also argues that the politicisation of issues occurs within subsystems and is dominated by a specific subsystem's sectoral policy frames and solutions (Jones et al., 1993; Baumgartner et al., 2018). Therefore, following Cejudo and Trein (2023b), politicisation will often rather favour a subsystem logic of policy-making. This hypothesis is supported by Trein and Ansell (2021) whose cross-country analysis of PI reforms in four policies found that problem pressure made reforms that enhance the coordination of public administrations less likely.

In addition, policy punctuations may induce PI reforms when policy challenges are redefined or reframed in a way that emphasises the complex character of the challenge. Cejudo and Trein (2023b) argue that increases in the level of salience and politicisation resulting from crisis events have the potential to break up the “sectoral structure and logic of policymaking, supported and defended by actors within subsystems” (p. 12). Söderberg’s (2011) analysis of Swedish bioenergy policy identified external events as causally relevant for explaining PI outputs through inter-ministerial coordination in an organisationally fragmented government setting. A similar dynamic occurred in the case analysed by Kefeli, Siegel, Pittaluga, and Dietz (2023) where policy integration ensued when an advocacy coalition strategically politicised an issue, leading a competing weak coalition to change some of its belief system regarding the issue and enter a policy compromise. Conversely, Russel, den Uyl and de Vito (2018) highlight the role of urgency perceptions by showing that a lack of urgency among sectoral stakeholders hindered the adoption of climate PI in the EU. In the study of sustainable development strategies by Casado-Asensio and Steurer (2015), a lack of political salience and marginalisation on the political agenda hampered the strategies’ potential to effectively influence the policy process.

Preliminary expectation 3: *A left-of-centre government may adopt a high number of PI reforms if the issue is politically salient.*

2.3 Executive capacity

To be able to translate its policy preferences into legislative activity, a government needs a room for manoeuvre to determine the legislative agenda on the issue (Bäck et al., 2022). Because political systems provide for veto points that impact on policy adoption, policy reform often requires the involvement – or at least the tacit assent – of several institutional actors. These arguments echo with the PI literature. PI as “anchored in a political system” is determined by structural features of the political system, such as the number of veto points (Jordan & Lenschow, 2010; Tosun & Lang, 2017).

The literature suggests that the preferences of the governing parties influence policy-making more if policy-making is centralised in the executive (Leinaweaver & Thomson, 2016; Guinaudeau & Guinaudeau, 2023, Wenzelburger, 2023). Several studies report that power concentration within the national executive enhances pledge fulfilment (Knill et al., 2010; Thomson et al., 2017). Praprotnik (2017) in particular argues that parties fulfil their electoral pledges more when they have the ability to do so, which is influenced by their resources, among which jurisdiction. Her study of Austria (1990-2013) shows empirically that governing coalitions fulfilled the parties’ electoral pledges less when the Länder were involved in the policy-making process. Thomson et al. (2017) show that the extent of pledge fulfilment

depends on the type of governments and that pledge fulfilment is highest by parties in single-party governments.

The PI literature advances the argument that PI reforms spanning different policy sectors are more likely if the government's discretion over policy subsystems is high (Cejudo & Trein, 2023b, p. 18). To conceptualise this argument, the PI literature has pointed at the role of executive capacity (Cejudo & Michel, 2017; Vogeler et al., 2022). Maggetti and Trein (2021) conceptualise the government's institutional capacity for policy integration as defined as its "capacity to act" (Armingeon, 1997) as an important intervening factor that enables the impact of partisan ideology on PI. According to these authors, the "role of governing parties' ideology in policy integration reforms is magnified when institutional capacity is high" (p. 83). Vogeler et al. (2022) identify the presence of executive capacity as a necessary condition for PI in a comparative study of antimicrobial resistance policies in European countries. Conversely, when the number of veto players is higher governing parties should have more difficulties realising their campaign promises. The more veto players in a political system, the more likely that those opposed to reforms successfully impede policy development in general and the adoption of PI reforms in particular (Tosun & Lang, 2017; Trein, Maggetti, et al., 2021).

Preliminary expectation 4: *A left-of-centre government may adopt a high number of PI reforms if the government enjoys high discretion over the legislative agenda.*

Several factors curtail the government's executive capacity to dominate the legislative agenda, though. Among these, the PI literature suggests that three are relevant: the type of government that allocates power between government and parliament; second, subnational veto points; and third, supra-national agenda-setters in multi-level systems.

Types of government

Recent studies of law-making processes in Western European parliamentary democracies have nuanced the role of governments therein (Holtmann & Patzelt, 2008) and instead shown that parliaments, and their committees in particular, have been institutionally strengthened in the past years (von Blumenthal, 2009). Individual parliamentarians, parliamentary groups, and/or parliamentary committees may hold instruments to trigger legislative processes (Ismayr, 2013; Schüttemeyer & Siefken, 2008, p. 492 ff.) but also to constrain the legislative activity of the government (Bäck et al., 2022). These actors may play a role as a legislative agenda setter by initiating law-making (Brunner, 2013; Ismayr, 2013) or interact with the government in legislative agenda-setting (Seeberg, 2013, 2023). However, they also exert considerable scrutiny over the governments' legislative activity. Governments' legislative projects are under scrutiny from parliamentary committees as well as coalition parties in coalition governments and are frequently amended at different stages of the process. Even in

parliamentary systems, parliaments may topple a legislative project of the government (König et al., 2023). Parliamentary committees in particular gather considerable competences in their respective issue area which allow them to challenge governments' legislative proposals (Gaines et al., 2019; Siefken & Rommetvedt, 2022). Challenges to government dominance mostly stem from the parliamentary opposition as the government's main competitor (Brunner, 2013; Garritzmann, 2017; König et al., 2023). This is in line with the veto players theory, according to which a government's ability to change the status quo is reduced when it lacks a legislative majority or when it comprises multiple parties.

The comparative politics literature on coalition politics and government formation shows that the government's dominance of the legislative agenda is particularly strong when the government majority and the parliamentary majority coincide (Schmidt, 1996; Armingeon, 1997) and that this leads to a high rate of adoption of government bills (König et al., 2023). When the government parties control a legislative majority, the demarcation between the parties in government and in opposition typically dominates voting patterns (Dewan & Spirling, 2011; Hix & Noury, 2016; Tuttnauer, 2018). Single-party governments are free from the need to find encompassing compromises with the parliamentary opposition (Crombez, 1996; Knotz & Lindvall, 2015). Conversely, government parties are more constrained in their legislative activity under divided or minority governments (Strøm, 1990; Bräuninger & Debus, 2009; Vodová, 2021; Whitaker & Martin, 2022). They may, however, anticipate potential points of resistance early in the process and adapt their legislative projects accordingly.

Party manifestos influence policy outputs also in proportional systems where coalition governments are common (Green-Pedersen & Mortensen, 2015; Brouard et al., 2018). Parties in a coalition government have stronger incentives to seek consensus within the coalition and with parliament by proposing accommodating and balanced reform packages, and to seek support through negotiations with interest organisations representing the involved sectors (Knotz & Lindvall, 2015). In the case of Austria's coalition governments between 1999 and 2008, Schermann and Ennsner-Jedenastik (2014) found that institutional constraints mediated the extent to which party preferences translated into policy outputs: in these coalitions, pledges were more likely to translate into policy outputs if they were contained in the coalition agreement and if the pledge-making party controlled the ministerial portfolio. Pledge fulfilment can even be high when a minority government in proportional parliamentary systems depends on the support of parliament (Artés & Bustos, 2008). Studies by Artés (2013) on Spain and Naurin (2014) on Sweden show that minority single-party governments fulfil as many, or even more, promises as do majority single-party cabinets in Westminster systems.

Supra-national agenda-setting

In harkening back to the literature on policy diffusion, Cejudo and Trein (2023b) argue that policy diffusion is a likely mechanism that puts policy integration on the national agenda.

International and supranational bodies play a major role in formulating demands for policy integration reforms and thereby pushing national agendas towards PI (Tosun et al., 2019; Dupont & Jordan, 2021; Cejudo & Trein, 2023b). In general, the internationalisation of a policy increases the need for domestic inter-ministerial policy coordination, both because national negotiating positions must be developed and because the international commitments once achieved must be implemented. More particularly, policy integration is an important item on the agendas of these bodies, which may provide policy knowledge or tools to member states (Tosun et al., 2019). Tosun and Peters (2018) argue that EU membership in particular should increase governments' commitment to PI. In areas of EU competence, the European Commission has sizeable legislative agenda-setting power (Rauh, 2021) and the EU has pushed its member states towards integrated policies in the past. Puska (2014) reports that Finland benefited from its EU Presidency in 2006 to launch the concept 'Health in all policies' that was also supported by the World Health Organization (WHO). Adelle et al. (2009) have shown that the EU acted as a policy entrepreneur for climate and energy PI when this became a crucial element of the new legitimating discourse of European integration. The literature on policy diffusion demonstrates that interaction with the international and supranational levels informs – and constrains – the agendas of national decision-makers through learning, emulation, competition, as well as soft or hard forms of coercion (Knill, 2001; Radaelli, 2003; Maggetti & Gilardi, 2016). Supra-national institutions, and the EU in particular, may therefore act as policy entrepreneurs for PI reforms. However, the adoption of the reforms still depends on political will and initiative of the political leadership of the national governments (Lenschow, 2002a), where different interests may prevail (Hey, 2002). In other words, supra-national influence on national agenda-setting interacts with national venue constellations (Sabatier & Jenkins-Smith, 1999; Egeberg & Trondal, 2016).

Subnational levels and bottom-up dynamics

Parts of the PI literature have been interested in how horizontal PI across sectors interacts with the vertical integration of a political system across levels of government. The general consensus is that the horizontal integration of policies does not challenge national governments in the same way in unitary/centralised and federalised political systems (Egeberg & Trondal, 2016; Ferry, 2021).

In systems with federal components, policy-making authority is divided between levels and local and state governments share in national policy-making authority. Governments and their

bureaucracies face a higher risk of agency loss over the initiative and adoption of policy reforms in federal than in centralised systems (Schnapp & Willner, 2013). Subnational entities may thus have some institutionalised influence on the legislative agenda and become *de facto* policy-making actors and veto players in areas in which responsibilities are divided between levels. Therefore, the policy integration literature supposes in general that PI reforms are more feasible when policy-making is centralised (Lenschow, 2002b, p. 18). Conversely, in federal systems, two dimensions of integration – horizontal and vertical – interact (Watson et al., 2008; Varone et al., 2013; Clar & Steurer, 2014; Steurer & Clar, 2014, 2015, 2018; Egeberg & Trondal, 2016; Henstra, 2016; Howlett et al., 2017). The PI literature generally associates this interaction with joint decision traps, unclear responsibilities and priorities and a lack of problem ownership, and tends to find that these factors hinder the horizontal integration of policies (Den Uyl & Russel, 2018; Steurer & Clar, 2018; Ferry, 2021). The studies of the interaction between horizontal and vertical integration in the federalist systems of the Alpine countries by Steurer and colleagues provide empirical evidence for this interaction. These authors find that federalism complicates an already complex horizontal integration challenge further by adding a vertical dimension (Casado-Asensio & Steurer, 2016; Steurer & Clar, 2015, 2018). Studying the integration of climate policy in the Austrian building sector, they observe that since no federal ministry had noteworthy responsibilities for construction policy, the federal Ministry for the Environment needed to negotiate policies with various provincial authorities (Steurer & Clar, 2015). In these processes, PI became the object of federal politics games that delayed or hindered policies for reasons unrelated to the policy issues at stake. The authors conclude that the vertical dispersion of responsibilities between levels of government, combined with the horizontal dispersion of responsibility within the federal government, prevented the adoption of PI in this case.

In a different case, however, Steurer and Clar (2018) report that the strong vertical fragmentation of responsibilities did not stand in the way of horizontal PI. More precisely, CPI in flood risk management presents a case where vertical fragmentation was offset by networks of coordination and interdependencies between levels and strong consensus on policy contents and helped to produce comparatively extensive policy output (Steurer & Clar, 2018, p. 259). In some fields, scholars have observed the emergence of ‘functional regulatory spaces’ that emerge “in order to tackle, support, or solve problems concerning several policy sectors in different institutional territories and at different levels of government” (Varone et al., 2013, p. 320). In functional regulatory spaces, the integration across policies, territorial perimeters, and levels of government, is considered “functionally appropriate” (Varone et al., 2013, p. 321) for resolving policy issues. Examples include specific geographic areas, such as ‘integrated coastal zone management’ (Alves et al., 2013; Falaleeva et al., 2011; Hovik &

Stokke, 2007; Portman et al., 2012), or specific resources, such as ‘integrated water resources management’ (Varis et al., 2014).

In sum, the plurality of policy venues in a multi-level system can impact policy integration in different ways. It can either produce veto players who obstruct policy integration reforms (Clar & Steurer, 2014; Steurer & Clar, 2018; Trein, Maggetti, et al., 2021), or create additional opportunities for cooperation and influence of subnational advocacy groups to move policy issues up the ladder of governmental authority (Pralle, 2003; Lidén & Nyhlén, 2023). Hence, whether federalism favours or impedes horizontal PI at the national level arguably depends on other contextual factors that shape policy-making (Steurer & Clar, 2018).

2.4 Organisational and political factors: causally complex interactions

From the existing literature on PI, a situation of causal complexity can be expected: possible explanatory conditions are multiple, and may also work in conjunctions, as none of the conditions is assumed to be necessary or sufficient for a high level of PI reform activity. The literature also suggests that there may be multiple causal pathways leading the outcome of high PI reform activity. The assumption of complex causality has been present in the PI literature since the beginnings. The early PI literature explained the adoption of PI with the help of various theoretical perspectives that have been grouped into institutional, political, and cognitive factors (Jordan & Lenschow, 2010; Hogl et al., 2016), in other words, “actors, ideas and institutions” (Lenschow, 2002b, p. 16). These factors were often used in a combined and complementary way. However, PI scholars have only more recently gone beyond mere directional expectations and instead incorporated arguments about how these conditions combine to produce PI. Maggetti and Trein (2021) argue that institutional capacities can be an important intervening factor enabling PI reforms, although political motivations and ideologies may play the decisive role in determining policy change and capacity-building trajectories.

According to Cejudo and Trein’s (2023) framework, depoliticised agenda-setting leads to limited conflicts between sectors which enable integrated policy strategy, while politicised agenda-setting leads to conflict between sectors, which in turn result in either an integrated or a sectoral narrative. As regards the policy logic of coordination, this framework conceptualised organisational integrative capacity as a depoliticised mechanism and venue shift as a politicised mechanism with the potential to explain PI outputs. Conversely, as regards the political logic of coordination, it argued that the policy goals or electoral objectives of political actors may explain the adoption of integrated policy outputs (Hustedt & Danken, 2017; Sarti, 2023) even when logics of turf protection and organisational capture inhibit positive administrative coordination (Peters, 2015). Developments on the political stream may open windows of opportunity that allow policy entrepreneurs to influence the policy process

(Kingdon, 2014). Hustedt and Danken (2017) explain that both policy and political logics in policy processes “are reconciled or aligned by anticipation and, ultimately, hierarchy” (p. 732). The theoretical framework thus suggests that the relationship between organisational conditions and policy output must rather be apprehended as a causally complex one. These hypothesised pathways follow a logic of equifinality, i.e., they suggest that different combinations of conditions have the potential to explain the outcome, i.e., the adoption of relatively many PI reforms. Rather than the *net effect* of single organisational conditions, this study is interested in the *combined effects* of conditions related to governments’ organisational structure as well as the political context in which these government organisations operate. This approach to causality is also appropriate in light of the current advancement of PI research, which has just taken the first steps towards cross-sectional and longitudinal designs and the cumulative analysis of existing case-specific research on the drivers and causal factors behind PI (Bornemann, 2016; Knudsen & Lafferty, 2016; Trein et al., 2019; Trein, Biesbroek, et al., 2021; Trein et al., 2023). In this situation, the assumptions of causal complexity, equifinality and conjunctural causation are particularly well-suited for advancing the cumulativeness of existing research (Maggetti, 2015, p. 173). Therefore, the methodology of this thesis is grounded in the ontological stance of configurational causation (Ragin & Sonnett, 2005; Fiss, 2007; Rihoux & Ragin, 2009). Configurational causality means that we assume the causal conditions and mechanisms to have combined and complementary effects, rather than working in isolation from, or in opposition to, one another (Pennings, 2003; Fiss, 2007). In other words, single conditions “may have a very different impact on the outcome according to the way they combine in a specific configuration” (Giraud & Maggetti, 2015, p. 139). Configurational causality also implies that there may be different, mutually non-exclusive explanations of the same outcome (‘equifinality’) (Schneider & Wagemann, 2012, p. 78). Finally, the configurational perspective means that the role and impact of single conditions depends on the context in which they unfold (Rihoux & Lobe, 2009, p. 224). Such ‘remote’ factors are crucial for understanding and assessing public administration reforms (Lægreid, Sarapuu, et al., 2014; Pollitt & Dan, 2013) and may be critical elements of the causal explanation.

Mindful that the conditions selected for the framework fall short of representing the variety of explanatory factors identified in the PI literature and that are susceptible of shaping the relationship between organisational structure and policy outputs, I selected the conditions for the present framework combining the “perspectives” and “configurational” approaches that Amenta and Poulsen’s (1994) proposed for how to approach the selection of variables when complex causality is assumed but the setting is exploratory (see also, Fischer & Maggetti, 2017). This has the advantage of combining elements of the two logics of coordination (policy and politics) and testing the relevance of each, while still keeping the number of conditions

manageable and making it more likely that empirical cases will correspond to each of the combinations of conditions (Amenta & Poulsen, 1994). In other words, the conditions selected should reflect different theoretical perspectives, thus testing the contribution of each (*ibid.*, pp. 26-27), but also tried to create a framework that makes the conjunctural or combinatorial nature of the expected relationships explicit (*ibid.*, p. 29). Following examples of previous studies, I expect these configurations to be those “most likely” associated with the outcome (Blatter et al., 2010), but do not systematically discuss all possible combinations of conditions (Maggetti, 2007) and also expect to detect unexpected configurations.

3 Organisational choices in parliamentary democracies

3.1 Partisan policy preferences and government organisation

The literature generally assumes that organisation is purposeful and that there are several non-exclusive ways of theorising these purposes (Derlien, 1996, p. 550; Davis et al., 1999). Ministries are politicised organisations, thus subject to environmental dynamics such as political policy priorities, change of perceptions, or coalition shifts (e.g., James et al., 2016). Policy considerations play a role when governments organise or reorganise ministries, but there is also evidence that the effects of organisation can be intended or unintended. Arguably, organisational choices have a policy dimension that is linked to the substance and the content of the policies that are nested in the organisations. When changing the division and organisation of labour, governments also make – more or less implicit – choices about the direction of the concerned policies. Organisational reformers may aspire to change behavioural patterns by modifying an organisation’s formal structure, which is a powerful instrument of organisational design (Hood, 1983, 2007; Howlett, 2011; Egeberg et al., 2016, p. 33). Structural choice, from this perspective, can be approached as a means for political actors to ingrain their preferences into the structure of organisations (Moe, 1989; Moe & Wilson, 1994). Organisational sociologists March and Olsen (1989) also emphasised the importance of the rhetorical dimension inherent in processes of reorganisation. Brunsson and Olsen (1997) suggest that the prime effect of organisational reforms is to diffuse norms and symbols in order to influence preferences and shape public opinion. The following section explores the argument that governments adopt organisational choices that are consistent with the governing parties’ policy preferences.

The formal structure of governments is governed by norms as much as by political practice (for many, Böckenförde, 1964; Lehguth & Vogelgesang, 1988; Egeberg, 1994; Derlien, 1996; Fernandes et al., 2016). In parliamentary systems, the authority to divide responsibilities among ministries lies with the parties in government, and it is usually the prerogative of the head of the government, i.e., Prime Minister or Chancellor, or of the party leaders in coalition

governments.¹⁹ When asking to understand the impact of governments' organisational choices on the odds of policy integration reforms, we must keep the drivers behind these organisational choices in mind.

Organisational effects of coalition dynamics

Organisational choices are an important object of negotiation when governments form. Coalition theory finds that the allocation of ministerial portfolios is central to the process of government formation determined by post-electoral party politics (Budge & Keman, 1993; Laver & Shepsle, 1996; Müller & Strøm, 2000; Strøm et al., 2008) and a recent study suggests that even voters expect their respective party to seek office (Gross et al., 2023). Empirical studies of government formation processes show that many ministerial reorganisations take place in the wake of government formation (Florack, 2013; Sieberer et al., 2021): when distributing portfolios among parties, incumbent governments often reorganise ministries or re-assign policy responsibilities between ministries (Dewan & Hortala-Vallve, 2011; Saalfeld & Schamburek, 2014; Sieberer, 2015). Portfolios are “raw material” (Hartmann, 2013) in coalition negotiations: all actors in this bargain strive to maximise the number and importance of the ministries they receive (Evans, 2018). The literature on cabinet formation and portfolio allocation is therefore relevant for understanding the partisan dynamics behind governments' choices of specific formal organisational arrangements.

Parts of the literature on portfolio allocation take a quantitative perspective that is interested in explaining the governing parties' shares of ministerial responsibilities. This approach explains portfolio allocation as an outcome of a distributive process among parties and future ministers in which inter- and intra-party arithmetic is decisive: portfolio allocation must satisfy the equilibrium between the political parties and their internal currents that form the government (Mershon, 1996, 2001; Vercesi, 2016; Ecker & Meyer, 2019). Portfolios are not equal in this calculus: some portfolios are more redistributive than others, i.e., deal with highly significant and/or visible issue that allow parties to enhance their electoral prospects through policy performance (Bueno De Mesquita, 1979). Often, the allocation of portfolios among parties also affects the delimitation of portfolios, i.e., ministerial jurisdictions. Even small jurisdictional changes that are barely visible for outsiders can alter a ministry's 'value' by expanding its policy competences and associated resources and by allowing for the creation of additional posts and offices that inflate the number of distributable positions (Mershon,

¹⁹ In contrast, in the presidential system of government of the United States, for instance, control over the structure of the federal administration is divided between Congress and the President, and the former must approve all ministerial reorganisations (March & Olsen, 1983). This has been identified as a major cause behind the “exceptionally static” (White & Dunleavy, 2010, p. 23) nature of government organisation in the US, where Congress generally opposes reorganisations on the grounds that these are disruptive to the existing structure of congressional committees.

2001; Manow & Zorn, 2004; Saalfeld & Schamburek, 2014). A head of government can exploit these subtle changes to her own party's benefit while decreasing the importance of ministries attributed to the coalition partner (Saalfeld & Schamburek, 2014, p. 198).

One reason for combining ministerial jurisdictions is that in order to attain a distribution of ministries among the coalition partners that is proportional to their seats in Parliament (Verzichelli, 2008), incoming governing coalitions may opt to decrease the number of ministries by one. Another reason is that incumbent coalitions can also enhance the value of a specific ministry, and, in consequence, the payoff of the party that receives it, by combining the policy functions for two or more policies into one ministry. The creation of a large ministry may serve as a symbolic retribution tailored to the head of the smaller coalition partner or another influential personality entering a governing coalition.

Coalition theory also suggests that organisation can serve as a means to curtail ministerial dominance on a policy by aligning the incentives of individual ministers with the preferences of the head of the government (Dewan & Hortala-Vallve, 2011). A dominant coalition party can combine policy functions through a fusion of ministries in order to retain control over a policy for which the coalition partner is responsible: It can thus avoid the ministerial drift that comes with the delegation of responsibility (Laver & Shepsle, 1990, 1994, 1996; Andeweg, 2000) and contain the influence of specific ministers (Saalfeld & Schamburek, 2014, p. 196). Studies into overlapping jurisdictions show that some degree of portfolio fragmentation may help the principal (the Prime Minister, the legislature) control the policy output (Ting, 2002; Dewan & Hortala-Vallve, 2011). Fernandes et al. (2016) show that governing coalitions make intentional use of fragmented policy portfolios because they give 'wary partners' possibilities to control a policy devised by a coalition partner through the assignment of ministers to overlapping jurisdictions. Inversely, a fusion of ministries may justify the placement of a junior minister who keeps watch alongside a minister of the smaller coalition partner (Müller & Strøm, 2000; Thies, 2001; Manow & Zorn, 2004; Schermann & Ennser-Jedenastik, 2013). Heppell (2014) illustrates two other mechanisms through which a combination of policy functions through a fusion of ministries may help dominant coalition partners to maintain control over a ministry's policy. One is to create a large ministry that combines responsibilities in a way that obliges the minister's party to introduce policies that are in contradiction with positions previously defended during the campaign, undermining the party's credibility (p. 69). The second follows the logic of 'binding'. Here, the dominant party (or faction) anticipates unpopular measures to be pursued by a ministry that is otherwise important for it, creates a 'large' ministry at the top of which he places two personalities (one of each coalition partner) in order to ensure that both parties share responsibility for the measures (p. 69). Finally, the need for cabinet coordination also places an upper limit on the overall number of ministries in a government (Indriðason & Kam, 2008). Therefore, a dominant coalition partner may opt

for a fusion of ministries in order to increase cabinet coordination and oversight (Indriðason & Bowler, 2014, p. 385).

Issue preferences and portfolio combinations

Another strand of the portfolio allocation literature takes a qualitative perspective that examines how the control of *specific* ministerial portfolios matters for political parties. This approach demonstrates that parties seek – and often obtain – ownership of ministries and portfolios that are critical to their identity, electoral strategy, and policy goals (Pappi et al., 2008; Bäck et al., 2011; Raabe & Linhardt, 2015). This is because in governing coalitions, parties seek to impose policies in their preferred domains (Laver & Shepsle, 1996, p. 295). The distribution of portfolios reflects the policy preferences (Chester & Willson, 1968; Mätzke, 2010) and ideological positions (Hernes, 2021) of the parties that form the government. In one of the first articles to connect issue salience and portfolio allocation, Bäck et al. (2011) argue and demonstrate empirically that the more salient a policy area is in the manifesto of a party, the more likely this party is to obtain the corresponding ministerial portfolio when in government. When they are a partner in a coalition government, green parties receive the environmental portfolio with overwhelming regularity (Little, 2016), and regionalist parties are often responsible for territorial, cultural, and institutional affairs (Terrière, 2023; Terrière & Bouteuca, 2023). Recent research suggests that the allocation of specific policy portfolios to a party in a governing coalition moderates the public perception of the party (Walgrave & Lefevere, 2017; Hjerimitslev & Krauss, 2023). Controlling a policy portfolio allows party leaders not only to cultivate a perception of strong emphasis on the related policy (Walgrave & Lefevere, 2017), but even to strategically impact their parties' perceived left–right position (Hjerimitslev & Krauss, 2023).

When allocating specific portfolios to parties, the delimitation of jurisdictions allows incumbent governments to express their policy preferences (Mätzke, 2010; Fleischer et al., 2022). Therefore, partisan policy preferences impact not only which party obtains which ministerial policy portfolio, but extend to how the latter are organised. Support from party leaders may be a crucial source for the survival of a ministry when a coalition government is formed. Parties generally strive to expand the jurisdiction and the resources of those ministries that are most important to their policy profile, which tend to gain competences (Sieberer, 2015, p. 84). A study of the establishment of the Finnish ministry of the Environment demonstrates the role of ideology and conflict between the major political parties who struggled to extend the influence of the ministries that they controlled politically (Storsved, 1993). Radcliffe (1985) notes that even changes to divisions within specific ministries “send out signals which are revealing about the direction of the [ministry] and have a relationship with the policies pursued by it” (p. 206; also, Yesilkagit et al., 2022). Governments may ‘signal’

both reactively, responding to changes in how some issue is represented in the collective political attention, as well as proactively to influence the agenda dynamics around that issue (Mortensen & Green-Pedersen, 2015).²⁰ Heppell (2011) provides telling examples of how UK governments used the organisation of ministries for expressing their priorities and policy strategies. The Labour party's desire to be seen as the party of technocratic modernisation motivated the creation of the ministry for Technology in 1964 (p. 426). In the 1990s, the New Labour governments restructured and rebranded several ministries in an effort to communicate their focus on coordination and 'joined-up government' that became "symptomatic of the 'newness' of New Labour" government (p. 425).

The qualitative perspective offers complementary insights why parties opt for portfolio combinations. By combining the competences for specific policy issues into ministerial portfolios, governing parties communicate their issue preferences, i.e., the fact that they are concerned by a specific aspect of a policy and encourage the public to concentrate attention on this issue dimension rather than others (Heppell, 2011; Hegele, 2021; Hernes, 2021). Comparing the organisation of immigrant integration policy functions in Western European governments, Hernes (2021) finds that right-of-centre governments combine policy functions for integration with those for immigration and/or justice. Similarly, the literature has attributed the combination of immigration and integration policy functions into one ministry by the conservative government of President Sarkozy in France to the government's desire to promote the issue linkage between immigration and national identity (Valluy, 2008; Ocak, 2015). Studies of the activation policy shift in the UK argue that the government's preference for an activation approach motivated the creation of a large ministry combining responsibilities for employment with social affairs or economic policy (Carmel & Papadopoulos, 2003; Wiggan, 2007). Some ministries are closely tied to specific political parties with whom they share an ideology or clientele interests (Downs, 1967; Lowi, 1969; Keman, 1991). Social affairs ministries are often closely linked with left-wing parties, as Pelinka (2003) observes for Austria (p. 486).

The literature on ministerial organisation shows that the salience of an issue on the governing parties' agenda may also affect organisational choices. Governments may be urged to concentrate policy functions in times of policy crises. A historical example is the French government that concentrated the health services that had been scattered across eight ministries when the Spanish flu epidemic hit France in the autumn of 1918 (Murard & Zylberman, 2003).

²⁰ Some caution that administrative policy motivated by symbolic responsiveness to public concerns is likely to produce administrative structures that function less effectively than structures designed to achieve policy objectives (Canes-Wrone, 2009), and there is a risk of organisational instability if reorganisations follow the rhythm of electoral cycles.

3.2 Organisational 'standards' at the turn of the millennium

When making organisational choices, political actors rely upon organisational forms that are considered legitimate according to prevailing norms of government (Bezes & Le Lidec, 2016). The idea that the quest for legitimacy of an organisation drives organisational choices is long-standing in the theory on the institutional processes of organisations (Meyer & Rowan, 1977; Scott, 1981; Powell & DiMaggio, 1991). Weber (1922) identified legality as source of legitimacy of the public bureaucracy, while Pfeffer and Salancik (1978) found that legitimacy derives from an organisation's consistency with its social functions. The public administration literature points to complementary 'rational myths' of government organisation that have shaped governments' organisational choices during the last decades: in particular, it distinguishes two periods, before and after the turn of the millennium, as corresponding to two different dominant paradigms prescribing different "organisational standards" (Bezes & Le Lidec, 2016): whereas during the 1990s, the NPM doctrine prescribed specialisation and ensuing fragmentation of public organisations, i.e., the disaggregation of functions and structures into smaller units; in contrast, the 'post-NPM' agenda at the turn of the millennium promoted fusions and the "re-aggregation" of public sector organisations to counterbalance an organisational fragmentation that was now perceived by many as excessive (Pollitt & Bouckaert, 2004; Verhoest et al., 2010).

The rationale of specialisation (1980s/1990s)

During the 1970s, administrative scientists in Anglo-Saxon countries established the term 'machinery of government' to designate "a broad structure that embraces the whole apparatus of governing, with the machine analogy – 'government as machine' – suggesting order, stability, predictability and the like" (Wettenhall, 2016, p. 99). German administrative scientists embraced an even more explicitly prescriptive stance on government organisation. Some regretted the lack of a "theory on portfolio delimitation" (Becker, 1989, p. 678) that would help incumbent governments define the most suitable ministerial jurisdictions (Siedentopf, 1976). During that time, organisational fusions in particular were surrounded by a rational myth of rationality, efficiency, and effectiveness, representing reduced public expenditure, more 'lenient', efficient, and effective administration, rational steering, and policy coordination (Salamon, 1981; Pollitt, 1984, p. 153). At the level of government, 'giant departments' (Pollitt, 1980) were most prominent under the British Prime Minister Edward Heath and inspired numerous studies by political and administrative scientists (Clark, 1977; Draper, 1977; Radcliffe, 1985). During the 1990s, New Public Management (NPM) was predominantly associated with the specialisation and ensuing fragmentation of public organisations, i.e., the disaggregation of functions and structures into smaller units that was more colloquially called 'unbundling government' (Pollitt & Talbot, 2004). For instance, in New

Zealand successive reorganisations of the government in the late 1980s took place as part of a large “bureaucratic revolution” driven by a relatively consistent theoretical framework that associated new managerialism and economic theories (Boston, 1991; Gregory, 2006).

The rationale of integration (2000s/2010s)

The ‘post-NPM’ era at the turn of the millennium made the NPM inspired reforms responsible for a loss of policy capacity (Verhoest & Bouckaert, 2005; Verhoest et al., 2010). Fusions of public organisations now (again) became an “organisational standard” of contemporary public sector reform (Bezes & Le Lidec, 2016b, p. 417). The ‘post-NPM’ era scholars concur constitutes a historic turn in the transformation of States that strives to counterbalance the excessive fragmentation of state apparatuses that the two previous decades had accentuated (Pollitt & Bouckaert, 2004; Gregory, 2006; Christensen & Lægreid, 2007; Cole & Eymeri-Douzans, 2010; Verhoest et al., 2010; Lægreid, Sarapuu, et al., 2014; Bezes & Le Lidec, 2016b; Carey et al., 2018). The coordination challenges associated with specialisation led researchers to think about new forms of holistic or networked forms of governance and related paradigms (Perri 6 et al., 2002; Bogdanor, 2005; Christensen & Lægreid, 2007). In the post-NPM context, practitioners and scholars alike gave the longstanding (Seidman, 1980; Hood, 2005; Peters, 2015) imperative of coordination various new labels that put forward the ‘horizontal’ or ‘integrated’ dimension of government and sought to overcome the fragmentation built in the organisational divides within (and across) governments.²¹ Its international administrative discourse is informed by an “increasing interest in the issues of public sector coordination and joining-up separate government bodies into more integrated apparatuses” (Lægreid, Randma-Liiv, et al., 2014, p. 1). Many scholars link the emergence of the new approaches to coordination to their supposed benefits for the ability of the concerned administrations to tackle ‘wicked problems’ (Christensen, Fimreite, et al., 2007; Christensen & Lægreid, 2013), i.e., problems that are transversal in character and therefore can be effectively addressed only through a ‘holistic’ approach (Head & Alford, 2015). Some scholarship on the new approaches to coordination has this teleological flavour to it (Allen, 2003), whereby professionals in specific sectors who strive to enhance the implementation and effectiveness of coordination with a view of solving some specific social problem (e.g. Carey et al., 2014; Carey & Crammond, 2015).

²¹ Among these more or less synonymous concepts, the most widely used are ‘joined-up government’ (mainly used in the UK; Bogdanor, 2005; Talbot, 2011), ‘whole-of-government’ (Christensen & Lægreid, 2006), ‘horizontal government’ (Peters, 1998), ‘horizontal management’ (Peters, 2015), and ‘holistic governance’ (Perri 6 et al., 2002). For details on the similarities and differences between the concepts, see the reviews by Tosun and Lang (2017) and Trein et al. (2018).

The literature reflects that in the post-NPM era the importance of hierarchy as a component of public sector coordination increased (Verhoest et al., 2010; Lægreid et al., 2015, p. 349; Behnke, 2016). Scholars point towards a strengthening of the central state and national bureaucracies, referring either to the steering state, steering from the centre (Dahlström et al., 2010), or the 'self-care' of the state (Bezes, 2002, 2005, 2009) to conceptualise a strengthened state bureaucracy. The UK-variant of coordination, JUG, was an answer to the fear of the 'hollowing out' (Rhodes, 1994) of the British central government (Flinders, 2002; Pollitt, 2003; also Parry, 2001). The literature on the European Commission also shows how it has sought to strengthen its capacity for coordination from the centre (e.g., Hartlapp et al., 2013). The centralisation of coordination in the core executive has transformed the vertical relationships within government and brought coordination under closer control and scrutiny of the core executive (Cole & Eymeri-Douzans, 2010; Lægreid et al., 2015; Verhoest et al., 2010). Coordination arrangements "are neither neutral nor simply technical by nature" and they may change "the balance between the priorities of the central government and the individual ministries" (Lægreid et al., 2015, p. 249). In the UK, for instance, Foster (2005) shows how the JUG reforms weakened the Cabinet as the collective body that achieves coherence between policies and strengthening of the centre of government at the expense of ministers. Although politics seems to play a stronger role for public sector coordination in the post-NPM era, its role and impact has remained under-conceptualised (Davies, 2009, p. 80; Lægreid et al., 2015).

Recent textbooks on public sector coordination discuss fusions of ministerial competences among the instruments for enhancing coordination (Peters, 2015, pp. 85–86; Pollitt & Bouckaert, 2017, pp. 100–101). Fusions represent a hierarchy-type coordination instrument that is central to governments' efforts to 're-integrate' the structures of government and of the public sector in general (Christensen, Røvik, et al., 2007; Christensen & Lægreid, 2012; Verhoest et al., 2007, 2010). The creation of the French Regional Health Agencies confronted different visions of how "integration" should unfold in the regulation of the health sector (Pierru & Rolland, 2016). Various reform programs have profoundly remodelled entire policy sectors through the promotion of organisational fusions, as has been documented in the US hospital sector (Kitchener, 2002), French higher education (Musselin, 2017), or the welfare and employment administration of Norway (Christensen et al., 2013). The creation of "one stop shops" that fuse front offices of different service providers is often mentioned in this context (Askim et al., 2011; Kim & Park, 2012).

In the post-NPM context, Cole and Eymeri-Douzans (2010) identify a "convergent reform trend towards the setting up of vast 'super-ministries', supposedly omniscient and all-powerful [that] forms parts of a broad trend that attempts to provide an institutional response to political claims for joined-up governance" (p. 400). Empirical examples of these "second

generation” reforms (Halligan et al., 2011, p. 74) have been observed mainly in Anglo-Saxon countries and Scandinavia, but other countries in various world regions are no strangers to this trend (Qiu & Li, 2009; Dong et al., 2010).

Like other procedural instruments such as ‘strategic plans’ that combine the logics of managerialism and whole-of-government (McMahon & Phillimore, 2013), fusions of public sector organisations were also associated with managerial modernisation reforms, however. Similar to the creation of semi-autonomous agencies, fusions were accompanied with a managerial rhetoric that “promote[d] the approach as adaptable common sense” for governments at all levels by placing the emphasis on efficiency, reduced overlaps, the pooling of support functions, and economies of scale (Cole & Eymeri-Douzans, 2010, p. 397; Bezes & Le Lidec, 2016a, p. 417). This logic inspired public sector reform for instance in the hospital and university sectors as well as territorial administrations in some countries (Kitchener, 2002; Kitchener & Gask, 2003; Aula & Tienari, 2011; Musselin & Dif-Pradalier, 2014; Barrier & Musselin, 2016; Musselin, 2017). Kitchener and colleagues show how fusions became a ‘rational myth’ of NPM in the professional field of US health care industry, for instance, where fusions were established as a means by which healthcare executives demonstrated legitimacy within the institutional logic of market-managerialism (Kitchener, 2002). This led to the widespread and uncritical adoption of fusions in that professional field and a further replacement of the “logic of professionalism – which legitimates the structures, power distributions and practices preferred by expert workers – with a countervailing managerial logic” (Kitchener & Gask, 2003, p. 21) that was promoted by the popular business press, standard economics and management textbooks and the management consultancy industry (Kitchener, 2002). Looking at fusions in the higher education sectors of different countries, scholars identified reputation-building and branding as central issues (Aula & Tienari, 2011; Musselin, 2017). Aula and Tienari’s (2011) case study of the Aalto University fusion shows that the fusion paved new actors the way to constructing the reputation of the university, and that innovativeness and the status as a ‘global player’ have become key to the university’s reputation after the fusion. Musselin and colleagues studied university fusions in the wake of the French RGPP reform. These authors show that the French university fusion movement responded to international as well as national dynamics (Musselin, 2017, Chapter 5) but also emerged from local initiatives (Musselin, 2017, Chapter 6; Musselin & Dif-Pradalier, 2014). With international competitiveness as a prime motivation, fusions came to “corresponds to what everyone thinks is expected of the public authorities, (...) and the merger thus becomes a source of inspiration for many university sites that will make it the norm” (Musselin, 2017, p. 228). The combined impact of mimetic and normative isomorphism resulted in a vast national scale fusion movement, while the resulting organisational designs, stemming from local processes and power balances, were quite diverse (Barrier & Musselin, 2016). While the

French case resulted from local and voluntary initiatives, in the Nordic countries, government policy was at the origin of extensive reforms of the higher education systems with the objective of creating larger units in order to increase efficiency, quality and reduce public spending (Aula & Tienari, 2011; Skodvin, 1999).

The literature shows that stark variations in the adoption of coordination reforms persist (Perri 6, 2004), for which institutional legacies, interest groups, and multi-level dynamics between levels of government are held to account (Cole & Eymeri-Douzans, 2010; Dong et al., 2010). Variations occur even within political systems over time with different logics at play at different moments, as shown in Sarapuu's (2012) analysis of continuity and change of the post-communist administrative restructuring in Estonia.²² There is also evidence that governments used both the 'agencification' of ministerial functions and fusions of agencies into ministries simultaneously when implementing NPM-inspired reform strategies, as Wettenhall (2016) demonstrates for the case of Australia (p. 104). Managerialist rhetoric still prevails today when governments justify fusions of ministries with budget cuts and more efficient management of public resources (e.g., La Nación, 2018).

²² First, the de-institutionalisation of the communist order acted as a critical juncture to end the highly fragmented state administration in the country, but shortly later, EU conditionality led reformers to emphasise the creation of independent regulatory agencies and the mergers of ministries, both of which resulted into a new division of policy fields (Sarapuu, 2012). In the post-accession period, however, the focus shifted to consolidation and agencies were merged again, in line with small states' preferences for more compact government structures (Sarapuu, 2012).

CHAPTER 2: COMPARATIVE FRAMEWORK

The literature on EPI constitutes the backbone of the PI literature. Most of the conceptual work on PI has long remained entrenched with specific policies, mainly environmental policy and climate policy, the specific normative implications of which (see, e.g., Lafferty & Hovden, 2003, p. 9) blurred an analytical view (Bornemann, 2016, p. 180). However, the PI literature has become much more diverse as regards the policies and sectors studied (Trein et al., 2019). Scholars have moved on to applying PI and neighbouring concepts to many other policy areas and sectors such as financial regulation (Gieve & Provost, 2012), preventive and curative approaches in health policy (Chernichovsky & Leibowitz, 2010; Hendriks et al., 2014; Trein, 2017), food policy (Barling et al., 2002; Drimie & Ruysenaar, 2010; Lie, 2011; Biesbroek & Candel, 2020), employment policy (Askim et al., 2011; Champion & Bonoli, 2011), and poverty reduction (Cejudo & Michel, 2017), to cite just a few.

With the diffusion of the PI conceptual lens to the study of ever more policy sectors, scholars have argued that PI arguably faces different challenges and takes different forms depending on the characteristics of the policy sectors in question (Giessen & Krott, 2009; Jordan & Lenschow, 2010; Adelle & Russel, 2013; Clar & Steurer, 2014; Runhaar et al., 2014; Hogl et al., 2016; Trein, 2017; Kaplaner et al., 2023). Studies that directly compare PI in different sectors (e.g., Trein & Maggetti, 2020; Trein, Maggetti, et al., 2021) have also incorporated characteristics at the level of policy issues and policy sectors into their theoretical frameworks. For instance, Trein and Maggetti (2020) conceptualise relevant variation between policy fields in terms of both the ‘technical complexity’ of the policy problem and the ‘scope of integration and coordination’.

Differences between policy sectors may explain differences between broad patterns in the conditions under which PI unfolds.²³ Mindful that the comparability across policies is central to the comparative study of PI (Howlett & Cashore, 2009; Maggetti, 2009, p. 455), I now discuss similarities and differences between the three policies chosen to be examined in this study, i.e., environmental policy, immigration policy, and unemployment policy. In order to ensure the comparability among these policies, PI is defined as regards specific policy goals (Howlett & Cashore, 2009, p. 39).

²³ Still, they are not the only piece to the puzzle. Lenschow (1997) observes that in spite of similar target policy fields, the EC had not adopted similar processes and experienced similar outcomes of PI reforms in different environmental sectors at the end of the 1990s.

1 Definition of PI in each policy

This section defines PI for each of the three policies. The definitions are centred around the notion of “interdependencies” between policies introduced above (cf., Chapter 1, section 1.2) as well as the definition of specific policy goals – i.e., environmental protection, immigrant integration, and reduction of unemployment – to ensure the comparability across the three policies (cf. Trein & Maggetti, 2020).

1.1 Environmental PI

Following the general definition of PI above (cf. Chapter 1, section 1.2), environmental PI is defined here as those policy outputs that attempt to resolve interdependencies between sectoral policies when it comes to the cross-sectoral policy goal of environmental protection. To do so, environmental PI attempts to align objectives and instruments both *within* the field of environmental policy, i.e., through the integration of policies relative to different environmental media or ecosystems, as well as *between* policy fields, i.e., “incorporating environmental matters into other policy fields” (Trein & Maggetti, 2020, p. 200; similarly, Bührs, 2002a, p. 29; Knoepfel et al., 2010, Ch. 19).

As regards EPI *within* the field of environmental policy, EPI brings together the different strands of environmental policy, i.e., the ‘green’ and the ‘blue’ lines at the origins of environmental protection, i.e., policies concerned with the conservation of nature and biodiversity on the one hand, and policies concerned with the control of pollution and environmental degradation (Nilsson & Eckerberg, 2007), as well as the regulation and management of natural resources. It aims at fostering environmental protection by avoiding problem-shifting and by strengthening the coherence among measures addressing different environmental media and sectors. To do so, instruments or objectives should address both pollution control as well as the protection, use and control of different environmental media or sectors, such as land use, water and biodiversity, simultaneously. Conversely, EPI *between* policy fields concerns the incorporation of environmental issues and objectives into specific sectoral policies outside the environmental policy domain, such as energy, transport, health, construction, or agriculture. It “implies moving away from ad hoc, reactive and fragmented policy making towards a more anticipatory approach based on a recognition of the linkages between, and directed at the sources of problems” (Bührs, 2002a, p. 28). In other words, EPI *across* policy fields consists in environmental policy issues becoming “part of sectors rather than being a separate (...) policy field on its own” (Nilsson, Eckerberg & Persson, 2007, p. 3; similarly, Persson et al., 2018, p. 113; Runhaar et al., 2014, p. 233).

EPI *within* the field of environmental policy mostly consists in legislative instruments, in particular the adoption of environmental (framework) legislation that integrates formerly

disperse environmental legislation, and that reduces the legal or administrative fragmentation of the governance of different environmental media or ecosystems. EPI *between* policy fields consists mostly in three types of instruments. Firstly, it consists in the adoption of strategic frameworks or policy plans to be implemented by other policy sectors, such as national biodiversity strategies, multi-sectoral national sustainability strategies (Steurer & Martinuzzi, 2005; Dalal-Clayton, 2013), national environmental health strategies, or strategies for ‘green growth’. Secondly, it refers to the introduction of environmental taxation (i.e., taxes on polluting activities or emissions). Thirdly, it consists in integrating the goal of environmental protection into government procedures through procedural instruments such as environmental budgeting (or ‘green’ budgeting), i.e., the incorporation of environmental criteria into government fiscal cycles (Russel & Benson, 2014; Wilkinson et al., 2008), ‘green’ public procurement procedures (Runhaar, 2016, pp. 5–6), environmental reporting obligations, environmental indicators (Hezri & Dovers, 2009; Sagris et al., 2015), policy appraisals, as well as the creation of environmental impact assessments (EIA) or the incorporation of sustainability criteria into regulatory impact assessment procedures, that require ex-ante evaluations of the environmental impacts of new legislation or public or private initiatives in various sectors, and are used to identify potential spill-over effects of sectoral policies on the environment (Russel & Jordan, 2009). Finally, governments may introduce a constitutional law that binds sectoral policy-making by establishing environmental protection as a constitutional principle with the status of a fundamental right or an objective of the national State (Orth, 2007).

1.2 Immigration PI

Based on the definition of PI above (cf. section Chapter 1, section 1.2), immigration PI is defined here as those policy outputs that attempt to resolve interdependencies between sectoral policies when it comes to the cross-sectoral policy goal of immigrant integration. To do so, immigration PI attempts to align the objectives and instruments both *within* the field of immigration policy, i.e., through the integration of policies relative to immigration and immigrant integration, as well as *between* policy fields, i.e., by incorporating the goal of immigrant integration into other policy fields.

Immigration policy, which can be defined as “the means by which governments aim to regulate the number and attributes of foreigners who enter and reside in their territory and their avenues for naturalization following entry” (Gest et al., 2014, p. 262), consist in the “laws and rules governing the admission, removal, and status change of noncitizens” (Filindra & Goodman, 2019, p. 501). Immigration policy can be differentiated into the subfields immigration regulation, refugee and asylum, immigrant integration, and citizenship and naturalisation (Mayda, 2010; Gest et al., 2014; de Haas et al., 2015; Beine et al., 2016),

whereby immigrant integration policy is a subfield of immigration policy (Gońda et al., 2020, p. 24) because the target group – noncitizens with migration background – is the same. Immigrant integration policy refers to those rules and laws regulating the civic-political, economic, and social rights of noncitizens in the host society (Gest et al., 2014; Filindra & Goodman, 2019).

Immigration PI *within* the field of environmental policy resolves interdependencies between policies that address two or more stages of immigration (i.e. selection, admission, settlement, integration, naturalisation) or are directed at two or more immigrant target groups or categories of migrants which correspond to different channels of admission (e.g., asylum policy and economic immigration policy) (Helbling et al., 2017; Schultz et al., 2021). Conversely, immigration PI *across* policy fields concerns the incorporation of issues and objectives relative to immigrant integration into specific sectoral policies outside the policy field of immigration, such as employment, social, or education policy, as well as area-specific policies that, although framed in a generic way, *de facto* still target specific groups that are over-represented in specific spatial areas or have specific needs (De Zwart, 2005; Scholten et al., 2016, p. 16).

Immigration PI *within* the field of environmental policy mostly consists in legislative, regulatory or procedural instruments. Policies targeting two or more stages of immigration, for instance, regulate interdependencies between integration and naturalisation, by making the immigrant's integration a criterion for attributing citizenship; or selection and integration, by prioritising selection factors associated with a better long-term integration outcome; or integration with admission or settlement, for instance by making language requirements, civic integration examination or contractual agreements by which an immigrant commits to integrate into society mandatory for admission or for obtaining a residence permit or a long-term visa (Joppke, 2007, p. 7; Goodman, 2012; Permoser Mourão, 2012). Policies are directed at two or more categories of migrants if they integrate systems that attribute permits or visa to two or more categories of migrants, e.g. by creating a single visa system or an integrated permit system; or regulate one or more stages of immigration across categories of migrants, for instance through an 'alien law' or an 'immigration law'; or adopt an overall integration concept or a uniform framework policy for immigration across categories of migrants; or harmonise conditions of immigration across migration categories, e.g. grant asylum seekers or migrants' family members access to the domestic labour market (Delaporte & Piracha, 2018), integrate humanitarian considerations into labour migration policy (Ruhs, 2019), or integrate economic elements into asylum policy (Laubenthal, 2019).

Immigration PI *between* policy fields consists in strategic (legislative) or procedural (regulatory) instruments. As regards the former, for instance, there are integrated settlement

strategies that contain employment, social and educational measures. Integration through instruments of employment policy takes the shape of reforms that extend migrants' access to the labour market (Delaporte & Piracha, 2018, p. 2480), e.g. by allowing asylum seekers or migrant family members to apply for work permits (Fossati & Liechti, 2020), lowering migrants' obstacles to participate in the labour market, e.g. through vocational training, or attracting and retaining international students through, e.g., simplified visa applications, the granting of a work permit or permanent residency (Akbari & MacDonald, 2014, pp. 811–812).²⁴ Integration through instruments of social policy takes the shape of reforms that provide or extend access to social services that target immigrants, such as settlement or integration services or pre-departure orientation. Mainstreaming scholars point to immigration policies allowing migrants to benefit from public services that are open to all residents (Collett & Petrovic, 2014), such as job counselling, the public health service or public education, based on a universalistic ideal of the welfare state (Anttonen et al., 2014). Integration through instruments of education policy takes the shape of reforms that provide or extend access to literacy or language instruction programmes or language proficiency examinations for immigrants, or that facilitate the recognition of educational credentials obtained prior to immigration. Finally, immigration PI *across* policy fields consists in instruments apply area-specific approaches that do not explicitly focus on immigrants but instead concentrate on specific spatial areas that are mostly inhabited by immigrants, such as urban de-segregation policies, or specific needs, e.g. educational ones (Escafré-Dublet, 2014).

1.3 Employment PI

Employment policy can be differentiated into the subfields unemployment protection policies, which insure against the loss of regular income from employment, and labour market policies, which consist in interventions that aim at facilitating the return of unemployed persons to employment. Based on the definition of PI above (cf. Chapter 1, section 1.2), employment PI is defined here as those policy outputs that attempt to resolve interdependencies between sectoral policies when it comes to the cross-sectoral policy goal of the reduction of unemployment. To do so, employment PI attempts to align the objectives and instruments both *within* the field of employment policy, i.e., through the integration of policies targeted at unemployed persons, as well as *between* policy fields, i.e., by incorporating the goal of unemployment reduction into other policy fields. Employment PI aims at “an integrated

²⁴ Conversely, temporary foreign workers programs that are designed to meet immediate needs of the domestic labour market, such as recent programs based on potential migrants' expression of interest (Akbari & MacDonald, 2014, pp. 808–811), are not considered as PI reforms because they do not aim at long-term integration.

benefit-and-service system adapted to the profile of economic risks that characterize post-industrial labour markets” (Clasen & Clegg, 2011c, p. 2).

Employment PI *within* the field of employment policy refers to the integration of unemployment protection and labour market policy as conceptualised through the notion of ‘triple integration’ by Clasen and Clegg (2011b). Conversely, employment PI *across* policy fields concerns those policies that aim at activating the claimants of social benefits other than unemployment benefits. This implies an approach that aims at alleviating poverty by restoring or strengthening the agency (as implied in the notion ‘active inclusion’) of working-age people in situations of poverty – who are thought to face particular barriers towards the labour market – by including them into the labour market instead of providing (only) the resources necessary for safeguarding an acceptable standard of living (Clegg, 2013; Heidenreich et al., 2014).

Employment PI *within* the field of environmental policy consists in legislative, regulatory, or procedural measures that integrate unemployment protection and labour market policy. Clasen and Clegg (2011b) speak of ‘benefit homogenisation’ in case of policies that simultaneously address benefits for different categories of unemployed persons. Such policies may dissociate prior employment records from the entitlement to unemployment benefits, diminish differences between unemployment benefit tiers, or reduce the tiers of unemployment protection by amalgamating previously separate unemployment transfer programs (Clasen & Clegg, 2011c). These authors find that governments have increasingly homogenised benefits for different categories of unemployed persons and thereby created “unemployment protection arrangements that are less differentiated than in the past” (Clasen & Clegg, 2011c, p. 335). Clasen and Clegg (2011b) speak of ‘activation’ policy referring to policies that simultaneously address both active and passive labour market policy. They observe a “closer articulation between passive and active labour market policy, both for individual benefit claimants and the administration of relevant policies” (Clasen & Clegg, 2011c, p. 337). Such policies introduce or tighten requirements concerning delays for the registration with employment services, mandatory reporting of job search efforts to employment services, or intensify monitoring measures. They often rely on procedural instruments, such as individual case management of persons receiving unemployment benefits (McDonald & Marston, 2005) or the formalisation of reciprocal rights and duties that apply to the relationship between the benefit recipient and the public service. Other PI reforms introduce positive or negative incentives for accepting employment offers or loosen employment suitability criteria. This may consist in directing unemployment benefit recipients towards any kind of employment (‘workfare programs’) (Crisp & Fletcher, 2008; Bonoli, 2012) or in compulsory training programs or specific ‘experience programs’ for unemployment benefit recipients. In their most extreme form, requirements take the form of conditionality

mechanisms based on which those who are unable, or refuse, to meet the requirements, face sanctions such as the partial withdrawal or suspension of their benefits (Knotz, 2018; McGann et al., 2020). Other PI reforms foster coherence and coordination by bringing the services for labour market integration and unemployment benefit provision closer together, either by enhancing coordination at the service level (Champion & Bonoli, 2011), or by creating joint implementation administrations in the form of one-stop-shops for services related to both job search/placement services and unemployment benefits (Champion, 2013; Heidenreich & Rice, 2016).

Employment PI *between* policy fields consists several groups of measures that concur in emphasising activation by introducing more rigorous conditions for, and control of, those who receive different types of social benefits (Lødemel & Trickey, 2001). For instance, they make benefit eligibility in non-employment benefits more dependent on employment-oriented criteria such as job search, thereby spreading an activation and conditionality approach to non-employment social services and benefits such as pension, family or invalidity (Allen, 2003; Atzmüller, 2009; Deeming, 2016); or introduce work requirements as a condition for receiving minimum income social benefits by introducing supply or demand side interventions targeted at social assistance recipients, such as strengthened financial incentives to return to work or enhanced active labour market policies (Lødemel & Trickey, 2001; Lødemel & Moreira, 2014). Specifically, employment PI reforms often transfer claimants of other social benefits, such as parental leave allowances, social assistance or disability benefits, to unemployment benefit schemes; or diminish differences in entitlement and conditionality between unemployment benefits and other benefit schemes; or terminate alternative programmes, e.g., closing or limiting access to early retirement regimes. Employment PI measures may also tackle the governance of services responsible for unemployed persons and other benefit recipients by bringing them closer together, e.g. through the creation of one-stop-shops that provide labour market advice and support for unemployed persons as well as other benefit groups (Askim et al., 2011); or integrate administrative procedures related to both unemployment services and other social service administrations, such as unified electronic declarations or social identification cards; or merge formerly separate benefit programs for unemployed persons and other social benefits, or, in the most far-reaching variant, create a single benefit for all working-age people indifferent of their employment status that may also complement the incomes of people in precarious low-wage positions ('working poor') (Clasen & Clegg, 2011b, p. 9; Clegg, 2013).

2 Sectoral and issue characteristics: differences and similarities

The literature on policy coherence argues that sectoral characteristics such as particular institutions and governance arrangements, procedures, and actor constellations, may explain

why different policies show differences in their cohesion and that the institutional context may matter more in some sectors than in others (May et al., 2006; May et al., 2011). If policy-makers of different subsystems disagree over the problem definition, this should make integrated solutions more problematic to achieve (Head, 2018) than if the disagreement concerns the choice of appropriate policy instruments. May et al. (2011) suggest that integration might be more difficult to achieve in group-specific than in general policies, although it should also depend on the ability of sectors and interest groups to organise their interests collectively (Bouwen, 2004). Some subsystems are also more mature than others (Sabatier & Weible, 2007). This section argues that environmental policy, immigration policy and unemployment policy exhibit some similarities but also significant differences with regard to institutions and actor constellations.

2.1 Issue interdependencies

Some contributions to the PI literature argue that policy issues differ in the extent to which they establish interdependences between policy sectors and in the type of these interdependencies (Bolognesi & Nahrath, 2020; Bolognesi et al., 2021). When an issue creates stronger interdependences between sectors, sectors are more likely to experience stronger functional pressures for PI (Metz et al., 2020). Kaplaner et al. (2023) argue that some policy sectors may be more “natural” candidates for PI because the underlying policy issues are of a more cross-cutting nature. The prominence of the cross-sectoral issue dimensions makes functionalist pressures for PI more powerful. In a similar vein, Trein and Maggetti (2020) argue that more complex policy challenges should experience a higher frequency of legislative amendments.

Environmental policy is subject to both internal and external interdependencies. It is widely accepted today that many environmental issues, such as different types of pollution or the loss of biodiversity, are interconnected and of an increasingly global nature (Knill, 2006; Lascoumes, 2018). To be effective, environmental policy depends to a large extent on the integration of policies for different environmental media (e.g., forests, soil, water, waterways, air, etc.) within environmental policy, as well as the integration of environmental goals into the policies of sectors whose actions and policies produce negative environmental externalities.

The environmental PI literature conceptualises these interdependencies. Some point to interdependencies *within* the field of environmental policy. Environmental historians identified a ‘green’ and a ‘blue’ line as the origins of environmental protection: The green line is concerned with the conservation of nature and the blue one with controlling pollution and degradation and their effects in terms of public health (Nilsson & Eckerberg, 2007). Weale (1992) first pointed to the problem of cross-media transfer, i.e., the interdependencies that

emerge when an environmental policy measure is only intended to protect one particular environmental medium, such as air, thereby neglecting the fact that regulating air pollution could easily create landfill or water pollution problems (similarly, Bryner & Duffy, 2012; Sainteny, 2015; Duffy & Cook, 2018). A similar view can be found in the Earth system perspective on global environmental governance, where Måns Nilsson and colleagues argue that EPI should aim at avoiding problem-shifting and emphasise that the interdependencies between global climate, land use, freshwater and biodiversity systems would require “much stronger attention to the internal coherence of environment and natural resource policies, and not just between environment and economic/sectoral policies” (Nilsson & Persson, 2012, p. 63). The external interdependences of environmental policy with other policies are more important, though (Trein & Maggetti, 2020). Most EPI research points to external interdependencies of environmental policy with specific sectoral policies outside the environmental policy domain, such as energy, transport, health, construction, agriculture, science and technology policy or urban or spatial planning (for many, Kivimaa & Mickwitz, 2006; Nilsson & Eckerberg, 2007; Runhaar et al., 2009; Runhaar et al., 2014).²⁵ A huge body of literature shows that since the 1990s, environmental policies have turned to cross-sectoral approaches that aim at better integrating environmental concerns into other sectoral policies. Numerous volumes and articles analyse the proliferation of strategic, procedural, financial, and administrative instruments for integrating environmental concerns into other policies and different sectors in the recent decades (Jordan & Lenschow, 2008a; Lenschow, 2002b; Nilsson & Eckerberg, 2007; Runhaar, 2016; Wurzel et al., 2013). There are weak and strong understandings of EPI as well as prescriptive and analytical ones. Some take a prescriptive stance and hail EPI’s potential to realise synergies and to promote innovation (Runhaar et al., 2020). More balanced analytical understandings that emphasise reciprocity between the integrated policies emerge from analyses of the operation of EPI instruments in their political contexts and argue that EPI need not imply that environmental objectives be given principled priority (Runhaar et al., 2020, p. 200). Rather, “some degree of revision in priorities needs to have taken place, increasing the role of environmental considerations” in other sectors (Alons, 2017, p. 1606). These external interdependencies are also at the heart of the idea of sustainable development (SD), or sustainability, a concept that points to “the integration of environmental concerns in *all* sectoral policy-making” (Lenschow, 2002b, p. 3, emphasis added) and with which parts of the literature on EPI are very much entrenched (Lenschow,

²⁵ A similar understanding dominates in the CPI literature, where the concept of policy integration is used to conceptualise the integration of climate policy goals into a range of greenhouse gas emitting sectors, such as industry, transport, energy, building, health or urban planning (Steurer & Clar, 2015; Serrao-Neumann et al., 2013).

2002a) although some find it is ambiguous and fraught with contradictions that make it difficult to operationalise (Lenschow, 2002b, p. 7; Pallemarts, 2006; Hezri & Dovers, 2009).

Immigration policy is subject to both internal and external interdependencies, too, but to different degrees. Western democracies have developed increasingly complex policy mixes to regulate and manage migration flows and migrant settlement, especially by classifying immigrants into different legal categories based on reasons for admission (Ford et al., 2015; Schultz et al., 2021). The immigration policy literature shows that the interdependencies *within* immigration policy, especially, between immigration and immigrant integration policy, are complex (Gest et al., 2014; Goñda et al., 2020). The regulation of immigration demarcates the conditions that circumscribe immigrants' rights to domestic welfare policies (Brochmann & Hagelund, 2012). Immigrant integration policy is often considered necessary if the host country wants to realise the full economic benefits of immigration and secure social cohesion (Bijl & Verweij, 2012, p. 12), but also appears as a means that allows governments to curb the influx of migrants especially in liberal welfare states (Brochmann & Hammar, 1999; Banting, 2000; Boucher, 2014). Generous immigration and integration conditions – i.e., permissive policies for, e.g., legal status or family reunification – can constitute a pull factor for immigration (Helbling & Leblang, 2019); therefore, governments use restrictive integration policies to decrease the number of immigrants, as Scandinavian countries did during the refugee crisis (Hernes, 2018). For instance, naturalisation policies featuring citizenship tests or lengthy waiting period, may act as deterrents against certain types of migration flows (Goodman, 2012). Restrictive immigration policies that allow countries to select immigrants with greater integration potential, can also lead to better integration outcomes of those allowed to settle (Helbling et al., 2020). Hainmueller et al. (2017) have shown that the access to citizenship through naturalisation has a powerful effect on the long-term social integration of individual immigrants. Concomitantly, integration policy can support both immigration and integration objectives, but there can also be trade-offs between the two (Brochmann & Hammar, 1999; Koopmans, 2010). For instance, assumptions about the relation between family migration and integration are crucial in shaping policies (Bonjour & Kraler, 2015). Because immigration policy influences the integration of immigrants, some argue that immigration policy is itself part of integration policy (Balch & Geddes, 2012). As regards the interdependencies *between* policy fields, immigration policy concerns a range of other fields among which border management, housing policy, education, and employment (Scholten et al., 2016; Trein & Maggetti, 2020). In particular, the literature on immigration and integration policy presents the integration of immigrants as a multi-dimensional, economic, social, civic-political, and spatial phenomenon (Freeman, 2004; Joppke & Seidle, 2012; Emilsson, 2015; Helbling et al., 2020). Immigrant integration policy, which aims at favouring the long-term integration of immigrants into the society and the economy of the host country, has

interdependencies with various other policy fields, most importantly employment policy, social policy, and education policy, and is rooted in the assumption that integration obligations do not concern only the immigrants, but that society plays an active part in it. This stance is reflected in the definition of immigrant integration as “a process through which newcomers become capable of participating in the economic, social and civic/political life of the receiving country. Acquiring these capacities is not only the responsibility of newcomers: the receiving society and its governments must provide instruments and resources that allow immigrants (and their families) to do so” (Seidle & Joppke, 2012, p. 9).²⁶ Migration scholars acknowledge that contemporary immigration and welfare policies intersect (Bommes & Geddes, 2000; Boucher, 2017), and access to employment is also often considered as the main element of the integration process in the host society. The extent to which migrants’ existing levels of education, training and professional experience are valued is also a key factor influencing an immigrant’s performance in the labour market of the country of arrival (Kanas & van Tubergen, 2009). Conversely, post-migration training and labour market experience tend to affect migrants’ occupational attainment positively (Cohen-Goldner & Eckstein, 2008). There are also interdependencies with the policy field of security (Bauböck, 2004).

The concept of policy integration has received relatively little attention in research on immigration policy. A recent case study of Swedish immigration policy in light of the European migration crisis is an exception (Lidén & Nyhlén, 2023). There are also some studies that address immigrant integration policy from the perspective of mainstreaming (Collett & Petrovic, 2014; Escafré-Dublet, 2014; Scholten et al., 2016; Van Breugel & Scholten, 2020). The mainstreaming of immigrant integration policy into other policies consists in the creation of policies that are not explicitly targeted at immigrants as a group but address the integration of immigrants through other venues, and thereby “eradicat[e] ‘integration policy’ as an isolated policy niche” (Scholten et al., 2016, p. 3; Bendel, 2014). The G8 roundtable in 2008 noticed a shift towards a mainstreaming approach to immigrant integration policy as “more G8 countries [were] moving towards a ‘whole of society’ approach in regard to managing integration and diversity” (Federal Ministry of the Interior, 2008, p. 15). This shift has become visible in the literature on the ‘mainstreaming’ of immigrant integration (Scholten et al., 2016; Van Breugel & Scholten, 2020).

Employment policy is a relatively well delimited issue that has limited systematic interdependencies with other policy fields (Maggetti & Trein, 2021, p. 200) and there has so far been little research on employment policy through the conceptual lens PI (but see Trein,

²⁶ Although origin countries have also become increasingly involved in the integration of their diasporas in the destination countries (Desiderio & Weinar, 2014), this study focuses on the destination countries’ policy-making only without taking into account the transnational dimension.

Maggetti, et al., 2021). The nature of this policy issue has evolved over time, though, and its interdependencies both within the policy field and across policy fields have become increasingly conceptualised, in particular in the literature on the ‘activation turn’ of employment policy (Berthet & Bourgeois, 2016; Heidenreich & Rice, 2016) and its different facets such as ‘welfare to work’, the ‘active welfare state’, ‘active inclusion’, and ‘social investment’ (Barbier, 2001; van Berkel et al., 2011; Bonoli, 2012; Clegg, 2013; Berthet & Bourgeois, 2014; Heidenreich & Rice, 2016). In their reconstruction of the post-war history of unemployment protection in Western European countries, Clasen and Clegg (2011a, 2011c) show that ‘activation’ has become the dominant paradigm of unemployment policy with the emergence of a new labour market structure in the wake of the economic recession of the 1990s when the risk of unemployment became more and more a structural one. According to these authors, the ‘activation turn’ entails a “blurring of the previously clear boundaries” between insurance on the one hand and poverty relief on the other, as well as “the growth of ‘unemployment protection by other means’” (Clasen & Clegg, 2011c, p. 2). There is little research on the interdependencies of *within* unemployment policy, i.e., between unemployment protection and labour market policy, but Fredriksson (2021) shows that the effects of these policies on macroeconomic outcomes can be interdependent. The activation of unemployed persons is interdependent with policies pertaining to several other policy fields. These are housing, child care, social assistance, education and professional training and health (Berthet & Bourgeois, 2014), but also pension policy. From this perspective, “activation calls for an integration of formerly separate policy fields under the aegis of employment promotion as a key dimension of social cohesion and integration” (Berthet & Bourgeois, 2016, p. 211). The activation of recipients of other social benefits is based on lines of thought called ‘social investment’ (Bonoli, 2012) or ‘human capital’ (e.g., Kluve et al., 2007). At the same time, poverty is increasingly seen as a multidimensional problem requiring cross-sectoral solutions (Gould, 2005; Cejudo & Michel, 2017). Clasen and Clegg (2011b) further argue that activation has “challenged the very distinctions between the long-established risk categories” around which social provisions for working-age people have traditionally been organised (p. 8). As a result, the notion of unemployment has become less pertinent and operational in labour market policy and other social policies, “with the implication that the identification of the unemployed as a *specific* group within the non-employed population of working age becomes ever less meaningful for the purposes of benefits and other types of social support” (p. 8, emphasis in the original). Berthet and Bourgeois (2014) study how policy fields, actors and levels combine to an ‘integrated approach’ to activation through the lens of ‘cross-sectorality’. In this context, an ‘integrated’ approach reflects the need to reconcile employment and social inclusion issues as the main challenges vulnerable populations face, and link and address them together (Berthet & Bourgeois, 2014, p. 25). Governance reforms have been an important

aspect of welfare state reforms in general (Dingeldey, 2009) and of the delivery of income protection and activation programmes for unemployed people specifically (van Berkel et al., 2011). Various governance-related issues in the areas of activation and income support have been the object of – often interdisciplinary – social science research, such as marketisation (Struyven & Steurs, 2005; Struyven, 2014), contractualisation, inter-agency cooperation, one-stop-shops, and the individualisation of service provision (van Berkel et al., 2011).

In sum, the three policies are subject to interdependencies that range between predominantly internal ones within a policy field (employment policy), both internal and external ones (immigration policy) and external ones between sectors of different policies fields (environmental policy).

2.2 National sectoral policy arenas

Environmental policy can be considered as the youngest among the three policies under study and it is still a relatively new policy field today. Although important political activities to curb air pollution or to improve water quality in many countries date back to the 19th century, it was not before the 1960s that environmental policy arose as a central area of governmental activities (Lascoumes, 1994; Knill, 2006; Kefeli et al., 2023). At the start of the period under investigation here, environmental policy was therefore still in its early days. A recent review of the literature on environmental PI found that the national level is by far the most studied one and that national governments have a major role in driving and facilitating EPI (Persson et al., 2016; Runhaar et al., 2020, p. 191). Among the three issues, environmental policy is more technically complex than immigration and employment policy (Trein & Maggetti, 2020). In particular, environmental policy involves a higher technical expertise on a wider range of issues and scientific communities therefore have a comparatively more important role to play than in the other two policies (Oreskes & Conway, 2010). A distinct feature of environmental policy is the high degree of uncertainty policy-makers have to deal with (Jänicke & Jörgens, 2000, pp. 612–614). Variation between the countries' exposure to and vulnerability towards environmental problems may partly explain variation of national environmental policies (as Dovers & Hezri, 2010, demonstrated for climate policy).

Migration flows in European countries have traditionally been regulated by the nation states (Goñda et al., 2020, p. 25). Goñda et al. (2020) observe that how *immigration and integration policies* relate in each country is closely related to the country's migratory histories, starting points, and traditions in relation to migration, which are very diverse even among European countries (Zincone & Caponio, 2006; Borkert & Penninx, 2011). Given the potential tensions and trade-offs between immigration and integration (cf. above), immigration policy is “a sector that can easily be afflicted by siloism or by unreflected policy integration and policy coordination” (Lidén & Nyhlén, 2023). Research has shown that immigration policy ‘mixes’ can

be inconsistent and even contradictory (de Haas et al., 2015, p. 4; Schultz et al., 2021, p. 3). As Geddes and Boswell (2011) put it, they can be an output of “deliberate malintegration” (pp. 47-48). Against this backdrop, immigration policies are often perceived as lacking effectiveness (Czaika & De Haas, 2013).

Employment policy is regulated at the national level. Continental European welfare states are traditionally the most difficult ones to reform (Scharpf & Schmidt, 2000; Pierson, 2001; Palier, 2010). Social partners are key actors shaping reform processes in corporatist regimes in particular not least due to their role in the government of Public Employment Services (Weishaupt, 2011), although their collective power varies according to their ability to unite around a common position (Soentken & Weishaupt, 2015), as well as the strength and internal cohesion of the governments (Rathgeb, 2017).

2.3 Supranational influence

Although the three policies are mainly regulated at the national level, they vary as regards the extent of EU-related legislation, which is strongest in environmental policy.

The environment is one of the most well-developed areas of competence of the EU (Jordan & Liefferink, 2004b, p. 3; Dupont & Jordan, 2021) and EU membership increases the number of domestic environmental policies enacted significantly (Knill et al., 2010). Supranational actors in general have provided national governments with policy knowledge or tools for environmental policy integration (Tosun & Peters, 2018; Tosun et al., 2019), and the EU in particular has made significant efforts to integrate environmental objectives into the policy-making activities of all policy sectors (Pallemaerts & Azmanova, 2006; Dupont & Jordan, 2021). Environmental policy and agricultural policy in particular are well integrated at the EU level and environmental objectives increasingly being integrated into the Common Agricultural Policy (Alons, 2017). The Europeanisation of environmental policy changed the status of environmental policy within governments. In some countries it reportedly empowered environmental ministries domestically, while in others, it rather strengthened the centre of the government. Europeanisation has strengthened environmental ministries in the United Kingdom (Jordan, 2002a) and Austria (Amann & Fischer-Kowalski, 2002, p. 57; Lauber, 2004, p. 53). Jordan (2002a) reports that during the 1980s, “the arrival onto the international agenda of issues such as acid rain, nitrate pollution from agriculture, ozone depletion and water pollution forced other ‘non-environmental’ departments in the UK such as agriculture and industry to routinely pay much more attention to the detailed aspects of environmental policy” (p. 41; also, Russel & Jordan, 2008, p. 248). Conversely, in Sweden, from 1995 onwards, the Europeanization of environmental policy increased the ministry’s reliance on agencies as well as the role of the Prime Minister’s office for policy coordination (Kronsell, 2004, p. 180).

Although the EU has no competence for harmonising legislation on immigrant integration policy (Bijl & Verweij, 2012, p. 12), a European agenda on immigration and integration policy emerged around the year 2000 with the Europeanisation of the rights of third-country nationals (Rosenow, 2009). During the 2000s, the EU has developed some 'soft' policy instruments (Borkert & Penninx, 2011, pp. 9-10), such as the "Common Basic Principles for Immigrant Integration Policy in the European Union" (adopted by the European Council in 2004) that formulate immigrant rights and obligations as well as host society obligations (Seidle & Joppke, 2012, pp. 7-8). Baldi and Goodman (2015) further observe that EU-level policies and institutions increasingly influence national integration conditionality policies. Green (2007) pinpoints membership of the EU and the gradual development of a common EU immigration policy as a key factor behind immigration and integration policy convergence in Germany and the UK, two countries with markedly different historical traditions. At the same time, central governments' influence and control over integration policies for migrants has increased significantly (Emilsson, 2015).

As regards employment policy, the EU and the OECD have promoted the activation paradigm starting in the 1990s, opening windows of opportunity for reforms at the national level (Zimmermann, 2006). The coordinated strategy for employment promotes an "active social State" as focal point for convergence of national policies (Béraud & Eydoux, 2009). Promoted by both the EU and the OECD, activation under the label of an 'integrated approach' as a new and more efficient way of dealing with employment and social cohesion challenges gained ground at the turn of the century (Berthet & Bourgeois, 2014, pp. 24-25). Social and labour policy are also among the policy fields in which the share of national EU-related legislation has traditionally been important (Jenny & Müller, 2010). Although the EU has become increasingly capable of exerting strong impact on national social spending, especially through its budgetary competences, welfare state reforms still need to be negotiated in the domestic arenas (Hassenteufel & Palier, 2015). Berthet and Bourgeois (2016) observe that employment policy integration "can only become a reality if the national institutional frame foresees a coordinated connection between several social policy fields related to activation" (pp. 223-224).

Although the three policies are mainly under the regulatory auspices of national governments, the extent of supranational influence varies. National institutional legacies and policy agendas always impact on the coordination of policies and create differences between countries (Berthet & Bourgeois, 2016), but comparing the influence of the national and supranational levels in the three policies suggests that the impact of the national level is likely more pronounced in employment policy and immigration policy given that these two policies are less exposed to supranational influence.

2.4 Politicisation dynamics

Environmental protection is generally not considered as a group-specific issue²⁷ and some argue that it has a high valence issue component (van der Brug, 2004, p. 211; Carter, 2007, p. 127). Carter (2007) observed that the environment is rarely an electorally salient issue (pp. 139-141). Knill, Debus and Heichel (2010) show that environmental protection became a more salient issue for governments between 1960 and 1990 but also that in some of the countries this trend stopped in the 1990s with governments adopting less environmentally friendly positions than before. In general, environmental issues are most actively defended by Green parties (Farstad, 2018). These parties have become part of governments in European countries starting in the late 1990s (Dumont & Bäck, 2006). Empirical evidence indicates that Green parties have moderated their environmental radicalism during the 2000s (Poguntke, 2002; Blühdorn, 2009) and that the issue has gradually been incorporated into the left-right dimension of political contestation (Dalton, 2009). In the EPI literature, both Green parties and environmental NGOs appear as policy entrepreneurs for environmental PI. Lenschow (1997) points to the possibilities of environmental NGOs to influence policy processes to explain differences between PI processes in otherwise similar sectors. Persson, Eckerberg and Nilsson (2016) show that shifting leadership by Green parties in government helps understand the evolution of environmental PI over time in Sweden, but a later study did not confirm the generalisability of this finding to other countries (Trein, Maggetti, et al., 2021). Likewise, Green parties have played an important role in the development of EPI at the European level (Vogeler et al., 2022). Trein, Maggetti and Meyer (2021) as well as Vogeler et al. (2022) expect Green parties to act as advocates of environmental PI successfully when in Parliament but not as government coalition member.

In the literature on EPI, Persson et al. (2016) find that the priority placed on environmental objectives by the government explains variation of policy outputs over time. The literature suggests that the salience and politicisation of environmental issues favours environmental policy outputs. Fredriksson et al. (2005) found a positive association between a higher number of environmental lobby groups in a country and the stringency of environmental policy. The literature shows that if the environment becomes an object of party competition, this leads to environmental policy outputs (Carter, 2013). Comparative studies of environmental policy associate a higher priority for and more positive positions towards the environment in governing parties' manifestos with a higher number (Knill et al., 2010) and stringency (Lundquist, 2022) of environmental policy outputs adopted, the proposition by governments of pro-environment policies during EU-level negotiations (Leinaweaver & Thomson, 2016),

²⁷ Some argue that environmental pollution disproportionately affects economically disadvantaged groups of the population, however (Neumayer, 2004; Larrère, 2017).

and even better achievement of environmental outcomes (Jensen & Spoon, 2011). In the case of forest policy integration analysed by Kefeli et al. (2023), the proximity of a new governing party to one of competing advocacy coalitions allowed for pre-electoral commitments from the government, including a focus on the environmental aspects of the development of the forestry sector. Schaub and Braunbeck (2020) show that a lack of concerted mobilisation by environmental organisations or ecological parties explains why German water protection policies fail to tackle the issue of pharmaceutical contaminants.

Employment policy is one of the most politically salient policy fields in advanced industrial states because the development of the labour market directly impacts the economy and quality of life, and reforms in this field can be highly unpopular (Vis, 2009). In unitary and federal settings alike, national governments' chances for re-election hinge upon their successes in this policy field (Schulze Buschoff & Hassel, 2019, p. 398). Some qualified high employment as a valence issue (van der Brug, 2004, p. 211) whereby actors may disagree not about the objective but about the means to achieve them.

Immigration policy is a technically relatively less complex policy field (Trein & Maggetti, 2021). Conversely, with the significant rise of cross-border migration, migration has become one of the most salient political issues over the last decade (Grande et al., 2018; Green-Pedersen & Otjes, 2019; Böhmelt, 2021). Analysing the program-policy nexus in immigration policy in 14 OECD countries between 1998 and 2013, Böhmelt and Ezrow (2022) show that the salience of immigration in manifesto pledges tended to translate into legislative action. Grande, Schwarzbözl and Fatke (2018) find that party politics and competition (rather than socio-economic factors) drive variation in the politicisation of immigration issues in West European countries. Investigating the interplay of institutional and political factors on the adoption of liberal immigration policy reforms, Abou-Chadi (2016b) shows that reforms that liberalise immigration policy become less likely when levels of electoral competition increase and the immigration issue becomes politicised, and that the presence of veto points and the politicisation of the immigration issue both limit the likelihood that left-of-centre parties pass reforms liberalising migration.

2.5 Ideology and the left-right dimension

Broad literatures cover the environment, immigration, and employment as issues of party competition.

Environmental issues often conflict with other priorities traditionally held by mainstream parties, in particular those of economic sectors such as industry or agriculture (Carter, 2013). Schout and Jordan (2008) suggest that political leadership for environmental PI mostly depends on the political visions of the governing parties and observe that left-of-centre

governments tended to promote EPI most actively. Conservative parties are rather associated with a more critical stance towards environmental policy and a more business and industry-friendly approach (Dunlap et al., 2001; Carter, 2007, p. 67), while left-of-centre governments are generally assumed to be more likely to embrace environment-friendly positions and policies (Neumayer, 2004). This assumption is based on the observation that left-of-centre parties “tend to embrace more governmental intervention, are less probusiness and are more concerned about the welfare of the lower social classes” who are more likely to suffer from environmental pollution than the rich (Neumayer, 2004, p. 168). A recent study found that left parties’ programmes tend to represent the complex and holistic dimensions of environmental issues more than their right counterparts (Pollex & Berker, 2022). Studying the climate change beliefs of Australian politicians, Fielding and co-authors (2012) find that politicians from centre-left and progressive parties exhibited beliefs that were more consistent with scientific consensus about climate change than their conservative or non-aligned counterparts. The literature also generally associates left-of-centre parties with a higher salience of environmental issues in their programmes (Båtstrand, 2015; Facchini et al., 2017; Farstad, 2018). Studies suggest that left-of-centre governments adopt more environment-friendly policies that favour environmental outcomes such as the reduction of CO₂-emissions (Garmann, 2014) or reduced levels of air pollution (Neumayer, 2003). Analysing the environmental dimension of OECD member governments’ manifestos between 1960 and 2000, Knill, Debus and Heichel (2010) find that more left-wing governments adopted more environmental positions than right-of-centre governments. Analysing climate policies adopted in 29 democracies between 1990 and 2016, Schulze (2021) finds that left-of-centre governments produced more “hard” climate policies (like taxes or regulations) than their right-of-centre counterparts. Conversely, Schulze (2014) found no difference in countries’ participation in environmental treaties under left and right-of-centre governments.

In *immigration policy*, too, scholars have argued that differences in policy outputs stem from political parties’ ideological preferences (Joppke, 2003; Abou-Chadi, 2016b) and that political parties play a “pivotal role” for explaining the politicisation of the immigration question (Hadj Abdou et al., 2022). Right-of-centre parties are traditionally considered as the ‘owners’ of immigration-related issues in electoral competitions and key actors of migration policy and politics (Bale, 2008). Their political responses to immigration are often considered by voters as more credible than their left-of-centre counterparts (Thränhardt, 1995). They are therefore more likely to promote immigration-related issues on their agendas as a way to compete with the left (Bale, 2003). Concomitantly, Hernes’ (2021) research into the organisation of immigrant integration policy in Western European governments shows that right-leaning governments disproportionately often combine the immigration portfolio with the policy functions for justice or security, instead of, for instance, social affairs or education. Left-of-

centre parties are rather associated with more liberal and inclusive frames of the immigration question (Berman, 2006, pp. 198-199; Helbling, 2014) and with policies that remove ethnic elements from access to rights or status, such as citizenship (Joppke, 2003, p. 436). Conversely, the literature generally associates right-of-centre parties with restrictive immigration measures rather than the promotion of immigrant integration (Bale, 2008; Green-Pedersen & Odmalm, 2008; Sager & Thomann, 2017). Some contributions paint a more differentiated picture, however. Hinnfors and colleagues (2012) demonstrate that Swedish social democrats favoured restrictive immigration policies at a high degree of consistency that would place them more towards the right of the ideological spectrum. Natter, Czaika and De Haas (2020) find that immigration policy is largely unaffected by the political ideology of parties in government and only find an impact when it comes to immigrant integration policy and policies directed towards specific groups. Hadj Abdou, Bale and Geddes (2022) show that the immigration policies by parties of the centre-right party family vary both between parties and over time.

Employment is an issue typically owned by left parties (Seeberg, 2017, pp. 482–487). Under left-leaning governments, unions tend to disproportionately more participate in government decision-making than under their right-leaning counterparts (Compston, 1994). However, this traditional association has come under scrutiny during the 1990s (P. Pierson, 1996; Ross, 2000; Seeleib-Kaiser, 2004; Trampusch, 2005; Patzwaldt, 2008; Egle, 2009). Comparative welfare state researchers have argued that partisan identity has ceased to matter for social policy choices, given that in a context of globalisation and austerity governments were driven to adopt similar policy reforms (C. Pierson, 2001; Giddens, 2008; Kwon & Pontusson, 2010; Finseraas & Vernby, 2011; Häusermann et al., 2013). Several quantitative studies have not found any systematic differences in policy choices between governments of either ideological orientation (Boix, 2000; Garrett & Mitchell, 2001; Kittel & Obinger, 2003). According to Paul Pierson (1996, 2001), parties only make a difference as far as the expansion of the welfare state was concerned, but less so in the era of welfare state dismantling. Other studies, however, found that partisan differences mattered even in the era of welfare state retrenchment and that right-of-centre and liberal parties were associated with retrenchment (Allan & Scruggs, 2004). Concomitantly, the literature does not clearly link employment PI to either left or right-of-centre governments (Knotz, 2021). As regards work conditionality reforms, for instance, previous studies associate them with either right-of-centre (King & Ward, 1992) or left-of-centre (Clasen, 2000) governments. Similarly, Rueda's (2006) analysis of active labour market policy measures in 16 countries from 1980 to 1995 demonstrates that whether a government was social democratic or conservative made no difference to the levels of ALMP that it promoted. Those who suggest that social democratic governments had a decisive role in the welfare state reforms of the 1990s and 2000s argue that after having been

the traditional advocates of a strong welfare state, these parties could more legitimately claim that the reforms were unavoidable and had greater political leeway to introduce them than conservative parties (Clasen, 2000; Bonoli, 2013; Knotz, 2021). Trein, Maggetti, and Meyer (2020) argue that left-of-centre and social democratic parties in particular should be advocates for PI in unemployment policy. Knotz and Lindvall (2015) lend support to the argument that coalition governments are more likely than single-party governments to adopt PI reforms in employment policy because they are more pressured to build political support for their policies and use compensation mechanisms to do so. They show empirically that coalition governments are more likely to combine cutbacks in unemployment benefits with compensating measures, such as increased spending on training. Analysing PI of employment policy, Kaplaner et al. (2023) argue that the political salience of combating rising unemployment in the context of economic recession explains intensified levels of intersectoral policy-making in the EU (p. 18).

2.6 Summary

In sum, there are some differences and similarities between the three policy fields studied here. Table 1 summarises the similarities and differences observed in the previous sections in a schematic way. It leads to observe that on most dimensions of the comparison, environmental policy tends to be different from immigration and employment policy, which tend to be more similar. These differences and similarities may be relevant for explaining patterns in how the conditions of the theoretical framework combine to produce the outcome in the three policies beyond the preliminary expectations formulated above.

Table 1: Similarities and differences of the three policy fields

	<i>Environmental policy</i>	<i>Immigration policy</i>	<i>Employment policy</i>
<i>Interdependences</i>	mainly external	mainly internal	mainly internal
<i>Technicality</i>	high	low	low
<i>Group-specific</i>	no	yes	no
<i>Salience</i>	low	high	high
<i>Supranational influence</i>	high	low	low
<i>Relevance of the right-left cleavage</i>	high	high	low

3 Ministerial policy functions

In order to operationalise the measure of portfolio concentration and the types of ministries for environmental policy, immigration policy, and unemployment policy, respectively, I identified the catalogue of national governments' policy functions for each of the three policies through a formal structural analysis of the ministries with policy functions in these fields.²⁸

3.1 Identification of policy functions through formal structural analysis

Formal structural analysis is a suitable method if one wants to identify the tasks of government units with respect to specific policy challenges and assess the distribution of these tasks across organisations (Derlien, 1982, p. 182; Saalfeld & Schamburek, 2014, p. 200).²⁹ It rose to prominence when political scientists became interested in the administrative structure of governments during the 1980s, and was used in studies of ministries and governments in Germany (e.g., Mayntz & Scharpf, 1975; Müller, 1986; Derlien, 1988) and the United Kingdom (e.g., Pollitt, 1984). More recent studies also demonstrate its usefulness for comparative research designs. For instance, Saalfeld and Schamburek (2014) use this method to extract all policy functions of the 16 German state governments between 1995 and 2013 and analyse how they are distributed across ministries. Similarly, Schamburek (2016) relies on formal structural analysis for describing and comparing the organisational set-ups for immigration and immigrant integration policy in the ministerial administrations of German state governments over time.

To identify the ministries' policy functions for these three policy challenges as exhaustively as possible, I triangulated data sources which included organisational decrees, attribution

²⁸ Not every ministry's denomination necessarily contains the word 'ministry' or 'department', though. For instance, New Zealand's *Commission for the Environment* did not contain these words in its title but it still acted "as a de facto government department with the responsibility to provide policy advice on environmental matters and to promote the co-ordination of environmental policy" and worked under a minister for the Environment (Bührs, 1991, 2002b, p. 331).

²⁹ An alternative strategy often used in the empirical literature is to infer ministerial jurisdictions from the names of ministries or units. Numerous studies proceed in this manner (e.g., Pappi et al., 2008, pp. 327, 341; White & Dunleavy, 2010, p. 24; Glor, 2011, p. 559; Linhart & Windwehr, 2012; Ryu et al., 2020, p. 937). Such an operationalisation of ministerial jurisdictions relies on the problematic assumption, however, that these names represent policy jurisdictions accurately (Warwick & Druckman, 2006, p. 642). This is not necessarily the case because issue preferences and signalling as well as bureaucratic turf strategies may influence ministries' names (Tosun, 2018; Hernes, 2021). Although Schamburek's (2016) analysis of German Länder ministries found that the names of directorates more accurately reflect jurisdictions than the names of ministries (p. 18), there is no comparative evidence that would allow to generalise this finding with reasonable certainty. On the contrary, Saalfeld and Schamburek's (2014) find considerable empirical support for the claim that "the name of a ministry frequently does not allow accurate inferences regarding its actual jurisdiction" (p. 209). Name changes certainly "often signal important life events" (Hannan & Freeman, 1993, p. 151) but whether a change of name actually coincides with a change of the organisational structure is an empirical question (Tosun, 2018, p. 333).

decrees, entries from parliamentary databases and archives, ministerial reports and organisational plans that attribute competences or create or organise ministries or their divisions. The data collection resulted in exhaustive lists that represent all relevant policy functions that could be identified as ministerial tasks for each of the three policy challenges in the nine countries during the period under study. I then grouped the items thematically, using also other classifications (such as the COFOG scheme) as well as operationalisations applied for other datasets (e.g., Seki & Williams, 2014; Hernes, 2020) and shortened the lists by removing policy functions that were specific to only one country.

3.2 Policy functions

The following three sections present the results of the identification of policy functions for each of the three policies. Based on the general definition of ministries (cf. Chapter 1, section 2.1), a ministry for the Environment is defined as a ministry that is responsible for performing environmental policy functions on behalf of a government, a ministry for Immigration is defined as a ministry that is responsible for performing immigration policy functions on behalf of a government, and a ministry for Employment is defined as a ministry that is responsible for performing employment policy functions on behalf of a government.³⁰ Hence, a ministry can be a ministry for, e.g., the Environment, if it does not have the word “environment” in its title, and if its jurisdiction contains additional policy functions for other policies that can be related to its environmental policy functions or not.

Environmental policy

The literature shows that ministries for the Environment are typically responsible for preparing and implementing decisions, regulations and laws related to environmental media and resources, adopting environmental programmes, representing domestic environmental interests in international policy processes, coordinating environmental policy within government, and commissioning research and reporting on environmental matters as well as environmental impact assessment and inspection (Müller, 1986; Weale et al., 1996; Aklin & Urpelainen, 2014). The OECD classification of the functions of government further details policy functions related to environmental protection as consisting in the sectors waste management, waste water management, pollution abatement, the protection of biodiversity and landscape, and research and development in the field of environmental protection.³¹ The CAP master codebook further lists several sectoral issues (drinking water, waste disposal,

³⁰ “Employment” and “unemployment” are treated synonymously when it comes to the denominations of ministries as well as the policy field.

³¹ The OECD’s “Classification of the Functions of Government” (COFOG) classifies government expenditure data by the purpose for which the funds are used. First-level COFOG splits expenditure data into ten “functional” groups or sub-sectors (such as economic affairs, social protection, defence, or education).

hazardous waste, air pollution, recycling, indoor hazards, species and forests protection, land and water conservation), as well as research and development in environmental technology, among environmental issues.³²

As outlined in the previous section, I triangulated the analysis of the secondary literature with an inductive identification of ministries' environmental policy functions through formal structural analysis. The results are displayed in Table 2. As a result of the triangulation of sources, I operationalise governments' policy functions for environmental policy as containing the following policy functions. Ministries for the Environment are responsible for *the formulation of policies that regulate environmental systems, resources and their respective challenges with the aim to protect nature and the environment while allowing for an ecologically sustainable development*. This function embraces both the *protection of the natural environment, ecosystems and biodiversity* – i.e. wildlife flora and fauna conservation, landscape protection and national parks, and the control, prevention and reduction of the exploitation of all environmental media; the protection of *water ecosystems* (i.e., inland waterways, lakes, coastlines, the sea and marine protected areas, if applicable); and *forestry policy*, i.e., the protection of forest ecosystems – and the *specialised development, integrated management and utilisation of natural resources* (land, water, air) and renewable natural resources. Ministries for the Environment are further responsible for the formulation of policies for the *control and reduction of environmental pollution* regarding all environmental media, such as, the prevention and control of soil and land contamination, the protection of air quality and air pollution control (*air policy*), as well as *water policy*, i.e. the protection of water ecosystems, water storage and pipelines, drink water supply, waste water disposal and treatment. Ministries for the Environment have further responsibilities for research, information, and reporting on environmental matters, such as on the state of the environment, on natural resources, forestry, etc., gathering data for a national pollution inventory and national solid waste database, reporting on the state of the environment and creating environmental indicators, research on oceans and marine life (if applicable) and the atmosphere. Finally, ministries for the Environment have *coordination functions related to environmental policy*, which typically consist in the organisation of environmental impact assessments and inspection to evaluate the environmental impact of other policies, monitoring environments and ecosystems, overseeing environmental accounting, considering environmental issues in public inquiries, as well as managing taxes, levies, deductions and rebates linked to activities affecting the environment.

³² Comparative Agendas Project: CAP Topics, <https://www.comparativeagendas.net/pages/master-codebook> [accessed 12.7.2022].

Conversely, several issues were excluded from the list of environmental policy functions and instead considered policy functions of other policy fields that are adjacent to environmental policy. In line with Weale et al. (1996), I consider fishery policy, hunting policy, farming policy as well as animal health and welfare as agricultural policy functions (p. 272). The development of mineral and energy resources is considered as an energy policy function. The control, protection and safety of radiation (radioactive substances, nuclear technology and facilities), radioactive waste management, toxic and chemical substances, as well as the development of “clean technology” are considered as industry policy functions (contrary to Weale et al., 1996, p. 272). Similarly, I consider climate policy as a separate policy field that is adjacent to environmental policy. While earlier contributions defined climate policy as a subfield of environmental policy (e.g., Nilsson & Nilsson, 2005), subsequent research found that climate policy has established itself as a policy sector of its own with its own logics and policy objectives (Massey & Huitema, 2012). Climate policy objectives can even be in contradiction with environmental policy objectives (Rietig, 2013; Sainteny, 2015), as has been documented in the case of the Swedish low-carbon energy strategy and longer-term environmental objectives (Hildingsson & Johansson, 2016). Specific climate objectives may conflict with water policy objectives, for instance, even if these are all parts of broader sustainable development strategies (Pittock et al., 2013). Sectoral differences are further reflected in differences in issue attention dynamics around climate issues on the one hand and environmental issues on the other (Lyytimäki, 2011; Farstad, 2018). For these reasons, climate policy functions – such as the responsibility for domestic climate change programs, renewable energy programs, energy efficiency, community and household climate action and greenhouse gas abatement programs, or the adaptation to global warming – were not considered as environmental functions.

Table 2 lists the policy functions that are defined as environmental policy functions as well as those policy functions that are defined as adjacent to environmental policy. The qualitative difference in kind between ‘concentrated’ and ‘fragmented’ portfolios of environmental policy functions concerns the distinction whether or not the policy functions for the protection and conservation of nature and biodiversity on the one hand, and those for pollution control, are located within the same ministry or not.

Table 2: Operationalisation of environmental policy functions

<i>Environmental policy functions</i>
Nature protection and biodiversity policy
- Wildlife conservation and protection, nature protection, crop protection, protection of species, flora and fauna
- National parks and heritage, landscape protection, green spaces

- Oceans and marine life, coastal environment, marine environment protection, protected marine areas
- Water policy: Protection and management of water resources, water storage, drink water supply
- Forestry policy, incl. forest industry
- Air policy: air quality

Pollution prevention policy

- Land contamination, soil protection: Fertiliser and pesticides legislation, contaminated sites
- Prevention of the pollution of marine areas and of coastlines
- Prevention of the pollution of inland waterways, wastewater disposal and treatment
- Air policy: emission protection, air pollution

Health issues related to environmental protection

Sustainable communities' policy

- "Environmental hygiene"
- Noise control, transport noise and industrial noise
- Waste policy and management, garbage disposal, recycling

Research on environmental matters

- Data gathering on natural resources, the state of the environment, on pollution

Environmental inspection

- Environmental ombudsman
- Primary/rural industries inspection, animal welfare
- Environmental impact assessment

Natural resources: Development and utilisation of land and water resources, integrated resource management

Environmental accounting

Topographical surveys, geodesy, mapping, meteorology

Adjacent/related policy functions

Climate policy, greenhouse policy, climate change adaptation and mitigation policy, adaptation to global warming, flood protection

Emissions trade, safety of nuclear installations, industrial security, "clean" technology (industry policy)

Energy policy, energy taxes

Agriculture, fishing policy, hunting policy, food policy

Public health policy

Land use planning, maritime policy

Territorial/regional development, urban development, rural development, transport policy, construction, equipment policy

Environmental education (education policy)

Immigration policy

Based on the literature, a government’s immigration policy function can be generally defined as regulating the presence of noncitizens in the country. Concomitantly, a ministry for Immigration has the policy functions to prepare and implement decisions, regulations and laws related to the entry, stay, settlement, and departure of different groups of noncitizens, asylum and the attribution of nationality (Schamburek, 2016; Hernes, 2021). It further represents domestic interests in international policy processes with regards to migration and asylum, coordinates immigration policy within government, and commissions research and reporting on these matters. Table 3 presents the results of the formal structural analysis of ministerial policy functions relative to immigration policy and immigrant integration policy. The qualitative difference in kind between ‘concentrated’ and ‘fragmented’ portfolios of immigration and immigrant integration policy distinguishes whether the policy functions for the subfields immigration regulation on the one hand and immigrant integration on the other are located within the same ministry or not.

Various policy sectors are adjacent to immigration policy. These concern the social rights of immigrants (e.g. employment policy, social policy, health policy, but also housing and community policy) as well as their economic integration through education and professional training, and anti-discrimination policy more largely (Hernes, 2021). Conversely, policy functions related to public order and security, crime prevention, and justice, are not considered as adjacent to immigration policy, although they are sometimes coupled with immigration policy functions within ministerial structures especially by governments supporting restrictive immigration policies (Hernes, 2021, pp. 132-133). Similarly, international development support is not considered as adjacent to immigrant integration policy.

Table 3: Operationalisation of immigration policy functions

<i>Immigration policy functions</i>
Immigration regulation <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Entry, stay and departure arrangements for noncitizens: economic migration, family migration, humanitarian migration and asylum, student migration - Immigration control - Border control - Recruitment of foreigner workers, family reunification policy
Refugee and asylum policy, humanitarian programme <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Torture and trauma counselling and support
Citizenship, naturalisation, nationality <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Passport issuing
Immigrant integration policy

- Immigrant post-arrival arrangements, settlement services, accommodation
- Culturally appropriate health care services
- Interpreter services, information on government services
- Income support programmes
- Language training for migrants or migrant children
- Vocational language and training services
- Education of migrant children
- Workplace-related services for immigrants
- Migrant liaison offices
- Welfare policy for specific groups, e.g. guest workers, asylum seekers, post-colonial immigrants
- Multicultural affairs programs, ethnic affairs
- Coordination of immigrant integration policy

Domestic, European and international coordination of migration policy, implementation of supranational agreements related to migration

Adjacent/related policy functions

Local government, urban policy, regional development, spatial planning

Housing and community policy

Social cohesion and race relations

Employment and labour policy: National employment service; technical and vocational training; unemployment insurance; working conditions and relationships

Family policy

Employment policy

Finally, a ministry for Employment is defined as the ministry of a government with primary responsibility for national employment and labour market policy, i.e., it is in charge of regulating the extent and nature of the state's intervention in the labour market, work and employment relations, and the compensation of unemployed persons (Heyes & Rychly, 2013a). Table 4 presents the results of the formal structural analysis of ministerial policy functions relative to (un)employment policy. Ministries for employment typically initiate and draft policies regarding the regulation and development of the labour market, measures for the promotion of employment and active labour market policies. They further supervise the public employment service or its private equivalents in countries where employment services are deployed by private employment services networks (e.g., Australia). They are also responsible for policies regarding the social insurance of unemployed persons of working age, their income support and welfare, as well as basic allowances and assistance for long-term unemployed persons in two-tiered systems (e.g., Germany) (Schiller, 2010). They are further in charge of workplace or industrial relations through policies regarding labour law, occupational health and safety, compensation, labour inspectorates, and equal employment

opportunities and pay issues. They further undertake the collection of statistical data on the development of the labour market (Rychly, 2013, p. 14) and labour market research. Finally, they represent the government on matters of international policy coordination in their fields of competence. The qualitative difference in kind between ‘concentrated’ and ‘fragmented’ portfolios distinguishes whether the policy functions for labour market regulation on the one hand and for the compensation of unemployed persons on the other are located within the same ministry. Therefore, a portfolio of employment policy functions is (rather) concentrated if it brings together policy functions for both labour market regulation and the compensation of unemployed persons; if different ministries are in charge of these two policy sectors, then the portfolio is (rather) fragmented.

Conversely, several issues were excluded from the list of employment policy functions and instead considered policy functions of other policy fields that are adjacent to employment policy. These are listed in the lower part of Table 4. This is the case of welfare-related social benefits and unconditional income support, social assistance as regards housing, family and care, for instance. All of these are linked to a person’s employability. Similarly, pension policy may affect a person’s employment status by encouraging early retirement. Education policy as well as (more targeted) literacy programmes also have synergies with employment since it may incentivise different labour market trajectories.

All other policy functions are considered to be unrelated to the challenge of integrating unemployed persons into the labour market. Unrelated policy functions present in the data are in particular, policy functions related to youth affairs (e.g., Australia, 1979-1998), immigration policy (e.g., Canada, 1970-1993), the interior (Sweden, 1970-1974), but also economic policy (e.g., Austria, 2000-2008), domestic market policy and targeted policies such as small businesses policy.

Table 4: Operationalisation of employment policy functions

<i>Employment policy functions</i>
Labour market policy
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Public Employment Service - Employment search assistance, counselling - Professional/vocational training, school-to-work transitions - Direct job creation and employment subsidies - Special schemes for specific groups, e.g. the disabled, youth, immigrants, etc. - Labour market programs - Employment protection and promotion policy
Employment insurance and unemployment benefits
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Net replacement rate - Duration of unemployment benefits

-
- Coverage and eligibility
 - Search and job availability requirements

Short-time working schemes

Labour taxation

- Social security contributions
- Income tax

Labour policy and law

- Industrial/workplace relations, workplace conditions, arbitration
- Policies regarding wages and labour costs
- Occupational health and safety, work diseases and accidents rehabilitation and compensation, labour inspections
- Affirmative action, equal employment opportunity issues
- Public sector employment pays and conditions

European and international employment policy

Adjacent/related policy functions

Welfare-related social security benefits other than unemployment benefits, income support

- In-work benefits: employment conditional benefit or tax credit, sickness pay
- Social assistance (housing, means-tested benefits, invalidity, disability, parental leave), community support policies, fight against poverty and exclusion
- Family-related benefits
- International social law
- European and international social policy

Pension policy

- Retirement benefits
- Early retirement schemes
- Disability schemes

Economic migration policy

Education policy, literacy programmes

CHAPTER 3: METHODOLOGY

The question how organisational features of governments and the adoption of policy integration reforms co-evolve is a so-called causes-of-effects research question that aims at understanding the reasons why a certain phenomenon occurs (Mahoney & Goertz, 2006; Ganghof, 2016). The review of the literatures on government organisation and on policy integration suggested that a causal perspective that supports configurational arguments is warranted if one wants to understand the link between both. These theoretical considerations have led to the choice of a research design and methodology presented in this chapter. The first section outlines the sample. Section 2 presents the operationalisation and datasets for the outcome (2.1) and the conditions (2.2 to 2.4). Section 3 outlines the use of QCA methodology for the present analysis (3.1), explains how the data were aggregated (3.2) and explains the choices of the calibration anchors (3.3). The two final sections explain how the analyses were performed both as regards the application of the QCA methodology (3.4) and its combination with case illustrations (3.5).

To explore the expectations empirically, this research makes use of two novel datasets. Both datasets are based on the qualitative analysis of sources, a strategy requiring qualitative judgment that is not entirely safe from measurement error. To ensure a maximum of transparency, both datasets quote sentences and reference the sources on which the coding is based. The datasets are contained in the Appendix.

1 Sample

In order to explore the conditions under which governments pursue policy integration, this research compares cases that are nested in countries as well as policies (Levi-Faur, 2006). Political systems and policy sectors are both relevant for explaining governmental decision-making in general (Freeman, 1985), but also PI reforms (Jordan et al., 2003; Nilsson & Persson, 2003; Jordan & Lenschow, 2010; Trein & Maggetti, 2020) and organisational styles at the level of government (Cole & Eyméri-Douzans, 2010) in particular.

1.1 Countries

In order to provide for a stable context, the nine countries chosen to be examined are established Western parliamentary democracies that are members of the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD): Australia, Austria, Canada, France, Germany, the Netherlands, New Zealand, Sweden, and the United Kingdom. As OECD members, these countries have broadly similar levels of economic development and are functioning democracies that have environmental, unemployment, and immigration policies

that can be compared. These features hold the institutional context as constant as possible by ensuring that the cases share enough characteristics to be comparable (Przeworski & Teune, 1970; Berg-Schlosser & De Meur, 2009). Data collection on OECD members seemed advantageous because demographic and economic as well as policy-specific data is available from OECD reports. According to the logic of QCA, it is imperative to select country cases for which data collection is feasible because in-depth case knowledge is crucial for establishing measurement and internal validity (Mahoney & Goertz, 2006).

As parliamentary democracies, the countries chosen are comparable on a broader range of institutional and political variables which limits the sources of contingency (Scharpf, 1989). There are similarities and functional equivalents across parliamentary democracies as regards executive-legislative relations and electoral systems, for instance (Laver & Shepsle, 1994, p. 286). This is important because the macro-institutional configuration of political systems informs both the path-dependent evolution of policy fields, which poses a particular challenge to the comparative study of PI (Trein, Maggetti, et al., 2021), as well as the number and positions of institutional veto points, which must be taken into account when studying the adoption of PI reforms (Tosun & Lang, 2017). This macro-institutional configuration also informs the nature of administrative reorganisation processes, their politicisation and the involvement of different kinds of actors (March & Olsen, 1989; Ma & Christensen, 2020). Some differences as regards particular characteristics of the political systems exist, though. A particularity of the Swedish central government, for instance, is that it relies heavily on the capacities of agencies, which are entrusted to make decisions on matters concerning implementation within their area of competence, while the ministries are focused on strategic policy-making (Eckerberg, 2000, p. 213).

France and Austria are included in the sample of parliamentary countries although the Constitutions of both countries foresee semi-presidential systems. Schleiter and Morgan-Jones (2009) argue that governments in semi-presidential systems tend to be less strongly linked to a particular political party than in parliamentary ones. Comparing cabinet size in both types of regimes, Indriðason and Bowler (2014) do not find any differences. Comparativists generally consider Austria as a parliamentary system (or a 'parliamentarised' semi-presidential regime, as Samuels and Shugart, 2010, call it) because in practice the parliamentary aspects largely outplay the presidential ones (Müller, 1999; Welan, 2000, p. 2; Pelinka, 2003, p. 522; Bröchler, 2008, pp. 107-109). The parliamentary aspects of semi-presidentialism also dominated in France during the 1980s and 1990s, but the balance of power has shifted in favour of the president during the 2000s. The president of the 5th French Republic was traditionally granted only weak formal powers and all the executive and regulatory competences belonged to the Prime minister (Duverger, 1996, p. 502; Elgie, 1999). Still, the president is the directly elected head of state and the presidential election the focal

point that rhythms political life. The *de facto* relative power of the Prime Minister vis-à-vis the President has fluctuated over the last decades. As regards domestic policy-making, Elgie (1999) considers the 1980s as prime ministerial government (p. 68). The balance of power tilted even more strongly towards the Prime minister during the *cohabitation* governments – during which the president and the prime minister belong to ideologically opposed political parties – of the 1990s (Elgie, 1999; Kempf, 2003; Bucur, 2017). The division of responsibility between them becomes clearest then and the Prime minister, whose political future is most immediately associated with the government’s policy performance, clearly takes the lead on domestic policy making. At the end of the 1990s, Elgie (1999) observed that “[t]he nature of the French semi-presidential system is such that the president cannot exercise power without the help of the prime minister” (p. 67). Since the turn of the century, however, the presidential realm has extended considerably in the political practice of the French government (Bucur & Elgie, 2012). Although individual ministers have been able to play a politically important role, Presidents have invested domestic policy-making more forcefully.

The nine countries are further chosen in a way to differ as regards conditions related to political systems. The sample balances federalist and centralised political systems as well as countries with and without EU membership. Responsibilities for many complex cross-cutting problems are typically situated across levels of government (Hull, 2008) and it is impossible to exclude that some policies may also be developed at other levels, especially in federal settings. In some countries, especially in federal ones, subnational levels do have some competences for the selected policies, but these remain limited and the national governments detain sufficient policy competences over these three policy challenges to allow for a reasonable claim that PI should take place mainly at the national level. However, there may be differences both between countries and between policies within one federation.³³ For instance, the

³³ Among the **unitary countries**, for instance in New Zealand authority for immigration policy is located at the national level and policy-making is centralized, without direct influence of the sub-national governments (OECD, 2014a, p. 44). In **Australia**’s federal system of government, environmental PI takes place at the levels of both the states and territories, with whom primary responsibility for land use and conservation rests, as well as the federal government, which did develop EPI over time following different approaches to balancing federal and devolved responsibilities (Ross, 2008). The case of **Canada**, where immigration is a shared federal and provincial responsibility, is even more complex. The federal government has long detained the responsibility for managing immigration (Birjandian, 2005, p. 22) and has generally taken the lead role (Ferrer et al., 2014, p. 854). With decentralisation, provincial authorities have exercised an increasing role in the selection and settlement of immigrants (Banting, 2012, p. 86) and municipalities have also become more active in immigration and integration policy agenda-setting (Gunn, 2012). As a result, immigration policy “proceeded through a series of incremental adjustments, usually in the form of bilateral political deals between the federal government and individual provinces. These changes have been layered in top of each other, with limited reference to any comprehensive federal-provincial rationale or to their cumulative impact. The result is one of the most complex immigration systems in the world and a set of intergovernmental relations characterized by pervasive asymmetry rather than a common conception of federalism” (Banting, 2012, p. 80). Conversely, immigrant integration policy depends more strongly on provincial policies and programs, such as labour market regulation, education, and social assistance and services (Banting, 2012, p. 85). Québec stands out as the first and strongest case of

literature on Austrian federalism characterises this federal system as a de jure federation and de facto unitary country with a high degree of centralization (Erk, 2004; Bischof & Karlhofer, 2015) because the number of areas of governance of the Länder is relatively low and most of them fall under joint decision-making (Bußjäger, 2015). Conversely, even in centralised systems, some competences may be decentralised to the territorial level.³⁴

The countries also belong to two groups of administrative systems – Westminster and Weberian – that differ regarding some organisational principles and display different levels of adherence to NPM administrative reform doctrines (Pollitt & Bouckaert, 2004, 2017; Gualmini, 2008; Verhoest et al., 2010; Hammerschmid et al., 2016). Australia, Canada, New Zealand, and the United Kingdom have Westminster administrative systems and are high-profile (Australia, New Zealand, United Kingdom) to moderate-profile (Canada) NPM reformers. Conversely, Austria, France, Germany, the Netherlands, and Sweden have Weberian administrative systems and have implemented NPM reforms to a moderate (Sweden, Netherlands) or low (Austria, France, Germany) degree.

Although the countries in the sample have been selected so as to present roughly homogeneous levels of economic development, they also cover different traditions of welfare states and unemployment policies. Demographics across (European) countries remain heterogeneous and so do the national institutions for intergenerational transfers of their welfare states (Lindh, 2012). Other policy traditions differ across European countries as well, for instance in the field of minimum income protection (Clegg, 2013), but also in policy fields that are relevant for employment policies, such as the development of childcare and work-family reconciliation policies (Morgan, 2012). Scandinavian countries have a comparatively long tradition of active labour market policy and Sweden in particular is a forerunner of the activation approach (Brochmann & Hagelund, 2012). Conversely, the Netherlands had a characteristically passive welfare state that did not contain any activating policies until recently (Schmid, 2010, pp. 204–205).

devolution in this area, following an agreement in 1991 that was the first to coordinate immigration policy vertically within Canada (Reitz, 2012, p. 530) and led to massive devolution in a context where the federal government sought to relieve financial pressure by loading off settlement programmes (Banting, 2012, p. 91).

³⁴ **France**, for instance, remains strongly centralised despite the decentralisation of selected policy issues initiated in the 1980s. This is particularly true for unemployment policy, which has largely remained under the responsibility of the French central state (Mériaux, 2006; Berthet et al., 2016, p. 143), as well as for welfare state policies that were even subject to national governments' "hyper-active reformism" (Ross, 2006, p. 317). In **Sweden**, municipalities – which are legally responsible for a broad range of basic services, among which, social services, roads, housing, primary and secondary education, water, and the reception of foreign refugees – have an important role in activation policy, mainly by activating unemployed recipients of social assistance (Bergmark & Minas, 2006). Discretion at local level is curtailed, though, through the regulative framework governing the work of the PES and the strong internalisation of norms by caseworkers, such as similar procedures for the categorisation of unemployed, that lead to largely similar practices across municipalities (Hollertz, 2016).

1.2 Time frame

The time frame chosen for data collection were yearly observations over the period 1970 to 2016 (i.e., 47 years). In environmental policy, 1970 was not only the first ‘European Year of Nature Protection’ but also marks the beginning of a new period of government intervention with environmental and nature protection policies (Bogaert & Gersie, 2006, p. 115). The early 1970s also mark a shift in immigrant integration policy since at that time many governments started adopting integration policies while tightening political measures regarding visa, selection and restriction, and differentiating national legislations into different ‘channels of entry’ (Goñda et al., 2020, pp. 26-29).

Collecting data on PI reforms starting as early as 1970 allowed to empirically establish when exactly PI reforms started being adopted across countries and policies, and to set the starting date for the analysis accordingly, in order to cover the largest number of observations (Knill & Tosun, 2010, p. 214). Other researchers have already studied PI over long periods of time which has allowed them to focus on how shifts or stability of governance models (Persson et al., 2016) and the evolution of macro-level factors have impacted governments’ PI activity (Schmidt & Fleig, 2018; Trein & Maggetti, 2020) and to disentangle the causal mechanisms behind the adoption of PI reforms (Metz et al., 2020, p. 8).

Organisational researchers contend that if we want to study the consequences of organisational forms, we need research designs that cut across not only space but also time (Egeberg, 2012, p. 165; Vestlund, 2015). The lengthy time frame of the data collection also helps avoid censorship problems which are common in longitudinal studies of the organisation of the public bureaucracy (Peters & Hogwood, 1991; Rolland & Roness, 2011). To avoid left censorship (i.e., missing information on the “birth” of the organisation that leads to mis-comparisons of their trajectories), one needs information going back to the date when the studied organisations were created; to avoid middle censorship, data must be continuous (Peters & Hogwood, 1991, p. 88; Rolland & Roness, 2011, pp. 299-400). By collecting continuous data on a large time frame (1970-2016) and limiting the analysis to temporal sub-sample (1985-2014), I wanted to keep censorship at a minimum (Lewis, 2002; Carpenter & Lewis, 2004; Kuipers & Boin, 2005; Boin et al., 2010).

2 Operationalisation and datasets

2.1 PI reform activity

How can we establish the extent to which governments embrace policy integration or abstain from doing so? This question is important because the policy integration literature suffers from a dependent variable problem concerning not only the definition but also the measurement of policy integration (Jordan & Lenschow, 2010). Despite advances on the

former, efforts to operationalise PI for comparative analyses across different policies have remained few. This section details how PI was operationalised (2.1.1), how the dataset was compiled (2.1.2), and how the PI reform activity of cabinets was measured (2.1.3).

Operationalisation of PI measures

The literature provides several approaches to the operationalisation and measurement of PI in studies that compare across sectors. Previous studies have found policy integration difficult to measure as either a process, an output, or an outcome, and sometimes these dimensions are conflated. The early literature on policy integration drew on coordination scales to conceptualise the extent to which governments embraced PI, but without operationalising it empirically (Persson, 2004; Stead & Geerlings, 2005). Several studies operationalise PI as ‘policy coherence’ (e.g., Briassoulis, 2004, p. 16; Rayner & Howlett, 2009; Candel & Biesbroek, 2016) to the point that the latter has become central to the study of PI although its measurement “is understudied at best and highly controversial at worst” (Candel & Biesbroek, 2016, p. 221; see also May et al., 2006, p. 383). When measuring PI as an outcome, it is difficult to avoid conflating PI as an outcome with policy performance in general (Adelle & Russel, 2013). As a result, even in a field as established as EPI, Andrew Jordan and Andrea Lenschow (2010) deplore a “virtual absence of agreed yardsticks to measure the (...) integration achieved” (p. 155).

Similar to previous studies in the literatures on policy coordination (Sarapuu et al., 2014, pp. 264-265) and policy integration (e.g., Candel, 2017; Schmidt & Fleig, 2018; Trein & Maggetti, 2020; Maggetti & Trein, 2021; Trein & Ansell, 2021; Trein, Maggetti, et al., 2021), I defined PI policy outputs in environmental, immigration, and employment policy by defining the characteristics related to policy objectives or instruments that are individually sufficient for a policy measure to be considered as PI (cf. Chapter 2, section 1). Based on the identification and qualitative assessment of each of the policy outputs from the secondary literature and policy reports, a policy output was included into the count when comprising one or several of these characteristics. I include cabinets’ PI reforms as laid down in policy documents, i.e., enacted legislation such as public laws and regulations but also other public acts of a general scope for the respective policy field, such as program documents, white papers or high-level agreements. Since the research is interested in PI as an *output* of government decision-making and not precise levels of PI achieved as an *outcome*, a policy reform was coded as one reform event if it comprised multiple single policy measures (e.g., ‘umbrella laws’, reform packages). This is in contrast to studies that analyse PI contained in a legal framework through counts of specific policy instruments, whereby one policy document can contain several instruments (e.g., Bolognesi et al., 2021). Since this study is interested in policy adoption and not in policy implementation, enacted PI reforms were counted even if secondary literature or expert

interviews revealed that the reforms were not effectively implemented in practice (e.g., the *Austrian National Environmental Health Plan* of 1997, cf. OECD, 2003a, p. 136). An update of an existing PI measure was coded as a new reform if it entailed changes regarding PI. For instance, if a reform adds a new cross-sectoral instrument to an existing instrument mix, or transforms a non-binding measure into a compulsory one, it entails significant changes to PI and was therefore coded as a PI reform event.³⁵ The same is true for two subsequent reforms that focus on different aspects of the policy in question.³⁶

The operationalisation of governments' PI reform activity follows the literature on the policy process and agenda-setting that commonly resorts to law counts to gauge the legislative activity that political actors devote to specific policy issues (Breunig et al., 2019, pp. 305-307; Klüser, 2022, pp. 352-353). Similar approaches are also widespread in the PI literature (Schmidt & Fleig, 2018; Trein & Maggetti, 2020; Maggetti & Trein, 2021; Trein & Ansell, 2021; Trein, Maggetti, et al., 2021). They are useful if the objective is to grasp the extent to which individual cabinets' legislative and political responses to cross-cutting issues in environmental policy, immigration policy, and employment policy adopt a PI approach during a specific legislature. In spite of their widespread use (cf. above), enumerative measures of policy outputs entail measurement challenges when studying policies over an extended time period (Grant & Kelly, 2008). Kaplaner et al. (2023) measure PI as the number of references to other policy domains in policy documents but also caution that more general policy-making patterns such as the growing size of policy documents and the effects of policy accumulation (Adam et al., 2017) may lead to an increasing number of references over time. Other PI studies have addressed this issue by measuring the density of a policy (Schmidt & Fleig, 2018) or counting the policy instruments in place at a moment in time (Bolognesi et al., 2021).

Dataset

The operationalisation of policy integration reforms presented above has the advantage of being quantifiable and the events are observable and comparable across both countries and policy fields. Information was readily available through desk research and experts could be identified straightforwardly and contacted for support. The expectation that the dataset contains all the relevant reform events of the period under study thus seems reasonable. For

³⁵ As an example, the introduction of non-binding Environmental Impact Assessments in Germany (1975) that were later made mandatory for projects with potential impact on the environment (1990) were coded as two PI reform events in both 1975 and 1990.

³⁶ For instance, the Dutch *First* and *Second National Environmental Policy Plan* (*NEPP1* and *NEPP2*) were coded twice as two reform events because they focused on different aspects: the former focuses on the general shift towards integrated environmental legislation and planning built on the notion of sustainable development, while the latter concentrates on greater cooperation between actors in the implementation of *NEPP1* and introduced additional policies (Dalal-Clayton, 2013, Ch. 14).

each policy, the output of the data collection consisted in a descriptive reform count database that contains a general description of the provisions contained in the enacted measures, references to the legal texts establishing them, and the source of the data. Appendix A, Part I, contains the output of the data collection on PI reforms in the nine countries and three policies that are studied in this thesis.

In order to identify policy integration reforms,³⁷ a manual coding procedure was followed and several types of sources were triangulated. Manual coding procedures are predominant in the PI literature where measurement methods are often tailored to the specific policy sectors under study. Using content analysis (Mayring, 2000; Boréus & Bergström, 2017), we searched the empirical material for events that correspond to the operationalisation of PI reforms in each of the three policies. In a first step, reforms were identified from the secondary literature on the relevant policy areas and countries. In a second step, these data were complemented with the help of country and policy reports by the OECD and the European Commission, evaluations of specific policy programmes and administrative reforms, as well as parliamentary and legislative databases. In a third step, the data sheets for each country-policy were submitted to one or two country and policy specialists in order to verify the accuracy and completeness of the data.

For *environmental policy*, the sources used are the country chapters in the edited volumes by Jänicke and Weidner (1997a, 2002), Hanf and Jansen (1998a), Jordan and Liefferink (2004a) and Jordan and Lenschow (2008a), as well as the OECD's Environmental Performance Reviews. For *unemployment policy*, the sources used are the country chapters in the edited volumes by Clasen and Clegg (2011a), Kluge et al. (2007), Eichhorst, Kaufmann and Konle-Seidl (2008) and Lødemel and Moreira (2014). In addition, three databases were used: I relied heavily on the European Commission's LABREF database, which provides detailed descriptive information on labour market and welfare policy measures introduced in EU member states between 2000 and 2018 (Turrini et al., 2015; European Commission, 2021). The International Labour Organisation (ILO) compiles the NATLEX database that provides a comprehensive record of abstracts of legislation and relevant information of national labour, social security and related human rights laws for over 190 countries.³⁸ Finally, the INSPIRES research database also

³⁷ The data on PI reforms were compiled by the author and two colleagues, Stefano Assanti and Philipp Trein, as part of a research project conducted under the direction of Martino Maggetti between 2016 and 2020 that resulted in a novel and comprehensive dataset on policy integration reforms in nine countries and three policies. The research project has the title "When and why do governments integrate policy sectors? A comparative analysis of thirteen countries and four policy areas" and was funded by the Swiss National Science Foundation (SNSF) for the period of March 2016 to May 2020. The project systematically compares policy integration and administrative coordination reforms relative to four policy challenges (unemployment, public health, immigration and environmental protection) in 13 OECD countries (Australia, Austria, Belgium, Canada, France, Germany, Italy, Netherlands, New Zealand, Sweden, Switzerland, UK, USA) over the period 1980-2014.

³⁸ The NATLEX database is available via the ILO at https://www.ilo.org/dyn/natlex/natlex4.home?p_lang=en.

registers relevant legislation.³⁹ For *immigration policy*, the most useful data sources were the OECD's International Migration Outlook and the European Migration Network's working papers and yearly country fact sheets⁴⁰ for factual overviews of the policy developments in immigration policy; in addition, I made use of several comprehensive datasets on immigration and immigrant integration policy developments, such as the Migrant Integration Policy Index (MIPEX),⁴¹ CIVIX (Goodman, 2012), and data from the Immigration Policies in Comparison (IMPIC) project (Helbling et al., 2017).

Based on the operationalisation detailed above, data collection allowed to identify a total of 125 environmental PI reforms, 147 immigration PI reforms, and 156 employment PI reforms.

Measurement of governments' PI activity

Based on the reform counts, I operationalise governments' PI reform activity in a given year t_0 as the sum of the policy integration reforms adopted over a period of three years (t_0 to t_{+2}). As Chapter 1 outlined, governments' PI reform activity is performed within ministerial bureaucracies and takes shape through these ministries preparing, drafting, and steering a PI bill through the parliamentary process. Studies of policy formulation in ministerial bureaucracies indicate that ministries accompany a draft bill during a period of two to three years until its formal adoption (Martinais, 2010; Bonnaud & Martinais, 2014). Therefore, I measure governments' PI reform activity in a given year as the sum of the policy integration reforms adopted between the year in question and the two subsequent years.

The downside of this operationalisation is that policy measures are undoubtedly heterogeneous objects and vary in scope and impact, which is a problematic aspect of reform count data (Turrini et al., 2015, p. 7). The law count also creates a bias in favour of gradual reform strategies that take shape through several subsequent formal acts spread over time (Turrini et al., 2015). Governments may also adopt more PI reforms precisely because previous reforms have proven ineffective. Still, the analysis of programmatic statements, official strategies, and legislation allows to identify patterns of reform activity and agendas. These can be compared and subjected to a more fine-grained analysis to grasp the dynamics behind their adoption. Therefore, this operationalisation of PI as an output has conveniently been used in recent time-series analyses of PI (Schmidt & Fleig, 2018; Trein & Ansell, 2021; Trein, Maggetti, et al., 2021; Kaplaner et al., 2023).

³⁹ The Inspires database is available at <http://www.inspires-research.eu/>.

⁴⁰ The European Migration Network country fact sheets are available at https://ec.europa.eu/home-affairs/what-we-do/networks/european_migration_network/reports/factsheets_en.

⁴¹ The 2020 version of the Migrant Integration Policy Index is available at <https://www.mipex.eu>.

Given that comparative research designs that compare PI in different policies are still relatively new in PI research, and comparative operationalisations therefore rare, the next sections provide detailed accounts of how PI reforms were operationalised for each of the three policies.

2.2 Operationalisation of organisational configurations

Following a set-theoretic approach to organisational analysis (Fiss, 2007, 2011), the previous chapter conceptualised the ministerialisation of policy functions related to a specific policy challenge as an organisational configuration that consists in two dimensions: on the one hand, the concentration of the portfolio of policy functions, and on the other, the type of jurisdiction of the ministry that is mainly responsible for the policy challenge.

This section explains the steps through which this conceptualisation was operationalised for the data collection. First, I operationalised the two dimensions, portfolio concentration and types of ministries, based on previous studies. Second, I made this operationalisation applicable to each of the three policies. To do so, I inductively identified and catalogued the ministerial policy functions that the governments perform for each of the three policies in the nine countries during period under study, leading to a catalogue of policy functions for each of the three policies (cf. Chapter 2, section 3).

Portfolio concentration

To my knowledge, two studies in political science have previously operationalised measures of ministerial portfolio concentration.

Weale et al. (1996) measure the administrative concentration of environmental functions in governments as a relation of environmental functions to ministries. Their index takes a value of zero (no concentration) if there is no ministry for the Environment (disregarding environmental functions carried out by other ministry) and a value of 1 if all environmental functions are located in a ministry responsible exclusively for the Environment; it takes values in between if environmental functions are performed by other ministries and/or the ministry for the Environment performs functions for other policies (pp. 261-262). Contrary to these authors, I distinguish two dimensions that in my view are conflated in their scale: the concentration of the portfolio and the jurisdiction of the ministry (cf. Chapter 1, section 2.1).

In a recent conceptual and empirical advancement to the study of ministerial policy functions, Klüser and Breunig (2022) measure 'ministerial policy dominance' which they define as the extent to which ministries dominate a particular policy domain. They measure dominance by assessing how the legislative activity with respect to the policy domain is distributed between

ministries. These authors operationalise ministerial dominance as the ‘effective number of ministries’ that draft legislation on a policy issue, using the *Inverse Simpson Diversity Index*.

Based on these two texts, I measure the concentration of a portfolio of policy functions for, e.g., environmental policy, as the highest proportion of environmental policy functions located within one ministry relative to all environmental policy functions of that government. For instance, the concentration of the environmental portfolio in one government at a given point in time is measured as 0.5 if the ministry with most policy functions for environmental policy detains half of the government’s environmental policy functions.⁴² Variation on this condition is thus measured through a scale that ranges from 0 to 1, with 0 meaning complete fragmentation and 1 complete concentration of policy functions. Full concentration corresponds to a situation where all major policy functions relative to a policy challenge are vested in one ministry. A portfolio is rather concentrated if most policy functions are vested in one ministry but minor policy functions located in other ministries. A portfolio is (rather) fragmented if major policy functions are located in other ministries or two ministries share responsibility for the policy.

Types of ministries

Some scholars have previously conceptualised portfolio combinations. To my knowledge, there are two contributions in particular. The first is the study by Karen Hult (1987) mentioned above that conceptualises different types of organisational fusions based on the relation between the policies that are nested in the organisations. However, although the question whether these policies are substantively similar or not is key to her conceptualisation, she does not reveal her criteria for measuring the similarity of jurisdictions. The second study by Vilde Hernes (2021) measures ‘coupling’ through a dummy that distinguishes whether specific issues are coupled or decoupled within one ministry.

Here, I propose a two-step operationalisation of types of ministries based on the policies nested within them. First, I measure the span of the ministry’s jurisdiction, and second, I classify the relation between the policies that the ministry’s jurisdiction consists of as substantively related or unrelated. First, the span of a ministry’s jurisdiction is measured as

⁴² Contrary to Weale et al. (1996), I measure portfolio concentration as the proportion of policy functions that is located within the ministry mainly in charge of the policy; this needs not be a ministry specifically and exclusively dedicated to that policy, however (e.g., regarding the concentration of the environmental policy portfolio, it must not be a ministry specifically and exclusively dedicated to the Environment). Therefore, contrary to Weale et al. (1996), my measure acknowledges that concentration can be high even if there is no ministry specifically dedicated to the policy in question. For instance, in the case of the government of Germany prior to 1986, my measure finds that the concentration of environmental policy functions was high although environmental policy was mainly taken care of by the *ministry for the Interior* (cf. Appendix A.2), as several sources indicate (Müller, 1990; Pehle, 1998). In contrast, the measure by Weale et al. (1996) incorrectly ascertains that portfolio concentration was absent in that case, as the authors acknowledge themselves (p. 263).

the extent of the jurisdiction of the ministry that is mainly responsible for the policy challenge of interest. The measure is performed by counting the different policies within the ministry's jurisdiction on an open-ended scale of absolute values beginning with '1'. The value represents the number of policies the ministry is responsible for. The score '1' is attributed to 'single-issue' ministries, i.e., ministries that have functions only for the policy of interest. For each additional policy field, the score is increased by one. If a ministry is competent for one policy field and has some functions for a smaller area that does not amount to an entire policy field, the score is increased by 0.5. For example, the Australian *Department of Environment, Housing and Community Development* that was created in December 1975, has policy functions for environmental policy (1), urban and regional planning and development (2), housing and the building industry (3), as well as leisure and youth affairs (4). It received a score of '4' for these four policies. This score reflects the fact that this ministry was announced as a "large and important department" (Fraser, 1975, p. 3).

Second, the ministerial portfolio combination is measured qualitatively with regard to the relation between the policies that are nested within the jurisdiction. This means that the jurisdiction is assessed asking whether or not the policies are substantively related or not concerning their objectives, target groups, and instrument types.

Taken together, the two steps of the operationalisation lead to ask two subsequent questions:

- 1) Has the ministry competences for more than one policy sector?
- 2) If the ministry has competences for more than one policy sector, does it have policy competences for policy sectors that are substantively related?

If the first question is answered with 'no', then the ministry is a 'single-issue' ministry. If the first question is answered with 'yes', then the ministry is a 'combined' one. If the second question is then answered with 'yes', the ministry is a 'large' one; if it is answered with 'no', then the ministry is a 'garbage-can' ministry. If a ministry has competences for both adjacent and non-adjacent additional policy sectors, then the ministry is measured as a 'large' one because the definition of a 'large ministry' is met although there are both adjacent and non-adjacent policy functions.

Dataset on the ministerialisation of environment, immigration, and unemployment

In addition, this research makes use of a novel and comprehensive dataset on the ministerial organisation of policy functions for three policies – environment, immigration, unemployment – in the national governments of nine parliamentary democracies between 1970 and 2016. These data were compiled by the author between 2017 and 2020 as a complement to the research project mentioned above.

As outlined above (cf. Chapter 2, section 3.1), this dataset is based on formal structural analysis. To ascertain the horizontal organisation of the policy functions for each of the three policy challenges as exhaustively as possible,⁴³ I triangulated data sources including organisational decrees, attribution decrees, entries from parliamentary databases and archives, ministerial reports and organisational plans that attribute competences or create or organise ministries or their divisions. In a first step, I relied heavily on the *Political Data Yearbook* edited by the European Journal of Political Research⁴⁴ that covers all nine countries included in this study in order to identify the dates and chronologies of organisational events such as reorganisations and cabinet reshuffles that affected the organisational location of the policy functions in question. These data were complemented with detailed information on ministerial policy functions and organisational structure obtained from documentary sources such as ministries' activity reports (e.g., departmental performance overviews), reports by parliamentary commissions or watchdogs such as national auditors, and legislative acts retrieved through parliamentary databases, and even the relevant secondary literature. Whenever available, I used country-specific legislative databases in order to retrieve legislative acts that enacted reforms and presented organisational details.⁴⁵

As recommended by Rolland and Roness (2010, 2011), I used existing datasets compiled by other researchers to triangulate the data provided by the aforementioned sources and to cross-check coding decisions. The replication data provided by Sieberer et al. (2019) was used for triangulating data on the organisational structure of ministries in Austria, France, Germany, the Netherlands and Sweden. I used the dataset by Aklin and Urpelainen (2014) to cross-check the coding of ministerial competences of environmental ministries until 2009, and Hernes' (2020) Dataset on immigrant integration governance (DIIG) was used for the same purpose for immigration policy in six Western European countries (Austria, France, Germany, Netherlands, Sweden, UK) between 1997 and 2016. I also consulted the *Mutual Information System on Social Protection (MISSOC)* dataset that provides helpful charts that present the organisation of social protection for the years 2006 to 2016.⁴⁶

⁴³ MacCarthaigh and Roness (2012) find that "the quality of available data on the structure of state administrations is relatively poor and underdeveloped" (p. 774), which is a problem for scholars interested in state organisation (see also Rolland & Roness, 2011). While archival data on organisational structure is often unavailable or access is restricted (Bodiguel & Le Crom, 2007, p. 163), there is less secondary literature covering the most recent years. The quality and extent of the available primary data sources, such as archives, was also very unequal across countries.

⁴⁴ The Yearbook is available at <https://ejpr.onlinelibrary.wiley.com/journal/20478852>.

⁴⁵ Language constraints represented a disadvantage for data collection on several countries. For I do not read neither Dutch nor Swedish, data collection on the Netherlands and Sweden was limited to sources available in English.

⁴⁶ The MISSOC charts are available at <https://www.missoc.org/missoc-database/organisation/>.

The data were coded through an analysis of the formal organisational structure of the ministries and their divisions⁴⁷ from a functional viewpoint, i.e., in terms of the functions they perform related to the policy challenge of interest (Weale et al., 1996). Based on the coding scheme presented in Table 5, the output of the data collection for each country and policy consisted in a chronological table that breaks down the organisational structure with respect to the functions for the policy in question in as detailed and comprehensive a manner as possible. The dataset also provides the references to legal texts or other documentary or secondary literature sources used to retrieve the data.

The final dataset contains ministries' formal structure relative to the policy functions for environmental, immigration, and unemployment policy, in the national governments of the nine countries studied here over the period 1970 to 2016. This corresponds to a period of 47 years for each policy in each country, and a total of 1269 country-years for all countries and policies taken together. Appendix A, Part II, contains the output of this data collection.

Table 5: Coding scheme for the organisation of ministerial policy functions (example)

<i>Coding category</i>	<i>Explanation</i>
Years	Time period
Main ministry	Official title of the ministry that was primarily responsible for the policy challenge of interest
Environmental policy functions of the ministry	Policy functions of the main ministry related to the policy challenge of interest
Other policy functions of the ministry	Other policy functions of the ministry, both related and unrelated to the policy challenge of interest
Environmental policy functions of the other ministries	Other ministries' policy functions relative to the policy challenge of interest

2.3 Operationalisation of executive capacity

Following the conceptualisation of executive capacity as depending on three factors (cf. Chapter 1, section 2.3), i.e., 1) the distribution of agenda-setting power between a (coalition) government and parliament; 2) the vertical concentration of power within the national

⁴⁷ For the sake of homogeneity, I use the term "division" to refer to the units at the highest organisational level of a ministry. This term translates, e.g., the German "Abteilung" and the French "Direction" or "Direction Générale".

setting; and 3) the extent to which supranational bodies detain formalised agenda-setting power, I operationalised this condition as follows.

The distribution of agenda-setting power between a (coalition) government and parliament was measured through the cabinet type based on the government’s status vis-à-vis the parliament, following Woldendorp, Keman and Budge (2000) who distinguish six types of cabinets (pp. 17-18):

1. Single Party Government: one party takes all government seats and has a parliamentary majority;
2. Minimal Winning Coalition: all participating parties are necessary to form a majority government;
3. Surplus Coalition: this comprises those coalition governments, which exceed the minimal-winning coalition criterion (i.e., one of the parties could leave and they would still have a majority);
4. Single Party Minority Government: the party in government does not possess a majority in Parliament;
5. Multi Party Minority Government: the parties in government do not possess a majority in Parliament;
6. Caretaker Government: the government formed is not intended to undertake any serious policy-making, but is only minding the shop temporarily.

The vertical concentration of power within the national setting is operationalised through the binary distinction between federal and unitary political systems (cf. Table 6).

Table 6: Federal and unitary political systems

<i>Federal political systems</i>	<i>Centralised political systems</i>
Australia	France
Austria	Netherlands
Canada	New Zealand
Germany	Sweden
	United Kingdom

Finally, supra-national agenda-setting is operationalised through a binary variable that codes whether a country in a given year is a member of the European Union (‘1’) or not (‘0’). Austria and Sweden both joined the EU as members on January 1st, 1995, and faced an *acquis communautaire* that they were required to adopt prior to joining. Jenny and Müller’s (2010)

study of the transposition process of the EU acquis into Austrian legislation shows that Austria started adapting its legal order to EU norms in 1992. Therefore, for both Austria and Sweden, I coded this variable as '1' from 1992 onwards.

2.4 Operationalisation of parties' policy preferences

Research into the ideological and issue preferences of political parties often relies on party manifestos (Dolezal et al., 2018). In advanced democracies, manifestos are prime outlets for parties to communicate their problem perceptions and hierarchies and influence their perception by voters (Budge, 1987, p. 18; Båtstrand, 2014, p. 934). Parties use manifestos in order to "communicate their interpretations of the current state of the world and their policy prescriptions to improve on it" (Dolezal et al., 2012, p. 869). Although they differ, for instance in length, manifestos are authoritative in collecting a compendium of valid party positions, defining a party's official position over contentious issues (Eder et al., 2017) and signalling which issues parties deem most relevant (Pollex & Berker, 2022), e.g. in an electoral context.

Ideological partisanship of the government

I operationalised the left-right dimension of government partisanship based on the left-right scale ('rile') contained in the Comparative Manifesto Project (CMP) database. The 'rile' scale is the most frequently used estimator for measuring the ideological left-right positions of political parties in the field of comparative politics (Laver & Garry, 2000, p. 620) and is generally assumed to provide reliable estimates (Hearl, 2001; Adams et al., 2004). CMP data contains content analytical variables that measure the self-ascribed policy positions of political parties through salience scores. Each content analytical variable indicates the share of quasi-sentences devoted to a particular issue category as a fraction of the overall number of allocated codes in an electoral manifesto (Lehmann et al., 2023).⁴⁸ The 'rile' score is calculated as the summed percentage of right emphases minus the summed percentages of left emphases in manifestos (Lehmann et al., 2023, p. 30). Its advantage is that it was constructed through a deductive approach that makes it suitable as an invariant general measure over time and space (Volkens et al., 2013) and has been validated for countries that have not experienced a communist past (Mölder, 2016).⁴⁹ More specifically, I use the government partisanship values that are contained in Seki and Williams' (2014) update of their Party Government data set because they fit with cabinets as unit of analysis.

⁴⁸ That is, a score of 5,4 indicates that 5,4 % of all substantive content of a particular manifesto was devoted to the issue in question. This approach to measuring parties' issue positions comes with conceptual and methodological challenges that have been outlined at length elsewhere (e.g., Ruedin & Morales, 2019).

⁴⁹ The 'rile' scale has been criticised, though (Gemenis, 2013), and alternative methods for coding party programmes have been developed (Castles & Mair, 1984; Gabel & Huber, 2000).

Issue salience

I operationalised the salience of environmental policy, unemployment policy, and immigrant integration policy as expressed through the governing parties' electoral manifestos using data from the CMP. Manifesto data measures parties' issue emphasis based on the salience of an issue in the electoral manifesto. Its advantage is the breadth of its coverage over time and across countries. For each policy, I selected the relevant indicators in the Manifesto codebook as follows.⁵⁰

Environmental policy: Following Carter (2013), I use two categories from the Manifesto data for operationalising the salience of environmental issues on governments' agendas: Favourable mentions of anti-growth economy and calls for an ecologically sustainable development, and opposition to growth that causes environmental harm (per416), as well as parties' references to policies that aim at environmental protection (per501):

+ per416 (anti-growth economy/SD) + per501 (environmental protection)

I added the two values in order to measure the salience of the environmental issue on a party's manifesto.

Immigration policy: The Manifesto coding scheme does not specifically measure the salience of immigration in parties' manifestos but bundles immigration into 'proxy categories' with other issues (Lehmann & Zobel, 2018; Ruedin & Morales, 2019). For this reason, Ruedin and Morales (2019) express doubt that these codes can reliably estimate the salience of the immigration issue on party manifestos. Alternative datasets such as the one by Lehmann and Zobel (2018) exist but their coverage over time and countries is more limited. Therefore, I decided to follow those immigration scholars who did measure parties' self-ascribed positions on immigration as reflected in the manifestos using the CMP data (Arzheimer & Carter, 2006; Meguid, 2008; Arzheimer, 2009; Alonso & Fonseca, 2012; Abou-Chadi, 2016a). I thus used the following CMP 'proxy' indicators on nationalism and multiculturalism in order to operationalise the salience of issues related to immigration on the agendas of cabinets: favourable and unfavourable mentions of a country's nation, appeals to patriotism and nationalism (per601 and per602), mentions of cultural diversity and plurality (per607) and the enforcement of cultural integration and appeals for cultural homogeneity (per608). Since I attempt to measure the salience of these issues on a cabinet's agenda (and not parties' rather positive or negative stance on nationalism/patriotism or multiculturalism), I add all these categories as follows:

⁵⁰ Brackets indicate the categories in the Manifesto dataset (Lehmann et al., 2023).

+ *per602 (national way of life: negative) + per601 (national way of life: positive) + per607 (multiculturalism positive) + per608 (multiculturalism: negative)*

Employment policy: To measure the salience of employment policy on the agendas of governing cabinets, I used the Manifesto indicators on welfare state expansion and limitation as well as positive and negative mentions of labour groups. I added the scores for favourable mentions in manifestos of welfare state expansion, i.e., the need to introduce, maintain or expand public social services and social security schemes (*per504*), welfare state limitation, i.e., limiting public expenditures on social services or social security and favourable mentions of private social insurances (*per505*), scores for positive and negative mentions of labour groups, the working class, as well as unemployed workers trade unions, more employment, good working conditions and fair wage (*per701* and *per702*):

+ *per504 (welfare state expansion) + per505 (welfare state limitation) + per701 (labour groups: positive) + per702 (labour groups: negative)*

As regards all the policies' measures, the individual party positions were aggregated into measures of cabinet positions on each issue. In single-party cabinets, the cabinet scores correspond to those of the governing party. In multi-party cabinets, I weighed each cabinet party's score according to its seat share as a proportion of the government's total seats in Parliament.⁵¹ For instance, a two-party government's position was calculated as follows:

$$posG = posP1 * seatsP1/seatsG + posP2 * seatsP2/seatsG$$

3 Qualitative Comparative Analysis (QCA)

This section presents the methodology used for the empirical analysis of this study, which proceeds through the methodological approach and techniques of Qualitative Comparative Analysis (QCA). QCA is the appropriate method for the study of complex causal configurations (section 3.1). For the purposes of the analysis, the longitudinal data were aggregated (section 3.2) and calibrated for both the conditions and the outcome (section 3.3). The final two sections present the analysis that includes the identification of necessary and sufficient (configurations of) conditions and the outcome (section 3.4), and is complemented with qualitative illustrations of cross-case patterns (section 3.5).

⁵¹ This corresponds to the method used by Haesebrouck and Van Immerseel (2020) to measure the 'executive ideological centre of gravity (ICGi)'.

3.1 QCA for the study of complex configurations

QCA is a configurational research approach and a technique that uses set theory, formal logic, and Boolean algebra to calibrate conditions and analyse truth tables with the aim to identify necessary and/or sufficient conditions or configurations (i.e., combinations of conditions) for an outcome (Amenta & Poulsen, 1994; Ragin, 2000, 2008; Fiss, 2007; Rihoux & Ragin, 2009; Berg-Schlosser et al., 2009; Mahoney et al., 2009; Schneider & Wagemann, 2012; Duşa, 2019; Oană et al., 2021). For the purpose of this study, QCA was chosen for several reasons.

Although the structure of the data would also support the use of regression techniques such as count models or survival models, the main reason why I privileged QCA over regression analysis is because the theoretical framework argues that the relationship between the organisational structure of government and policy outputs is characterised by complex relationships and arguments of necessity and sufficiency (cf. Chapter 1). QCA allows to address multiple conjunctural causation straightforwardly, which is “particularly important when it is likely, based on theory, that there are more ways than one to bring about the outcome or that the causal conditions combine in complex ways” (Vis, 2012, p. 190). Configurational theory assumes complex causality and non-linear relationships, whereby conditions “found to be causally related in one configuration may be unrelated or even inversely related in another” (Meyer et al., 1993, p. 1178). QCA is particularly suited for analysing causes-of-effects by identifying the minimally necessary and/or sufficient combinations of conditions that produce an outcome (Vis, 2012). QCA accommodates equifinality, i.e., it allows for multiple configurations of conditions to produce the same outcome. Conversely, the core assumptions about complex causality hardly play a role in regression analysis. If complex causation is central to the theoretical argument, the complex interactions between the variables cannot be tested adequately with interaction terms because the number of interaction effects that can be included in one analysis is limited (Amenta & Poulsen, 1996; Vis, 2012); higher-order interaction terms are difficult to interpret (Vis, 2012) and entail a linear functional form that might not necessarily be supported by the theory (Meuer & Rupietta, 2017).⁵²

The second reason behind the choice of QCA is that it is oriented towards the analysis of diversity, as opposed to methods of regression analysis that are geared towards the analysis of variance. For this reason, QCA is more suitable for comparisons *between* rather than *across* cases (Meuer & Rupietta, 2017; Beach & Kaas, 2020, p. 222). The analysis retains a strong orientation towards cases, which are conceived as combinations of attributes and can be

⁵² On a minor note, another likeable feature of QCA is that QCA methodologists have been very explicit about the restrictive assumptions that underlie QCA. Conversely, in regression analysis the underlying assumptions about causality (e.g., form of the function, exogeneity of omitted variables) are often implicit and routinely made and therefore not necessarily supported by evidence (Seawright, 2005; Radaelli & Wagemann, 2019).

differentiated into groups of cases (Haesebrouck & Thomann, 2022). In contrast, regression analyses typically aim to explain the effects of particular causes by estimating the average effect of one or more variables or interaction effects across a population of cases (Vis, 2012). The state of the art on PI research is ripe for the analysis of cross-case patterns as demonstrated by the recent resurgence of studies using QCA to analyse the conditions that are conducive to PI (e.g., Careja, 2011; Baulenas & Sotirov, 2020; Trein, Maggetti, et al., 2021; van Geet et al., 2021; Vogeler et al., 2022).

QCA is typically geared towards the analysis of a medium-sized set of cases selected with a particular purpose in mind because “an intimate knowledge of cases is a *sine qua non* for the interpretation of results” (Thiem, 2014, p. 491, citing Rihoux, 2003, p. 360). This allows for modest – or ‘contingent’ – generalisation under the condition that one specifies the empirical scope of the argument in congruence with the case selection rationale in order to ensure external validity (Thomann & Maggetti, 2020, pp. 365-367). Although the use of QCA for the analysis of a large number of cases in political science (but also beyond) has become more widespread in recent years (Thiem, 2014), the suitability of QCA for large-N analyses of a large number of cases is still open to debate. Some find that applying QCA to analyses of more than 50 cases creates challenges for the calibration of sets and weakens the case orientation of the analysis (Finn, 2022; Pagliarin et al., 2023). Others argue however that a larger number of cases may be considered as an advantage. In particular, a higher number of cases strengthens the diversity of the combinations of conditions that are represented by empirical cases and thus avoids problems commonly associated with limited diversity (Ragin & Sonnett, 2005, p. 180; Cooper & Glaesser, 2011; Greckhamer et al., 2013, p. 60; Thiem, 2022).⁵³ Arguably, this should be an advantage especially for condition-oriented approaches to inference from QCA (Thomann & Maggetti, 2020; Thomann et al., 2022).⁵⁴

Finally, QCA was chosen because it allows to identify cases that are typical for a causal relationship, as well as cases that deviate from it, and thereby informs the selection of cases for the subsequent exploration of cross-case patterns (cf. section 3.5) (Schneider, 2023). Deviant cases identified through QCA can be explored to identify additional factors at play that explain why these cases do not display the pattern of a path.

⁵³ Limited diversity in QCA denotes the presence of a high number of ‘logical remainders’, i.e., configurations of conditions in the truth table that correspond to no empirically observed case and thus cannot be associated with a positive or negative outcome based on empirical information.

⁵⁴ In addition, QCA methodologists have suggested solutions, including calibration techniques and the use of robustness tests, that allow to enhance the case orientation and strengthen the validity of large-N QCA analysis (Emmenegger et al., 2014).

3.2 Data aggregation

As outlined in the previous section, data collection covered nine countries and three policies over the period 1970 to 2016. I excluded the decade of the 1970s because PI reforms were rare during the 1970s; only 6.1 % of the PI reforms identified through the data collection were adopted in the period 1970 to 1980 (cf. Chapter 4, section 1).

Legislatures as unit of analysis

In order to use the longitudinal data with QCA, some level of aggregation is needed. Since the research question focuses on understanding the adoption of PI reforms by governments, governing cabinets are the unit of analysis. Reform count data was thus aggregated to the level of cabinets. That is, each country-policy constitutes several cases delimited temporally by both the presence of a specific governing cabinet and a specific organisational configuration of policy functions. Previous PI research has indeed shown that there can be substantial differences in the levels of PI adopted by subsequent governments (e.g., Kaplaner et al., 2023). Governing cabinets were identified and delimited based on legislatures. This means that if a reshuffle of a governing cabinet occurred in between elections, the “reshuffled” cabinet was not necessarily considered as a new cabinet if both the previous and the new cabinet derived from the same election and the partisanship values remained stable. This is true even if the reshuffle prompted a replacement of the head of government. In these cases, the two successive cabinets were considered as one, since they were similar on all conditions of interest. Conversely, if a qualitative change of the organisational configuration occurred during the mandate of a governing cabinet, I divided the cabinet into two cases. This was the case only once, regarding the Persson III cabinet that governed Sweden between October 2002 and October 2006: since the Persson III cabinet reorganised the ministry for the Environment mid-mandate in January 2005 (cf. Appendix A), which led to a qualitative change of the organisational configuration from a single-issue to a large ministry, this cabinet was divided into two cases (Persson III A and Persson III B). Aggregation of the data into governing cabinets as the unit of analysis resulted in a total of 224 cases nested in the nine countries and the three policies.

Time periods

Besides aggregating the data at the level of governing cabinets, I performed separate QCAs for each policy and two periods in time: the 1980s/1990s and the 2000s/2010s. Given the differences in organisational standards between both time periods (cf. Chapter 1, section 3.2), there may be differences in how the conditions combine with one another and are associated with the outcome in the 1980s/1990s on the one hand and the 2000s/2010s on the other. Performing separate QCAs for the two periods in time also implied setting different calibration

anchors for the two time periods (cf. this Chapter, section 3.3). By dividing the cases of each policy into two time periods, I integrated the temporal dimension of variation to a limited extent by exploring whether we can observe differences in the relationship between organisational and political conditions and the outcome between the two periods. Exploring temporal variations in the relationship between organisational configurations and policy output may also allow to single out (combinations of) conditions that are associated with the outcome in both various points in time, while other combinations may hold only for one of the periods. Combinations of conditions that are relevant parts of several solutions could be considered core conditions, while conditions that hold only for specific policies and points in time could be considered peripheral (Fiss, 2011). As Maggetti (2021) observes referring to Bartolini (1993), “in some cases, temporal variations can be considered even more important than spatial variations for explaining differences between countries or regions”. Some have suggested that performing two or more separate QCAs for different time periods and comparing the solutions allows to incorporate the temporal dimension into QCA (Fischer & Maggetti, 2017; Maggetti, 2021; Verweij & Vis, 2021) and others that it leads to evidence about the time consistency of the explanatory model (Maggetti & Levi-Faur, 2013).⁵⁵ Temporal variation is therefore part of the analysis to a limited extent through the comparison of the solution paths of the two time periods, 1980s and 1990s.

3.3 Calibration

In QCA, conditions are conceptualised in terms of set membership. For the purposes of the QCA, the data were transformed into set membership scores, a process called ‘calibration’ (Schneider & Wagemann, 2012). Most conditions of this study are represented in fuzzy-sets, i.e., sets whose membership scores can have any real value between ‘0’ and ‘1’ that convey a case’s degree of membership in a given set (Ragin, 2000, 2008). Fuzzy-sets allow for fine-grained measurement of differences between cases with partial (non)membership in a set. Calibration requires researchers to define thresholds for case membership in sets: for “ideal” cases located ‘fully in’ and ‘fully out’ of a set (Iannacci & Cordford, 2018), as well as for the cross-over point where cases are “neither in nor out” of the set. Thereby, calibration helps avoid that extreme values distort the outcome of the analysis, as they do in statistical analyses (Pennings, 2003, p. 551).

In QCA, calibration is the crucial step that articulates concepts and cases. In order to validly capture a concept with a set, the researcher needs to use theoretical and conceptual criteria external to the data, while taking the context of the research into account using the

⁵⁵ QCA methodologists have suggested different innovations for incorporating time as an empirical dimension of variation into QCA (Caren & Panofsky, 2005; Ragin & Strand, 2008; Hino, 2009; Garcia-Castro & Ariño, 2016; Fischer & Maggetti, 2017; Gerrits & Pagliarin, 2021; Maggetti, 2021; Verweij & Vis, 2021).

distribution of cases on the raw data. Calibration should be based on theoretical and substantive case knowledge and not be applied mechanically (Schneider & Wagemann, 2012, pp. 32-41; Oană et al., 2021, p. 47). This poses a challenge when QCA is applied to a large number of observations, as is the case here. A major point of criticism of large-N applications of QCA concerns the exclusive use of empirical features of the data for calibrating sets inductively (Hug, 2013), such as the use of the median for establishing the threshold of indifference. Such a calibration strategy would leave the set conceptually underdeveloped (Emmenegger et al., 2014). Still, calibration with percentiles can be an adequate strategy for calibrating continuous variables into set membership scores (Emmenegger et al., 2014, p. 15). Fischer (2015), for instance, inductively calibrate different conditions related to policy processes, such as the openness of policy venues. I follow such an inductive and iterative mode of reasoning to QCA that relies strongly on making sense of concepts via a dialogue with the data (Berg-Schlosser et al., 2009; Maggetti, 2009; Fischer, 2014; Thomann & Maggetti, 2020). However, empirical criteria must be substantiated by conceptual ones. Even if a large number of cases is analysed, researchers must be familiar with both the theory and the empirical data in order to establish valid qualitative anchors for set membership (Greckhamer et al., 2013, p. 58). The validity of QCA results critically depends on the qualitative position of all cases within or outside a set, and the truth table analysis is very sensitive to single cases and qualitative measurement errors (Seawright, 2005; Hug, 2013). In particular, the cases that are located close to the ‘threshold of indifference’ (also called ‘cross-over point’) that marks the qualitative difference in kind between membership and non-membership in a set, are critical for the internal validity of the calibration of fuzzy-sets.⁵⁶ Therefore, when an inductive calibration strategy is used, cases that are close to the cross-over point should be given particular attention and re-calibrated in light of the theory.

Some raw measures displayed more or less important differences across policies. This is the case in particular as regards the measurements of the conditions issue salience and portfolio concentration as well as of the outcome. Just like it would not make sense to use the same calibration thresholds for the set of “tall” persons when comparing the effects of tallness in the Netherlands and in Korea (Duşa, 2019, p. 77), differences between the three policies indicate that the sets must not be calibrated alike across policies. In line with good practice (Schneider & Wagemann, 2010; De Block & Vis, 2019), the following section discusses the

⁵⁶ Cases located exactly on this threshold obtain a membership score of 0.5 which means that the researcher is unable to determine whether a case is part of a set or not. The qualitative difference of locating a case within or outside a set has important consequences for the results. Conversely, quantitative differences on the same side of the point of ambiguity (such as allocating a score of 0.7 instead of 0.8) reportedly affect the results less (Emmenegger et al., 2014).

arguments that determined the calibration of the raw data on the outcome and the conditions.

Portfolio concentration

Portfolio concentration is operationalised as the proportion of these policy functions located within one ministry relative to the whole portfolio of policy functions for this challenge of a government (cf. Chapter 3, section 2.2). The condition 'CONC' is calibrated as a fuzzy-set whereby cases can have any real value between the two extreme anchor points of '1', which represents fully concentrated portfolios of policy functions, and '0', which represents fully fragmented portfolios of policy functions. In order to calibrate this set, I defined the three anchor points for inclusion in the set, cross-over (neither in nor out of the set), and exclusion of the set qualitatively for each policy. Based on the three anchor points, the set was calibrated with the direct calibration function of the SetMethods package in R (Oană & Schneider, 2018). Figure 1 in Appendix B displays the distribution of the raw scores of portfolio concentration for each of the three policies. The thresholds for each policy are explained in the following paragraphs.

For *environmental policy*, cases with a concentration measure ≥ 0.9 are fully in the set of concentrated portfolios, cases with measures ≥ 0.7 are rather in the set, and cases < 0.6 are fully out of the set of concentrated portfolios (i.e., they are fully fragmented).⁵⁷ A portfolio is (rather) concentrated (i.e., the cabinet is a case that is a member of the set 'concentrated portfolios') if it unites the policy functions for both the control of pollution and nature protection (cf. Chapter 3, section 3.2). Conversely, the portfolio is (rather) fragmented if a different ministry is in charge of nature protection (i.e., a non-member). Full membership in the set of 'concentrated' portfolios applied to cabinets with a measured concentration score of ≥ 0.9 . This applied to cabinets in different countries. For instance, the UK's DoE received a concentration measure (raw score) of 1.0 since its jurisdiction united all of the government's environmental policy functions (Jordan, 2002a). The German ministry for the Environment after 1986 was responsible for all environmental policy functions except for marine environmental protection, the environmental aspects of transport policy and plant protection (raw score of 0.9). In the case of France (2002-2016), only forestry policy could be identified as an environmental policy function of another ministry than the lead ministry for the

⁵⁷ This means that cases with raw scores above or equal to 0.9 are 'fully in' the set of concentrated portfolios, cases with raw scores between 0.9 and above or equal to 0.7 are 'rather in' the set of concentrated portfolios, cases with raw scores between 0.7 and above or equal to 0.6 are 'rather out' of the set of concentrated portfolios, and cases with a raw score below 0.6 are 'fully out' of the set of concentrated portfolios. Thanks to the fuzzy-set calibration, however, the fuzzy scores still reflect the differences between those cases with raw scores between the anchor points of 0.9 and 0.6 are not lost in calibration. Only the differences between those cases that are 'fully in' (i.e., with raw scores above 0.9) are 'lost', since all these cases receive a fuzzy score of '1'; the same is true for the cases with raw scores below 0.6, that are 'fully out' and thus all receive a fuzzy score of '0'.

environment. Partial membership in the set of ‘concentrated’ portfolios applied to cases with concentration measures between 0.7 and 0.9; for instance, in Australia before 2008, where policy functions for specific environmental media, e.g., water or forestry, are located within a different ministry than the ministry mainly responsible for environmental policy. Conversely, concentration measures between 0.6 and 0.7 correspond to ‘rather fragmented’ portfolios; this applies to Austrian cabinets before 1999 where nature and landscape protection were located in the *Ministry for Agriculture*, which was further responsible for the sectors forestry, water, and crop protection (Amann & Fischer-Kowalski, 2002, pp. 55-56). Full non-membership (calibrated score <0.6) applied to cabinets in New Zealand where policy functions for environmental policy, nature conservation and protection, national parks and wildlife, as well as sustainable development policy were scattered across various ministries.

The same thresholds as above were applied for *immigration policy*. A portfolio is concentrated if it brings together policy functions for both immigration regulation and immigrant integration; if different ministries are in charge of these two policy sectors, then the portfolio is fragmented (cf. Chapter 2, section 3.2). Full membership in the set of ‘concentrated’ portfolios applied to cabinets with a measured concentration score of ≥ 0.9 . This applied, for instance, to cabinets in the United Kingdom between 1970 and 2005, since all matters concerning immigration, integration, race relations and communities were clustered in the Home Office (Cerna & Wietholtz, 2011, p. 226), but also in Australia between 1976 and 1987 as well as between 2002 and 2013, where the policy functions relative to immigration regulation including refugees, nationality and naturalisation as well as post-arrival arrangements and migrant settlement, and multi-cultural affairs more generally, were all located within the same ministry. Partial membership in the set of ‘concentrated’ portfolios applied to cases with concentration measures between 0.7 and 0.9, meaning that parts of either immigration or immigrant integration policy is located within a different ministry. For instance, Australia between 1988 and 2001 had specific services for immigrants located within other ministries than the *Department of Immigration, Local Government and Ethnic Affairs* which was responsible for migration, citizenship, ethnic affairs, and post-arrival migrant arrangements. The calibration of cases located close to the cross-over point (0.7) is critical for internal validity. Slightly above the threshold are cases in Austria (1987-2013) and New Zealand (1970-2016). Both have parts of the competences for immigrant integration within the same ministry than immigration regulation: New Zealand’s minister of Immigration is responsible for settlement policy (but some policy functions, in particular language training for immigrants is located in other ministries); its Austrian counterpart was competent for the integration of recognised refugees, the integration commission and European integration policy (both the integration of asylum candidates is located elsewhere). Slightly below the threshold were cases in the United Kingdom between 2005 and 2009, since most parts of

immigrant integration policy were located within DCLG and not within the Home Office, which was responsible for immigration policy. Fully fragmented portfolios, finally, were present in the Netherlands for most of the period under investigation since the *Ministry for Justice* was charged with immigration regulation and control, the *Ministry for Social Affairs and Employment* responsible for the recruitment of foreign workers and family reunification policy, and additional integration policies for vulnerable groups were frequently handed back and forth between ministries (Entzinger, 1985; Bruquetas-Cellejo et al., 2011; Karré et al., 2013).

For *employment policy*, recall that a portfolio of employment policy functions is (rather) concentrated if it brings together policy functions for both labour market regulation and the compensation of unemployed persons; if different ministries are in charge of these two policy sectors, then the portfolio is (rather) fragmented (cf. Chapter 2, section 3.2). The thresholds differ slightly from the other policies in order to avoid skewed sets: cases with a concentration measure ≥ 0.95 are fully in the set of concentrated portfolios, cases with measures ≥ 0.75 are rather in the set, and cases ≤ 0.6 are fully out of the set of concentrated portfolios (i.e., fully fragmented). Full membership in the set of 'concentrated' portfolios applied to cabinets with a measured concentration score of ≥ 0.95 . This applied, for instance, to cabinets in Austria (2009-2013) onwards, where all competences for employment were fully concentrated, first within the Ministry for Economy and later within a social affairs ministry, and to Germany, where all aspects of unemployment policies were fully concentrated when unemployment assistance was transferred to BMAS in 1998. In Canada, responsibilities for the national employment service, employment and professional training, and the unemployment insurance were even concentrated within one ministry during the whole period under observation. Similarly, in the Netherlands, the social affairs ministry created in 1982 was competent for unemployment insurance as well as other forms of income support, but also the employment portfolio composed of labour market policy, employment assistance programmes and activation policy, labour relations and occupational health and safety. The cross-over point that distinguishes concentrated and fragmented portfolios qualitatively is set at a concentration measure of 0.75. Slightly above is Austria (1970-1999), where the *Federal Ministry for Social Administration* was responsible for all aspects of employment policy (job placement, measures for employment promotion and welfare of unemployed persons) that were located in the ministry's Social Policy section, but had only partial responsibility for labour market policy. Conversely cases in Germany, Sweden, and Australia, are slightly below the threshold: they have in common that the social benefits for unemployed persons were split between different ministries, with one ministry being responsible for unemployment insurance and another for unemployment assistance. Finally, a concentration measure of \leq

0.6 corresponds to fully fragmented portfolios. This applied, for instance, to cabinets in the United Kingdom (1984-2000) (0.5) and New Zealand (1985-1996).

Large ministries

The condition 'large ministry' (LARGE) conceptualises the set of ministries with jurisdictions that bring together functions for two or more policies that are substantively related to each other (cf. Chapter 1, section 2.1). In set theoretic terms, the set of 'large' ministries is a subset of the set of 'combined' ministries, since the latter comprise ministries with several unrelated policy functions also. In order to be 'in' the set of 'large' ministries, a ministry must have a jurisdiction of two or more policies and these policies must have substantive implications for one another. This condition is represented in a fuzzy-set whereby set membership scores convey a case's degree of membership in the set of cabinets where the ministry for the Environment, Immigration, or Employment respectively has an broad jurisdiction. I assume that from two policies onwards the minister will likely experience a span of control problem. I set the cross-over point at 1.7, which means that jurisdictions above this threshold qualify as 'in' and all those below as 'out' of the set; the exclusion score is set at 1.1 (i.e., single-issue ministries are fully out of the set), and the inclusion score at 2.5, meaning that jurisdictions for two policies plus one smaller issue are fully in the set of extensive jurisdictions.

Executive capacity

The condition 'executive capacity' (EXECDOM) was operationalised as depending on the cabinet type, i.e., the government's status vis-à-vis the parliament; the vertical concentration of power within the national setting; and the extent to which supranational bodies detain formalised agenda-setting power (cf. Chapter 3, section 2.3).

The cabinet type ('cabtype') was calibrated via a four-point fuzzy scale whereby single-party governments being fully in ('1'), surplus coalitions ('0.8') and minimal winning coalitions ('0.6') rather in the set but to different degrees; single and multi-party minority governments are fully out of the set ('0').⁵⁸ Vertical concentration of power ('vcp') within a political system was calibrated as a crisp-set whereby countries with federal systems receive the crisp score '0' and those with centralised systems receive the crisp score '1' (cf. Chapter 3, section 2.3). Similarly, supranational agenda-setting ('supra') did not need to be calibrated since the binary coding already attributed the crisp scores '1' and '0' to cases (cf. Chapter 3, section 2.3).

⁵⁸ Since caretaker government are not intended to undertake any serious policy-making, they were (theoretically) assigned the calibrated score of indifference ('0.5'), but in practice no care-taker government is included in the dataset.

Based on these three dimensions, the set 'EXECDOM' was calibrated through an additive scale that considers that a government dominates the legislative agenda, i.e., is the dominant agenda-setter, if at least two of the three dimensions are present:

- the government dominates vis-à-vis parliament AND the setting is centralised, OR
- the government dominates vis-à-vis parliament AND there is little supra-national influence, OR
- the government does not dominate vis-à-vis parliament, but the setting is centralized AND there is little supra-national influence.

Expressed in Boolean terms,⁵⁹


$$EXECDOM = (CABTYPE * SUPRA) + (CABTYPE * VCP) + (SUPRA * VCP)$$

Since the three sets 'cabtype', 'supra', and 'vcp' each have scores between 0 and 1, a calibrated score of '1' on 'EXECDOM' reflects that at least two dimensions are present. Hence, values ≥ 1 are calibrated as 'fully in'.⁶⁰

Ideological partisanship of the government

Government partisanship was calibrated as a fuzzy set whereby membership in the set indicates the presence of a right-leaning governing cabinet. More precisely, I calibrated two fuzzy sets: one called 'GOVR' that calibrates the right-left position of the entire cabinets (as measured by Seki and Williams, 2014), and another called 'HGOVR' that calibrates the right-

Figure 1: Distribution of the cases on the rile scale



⁵⁹ The Boolean OR is expressed with a '+' and the Boolean AND with a '*'.

⁶⁰ In the data, there are only three cabinets with a score superior to 1, all of which are nested in New Zealand.

left position of the leading party, i.e., the party that provides the head of government in a coalition. By implication, non-membership in the sets indicates that the cabinets are dominated by parties left of the centre ('~GOVR') and are headed by a person from a party at the left of the political centre ('~HGOVR'). Figure 1 displays the distribution of the cabinets on the rile-scale.

Both sets (GOVR and HGOVR) were calibrated in the same way. Since the 'rile' scale score is the summed percentage of right emphases minus the summed percentages of left emphases (Lehmann et al., 2023, p. 30), the raw score of zero, where neither right nor left emphases dominate, was set as the cross-over point. I further considered that if right emphases in the cabinet parties' manifestos dominate by ten percent or more, the cabinet is 'fully in' the set of right dominated cabinets ('GOVR' and 'HGOVR' respectively); conversely, if left emphases dominate by ten percent or more, the cabinet is 'fully out' of the set of right dominated cabinets (~GOVR and ~HGOVR respectively).

Issue salience

The different salience levels of the three policies in partisan manifestos displayed in Table 7 reflect that parties do not treat these issues in the same way. The environment and unemployment are commonly considered as valence issues, while immigration is not; further, parties mention issues related to (un)employment generally more often than issues related to the environment or immigration. The minimal values show that in all cabinets, at least one of the future governing parties mentioned issues related to employment; conversely, there are cabinets that did not mention environment or immigration even once in the manifestos.⁶¹ Therefore, issue salience was calibrated individually for each policy. In order to ensure comparability across policies, I used the median and the quartiles as anchor points.

Table 7: Summary statistics for issue salience

	Min	Max	Mean	Median	SD	Q1(25%)	Q3(75%)
Environmental policy	0	16.3	5.5	4.62	3.56	3.18	7.71
Immigration policy	0	12.2	2.4	2.25	1.72	0.715	3.38
Unemployment policy	1.94	36.4	11.3	5.23	9.78	7.615	14.475

⁶¹ The Key I cabinet that came to power in New Zealand in late 2008 did not mention environmental issues even once. There are even six cabinets from four different countries and across different decades that did not mention issues related to immigration even once.

As for the condition ideological partisanship, I calibrated two fuzzy sets, one based on the measure of the salience of the issue on the manifestos of the parties composing the government ('SALG'), and another based on the measure of the salience on the manifesto of the party that leads the government ('SALHG').

PI reform activity

To calibrate governments' high reform activity as a fuzzy set, a qualitative and two quantitative anchors needed to be defined. The former indicates the qualitative difference between the presence and absence of high PI activity, and the latter indicate the 'ideal' cases of governments that are either 'fully in' or 'fully out' of the set of governments with high PI reform activity.

The literature does not provide much guidance on these questions. Some studies compare PI reform activity across governments or countries by measuring the level of PI reform activity but do not discuss the operationalisation of 'high' PI reform activity (e.g., Trein & Ansell, 2021; Maggetti & Trein, 2021; Trein, Maggetti, et al., 2021). Trein, Maggetti, and Meyer (2021) calibrate 'high reform activity' with regard to PI using different anchor points that lead to three different models. Maggetti and Trein (2021) perform annual reform counts to analyse the 'intensity of PI reforms' in a country; their data reflect that while no PI reforms occurred in most countries and most of the years, the average annual reform activity in a given country remained lower than '1' for all policies and the whole period under study (pp. 9-11).

In the absence of theoretical guidance on the amount of PI reform activity that governments must pursue to be qualified as active PI reformers, I chose an inductive approach to calibrating the concept of high PI reform activity. The summary statistics in Table 8 reflect differences in the distribution of the outcome both between policies and over time. As regards the differences between policies, the ranges and standard deviations indicate that governments' reform activity for unemployment PI and for immigration PI has a higher dispersion than environmental PI, i.e., there is higher variation between cabinets with little and with high PI reform activity for unemployment PI and for immigration PI, whereas governments' PI reform activity as regards environmental policy is distributed more homogeneously. As regards the centrality, PI reform activity in immigration policy has a mean that is higher than the median, which indicates that the data is skewed to the right. Conversely, the distribution of governments' PI reform activity in both environmental policy and unemployment policy is lightly skewed to the left. As regards differences over time, in immigration policy for instance, it is evident that much more PI reforms were adopted during the 2000s and 2010s than during the two previous decades; therefore, for establishing which cabinets are actively pursuing PI reforms, the threshold for the 1980s and 1990s needed to be lower than that of the 2000s and 2010s.

Due to this unequal distribution, I chose to calibrate the outcome individually for each policy and both time periods (Duşa, 2019, p. 77). To establish the anchor points, I chose values around the quantiles (0-25% = fully out, 25%-50% = rather out, 50-75% = rather in, 75-100% = fully in). This means that governments who are among the 25% most active PI reformers *in this policy as compared to all other governments of the same time period* are ‘fully in’ the set of ‘active PI reformers’. I established the cross-over points at a place *above* the median where a gap in the raw values could be identified. I used the direct method for attributing fuzzy scores to cases to reflect continuous differences in degree.

Table 8: Summary statistics of the measures of the outcome

	Min	Max	Mean	Median	SD	Q1(25%)	Q3(75%)
<i>Environmental policy</i>							
1980s/90s	0	3.75	1.29	1.33	0.85	0.75	1.67
2000s/2010s	0	3.25	1.17	1	0.73	0.67	1.5
<i>Immigration policy</i>							
1980s/90s	0	2.75	0.84	0.67	0.73	0.33	1
2000s/2010s	0	4.33	1.93	1.67	1.15	1	3
<i>Unemployment policy</i>							
1980s/90s	0	4	1.38	1.5	0.91	0.67	2
2000s/2010s	0	4.5	1.73	1.88	1.08	0.75	2.27

Calibration – summary table

Table 9 summarises the operationalisation and calibration for all conditions as well as the outcome.

Table 9: Operationalisation, measurement, and calibration of the sets

Condition	Operationalisation and source	Calibration
<i>Ministerial configuration</i>		
CONC	Portfolio concentration measure (‘conc’) Continuous (0 to 1) Source: See Appendix A	Fuzzy set, continuous values Thresholds: - Environmental policy: exclusion 0.6, cross-over 0.7, inclusion 0.9 - Immigration policy: exclusion 0.6, cross-over 0.7, inclusion 0.9 - Unemployment policy: exclusion 0.6, cross-over 0.75, inclusion 0.95

LARGE	<p>Quantitative measure of the lead ministry's jurisdiction ('span') as a count of the different policies within the ministry's jurisdiction on an open-ended scale of continuous values beginning with '1'</p> <p>Continuous scale of integer values</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - 1 = 'single-issue' ministry - 2 = combined ministry with a jurisdiction composed of two policies - 3 = combined ministry with a jurisdiction composed of three policies - ... <p>Qualitative assessment of the relation between the policies within the ministry's jurisdiction on a nominal categorical scale of integer values</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - "1" = policies are related - "2" = policies are unrelated - "0" = n/a (jurisdiction composed of only one policy) <p>Source: See Appendix A</p>	<p>Four-point fuzzy set</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Span ≥ 2 & adjacency = yes \rightarrow '1' - Span ≥ 1.7 & < 2 & adjacency = yes \rightarrow '0.67' - Span < 1.7 & adjacency = yes \rightarrow '0.33' - Adjacency \neq yes \rightarrow '0'
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<i>Cabinet characteristics</i>		
GOVR	<p>Annual government value on the Manifesto variable rile ('rileG') measured on a continuous scale of absolute values.</p> <p>Source: Seki & Williams (2014) update of the Party government dataset</p> <p>Missing: 2015-2016; Austria 2014.</p>	<p>Denotes a case's degree of membership in the set of right-dominated cabinets.</p> <p>Fuzzy set, continuous values.</p> <p>Thresholds:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Exclusion: -10 \rightarrow fully out ('0') - Cross-over: 0 \rightarrow neither-nor ('0.5') - Inclusion: 10 \rightarrow fully in ('1')
HGOVR	<p>Annual value of the head of government's party on the Manifesto variable rile ('rilePM') measured on a continuous scale of absolute values.</p> <p>Source: Seki & Williams (2014) update of the Party government dataset</p> <p>Missing: 2015-2016; Austria 2014.</p>	<p>Denotes a case's degree of membership in the set of cabinets with a head of government from a right-dominated party.</p> <p>Fuzzy set, continuous values.</p> <p>Thresholds:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Exclusion: -10 \rightarrow fully out ('0') - Cross-over: 0 \rightarrow neither-nor ('0.5') - Inclusion: 10 \rightarrow fully in ('1')
cabtype	<p>Executive dominance of the legislative agenda as measured through Woldendorp et al.'s (2000) cabinet types based on government status ('tog'):</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - [1] Single-party government - [2] Minimal winning coalition - [3] Surplus coalitions - [4] Single Party Minority Government - [5] Multi Party Minority Government 	<p>Denotes a case's degree of membership in the set of cabinets that dominate the legislative agenda.</p> <p>Fuzzy set:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - [1] Single-party government \rightarrow fully in ('1') - [3] Surplus coalitions \rightarrow rather in ('0.8') - [2] Minimal winning coalition \rightarrow rather in ('0.6')

	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - [6] Care-taker government 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - [4] Single Party Minority Government → fully out ('0') - [5] Multi Party Minority Government → fully out ('0') - [6] Care-taker government → neither nor ('0.5')
vcp	Measure of the vertical concentration of power within the levels of a country's political system	Crisp-set: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Federal systems → out ('0') - Centralised systems → in ('1')
eu	Supranational agenda-setting as measured through a country's EU membership in a given year	Crisp-set: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - EU membership → in ('1') - No EU membership → out ('0')
EXECDOM	Executive capacity as composed of: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - cabinet types based on government status - centralisation of the political system at the national level - exemption from supra-national influence on the legislative agenda Additive index generated from <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - type of cabinet (cabtype) - the political system (vcp) - supra-national influence (eu) 	Fuzzy set: $EXECDOM = (cabtype * supra) + (cabtype * vcp) + (supra * vcp)$
SALG	Issue salience on governments' agendas as measured through the Manifesto scores of the government parties' electoral manifestos. Continuous scale of absolute values	Fuzzy-set, continuous values. Calibration separately for each policy. Data-guided calibration using the quantiles as anchors: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - 0-25% = fully out ('0') - 25%-50% = rather out - 50-75% = rather in - 75-100% = fully in ('1')
SALPM	Issue salience on the Prime Minister's agenda as measured through the Manifesto scores of the Prime Minister's party's electoral manifesto. Continuous scale of absolute values	Fuzzy-set, continuous values. Calibration separately for each policy. Data-guided calibration using the quantiles as anchors: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - 0-25% = fully out ('0') - 25%-50% = rather out - 50-75% = rather in - 75-100% = fully in ('1')
<i>Outcome</i>		
PIACT	A government's PI reform activity as measured as the sum of a governing cabinet's yearly PI activity, divided by the number of years of duration.	Fuzzy-set, continuous values. Calibration separately for each policy. Data-guided calibration using the quantiles as anchors: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - 0-25% = fully out ('0') - 25%-50% = rather out - 50-75% = rather in

3.4 Analyses of necessity and sufficiency

The analyses were performed by means of QCA within the R software environment, using R Studio and the packages 'QCA' and 'SetMethods' (Oană & Schneider, 2018; Duşa, 2019; Oană et al., 2021). For each of the three policies, two separate analyses were performed for two periods in time: a first analysis covering the cases that fall into the decades 1980 and 1990, and second the cases from the 2000s and 2010s. The final analyses incorporate five conditions, i.e., the truth tables consist of $2^5 = 32$ rows. Performing two or several QCAs and comparing the solutions is a strategy that has become increasingly popular over the recent years.

Analyses of necessity

The first step in a QCA is the analysis of necessity which allows to identify any condition whose presence is necessary for the outcome to occur; i.e., the outcome never occurs if the condition is absent. Analyses of necessity were performed for each of the three policies and two time periods. None of the analyses revealed any individually necessary conditions for neither the presence nor the absence of the outcome.⁶² In other words, none of the conditions is necessary for the outcome 'PIACT', i.e., governments that adopt a high number of policy integration reforms, in any of the three policies. The same is true for the absence of the outcome: none of the conditions included in the analyses is individually necessary for governments *not* to adopt a high number of policy integration reforms (absence of the outcome, \sim PIACT) in any of the three policies. Also, none of the analyses (of the presence or the absence of the outcome) revealed SUIN conditions, i.e., conditions that are sufficient but unnecessary parts of insufficient but necessary configurations (Mahoney et al., 2009, p. 126).

Truth table analyses

The second step consisted in the analysis of sufficiency by means of truth table analysis.⁶³ All six truth table analyses allowed to identify INUS causes. An INUS cause is defined as an "*insufficient but non-redundant part of an unnecessary but sufficient condition*" (Mackie, 1980, p. 62, italics in original, cited in Vis, 2012, p. 172). Truth table analysis requires the researcher to determine appropriate thresholds for consistency and coverage. Researchers

⁶² I applied a consistency threshold of 0.9 which is the standard for the analysis of necessity (Schneider & Wagemann, 2012, p. 143). The other cut-off values used are 0.6 for coverage and 0.6 for the Relevance of Necessity (RoN).

⁶³ In line with common practice, I set the threshold of PRI (Proportional reduction in inconsistency, at 0.51, since cases with a PRI below 0.5 indicate significant inconsistency).

often use a “conventional” threshold of consistency around 0.75. Schneider and Wagemann however emphasise that it is impossible to establish a single, universal consistency value (2012, p. 128) and that in settings with more cases the consistency threshold can be lower (2013, p. 127 f.). Therefore, I determined the consistency threshold that appeared appropriate individually for each truth table analysis in light of the consistency values of the individual truth table rows (cf. Appendix B). Conversely, the coverage of the sufficiency relation indicates how much of the entire outcome is “explained” by a causal condition or combination of conditions (Duşa, 2019, p. 136).⁶⁴ In situations of equifinality, i.e., several paths leading to the same outcome, comparing the coverage of the paths informs about their respective empirical relevance (Ragin, 2006, p. 299). When choosing the thresholds, I privileged higher consistency scores and avoided model ambiguity as far as possible, at the expense of lower coverage scores. The reason was to avoid overcomplexity which would have further complicated the comparison of the solutions. In other words, the consistency with which the arguments contained in the solutions explain the outcome was privileged over the solutions’ ability to explain a larger share of the empirical evidence.

Solution types

Each truth table analysis leads to a conservative and a most parsimonious solution, which differ in the level of detail at which they describe the combinations of conditions associated with the outcome (Glaesser, 2023). The details of the analyses can be found in Appendix B, which contains the raw scores, calibrated scores, truth tables, and the complete solution formula with parameters and plots for each of the analyses. The interpretation of the results focuses on the most parsimonious solution. The conditions of the most parsimonious solution are indispensable parts of sufficient combinations; in other words, the solution is sufficient for the outcome *only as long as* none of the conjuncts is taken away. The parsimonious solution can be interpreted causally because for each of its conjuncts there is empirical evidence at the cross-case level that it does make a difference to the outcome (Baumgartner, 2015; Haesebrouck, 2023). In focusing on the parsimonious solution, the analysis aims at substantively interpretable results (Thomann & Maggetti, 2020), that is, identifying “meaningful super- and/or subsets of the phenomenon to be explained” (Schneider, 2016, p. 2). Conversely, the conservative solution “removes conditions for which there is evidence that they are contextually irrelevant” (Haesebrouck, 2023, p. 17). The most parsimonious solution employs all possible statements (the so-called simplifying assumptions) about logical remainders that contribute to reducing the complexity of the solution term. This means that it uses any *unobserved* combinations of conditions and the outcome on which there is no

⁶⁴ In a sufficiency relation, raw coverage indicates how much of the outcome Y is explained by a set, while unique coverage measures how much of that explanation can be uniquely attributed to that set (Duşa, 2019, Ch. 6.4).

empirical evidence in the data, as long as they reduce the complexity of the solution term. Therefore, the drawback of the most parsimonious solution is that it typically entails difficult assumptions about the outcome, the plausibility of which should be discussed in the course of the research. As Glaesser (2023) notes, “[i]ncluding implausible assumptions increases the range of models. Especially in a research situation with little theoretical prior knowledge and little case knowledge, this may be useful so that it is possible to get a sense of the likely range within which the underlying causal model may be found” (p. 3495).

A much-used alternative to the most parsimonious solution is the intermediate solution, which distinguishes easy and difficult counterfactuals. In order to generate the intermediate solution, the researcher uses his/her theoretical and substantive knowledge for the formulation of directional expectations on logical remainders. This means that he/she associates those combinations of conditions (truth table rows) for which no empirical information is available with either the presence or the absence of the outcome based on theoretical arguments. Contrary to the parsimonious solution, the simplifying assumptions for the intermediate solution are thus carefully justified and derived from theory and counterfactual reasoning by the researcher (Schneider & Wagemann, 2012, 2013; Thomann & Maggetti, 2020; Glaesser, 2023). Therefore, the intermediate solution is best used when a “strong body of existing theory can provide a sound basis for the counterfactual reasoning” (Cooper & Glaesser, 2011) that is needed to derive clear-cut combinational expectations about the relationship between the conditions and the outcome for those combinations where no empirical evidence is contained in the cases. Such an established body of theory does not exist regarding the relationships studied here; instead, the research has a rather inductive purpose. For this reason, I disregarded the option of producing intermediate solutions, following instead the approach to the interpretation of the solution proposed by Tim Haesebrouck (2023) which is more in line with an inductive reasoning based on QCA.

3.5 Interpretation of cross-case patterns

The results of the truth table analyses are complemented with qualitative illustrations of typical, deviant, and unexplained cases that are clustered in the parsimonious solution terms. These focused cross-case illustrations aim at identifying “multiple-case narratives”, i.e., “common (bits of) narratives across several cases” (Rihoux & Lobe, 2009, p. 236) that strengthen the case orientation of the analysis (Rihoux et al., 2011; Thomann & Maggetti, 2020; Thomann et al., 2022) by making the complex configurations plausible theoretically and empirically (Bunge, 2004; Lieberman, 2005; Braumoeller, 2015). The illustrations are geared towards description and interpretation as fundamental building blocks of scientific understanding, which is appropriate when the goal is to explore relatively uncharted theoretical territory (Gerring, 2012). I analyse typical cases that provide illustrative evidence

on how the combinations of conditions work to produce the outcome as well as deviant cases and unexplained cases that hint at potential additional factors at play (Mahoney & Goertz, 2004; Rihoux & Lobe, 2009, p. 236; Greckhamer et al., 2013; Radaelli & Wagemann, 2019). In addition, in order to illustrate the influence of a particular condition, I compare typical and counterfactual cases, which are at the core of the logic of the configurational approach to causality (Ragin & Sonnett, 2005). When model ambiguity is present in a solution term, in line with good practice I present both models (Thiem, 2014) and examine the cases representing the paths more closely to determine which model describes the empirical evidence more accurately.

I privilege this form of enriching the analyses – through illustrations of how the conditions combine to produce the outcome – over a single full-fledged process-tracing case study because it allows to add qualitative evidence to the analyses of all three policies, instead of tracing causal mechanisms in one country-policy case only. While the literature of policy integration is already very rich in in-depth case studies focusing on specific policies or sectors (Trein et al., 2019), the current PI research agenda is much more turned towards the need for large-N and comparative studies that “move forward toward a cumulative analysis of existing case studies” (Trein, Biesbroek, et al., 2021, p. 974) and “allow testing some of the main mechanisms around policy integration” (Trein et al., 2023). By privileging multiple-case narratives over an in-depth case study, the analysis also aims at identifying similarities and differences across all three policies studies, which is in line with the current orientation of PI research towards more cross-sectional research that allows for the comparison of PI across policy sectors (Trein, Biesbroek, et al., 2021). In QCA, the back and forth between cross-case analysis and the examination of specific cases is essential to theory generation and refinement (Schneider, 2023).

Given the high number of cases, I mostly draw on qualitative evidence that can be obtained through desk research, i.e., from documentary sources and the secondary literature, but to a limited extent also make use of interviews that were carried out between 2017 and 2019 in the framework of this project.


CHAPTER 4: PRESENTATION OF THE DATA

This chapter is dedicated to presenting the data gathered in the course of this research from a descriptive, longitudinal perspective. The first section briefly displays the development of the absolute numbers of PI reforms in the nine countries and three policies under study. Given that this data has already inspired detailed descriptions and analyses in previous studies (Trein & Maggetti, 2020; Maggetti & Trein, 2021; Trein & Ansell, 2021; Trein, Maggetti & Meyer, 2021), the main focus of this chapter is on the original data gathered on the ministerial organisation. Section 2 thus provides a detailed description of the modes of ministerial organisation on both dimensions – the concentration of the portfolios and the types of ministries – for the three policies under study.

1 Data on PI reforms


Based on the conceptualisation and operationalisation of PI for the three policies, the data collection allowed to identify 426 PI reforms in environmental, unemployment and immigration policy that were adopted in the nine countries over the years 1970 to 2016. An absolute number of 125 PI reforms were identified in environmental policy, 145 in immigrant integration policy, and 156 in unemployment policy. Figure 2 displays the absolute number of yearly PI reforms contained in the dataset. It shows that from the mid-1980s onwards, governments adopted more PI reforms than during the previous decades. This mirrors Kaplaner, Knill and Steinebach (2023) who observed that the intersectionality of legal acts of the EU increased in the 1990s.

Figure 2: The evolution of PI reforms in three policies, 1970-2016



Source: own data, cf. Appendix A

Figure 3: PI reforms in environmental policy (1970-2016)




Source: own data, cf. Appendix A

displays the absolute numbers of yearly PI reforms in *environmental policy*. It confirms earlier comparative studies of EPI that found that although governments started intervening in environmental and nature protection policies as early as the late 1960s, most governments turned towards EPI only in the second half of the 1980s by adopting the first environmental policy plans (Steurer & Martinuzzi, 2005, p. 457) and strategies for sustainable development (Jacob & Volkery, 2004, p. 302) and by diversifying their mix of EPI instruments (Jacob et al., 2008, p. 42). For instance, in the Netherlands, environmental policy developed through sector-specific environmental legislation and local environmental planning during the 1970s (Coenen, 1998), but in the late 1970s, the sectoral approach to environmental policy came under criticism and was replaced with a new approach that put into practice the (internal) integration of the various issues of environmental policy during the 1980s: instead of sectors, environmental policy was now formulated according to themes, geographical areas, or target groups (Hanf & van de Gronden, 1998, p. 164). Case studies of EPI in countries across the world show that EPI increased since the 1990s (e.g., Kefeli et al., 2023).

Figure 4 displays the absolute numbers of yearly PI reforms in *immigration policy*. It shows that until the second half of the 1980s, PI in immigration policy remained marginal and that an increase in the absolute number of PI reforms set in from 1987 onwards. Between 1970 and 1986, the mean number of PI reforms adopted across countries is at 1.18, while in the


Figure 4: PI reforms in immigration policy (1970-2016)



Source: own data, cf. Appendix A

subsequent period between 1987 and 1994, it increased to 2.5. Finally, Figure 5 displays the absolute numbers of yearly PI reforms in *employment policy*. It shows that until 1985, the PI approach to employment policy was almost completely absent in the countries under study, but from then on developed in a more stable and constant manner than PI in the two other policies.

Figure 5: PI reforms in employment policy (1970-2016)



Source: own data, cf. Appendix A


2 Ministerial organisation

How did governments organise their sectoral policy functions over the past decades? The data set contains data on ministries for the Environment for a total of 396 years, and on ministries for Employment and for Immigration during a total of 421 years each. This empirical section presents the results of descriptive and correlational analyses of the organisational configurations in environmental, immigration, and unemployment policy over the years 1970 to 2016. The organisational set-ups that were adopted by governments differed between countries, and also evolved over time.

2.1 Portfolio concentration

The longitudinal data show that when taking the observations on the three policies together, we can observe a striking trend in the organisation of national governments' portfolios for sectoral policies towards the concentration of these portfolios: over time, more governments on more occasions opted for concentrating the competences for these policies within ministerial jurisdictions (Figure 6). A first phase can be observed between the start of the period under investigation and 1985. During this period, the shares of portfolios on the (rather) concentrated and on the (rather) fragmented sides of the portfolio concentration

Figure 6: Portfolio concentration, evolution in the three policies (1970-2016)



Source: own data, cf. Appendix A

scale were of approximately equal size (some small variations set aside). In the mid-1980s, however, the organisation of the ministerial portfolios for the three policies starts to diverge. The share of concentrated and rather concentrated portfolios taken together increased to around 60 %, while that of fragmented and rather fragmented portfolios decreased concomitantly. These shares remained stable throughout the 1990s. Starting in 1998, we can observe a steep increase in the concentration of portfolios that culminated in the years 2003 and 2004 with three out of four (74.0 %) portfolios being (rather) concentrated ones. Between 2005 and 2010, around 70 % (small yearly variations set aside) of the portfolios were on the concentrated side; within these, however, the share of fully concentrated increased further. The highest portfolio concentration is reached in 2013 when almost four out of five (77.8 %) portfolios were concentrated ones and 63.0 % of the portfolios were fully concentrated ones. In sum, over the decades between 1970 and 2016 there is a clear trend towards the concentration of these portfolios.

However, the three policies differ with regard to the frequencies with which countries opted for concentrated or fragmented ministerial portfolios. Table 10 shows that as regards the ministries for the Environment as well as Immigration, concentrated portfolios were the dominant mode of portfolio organisation, while fragmented portfolios dominated as regards ministries for Employment.

Table 10: The concentration of ministerial portfolios for environmental, immigration, and unemployment policy (1970-2016)

	Environment	Immigration	Unemployment	All
Concentrated	145 years (36.6 %)	151 years (35.9 %)	131 years (31.1 %)	427 years (34.5 %)
Rather concentrated	69 years (17.4 %)	98 years (23.3 %)	33 years (7.8 %)	200 years (16.2 %)
Rather fragmented	95 years (24.0 %)	26 years (6.2 %)	181 years (43.0 %)	302 years (24.4 %)
Fragmented	87 years (22.0 %)	146 years (34.7 %)	76 years (18.1 %)	309 years (25.0 %)
N	396 years	421 years	421 years	1238 years

Environmental policy functions

The data show that portfolios of ministries’ environmental policy functions were globally more often concentrated than fragmented during the period under study (Table 11). Taken together, concentrated and rather concentrated portfolios are present in 54.0 % of the years. In over one third of the years (36.6 %), environmental policy functions were fully concentrated

within one ministry. Conversely, rather fragmented (24.0 %) and fragmented portfolios (22.0 %) were each present in less than a quarter of the years under study.

Table 11: Environmental ministries: portfolio concentration (1970-2016)


Concentrated	Rather concentrated	Rather fragmented	Fragmented	N
69 years (17.4 %)	145 years (36.6 %)	95 years (24.0 %)	87 years (22.0 %)	396 years (100 %)

Figure 7 shows how the organisation of environmental policy functions in the national governments of the nine countries evolved between 1970 and 2016. It shows a strong trend towards the concentration of the portfolios of environmental policy functions over the decades. While governments with concentrated portfolios were the minority at the start of the period under investigation and until 1985, their share increased in particular in the late 1980s as well as the early 2000s; at the end of the period under investigation, two in three countries had organised the national portfolios of environmental policy functions in a concentrated manner.

The beginning of the period under investigation coincides with the formation of environmental policy as a policy field. As a consequence of an increasing public awareness of the problems of environmental pollution and the ensuing strong politicisation of environmental issues, most industrialised countries established new administrations for environmental protection starting in the late 1960s (Weale, 1992). At that time, different ministries started working on specific issues that would later become parts of the environment as a political category.⁶⁵ In several countries, environmental issues first emerged within the public health portfolio (e.g., Germany, Canada, Austria, Netherlands). For instance, the German Ministry of Health had developed some competences for water and air quality, noise abatement and waste disposal. In Canada, the *Occupational Health Division* of the *Department of National Health and Welfare (NHW)* began examining airborne contaminants in industrial settings and established a Canada-wide network of air sampling stations to collect information on air pollution in cities, and in 1969 received formal responsibility for the health aspects of air pollution and for the control of pollution emanating from federal facilities and NHW created a new division for air pollution (Powell & Wharton, 1982, p. 63). In Austria, emission protection was an early competence of the *Ministry for Social Affairs* that had established a division for air pollution as part of its portfolio for public health (Pesendorfer, 2007, p. 48). In

⁶⁵ Some antecedents can be traced back as early as the 19th century; e.g., the creation in 1865 of the world's first national pollution agency, the Alkali Inspectorate, in the United Kingdom (Weale, 1997, p. 91).

Figure 7: Environmental ministries: portfolio concentration (1970-2016)



Source: own data, cf. Appendix A

the Netherlands, the environment first appeared in the governments’ list of attributions as early as 1962 when the *Ministry of Social Affairs and Public Health* set up a Public Health Inspectorate responsible for environmental protection (Bressers & Plettenburg, 1997, p. 113). In other countries, policy functions were scattered over of a variety of government institutions, with some departments having responsibility for both the protection and exploitation of the resources under their control: for instance, the *New Zealand Forest Service* was responsible for protecting indigenous forest and also for converting native forest into commercial plantation forest. The governments of the Netherlands and Austria established ministries for Health and the Environment in 1970 and 1972, respectively. The Netherlands also created the *Directorate General for Environmental Protection (DGEP)* (Bressers & Plettenburg, 1997, p. 113) in 1970, during the term of office of the first minister for Public Health and Environmental Hygiene, as a central administration in charge of environmental policy functions. Sweden, which had small national administrations for nature conservation and for water and air pollution control already before 1960 (Lundqvist, 1998, p. 232; Lönnroth, 2010, p. 11), in 1967 established the *Swedish Environmental Protection Agency (SEPA)* that consolidated existing agencies in the field.

At the time of the creation of the ministries, environmental issues represented a rising public concern and electoral issue. When environmental issues settled on the agendas of Western governments in the 1960s and 1970s, governments responded organisationally by establishing organisations to take charge of these matters (Weale, 1992; Weale et al., 1996).

The Australian Gorton government announced its intention to establish a *Federal Office for the Environment* before the 1970 half-senate election, the Prime Minister citing mounting and justified concern in Australia at the risks of environmental pollution (Burnett, 2015, p. 4). In Canada, the late 1960s saw the birth of the modern environmental movement and a new attention to the issue of pollution. NGOs were created and grew rapidly, environmental publications launched, leading to a rise of environmental capacity (Paehlke, 2002, p. 126). In New Zealand, the government appoints the first minister for the Environment in 1971, at a time when environmental issues experienced an upsurge in media attention and became a political 'bandwagon' (Bührs, 2002b, p. 331).

Around 1970, Hanf and Jansen (1998b) observe, "the environment had been established as a political category" (p. 1) whereby various issues came to be recognised and (re)defined as pertaining to the environment. Although the timing of the establishment and development of the environment as a policy sector varied between the countries, all governments were faced with the question how to arrange the environment institutionally so as to ensure its protection is considered by other sectors (ibid.). This wave of institutionalisation of the environmental field in national governments around the year 1970 is reflected in Figure 7. Between 1970 and 1973, the number of ministries for the Environment established in the nine countries increased from three to eight. By 1974, all the countries under study, with the exception of Sweden, had established a government ministry with policy functions for the environment, consisting in both a cabinet position with political responsibility, as well as a national administration. Most of the initial environmental administrations were poorly funded. For instance, the DGEP was allocated very limited resources (Bressers & Plettenburg, 1997, p. 113). However, the consolidation of the environmental administrations also underlined the necessity of co-ordinating environmental policy within government, as in the Netherlands (Wolters, 2001, p. 43).

The way in which the new ministerial policy functions for the environment were organised within the national governments during the early 1970s varied. In particular, these organisational set-ups represented different degrees of concentration, among which fragmented portfolios predominated: out of the eight governments that institutionalised environmental portfolios in the early 1970s, five were on the fragmented and three on the concentrated side, and only one was fully concentrated. The only concentrated portfolio was created in the United Kingdom in 1970, where cabinets had put a stronger focus on the environment in the late 1960s (Russel & Jordan, 2008, p. 248) and in 1970, the incoming Heath cabinet established the *Department of Environment (DoE)* that unified all environmental policy functions that had previously been scattered across different ministries of government and also absorbed the Central Unit for Pollution Control from the Prime Minister's Office (Pollitt, 1984, p. 93). The rationale for this organisational concentration in one department

was to facilitate holistic policy problem-solving “as part of an attempt to establish a new style of government” promoted by the conservative Prime Minister Heath (Radcliffe, 1985, p. 201; Pollitt, 1984, p. 83 ff.). Thereby, the government claimed DoE reflected its determination to implement EPI with organisational means (Jordan, 2002b, p. 43).

In the 1980s, in most countries the policy functions for the environment remained fragmented between policy functions for the control and prevention of pollution, on the one hand, which became the core of the new environmental portfolios, and for nature protection and conservation on the other (e.g., Germany, Austria, Netherlands, New Zealand). Policy functions for the control and prevention of pollution often were organised along the lines of environmental media or ecosystems – water, air, soil, rivers – and sources and types of pollution – e.g., waste, noise, radiation. Policy functions for the management of individual natural resources, e.g. water management, were also often part of the environmental portfolio. In countries with fragmented portfolios, the ministries for Agriculture often continued to play a role. In several countries, they were responsible for the policy functions for nature and landscape protection and conservation (Germany, Austria, Netherlands). In the Netherlands, the DGEP with its competences for specific sectors (air, water, soil, waste, radiation, noise) and some more specific problem areas was part of the ministry for Agriculture during the 1970s, and the latter retained the policy functions for nature protection and conservation – later relabelled biodiversity policy – when the DGEP was split off in 1983.

In the Netherlands, Canada and New Zealand, policy functions for nature protection and conservation remained separate from the environmental portfolio during the whole period under study. New Zealand’s *Ministry for the Environment* in 1986 unified environmental responsibilities that were “scattered over of a variety of government institutions” (Taylor et al., 1997, p. 5), such as the Commission for the Environment, the *New Zealand Forest Service*, the *Department of Lands and Survey*, the *Ministry of Works and Development*, and the *Wildlife Service* of the *Department of Internal Affairs*. In this situation, Bührs (2002b) writes, “life was made very difficult, and at times even precarious, for the Commission for the Environment” and its influence was limited (p. 331). From 1984 onwards, the Labour government undertook reorganizations of the machinery of government (Boston, 1991), beginning in the area of environmental administration and later throughout the bureaucracy, with the stated primary aims being to improve the efficiency and accountability of government, and to rationalize government structure. The set-up chosen by New Zealand is unique among the countries, since in 1987 it set up two different new ministries, one uniting the policy functions for environmental policy and resource management as well as for most ecosystems (rivers, soil conservation, aquaculture) and types of pollution (protection of the ozone layer, waste, hazardous substances), and another with responsibility for nature conservation and protection as well as the management of specially protected areas. In Canada, *Environment*

Canada was created based on the existing *Department of Fisheries and Forestry* (whose minister became Minister for the Environment) that received the responsibilities for environmental issues that had belonged to the administrations of Meteorology and Wildlife. Within EC, a new *Environmental Protection Service* became responsible for environmental protection consisting in environmental policy, as well as sectoral policies related to air, water, and soil protection, renewable natural resources, wildlife, and the coordination of environmental policy across government. It also assumed responsibility for air pollution control legislation already under development by the *Department of National Health and Welfare* (Harrison, 1996, p. 70). Policy functions for natural resource management, national parks and marine protected areas, remained fragmented across a range of ministries (cf. Appendix B).

These first national organisational frameworks for environmental policy functions remained stable until the mid-1980s. In the second half of the 1980s, the overall pattern shifted towards the concentration of the portfolios: several governments reorganised their national framework for environmental policy and in so doing concentrated them further. This development was driven by the creation of ministries for the Environment in those three countries that had not yet done so: New Zealand, Germany, and Sweden. The governments of these countries created ministries for the Environment in 1986 (Germany, New Zealand) and 1987 (Sweden) and thereby further concentrated the portfolios for the environment in their national governments, in a move that was at least partly a response to the Chernobyl nuclear accident in early 1986. Weale et al. (1996) describe the creation of the stand-alone federal ministry for the Environment by the German federal government as “symbolic politics leading to substantial administrative change under pressure from an external event” (p. 264). The nuclear accident also contributed to the paradigm shift identified in Sweden’s environmental policy that rang in a second formative phase of the national organisational setting (Lönnroth, 2010, p. 11). When the Swedish government created the ministry for Energy and the Environment in 1986, its environmental divisions mirrored the structure of SEPA since they became responsible for the regulation for environmental protection, nature conservation, control of chemical products and waste management; as well as the management of natural resources, and radiation protection, control and the supervision of nuclear technology. In New Zealand, the creation of the first *Ministry for the Environment (MfE)* in 1986 was part of the Labour government’s “sweeping reorganizations of the machinery of government” that had the purpose of rationalising the structure of government and to achieve greater clarity of objectives (Bartlett, 1997, p. 162). International influences were important, especially the OECD’s 1981 review of New Zealand’s environmental policy that concluded that New Zealand’s environmental policies needed to be better advised and better coordinated, and that a more integrated approach was necessary in dealing with the environmental concerns

in energy, agriculture, forestry, mining and other economic development programmes (OECD, 1981). The Environment Act 1986 also established the role of a *Parliamentary Commissioner for the Environment* who should perform as a “watchdog” over the environmental administration from the national to the local level. Bührs found that the Commissioner played “a key role in enhancing integrative capacity” and that as “a ‘system guardian’ it [was] at least as important as the Ministry for the Environment in the further development of integrative capacity” (Bührs, 2002b, pp. 335 and 339). A year later, the Conservation Act 1987 established the *Department for Conservation* through a fusion of various government agencies, and gave it the mandate to be an “advocate for conservation, combining policy and management responsibilities” with responsibility for the protection of natural areas on publicly owned land, comprising almost twenty-three per cent of New Zealand (Bührs, 2002b, p. 335). The reforms thus consolidated environmental responsibilities within government into three organisations: the Ministry for the Environment, the Department of Conservation, and the Parliamentary Commissioner for the Environment (Taylor et al., 1997, p. 5).

As a consequence, by the start of the 1990s, the pattern had shifted slightly in favour of concentrated portfolios. While the majority of portfolios in 1985 were fragmented ones (62.5 %), this situation had reversed by 1990 with more than one in two governments having concentrated the portfolio for environmental policy (55.5 %). Again, this pattern remained stable for one decade: between 1990 and 2000, governments with concentrated portfolios outnumber those with fragmented portfolios by one. Another shift towards further concentration took place at the turn of the millennium, more precisely during the years 1999 and 2003. During those years, governments moved towards fully concentrated portfolios, while the share of both rather concentrated and rather fragmented portfolios decreased. In contrast to the trend, the fragmentation of the competences in New Zealand was accentuated when the Department of Prime Minister and Cabinet took over the lead for national sustainable development policy (OECD, 2007b, p. 108). As a consequence, the environmental portfolios of six out of the nine governments were on the concentrated side and even fully concentrated in five out of these (55.5 %). Taken together, this evolution nuances the statement by Lascoumes (2008) who stated that most of the time “the ministry for the Environment governs only a small part of the field that are allocated to it symbolically through its title” (p. 29, translation by the author). While the data confirms that the lion’s share of environmental functions was in the hands of other ministries during the earlier period, they also suggest that the portfolios have become significantly more concentrated over time.

Immigration policy functions

As regards immigration policy functions, Table 12 shows that portfolios were globally either fully concentrated or fully fragmented (each representing just over a third of the yearly case

data), and that while rather concentrated portfolios represent just under one fourth (23.3 %) of the yearly portfolio measures, rather fragmented portfolios were only very marginally present (6.2 %) in the data. Since these values are only an overall description of the period under investigation, we shall now investigate the temporal variance in how national governments organised the portfolios of immigration policy functions between the early 1970s and the mid-2010s.

Table 12: Immigration ministries: portfolio concentration (1970-2016)


Concentrated	Rather concentrated	Rather fragmented	Fragmented
151 years (35.9 %)	98 years (23.3 %)	26 years (6.2 %)	146 years (34.7 %)

Note: N = 421 years

In contrast to environmental policy, immigration policy functions had been institutionalised gradually as functions of governments over the centuries, and ministries with policy functions for immigration policy already existed in all nine countries at the beginning the 1970s (Hammar, 1985a). In the UK, for instance, the *Home Office* had been responsible for immigration policy since 1793. Other countries, among which Sweden, Australia, Canada and New Zealand, institutionalised policy functions for immigration in the wake of the second World War. Sweden created the *National Aliens Commission* as early as 1944 for immigrant questions concerning residence and work permits, deportations and aliens control (Hammar, 1985b, p. 45). In 1945, Australia established the *Department of Immigration* that took over the immigration functions of the Department of the Interior at a time when the government promoted an immigration policy under the concept ‘populate or perish’ (DIBP, n.d.). New Zealand, too, first established a *Minister for Immigration* in 1946 and institutionalised competences for immigration control within the Customs Service, but as early as 1951, these competences were moved to the *Department of Labour* – under whose successor they remain today – in a move that reflected the shift in the focus of immigration policy from managing colonial population growth to resolving short-term labour-market shortages during the post-war years (OECD, 2014a, p. 35). While immigration policy functions were institutionalised, not all governments had policy functions for immigrant integration, however. Yet, there is a similarity with environmental policy insofar as the organisational set-ups for national governments’ immigration policy functions in the different countries varied at the start of the period under investigation, and the pattern also evolved over time.

Figure 8 shows how the organisation of the portfolios of immigration policy functions evolved in the national governments between 1970 and 2016, all countries taken together. Similar to environmental policy, the overall evolution of the portfolio is in the direction of increased

Figure 8: Immigration ministries: portfolio concentration (1970-2016)



Source: own data, cf. Appendix A

concentration, but less strongly so: already at the beginning of the 1970s, concentrated portfolios predominate, and they remain in the dominant position (with the notable exception of the year 1993) during the whole period under investigation, with a movement however towards even stronger concentration.

Figure 8 reveals that there is a first period from the early 1970s until the second half of the 1980s during which most countries had concentrated portfolios for immigration and immigrant integration policy. This was the case in Australia, where the *Department of Immigration* had rapidly expanded its integration functions in the post-War years: it assumed control of the existing Adult Migrant English Programme and established a *Migrant Workers Accommodation Division* to administer the network of migrant hostels, developing strong relationships with the community and NGOs in the delivery of settlement services (DIBP, 2015, p. 31). In 1973, a dedicated *Settlement Services Branch* was created. This concentration was only shortly interrupted during the two years of Labour government in 1974-1975,⁶⁶ but as soon as late 1975, the ministry further expanded its structures for immigrant integration with the creation of a new ‘Ethnic Affairs’ wing for migrant settlement (DIBP, 2015, p. 54). New Zealand concentrated the policy functions for “the selection, transport, and accommodation of immigrants” within the *Department of Labour* through the 1954 *Labour Department Act*

⁶⁶ In 1974-1975, policy functions including settlement services were fragmented widely across ministries and the function now known as client visa services integrated into the *Department of Labour* (DIBP, 2015, p. 54) but these changes were reversed following another change of government in late 1975.

(McLintock, 1966). In 1969, Sweden replaced the *National Aliens Commission* with the *Swedish Immigration Board (SIV)* that became the central authority with the overall responsibility for the proper consideration of applications for visits, residence, asylum or nationality, as well as also being responsible for offering asylum seekers accommodation and occupation (Bergmark & Minas, 2006, p. 36; Hammar, 1985b, pp. 42 & 47). Canada's federal government established the *Department of Citizenship and Immigration (DCI)* in 1950, concentrating the policy functions for immigration and immigrant integration policy, but multiculturalism policy as part of the department's 'citizenship' branch was split off in 1965 when immigration policy became part of the *Department of Manpower and Immigration (DMI)* (Vineberg, 2012, pp. 24-25). In the UK, responsibilities for immigration as well as refugee integration, race relations and communities were clustered in the Home Office (Cerna & Wietholtz, 2011, p. 226). Immigrant integration, however, fell between several ministries' jurisdictions, and within the Home Office "had a marginal place with almost no budget attached" (Ali & Gidley, 2014, p. 5). In Austria, policy functions were rather fragmented between immigration regulation and foreigners' policy within the *Ministry for Social Affairs* on the one hand and the integration of refugees within the *Ministry of the Interior* on the other (Bauböck & Perchinig, 2006, p. 731). In France, the *Ministry of the Interior* controlled immigration policy; conversely, integration programmes were under the responsibility of the *Ministry of Social Affairs* since the creation of the *Directorate for population and migrations (DPM)* in 1965 which also operated the Social Action Funds, one for the main public institutions specialised in integration issues (Viet, 1998). The highest degree of portfolio fragmentation during this early period can be observed in the governments of both Germany and the Netherlands. The German government dissolved the *Ministry for Displaced Persons, Refugees and War Victims* in 1969 and distributed its policy functions to several ministries and the Federal Administrative Agency (BVA). On the one hand, policy functions for foreigners' policy were located within the Federal Chancellery, which also took over inter-ministerial coordination functions for this policy (Schneider, 2010, p. 125). In 1978, the government further created the position of a *Commissioner for Foreigners* with the aim of better coordinating immigrant integration policy both horizontally and vertically (Bendel, 2014, p. 2; Schneider, 2010, p. 128). The Commissioner's position within the *Federal Ministry of Labour and Social Affairs (BMAS)* perpetuated the fragmentation of the portfolio. In the Netherlands, policy functions for immigration and immigrant integration policy were highly fragmented between several ministries: immigration regulation and control on the one hand, the recruitment of foreigners and family reunification policy on the other, and targeted welfare policy for vulnerable groups on another still, were fragmented among three ministries. In 1979, a *Directorate for the Coordination of Minorities Policy* was created within the *Ministry of the Interior* with the mandate "to remind all other ministries of their particular responsibilities in this field and to harmonize basic policy guidelines" (Entzinger, 1985, p. 86).

Still, the other ministries remained fully responsible of their own domains (Entzinger, 2014, p. 62).

Between the second half of the 1980s and the mid-1990s, the general pattern shifted away from the dominance of concentrated portfolios. Governments tended to distribute parts of the portfolio more widely among ministries, a trend that culminated with only one country having a fully concentrated portfolio in 1992. Australia distributed some parts of the portfolio for immigration and integration policy to three different ministries as early as the late 1980s. Sweden fragmented the portfolio during the 1990s and replaced the *Minister for Immigration* with two ministers, one for Integration and one for Migration. In 1998, the Swedish Immigration Agency was split into two new agencies, too: the *Swedish Migration Agency* and the *Swedish Integration Agency*.⁶⁷ The governments of the other countries maintained the organisation of the portfolio intact, either on the concentrated side (Canada) or on the fragmented side (France, Germany, Netherlands). Austria is even an exception to this trend, however, since it enhanced the concentration of the portfolio slightly with the transfer of the competences of immigration and foreigners' policy to the *Ministry of the Interior*, which had already been responsible for refugees' integration via the Austrian Integration Fund (Bauböck, 2001, p. 256; Perchinig, 2010, pp. 13-18). This configuration, whereby other parts of immigrant integration policy were in the hands of other ministries, remained unchanged until 2014.

During the early 2000s, more countries turned towards concentrated portfolios again. The government of the Netherlands first sought to strengthen the coordination of integration policy in 2002 by creating the *Programme Ministry for Housing, Neighbourhoods and Integration* under the *Ministry of Housing, Spatial Planning and the Environment (VROM)*. Four years later, all aspects of the immigration and integration portfolio became concentrated under a *Minister without portfolio for Immigration, Integration and Asylum*. In a first move into this direction, Germany moved the BVA's and BMAS's competences for immigrant integration to the *Federal Agency for Migration and Refugees (BAMF)*. Kreienbrink (2013) demonstrates that this translated into two changes in particular (pp. 407-408): First, in addition to its immigration policy competences BAMF was now responsible for conceiving and defining policies for promoting immigrant integration (e.g., integration courses) and a new division for integration was created within BAMF for this purpose. Second, BAMF became responsible for coordinating information exchange on labour immigration policy between government bodies (in particular the Immigration Administration, the Labour Administration,

⁶⁷ The *Swedish Integration Agency* received responsibility for integration and the introduction of newly arrived immigrants; thereby, it "is responsible for disbursing the introduction allowance to municipalities and issuing general guidelines on integration, but implementation and direct responsibility for newly arrived immigrants is in the hands of the municipalities" (Lemaître, 2007, p. 15).

and the Foreign Office) and became the central point of contact for the coordination of the government's immigration policy at European level. BAMF also strengthened its capacities through creating a division for migration research in 2004 (Kreienbrink, 2013, p. 409). France, too, recentralised competences for immigration and integration within government from the mid-2000s onwards, by concentrating within the *Ministry for the Interior* tasks relative to visas, citizenship, asylum, and all the responsibilities of the DPM that had formerly belonged to the Social Affairs Ministry (Simon, 2012, p. 87). In parallel, the government created the *Agence nationale de l'accueil des étrangers et des migrations (ANAEM)* that replaced two former administrative bodies in charge of migration and integration and was directly supervised by the Ministry for the Interior. ANAEM became "the main administrative contact of recently arrived migrants", carrying out "all aspects of the accommodation and integration program individually with each migrant" (Safi, 2014, p. 22). As Simon (2012) notes, the transfer of prerogatives in particular for decisions relating to illegal residence and deportation procedures from the judiciary to the administrative authorities further consolidated this concentration (p. 87). In 2007, France created the *Ministry of Immigration, Integration, National Identity and co-development* that united three former ministries' policy functions for the management of migrant flows and the question of refugee rights, for border control and the naturalisation process, and for integration (Valluy, 2008; Burban, 2009; Ocak, 2015).

A striking tendency at the end of the period under observation consists in governments moving towards either fully concentrated or fully fragmented portfolios: in 2015, all but one country have either fully concentrated or fully fragmented portfolios. On the concentrated side, Australia's government fully concentrated the portfolio within the *Department of Immigration and Multicultural Affairs and Indigenous Affairs (DIMIA)* created in November 2001. New Zealand similarly concentrated the portfolio as a consequence of the 2004 *Settlement Strategy* when Immigration New Zealand became the government's lead agency for new migrant settlement, received funding to lead and coordinate settlement support, and established a settlement secretariat (NZ Controller and Auditor-General, 2013, p. 20).⁶⁸ In 2012, Immigration New Zealand was integrated into the *Ministry of Business, Innovation and Employment (MBIE)* that became responsible for 14 policies including economic development, social housing, science and innovation, tertiary education, and skill development and employment. The MBIE "manages all immigration-related activities at the government level" (OECD, 2014a, p. 40). Canada consolidated the concentration of the portfolio in 2008 with the transfer of the Multiculturalism portfolio from the *Department of Canadian Heritage* to CIC that "should provide new opportunities for improving coordination between the immigration,

⁶⁸ Based on the *Settlement Strategy*, the *Settlement Unit* within *Immigration New Zealand's Settlement, Protection, and Attraction Group* has the main responsibility for the settlement of new immigrants and leading the sector through its role leading and co-ordinating national and regional settlement strategies.

citizenship, and multiculturalism programs” (Vineberg, 2012, p. 63). In addition, in 2013 CIC received additional competences for passport matters as well as the *International Experience Canada* programme.

On the fragmented side, several governments moved further towards fragmenting the portfolio of immigration and immigrant integration policy between two or more ministries. In Sweden, the portfolio remained fragmented between a *Minister for Integration* (also responsible for Gender Equality between 2007 and 2010) whose area of responsibility included consumer affairs, democracy issues, gender equality, human rights, integration issues, metropolitan affairs, minority issues, NGOs and youth policy. The ministry was abolished again in 2011 (Emilsson, 2013, p. 300) and the position of the *Minister for Integration* moved first to the *Ministry for Employment*; in 2014, when the Löfven I government took office, the position was abolished completely and integration dealt with at the *Ministry for Labour*, while immigration was dealt with by the *Ministry for Justice*. The United Kingdom separated the competences for immigrant integration from those for immigration in 2006 when creating the *Department for Communities and Local Government (DCLG)* that received primary responsibility for integration policy and has been in charge of community cohesion and race relations (DCLG, 2008, p. 43). Upon its creation, it received units previously responsible for race and social cohesion from the *Home Office*, but the latter kept its responsibility for refugee integration policy, and a new specialised agency for refugee integration, the *Border and Immigration Agency* was created in 2007. DCLG unified the policy functions for “a comprehensive equality policy, including policies on race, faith, gender and sexual orientation tasks” as well as “the community policy function of the Home Office, which means that the CLG’s other responsibilities entail housing, local government, urban policy and neighbourhood renewal” (Cerna & Wietholtz, 2011, p. 226).

Australia reversed the portfolio concentration reported above when creating DIBP in 2013, since in parallel the policy functions for immigrant integration were most settlement and multicultural affairs programmes were transferred to the DHS. Similarly, the Austrian government fragmented the portfolio in 2014: While the *Ministry for the Interior* remained competent for migration and immigration policy, foreigners’ policy, and asylum policy, immigrant integration policy and international cooperation on refugee policy were transferred to the *Ministry for Europe, Integration, and the Exterior* (IOM & EMN, 2015, p. 38).

Employment policy functions

As regards the national governments’ employment policy functions, Table 13 reveals that most governments, most of the time, had concentrated portfolios of employment policy functions. All countries taken together, concentrated and rather concentrated portfolios were present in as much as 70.8 % of the years. Among these, fully concentrated portfolios

predominated, since they were present in 39.0 % of the years. Conversely, governments recurred to rather fragmented (18.0 %) and fully fragmented (11.2 %) portfolios much more marginally as regards unemployment policy than the two other policies under study. These values summarise the portfolio organisation in nine countries over 47 years. Similar to the other two policies, some temporal variance in how national governments organised the portfolios of unemployment policy functions between the early 1970s and the mid-2010s can therefore be expected.

Table 13: Employment ministries: portfolio concentration (1970-2016)


Concentrated	Rather concentrated	Rather fragmented	Fragmented
131 years (31.1 %)	33 years (7.8 %)	181 years (43.0 %)	76 years (18.1 %)

Note: N = 421 years

Ministries with competences for unemployment policy existed in all nine countries during the whole period under study. This is unsurprising given that most OECD member countries created ministries for labour related issues or functional equivalents as early as the first half of the 20th century (Rychly, 2013). In the second half of the 20th century, the role of the State in the regulation of the labour market expanded with new objectives of full employment, social security and better working and living conditions. Concomitantly, government functions in this field have increased and labour administrations administered growing portions of state budgets and more complex policy programs (Rychly, 2013).

Figure 9 shows how the concentration and fragmentation of competences for unemployment policy evolved over time between 1970 and 2016. It reveals two important insights. The first is that as regards the portfolio organisation of unemployment policy functions, we can observe a striking shift of the dominant mode of ministerialisation in the countries during the period under study. Recall that portfolio concentration means that policy functions for labour market regulation on the one hand and for the compensation of unemployed persons on the other are located within the same ministry. The second insight is that starting from on average a very low level of portfolio concentration at the start of the period under observation, the evolution of the national governments’ portfolios of policy functions for unemployment policy shows a clear and consistent trend over time towards an increased concentration within specific ministries. Within this overall trend, Figure 9 shows that three phases of the evolution of the portfolio across countries are distinguishable.

Figure 9: Employment ministries: portfolio concentration (1970-2016)



Source: own data, cf. Appendix A

A first phase lasts from the beginning of the observations in 1970 until the year 1981. During this phase, the portfolios of all governments but one (or two in 1974/75) were fully or rather fragmented. Among these, 'rather fragmented' portfolios were predominant, since they represent – with some variation between the years – between 44 % and 55 % of the countries' portfolios during that period. Recall that 'rather fragmented' portfolio means that most policy functions for either labour market regulation or the compensation of unemployed persons are located within different ministry than the ministry mainly responsible for employment. Among the fragmented portfolios, for instance, in New Zealand (1985-1996), the *Department of Labour (DoL)* was in charge of employment policy, the national employment service as well as labour laws and labour relations, while the *Department of Social Welfare (DSW)* was responsible for the payment of monetary benefits. In the United Kingdom (1970-2000) the policy functions for employment policy and services as well as benefits for working-age persons with qualifying employment records was with the *Department for Employment* (which became the *Department for Education and Employment (DfEE)* in 1995), while the overall responsibility for the payment of benefits was with the *Department of Social Security (DSS)*, formed in 1988 "as an integrated welfare-benefits ministry" (White & Dunleavy, 2010, p. 53). In Australia, the *Department for Employment* was responsible for developing employment policies, administering labour market activities and programs, as well as supervising the employment services market (OECD, 2001, pp. 90–91). In 1998, workplace relations became part of the same ministry (Nethercote, 1999). Meanwhile, the national social security system, which handled individual welfare transfers also for unemployment, was administered by the *Department of Social Security (DSS)* (Halligan, 2015, p. 1007), that also set definitions for

suitable work and applied work and job search tests (OECD, 2001, p. 75). In Sweden, where responsibility for labour market measures was highly centralised although the municipalities have an important role in activation policy, the *Swedish Labour Market Administration* was responsible for implementing labour market policy with the National Labour Market Board as its central authority. The *National Board of Health and Welfare*, located under the *Ministry of Health and Social Services*, supervises the social services, public health, disease prevention and health services. During this first period, the only countries with rather concentrated portfolios were Austria and France (cf. Appendix A).

In the early 1980s, a first timid shift towards more concentration of the portfolio of unemployment policy functions can be observed in several countries. The number of countries that preserved fully fragmented portfolios after 1981 declined to two, notably New Zealand and the United Kingdom. Conversely, some countries, notably France and the Netherlands, created fully concentrated portfolios. Along a similar line, New Zealand in the late 1980s undertook a restructuring and adopted a new management plan for the *Department of Social Welfare* that was centred on the activation of different clientele groups and should foster more integrated processes for benefits and active labour programmes (Garlick, 2012, p. 116). At the same time, it diminished the role and portfolio of the *Department of Labour*, which had been the government's prime means for regulating economic and social life since its foundation in the late 19th century and "perhaps the most powerful and all-embracing government body concerned with the 'labour problem'" and directed it to focus exclusively on core labour market functions (Martin, 1996). This shift towards portfolio concentration remained rather small overall, however, and was partly reversed in early 1990s.

Another shift, again towards increased concentration, occurred during the second half of the 1990s. This shift is very significant, since the number of countries where the governments' portfolios were concentrated increased threefold between 1995 and 2001 and remained at that level with only small variations during the 2000s and 2010s. During this period, two in three countries shifted towards full concentration. In Germany, the *Federal Ministry for Employment and Social Affairs (BMAS)* had united the federal competences for employment promotion, employment insurance and assistance, as well as social insurances, since 1957; these were separate, however, from competences for the social assistance for long-term unemployed persons, which had always been part of the ministry for Health's jurisdiction (Hoffmann, 2003, p. 289). This division reflected the traditional two-tiered structure of the German unemployment benefits system (Champion, 2013, p. 126). In 1994, following criticism of the Federal Employment Agency's inefficient and inflexible modes of operation, an internal reorganisation fused the agency's divisions for benefit administration and employment services, in order to pre-empt calls for a split into two separate organisations (Schiller, 2016, p. 156). In 1998, the policy functions for social assistance were transferred from the ministry


for Health to BMAS (Schiller, 2010). In the United Kingdom, the creation of the *Department of Work and Pensions (DWP)* in 2001 concentrated the portfolio for labour market policy and employment programmes as well as unemployment benefits and income support (Wiggin, 2007; OECD, 2014d, p. 46). In 1998, New Zealand established the *Department of Work and Income (WINZ)* through “one of the largest processes of organisational change in the history of the New Zealand public sector” (Garlick, 2012, p. 211). WINZ integrated the decisions on income support with the administration of reciprocal obligations and the provision of employment assistance, with an unprecedented emphasis on employment obligations (OECD, 1999, pp. 55-56; Garlick, 2012, p. 207). In a second move, in 2001 it established the *Ministry of Social Development (MSD)* that fused WINZ with the *Ministry of Social Policy*, which focused more on policy and research functions (Garlick, 2012, p. 87). In 2001, the amalgamation of both WINZ and MSP creates the *Ministry of Social Development (MSD)* that fully concentrated competences for unemployment policy, ushering in “a comparatively settled era of welfare administration” (Garlick, 2012, p. 19).

Conversely, during the latter two decades, Australia, Austria (until 2008), France (after 2007), and Sweden – and Canada in 2004/05 (cf. Appendix A) – had rather or fully fragmented portfolios of unemployment policy functions (44.4 %). Among the countries with concentrated portfolios, fully concentrated portfolios were plainly dominant. All in all, during the last phase starting in 2001, the dominant mode of portfolio organisation in unemployment policy is one of completely concentrated portfolios (67 %). A notable exception from the general pattern of portfolio concentration is Australia, where the policy functions for employment on the one hand and income security, including unemployment assistance, on the other hand, remained fragmented during the whole period under study. This is even more surprising given the significant large-scale reorganisations that modified the organisation of the Australian government especially during the 2000s with the creation of Centrelink in 2004 and the subsequent creation of the *Department for Human Services (DHS)* (Halligan, 2004, 2015; Halligan & Wills, 2008). With the creation of the *Department of Education, Employment and Workplace Relations (DEEWR)* in late 2007, the responsibility for income support policies and programs for people of working age became part of this ministry’s jurisdiction, while Education and Training were also added. Other social transfers and income support policy were in the realm of a separate ministry, FaHCSIA, while DHS delivered all payments and social services to families and individuals through its Centrelink programme (OECD, 2012c, p. 63).

2.2 Types of ministries

Based on the distinction between three types of ministries – single-issue, garbage-can, and large ministries – we can now explore the second dimension of the ministerial organisation of sectoral policy functions in national governments, i.e., the question with which other policies

Figure 10: Types of ministries, evolution in the three policies (1970-2016)



Source: own data, cf. Appendix A

the policy functions for the environment, immigration, and unemployment, respectively, were combined within ministerial jurisdictions.

Taking the three policies together, governments have tended to move away from “garbage-can” combinations of these policies with other un-related policies, and instead tended to privilege either siloed ministries with policy functions for a single issue or “large” ministries that combine these policies with substantively related ones. Differences between policies notwithstanding, the latter type of ministry is the overall dominant one in the sample. Figure 10 shows that during the whole period under study, large ministries were the most frequently used type of ministry when taking the three policies together. Conversely, garbage-can ministries have become less prominent over time: they were used most in the mid-1970s, but have been in decline both during the late 1970s and early 1980s as well as during the late 2000s. They were the least used type of ministry at the end of the period under investigation, with only four garbage-can ministries present across all countries and policies. In contrast, single-issue ministries gained in prominence over the decades. While they were the least used type of ministry during most of the 1970s and 1980s, they rose to prominence in the early 1990s and their number has remained stable since.

Table 14 displays the number of years that each of the types of ministries were present in each of the policies, as well as in all three policies taken together. It shows that large ministries were the most frequent mode of ministerial organisation in the three policies taken together. Almost half (45.0 %) of all ministries contained in the data set were large ones. The same is true for both immigration policy and unemployment policy individually, where large ministries were present in 44.9 % and 49.6 % of the years respectively. Environmental policy deviates

from the general pattern since although large ministries were also very present (40.4 %), the dominant most of ministerialisation of environmental policy were single-issue ministries (45.7 %). Conversely, single-issue ministries were the least present in the other two policies, with only 15.9 % and 20.0 % respectively. Overall, this seems to suggest that governments’ organisational choices with respect to the ministerialisation of the policy functions for immigration and unemployment tend to be more similar than as regards the policy functions for the environment.

Table 14: Types of ministries for the Environment, Immigration, and Unemployment (1970-2016)

	Environmental policy	Immigration policy	Unemployment policy	All
Single-issue	181 years (45.7 %)	67 years (15.9 %)	84 years (20.0 %)	332 years (26.8 %)
Garbage-can	55 years (13.9 %)	165 years (39.2 %)	128 years (30.4 %)	348 years (28.1 %)
Large	160 years (40.4 %)	189 years (44.9 %)	209 years (49.6 %)	558 years (45.0 %)
N	396 years	421 years	421 years	1238

Ministries for the Environment


Table 15 shows that single-issue ministries for the Environment were the organisational option most governments chose for organising ministries’ environmental policy functions: they were present in 181 years, which corresponds to 45.7 % of the country-years. The second most frequent type of ministry are large ministries, which were present in 160 years, or 40.4 % of the of the country-years. Conversely, garbage-can ministries were the organisational option that governments chose the least often for organising environmental policy functions, given that they were present in only 13.9 % of the country-years under study.

Table 15: Environmental ministries: types of ministries (1970-2016)

Single-issue	Garbage-can	Large	N
181 years (45.7 %)	55 years (13.9 %)	160 years (40.4 %)	396 years (100 %)

The overall evolution of the types of ministries for the Environment over the period 1970 to 2016 is pictured in Figure 11. Most governments had established ministries for the Environment around 1973. By 1976, one in two governments had established large ministries for the Environment, which were predominant until 1980. The governments of Australia, Canada, and New Zealand chose a sectoral, or single-issue, organisational set-up for the

Figure 11: Environmental ministries: types of ministries (1970-2016)



Source: own data, cf. Appendix A

governments' environmental policy functions. The federal government of Canada created *Environment Canada* (EC) and an *Environmental Protection Service* in 1971. The federal government of Australia, citing mounting and justified concern at the risks of environmental pollution (Burnett, 2015, p. 4), first announced its intention to establish a Federal Office for the Environment before the 1970 half-senate election, but created the first *Department for Environment and Conservation* (DEC) in late 1972. In the same year, the government of New Zealand appointed the first minister and set up the *Commission for the Environment* as what Bührs (2002b) calls a “de facto” government department (p. 331).

Other governments consolidated environmental policy functions in the early 1970s within combined ministerial jurisdictions. Three options were retained in the countries under study: the combination of the environment and various related policy sectors in a “large” ministry (United Kingdom); the combination of the environment with health policy (Netherlands, Austria); and the integration of the environment into the ministry for the Interior (Germany). In the Netherlands, environmental policy was a limited activity within the policy area of the *Ministry of Social Affairs and Public Health* before becoming formally institutionalized as a task of the national government in 1970.

During the 1980s, governments slowly but surely shifted towards single-issue ministries. In 1990, five out of the nine countries had established single-issue ministries for the Environment, while the remaining four countries combined environmental issues either in garbage-can or in large ministries. During the 1990s, the share of single-issue ministries remained stable and predominant; among the combined ministries, governments turned

towards large ministries, while garbage-can ministries were more marginal. Australian governments are those that recurred to garbage-can ministries the most, by integrating the environment into an ever-larger jurisdiction with science and research.⁶⁹ In 2000, most (five out of nine) countries had single-issue ministries, and the remaining ones had large ministries. Conversely, governments turned definitively away from garbage can ministries, which disappear from the graph in Figure 11 except for a short reappearance in one country between 2008 and 2010. Instead, most governments turned towards large ministries, which slowly but surely became the predominant type of ministry for environmental policy. At the end of the period under observation, two in three governments (66.6 %) had combined the policy functions for environmental policy within large ministries for the Environment; in the other countries, environmental policy functions were organised within single-issue ministries.

Table 16 gives an overview of the presence of the different types of ministries in each of the countries. Single-issue ministries for the Environment were present during the whole period under study, and six out of the nine countries at some point of time had a ministry with a single-issue jurisdiction that consists of environmental policy only. Exceptions are Austria, the Netherlands, and the United Kingdom, which never had single-issue ministries for the Environment. On the other extreme, Canada and New Zealand only had single-issue ministries for the Environment and never combined environmental policy competences with any other policy field. The single-issue ministry has also prevailed for most of the time in Germany and Sweden. Large ministries for the Environment were likewise present during the whole period under study. Seven out of the nine countries had a large ministry for the Environment at some point in time, i.e., all countries with the exceptions of Canada and New Zealand, i.e., those two countries that had a stable single-issue during the whole period under study. Conversely, two countries – the Netherlands and the UK – had large ministries during the whole period. Finally, some governments organised environmental policy functions within garbage-can ministries, combining them with policy functions for culture (France, Australia), family policy (Austria), or the Interior (Germany).

Table 16: Ministries for the Environment in nine countries (1970-2016)

Years	Country	Ministry
Single-issue ministries		
1973-1975	Australia	Department of the Environment and Conservation

⁶⁹ Between the late 1970s and early 1990s, the environment was combined with: science/technology/research (*Department of Science and the Environment*, 1978-80), adding home affairs (special territories, national archives and museums) (*Department of Home Affairs and Environment*, 1980-84), then adding arts (cultural affairs) (*Department of Arts, Heritage and Environment*, 1984-87), and finally adding sport and tourism (*Department of the Arts, Sport, the Environment, Tourism and Territories*, 1987-91) (cf. Appendix A).

1998-2007	Australia	Department of the Environment
1971-2016	Canada	Environment Canada
1971-1973	France	Ministry for the Environment
1981-1996	France	Ministry for the Environment
2002-2006	France	Ministry for Ecology and Sustainable Development
1986-2013	Germany	Federal Ministry for the Environment, Nature Protection and Nuclear Safety
1972-1986	New Zealand	Commission for the Environment
1987-2016	New Zealand	Ministry for the Environment
1990-2004	Sweden	Ministry of the Environment
2007-2016	Sweden	Ministry of the Environment
Large ministries		
1976-1978	Australia	Department of Environment, Housing and Community Development
2011-2016	Australia	Department of Sustainability, Environment, Water, Population and Communities
1972-1986	Austria	Federal Ministry for Health and the Protection of the Environment
2000-2016	Austria	Federal Ministry for Agriculture, Forestry, Environment and Water Management
1979-1980	France	Ministry for the Environment and Living Conditions
1997-2001	France	Ministry for Spatial Development and the Environment
2007-2016	France	State Ministry for Ecology, Sustainable Development and Planning
2014-2016	Germany	Federal Ministry for the Environment, Nature Protection, Construction and Nuclear Safety
1970-2016	Netherlands	Ministry for Housing, Spatial Planning and the Environment
1987-1989	Sweden	Ministry for Energy and Environment
2005-2006	Sweden	Ministry for Environment and Societal Planning
1971-2000	UK	Department of the Environment
2001-2016	UK	Department of Environment, Food and Rural Affairs
Garbage-can ministries		
1979-1997	Australia	Department of Science and the Environment; Department of Home Affairs and Environment; Departments of Science and the Environment, of Administrative Services, and Home Affairs; Department of Arts, Heritage and Environment; Department of the Arts, Sport, the Environment, Tourism and Territories; Department of the Arts, Sport, the Environment and Territories
2008-2010	Australia	Department of the Environment, Water, Heritage and the Arts
1987-1999	Austria	Ministry of the Environment, Youth, and Family
1974-1978	France	Ministry for Cultural Affairs and the Environment
1970-1985	Germany	Ministry of the Interior

Ministries for Immigration

Table 17 shows that most of the time, governments chose to combine the policy functions for immigration policy with those for one or more other policies within ministerial jurisdictions: combined ministries represent 84.1 % of the years in the data set, while only in 15.9 % of the years governments opted to organise immigration policy in a stand-alone single-issue ministry. The most frequent type were large ministries, which were present in 189 years (or 44.9 % of the time), followed by garbage-can ministries (165 years, or 39.2 % of the time).

Table 17: Immigration ministries: types of ministries (1970-2016)


Single-issue	Garbage-can	Large
67 years (15.9 %)	165 years (39.2 %)	189 years (44.9 %)

Note: N = 421 years

The overall evolution of the types of ministries for the Immigration over the period 1970 to 2016 is pictured in Figure 12. Ministries for Immigration already existed in all nine countries at the beginning the 1970s (Hammar, 1985a). Some general remarks can be made: first, although single-issue ministries were the organisational choice that governments opted for least often, they were present during the whole period under observation with only a short interruption in the late 1980s and early 1990s. Second, combined ministries for Immigration were overall very much dominant. Within this category, there is some variation over time, however: governments predominantly chose large ministries during a first period that lasted until the early 1990s, and then turned towards garbage-can ministries, which became the dominant type of ministries from the mid-1990s onwards. In the 2000s, even five out of nine governments (55.6 %) had garbage-can ministries for Immigration.

With the exception of Australia, all countries combined the policy functions for immigration and immigrant integration policy within ministries that were also responsible for other policies. During the 1970s and 1980s, most countries combined immigration and integration functions within large ministries that were also responsible for the labour market. In Sweden, the SIV worked under the authority of the *National Labour Market Board* and its decisions could be appealed before the *Ministry for Labour* (Hammar, 1985b, p. 47), where the *Minister for Immigration* was located. New Zealand moved control over immigration policy from the Customs Service to the *Department of Labour* as early as 1951 in a move that reflected a focus on resolving labour market shortages through immigration policy (OECD, 2014a, p. 35). In 1988, *New Zealand Immigration* became a distinct service within the *Department of Labour*, alongside New Zealand Employment, Training Support, Occupational Safety and Health, and

Figure 12: Immigration ministries: types of ministries (1970-2016)



Source: own data, cf. Appendix A

Industrial Relations; each with a general manager, a policy analysis unit, support services, and a regional network of offices (Garlick, 2012, p. 193). In contrast, in Australia the combination of immigration policy with the large *Department of Labor and Immigration* (DLI) in 1974-1975 remained short-lived. In 1965, the Canadian federal government embarked on a major reorganization that centred around the creation of a department responsible for ‘manpower’ (Vineberg, 2012, pp. 24-25): the *Department of Manpower and Immigration* (DMI) brought together DCI’s Immigration Branch with a number of services formerly with the *Department of Labour* (including the National Employment Service, the Technical and Vocational Training Branch, and the Economics and Research Branch). In Austria, the *Ministry for Social Affairs* was responsible for immigration policy and foreigners’ policy, while refugee policy and the integration of refugees via the *Austrian Integration Fund* were in the hands of the *Ministry for the Interior* (Bauböck & Perchinig, 2006, p. 731). In the Netherlands, the *Ministry of Social Affairs and Employment* controlled the recruitment of foreigners and the coordination of family reunification policy. In the latter two countries, social partners, i.e., trade unions and employers’ associations, were important players of immigration policy through their involvement in the formulation of recruitment agreements and the granting of work permits (Bruquetas-Callejo et al., 2011, p. 142).

The remaining three countries located immigration and integration policy closer to the core executive, most of them within Ministries of the Interior. In the UK, immigration and refugee integration policy remained within the Home Office (Cerna & Wietholtz, 2011, p. 226). In the

Netherlands, the *Ministry of Justice* was responsible for immigration regulation and control; in addition, in late 1979, the *Ministry for the Interior* became responsible for immigrant integration policy, which was placed within the DG Home Policies that was also responsible for matters of local government, urban policy and the provinces. Conversely, the *Ministry for Culture, Recreation and Social Work* developed a welfare policy for some vulnerable groups including guest workers, asylum seekers, and post-colonial immigrants (Entzinger, 1985, pp. 85-86; Bruquetas-Callejo et al., 2011, pp. 134 & 141). In France, the *Ministry of the Interior* was traditionally responsible for immigration policy. Conversely, the *Direction de la Population et des Migrations (DPM)* under a secretary of State within the *Ministry for Social Affairs* was in charge of integration programmes and also supervised the *Social Action Fund*, a major public institution specialised in integration issues that operated between 1958 and 2005. Similarly, in Germany, from the 1970s onwards the policy functions for foreigners' policy and policy coordination were located within the *Federal Chancellery*, i.e., the core executive; in the late 1970s, the role of the BMAS in immigrant integration policy was strengthened when it received the institution of the Commissioner for Foreigners that was mandated to help coordinate the government's immigrant integration policy both horizontally and vertically (Bendel, 2014, p. 2; Schneider, 2010, p. 128).

Between the second half of the 1980s and the mid-1990s, the general pattern of ministerialisation shifted. While governments tended to distribute the portfolio more widely across ministries (cf. previous section), they also turned away from the dominance of large ministries and towards a more mixed picture. The governments of several countries shifted the competence for immigration away from labour/social affairs ministries and rather strengthened the roles of their ministries for the Interior. Austria shifted the competences for immigration policy and foreigners' policy from the *Ministry for Social Affairs* to the *Ministry of the Interior* in late 1986 (Bauböck & Perchinig, 2006, p. 731). The latter henceforth dominated both immigration policy as well as the federal government's role in immigrant integration policy within the federal setting. In a similar move, Sweden split the competences for immigrant integration policy off the *Ministry for Labour* in 1991 and created the position of a *Minister for Immigration* that was located successively in the ministry for the Interior, Culture, and finally Justice, where the competences for integration were combined with those for democracy and gender equality. Canada, too, shifted the whole portfolio for immigration and integration policy away from the DMI in October 1993 and created instead the new *Department of Citizenship and Immigration (CIC)* that united "all matters over which Parliament has jurisdiction relating to citizenship and immigration"⁷⁰ with the competences for settlement and integration that were grouped within a new Integration Branch.

⁷⁰ Department of Citizenship and Immigration Act, 1994.

Conversely, only the governments of France and New Zealand maintained the dominant positions of their *ministries for Labour* on immigration and immigrant integration policy during this period. In France, the overall organisational configuration remained stable although the precise perimeter of the ministry's jurisdiction underwent regular changes in the 1990s and 2000s. In addition, the successive French governments created various inter-ministerial commissions and committees for the coordination of different aspects of immigration and integration policy within government.

As shown above, during the early 2000s governments tended to concentrate these competences, and all the while, placed them more closely to the core executive, mostly within ministries for the Interior. The government of the Netherlands placed the new *Minister without portfolio for Immigration, Integration and Asylum* that concentrated the competences for immigration and immigrant integration policy under the *Ministry of the Interior and Kingdom Relations* (EMN, 2012, p. 11). Similarly, BAMF in Germany is an agency that operates under the *Ministry of the Interior*. Through the concentration of the portfolio within BAMF, the *Ministry of the Interior* became politically responsible for both immigration and integration policies although integration-related policies continued to fall within the competences of several other ministries (in particular, Economy and Labour, Family Affairs, and Education). France, too, concentrated the portfolio within the *Ministry for the Interior* from the early 2000s onwards. The *Ministry of Immigration, Integration, National Identity and co-development* created in 2007 was placed under the responsibility of the *Ministry of the Interior*, which increased the latter's influence on integration policy (Brunn, 2012, p. 99; Michalowski, 2007, p. 126). In 2011, the ministry was integrated into the *Ministry for the Interior*,⁷¹ which fully concentrated all policy functions of the portfolio and uniting them with the functions for internal security, public liberties, coordination of crime prevention and the fight against drug trafficking (Escafré-Dublet, 2014, p. 4). All issues dealing with foreign citizens were thereby united within a single ministry.⁷² Finally, the reorganisations of the Australian government partly fit into this picture. The government transferred immigration functions to a newly created *Department of Immigration and Border Protection (DIBP)* that took over most of DIMIA's immigration policy functions in late 2013 in the context of a major restructuring of ministries by the Liberal government when it took office (Packham, 2013; Wilson, 2013). As its name reflects, DIBP strongly focused on compliance and border control functions (Hawthorne, 2017) especially after the *Australian Customs and Border Protection Service* was

⁷¹ Renamed *Ministry of the Interior, Overseas Territories, Territories and Immigration* at this occasion.

⁷² The Ministry of the Interior contained the *Immigration Directorate*, the *Asylum Service* and the *Directorate for reception, integration and nationality (DAIC)*.

integrated into it in 2015, a move intended to ensure a stronger integration of border protection resources (DIBP, 2015, p. 84).

These findings confirm and extend Hernes' (2021) study of 16 Western European countries that found that between 2002 and 2011, more governments coupled integration with immigration and/or justice (p. 11). In contrast, Schamburek (2016) found that during this period German *Länder* governments tended to move the portfolio for immigrant integration away from Ministries for the Interior and towards ministries in charge of social or societal portfolios (e.g., education).

Table 18: Immigration ministries in nine countries (1970-2016)

<i>Years</i>	<i>Country</i>	<i>Ministry</i>
Single-issue ministries		
1970-1973	Australia	Department of Immigration
1976-1987	Australia	Department of Immigration and Ethnic Affairs
1993-2016	Australia	Department of Immigration and Ethnic Affairs, Department of Immigration and Multicultural Affairs and Indigenous Affairs, Department of Immigration and Border Protection
1994-2016	Canada	Department of Citizenship and Immigration, Immigration, Refugees and Citizenship Canada
2007-2010	Sweden	Ministry of Integration and Equality
Garbage-can ministries		
1987-2016	Austria	Ministry of the Interior
2007-2016	France	Ministry of Immigration, Integration, National Identity and Solidary Development, Ministry of the Interior, Overseas Territories, Territories and Immigration
1970-2016	Germany	Federal Chancellery, Ministry of the Interior
1970-1979	Netherlands	Ministry of Justice
2003-2006	Netherlands	Ministry of Justice
2011-2016	Netherlands	Ministry of the Interior and Kingdom Relations
1992-2006	Sweden	Ministry of Culture, Ministry for Justice
1970-2009	UK	Home Office
Large ministries		
1974-1975	Australia	Department of Labor and Immigration
1988-1992	Australia	Department of Immigration, Local Government and Ethnic Affairs
1970-1986	Austria	Ministry for Social Affairs
1970-1992	Canada	Department of Manpower and Immigration
1970-2006	France	Ministry of Social Affairs, Ministry for Labour, Employment, and Population,

1980-2002	Netherlands	State Secretary for Urban Policies and Integration within the Ministry of the Interior
2007-2010	Netherlands	Ministry of Housing, Spatial Planning and the Environment
1970-2016	New Zealand	Department of Labour, Ministry of Business, Innovation and Employment (MBIE)
1970-1991	Sweden	Ministry for Labour,
2011-2016	Sweden	Minister for Integration within the Ministry for Employment
2010-2016	UK	Department for Communities and Local Government

Ministries for Employment


Employment policy functions were predominant organised in large ministries in the countries between the 1970s and 2010s. As Table 19 shows, governments chose to combine the policy functions for employment policy with those for one or more other policies within ministerial jurisdictions most of the time: combined ministries represent 80.0 % of the years in the data set, while only in 20.0 % of the years governments opted to organise unemployment policy in a stand-alone single-issue ministry. In this respect, the ministerialisation of unemployment policy resembles that of immigration policy. Among the combined ministries, large ministries were more frequent than garbage-can ministries: the category of large ministries alone represents almost half of yearly data on types of ministries in the data set (49.6 %).

Table 19: Employment ministries: types of ministries (1970-2016)

Single-issue	Garbage-can	Large	N
84 country-years (20.0 %)	128 country-years (30.4 %)	209 country-years (49.6 %)	421 country-years

Beyond this general distribution of the types of ministries, the description of the distribution of the types of ministries in the nine countries over the whole time period 1970 to 2016 allows to some more nuanced findings. The evolution of the types of ministries for Employment is pictured in Figure 13. It shows that the degree to which the different types of ministries were present across the period under study underwent changes. Although single-issue ministries were the organisational choice that governments opted for least often, they were present during the whole period under observation with only a short interruption in 1996 and 1997. During the 1970s, garbage-can ministries were the predominant type of ministry for unemployment. Large ministries were present in Austria and Germany. In Austria, the jurisdiction of the *Federal Ministry for Social Administration* united employment policy with

Figure 13: Employment ministries: Types of ministries (1970-2016)



Source: own data, cf. Appendix A

general social policy and social assistance, as well as health policy until 1986, and corresponded therefore to a large social affairs ministry that was firmly linked to the left-wing social democrats (Pelinka, 2003, p. 486). In Germany, the portfolio for unemployment policy was combined with competences for social policy (social insurances and social assistance) in the Ministry for Employment and Social Affairs that remained in place until 2002 (Schiller, 2010, 2016).

Starting in 1980, some governments replaced the garbage-can ministries with large ones with the result that, at the end of the 1980s, large ministries had become the predominant type of ministry. In the early 1990s, the situation stabilised, with a small majority of governments with large ministries (44.4 %), one in three (33.0 %) with garbage-can ministries, and a minority (22.2 %) with single-issue ministries. For instance, in 1994, the Canadian federal government created *Human Resources Development Canada (HRDC)* that was also responsible for education policy as well as welfare programmes. Between 2003 and 2005, the ministry is split in two, one focussing on workforce-related aspects as well as education, and the other on social support programs. In 2006, HRDC is re-established as a large social affairs ministry, but without the competences for education policy. This dominance of large ministries further increased in the second half of the 1990s. For instance, in the United Kingdom, the creation of the *Department of Work and Pensions (DWP)* in 2001 combined the portfolio for unemployment policy with other social policy functions (housing, disability, family and health-related benefits; pensions; child maintenance) (OECD, 2014d, p. 46). During the whole remainder of the period under investigation, roughly two in three governments had large

ministries for unemployment (between 55.5 % and 66.0 % depending on the year). Garbage-can ministries became a minority (between 22.2 % and 33.0 % depending on the year).

Some countries however combined employment with policy functions for the economy and/or finances during this period. An example is Austria, where the employment portfolio is split from the wider social security portfolio between 2000 and 2008; instead, all competences for employment are concentrated within the *Ministry for Economy*. In 2009, however, the employment portfolio was reunited with the competences for social affairs. Similarly, Germany transferred the employment policy portfolio to the *Ministry for Economy* for the duration of one legislature between late 2002 and 2005 (Schiller, 2010, 2016), but reinstated the combination of policy functions for employment and social affairs as early as 2006, which remained in place until the end of the period under investigation.

A final small shift intervened starting in 2011, when some governments again turned to single-issue ministries for Employment, and garbage-can ministries disappeared completely. These findings are consistent with Rychly (2013) who observed that the mandates of many employment ministries evolved towards combined jurisdictions in general and the combination of employment with social affairs in particular. They are also consistent with case evidence from countries such as Australia (Halligan, 2015) and Germany (Schiller, 2010) where governments created large ministries combining the policy functions for unemployment policy with those for social affairs during the 2000s. Similar to the Netherlands, New Zealand moved from a fragmented portfolio and a garbage-can ministry to a concentrated portfolio and a large ministry over the period under investigation.

Table 20: Employment ministries in nine countries (1970-2016)

Years	Country	Ministry
Single-issue ministries		
1970-1973	Australia	Department of Labour and National Service
1976-1987	Australia	Department of Employment and Industrial Relations
1999-2007	Australia	Department of Employment, Workplace Relations and Small Business
2014-2016	Australia	Department of Employment
1977-1982	France	Ministry for Labour
1989-1995	France	Ministry for Labour, Employment, and Vocational Training
2012-2016	France	Ministry for Labour, Employment, (Professional Training) and Social Dialogue
1999-2000	New Zealand	Department of Work and Income
2007-2016	Sweden	Ministry of Employment
1970-1995	UK	Department of Employment (and Productivity)


Garbage-can ministries		
1974-1975	Australia	Department of Labour and Immigration (DLI)
2000-2008	Austria	Federal Ministry for Economy and Labour
1970-1993	Canada	Department of Manpower and Immigration
1970-1976	France	Ministry for Labour, Employment, and Population
2007-2010	France	Ministry for Economy, Finances and Employment
2003-2005	Germany	Ministry for the Economy and Employment
1970-1981	Netherlands	Ministry for Economy
1970-1998	New Zealand	Department of Labour
1970-2006	Sweden	Ministry of the Interior, Ministry of Employment, Ministry of Enterprise, Energy and Innovation
Large ministries		
1988-1998	Australia	Department of Employment, Education and Training
2008-2013	Australia	Department of Education, Employment and Workplace Relations
1970-1999	Austria	Federal Ministry for Social Administration, Federal Ministry for Employment (, Health) and Social Affairs
2009-2016	Austria	Federal Ministry for Labour, Social Affairs and Consumer Protection
1994-2016	Canada	Human Resource Development Canada, Human Resources and Social Development Canada
1983-1988	France	Ministry of Social Affairs and National Solidarity, Ministry for Labour, Employment and Professional Training, Ministry for Social Affairs and Employment
1997-2006	France	Ministry for Employment and Solidarity, Ministry for Social Affairs, Labour and Solidarity, Ministry for Employment, Labour and Social Cohesion
1970-2002	Germany	Ministry for Employment and Social Affairs
2006-2016	Germany	Ministry for Labour and Social Affairs
1982-2016	Netherlands	Ministry of Social Affairs and Employment
2001-2016	New Zealand	Ministry of Social Development
1996-2016	UK	Department of Education and Employment (DoEE), Department for Work and Pensions (DWP)

2.3 Organisational configurations of policy functions

As regards environmental policy, the analysis of the organisation of environmental policy functions in the nine countries between 1970 and 2016 finds an increasing similarity of governments' organisational frameworks. The patterns observed until the end of the 1990s point at a diversity of organisational modes of ministerialisation of environmental policy in the

different countries. These lend support to Weale et al. (1996) who found that national models explain European governments' organisational choices with respect to the environmental portfolio. However, over time these setups have become increasingly convergent: on the one hand, the portfolios of environmental policy functions have become increasingly concentrated within governments, and on the other, governments have increasingly combined environmental portfolios within large ministries (section 0). Explanations of this convergence may be found, for instance, in the diffusion or transfer of organisational models, that may itself be a result of international cooperation and transnational communication in this field (Kern et al., 1999; Knill, 2006). An even more pronounced evolution becomes apparent from the analysis of the organisation of employment policy functions in the nine countries between 1970 and 2016. Starting from on average a very low level of portfolio concentration at the start of the period under observation, the evolution of the national governments' portfolios of policy functions for unemployment policy shows a clear and consistent trend over time towards an increased concentration within specific ministries. While garbage-can ministries dominated until the 1990s, large ministries have become the norm since then, lending support


Figure 14: Environmental ministries: Organisational configurations (1970-2016)



to Rychly (2013). The empirical findings regarding the evolution of governments' ministerial set-ups as regards immigration policy, the pattern is different. Here, too, national models seem to explain governments' organisational choices, which are much more equally distributed but also polarised on the scale of concentration: at the beginning as well as the end of the period under investigation, most governments had either fully concentrated or fully fragmented portfolios. As regards types of ministries, there is a clear trend over the decades governments moving away from the combination of immigration related issues with labour and social policy functions and towards the combination with policy functions for the interior (conceptualised here as garbage-can ministries).

Figure 14 visualises organisational configurations of environmental policy functions present in the nine countries between 1970 and 2016. Eyeballing the graph allows to detect that the ministerialisation of environmental policy functions in governments is much more country-specific as regards the type of portfolio (fragmented vs. concentrated), i.e., the administrative organisation of the policy functions, than the type of ministry, i.e., the political organisation of the policy functions. In other words, with rare exceptions, countries have either (rather)


Figure 15: Immigration ministries: Organisational configurations (1970-2016)



fragmented or (rather) concentrated portfolios for environmental policy functions. Countries changing from fragmented to concentrated portfolios (or inversely) are rare. There is less within-country variation as regards the concentration (vs. fragmentation) of environmental policy functions than as regards the types of ministries; i.e., countries tend to change from single-issue to garbage-can or large ministry or vice-versa. This suggests that as regards the ministerialisation of policy functions for environmental policy, administrative stability is more pronounced than political stability. An exception is Germany which had both concentrated as well as mostly fragmented portfolios at different points in time. New Zealand, Canada, the Netherlands and the United Kingdom catch the eye since they feature the most durable organisational configurations of environmental ministries.

As regards immigration policy, major shifts on both dimensions occurred around the year 1990 and in the second half of the 2000s. Section 2.1 showed that during the early 2000s in particular the general pattern of portfolio organisation shifted significantly. It also showed

Figure 16: Employment ministries: organisational configurations (1970-2016)



that during the 2000s and 2010s, governments reorganised the portfolios more often than during the previous decades. In immigration policy, the organisational configurations of the earlier decades 1970 and 1980 were more stable than those of the 1990s and 2000s. Most countries started the period under investigation with either large or garbage-can ministries; single-issue ministries are rarer, and those governments that did establish them only did so during the 1990s at the earliest. All countries shifted the ministerialisation of immigration policy at least once during the period under investigation.

Finally, the patterns observed in all three policies lend support to explanations of the evolution of the organisation of sectoral ministries in national governments as occurring through patterns of punctuated equilibrium (Glor, 2011). As regards all three portfolios of policy functions, the evolution over time revealed points in time where the dominant modes of portfolio organisation shifted. In environmental policy, shifts on both dimensions occurred both in the late 1980s as a reaction to the Chernobyl accident as well as in the early 2000s, most likely as a consequence of the paradigm shift towards sustainable development. In immigration policy, major shifts across countries occurred both around the year 1990 and in the late 2000s. In unemployment policy, the most important and durable change occurred during the late 1990s.

CHAPTER 5: RESULTS


This chapter is dedicated to the presentation of the results of the empirical analysis. From now on, the analysis turns away from the longitudinal data of the whole period 1970 to 2016 and instead focuses on the PI reform activity of governing cabinets as the unit of analysis. The first (short) section pursues the examination of the organisational conditions by establishing correlations between the specific organisational configurations of ministerial policy functions during a governing cabinet’s time in office and its PI reform activity as operationalised above (cf. Chapter 3, section 2). In its second part, the chapter then pursues with presenting the results of the main analysis, which tackles the assumption of causally complex relationships between organisational and political conditions and the adoption of PI reforms through QCA (cf. Chapter 3, section 3). The results of each QCA are discussed and complemented with case illustrations.

1 Organisational configurations and policy integration reforms: correlational analyses

1.1 Environmental policy

As regards environmental policy, the description of the data displayed in Figure 17 suggests that on average, governments in which policy functions for environmental policy were concentrated within one ministry tended to have a higher PI reform activity; conversely, governments in which the policy functions for environmental policy were fragmented across two or more ministries tended to be less active as regards the preparation and adoption of PI reforms. Governments with fully concentrated portfolios had the highest maximum values as

Figure 17: Environmental policy: PI reform activity of governments with different degrees of portfolio concentration (left) and different types of ministries (right)




regards PI reform activity, i.e., those governments in the sample that were the most active PI reformers had fully concentrated portfolios. Conversely, governments with fragmented portfolios had the lowest median PI reform activity. In between both, governments with mostly fragmented portfolios on average were more active PI reformers than governments with mostly concentrated portfolios.

Turning to the types of ministries, the description of the data in Figure 17 suggests that on average, governments with large ministries for the Environment tended to have the highest PI reform activity in environmental policy, and governments with single-issue ministries tended to have higher PI reform activity than governments with garbage-can ministries. However, the differences between the different types of ministries seem to be less clear-cut than those observed for the relationship between portfolio concentration and PI reform activity: on the one hand, governments with large ministries have the highest mean and median values, but on the other, their values have the least spread, i.e., they are more clustered around the mean, and also governments with single-issue ministries have the highest overall maximum values, i.e., the governments with the highest PI reform activity in environmental policy had single-issue ministries.

Looking at the different organisational configurations – i.e., the combinations of portfolio concentration on the one hand and the type of ministry on the other – the graph in Figure 18

Figure 18: Environmental policy: organisational configurations of ministerial policy functions and governments' PI reform activity




reveals that the different organisational configurations were associated with some differences in the extent to which governments engage in PI reform activity. It shows that on average governments tended to engage in higher median PI reform activity in environmental policy when the ministry for the Environment was a large one, and in particular, when a large ministry for the Environment had competences over a concentrated portfolio of policy functions for environmental policy. On the other extreme, governments with two configurations were the least active as regards policy integration reforms: these are governments where environmental policy functions were concentrated within a garbage-can ministry, as well as governments where the environmental policy functions were fragmented and the ministry for the Environment a single-issue ministry.

1.2 Immigration policy

The description of the relation between the concentration of the immigration policy functions and governments immigration PI reform activity in Figure 19 suggests that on average, those governments that had mostly fragmented portfolios for immigration policy – i.e., some parts of immigrant integration policy were located in a different ministry than the ministry mainly responsible for immigration policy – had the highest median PI activity. Put differently, almost one in two governments with a mostly fragmented portfolio of immigration policy functions had a median yearly PI activity of two, i.e., prepared or adopted two PI reforms yearly; as regards governments with concentrated or mostly concentrated portfolios, only one in four had a median yearly PI activity of two reforms prepared or adopted.


Figure 19: Immigration policy: PI reform activity of governments with different degrees of portfolio concentration (left) and different types of ministries (right)



However, those governments that had completely fragmented portfolios for immigration policy – i.e., immigration policy functions and immigrant integration policy were located in two different ministries – had the lowest median PI activity. The gap in the median values between these two groups of governments are important: governments with mostly fragmented portfolios were more than twice as active PI reformers, on average, than governments with completely fragmented portfolios. The highest maximum values of PI reform activity are to be found in governments that had either concentrated or mostly concentrated portfolios. This suggests that only in some cases, portfolio concentration may have contributed to very high PI reform activity, although in the majority of the cases, it did not.

Turning to the PI activity of governments with different types of ministries for Immigration, the description of the data in Figure 19 suggests that on average governments with garbage-can ministries for Immigration were the most active PI reformers: one in two governments with a garbage-can ministry had a yearly PI reform activity of 1.5 or more reforms adopted or prepared, which is clearly above the medians of the governments with the other two types of ministries. Conversely, one in two governments with a single-issue ministry for Immigration had a median yearly PI activity of one reform or less, and one in two governments with a large ministry even had a median yearly PI activity of 0.67 adopted or prepared reforms.

Figure 20: Immigration policy: organisational configurations of ministerial policy functions and governments' PI reform activity




However, Figure 19 also reveals that indifferently of the type of ministry, in all three groups there were at least some rare instances of governments that did embrace high PI reform activity: one in four governments with single-issue ministries adopted or prepared two PI reforms yearly, and even among the governments with a large ministry for Immigration, some outliers with high PI reform activity can be observed from the graph (a maximum PI reform activity measure of 4.33 for the category of large ministries) (Figure 19).

Finally, looking at the different organisational configurations – i.e., the combinations of portfolio concentration on the one hand and the type of ministry on the other – displayed in Figure 20 reveals that again, the different organisational configurations are associated with some differences in the extent to which governments engage in PI reform activity. Governments tended to engage in higher median PI reform activity when the ministry was garbage-can but only if the portfolio was concentrated. Conversely, there is a big difference within the group of governments with single-issue ministries by which those with a concentrated portfolio had lower PI activity as compared to those with a fragmented portfolio – with the caveat, however, that there seems to have been only one government where the latter configuration was present.

1.3 Employment policy

The description of the relation between portfolio concentration and governments’ unemployment policy integration reform activity in Figure 21 suggests that governments with fragmented portfolios – i.e., the policy functions for labour market policy and unemployment assistance are located in different ministries – tended to be, on average, more active PI


Figure 21: Employment policy: PI reform activity of governments with different degrees of portfolio concentration (left) and different types of ministries (right)



reformers than governments with concentrated portfolios. This is shown in the differences in the mean and median values between both groups, but also in minimum values: all governments with fragmented portfolios had at least some PI reform activity, whereas among the governments with concentrated portfolios the minimum values are zero. At the upper extreme, the highest maximum values are to be found in governments with all degrees of portfolio concentration except for the mostly concentrated ones: This suggests that the degree of portfolio concentration cannot by itself explain cases of very high employment PI reform activity by governments. Conversely, governments with mostly concentrated portfolios for employment policy functions were the least active PI reformers, as visible in the low median, mean, and maximum values.

Turning to the PI activity of governments with different types of ministries for Employment, the description of the data in Figure 21 suggests that on average, governments with garbage-can ministries for Unemployment were the most active PI reformers: one in two governments with a garbage-can ministry had a yearly PI reform activity of two or more reforms adopted or prepared, which is well above the medians of the governments with the other two types of ministries. On the other extreme, governments with single-issue ministries for Unemployment were those that were the least active PI reformers: the median value of 0.9 shows that more than half of the governments with a single-issue ministry for Unemployment had a PI reform activity of one reform prepared or adopted per year. Figure 21 also reveals that combined

Figure 22: Employment policy: organisational configurations of ministerial policy functions and governments' PI reform activity



ministries – i.e., both garbage-can and large ministries – are those with the highest maximum values of PI reform activity, meaning that in both groups there were at least one instance of a government that did embrace high PI reform activity, which is not the case for governments with single-issue ministries.

Finally, turning towards the different organisational configurations – i.e., the combinations of portfolio concentration on the one hand and the type of ministry on the other – displayed in Figure 22 reveals that the different organisational configurations are associated with some differences in the extent to which governments engage in PI reform activity in unemployment policy. While Figure 21 above already showed that governments with single-issue ministries adopted or prepared only little PI reforms, Figure 22 reveals that this is the case especially when the portfolio was a concentrated one. At the other extreme, we see from Figure 22 that while governments with garbage-can ministries were highly active PI reformers in particular when the portfolio was fragmented. There are two organisational configurations – large ministries with a concentrated portfolio as well as garbage-can ministries with a fragmented portfolio – that had the highest variation as regards governments PI reform activity: both groups cover the widest range of governments with little as well as very high PI reform activity. There is only one organisational configuration, concentrated portfolio within a large ministry, that was present in governments without any PI reform activity at all. Taken together, the results for unemployment PI suggest that ministerial coordination of unemployment PI reforms takes place primarily at the inter-ministerial level and less at the intra-ministerial one.

2 Organisational and political conditions for PI reforms: causal configurations

This section presents the results of the configurational analysis (cf. Chapter 3, section 3.4) into the conditions under which different organisational configurations of ministerial policy functions in the governments of Western parliamentary democracies are associated with the intensity with which governments adopted PI reforms in environmental policy, immigration policy, and employment policy.

2.1 Environmental PI in the 1980s and 1990s (analysis 1)

The analysis of environmental policy integration in the 1980s and 1990s covers 37 cases, 15 out of which are members of the outcome.⁷³ All countries have at least one case with membership in the outcome. Cases with membership in the outcome are those cabinets that had the highest PI reform activity in environmental policy in the nine countries during the

⁷³ The fuzzy scores of all cases are displayed in Appendix B, Analysis 1.

1980s and 1990s. One cabinet each are from Australia (Howard I, 1997-98), Austria (Vranitzky IV, 1995-96), Canada (Mulroney II & Campbell, 1989-92), Germany (Kohl II, 1987-89), the Netherlands (Lubbers III, 1990-94), and New Zealand (Bolger II-III, 1994-1996). France has two cabinets with membership in the outcome (Rocard I-II, 1988-90; Jospin, 1997-2001). The United Kingdom has three cabinets with membership in the outcome (Thatcher III, 1987-91; Major II, 1993-96; Blair I, 1997-2000). This reflects Russel and Jordan's (2008) analysis of UK EPI that observes that during the Conservative cabinets of the 1990s the UK government first attempted "to establish a national EPI system within central government" (p. 248). Finally, all four Swedish cabinets (Carlsson I, 1986-89; Carlsson III, 1990-91; Bildt, 1992-93; Carlsson IV & Persson I, 1995-1998) have membership in the outcome, which is in line with the literature that shows that Sweden has generally a high level of environmental policy outputs (Knill et al., 2010) and characterised Sweden as an EPI pioneer (Persson et al., 2016).

The truth table analysis reveals that no condition is individually sufficient for the presence of the outcome PIACT, but the condition 'large ministry' (LARGE) comes closest to being individually sufficient.⁷⁴ Conversely, portfolio fragmentation (~CONC) comes closest to being individually sufficient for ~PIACT.⁷⁵ None of the organisational conditions is thus a consistent superset or subset of the outcome; i.e., neither the concentration of the portfolio nor a large ministry explains the high level of PI reform activity of those governments that prepared or adopted a high number of EPI reforms during the 1980s and 1990s. The sets of both organisational conditions contain several cases that contradict the sufficiency relation by being members of the condition but not of the outcome.

The most parsimonious solution for the outcome PIACT contains four Prime Implicants, i.e., four configurations of conditions that are sufficient to produce high PI reform activity.⁷⁶ The solution is ambiguous about the third and fourth Prime Implicants, i.e., it suggests that both paths can explain parts of the outcome with similar levels of consistency and coverage. The combinations of conditions of each model are jointly sufficient for governments' high PI reform activity in environmental policy in the 1980s and 1990s.

Model 1: CONC * EXECDOM * SALG + CONC * GOVR * SALG + (CONC * LARGE) → PIACT

Model 2: CONC * EXECDOM * SALG + CONC * GOVR * SALG + (LARGE * EXECDOM) → PIACT

⁷⁴ Parameters of the sufficiency relation of LARGE and PIACT: consistency = 0.666, coverage = 0.482, PRI = 0.624.

⁷⁵ Parameters of the sufficiency relation of ~CONC and ~PIACT: consistency = 0.649, coverage = 0.584, PRI = 0.563.

⁷⁶ The parameters for the conditions GOVR and SALG have slightly higher consistency scores for sufficiency than HGOVR and SALHG respectively; therefore, the truth table analysis includes GOVR and SALG (cf. Appendix B, analysis 1).

Figure 23: Solution paths and cases (analysis 1)




Figure 23 gives an overview of the typical and deviant cases associated with each path. As regards the organisational conditions, a first glance at the solution paths indicates that all four sufficient combinations of conditions contain either a concentrated portfolio or a large ministry for the Environment, or both (path 3). Conversely, the negation of neither of the organisational conditions is part of a sufficient combination, i.e., neither fragmented portfolios nor the absence of a large ministry are part of a combination of conditions that is sufficient for PIACT. The condition ‘concentrated portfolio’ (CONC) does not pass the threshold for being a necessary condition, but it is part of all four paths of the conservative solution and only four cases contradict the necessity relationship (cf. Appendix, Analysis 1). The conservative solution shows that the condition ‘concentrated portfolio’ (CONC) in different associations with large ministries, a dominant executive, or issue salience, is relevant for EPI with a high degree of consistency.

The first configuration (**CONC * EXECDOM * SALG → PIACT**) shows that cabinets that combined a concentrated portfolio with executive capacity and perceived the environmental issue to be important for voters were active environmental PI reformers during the 1980s and

1990s at a high level of consistency (0.912). The second configuration (**CONC * GOVR * SALG → PIACT**) leading to high environmental PI reform activity during the 1980s and 1990s consists of a concentrated portfolio of environmental policy functions in right-of-centre cabinets who consider the environmental issue as important for voters. This path shares two conditions – the combined presence of a concentrated portfolio and issue salience – with path 1, but provides an alternative pathway in showing that the outcome also occurs if the cabinets are right-of-centre instead of having strong executive capacity. The consistency score of the second path (0.765) is significantly lower than that of path 1 and only slightly above the conventional threshold of 0.75. The final two combinations of conditions, about which the solution model is ambiguous, explain a sizeable subset of governments' high environmental PI reform activity during the 1980s and 1990s. These consist of a 'large ministry' for the Environment combined with either a concentrated portfolio of environmental policy functions (path 3: **CONC * LARGE → PIACT**) or a high extent of executive capacity (path 4: **LARGE * EXECDOM → PIACT**). The conservative solution further shows that if the three conditions 'large ministry', 'concentrated portfolio' and 'executive dominance' are present together, they are jointly sufficient for governments' high PI reform activity irrespective of the other two conditions: both the ideological partisanship of the cabinet and the salience of environmental issues are contextually irrelevant (cf. Appendix B, Analysis 1).⁷⁷

In terms of coverage, the four paths share several typical cases, while other typical cases are path-specific. The Major II cabinet, that governed the UK between 1993 and 1996, is a member of all four paths. The first two paths each cover a moderate subset of the outcome. Path 1 reflects the experiences of three typical cases in Sweden and the UK and has Sweden's two successive Carlsson I (1986-1989) and Carlsson III (1990-1991) cabinets as well as the UK's Major II cabinet as typical cases. Path 2 likewise has three typical cases, which are Sweden's Bildt cabinet (1992-1993) and Germany's Kohl II cabinet (1987-1990), in addition to the UK's Major II cabinet; additionally, Germany's Kohl IV cabinet (1995-1998) is a deviant case in kind. Paths 3 and 4, about which the model is ambiguous, capture the experiences of five cabinets in three different countries: the three successive cabinets – Thatcher III, Major II, and Blair I – that governed the United Kingdom between 1987 and 2000, the Jospin cabinet that governed France between 1997 and 2001, and the Swedish Carlsson I cabinet (1987-1989).

⁷⁷ In order to further probe how the conditions combine to produce the outcome in the two paths 3 and 4, about which the sufficient solution is ambiguous, one would ideally want to compare the cases representing paths 3 and 4 with counterfactual cases. However, in the empirical evidence, the three conditions **CONC * LARGE * EXECDOM** always appear together; i.e., there are no cases representing the counterfactual combinations **CONC * LARGE * ~EXECDOM** (truth table rows 25 to 28) and **~CONC * LARGE * EXECDOM** (truth table rows 13 to 16), and there is thus no empirical evidence allowing to associate these combinations with either the presence or the absence of the outcome.

In the following, the analysis first examines how the typical cases perform on the outcome. It then examines the presence of the organisational conditions, which play a role in all solution paths. Finally, it illustrates how organisational and political conditions combine to produce high PI reform activity.

The outcome: environmental PI reforms during the 1980s and 1990s

The Carlsson I and Carlsson III cabinets' PI reform activity was particularly high with three PI reforms prepared and/or adopted by each of them. Regarding the outcome, the PI reforms adopted by these two Swedish cabinets covered environmental legislation as well as more administrative measures. Under Carlsson I, the Swedish government prepared and adopted the *Natural Resources Act* that provided a framework for state planning in areas of national significance, such as transport, energy production and nature conservation (SEPA, 2011, p. 18). It further adopted an *Environmental Bill* that introduced that view that "successful environmental management presupposes that care for the environment is integrated into the development plans for different sectors of society" and that the responsibility to prevent environmental damage needed to be shared by all sectors (Lundqvist, 1997, p. 57). The Carlsson III cabinet adopted a new *Environmental Bill* that "comprises measures not only in relation to atmosphere and climate, trans-national pollution, the urban environment, nature conservation, sea and water, but is also directed towards numerous other sectors and activities in Swedish society". The bill stated that the "mission of the 1990s is to readjust all societal activities in an ecological direction" (Lundqvist, 1998, p. 238, 2004, p. 123). The Carlsson III cabinet in 1990 introduced a 'green tax exchange' that taxed fuels and products posing potential hazards to environmental quality (Lundqvist, 1998, p. 237; OECD, 2004a, p. 102). The Bildt cabinet continued the PI agenda of the previous years, and yet its PI reform activity was reduced as compared to its predecessors. During the Bildt cabinet, Sweden took first steps towards a more decentralised approach to EPI in government. It published the strategy paper "*A Greener Sweden: The Environmental Strategy of the Swedish Government*". In 1995, the government adopted the directive that formulated the "general sector responsibility" whereby all government agencies were "legally required to consider the implications of their work for sustainable development" (Nilsson & Persson, 2008, p. 229).

The three cabinets that governed the UK between 1987 and 2001 – Thatcher III (1987-1991), Major II (1992-1996) and Blair I (1997-2001) – have high membership scores in the outcome set. As early as the late 1980s, the UK government introduced some organisational mechanisms for environmental policy coordination within the government and adopted some early regulation for environmental protection. The adoption of PI started in 1990 with the *White Paper "This Common Inheritance"* by the Thatcher III cabinet. The White Paper had a clear focus on the environmental administration: it "sought to reorient the machinery of

government to ‘integrate environmental concerns more effectively into all policy areas’ and as early in the decision-making process as possible” (Russel & Jordan, 2008, p. 249). It outlined a “comprehensive cross-governmental approach which was publicly endorsed by all government departments” (Russel & Jordan, 2008, p. 249) and also established several coordination mechanisms as well as an annual review process (Russel, 2007, p. 190). In so doing, the *White Paper* introduced an important institutional structure for implementing sustainable development policy. In 1990, the DoE introduced a specific *Environmental Policy Appraisal (EPA)* procedure and provided both political and technical leadership by disseminating best practices and evaluating performance (Russel & Jordan, 2009, p. 1202). The DoE produced documents to guide other ministries’ civil servants showing the functioning of policy appraisals (1991, 1994) as well as risk assessment and management (1995). With the avowed purpose of ensuring that the government achieved a consistent standard of integrating environmental considerations into all policy sectors, EPA was one of the primary instruments for coordination of sustainable development in the UK government during the 1990s (Russel & Jordan, 2009, p. 1201). Regarding environmental legislation, the UK government under the Major II cabinet (1993-1996) adopted an *Environment Act* in 1995. More administrative measures cover the adoption by the Major II cabinet of a series of *Sustainable Development Indicators* to sit alongside the headline inflation and gross domestic product figures, meant to show whether or not the UK was on a sustainable growth path and to flag the need for appropriate policy intervention (Jenkins, 2002, p. 585; Jordan, 2002b, p. 47). Under New Labour, the government broadened the scope of the EPI measures (Maggetti & Trein, 2021). It incorporated the social and economic dimensions of sustainable development more strongly, for instance by integrating the social dimension into the 1999 revision of the *SD strategy “A better Quality of Life”* (Jenkins, 2002, p. 584), and strengthened the horizontal coordination mechanisms (Russel, 2007, p. 191).

During France’s Jospin cabinet (1997-2001) time in office, several environmental PI reforms were adopted. The *Law on Enhanced Environmental Protection* adopted in 1995⁷⁸ introduced a legal definition of sustainable development into French law. The framework law on territorial planning and sustainable development, adopted in 1999, promoted sustainability in urban and rural planning and development. It created new legal categories such as the regional environmental profiles, the regional planning and sustainable territorial development schemes, and the “collective services” provided by the environment (Szarka, 2004, p. 18). The *Law on Urban Solidarity and Renewal* (2000) integrated air pollution by extending the scope of urban mobility plans which formulated objectives on the development of less polluting forms of transport and the reduction of car traffic and goods transports. A *general tax on*

⁷⁸ Loi n° 95-101 du 2 février 1995 relative au renforcement de la protection de l'environnement.

polluting activities (TGAP) was introduced with the 1999 Finance Bill in order to make ecological taxation more coherent and help integrate the environmental costs of pollution in economic decision-making (Szarka, 2003). It strengthened EPI by combining fiscal instruments applicable to different sectors – industrial and household waste, used lubricants, air pollution and noise at airports – into a single tax under the Ministry for Finance (Szarka, 2003). The report accompanying the ministerial draft advocated replacing the existing piecemeal approach with a more coherent strategy of environmental taxation. The final text of TGAP was watered down from the ministry for the Environment’s initial draft. A complement to TGAP introduced fiscal disincentives to water pollution, but its core objective was to bring the charges levied by the Water Agencies within the remit of the TGAP controlled by the ministries for Finances and the Environment (Szarka, 2003). Another complement, an eco-tax on intermediate energy consumption, was designed as a carbon tax that should improve the existing ‘command and control’ regime on emissions that the government drew up in the context of the formulation of the National Plan to Combat Climate Change (*Programme National de Lutte contre le Changement Climatique, PNLCC*) in 2000 (Szarka, 2003). Both complements experienced significant cutback following severe resistance by powerful industrial actors who, in all of the concerned sectors, lobbied to protect their interests (Szarka, 2003).

During the time in office of the Kohl II cabinet, the German government adopted the *Environmental Economic Account (Umweltökonomische Gesamtrechnung)* that integrated environmental burdens such as emissions, utilisation of materials and energy and pressures on soils into economic data (OECD, 2002b, p. 140). In 1990, it also adopted the law on the creation of an *Environmental Impact Assessment* which transposed the European directive on EIA for certain projects (not including public programmes), stating the obligation for projects with potential impact on the environment to be assessed in terms of their compatibility with environmental concerns.

Portfolio concentration as an INUS condition

The presence of a portfolio of policy functions for environmental policy that was concentrated within one ministry is a condition that is shared by all the cases covered by the solution path. Portfolio concentration is not a necessary condition for the outcome to occur, for there are several cases that contradict the necessity relationship (cf. above), but it is a key INUS condition given its presence in all four paths of the conservative solution term (cf. Appendix B, Analysis 1) and in three out of four paths of the most parsimonious solution. Therefore, we first look at this condition in more detail, before illustrating how it combined in the configurations identified by the most parsimonious solution term.

As regards the concentration of the policy functions, the cases nested in Sweden and in the UK are similar insofar as the national governments' environmental portfolios had traditionally been concentrated, which suggests that the national environmental administrations had accumulated administrative capacity for environmental PI over the years. In the **UK**, the *Department of Environment (DoE)* had concentrated the government's environmental policy functions for national policies in the fields of environmental pollution, nature conservation, habitat, clean air and noise, as well as policy coordination and research on environmental pollution and resources since its creation in 1970 (Draper, 1977; Weale, 1997, pp. 94-95; Jordan, 2002b). In Sweden, the ministerial portfolio in a narrow sense had been concentrated only in 1987 by the Carlsson I cabinet which upon taking office created the first ministry of the Swedish government dedicated specifically to the Environment as a part of what Lundqvist (1997) calls the "second formative phase" of the organisational framework of Swedish environmental policy (p. 57). The ministry concentrated the policy functions for environmental policy that had previously been handled by the two ministries for Agriculture and for Housing. However, since the 1970s Swedish environmental policy had been centralised around the *Swedish Environmental Protection Agency (SEPA)*, which was the "prime motor in developing and implementing environmental policy" (Eckerberg, 2000, p. 213). SEPA's policy capacity was high with about 470 personnel at that time, more than three times that of the ministry (Eckerberg, 2000, p. 213). The ministry for the Environment was small with only about 150 employees, more than half of whom had academic backgrounds (Lundqvist, 1997, p. 49). That is, the 1987 ministerial reorganisation harmonised the concentration of the ministerial portfolio with the existing centralisation at agency-level, where SEPA was the main governmental actor of Swedish national environmental policy. The government gave the new ministry for the Environment the explicit purpose of coordinating environmental policy within the government: it sought to have "an offensive and coordinating role within the Cabinet" that should allow it to instil environmental considerations into other policy sectors (Lundqvist, 1998, p. 240). In order to fulfil the purpose of environmental policy coordination, the government had even considered creating a "super-ministry" that would perform as a coordinator of environment-related issues within cabinet (Lundqvist, 1997, p. 49). This purpose was embraced by the founding minister for the Environment, Birgitta Dahl, who conceived of her role in cross-cutting terms (Nilsson & Persson, 2008, p. 230). For both cabinets, there are indicators that portfolio concentrated mattered for the coordination of environmental policy. The OECD's first Environmental Performance Review of Sweden in 1996 underscores the relevance of the concentrated portfolio for policy development by finding that the intra-ministerial coordination of environmental policy within the realm of the ministry, its administrations, and regional and municipal authorities was well developed and constructive (OECD, 1996b). The portfolio

remained concentrated during the Carlsson III cabinet that consolidated the concentration of policy functions within the ME even further by transferring issues of national physical planning from the ministry for Housing and Physical Planning (Lundqvist, 1997, p. 49).

In France, at the end of the 1990s, environmental policy in France had consolidated into a “standard” policy field (Lascoumes, 2008, p. 29). The creation of an environmental bureaucracy in the early 1990s and the ensuing institutional recognition had consolidated the ministry and provided it with a regional administrative branch that allowed it to implement its policies independently from other ministries’ administrations (Lascoumes & Le Bourhis, 1997; Bonnaud et al., 2012). From the mid-1990s onwards, the ME seized the issue of ‘sustainable development’ (Laville, 2010, p. 292). It created a Sustainable Development Commission (*Commission de Développement Durable*) that delivered the first report on sustainable development. In 1997, for the first time the ministry’s attribution decree formulated competences for sustainable development policy explicitly as “taking into account the objectives of sustainable development policy in the development and implementation of public policies and in the management of natural areas and resources”.⁷⁹ The cabinet also took measures to strengthen the ministry administratively through an extensive reorganisation of the ministry’s central administration in 2000,⁸⁰ creating a general inspectorate as well as competences for environmental policy integration. The creation of the *General Inspection of the Environment (IGE)* should allow the ministry to control its administration and the public bodies it supervised and to end the ministry’s dependence on other ministries’ inspections. A directorate in charge of economic studies and environmental evaluation, the *Direction des études économiques et de l’évaluation environnementale (D4E)*, was created that absorbed some units formerly in charge of research and evaluation within the ministry.⁸¹ D4E contained four units in charge of research and prospective analysis, the economic perspective on the environment, the integration of the environment into public policies, and environmental evaluation.⁸² The *Subdirectorate for the Integration of the Environment into Public Policies* was

⁷⁹ Décret n° 97-715 du 11 juin 1997 relatif aux attributions du ministre de l'aménagement du territoire et de l'environnement.

⁸⁰ Décret n° 2000-426 du 19 mai 2000 portant organisation de l'administration centrale du ministère chargé de l'environnement.

⁸¹ The *Service de la recherche et des affaires économiques (Direction Générale de l'administration et du développement)* and the *Sous-direction de l'évaluation environnementale et de l'aménagement durable (DNP)*.

⁸² Service de la recherche et de la prospective ; Sous-direction des politiques environnementales ; Sous-direction de l'intégration de l'environnement dans les politiques publiques ; Sous-direction environnement, régulations économiques et développement durable.

initially composed of three units for sectoral evaluation, infrastructure and energy, and for urban and land use policy and concertation.⁸³

While in the UK and Sweden, the concentrated portfolios of environmental policy functions were created before the two cabinets took office (cf. path 1), the German *Federal Ministry for the Environment, Nature Protection and Nuclear Safety (BMU)* was created shortly before the Kohl II cabinet took office in June 1986 in the aftermath of the Chernobyl accident (Pehle, 1998). Weale et al. (1996) hint at a mechanism at play here, qualifying the creation of BMU as “symbolic politics leading to substantial administrative change under pressure from an external event” (p. 264).

Although the concentration of environmental policy functions within one ministry is a condition shared by all typical cases of the solution models, it does not on its own explain the adoption of relatively many environmental PI reforms in these cases during the 1980s and 1990s. It is an INUS condition combined with either a large ministry or executive capacity (paths 3 and 4), with executive capacity *and* salience (path 1), or with salience *and* a right-of-centre government. The following section illustrates these complex configurations in more detail.

Large ministry and concentrated portfolio (path 3), or large ministry and executive capacity (path 4)

Paths 3 and 4 highlight that in some of the cases with a concentrated portfolio, the cross-case evidence contained in the truth table indicates that this conditions may have been contextually relevant instead of causally relevant in some of the typical cases covered by paths 3 and 4. These paths suggest that the outcome may be explained by the presence of a large ministry for the Environment combined with either a concentrated portfolio, or a high amount of executive capacity.

Both causal paths are plausible in light of evidence on EPI in the UK and the role of the DoE in particular. First, the literature on EPI in the UK provides some support for the argument that the fact that DoE was a large ministry was a necessary part of the sufficient combination of conditions. The DoE had been established by the Conservative government in 1970 as part of an “attempt to establish a new style of government” (Radcliffe, 1985, p. 201). Studies of the DoE’s administrative culture in the early years well established that the internal relationships between the DoE’s directorates were as highly formal as they were competitive (Painter, 1981; Wilks, 1987). The literature also suggests that the status of environmental policy within DoE was relatively weak and that it was rather loosely coupled with the other parts of the

⁸³ Arrêté du 19 mai 2000 portant organisation de services et de sous-directions de l’administration centrale du ministère chargé de l’environnement, art. 4 C.

ministry (Radcliffe, 1991, pp. 113–115; Jordan, 2002a, pp. 27-28). Jordan (2002a) also reports that DoE ministers “were generally uninterested in the environment as a political issue” (p. 29). However, Jordan’s (2002a) investigation of DoE also demonstrates that the status of environmental policy within DoE changed over time. The share of DoE staff employed in the environmental division rose from a mere 3.2 % in 1980 to 18.4 % in 1993 (McQuail, 1994, p. 52). The DoE was the key actor in developing the Thatcher cabinet’s *White Paper* as well as the subsequent EPI measures cited above (Osborn, 1997, p. 21). Voisey and O’Riordan (1997) observe that the Thatcher III cabinet’s White Paper lacked a political commitment to environmental issues, but having been produced at all, it set in motion an incremental process of PI under DoE leadership (p. 27-28). The successive cabinets developed high EPI reform activity by means of both procedural and legislative instruments throughout the 1990s in spite of a well-documented “lack of sustained commitment and leadership, not only by the Prime Minister but throughout government” (Russel, 2007, p. 197). This suggests that the DoE’s environmental part acted with considerable autonomy within its realm in developing EPI in the UK. Weale (1997) also reports that since DoE covered not only matters of environmental pollution, but also such functions as land-use planning, building and nature conservation and the management of government property as well as the control of local government, including local government finance, the span of its jurisdiction “had important implications for what it was able to do” when local government finance became politically controversial in the UK during the late 1980s (p. 91). It is plausible that the same logic applied to environmental policy, as the span of the jurisdiction prevented policy proposals from reaching inter-ministerial discussion at the cabinet table, where they would have met with other ministries’ opposition and the prime ministerial indifference for environmental issues that characterised the UK governments of the 1990s.

The case of France’s Jospin cabinet (1997-2001) covers the years of existence of the Ministry for Spatial Development and the Environment (in French: *Ministre de l’aménagement du territoire et de l’environnement*) that concentrated most environmental policy functions and brought together environmental policy with spatial development policy. In 1997, the “minister in charge of sustainable development, but without the title” headed an administration composed of the former ME and the administration for territorial planning. These two administrations had already acted on sustainable development under the previous government (Laville, 2010, p. 292). It further corresponded to one of the building blocks of the MECV (1978-1981) and allowed to keep organisational restructure at a minimum during cohabitation (Laville, 2010, p. 292). For the first time the ME obtained the joint supervision of the *Directorate for the Safety of Nuclear Installations*.

In the case of Carlsson I (Sweden, 1987-1989), the ‘large’ ministry that combined policy functions for the environment and for energy was rapidly dismantled again: energy issues

were transferred back to the Ministry of Industry, although the supervision of nuclear energy was retained, when the subsequent Carlsson III cabinet took office in 1990. Therefore, the evidence on the impact of this condition is weakest in the Carlsson I case. An OECD review found several years later that the “external dialogue between the environmental agencies and those in other sectors is developing” (OECD, 1996b). Therefore, the evidence suggests that this case is better described through the combination of conditions of path 1, of which it is also a typical case (see above).

The conservative solution further shows that if the three conditions ‘large ministry’, ‘concentrated portfolio’ and ‘executive dominance’ are present together, they are jointly sufficient for governments’ high PI reform activity irrespective of both the ideological partisanship of the cabinet and the salience of environmental issues are contextually irrelevant (cf. Appendix B, Analysis 1).

The Jospin cabinet was a surplus coalition formed by the Socialist and the Green Party *Les Verts* during a Cohabitation government (i.e., the President of the Republic was a representative of the Conservative movement) called the “*Gauche plurielle*” (i.e., the “Plural Left”), which was composed of representatives of several left-wing parliamentary groups and ecologists. *Les Verts* had entered the National Assembly for the first time in 1997 with six MPs elected. Their participation in the government gave environmental policy a higher level of salience. Prime Minister Jospin nominated the leader of *Les Verts* as Minister for the Environment and tailored the ‘large’ ministry to the personality of the incoming minister, the leader of the Green party (Voynet, 2003, p. 32). In contrast, the UK cases of the late 1980s and 1990s illustrate that a large ministry with a concentrated policy portfolio produced a decent amount of PI outputs in spite of other ministries’ wariness even though EPI lacked political commitment of a government with high executive capacity but little priority for environmental matters. The literature on EPI in the UK highlights that EPI during the 1990s remained primarily administratively oriented, led by the DoE, and incremental (Jenkins, 2002; Russel, 2007, p. 197; Russel & Jordan, 2008, p. 249), but lacked political salience of – and commitment to – environmental objectives throughout the period (Voisey & O’Riordan, 1997, pp. 27–28; Jenkins, 2002). Jordan (2002) and Ross (2005) document how departmental resistance disturbed the DoE’s attempts at introducing EPI reforms at various other occasions and link this to the lack of central leadership from the Cabinet Office. The literature has documented that the DoE’s EPA was not widely used under the Conservative governments (Russel & Jordan, 2007). Under the Labour government after 1997, EPA was still not used consistently, but rather of poor quality and used in a departmentalised fashion that did not contribute to coordinating policy-making across government (Russel & Jordan, 2009).

Portfolio concentration and issue salience...

In the cases of paths 1 and 2, the concentrated portfolios appear as causally relevant when combined with issue salience, i.e., the governing parties perceive that the environmental issue is important for voters and express this by highlighting the issue during their electoral campaigns. On its own, the impact of issue salience is in line with the literature that associates a higher priority for environmental issues in governing parties' manifestos with a higher number of environmental policy outputs adopted (Knill et al., 2010). A third condition must also be met, though: the paths show that these two conditions only lead to high environmental PI reforms when the executive's capacity is high (path 1), in which case the configuration is indifferent to the ideological position of the governing parties; or when the government is a right-leaning one (path 2), in which case executive capacity is not necessary.

... and executive capacity (path 1) or right-of-centre government (path 2)

The sources of the **Major II** cabinet's executive capacity stemmed from its status as a single-party majority government in a centralised country. The UK was at the time a member of the EU, but evidence on the impact of EU membership on the adoption of EPI in the UK is inconclusive. Although some find that the Major II cabinet's environmental policy reforms were largely driven by the environmental agenda of the EU (Fairbrass & Jordan, 2001), others find that governments still denied the need for more EPI reforms that supranational organisations had started promoting in the late 1980s (Jordan, 2002b, p. 41). The introduction of an *Environmental Audit Committee* was in line with commitments of the Labour party which had first committed to introduce a parliamentary Environmental Audit Committee in an environmental policy statement entitled 'In Trust for Tomorrow' in 1994 (Jenkins, 2002, p. 586).

As regards path 1, the cases nested in Sweden illustrate the impact of issue salience. According to the literature on EPI in Sweden, both the creation of the ministry and the high level of EPI reforms in the late 1980s intervened in a political context in which the environmental issue was salient in the public opinion and among the major political parties. The environmental policy focus shifted to the environmental impacts of sectoral activities with the gradual and consensual realisation that industrial pollution was manageable, and that international cooperation in environmental policy was not only increasingly necessary (with the role of the EC in national environmental policies and international pollution on the agenda) but that it was also possible (following the re-democratisation of the Baltic region) (Lönnroth, 2010). The late 1980s witnessed the emergence of the Swedish Green parties that won seats in the Parliament of Sweden for the first time in 1988. The 1988 election campaign in particular was, according to Lundqvist (1997), "totally dominated" by environmental issues (p. 53). Both Swedish cabinets were single-party minority governments, but environmental policy was little

contentious among the major parties in the Swedish parliament during the 1980s and 1990s. Lundqvist (1997) writes that in accordance with Sweden's consensual political culture, the main parties agreed on most aspects of environmental policy (pp. 57-58). The cabinets Carlsson I and Carlsson III were led by the Social Democrats (SAP) that governed Sweden for most of the 1980s and 1990s and gradually built up their environmental policy portfolio, within which, as Persson et al. (2016) observe, "EPI resonated well with the broader vision of a 'green welfare state' (p. 483). Jamison et al. (1990) explain that Sweden's established political parties responded early and strongly to the rise of the environmental issue (pp. 13 ff.). The "ideological incorporation" of environmental issues into the established political parties' programmes also explains why a strong environmental movement never materialised in Sweden (ibid.).

As regards path 2, the combination of a right-of-centre cabinet and issue salience puts party-political conditions at the centre of this pathway. This combination is plausible in light of studies showing that if the environment becomes an object of party competition, this leads to environmental policy outputs (Carter, 2013). However, evidence on the cases covered by this path do not point to party competition as a major motive for PI reform. Sweden was characterised by high salience of environmental issues, but also a consensual stance by the main parties (cf. path 1). In Sweden, there was a high degree of policy continuity as regards environmental PI under left and right-of-centre governments during the 1990s due to the main parties' consensual stances on environmental issues which allowed the administration to be a major driver for EPI when the governments showed little backing and commitment (Lundqvist, 1998). Evidence for salience as a driver of PI under this government is limited, because although the salience of environmental issues on the agenda of the Bildt cabinet was high when the positions of all parties of the government are concerned, it was low on the electoral agenda of the Prime Minister's party. Persson et al. (2016) link this decline of environmental PI to the financial crisis and economic slowdown of the early 1990s, which led the government to paying more attention to economic and industrial concerns than environmental ones. In the German context, environmental issues played a dominant role in the German public debate in the 1970s and 1980s, but public opinion remained still generally unfavourable (Jänicke & Weidner, 1997b, pp. 133-135) and the high salience of environmental matters on the electoral agendas of the Kohl II government can partly be attributed to the Chernobyl nuclear accident of 1986 (Weale et al., 1996). In addition, the absence of executive's legislative dominance seems relevant for bringing about PI reform activity in the case of the Kohl II cabinet – although the truth table does not support the causal relevance of this condition at the cross-case level – for two reasons. First, according to Beuermann (2000), there is a high number of veto points that impeded the adoption of far ranging policy changes by the government and encouraged incremental policy-making that has been visible in

German EPI. Second, one of the Kohl II cabinet's two EPI measures was the transposition of the EU directive on EIA, i.e., a direct output of supra-national agenda-setting.

Unexplained cases

In order to get a fuller understanding of the combinations of conditions that explain the outcome and identify potential additional factors at play, the QCA literature recommends examining unexplained cases (Radaelli & Wagemann, 2019). In this analysis, the sufficiency plot indicates several unexplained cases (cf. Appendix B, Analysis 1) that are members of the outcome set because governments did adopt relatively many PI reforms but that not covered by the solution term because the truth table row is not consistently associated with a positive outcome.

The contradictory truth table row 6 contains such an unexplained case, the New Zealand's Bolger II-III cabinet (1994-1996), which is a member of the outcome, contrary to the other case of the same truth table row, the Bolger I cabinet (1991-1993). These cases share two of the conditions of solution path 1, the presence of executive capacity and salience, but differ insofar as ministerial responsibilities with regard to environmental policy are fragmented.⁸⁴ Therefore, this unexplained case can also be regarded as a counterfactual case as regards the status of the condition 'concentrated portfolio' as an INUS condition when combined with both 'executive capacity' and 'salience': when combined with portfolio fragmentation, these two conditions do not consistently lead to an outcome of relatively many PI reforms.

As observed above (cf. Chapter 4, p. 142), New Zealand extensively reorganised its national environmental institutions in the second half of the 1980s, leading to a setting where competences were fragmented between the ministers for Environment and Conservation as well as a Parliamentary Commissioner for the Environment. Ton Bührs attributes the introduction of the *Resource Management Act (RMA)* during the Bolger I cabinet in 1991 to the role and commitment of the Minister for the Environment at the time, who even retained the portfolio when he became Prime Minister (Bührs, 2002b, p. 336). The RMA had the formal aim to embed all decisions on policies, plans and projects in the principle of sustainable management of natural resources (Bührs, 2016) although in itself it did not contain any "specific goals, objectives or targets, does not stipulate a timeframe for achieving objectives, and does not contain strategic analysis" (Bührs, 2002a, p. 36). Under the RMA, the MfE should coordinate the development of environmental standards and guidelines that define an "environmental bottom line" of sustainable management by setting values and targets for

⁸⁴ Truth table row 6 is the only truth table row that has the combination of the conditions ~CONC * EXECDOM * SALG and is associated with an outcome, the absence of 'PIACT'. The other truth table rows with this combination of conditions are logical remainders.

environmental quality (Taylor et al., 1997, p. 15). During the time in office of Bolger II, the government adopted the *Environment 2010 Strategy* that was the most comprehensive environmental policy statement of a New Zealand's government so far (Bührs, 2002b, p. 334). It was developed by the *Strategic Policy Group* within the Ministry for the Environment, which was the only arena in government whose main responsibility lay in long-term and strategic environmental policy development (Bührs, 2002a, p. 39). However, given its very small size and modest resource base, which did not match the extension of its (strategic) work to a broad range of issues, the *Strategic Policy Group* had remained a weak and ineffective advocate for EPI (Bührs, 2002a, pp. 39–40). Because the group was “not insulated from the Ministry's day-to-day requirements, the group has very little time left for actual long-term environmental policy development, or for building and cultivating a network of green planning advocates across government agencies”, and its volatile agenda was “to a large extent dictated by political priorities” of the moment (Bührs, 2002a, pp. 39–40). This is further exemplified by Bührs' observation that the follow-up to the *Environment 2010 Strategy*, that was due in 1999, remained incomplete because the Labour-Alliance Government that came to power at the end of 1999 abandoned the Strategy, and later announced its intention to develop a formal sustainable development strategy (Bührs, 2002a, p. 36). These patterns of policy outputs, or the lack therefore, according to Ton Bührs (2002b) are in part due to New Zealand's institutional context, where a strong principle of vertical accountability prevailing in ministries, and a lack of assessment of the outcome effectiveness of ministerial policy (Bührs, 2002b, p. 42), lead ministries to pursue policies based on short-term orientations and assessments of priorities. In this situation, Ton Bührs observes that the status of environmental policy and the success of reform initiatives was also strongly contingent upon the personal commitment, position and effectiveness of the persons occupying the positions of ministers for the Environment and Conservation (Bührs, 2002b, p. 336). When compared with the cases of path 1, where Environmental ministries concentrated the governments' environmental policy functions, one can plausibly argue that in the fragmented set-up of New Zealand, the ministries were not in a position to consistently exert policy entrepreneurship and ensure a high intensity of environmental PI reforms. These cases illustrate that in spite of the combined presence of ‘executive capacity’ and ‘issue salience’, when combined with fragmented ministerial responsibilities for environmental policy, the conditions do not consistently lead to an outcome of high environmental PI reform activity during the 1980s and 1990s. They also point at the degree of vertical accountability and the short-term policy orientation that helps understand differences between cases of this contradictory truth table row.

The Canadian cases of the 1980s and 1990s point to a similar configuration where the horizontal fragmentation of competences within the government. They further display

remarkable stability insofar as they share the same conditions across all four cases, therefore being all members of the same truth table row. Only one case, the Mulroney II-Campbell cabinet (1989-1992), is a member of the outcome, making this a contradictory truth table row. From 1988 onwards, the first of two series of policy integration reforms were enacted at the federal level. In 1988, the department consolidated and updated Canada's environmental legislation in the *Canadian Environmental Protection Act (CEPA)* (MacDowell, 2012, p. 255). In 1990, with the Green Plan the federal government provided a policy framework and action plan for sustainable development and committed itself to substantial additional spending on the environment over the following five years (Bouder, 2002, p. 46). CEPA is jointly administered by *Environment Canada* and *Health Canada*, who also collaborate on research activities related to environmental health (OECD, 2004b, p. 133). Through several ministries (*Natural Resources, Environment Canada, Fisheries and Oceans Canada*, and others), the plan funded research on environmental matters at a large scale (Paehlke, 2002, p. 133). It also obliged government ministries to develop environmental capabilities and behaviour in their own administrations (Paehlke, 2002, p. 133). In 1992, the *Canadian Environmental Assessment Act* introduced environmental assessments for proposed projects where the federal government was the proponent or where the project involved federal funding, permits, or licensing. However, with the 1993 change of government, the Green Plan lost the support of all key players (MacDowell, 2012, p. 256). For *Environment Canada*, which had led the process towards the adoption of the Green Plan, its subsequent demise meant a backlash in terms of status and capacity (Toner, 1996). The review of CEPA in the 1990s became a protracted process due to conflicts between Environment Canada and the "resource management" departments (Natural Resources, Industry, and Agriculture), in particular over authority for the regulation of biotechnology products (Leiss, 2001, p. 170). During the 1990s, fiscal stability figured prominently on the political agenda and led to budget cuts that "weighed heavily on environmental departments at both federal and provincial levels. Environment Canada's budgets stopped increasing in 1994/95 and had decreased by about 30 per cent by 1998/99 (compared to a 6 per cent reduction of overall federal budgetary expenditure)" (Bouder, 2002, pp. 46–47). At the same time, the public interest in the environment seemed to decline and sustainable development went lower on the political agendas Canada wide.

During the remainder of this period, Canada's environmental PI reform activity remained low. In 1995, amendments to the Auditor General Act requested all federal ministries to produce sustainable development strategies to be submitted to the Commissioner (Bouder, 2002, p. 49). The government created the role of a *Commissioner of the Environment and Sustainable Development*, who should act as a source of independent audit of the federal government in this field and report directly to the Auditor General, with a mandate to monitor the extent to which departments met the objectives of their sustainable development strategies (Bouder,

2002, p. 49). However, in the absence of a government-wide strategy and common goals and targets, the departmental strategies did not deliver the expected results (Remmel, 2012, p. 4). The government also created the *Canadian Environmental Assessment Agency* as an independent agency responsible for administering the environmental assessment process at a federal level (Bouder, 2002, p. 57). However, a review of several federal departments showed that only less than a quarter of audited policy, plan and programme proposals with potentially important environmental effects underwent such assessments (OAG, 2016).

To further explore the impact of LARGE combined with CONC, we look at cases with the conditions $\sim\text{CONC} * \text{LARGE}$. The organisational configuration of a fragmented portfolio and a large ministry was present only in the five cases that represent truth table rows 10 and 12, four of which are nested in the Netherlands. Although the combined presence of a left-of-centre government and issue salience in truth table row 10 would lead to expect a relatively high output of environmental PI reforms, only one of the cases – the Netherlands' Lubbers III cabinet (1990-1993) – is a member of the outcome, but left unexplained by the solution terms.⁸⁵ Comparing the Lubbers III cabinet with the other cases of truth table row 10 might allow to identify additional factors that set the Lubbers III case apart from the other cases and help explain this cabinet's PI reform activity.

The organisational configuration of fragmented ministerial policy functions for environmental policy and a large ministry remained stable in the Netherlands during the whole period under investigation (1970-2016). The creation of VROM in 1983, of which DGEP became part, did not alter DGEP's environmental policy functions *per se*, but added an inter-ministerial coordination function for environmental policy. Environmental competences were fragmented among three ministries (VROM, Agriculture and Waterworks). It also led to the combination of environmental policy functions in a large ministry with spatial planning and housing. While the organisational configuration remained stable, Lubbers III (1990-1993) is the only cabinet in the Netherlands, and the only one of the five cabinets with this organisational configuration, with a high PI reform activity in the 1980s and 1990s (cf. Appendix B, analysis 1). Under the Lubbers III cabinet, the government adopted and prepared the NEPP1 and NEPP2 *National Environmental Policy Plans*, the first of which marked the shift towards integrated environmental legislation and planning built on the notion of sustainable development (OECD, 2003b, p. 139; Dalal-Clayton, 2013, Ch. 14). The NEPP were prepared from 1986 onwards, i.e., under the Lubbers II cabinet, by a project and steering group involving various ministries. The literature shows that the NEPP were the result of

⁸⁵ Conversely, the cases of truth table row 12 are consistently associated with the absence of PIACT and are typical cases providing the empirical basis for paths 4 and 5 of the solution term for the absence of governments' PI reform activity in environmental policy during the 1980s and 1990s.

institutionalised inter-ministerial policy coordination that had emerged in the early 1980s as was focused on long-term policy outputs. During the 1970s, Dutch environmental policy developed through sector-specific environmental legislation and local environmental planning (Coenen, 1998) that mirrors the organisation of the DGEP responsible for environmental policy within government, which was set up along sectoral lines (air, water, soil, and some specific problem areas such as waste, radiation and noise (Bressers & Plettenburg, 1997, p. 113; Van Eijndhoven et al., 2001, p. 115; Wolters, 2001, p. 43; Van Tatenhove & Goverde, 2002, p. 49). This sectoral approach came under criticism as early as the late 1970s and during the 1980s was replaced with a new approach that put into practice the (internal) integration of the various issues of environmental policy: instead of sectors, environmental policy was now formulated according to themes, geographical areas, or target groups (Hanf & van de Gronden, 1998, p. 164). From 1984 onwards, the government institutionalised policy coordination among the ministries involved in environmental policy by means of the yearly publication of the *Multi-Year Integrated Environmental Programme* through which they planned and programmed environmental policy in an integrated manner (de Jongh, 1996, p. 8). According to observers (Hajer, 1995; Liefferink, 1999), these integrated planning efforts were an important step “in the protracted shift from a ‘command-and-control approach’” towards EPI in the Netherlands (Steurer & Martinuzzi, 2005, p. 457). Weale et al. (1996) explain that those “responsible in the Netherlands for drawing up the 1989 National Environmental Policy Plan took the view that formal organizational structures should not determine the capacity for environmental policy co-ordination” (p. 257). Instead, they “consciously eschewed organizational changes in a bid to devise a planning process on which different, and traditionally hostile, ministries could agree” (Weale, 1992, pp. 148-149). As Weale et al. (1996) put it, “they were fond of saying that when they had done their job properly a separate environmental ministry would no longer be needed” (p. 257).

In sum, in the Netherlands EPI measures result from intense inter-ministerial coordination and implication of various ministries within an organisational configuration where not only several ministries share policy functions for environmental policy but also VROM as large ministry provides a structure for environmental policy coordination. Under this organisational set-up, however, high PI activity emerged only after a significant time lapse since the institutionalisation of coordination (as a functional equivalent to integrated organisational structure) took some time and policy coordination was oriented towards long-term strategies instead of short-term policy outputs.

This long-term orientation and institutionalised policy coordination is also a factor that upon closer inspection distinguishes the Lubbers (II and) III cabinets from the third case of this contradictory truth table row, the Austrian Sinowatz III cabinet (1983-1986). Similar to the Netherlands, this cabinet had a large ministry for the Environment. In this case, the

combination of environment and health into one ministry went along with environmental protection being interpreted as a health issue (Pesendorfer, 2007, p. 55), an interpretation that should arguably favour the adoption of environmental PI outputs. Similar to the UK's DoE (cf. above), until the second half of the 1980s, BMUG's environmental division suffered from a lack of power and resources: it "consisted of only a few civil servants, and was rebuffed when it requested to be involved in environmental legislation prepared by other ministries" (Lauber, 2000, p. 38). For instance, the BMGU played no important role in the development of policy against water pollution in the 1970s (Amann & Fischer-Kowalski, 2002, pp. 46–47) because federal water management and protection policy was "the exclusive concern of the very traditionally organized Ministry of Agriculture and Forestry" and the BMGU lacked competences in the field (Amann & Fischer-Kowalski, 2002, p. 50). Similar to the Netherlands' set-up (cf. above), the Austrian government's portfolio for environmental policy had been fragmented since the federal government had acquired some competences for environmental policy in the early 1970s. Created in 1972, the first Austrian ministry for the environment concentrated the competences formerly attributed to three different ministries, but lacked those for nature and landscape protection, among others, and "most environmental tasks were in the hands of several other ministries and the provinces" (Amann & Fischer-Kowalski, 2002, pp. 55–56). Similar to the Netherlands, too, the ministry had coordination competences for environmental policy within the federal government; its core task was the coordination of research on environmental protection that would help the government take decisions on complex matters in this field (Pesendorfer, 2007, p. 72).

In this context, the relatively modest environmental PI reform activity of the Sinowatz III cabinet during its period in office consisted in the adoption of one PI measure, the *Federal Constitutional Law on Comprehensive Environmental Protection* (1984) that established the notion of "comprehensive environmental protection" ("*umfassender Umweltschutz*") which it defined as the preservation of the natural environment as the basis of human life from harmful influences, especially through measures against the pollution of air, water, and soil, and the prevention of noise disturbance (Orth, 2007). It further assigned responsibilities for environmental protection to the different levels of the State.

The literature interprets this (only) PI measure as linked to the high amount of public interest in environmental issues, but also shows that the partisan politics within a federal set-up characterised by highly interdependent political decision-making limited the amount of PI reforms adopted nationally. The only PI measure adopted was part of the government's response to two major political conflicts over environmental issues in 1974 and 1984, when the government was defeated by public mass resistance against public investments in energy production, and the foundation of the Green party in 1984. Those incidents led to a restructuring of the Austrian political system and the constitutional law was supposed to

signal the government's commitment to environmental matters in that context. In 1985, the government also created the Federal Environmental Agency (OECD, 2003a, p. 116). According to Lauber (2004), environmental issues were a priority of the government in the second half of the 1980s, as expressed in the salience of these issues in their electoral manifestos. Policy was made "in response to grass-roots political pressure" (pp. 53, 55) and Parliament tended to play an important role (p. 53). During this period, the political parties "emancipate[d] themselves somewhat from the grip of the social partners on environment and energy issues" (p. 53) and began making policy outside the practice of social partnership and corporatist politics that were responsible for the otherwise great continuity and long-term policy planning of Austria's legislative agenda during that time (p. 55).

The highly interdependence between the levels of Austrian federalism when it comes to political decision-making (Fallend, 2015; Karlhofer, 2015) seem relevant for explaining the little PI reform intensity, in particular as they are combined with a relatively weak federal ministry that detained only parts of the portfolio of environmental policy functions. Most provinces were headed by conservative governments and opposed the ministry's policy initiatives mainly out of their general opposition to the Socialist government which in turn tried to avoid conflict (Glatz, 1980, pp. 204-205). This is in spite of the distribution of environmental policy competences between the levels of the federation, where the provinces detained only a small amount: according to Glatz (1980), about 80 % of the competences for environmental matters were located at the federal level, especially in the ministries for Agriculture, for Trade, Commerce and Industry, for Transport, and for Construction (p. 205).

These illustrations help understand differences between the cases of the same truth table row, where only in one case where a large ministry was present, the Lubbers III case, and the combined presence of a left-of-centre government and issue salience would lead to expect a relatively high output of environmental PI reforms. On the one hand, there are differences in the informal status and structure of the 'large' Environmental ministries. In Austria, the environmental part of the large ministry lacked power, was only loosely coupled with the rest and somehow diluted within it; in the Netherlands, VROM was an important player in the government and was more internally integrated. Also, the lack of 'executive capacity', which both cases share, had different effects on the outcome: in Austria, the cooperative system of federalism allows the Länder to act as veto players against federal measures in areas of shared competences, while in the Netherlands, the political system is centralised and the lack of 'executive capacity' in minority governments is compensated by the consensual political culture.

Another unexplained case worthwhile a more detailed examination is Sweden's Carlsson IV-Persson I cabinet (1995-1998). This case is a member of the outcome, like all other cabinets

of Sweden, but the only case with membership in the outcome of truth table row 19.⁸⁶ The cases nested in Sweden are characterised by a high continuity as regards both the ministerial portfolio (policy functions were concentrated during the whole period) as well as their level of PI, as all Swedish cabinets between 1987 and 2002 were active PI reformers. The Carlsson IV-Persson I is in a different truth table row than its predecessor, the Carlsson III cabinet, because both cases are different as regards the political composition of the government and the level of salience of environmental issues, but these two conditions do not seem to create decisive differences as regards policy outputs. As regards the salience of environmental issues, it effectively declined in the election in 1994, leading the Green party to leave Parliament again, but the Greens returned forcefully as early as the 1995 elections to the European Parliament (Lundqvist, 1997, p. 53). Also, the analysis above already underlined the consensual stances of Sweden's major political parties as regards environmental policy. In spite of the change of government, under the SAP from 1995 onwards the government was (again) committed to EPI at a high level as reflected in the PM's 'green people's home' statement (Nilsson & Persson, 2008, p. 227). In terms of environmental PI reforms adopted, the government further made steps in two directions: first, it developed the decentralised approach that mainstreamed EPI in government organisations by adopting the sectoral responsibility principle (1998), introducing Environmental Management Systems (1997) and defining national environmental quality objectives (1999); second, by centralising environmental policy coordination within the cabinet: in the wake of the OECD review mentioned above, the Persson I cabinet briefly experimented with other inter-ministerial coordination devices by establishing an interdepartmental delegation of ministers, the *Delegation for Ecologically Sustainable Development* in 1997. Situated within the Cabinet, it consisted of the Ministers of Environment, Agriculture, Taxation, Basic Education and the Ministers of Environment, Agriculture, Taxation, Basic Education and the Junior Minister of Labour (Lundqvist, 1998, p. 249) and had the task of proposing instruments for ecologically sustainable development. However, it was dismantled soon afterwards (Nilsson & Persson, 2008, p. 227).

2.2 Environmental PI in the 2000s and 2010s (analysis 2)

The analysis of environmental policy integration in the 2000s and 2010s covers 37 cases, 18 out of which are members of the outcome.⁸⁷ Cases with membership in the outcome are those cabinets that had above average PI reform activity among the nine countries in the 2000s and

⁸⁶ Therefore, this case is even a deviant case of path 2 of the most parsimonious solution term for the *absence* of the outcome (cf. Appendix B, analysis 1).

⁸⁷ The fuzzy scores are displayed in Appendix B, Analysis 2.

2010s. New Zealand does not have any case with membership in the outcome. This is congruent with the observation that New Zealand adopted comparatively little PI reforms during these two decades (Bührs, 2002b, p. 331). Only one cabinet with membership in the outcome is from each of the three countries Australia (Gillard II-Rudd II, 2011-13), Germany (Merkel I, 2006-09) and the UK (Blair II, 2001-04). Three cabinets each come from Austria (Schüssel I, 2000-02; Schüssel III, 2003-06; Gusenbauer, 2007-08), Canada (Harper I, 2006-08; Harper II, 2009-10; Harper III, 2011-14), France (Raffarin I-III & Villepin, 2002-06; Fillon I-IV, 2007-11; Ayrault & Valls, 2012-14), the Netherlands (Kok II&III, 1999-2002; Balkenende IV-V, 2007-10; Rutte I-II, 2012-14), and Sweden (Persson II, 1999-2002; Persson IIIA, 2003-04; Reinfeldt II, 2011-14).

The truth table analysis⁸⁸ reveals that while no condition is individually sufficient for the presence of the outcome PIACT, the condition LARGE comes closest to being individually sufficient for an outcome PIACT.⁸⁹ Neither is any condition individually sufficient for ~PIACT, but EXECDOM comes closest to a statement of sufficiency.⁹⁰ Those countries where the executive capacity of the national government is high, in particular New Zealand and the UK, were among those countries with the least PI reform activity during this period. None of the organisational conditions is thus a consistent superset or subset of the outcome; i.e., neither the concentration of the portfolio nor a large ministry explains the high level of PI reform activity of those governments that prepared or adopted a high number of EPI reforms during the 2000s and 2010s.

The most parsimonious solution for the outcome PIACT contains six Prime Implicants, i.e., it identifies six sufficient combinations of conditions on which the data provide evidence that they are causally relevant.⁹¹ The solution is ambiguous about the fifth and sixth Prime Implicants, i.e., it suggests that both paths can explain parts of the outcome with similar levels of consistency and coverage.

Model 1: ~CONC * ~LARGE * ~EXECDOM + LARGE * ~HGOVR * SALG +
 CONC * ~LARGE * ~HGOVR * ~SALG + CONC * LARGE * HGOVR * ~SALG
 + (~CONC * LARGE * SALG) → PIACT

⁸⁸ Cf. Appendix B, Analysis 2. When comparing the parameters for the conditions HGOVR and GOVR, and SALHG and SALG, respectively, HGOVR and SALG have slightly higher consistency scores than GOVR and SALHG; therefore, the truth table analyses include HGOVR and SALG. The nine truth table rows that are most consistently associated with an outcome PIACT are used for producing the solutions.

⁸⁹ Parameters of the sufficiency relation of LARGE and PIACT: consistency = 0.651, coverage = 0.616, PRI = 0.585.


⁹⁰ Parameters of the sufficiency relation of EXECDOM and ~PIACT: consistency = 0.662, coverage = 0.564, PRI = 0.610.

⁹¹ The parameters for the conditions HGOVR and SALG have slightly higher consistency scores for sufficiency than GOVR and SALHG respectively; therefore, the truth table analysis includes HGOVR and SALG (cf. Appendix B, Analysis 2).

Model 2: $\sim\text{CONC} * \sim\text{LARGE} * \sim\text{EXECDOM} + \text{LARGE} * \sim\text{HGOVR} * \text{SALG} +$
 $\text{CONC} * \sim\text{LARGE} * \sim\text{HGOVR} * \sim\text{SALG} +$
 $\text{CONC} * \text{LARGE} * \text{HGOVR} * \sim\text{SALG} +$
 $(\sim\text{CONC} * \sim\text{EXECDOM} * \text{SALG}) \rightarrow \text{PIACT}$

Thus, these INUS combinations of conditions appear as jointly sufficient for governments' high PI reform activity in environmental policy in the 2000s and 2010s. Figure 24 provides an overview of the typical and deviant cases associated with each path.

Figure 24: Solution paths and cases (analysis 2)



A first glance at the solution term suggests that the sufficient combinations of conditions are more diverse as regards the organisational conditions than those of Analysis 1. In particular, all four organisational configurations (i.e., possible combinations of type of ministry [LARGE vs. $\sim\text{LARGE}$] and portfolio spread [CONC vs. $\sim\text{CONC}$]) feature in the six paths. In contrast to analysis 1, also the absence of either organisational condition is contained in the Prime Implicants; in other words, fragmented portfolio and the absence of a large ministry both appear as necessary parts of sufficient solution paths.

This section analyses each of the redundancy-free causal configurations of the most parsimonious solution. It starts with those paths that are mostly dominated by organisational and institutional conditions (path 1 in particular, but also paths 5 and 6) and that have some

common coverage (i.e., shared typical cases). It then goes on to examine path 3, and finally paths 4 and 2, which are dominated by political conditions.

Fragmented portfolio, absent large ministry, absent executive capacity (path 1)

This configuration of conditions (~CONC * ~LARGE * ~EXECDOM → PIACT) shows that cabinets that combined an environmental portfolio that was horizontally fragmented between ministries of government with the absence of a large ministry for the Environment and that possessed only weak executive capacity were active environmental PI reformers at a high level of consistency (0.925). This path is unexpected from a theoretical point of view and has small coverage, with two typical cases – the successive conservative Harper I (2006-2008) and Harper II (2009-2010) cabinets – nested in Canada. It grasps Canada’s experience of EPI after the turn of the century and within the federal setting, where environmental policy competences were fragmented vertically between the levels of the federal state as well as horizontally within the federal government. Canada is one of the most decentralised jurisdictions with regard to environmental policy and this plays an important role for Canadian EPI (Harrison, 1996). The provinces detain primary jurisdiction over natural resources – more precisely, they “regulate air emissions, water and wastewater treatment and discharges, waste management (with the exception of transboundary movement of waste), land use, development of natural resources and protection of wildlife” (OECD, 2017, p. 83) – and Canada has a history of federal deference especially as regards environmental assessment (Harrison, 1996). Paehlke (2002) explains that the federal government of Canada was always “generally hesitant to duplicate provincial efforts of any kind” and cautious not only to take over more policy competences but even to enforce federal legislation on environmental matters; instead, it had rather argued in favour of provincial jurisdiction on environmental matters (p. 130, pp. 142-143). Within the jurisdiction of Environment Canada, turf wars raged between the headquarters and regional units (Leiss, 2001, p. 170).

During the time in office of the Harper I and Harper II cabinets between 2006 and 2010, the Canadian federal government adopted a series of EPI reforms. The Harper I cabinet adopted the *Federal Sustainable Development Act (FSDA)* (2008) that provided the Canadian government with a legal framework regulating the development and implementation of a *Federal Sustainable Development Strategy (FSDS)* and it also provided for the creation of a *Sustainable Development Office (SDO)* within the *Department of the Environment* (Benidickson, 2016, p. 51). In 2010, the first cycle of the FSDS for the years 2010 to 2013 was adopted, defining goals, targets, and implementation strategies for 37 departments and agencies (Rommel, 2012). In the same year, the *Cabinet Directive on the Environmental Assessment of Policy, Plan and Program Proposals* made strategic environmental assessment

mandatory for proposals that may result in important positive or negative environmental effects (OECD, 2017, p. 87).

During both cabinets' time in office, the federal ministry for the Environment, *Environment Canada*, was a single-issue ministry that detained only some competences for environmental policy, which were fragmented between ministries of the federal government. *Environment Canada* lacked resources and was globally perceived as a weak governmental actor. Created in 1971, *Environment Canada* had a markedly scientific professional profile, which translated into a lack of policy competence (Doern & Conway, 1994; Hawke, 2002). From the onset, *Environment Canada* "saw its scientific and technical capacity as a central pillar of its hoped-for influence" (Doern & Conway, 1994, p. 19). Therefore, it "filled its professional staff slots with scientists, sought to align many of its program delivery functions in terms of the scientific description of reality, and sent forth these highly trained legions into policy battles – but it was unable to "translate" scientific competence into policy competence, as perceived by many others within the federal bureaucracy" (Hawke, 2002, p. 173). During the 1990s, the federal government institutionalised new roles for sustainable development policy, but these were placed outside the ministry (Bouder, 2002).⁹²

In support of the combination of conditions of this path, Remmel (2012) links the adoption of the FSDA to the failure of the previous ten years of decentralised sustainable development planning in the federal government, as well as a response to the Canadian government's international commitments (p. 5). Her analysis points more specifically to the failure of the 1995 *Auditor General Act* and the *Commissioner of the Environment and Sustainable Development (CESD)* to make the departmental SD strategies effective. Coordination was weak both horizontally, given the absence of a government-wide SD strategy, and vertically, given the weaknesses of the decentralised approach to federal SD planning. Importantly, the FSDA changed the legal setting for federal sustainability policy in the Canadian federal system by implementing a whole-of-government approach which involves all levels of government (Remmel, 2012, p. 6). With the FSDS, *Environment Canada* was endowed with a formal coordination role through the creation of the SDO, which became responsible for developing and maintaining systems and procedures to monitor progress on the implementation of the FSDS. The latter was under the responsibility of the minister of the Environment but involved several administrative units across the federal government. In particular, it required 26 federal departments and agencies to prepare their own SD strategies to comply with the FSDS (Benidickson, 2016, p. 51; OECD, 2017, p. 114). As a consequence, the OECD found

⁹² In particular, the National Round Table on the Environment and Economy (NRTEE), an entity under the direct responsibility of the Prime Minister that should "serve as a catalyst in identifying, explaining and promoting the principles and practices of sustainable development" in all sectors of Canadian society. It focused mainly on the economic and environmental aspects of sustainable development (Bouder, 2002, p. 49).

coordination between the federal environment, health and other departments improved, particularly in the framework of the FSDS (OECD, 2017, p. 26). The FSDS also enabled the “linking of sustainable development to the Government’s general and budgetary planning and reporting processes” (Rommel, 2012, p. 6), thus making it a routine part of other formal government processes. The cases of these two Canadian cabinets illustrate that a setting in which competences were fragmented both horizontally between ministries of government and vertically within a federal setting led to the adoption of PI reforms that compensated for administrative fragmentation through the institutionalisation of horizontal and vertical mechanisms of policy coordination when the issue became salient on the political agenda.⁹³

Fragmented portfolio, salience, (large ministry or absent executive capacity) (paths 5 and 6)

The most parsimonious solution features two further sufficient combinations (path 5: **~CONC * LARGE * SALG → PIACT** and path 6: **~CONC * ~EXECDOM * SALG → PIACT**) but the model is ambiguous about which of them explains the outcome better. Both configurations share two conditions: they concur that in the 2000s and 2010s, governments where the environmental policy functions were fragmented across ministries and on whose agendas environmental issues were salient, adopted a relatively high amount of environmental PI reforms if an additional condition was met: either the government had a large ministry (path 5), or it lacked executive capacity (path 6). These paths are indifferent to the ideological position of the cabinet on the right-left scale.

Path 6 bears some similarities with path 1 insofar as it also combines a fragmented portfolio of environmental policy functions and the lack of executive capacity, but instead of the absence of a large ministry (path 1), points at the presence of issue salience in explaining the adoption of relatively many PI reforms. This path has a high level of consistency (0.963) and a level of coverage comparable to path 1 with 12.7 % of the outcome explained. It captures the experiences of two typical cases: The Harper II cabinet that governed Canada between 2009 and 2010, and the Rutte I-II cabinet that governed the Netherlands between 2012 and 2014. As regards the former, the inclusion of this case in two different paths shows that there are two explanations, one pointing at similarities between the two cabinets within one country, and a second one pointing at similarities between two cases in different countries but that share a high level of salience as an INUS condition. Harper II was a minority multi-party coalition under the leadership of CPC and environmental issues were salient in the coalition

⁹³ There is no evidence to support the argument that the conservative partisanship of the cabinets was relevant for explaining PI, although the conservative solution suggests that it may have been contextually relevant. This path of the most parsimonious solution has been created by using the simplifying assumptions provided by the logical remainders in truth table rows 1 and 2 as counterfactuals, which led to the exclusion of the condition ‘HGOVR’ from the path (cf. Appendix B, Analysis 2).

parties' manifestos. International developments may have played a role here, given that the FSDS was partly a response to the Canadian government's international commitments (Rommel, 2012, p. 5). But the literature on Canadian environmental politics also shows that the above-mentioned ineffectiveness of federal SD planning was the object of criticism from Parliamentarians, NGOs and other stakeholders, who long pointed to the danger of a general "race to the bottom" in Canadian environmental policy (Paehlke, 2002, pp. 142-143), and led to a review of this policy when the need for a change of approach became obvious in 2007 (Rommel, 2012). This concern was mirrored by public interest as polls showed that around a third of Canadians identified the environment as the single most important issue, the "highest ever levels of public concern for the environment in Canadian public opinion polling" (Winfield, 2009, p. 77). In other words, the Harper governments were "elected during a wave of intense public interest in environmental issues and increasing international pressure to act on climate change" (Lakanen, 2018, p. 555). In particular given the Harper cabinets' otherwise poor environmental policy performance (Lakanen, 2018), the salience of the environmental issue and voters' concern for it appears as a similarly plausible explanation for the federal government's PI reform activity especially given the mentioned criticism of the decentralised approach of the previous years.

Path 5 is in line with the theoretical expectations as regards both the organisational and the political factors. It shows that when the portfolio was fragmented and the ministry a large one and environmental issues featured prominently on governments' electoral agendas, governments tended to adopt relatively many PI reforms at a high level of consistency (0.905). In terms of coverage, this path is exclusive to the Netherlands. The Netherlands are the only country to have adopted an organisational configuration of portfolio fragmentation and large ministry during the 2000s and 2010s. It covers two typical cases, the Kok II-III (1999-2002) and Rutte I-II (2012-2014) cabinets that governed the Netherlands at two different moments in time: at the turn of the millennium and ten years later. The Netherlands' environmental policy-making makes a strong case for the problems induced by the fragmentation of the environmental competences between different ministries. As Liefferink and Van der Zouwen (2004) demonstrate, the plurality of ministries and formal coordination bodies involved in the inter-ministerial negotiation of common negotiation positions in response to EC proposals in the field of environmental policy was "ineffective at developing and sustaining coherent national positions". In spite of this, the inter-ministerial approach to environmental policy coordination led to more PI reform activity in the Netherlands after the turn of the millennium than during the previous two decades. Among the four cabinets of the Netherlands, which are all similar as regards the ministerial organisation of the policy functions, three were active PI reformers, and this path suggests that the salience of environmental issues explains the adoption of relatively many PI reforms by two of them. Issue salience is a plausible explanation

in the Dutch context in particular for several reasons, most importantly the Dutch public's generally high level of interest in environmental concerns, which is paralleled by the strength of environmental NGOs. The latter have high levels of membership in the population, participate actively in governmental consultations and promote societal awareness of ecological interdependences (Arts et al., 2002, pp. 205-208).

Left-of-centre government, absent salience, concentrated portfolio, absent large ministry (path 3)

The second configuration of conditions (**CONC * ~LARGE * ~HGOVR * ~SALG → PIACT**) shows that a small part of the observed environmental PI reform activity during the 2000s and 2010s was adopted by left-of-centre governments that do *not* perceive the issue to be salient for voters when one specific organisational configuration was present, notably when the environmental portfolio was concentrated and not combined within a large ministry. This configuration is theoretically unexpected. Although the presence of a left-of-centre reference party is expected to favour PI reform outputs, the combination with the necessary absence of salience is surprising. In spite of its low coverage, its high consistency score makes a closer look at the cases concerned by this configuration worthwhile. With typical two cases in two countries, this path has small coverage. It captures the experiences of the second cabinet led by Göran Persson that governed Sweden between 1999 and 2002, as well as France's government led first by Jean-Pierre Raffarin and then by Dominique de Villepin between 2002 and 2006. This cabinet is the successor of the Jospin cabinet discussed as a typical case in Analysis 1 above (paths 3 and 4, pp. 190-191) and the predecessor of the Fillon government (cf. path 2, pp. 217-220).

Both cases have full membership in the outcome set with fuzzy scores of 1. During the time in office of the Persson II cabinet (1999-2002), the Swedish government adopted the *Environmental Code* as well as 15 national environmental quality objectives in 1999. In 2002, the *National Strategy for Sustainable Development* was adopted, one of the few SD strategies internationally that formulates an operational, goal-oriented approach (Nordbeck & Steurer, 2016, p. 7). In 2002, the government also introduced the *Environmental Objectives Council* which ought to "evaluate and report on progress, identify contradictions among EQOs and other objectives, propose indicators", among others (Nilsson & Persson, 2008, p. 233; OECD, 2004a, p. 40). In France, during this cabinet, a national sustainable development policy became institutionalised and environmental issues extended to various policy sectors. The first *National Strategy for Sustainable Development (SNDD)* adopted in 2003 contained 400 measures regarding agriculture, transport and energy as well as new information and education instruments. It further aimed at reducing greenhouse gases and energy consumption, protecting biodiversity, and research and technological innovation.

Environmental concerns were also integrated into sectoral policies, especially territorial development and environmental health, the latter particularly focusing on air pollution. An environmental health policy materialised with the first *National Health Environment Plan* adopted in 2004 that aimed at helping public authorities develop a better strategic vision on health risks connected with exposure to the environment in the broadest sense (including outdoor as well as indoor environment and the work environment) (OECD, 2005, p. 101). It focused on both introducing environmental and health priorities into other policies (especially into legislation on air, water, waste, and soils) and the development of a national strategy on air pollution and quality. A *Charter for the Environment* was adopted in 2004 and incorporated into the preamble of the Constitution in 2005, alongside human, economic, and social rights, and obtained thus the same legal value as the Constitution itself. The Charter emphasises the integration of environmental, economic, and social policy goals and human rights regarding the quality of the environment, from which it deduces rights and duties for both individuals and the State. The Charter gives environmental principles constitutional legitimacy and includes the possibility of appeals before the Constitutional Court if governmental acts transgress its principles (Bourg & Whiteside, 2007).

In the case of Sweden's Persson II cabinet inter-ministerial environmental policy coordination was important in the second half of the 1990s when the government turned towards a decentralised approach to EPI. SEPA observes that other agencies had adhered to the decentralised approach at the turn of the century, for instance as regards the *Environmental Management Systems (EMS)* introduced in 1997, with which the vast majority of government organisations had gotten to work by 2005 (SEPA, 2005, p. 8). In France, this cabinet corresponds to the period of the *Ministry for Ecology and Sustainable Development*, created in May 2002. The ministry was strengthened through reorganisations made in 2000 which in creating the IGE put an end to the ministry's dependence on other ministries to fulfil its inspection missions, and the creation of the directorate in charge of economic studies and environmental evaluation (D4E) (cf. Analysis 1, p. 188).

The solution path attributes the high level of PI reform activity to the combination of a left-of-centre government that did not feature environmental issues saliently in its electoral campaign. This combination of conditions is unexpected and the cases do not clearly support that it led to the adoption of relatively many PI reforms across cases. In the case of the second cabinet led by Göran Persson and the Social Democratic SAP, there is evidence that the turn towards sustainable development led the governing parties to de-emphasise environmental issues. Lundqvist (1998) observes that Persson presented sustainable development as a 'win-win' issue because it created demands for investments in new technology and infrastructure, which in turn created growth and employment opportunities (p. 250). The French case also points to issue competition dynamics. The Charter featured among the campaign proposals of

the conservative presidential candidate Jacques Chirac who endorsed ecologic topics in general and the Charter in particular – an idea that had existed in France since the early 1970s⁹⁴ – starting in 2001 (Bourg, 2005, p. 2).⁹⁵ The timing of the Charter’s announcement one year before the presidential election and during cohabitation government makes party competition a likely motive, for the idea seduced ecologists while dividing left-wing parties (Priour, 2008, p. 51). The vote about the Charter in the National Assembly divided the Socialist Party’s leadership (Batho, 2014, p. 199) and the socialist and communist groups in the Assembly abstained from voting (Bourg, 2005, p. 4). Scholars concur that Chirac’s political will was at the main driver behind the adoption of the Charter (Bourg & Whiteside, 2007) and that the Charter represents a symbolic political measure that does not concern the administration (Interviews 1 and 2).⁹⁶ Still, its principles clearly frame governmental policy decisions (OECD, 2005, p. 64; Lascoumes, 2008, pp. 43–45). The administration was not directly involved in the elaboration of its text, which was prepared by a working group and two committees of the Assembly, and revised by the General Secretary of the Government and the President’s cabinet in a sense that reduced the scope of its application (Bourg & Whiteside, 2007, p. 128). In order to further probe the role of the government’s partisanship for this combination, the German Merkel I cabinet takes the role of a counterfactual case for the partisanship

⁹⁴ The idea to insert environmental rights into the French Constitution had existed since the early 1970s. A preparatory report to the 1970 “Programme des cent mesures pour l’environnement” which is generally considered as the origin of French environmental policy (Lascoumes, 2008, p. 43) already contained the idea of granting the right to a healthy environment maximum legitimacy as a “guiding principle” by integrating it into the French Constitution, and the idea of a charter to protect the environment also federated environmental NGOs in the early years of the French ecological movement (Aspe & Jacqu , 2012, p. 111). The idea was also debated several times in the National Assembly during the 1970s and resurfaced in the form of parliamentary initiatives in 1989 and 1995 (Kosciusko-Morizet, 2004, pp. 17-20).

⁹⁵ Chirac first endorsed the Charter publicly in 2001 in a speech: “Au nom de cet id al, l’ cologie, le droit   un environnement prot g  et pr serv  doit  tre consid r    l’ gal des libert s publiques. Il revient   l’Etat d’en affirmer le principe et d’en assurer la garantie. Et je souhaite que cet engagement public et solennel soit inscrit dans une charte de l’environnement adoss e   la Constitution et qui en consacrerait les principes fondamentaux, cinq principes fondamentaux afin qu’ils soient admis au nombre des principes fondamentaux reconnus par les lois de la R publique, et   ce titre bien entendu s’imposant   toutes les juridictions.” (Chirac, 2001)

⁹⁶ Observers found that the Charter remained ambiguous about the relative importance of these objectives (Bourg, 2011, pp. 138–140), a point that was central to debates when the draft was prepared (Kosciusko-Morizet, 2004, pp. 116). Environmental NGOs found that the draft subordinated the environmental to the others and advocated that the order in which the terms appear be inversed. The final report argued that article 6 did not rank the principles (Kosciusko-Morizet, 2004, pp. 116), while conceding that the parallelism of the three pillars was not yet expressed satisfyingly. The first years of application deceived the expectations of environmental NGOs (Bourg & Whiteside, 2007, p. 129). After evidence that the high courts at first “anaesthetized” the Charter by denying it judicial applicability (Huten & Cohendet, 2007), courts started applying the Charter’s principles from 2008 onwards and its application as seen through various implementing regulations also appeared as reinforcing its effectiveness (Huten & Cohendet, 2010).

condition.⁹⁷ This right-of-centre cabinet also adopted some PI measures, but to a more limited extent than the cabinets that are typical for this path. It adopted a *National Strategy on Biological Diversity* that integrated the protection of biodiversity into various sectoral policies and formulated targets, timeframes, and instruments (OECD, 2012a, p. 33). In 2008, environmental components were integrated into the Stimulus and Consolidation Package (representing about 13% of the total recovery package), e.g. for energy efficient building refurbishment, research and development for electro-mobility, a car scrapping programme (in German, “Umweltprämie”), and the revision of the passenger car tax based on CO2 emissions (OECD, 2012a, p. 63). The OECD however qualified these measures as internally inconsistent and an un-coordinated policy mix (OECD, 2012a, p. 63). The government also introduced a sustainability criterion into the existing regulatory impact assessment procedure for new legislation, as well as into the standing orders of the federal government (OECD, 2012a, pp. 30 and 38). However, the right-of-center governing coalition of CDU/CSU opposed the creation of a unifying *Environmental Act* (in German, “Umweltgesetzbuch”), which led to a continued failure of this project (Wurzel, 2008, p. 191). Although the Merkel I coalition agreement claimed commitment to the principles of environmental PI and sustainable development, the re-arrangement of environmental law and nature protection policy were clearly secondary fields for action of this government as compared to climate policy (Jänicke, 2010, pp. 489–499). Climate policy as an area of federal policy-making gained in priority as compared to the environmental protection and nature conservation policy (Huß, 2015; Stecker, 2015). As Blühdorn (2009) observed, in its process of programmatic reinvention, the Green party also embraced new policy positions supposed to make the party benefit electorally from the unprecedented level of attention devoted to climate change (p. 46).

In addition, there is some evidence supporting the contextual relevance of the absence of executive capacity, although the path suggests that is not a necessary part of this sufficient path at the cross-case level. The period in office of the Persson II cabinet in Sweden corresponds to a Swedish presidency of the Council of the EU. According to SEPA, “work on environmental integration at EU level is an important element in promoting sustainable development” and EU-level developments led Sweden to stress the importance of environmental integration in particular (SEPA, 2005, p. 9). This was linked to what SEPA calls a ‘Cardiff Process’ for environmental integration into sector policies that was initiated in 1998 with regard to nine sectors (SEPA, 2005, p. 9). Europeanisation had also drastically changed the role of the ministry for the Environment and its relationship especially with agencies as well as expanded its staff (Kronsell, 2004). In the case of France, some evidence points to

⁹⁷ The Merkel I cabinet is a member of a different truth table row (19), which is similar to the cases of this path on all conditions except for the cabinet’s right or left-of-centre partisanship. In addition, this case is also a member of the outcome, while the other two cabinets of this truth table row are not.

supra-national agenda-setting, which played a role for the adoption of the *National Health Environment Plan* that responded to the EU's Sixth Environment Action Program, which includes an Environment and Health component.

Concentrated portfolio and large ministry, right-of-centre cabinet, absent salience (path 4)

This configuration of conditions (**CONC * LARGE * HGOVR * ~SALG → PIACT**) demonstrates that right-of-centre cabinets that did not perceive environmental issues to be salient for voters but concentrated the policy functions for the Environment within one ministry and combined them with other interdependent policy functions in a large ministry, were active environmental PI reformers during the 2000 and 2010s at a decent level of consistency (0.831).

This path covers only a small subset of the empirical evidence but points to a theoretically interesting combination of conditions. The theoretical framework (cf. Chapter 1) did not expect right-of-centre cabinet for which environmental issues were not salient to adopt a high level of PI reforms. It suggested, however, that many PI reforms outputs could be expected under the organisational configuration of portfolio concentration and a 'large' ministry: this configuration makes administrative integrative capacity as part of a mechanism by which administrative PI entrepreneurship is linked to PI plausible. Interestingly, however, this path suggests that this organisational configuration led to a high level of PI reforms *only* when combined with political factors that were deemed unfavourable for the adoption of PI reforms.

This combination captures the experiences of two typical cases in two different countries: the first cabinet led by Schüssel in Austria between 2000 and 2002, as well as the Blair II cabinet that governed the United Kingdom between 2001 and 2004. Both cases are well documented in the literatures on environmental PI and sustainable development. Both cabinets adopted a relatively high number of environmental PI reforms during their times in office. Under the Blair II cabinet, the Labour government broadened the scope of sustainable development and more strongly incorporated the social and economic dimensions and also strengthened the horizontal coordination mechanisms (Russel, 2007, p. 191). In 2002, the government broadened the focus of the *Greening Government Initiative* from improving the environmental performance of government to all dimensions of SD, so that it also included a consideration of economic and social impacts (Jenkins, 2002, p. 585). In the 2002 Spending Review, the government introduced a compulsory *Sustainable Development Report* for all departments (Russel & Jordan, 2009, p. 1212). In 2004, it replaced EPA as well as ten separate policy appraisal systems with a more integrated and cross-government form of Regulatory Impact Assessment that was meant to assess regulatory, economic, social and environmental impacts of new policy proposals (Russel & Jordan, 2007, p. 3). Under this cabinet, the government also

prepared the third *Strategy for Sustainable Development* “Securing the Future” (adopted in 2005) including a UK-wide common *Sustainable Development Framework* consisting of a series of shared guiding principles and four priority areas for action (Jones, 2006, pp. 126–128). Austrian EPI in the 2000s took place exclusively at the goal-strategic level and followed the sustainable development paradigm. During the Schüssel I cabinet’s time in office, Austria adopted the *Climate Strategy* that entailed goals to reduce emissions with regard to energy policy, waste policy, traffic, industry policy, and agriculture (Casado-Asensio & Steurer, 2015, p. 107). In 2002, it also adopted the *National Strategy for Sustainable Development (NSTRAT)* that established the principle of sustainability in federal policies and set 20 key objectives in the areas quality of life, competitiveness, environment and international responsibility. It further established an overarching governance framework and was to be implemented through annual work programmes outlining specific measures and annual progress reports (OECD, 2003a, pp. 44 and 49). Sectoral strategies for climate policy followed in 2002, 2004, and 2007 (Casado-Asensio & Steurer, 2015, p. 107) and a biodiversity policy strategy in 2005 (OECD, 2013a, p. 44).

Both cases share a major similarity insofar as they created large ministries for the Environment upon taking office. The concentration of all ministerial environmental policy competences has been characteristic of the UK’s ministerialisation of environmental policy since the 1970s (cf. Analysis 1) (Jordan, 2002a). As regards the combination of jurisdictions, however, the Blair II cabinet performed the first major change in decades, by splitting the DoE’s successor, the *Department of Environment, Transport and Regions (DETR)* and creating instead the *Department of Environment, Food and Rural Affairs (DEFRA)* through a fusion of the Environment portfolio with the *Ministry of Agriculture, Fisheries and Food (MAFF)* and a small part of the Home Office. Upon taking office, the Schüssel I cabinet created the *Federal Ministry for Agriculture, Forestry, Environment and Water Management (BMLFUW)*, nicknamed “Ministry of Life” (“Lebensministerium” in German) by fusing the ministries for the Environment and Agriculture. Both ministries had been headed by representatives of the People’s Party’s eco-social current prior to the fusion (Lauber, 2000, pp. 38–39). In parallel, the government undertook a consolidation of the ministry’s tasks and reduced its budget (Pesendorfer, 2007, p. 195). BMLFUW’s environmental policy jurisdiction comprised general environmental protection and coordination of environmental policy, waste policy, protection of biodiversity and landscapes, radiation protection and coordination of nuclear policy (Federal Republic of Austria, 2000).

The reorganisation by the Blair II cabinet followed the widespread perception that DETR had failed to deal adequately with an outbreak of the Foot and Mouth disease (Begg & Gray, 2004). It has also been attributed to the government’s intent to shift agricultural policy towards more support for rural policy actions unrelated to agricultural production, such as the nexus

between agriculture and environment protection and conservation measures (Barling et al., 2002, p. 560). Reports by the Environmental Audit Committee (ECA) show that it feared DEFRA becoming “a department that is principally concerned with rural affairs” (Jenkins, 2002, p. 584) and that by losing transport and local planning responsibilities, the environmental ministry’s impact on these crucial aspects of sustainable development policy would be reduced (Russel & Jordan, 2008, p. 254). The ECA further criticised the reorganisation because it “absorbed huge amounts of administrative time, undid a great deal of work that had been done at the interface of environment and transport, and distracted ministers and senior officials from strategic initiatives like EPI” (Russel & Jordan, 2008, p. 254). Similarly, in **Austria**, the government presented the fusion of the ministries responsible for agricultural and environmental policy as an important strategic decision with a view to implementing the principle of sustainable development (BMLFUW, 2000; Bundesrat, 2000, pp. 33, 35, 39). However, the Social-democratic and Green parties opposed the fusion because they believed it depoliticised conflicts of interests between environmental and agricultural policy, and terminated environmental policy as such,⁹⁸ and critical stances were also voiced by other observers (Schleicher, 2001).

As regards the UK’s Blair II cabinet, Russel and Jordan (2008) find that “under Labour, the political status and comprehensiveness of the UK’s EPI system grew significantly” (p. 253) with a clear focus on sustainable development, although the ministry’s political status remained low (Russel, 2007, p. 197). Akin to UK environmental PI cases of the previous period (cf. Analysis 1), the adoption of PI measures under this cabinet was mostly driven by the environmental ministry, DEFRA, although the status and power of the environmental division within DEFRA remained low (Jordan, 2002a, p. 40; Begg & Gray, 2004, p. 156). The 2005 strategy was prepared by DEFRA’s *Sustainable Development Unit (SDU)* and the *Sustainable Development Commission (SDC)*, a formal, independent body that should act as an advisory body and was sponsored by the Cabinet Office (Jones, 2006, p. 129), and intensified the working relationship between both bodies (Jones, 2006, p. 130). In addition, it involved other ministries in an attempt to build shared ownership and move away from SD strategies being “an exercise led by the environment department” (Jones, 2006, p. 131). Russel (2007) reports that as a consequence of the lack of high-level commitment, the other ministries however refused to produce data through policy appraisal and reports and to use sustainable development mechanisms and tools effectively. In spite of measures adopted, the level of EPI in terms of influence on other sectors’ policy-making overall and outcomes in the UK remained low (Russel, 2007; Russel & Jordan, 2008, p. 260).

⁹⁸ Statements by Members of Parliament Alfred Gusenbauer (Social democratic Party) and Alexander Van der Bellen (Green Party), in: Neuverteilung von Kompetenzen der Bundesministerien, Parlamentskorrespondenz Nr. 100 vom 01.03.2000, online: https://www.parlament.gv.at/PAKT/PR/JAHR_2000/PK0100/#XXI_A_00085.

As regards Austria, Lauber (2004) observes that environment slipped down the domestic agenda in the second half of the 1990s, leading to a much-reduced role of pressure groups and the Parliament, and the government “return[ed] to the period of ‘benign neglect’ that prevailed before the intense conflicts of the 1980s” (p. 53). Besides, the Schüssel I cabinet curtailed participation rights in environmental policy procedures (OECD, 2013a, p. 49). At the same time, the Austrian People’s Party’s policy at that time was strongly influenced by the Austrian agriculture sector’s support for reorienting agricultural policy and subsidization towards non-polluting production techniques (Amann & Fischer-Kowalski, 2002, p. 62). The literature similarly hints at the environmental administration as major policy entrepreneur for environmental PI. Since the 1990s, the role of environmental policy in the ministry had expanded, according to Lauber (2000), who observes that the personnel had increased tenfold over less than a decade (pp. 38-39) and that the Europeanisation of environmental policy had strengthened the ministry’s domestic role (Lauber, 2004, p. 53). The minister for the Environment coordinated Austria’s positions on environmental policy domestically and negotiated environmental policy at the EU level, including for environmental matters that are under the jurisdiction of other ministries (Amann & Fischer-Kowalski, 2002, p. 57; Lauber, 2004, p. 53). Since the delimitation of the Austrian government ministries did not match the EU Council’s structure, the domestic lead ministry that coordinates the ministerial positions has an important leverage. This has allowed the minister for the Environment to make decisions regarding environmental protection autonomously during EU negotiations (Lauber, 2004, p. 53). Martinuzzi and Steurer (2005) observe that the elaboration of the SD strategy was led by a working group within BMLFUW throughout all its phases (p. 17), although it later created the inter-ministerial *Committee for a Sustainable Austria* that coordinated its implementation (OECD, 2003a, p. 48; Martinuzzi & Steurer, 2005, p. 20). Pesendorfer (2007) cites officials of BMLFUW’s environmental directorates asserting that the fusion had enhanced the coordination between the concerned directorates, while strengthening the ministry’s role at the European level (p. 196). This is also in line with Lauber’s (2004) observation that the implementation of environmental EU directives was rather de-politicized after Austria became an EU-member (p. 53).

Large ministry, left-of-centre government, salience (path 2)

The second configuration of conditions (**LARGE * ~HGOVR * SALG → PIACT**) shows that left-of-centre cabinets that had a large ministry for the Environment and on whose agendas environmental issues featured saliently were active environmental PI reformers at a high level of consistency (0.871). The conditions of this path individually as well as in combination are in line with the theoretical expectations. It appears as plausible that left-of-centre cabinets that perceive environmental issues as salient for voters adopt environmental PI reforms when a

large ministry for the Environment favoured the adoption of EPI reforms in particular through the organisational integration of environmental and sectoral policy functions. By implication, however, the path also shows that the combined presence of the political conditions expected to lead to PI reforms, i.e., left-of-centre government and issue salience, alone is not sufficient for producing EPI reforms when the additional condition of a 'large ministry' was unfulfilled.⁹⁹

This path has the highest coverage in the model, as it explains 28.6 % of the outcome across cases, and 16.7 % of the outcome are explained exclusively by this path and none other. It captures the experiences of five typical cases of cabinets with high PI reform activity. Its coverage is diverse with four countries represented among the typical cases: the Gillard II-Rudd II cabinet that governed Australia between 2011 and 2013; the cabinet led by Prime Minister Kok in the Netherlands between 1999 and 2002; the two successive cabinets, Schüssel III and Gusenbauer, that governed Austria between 2003 and 2008; as well as the government under Prime Minister Fillon in France (2007-2011).¹⁰⁰ In addition, this path features a deviant case in kind diminishing its consistency, the Swedish Persson IIIB cabinet (2005-2006).

Upon closer examination, the cases of the Gillard II-Rudd II cabinet and the Schüssel III and Gusenbauer cabinets share some similarities. Both are situated in federal settings, and in both cases major external crisis events preceded this period of relatively many PI reforms. In the case of Austria, major flood events affected the country during the year 2002 (OECD, 2003a, p. 75). During the time in office of the Schüssel III cabinet (2003-2006), which is the successor of the Schüssel cabinet covered by path 4 above (cf. pp. 212-215), the government of Austria adopted the *National Biodiversity Strategy* (OECD, 2013a, p. 44). The EPI reforms adopted during the Gusenbauer cabinet (2007-2008) reflect Austria's sustained turn towards the sustainable development paradigm in EPI that took place exclusively at the goal-strategic level during the 2000s. The government adopted the second *Climate Strategy* (2008-12) (Casado-Asensio & Steurer, 2015, p. 107) as well as the *Austrian Strategy for Sustainable Development* (ÖSTRAT) (Nordbeck & Steurer, 2016; OECD, 2013a, p. 72). The latter reinforced the institutional mechanisms for co-ordination between the national and subnational levels and provided for monitoring reports to be published every two years and a full evaluation every four years (OECD, 2013a, p. 72). Yet, the strategy's content mostly replicated the objectives already formulated in an earlier strategy adopted in 2002, and most of the action programs

⁹⁹ In particular, truth table row 6 with four typical cases, none of which is a member of the outcome set, and truth table 18 with two cases, one of is a member in the outcome set, provide evidence that all but one left-of-centre governments for which environmental issues were salient but that did not create a large ministry did not adopt environmental PI reforms.

¹⁰⁰ All of these cases except for the Netherlands' Kok II-III cabinet share the additional condition of concentrated ministerial competences for environmental policy.

were limited to soft regulations promoting corporate social responsibility (Nordbeck & Steurer, 2016, pp. 9–10). In the Australian case, when the Gillard II-Rudd II cabinet took office in 2010, both water policy and climate change were prominent on the policy agenda as a consequence of the millennium drought that affected Australia between 2002 and 2010. According to Dovers (2013), the drought led to “an environment-driven policy punctuation of unparalleled impact” and an outbreak of policy activity in water policy (p. 122), but its impact was likely felt beyond the water policy sector. Mackerras (2011) describes how climate change policy was the key policy problem in Australia in 2009 and 2010 that also polarised the political parties; as a consequence, the 2010 electoral campaign and the resulting minority coalition formed by Labour and the Greens focused on this issue. Within the Australian system of cooperative federalism, the Australian national government limited its environmental policy interventions to initiating and coordinating environmental strategies for urgent issues that affected the whole nation or several states or that concerned international obligations (Ross, 2008, p. 289). During the time in office of the Gillard II-Rudd II cabinet, the Australian government adopted some amendments to the *Environmental Protection and Biodiversity Conservation (EPBC) Act*, which provides the key nationwide framework for environment and heritage protection and biodiversity conservation. In 2011, it adopted a *Sustainable Population Strategy* that, without identifying any population targets, “sought to ensure that changes in population were compatible with ‘the sustainability of our economy, communities and environment’” (Burnett, 2015, p. 15). The strategy increased strategic (environmental) assessments under the EPBC Act in high growth areas (ibid.). In 2013, the government again amended the EPBC Act, adding the protection of water resources from coal energy developments as an additional matter of national environmental significance under the EPBC Act (OECD, 2019, p. 106). The second cabinet led by Julia Gillard also created the department for the environment became the *Department of Sustainability, Environment, Water, Population and Communities (DSWEPaC)* with a large portfolio covering environment and conservation, air quality, land contamination, meteorology, heritage, water policy, the coordination of a policy for sustainable communities, as well as population policy incl. housing affordability and built environment innovation (AAO, 14.10.2010, pp. 37-38). Finally, although the presence of a left-of-centre cabinet is an INUS condition at the cross-case level, the literature is inconclusive as regards the impact of party positions on Australian environmental policy. While Ross (2008) finds evidence for Conservative and Labour governments’ different approaches and priorities in EPI strategies in Australia, according to Dovers (2013) policy attention and style did not shift consistently with party politics.

Shortly after the presidential election of May 2007, the French government implemented a vast administrative reorganisation of several ministries. The reform included a fusion of the administrations of the three former ministries for Ecology, Equipment, and Industry, which

disappeared. They were replaced with a newly created ministry for Sustainable Development whose competences reached well beyond the realm of environmental protection and pollution prevention (Bonnaud et al., 2012; Lascoumes et al., 2014). The ministry's jurisdiction covered also climate policy and the prevention of risks, as well as transport policy, housing policy, and spatial planning. At the highest organisational level of the ministries, 35 directorates were fused into five general directorates (DGs). This fusion has been perceived by many as the outcome of a long history of bureaucratic competition and the decline of the traditional Ministry for Equipment, which some found was "losing steam" from the second half of the 1980s onwards (Duran, 2001; Maugard, 2013). It appeared as a solution that would allow to adjust the activities and rationalise the budgets and personnel of the Equipment administration that still disposed of considerable resources, although its missions and responsibilities had gradually diminished (Lascoumes et al., 2014, p. 13).¹⁰¹ Conversely, the environmental lobby generally opposed the fusion (Hulot, 2006, p. 203), although it was not clearly aware about its potential implications for environmental policy-making at the time (Interview 8).

In 2007, the French government also initiated the process called "Grenelle de l'environnement" that consisted of a series of negotiations with stakeholders of various policy sectors aimed at defining a sustainable development policy roadmap that integrated sustainable development into public decision-making. This deliberative phase was complemented with monitoring mechanisms and two laws. The Grenelle I Law adopted in summer 2009 integrated environmental matters into construction, urban planning, transport, energy, biodiversity, research, water, agriculture, health, waste, and public procurement. It thus introduced a "systemic approach" to environmental policy-making by bringing together disperse policies (Bourg, 2007, p. 59). Some measures transposed European texts regarding sewage, nitrates, and bird protection, among others (Lacroix & Zaccai, 2010, p. 222). The deliberations took place in six thematic working groups that focused on precise technical issues that promised rapidly attainable action, while more controversial matters, such as nuclear waste or genetically modified organisms (GMO), were excluded from the process (Halpern, 2012a, pp. 390–391). The working groups worked for four months followed by a public consultation. The Grenelle I Law was adopted at almost unanimity by both the Parliament and the Senate. The Grenelle II Law adopted in 2010 operationalised the objectives defined in the Grenelle I Law and reformed environmental impact assessments (OECD, 2016, p. 231). The Grenelle was a consequence of the politicisation of environmental issues in the run-up to the 2007 presidential elections, which stems from the ascent of the French

¹⁰¹ As a senior civil servant put it at that time: "I think many people share this view, including internally in the ministries, that finally there is going to be the electroshock that will completely shift the ministry in charge of Equipment into another culture and time, and give meaning back to its existence" (Interview 9).

environmental movement after 2002 (Halpern, 2012b, pp. 30–33, 2012a, p. 389). Within the green movement, NGOs such as the Alliance pour la Planète gained strength at that time and introduced new forms of mobilization and interest representation (Halpern, 2012b, p. 33). The NGO's lobbying successfully put the representation and handling of environmental issues and sustainable development on the presidential candidates' agendas. The campaign team of the Conservative candidate Sarkozy used the movement's pressure as an opportunity to widen the candidate's electoral appeal and to revamp the topics covered by the conservative UMP (Halpern, 2012b, pp. 46–52). The development of a "right-wing ecology" ("écologie de droite") built on internal expertise and links with NGOs that were nurtured by some members of UMP that were sensitive to environmental and sustainable development issues (Halpern, 2012b, p. 31). The Grenelle resulted from negotiations between environmental NGOs organised as the Pacte Écologique and the new government. The main NGOs further took part in preparing the Grenelle's modus operandi. Launched immediately after the new government was formed, the Grenelle was linked to the president's political priorities and its implementation led by minister Jean-Louis Borloo, at a time when the bureaucracy of the ministry for Sustainable Development was chiefly concerned with the extensive reorganisation process (Interviews 2 and 8). The Grenelle intensified the links between parts of the ecological movement and of the conservative UMP¹⁰² who formed a new interest coalition around a "right-wing ecology" (Interview 1). The Grenelle process gave these NGOs a new role as co-decision-makers that undermined their capacity to criticise the government and to formulate radical demands and exacerbated tensions among them (Flipo, 2007).

The Second National Sustainable Development Strategy (SNDD) was adopted in 2010 in order to frame France's transition towards a "green and fair economy" between 2010 and 2013. A public consultation process preceded the elaboration of the strategy that ought to be more didactic and strategic and mobilise public and private stakeholders. Both its content and form were aligned with the European SD Strategy (ESDS) that provided for seven out of the SNDD's nine strategic challenges. The SNDD's approach was to be both exhaustive and soft-policy. Regarding the former, the SNDD covered all fields of sustainable development, with various objectives for each of the nine challenges, and each objective accompanied with multiple "levers for action"; yet, it identified neither the types of policy instruments nor the criteria or procedures for evaluating its implementation and progress of sectoral policies (Le Clézio, 2010). According to critics, the SNDD diluted priorities and summarized the measures taken since the Grenelle rather than prospectively reflecting about how to implement a new economic and social model (Laville, 2010, p. 308). It lacked the normative character of a full-

¹⁰² Within UMP, it was represented by the MP Nathalie Kosciusko-Morizet and members of the ministerial cabinet, and among the NGOs, the Fondation Nicolas Hulot and some bigger NGOs of the Alliance pour la Planète.

fledged policy meta-strategy that would bind sectoral policymaking and instead promoted a vision of sustainable development as a consensual process that builds on the voluntary implication of society. While the implementation of the SNDD was an administrative responsibility of the inter-ministerial delegate for Sustainable Development, there was a lack of political responsibility to effectively ensure that the strategy guided the government's policy-making (Laville, 2010, p. 308; Le Clézio, 2010, p. 26).

Sweden's Persson IIIB cabinet (covering the period 2005-2006) is a deviant case in kind, i.e., it associates the same combination of conditions with an absence of the outcome. The Persson III cabinet did not adopt EPI measures besides the second revision of the *National Strategy for Sustainable Development* in 2006 (OECD, 2014b, p. 47). Similar to France's Fillon cabinet examined in more detail above, the Persson III cabinet also changed the organisation of environmental policy competences in the Swedish government by creating the *Ministry for Environment and Societal Planning* half-mandate in January 2005. The *Ministry for Environment and Societal Planning* united the competences of the already concentrated *ministry of the Environment* with those for the coordination of sustainable development policy (OECD, 2004a, p. 98). It absorbed the Secretariat for Sustainable Development that had been established within the Prime Minister's office in 2004 as small coordination unit staffed with officers from various central government bodies. It was responsible for the development of the NSDS and interaction with all ministries as well as international sustainable development processes (Nilsson & Persson, 2008, p. 229). The ministry was also responsible for climate policy, housing policy and energy policy, a combination that expanded the political clout of the ministry for the Environment considerably (Eckerberg et al., 2007; Nilsson & Persson, 2008, p. 228). According to Nilsson and Persson (2008), the left-of-centre cabinet's reshuffle ought to reaffirm the political standing of the "green welfare state", a paradigm that had received less political attention since the late 1990s (p. 228). The political status of EPI in Sweden started to decline only when a new right-of-centre coalition took over in late 2006 (Nilsson et al., 2016). The very short duration of this large ministry, which was dissolved again when the right-of-centre coalition took office, appears as a plausible explanation of the deviant status of this case.

2.3 Immigration PI in the 1980s and 1990s (analysis 3)

The analysis of immigration policy integration in the 1980s and 1990s covers 38 cases, 15 out of which are members of the outcome.¹⁰³ Cases with membership in the outcome are those cabinets that had the highest PI reform activity in immigration policy in the nine countries during the 1980s and 1990s. All countries have one case at least with membership in the

¹⁰³ The fuzzy scores and skewness checks are displayed in Appendix B in the section on Analysis 3.

outcome. The countries whose governments were the least active PI reformers have one cabinet each that is member of the outcome. These are cases from France (Rocard I-II, 1988-90), Germany (Kohl II, 1987-90), the Netherlands (Kok I, 1995-98), New Zealand (Lange I, 1985-87), and Sweden (Bildt, 1992-93). Austria and Canada each have two cabinets that were among the most active PI reformers during the 1980s and 1990s. These are the successive Vranitzky IV and Klima cabinets that governed Austria between 1995 and 1999, and the Mulroney II and Chrétien II cabinets that governed Canada between 1989 and 1992, and 1997 and 2000, respectively. The most active PI reformers during the 1980s and 1990s with three cabinets each with membership in the outcome were Australia (Hawke II, 1984-87; Hawke III, 1988-89; Hawke IV-Keating, 1990-92) and the United Kingdom (Thatcher III, 1987-91; Major II, 1993-96; Blair I, 1997-2000).

The truth table analysis reveals that no condition comes close to being individually sufficient for the presence of the outcome (PIACT).¹⁰⁴ Neither is any condition individually sufficient for the absence of the outcome (\sim PIACT), but the condition \sim HGOVR comes close to sufficiency.¹⁰⁵ None of the organisational conditions is thus a consistent superset or subset of the outcome; i.e., explains governments' high level of immigration PI reform activity during the 1980s and 1990s. The truth table analysis reveals that only three truth table rows (18, 19, 24) are consistently associated with the outcome PIACT at a consistency level of 0.7 (cf. Appendix B, Analysis 3). These truth table rows cover seven cases, one of which is deviant in kind. In other words, only six out of 15 cases with membership in the outcome are explained by the conservative and most parsimonious solution terms generated from the truth table. Accordingly, the solution terms have low coverage, which means that although the solution term is highly consistent with a statement of sufficiency for PIACT, this sufficiency relation is empirically not very relevant since it covers only a small share of the cases.


The most parsimonious solution for the outcome PIACT allows to identify two sufficient combinations of conditions on which the data provide evidence that they are causally relevant:

$$\sim\text{LARGE} * \text{SALG} + \text{CONC} * \sim\text{EXECDOM} * \text{HGOVR} \rightarrow \text{PIACT}$$

¹⁰⁴ The condition SALG comes closest to (but is still very far from) a statement of individual sufficiency for PIACT (consistency = 0.585, coverage = 0.570, PRI = 0.496).

¹⁰⁵ Parameters of the sufficiency relation of \sim HGOVR and \sim PIACT: consistency = 0.725, coverage = 0.609, PRI = 0.684.

Figure 25: Solution paths and cases (analysis 3)



These two INUS combinations of conditions appear as jointly sufficient for governments’ high PI reform activity in immigration policy in the 1980s and 1990s. Figure 25 gives an overview of the typical and deviant cases associated with each path. Path 1 has a deviant case. The following sections analyse these two redundancy-free causal configurations of the most parsimonious solution.

Concentrated portfolios, absent large ministry

The conservative solution provides additional insights (cf. Appendix B, Analysis 3). Remarkably, all three paths of the conservative solution share the organisational configuration of a concentrated portfolio of immigration policy functions and the absence of a large ministry. This means that, small coverage notwithstanding, the combination of the conditions ‘concentrated portfolio’ and the absence of a large ministry is highly consistent with a statement of sufficiency for governments’ high PI reform activity in three combinations with the other conditions. This also means that the only sufficient combinations for high immigration PI reform activity during the 1980s and 1990s contain a concentrated portfolio and a single-issue or garbage-can ministry. However, neither is this configuration necessary for the outcome, for there are some cases with membership in the outcome that have other organisational configurations and remain unexplained by the solution terms, nor is it sufficient

for outcome for there are various cases with this organisational configuration that lead to the absence of the outcome.

In particular, turning to the truth table for the absence of the outcome (\sim PIACT) reveals a complementary insight: when combined with a left-of-centre government for which immigration-related issues were not electorally salient (\sim HGOVR * \sim SALG), this organisational configuration is consistently associated with the *absence* of the outcome (cf. Appendix B, Analysis 3). In other words, when this organisational configuration is present in left-of-centre cabinets that did not perceive the immigration issue to be important for voters, it is consistently associated with the absence of immigration PI reform activity during the 1980s and 1990s. As the complementary analysis of the conditions explaining the absence of high PI reform activity during this time period shows, the combination of the conditions 'left-of-centre partisanship' and absence of 'salience' is consistently associated with an absence of PI reform activity (Appendix B, Analysis 3). Cases representing this configuration are Austria's Vranitzky II and Vranitzky III cabinets that governed the country between 1987 and 1994 as well as Australia's Keating II cabinet (1993-1995).

Issue salience, absent large ministry (path 1)

The first configuration of conditions (\sim LARGE * SALG \rightarrow PIACT) shows that governments on the electoral programs of which immigration-related issues featured saliently and that did not combine immigration policy functions within a large ministry, are a sizeable and consistent subset of cabinets with high PI reform activity in immigration policy in the 1980s and 1990s. This sufficient configuration has a good level of consistency (0.809). Governments that combine these conditions are responsible for a good third (36.9 %) of the observed immigration PI reform activity across all cases during the 1980s and 1990s. Coverage is diverse as typical cases of this path are distributed across four countries. The typical cases are the Vranitzky IV cabinet that governed Austria between 1995 and 1996, the Hawke II cabinet of Australia (1984-1987), the second Chrétien cabinet that governed Canada between 1997 and 2000, and the UK's Major II cabinet (1992-1996). However, the sufficiency relation is contradicted by one deviant case in kind, Australia's Howard 1 cabinet (1996-1998). The conservative solution (cf. Appendix B, analysis 3) shows that all these cases further share the condition 'concentrated portfolio'. Conversely, this path is shared by both left- and right-of-centre cabinets, and cabinets that do or do not dominate the legislative agenda.

Cases nested in Austria

The reforms of immigration policy adopted or prepared by the Austrian Vranitzky IV cabinet, such as the reform of the Alien Law adopted in 1997, are different from those of the previous

and subsequent cabinets by focusing on the integration of immigrants and the securitisation of their legal status and access to social services.

Austria had used immigrants as a labour market force that could be regulated according to macroeconomic imperatives since the 1960s. Immigration was considered to consist in the temporary stay of guest workers whose regulation concerned mainly the granting of work permits (Bauböck & Perchinig, 2006, pp. 729–730; Kraler & Sohler, 2007, p. 19). Immigration legislation concerned mostly the regulation of temporary immigration of economic migrants. Compared to other European countries, guest workers had fewer rights and could be repatriated more easily when the demand decreased (Bauböck & Perchinig, 2006, pp. 729–730). The “Anwerbestopp” legislation of 1973 and the Aliens Employment Act of 1975 introduced restrictions that reduced immigration and limited permanent residence (IOM & EMN, 2015, p. 30). These measures effectively reduced the foreign labour force but due to family reunifications the number of immigrants living in the countries remained nevertheless constant (IOM & EMN, 2015, p. 30). In sum, Austria’s immigration policy aimed at regulating immigration flows according to the country’s economic needs, and focused on restricting immigration in the 1970s. Even during the early 1990s, when the number of refugees entering Austria reached a peak, policies focused on asylum as well as on limiting new immigration (Perchinig, 2010, p. 20). Before 2002, the federal government’s immigrant integration policy focused solely on assisting recognized refugees in the first years following their entitlement to refugee status through the *United Nations Refugee Fund* (Permoser Mourão, 2012, pp. 189–190). A shift towards policy integration occurred only in the late 1990s under the Vranitzky IV cabinet (1995-1996) and Klima (1997-1999) cabinets. These governments prepared and adopted the 1997 reform of the *Unemployment Insurance Act* that opened people without Austrian citizenship access to emergency allowance (Bauböck & Perchinig, 2006, p. 734), as well as two reforms that advanced internal PI of immigration policy through the conditionality principle. First, the adoption of the *Alien Law* in 1997 integrated two previous laws and regulated the entry, stay and settlement of foreigners, but perpetuated the basic distinction between settlement and stay (EMN & IOM, 2004, p. 38). The *Alien Law* further facilitated family members’ access to the labour market. More generally, it aimed at implementing the principle of “integration before immigration” and at granting a more secure status to long-term immigrants (Bauböck & Perchinig, 2006, p. 734). Second, the reform of the citizenship law in 1998 made an immigrant’s integration a criterion for a positive decision of a demand for citizenship; it introduced examinations of German language and Austrian history and culture as mandatory elements of a demand for citizenship, and obliged immigrants to produce evidence of their financial self-sufficiency (IOM & EMN, 2015, p. 32).

Table 21 summarises the Austrian cases with their respective configurations of conditions. As regards the cabinet’s left-of-centre orientation, Austria was governed by coalition cabinets

under SPÖ leadership during the various Vranitzky cabinets. The first three cabinets are typical for the configuration that associates left-of-centre cabinets for which immigration-related issues were not salient with the lack of PI reform activity under the condition that the governments lacked executive capacity. The cases Vranitzky IV and Klima are each typical of one of the two most parsimonious solution paths.

Table 21: Austrian cases' combinations of conditions and outcome, 1980s/1990s

Case	TT row	Conditions					
Sinowatz III / Vranitzky I (1983)	9	~CONC	LARGE	~EXECDOM	~HGOVR	~SALG	~PIACT
Vranitzky II (1987)	17	CONC	~LARGE	~EXECDOM	~HGOVR	~SALG	~PIACT
Vranitzky III (1991)	17	CONC	~LARGE	~EXECDOM	~HGOVR	~SALG	~PIACT
Vranitzky IV (1995)	18	CONC	~LARGE	~EXECDOM	~HGOVR	SALG	PIACT
Klima (1997)	19	CONC	~LARGE	~EXECDOM	HGOVR	~SALG	PIACT

Note: Bold font indicates sufficient combinations.

In the Austrian federal system, the subnational authorities were active in the field of immigrant integration policy beyond the implementation of federal legislation. Immigrant integration policy in Austria emerged at the margins of the political system in a bottom-up fashion, first at municipal, then regional level (Wohlfahrt & Kolb, 2016, p. 3). The city of Vienna for instance pioneered the creation of a local integration fund in 1992 as a mechanism to coordinate the capital's integration policy (Bauböck & Perchinig, 2006, p. 734). Therefore, the role of the subnational authorities may have contributed to the federal government's inaction in the field, making the lack of executive capacity plausibly contextually relevant for the absence of PI reform activity until the mid-1990s.

Prior to 1987, the Austrian governments' immigration policy was determined by the *Ministry for Social Affairs*, a 'large ministry' with a jurisdiction covering social insurance, social policy and labour law, as well as labour market administration and policy. Policy-making resulted from the cooperation between the ministry and social partners, in particular the Austrian Trade Union, mainly through the commissions of the Public Employment Service that were responsible for defining the regulations that applied to work permits for guest workers (Bauböck & Perchinig, 2006, pp. 729–730; Kraler & Sohler, 2007, p. 19). These actors shared the objective of limiting the employment of foreigners (Perchinig, 2010, pp. 13–14). In the 1970s, legislation consolidated the social partners' dominance of immigration policy further, and also aligned immigration regulations with the annually defined labour market policy priority programs (Perchinig, 2010, p. 18). In 1987, the Vranitzky II cabinet transferred the competences for immigration policy and foreigners' policy from the *Ministry for Social Affairs*

to the *Ministry for the Interior*, which was already responsible for refugee policy. This transfer followed from a 1985 decision by the Austrian Constitutional Court that initiated a paradigm shift towards a perspective on immigration policy that focused on immigrants' settlement instead of the needs of the labour market (Perchinig, 2010, pp. 18–19). It did not, however, initiate a turn towards PI in immigration policy in the short term.

Also, immigration-related issues were not salient on the agenda of the governing parties of the Vranitzky II and III cabinets. This absence of salience during the Vranitzky II and III cabinets is surprising in the light of the massive upheavals that the Austrian party system experienced during this period with the change of leadership in the FPÖ to Jörg Haider on the far-right end of the ideological spectrum and the entry of the Green party into parliament on the left. These new parties appropriated the immigration issue, which led to its politicisation on both sides of the ideological left-right dimension (Perchinig, 2010, p. 19); however, it did not prompt the governing parties to change course. Perchinig (2010) explains that “[p]aradoxically, the parliamentarization of the issue by the two small parties enabled the major parties of the time, the SPÖ and ÖVP, to continue their cooperation, which had been established in the context of the social partners, because they were able to distinguish themselves from the FPÖ and the Greens, who were using the issue in an actionist way to raise their profile, as fact-oriented and experienced actors and to present the continuation of their previous policy as the middle way” (p. 19). This strategy only proved sustainable for the two major parties as long as the far-right competitor did not capitalise on these developments with an increase in support, though.

Several changes occurred when the Vranitzky IV cabinet took office, though, and these appear as only partly reflected through the configurations of conditions (cf. Table 21). First, the immigration issue became salient when in the mid-1990s, Austria's high net immigration rate was increasingly perceived as a threat by parts of the population. The anti-immigration party FPÖ capitalised on these developments with an increase in support that convinced the governing coalition of the necessity of reforming the country's immigration laws (Perchinig, 2010, p. 20). Second, the transfer of policy functions in 1987 from the *Ministry of Social Affairs* to the BMI now proved crucial for further developments of Austrian immigration policy because it had ended the social partners' informal dominance of immigration policy-making (Bauböck and Perchinig (2006, p. 731). The BMI abandoned the regulation of migration through the venues and means of labour market policy and implemented direct immigration control for the first time by capping the maximum number of residence permits to be issued each year. Only in the mid-1990s under the Vranitzky IV cabinet, the BMI asserted its authority in the field of immigration policy and became a leading actor for shaping immigration policy (Kraler & Sohler, 2007, p. 20; Perchinig, 2010, p. 20). Perchinig (2010) attributes a crucial role in the turn towards PI reforms under the Vranitzky IV cabinet to the minister for the Interior

of this cabinet, Caspar Einem, who pertained to the left wing of the SPÖ and had long been vocal in supporting a liberal approach to immigration policy and an equal legal status for immigrants (p. 21). It was under Einem's leadership that the BMI prepared the reform of the important reform of the *Alien Law* adopted in 1997.

Finally, in the early 1990s, the lack of executive capacity had a different effect than in the previous periods, because it led to more effective supranational agenda-setting. Supranational agenda-setting started materialising during the Vranitzky III case as a consequence of Austria's impending EU membership, along with demands for improving the integration of migrants increased in Austria. The national administration under the BMI's lead however procrastinated the implementation of these demands. Under the Vranitzky IV cabinet, significant impulses for the observed PI reform activity in immigration policy integration came from supranational legislative agenda setting. Not only did EU membership increase demands for improving the integration of migrants in Austria; more concretely, the first PI measure was set on the agenda by a judgment of the European Court of Human Rights the implementation of which in Austrian law in 1997 opened people without Austrian citizenship access to the emergency allowance through the reform of the *Unemployment Insurance Act*.

In conclusion, the Austrian cases illustrate that both the absence of a large ministry and issue salience are necessary for this sufficient configuration, as indicated in the parsimonious solution term. They also provide illustrative evidence that the cabinet's left-of-centre partisanship and the absence of executive capacity are contextually relevant for the outcome in this configuration.¹⁰⁶ Conversely, they illustrate that the latter two conditions, when combined with the absence of salience, were sufficient for explaining the absence of immigration PI reforms under the cabinets prior to 1995.

Cases nested in the UK

The Major II cabinet (1992-1996) is the only one of the three UK cabinets with membership in the solution term, but two other cabinets – Thatcher III (1987-1991) and Blair I (1997-2000) – that preceded and succeeded Major II are also members of the outcome and remain unexplained (cf. Table 22). Therefore, given the stable country context, these cases should provide a particularly fertile ground for the identification of further explanatory conditions.

¹⁰⁶ The evidence from the Austria cases do not allow to assess the simplifying assumption (on which the most parsimonious solution is based) that the outcome would also have occurred had the portfolio been fragmented (~CONC). One could argue that the BMI would not have been able to assert its authority on this domain had it only detained parts of the immigration and integration portfolio; also, arguably, a fragmented portfolio would have accentuated inter-partisan and inter-ministerial opposition on immigration and integration-related questions further and have prevented policy integration reforms in Austria for a longer time still. However, the data does not provide evidence to directly support these claims, which is why the status of CONC remains ambiguous.

Table 22: UK cases' combinations of conditions and outcome, 1980s/1990s

Case	TT row	Conditions
Thatcher (1987)	III 23	CONC ~LARGE EXECDOM HGOVR ~SALG PIACT
Major II (1992)	24	CONC ~LARGE EXECDOM HGOVR SALG PIACT
Blair I (1996)	23	CONC ~LARGE EXECDOM HGOVR ~SALG PIACT

Note: Bold font indicates sufficient combinations.

On the outcome, these three successive cabinets pursued policy integration very intensely during a decade with an approach focused entirely on the mainstreaming of immigration and immigrant integration policy. As regards immigration policy in general, the Thatcher and Major governments cover a period of stable policy built around both restriction and integration (Ford et al., 2015, pp. 1402-1403). From the end of the 1980s onwards, immigrants' rights were incorporated into broader equality legislation, such as on housing, employment, and health (McCormick, 2013, p. 318). Most mainstreaming reforms were adopted between 1989 and 2002. The 1989 *National Health Service (Charges to Overseas Visitors) Regulations* allowed migrants who were present for the purpose of employment (with an employer based in the UK) or self-employed to use the National Health Service free of charge and gave migrant children access to state schools (Hunter, 2007, p. 14). The 1993 *Asylum and Immigration Appeals Act* allowed asylum seekers to apply for social security benefits while they were waiting for their applications or appeals to be decided, but limited their right to the provision of housing (Elliott & Quinn, 2008, p. 298). The 1996 *Employment Rights Act* introduced maternity and parental rights for some categories of migrant employees (Hunter, 2007, p. 29). The *National Minimum Wage Act 1998* introduced a minimum wage for all workers including migrants (Hunter, 2007, p. 30). The *Race Relations Amendment Act* in 2000 created a general duty on public authorities to actively promote equality of opportunity and good relations between people of different racial groups (Ali & Gidley, 2014, p. 9).

The literature on the UK's immigration policy during those years is ambivalent about the relevance of the immigration issue's salience for explaining immigration PI reform activity. According to Cerna and Wietholtz (2011), UK immigration policies before 1996 were reactive rather than proactive and the timing and adoption of mostly restrictive reforms tended to be determined by external events such as large-scale immigration from certain parts of the world or a significant number of asylum applications during a specific time period (pp. 202-203). For much of the 1980s and 1990s, the salience of immigration to the public eye was close to zero and negative attitudes about immigration declined (Ford et al., 2015, pp. 1394-1397). By the mid-1990s, the UK was widely perceived as a multicultural society and "immigration had lost a good deal of its significance as a divisive political issue" (Schierup et al., 2006, p. 120). In

spite of this overall absence of salience, the two cabinets preceding and succeeding to Major II both adopted a high level of PI reform activity.

While in opposition during the Conservative governments, Labour voiced commitment to multiculturalism and worked closely with minority and migrant interest groups (Schuster & Solomos, 2004, p. 272). In the late 1990s, immigration and integration became politically salient and controversial again. During the first Blair cabinet's term in office national census data revealed a combination of growing immigration and asylum and a departure of British people, which "fuelled a new debate on immigration and national identity, with strong impetus from sensationalist popular newspapers" that conveyed fears of 'losing control' of immigration (Schierup et al., 2006, p. 121). Although the issues of immigration and integration had not featured prominently on New Labour's agenda in the run-up to the 1997 elections, the party's "electoral strategists had identified public fears on immigration, and were determined that the party should not appear 'soft' on such issues" (Solomos, 2003, p. 90). New Labour's first term in office therefore reflects both continuity with the Conservative policy but also a concern with being seen to be prolific in immigration policy, not only with major pieces of legislation but also effort to set supranational agendas (Schuster & Solomos, 2004).

The literature further suggests that the high executive capacity, which is common to all three cases given the majoritarian political system and the centralised state, may have been relevant for explaining the high amount of PI reforms adopted by all three governments. According to Hansen (2000), the institutional features of the Westminster model with a powerful executive, a weak legislation and a timid judiciary made most immigration policies possible (p. 237), and the comparative PI literature has made the same argument for the UK's immigration PI reforms (Maggetti & Trein, 2021). The Prime Minister and the Home Secretary are "the main agenda-setters and leaders in immigration policy-making" (Cerna & Wietholtz, 2011, p. 202) and most executive proposals are adopted without or with only small changes by the legislature (Cerna & Wietholtz, 2011, p. 204).

As regards the organisational configuration of ministries' immigration policy functions, in the UK, all matters concerning immigration, integration, race relations and communities had always been clustered in the Home Office (Cerna & Wietholtz, 2011, p. 226). Although immigration integration had a "marginal place" in the Home Office's work with very little budget attached, it is the Home Office that led most of the work on immigrant integration during the 1990s and 2000s (Ali & Gidley, 2014, p. 5). This explains the focus of the UK's integration policy on refugees, whose integration is dealt with by the Border Agency (Cerna & Wietholtz, 2011, pp. 229–230).

The solution term does not identify the governments’ ideological partisanship as an INUS condition, but it may still be relevant, as the conservative solution indicates. Schierup et al. (2006) lay out that the policies of deregulation concerning state intervention in the economy, the labour market, and crucially, the social welfare system, pursued by the subsequent governments and especially the Thatcher and Major governments of the 1980s until 1997 “have been driven by the desire to roll back [the far reaching welfare state measures of the post-war years] and return to minimalist welfare practices” (pp. 112-113).

Cases nested in Australia

Two further cases with membership in truth table row 24 and in the solution path – one typical, one deviant – are nested in Australia: while the Hawke II cabinet (1984-1987) has membership in the outcome for adopting relatively many PI reforms, the Howard I cabinet (1996-1998) that governed the country a decade later is a deviant case consistency in kind whereby the same configuration is associated with an absence of PI reform activity. In this context, it also makes sense to look more closely to two additional Australian cabinets with membership in the outcome but that remain unexplained by the solution term (cf. Table 23). Australia had a high PI reform activity continuously for a decade starting in the early 1980s under the three successive Hawke cabinets (Hawke I-II, 1984-1987; Hawke III, 1988-1989; Hawke IV-Keating I, 1990-1992).¹⁰⁷

Table 23: Australia’s cases’ combinations of conditions and outcome, 1980s/1990s

Case	TT row	Conditions					
Hawke I-II, 1984	24	CONC	~LARGE	EXECDOM	HGOVR	SALG	PIACT
Hawke III, 1988	29	CONC	LARGE	EXECDOM	~HGOVR	~SALG	PIACT
Hawke IV-Keating I, 1990	29	CONC	LARGE	EXECDOM	~HGOVR	~SALG	PIACT
Keating II, 1993	21	CONC	~LARGE	EXECDOM	~HGOVR	~SALG	~PIACT
Howard I, 1996	24	CONC	~LARGE	EXECDOM	HGOVR	SALG	~PIACT

Note: Bold font indicates sufficient combinations.

At the end of the 1970s, Australian federal immigration policy shifted towards the policy paradigm of multiculturalism, with several PI reforms in the late 1970s and throughout the 1980s. This paradigm accentuated the policy focus on the provision of longer-term settlement services and led the government to expand or introduce services, such as English language teaching, on-arrival accommodation and orientation assistance, interpreting and translating services, and assistance with overseas qualifications recognition (Millbank et al., 2006).

¹⁰⁷ The latter two are members of the contradictory truth table row 29.

Government funding for the *Adult Migrant English Programme (AMEP)* expanded further, making it the largest government-funded English teaching program for migrants worldwide (Hawthorne, 2005, pp. 675–676). Migrants were paid to enrol the courses, in addition to being supported by immediate access to Social Security benefits right from the time of their arrival (ibid.). In 1987, the availability of integration services for migrants was extended to five years after their arrival, after which they were transferred to general services. The creation of the *National Office of Overseas Skills Recognition* in 1989 aimed at improving the recognition of professional skills of non-English-speaking background immigrants (Hawthorne, 2005, p. 678). Although reforms of the 1980s accentuated the division of migration policy into streams (DIBP, 2015, p. 48), many services were the same for all of them.¹⁰⁸ In the mid-1990s, however, policies embraced “demand-driven” migration (Cully, 2011, p. 4) and turned away from PI approaches again. Settlement services and activities were outsourced to the private sector in line with the National Competition Policy agenda that imposed a funding structure that altered the nature and models of service delivery (Mwaiteleke, 2003). Pre-migration qualifications screening was placed more in the hands of professional bodies, whose power to disqualify applicants from eligibility for skilled migration increased (Hawthorne, 2005, p. 685). Reforms implemented a new “select for success” policy concentrating on restricting new migrants’ access to welfare, increasing migration policy’s economic focus by enhancing the skills stream and decreasing family reunion (Betts, 2003, p. 178; Hawthorne, 2005, p. 681). In terms of PI, this translates into disintegration, when for instance in 1997 the waiting period for the eligibility of immigrants’ in the skilled and family categories for social security income support payments (as well as access to income support, social security benefits, and most related labour market services) was increased from six months to two years (Liebig, 2007b, pp. 18 & 22; OECD, 2007a, p. 87). Access to free language and labour market programs was abolished (Hawthorne, 2005, p. 681). The *Integrated Humanitarian Settlement Strategy (IHSS)* adopted in 1997 aimed at providing a more targeted and coordinated approach to settlement services for humanitarian immigrants (Spinks, 2009, p. 6) which were completely contracted and tendered (Urbis Keys Young, 2003, p. 5).

The organisation of the immigration portfolio has remained stable as regards its concentration: during the two decades, Australian governments concentrated all immigration policy functions within one ministry. Hugo (2014) observes that one “of the defining features of the Australian immigration system is its highly planned and closely managed nature. (...) There is an established cadre of migration professionals who develop and administer the migration program. This substantial institutional and human capacity has been crucial in the

¹⁰⁸ Only a number of services were reserved to the humanitarian programme, such as the exemption from having to wait two years for immediate access to social security benefits, the availability of humanitarian workers to assist entrants in meeting their settlement needs, and a health awareness program (Waxman, 1998, p. 763).

development and operationalization of international migration policy in Australia over the post-war period” (p. 869). From the onset, inter-ministerial coordination played an important role in the immigrant integration policy led by the Department that “worked closely with other areas of government to provide accommodation and employment to new migrants” (DIBP, 2015, p. 31).

At the same time, the ministerial portfolio combinations changed twice over this period: While the first Hawke cabinet let the single-issue ministry in charge of immigration and integration policy in place, the later Hawke governments combined this portfolio with policy functions for local government (cf. Appendix B). The Howard I cabinet in 1996 changed the ministry’s name from *Department of Immigration and Ethnic Affairs* to *Department of Immigration and Multicultural Affairs*, a move that reflected the Department’s focus on continuing to “develop policy and programmes in support of multiculturalism” (DIBP, 2015, p. 70). DIMA was the “key actor” with regard to migrant integration (OECD, 2007a, p. 86). During the Howard I cabinet, in 1997-1998 DIMA underwent major restructuring that aimed at aligning policy and operational areas and strengthen its border management functions, while settlement services and activities in particular were outsourced to the private sector (Mwaiteleke, 2003; DIBP, 2015, p. 72). Waxman (1998) observes that the inter-ministerial coordination of immigrant settlement policy was exceedingly difficult due to a lack of communication and commitment from a number of ministries as well as the absence of a common vision about how services should be provided. He finds ministries were “driven by their individual departmental philosophies, with no legislative basis to ensure integration of services by all levels of government” (p. 764). According to Waxman (1998), the lack of agreement and coordination across government ministries prevented for instance the development of a uniform and coherent refugee settlement policy, which other departments than DIMA “view[ed] as an add-on responsibility rather than part and parcel of their *raison d’être*” (p. 770), thus “ignoring settlement concerns which would be within their responsibilities to address” (p. 771).

During the 1980s, the nature of the immigration issue in Australian public debates changed, as explained by Betts (1999, 2003), as it became more politicised. Ethnic lobby groups representing the concerns of particular groups of immigrants, refugees in particular, became more vocal. The debates about the composition of yearly immigrant numbers became more public and “a more moral issue for many Australians, people who might otherwise have had little interest in the question” (Betts, 2003, p. 171), and opposition to immigration was now perceived as closely related to racist stance (Betts, 1999). The Hawke governments embraced this climate of opinion, which “fitted well with [its] interest in multiculturalism and cultivating migrant communities” (Betts, 2003, p. 171). Its reforms of the 1980s are in continuity with the policy shift towards multiculturalism that initiated a stronger focus on the provision of longer-term settlement services at the end of the 1970s. The remainder of the 1980s was marked by

ethnic lobby influence, reforms meant to curtail ministerial discretion and reassert executive control on immigration numbers, and high ministerial turnover (Betts, 2003, pp. 172-176). During the Keating governments in particular, a lack of Prime ministerial interest likely increased ministers' and lobbyists' impact on policy (Betts, 2003, p. 176). By 1996, public discontent and a felt need for reform had grown again (Betts, 2003, p. 176). The new conservative Howard government "moved briskly" with a number of immigration reforms that "concentrated on reducing the welfare costs of the program and increasing its economic focus", in "a shark break with previous policy" (Betts, 2003, p. 177). The Howard governments' policy choices (with regard to immigration but also beyond) were dictated to a large extent by its perception of public attitudes and of the public's (lack of) support for particular policy initiatives (Baringhorst, 2004; Lewis, 2007).

Although Hugo (2014) observes "a strong element of bipartisanship in Australian immigration policy for much of the post-war period" (p. 869), the governments' ideological partisanship and levels of salience seems reforms of the 1980s and 1990s therefore appear as factors helping to explain whether or not Australian governments adopted a PI approach to immigration policy, but the inherited institutional context as well as reforms of previous periods also appear as additional factors that might help understand the patterns observed.

Right-of-centre government, concentrated portfolio, absent executive capacity (path 2)

The second sufficient configuration (**CONC * ~EXECDOM * HGOVR → PIACT**) shows that right-of-centre governments that lacked executive capacity and that concentrated the policy functions for immigration and immigrant integration policy within one ministry adopted immigration PI reforms at a high level of intensity during the 1980s and 1990s.

This path has a high consistency (0.902) but very little coverage, since it captures the experience of only one typical case, the Austrian Klima cabinet (1997-1999). During the Klima cabinet's term in office, the government adopted the *Alien Law* that contained several elements of PI. It integrated previous legislation, regulated the entry, stay and settlement of foreigners, as well as facilitated the access of family members to the labour market and generally aimed at implementing the principle of "integration before immigration" (Bauböck & Perchinig, 2006, p. 734; IOM & EMN, 2015, p. 31). A reform of citizenship law made an immigrant's integration a criterion for citizenship (IOM & EMN, 2015, p. 32). In 1997, a reform of the Unemployment Insurance Act opened the access to the emergency allowance to people without Austrian citizenship (Bauböck & Perchinig, 2006, p. 735).

The solution term indicates that the government dominated this legislative agenda only to a limited extent, and the consequences of EU membership in terms of immigration policy seem relevant in this regard. In particular, several decisions by high courts obliged the Austrian

government to revise the legal regulations governing immigrants' access to the domestic labour market (Perchinig, 2010, pp. 22–24). Evidence on the government's right-of-centre partisanship provides a mixed picture, though. On the one hand, it played a role insofar as the cabinet integrated immigration and integration policy based on the more restrictive perspective of integration as conditioning immigrants' further legal prerogatives, such as citizenship (cf., the 1998 reform). On the other hand, other potential PI measures that would have further integrated immigration and integration policy, such as a planned harmonisation of the immigration and employment legislations through the Alien Law of 1997, were abandoned (Bauböck & Perchinig, 2006, pp. 734–735).

Evidence on the cases in truth table row 17, which differ from truth table row 19 as regards the government's partisan orientation and the absence of the outcome, supports the relevance of the combination of the right-of-centre cabinet and the lack of dominance of the legislative agenda. Truth table row 17 covers the cases of Austria's Vranitzky II and III cabinets, which has the additional benefit of holding the context relatively constant. In both cases, the combination of a left-of-centre government combined with a lack of dominance over the legislative agenda seems relevant for the relative *absence* of PI reforms during these cabinets. During the years of the Vranitzky cabinets, Austria was governed by coalition cabinets under SPÖ leadership. The major Austrian immigration policy reforms of the early 1990s were formulated under the leadership of a section head in the BMI with close ties to the SPÖ; they reorganised the right of asylum and created a new law on aliens and residence (Perchinig, 2010, p. 21) but did not adopt PI as an approach to immigration policy. In 1994, the SPÖ-led BMI however did propose an "integration pact" that failed due to the opposition by coalition partner ÖVP and the anticipated elections held in 1995 (Bauböck & Perchinig, 2006, p. 734). The literature does not provide any direct evidence on the impact of the concentrated portfolio in the case of the Klima cabinet. Supporting evidence on the impact of portfolio concentration for this combination of conditions comes from the cases in truth table row 3 (differing only as regards the absence of the concentrated portfolio, while all other four conditions are similar), though.

Taken together, the evidence supports a depoliticised path to PI reforms whereby a clear lead ministry, the government's right-of-centre partisanship and the impact of EU membership combine to a relatively high PI immigration reform activity.

2.4 Immigration PI in the 2000s and 2010s (analysis 4)

The analysis of immigration policy integration in the 2000s and 2010s covers 37 cases, 14 of which are members of the outcome.¹⁰⁹ Cases with membership in the outcome are those cabinets that had the highest PI reform activity in immigration policy in the nine countries during the 2000s and 2010s. All countries have one case at least with membership in the outcome. Countries with one cabinet with membership in the outcome are Australia (Howard III, 2002-04), France (Raffarin-Villepin, 2002-06) the Netherlands (Rutte I-II, 2011-14), and New Zealand (Clark II, 2003-05). Countries with two cabinets with membership in the outcome are Canada (Harper I, 2006-08; Harper II, 2009-10), Germany (Schröder II, 2003-05; Merkel I, 2006-09) and Sweden (Reinfeldt I, 2007-10; Reinfeldt II, 2011-14). Austria and the United Kingdom have the highest number of cabinets with membership in the outcome. Austria has three cabinets with high PI reform activity (Schüssel I, 2000-02; Schüssel III, 2003-06; Faymann I, 2009-13). Regarding the United Kingdom, all four cabinets have membership in the outcome (Blair II, 2001-04; Blair III, 2005-06; Brown, 2007-09; Cameron, 2010-14), which is in line with a previous study that identified a high amount of PI reforms in the UK during this period (Maggetti & Trein, 2021).

The truth table analysis of the cases of immigration policy integration in the 2000s and 2010s reveals that no condition is individually sufficient for neither the presence (PIACT) nor the absence (\sim PIACT) of the outcome. While no condition comes close to individual sufficiency for PIACT, the condition left-of-centre government comes close to sufficiency for the absence of the outcome.¹¹⁰ Therein, the analysis yields a similar result than for the 1980s and 1990s. A left-of-centre government – or, in governing coalitions, a government led by a party with a left-of-centre platform – comes close to a statement of individual sufficiency for the absence of a high level of PI reform activity in immigration policy.

The truth table analysis reveals four truth table rows (5, 11, 20, 23) that are consistently associated with the outcome PIACT (cf. Appendix B, analysis 4). These truth table rows cover 13 cases, two of which are deviant in kind. In other words, the solutions generated from the truth table are able to explain the outcome PIACT of eleven cases (out of 14) with membership in the outcome; the remaining three cases remain unexplained. The most parsimonious solution term is highly complex. It contains six paths, four of which are ambiguous:

M1: \sim CONC * \sim LARGE * EXECDOM + EXECDOM * HGOVR * \sim SALG + (LARGE * \sim EXECDOM * \sim SALG + CONC * \sim EXECDOM * HGOVR * SALG) \rightarrow PIACT

¹⁰⁹ The fuzzy scores are displayed in Appendix B, Analysis 4.

¹¹⁰ Parameters of the sufficiency relation of \sim HGOVR and \sim PIACT: consistency = 0.727, coverage = 0.606, PRI = 0.668.


M2: $\sim\text{CONC} * \sim\text{LARGE} * \text{EXECDOM} + \text{EXECDOM} * \text{HGOVR} * \sim\text{SALG} +$
 $(\text{LARGE} * \sim\text{EXECDOM} * \sim\text{SALG} + \sim\text{LARGE} * \sim\text{EXECDOM} * \text{HGOVR} * \text{SALG}) \rightarrow \text{PIACT}$

M3: $\sim\text{CONC} * \sim\text{LARGE} * \text{EXECDOM} + \text{EXECDOM} * \text{HGOVR} * \sim\text{SALG} +$
 $(\text{LARGE} * \text{HGOVR} * \sim\text{SALG} + \text{CONC} * \sim\text{EXECDOM} * \text{HGOVR} * \text{SALG}) \rightarrow \text{PIACT}$

M4: $\sim\text{CONC} * \sim\text{LARGE} * \text{EXECDOM} + \text{EXECDOM} * \text{HGOVR} * \sim\text{SALG} +$
 $(\text{LARGE} * \text{HGOVR} * \sim\text{SALG} + \sim\text{LARGE} * \sim\text{EXECDOM} * \text{HGOVR} * \text{SALG}) \rightarrow \text{PIACT}$

These six INUS combinations of conditions, four of which are ambiguous in the model, appear as jointly sufficient for governments' high PI reform activity in immigration policy in the 2000s and 2010s. Figure 26 gives an overview of the typical and deviant cases associated with each path. Paths 5 and 6 have deviant cases. Unsurprisingly given the membership of all four UK cases in the outcome, cases nested in the UK play a prominent role as typical cases for the solution terms. While paths 1 to 4 cover only a small number of typical cases each, paths 5 and 6, about which the model is ambiguous, have the highest coverage scores (cf. Appendix B, analysis 4). As shown in Figure 26, the first two configurations of conditions cover typical cases that are nested in the UK.

Figure 26: Solution paths and cases (analysis 4)



Executive capacity as an INUS condition (paths 1 and 2)

The first configuration of conditions (**~CONC * ~LARGE * EXECDOM → PIACT**) shows that during the 2000s and 2010s, governments that enjoyed a high amount of executive capacity, i.e., that largely dominated the national legislative agenda, and organised the ministerial immigration policy functions in a fragmented way across ministries and did not them within a large ministry, had a high amount of PI reform activity. This sufficient configuration has a good level of consistency (0.821), but its raw coverage is small with 14.2 % of the outcome explained and the unique coverage, i.e., the part of the outcome exclusively explained by this path, at only 6.7 %. However, it is interesting from a theoretical perspective because it pinpoints one particular organisational configuration as INUS conditions and shows that cases with this organisational configuration adopted relatively many PI reforms only when the government enjoyed a large leeway on the national legislative agenda. In other words, when power is concentrated in the hands of the government, a highly fragmented ministerial organisation can translate into relatively many immigration PI outputs. Conversely, when governments dominated the legislative agenda, this organisational configuration is sufficient – although not necessary – for explaining high PI reform activity.

The second configuration of conditions (**EXECDOM * HGOVR * ~SALG → PIACT**) shows that right-of-centre cabinets that did not highlight immigration issues on their agendas but enjoyed a high amount of executive capacity, adopted a relatively high number of immigration PI reforms during the 2000s and 2010s. This sufficiency relationship has a good level of consistency above the traditional threshold (0.799). In addition, it is theoretically interesting because it contracts the theoretical expectation that when the government dominates the legislative agenda, either the presence of a left-of-centre government or of salience is needed for a government to have high PI reform activity (cf. Chapter 1); instead, it associates executive capacity with governments' right-of-centre partisanship and the absence of salience in explaining high PI reform activity. For this reason, it is worthwhile examining it in more detail in spite of its small coverage: this path explains 16.7 % of governments' immigration PI reform activity after the turn of the century, and 5.5 % of this outcome are explained exclusively by this configuration.

The typical cases of these two paths are nested in the United Kingdom, which is why they are discussed together. Path 1 is represented by the two subsequent cabinets Blair III (2005-2006) and Brown (2007-2009). Both cases share membership in truth table row 5 and have therefore the same characteristics on the other conditions: the cabinets were elected based on a left-leaning agenda (~HGOVR) on which immigration-related issues were little salient (~SALG). The conservative solution indicates that both may be contextually relevant (path 1). Path 2 has one typical case, the Blair II cabinet (2001-2004). For the sake of clarity, the typical cases are

discussed in chronological order (cf. Table 24) rather than in following the numeration of the paths, starting with path 2.

Table 24: UK cases' combinations of conditions and outcome, 2000s/2010s

<i>Case</i>	<i>TT row</i>	<i>Conditions</i>					
Blair II, 2001	23	CONC	~LARGE	EXECDOM	HGOVR	~SALG	PIACT
Blair III, 2005	5	~CONC	~LARGE	EXECDOM	~HGOVR	~SALG	PIACT
Brown, 2007	5	~CONC	~LARGE	EXECDOM	~HGOVR	~SALG	PIACT
Cameron, 2010	12	~CONC	LARGE	~EXECDOM	HGOVR	SALG	~PIACT

Note: Bold characters indicate sufficient conditions.

Executive capacity, right-of-centre cabinet, absent salience (path 2)

Under the Blair II cabinet, from 2001 onwards, the UK government pursued a 'community cohesion' policy that focused not on immigrants but on minority ethnic communities, including the second and third generation, who were identified to live separately from the rest of society (Gidley, 2012, p. 349). It adopted the same mainstreaming approach with the 2002 *Ethnic Minority Outreach Programme* that aimed at attracting ethnic minority people to the mainstream labour market and building links with Jobcentre Plus services (Cangiano, 2008, pp. 24–25) and the *Ethnic Minority Employment Strategy* one year later that recommended a fresh approach involving a number of government departments to address the many employment barriers faced by ethnic minorities, with action on schools, jobs, housing and discrimination (NAO, 2008, p. 18; see also Cangiano, 2008, p. 20). Besides the mainstreaming approach, the government also reinforced targeted policy towards refugees. In 2000, the government created the *National Refugee Integration Forum* that had the mission to report and advise the government on different areas of refugees' integration, as well as to coordinate refugee integration policy between the different levels of government (Cangiano, 2008, p. 33). In the early 2000s, evidence around the significant exclusion of refugees from the labour market also spurred targeted government intervention. In response, various ministries, especially the Home Office and the *Department for Work and Pensions*, devised strategies on the integration of refugees into the labour market (Cangiano, 2008, p. 33). In 2005, both the Home Office and DCLG published refugee integration strategies. The Home Office published its refugee integration strategy "Integration Matters" with a strategic upgrade of the *National Refugee Integration Services* that provided comprehensive support, incl. employment support to recognised refugees (Cangiano, 2008, p. 34; Gidley, 2012, p. 348). The DWP published a refugee employment strategy titled "Working to rebuild lives" that targeted refugees'

integration into the labour market under the responsibility of the Jobcentre Plus (Cangiano, 2008, p. 34; Marangozov, 2014, p. 7).

The *Ethnic Minority Outreach Programme* was terminated in 2006 and integrated into the Home Office's Deprived Areas Fund (Cangiano, 2008, p. 25). In 2008, government policy shifted towards managing migration with the publication titled "Managing the Impacts of Migration: A cross-government approach" by DCLG (Gidley, 2012, p. 348). Still, employment and labour market shortages were placed at the heart of immigration policy. In 2008, the government also created the new Refugee Integration and Employment Service (RIES) (terminated again in 2011) (Marangozov, 2014, p. 7), and in 2009 the government recommitted to refugees' integration into the labour market and linguistic requirements, while stating explicitly that it refrained from developing a comprehensive national migrant integration strategy (Gidley, 2012, p. 349). The 2010 *Equality Act* broadened immigrants' access to social rights by consolidating the provisions of the 2006 Act that it replaced; the act legally allowed all persons, including migrants lawfully living in the UK, equal access to any publicly used facilities (McCormick, 2013, p. 318).

Across both paths 1 and 2, and their three typical cases, executive capacity appears crucial to understanding the intensity of immigration PI reform activity in the UK (Maggetti & Trein, 2021). The analysis of immigration PI during the previous period already reflected that the literature on UK immigration policy singles out the Prime Minister and the Home Secretary as "the main agenda-setters and leaders in immigration policy-making" (Cerna & Wietholtz, 2011, p. 202) and that most executive proposals are adopted without or with only small changes by the legislature (Cerna & Wietholtz, 2011, p. 204). However, the evidence also suggests that UK's immigration policy making environment has become more plural and fragmented. Somerville (2007) finds that New Labour's emphasis on horizontal and vertical coordination has left its mark on immigration policy-making: under New Labour, the *Home Office* invited stakeholders to join advisory panels increasingly and consulted these on policy development, although this remained an ad hoc practice (p. 77). While the government can still implement immigration policies with relative autonomy, it also now anticipates other factors such as "challenges from political party opponents, but also the blocking potential of the judiciary, and to a lesser extent pressures from lobby groups" (Statham & Geddes, 2006, p. 258).

As indicated above, during the Blair I cabinet's term in office national census data revealed a combination of growing immigration and asylum and a departure of British people. As migration levels rose sharply in the late 1990s and early 2000s, the salience of the immigration issue in public opinion rose sharply and the mood towards immigrants turned more restrictive (Ford et al., 2015). These trends "fuelled a new debate on immigration and national identity,

with strong impetus from sensationalist popular newspapers” that conveyed fears of ‘losing control’ of immigration (Schierup et al., 2006, p. 121). The Conservative party’s 2001 and 2005 election campaigns were widely depicted as focussing on issues of interest to its right-of-centre core voter base and seeking to raise the salience of immigration (Green, 2011), which was framed as a problem of numbers and control (Ford et al., 2015, p. 1397). The far-right and radical right parties increased their support by campaigning for sharp reductions to immigration, winning over parts of the core electoral bases of the main parties (Ford & Goodwin, 2010). New Labour distanced itself from the competitors by de-emphasising and de-politicising the issue during its campaign, as the lack of salience of immigration-related issues in its otherwise rather right-leaning electoral platform demonstrates; in fact, it however made immigration a priority area of policy-making and instigated policy developments on several parallel agendas and was continuously concerned to be seen as prolific in this field (Schuster & Solomos, 2004).

The organisational configuration during the Blair II cabinet consisted in a concentrated portfolio for immigration and immigrant integration policy within the jurisdiction of the *Home Office*. The portfolio was not fully concentrated, though, as the 2002 strategy was coordinated by an *Ethnic Minority Employment Taskforce* led by the *Department for Work and Pensions*. Although the most parsimonious solution shows that this organisational configuration was not causally relevant at a cross-case level, the conservative solution (path 2) suggests that it may be contextually relevant (cf. Appendix B, analysis 4). On the one hand, the government pursued a ‘community cohesion’ policy that targeted not immigrants per se but minority ethnic communities who were identified to live separately from the rest of society (Gidley, 2012, p. 349); on the other, the government also focused on immigration through the ‘race relations’ issue, with measures such as the 2000 Race Relations Amendment Act, that, too, mainstreamed the integration of immigrants into a more general equality policy; on another hand still, the *Department for Work and Pensions* in parallel led the Ethnic Minority Employment policy to address the many employment barriers faced by ethnic minorities, which led to different transversal PI measures starting in 2003; and finally, a more targeted integration agenda led by the Home Office. The literature indicates that the combination of responsibilities for immigration and parts of integration policy as well as the police force and the penal system was problematic in view of the Home Office’s image as a rather “repressive institution” (Schierup et al., 2006, pp. 118–119; also Cerna & Wietholtz, 2011, p. 226). Studies indicate that this combination also made it difficult to find adequate solutions for immigration and integration issues and to mobilise public support for them (Solomos, 2003; Layton-Henry, 2004).

The Blair III cabinet created the *Department for Communities and Local Government* (DCLG) that received the race and social cohesion portfolios from the *Home Office*, thereby replacing

the concentrated immigration and immigrant integration portfolio with a fragmented one (**~CONC * ~LARGE**). The creation of DCLG fragmented the portfolio of immigration and integration policy because immigrant integration policy became part of the broader race relations and social cohesion agendas and introduced what (Cerna & Wietholtz, 2011, p. 226) call “a peculiar separation” between refugee integration in the UK Border Agency (within the Home Office) and integration policy for all other immigrant groups within *DCLG*. In the words of Cerna and Wietholtz (2011), immigrant integration policy was thus “institutionally subsumed into matters of human rights, discrimination, equality and ‘community relations’” (p. 226), a development that became also visible through the establishment of the *Equalities and Human Rights Commission (EHRC)* as a single equality body in 2007. After 2006, DCLG actively integrated the migration issues into social cohesion policy. It created the *Commission on Integration and Cohesion* that examined the issues of new immigrants and ethnic minorities from the perspective of community cohesion and formulated some policy principles on this matter (Gidley, 2012, p. 349). In particular, the Migration Directorate at DCLG actively appropriated and promoted this agenda. In a review of immigrant integration policy published in 2008, DCLG concludes indeed that there was no need to establish a centralised body to coordinate the government’s immigrant integration policy, but that instead DCLG and the Migration Directorate in particular would be best placed to advance immigrant integration policy through its focus on and cooperation with local authorities (DCLG, 2008, pp. 43-44).¹¹¹ According to Cerna and Wietholtz (2011) DCLG’s Migration Directorate “with a rather meagre number of staff and lacking resources, saw the review as their chance to grow institutionally” (pp. 227–228). The combination of portfolio fragmentation and executive dominance appears as relevant for explaining the high PI reform activity of the latter two successive UK cabinets. We can make the hypothesis that high PI reform activity stems from congruence of administrative and governmental agendas when executive capacity is high and various ministries pursue similar parallel PI agendas, each with its own issue focus and PI instruments, leading to a relatively high number of PI reforms adopted as well as a diversification of the reform instruments.

Large ministry, absent salience, and (absent executive capacity or right-of-centre cabinet) (paths 3 & 4)

The most parsimonious solution features two further sufficient combinations but the model is ambiguous about which of them explains the outcome better. Both configurations share two conditions: they concur that in the 2000s and 2010s, governments that combined immigration policy functions with substantively related policy functions in a large ministry,

¹¹¹ In 2010, DCLG was given primary responsibility for immigrant integration (Ali & Gidley, 2014, p. 5) under the Cameron cabinet, enhancing the fragmentation of the portfolio even further.

and that were not elected on an agenda on which immigration-related issues featured saliently, adopted a relatively high amount of immigration PI reforms if an additional condition was met: either the cabinet lacked executive capacity (path 3), or the cabinet was a right-leaning one (path 4). These conditions are shown to be jointly sufficient for the outcome at the cross-case at good levels of consistency.¹¹² The empirical coverage of these ambiguous configurations is very low, though, and they are represented by only one typical case: the Reinfeldt II cabinet that governed Sweden between 2011 and 2014.¹¹³ The fact that this Swedish cabinet is a typical case of combinations of conditions that are specific to this country (although not contradicted by evidence from other countries neither)¹¹⁴ reflects the claim in the literature that the development of the Swedish approach to immigration and integration was remarkably different from other countries, especially Western European ones (Dahlström & Esaiasson, 2013; Borevi, 2014). The PI reforms of this period aimed at enhancing migrant integration and broadening immigrants' access to mainstream rights. In particular, in 2013, people residing in Sweden without permission were granted access to the same subsidized health and medical care as asylum seekers, new funding was provided for Swedish language courses for adult migrants and for asylum seekers, and skilled migrants' access to employment should be improved and the validation of foreign university qualifications streamlined. At the same time, in 2014, the *Introduction Programme* (introduced in 1985, it aimed at preparing immigrants for, and facilitating the transition to the labour market) was limited to those immigrants who had already settled in a municipality, excluding those – especially refugees – still in temporary housing; this restriction aimed at ensuring “continuity in introduction activities, but also to enable the labour market activities of the introduction programme to be tailored to the local economic conditions” (OECD, 2016, p. 68). The Reinfeldt cabinet integrated the minister for Integration within the Ministry for Employment while immigration policy remained within the Ministry for Justice (Emilsson, 2013, p. 300), but this minister's affiliation and status within the Swedish government was highly volatile (Hernes, 2020). The 2010 election introduced a shift in the *Alliance for Sweden* centre-right coalition that had governed Sweden since 2006 away from the majority government towards a minority government that in order to govern depended on issue-specific coalitions with or support from other parties in Parliament. In immigration policy, the government came to an agreement with the Green party that included rights for undocumented migrants to education

¹¹² The consistency of path 4 is slightly higher with 0.847, as compared to 0.794 for path 3.

¹¹³ This cabinet had a fragmented portfolio for immigration and immigrant integration policy (~CONC) and a right-leaning agenda (HGOVR), two conditions that the conservative solution suggests might also be contextually relevant (cf. Appendix B, Analysis 4).

¹¹⁴ The two paths are based on logical minimisation with the help of logical remainders in truth table rows 9, 15, 25, 27, 29, 31.

and health care as well as easier family reunification (Demker & Odmalm, 2022, p. 434). During these years, the emergence of the anti-immigration Swedish Democrats also politicised the immigration and integration issues (Jerneck, 2023). This party entered Parliament for the first time in 2010 after an electoral campaign during which it mobilised popular support around an anti-immigration stance characterised by a restrictive and assimilationist agenda that was new to, and at first remained isolated within, Swedish party politics (Elgenius & Rydgren, 2019; Demker & Odmalm, 2022; Jerneck, 2023). The emergence of this radical right party set in motion a fundamental change of the Swedish party system towards multi-partyism (Oskarson & Demker, 2015; Rydgren & Van der Meiden, 2019). From 2010 onwards, it slowly eroded the previous consensual stance shared by the political parties that had characterised parliamentary discussions and policy formulation on immigration and integration policy (Odmalm, 2011; Demker & Odmalm, 2022). It was replaced with a zero-sum framing that pitted immigrants against other groups of beneficiaries in a perceived trade-off between immigration and the welfare state (Jerneck, 2023).

Right-of-centre government, salience, absent executive capacity, and (concentrated portfolio or absent large ministry) (paths 5 & 6)

The final two sufficient configurations (~EXECDOM * HGOVR * SALG * [CONC + ~LARGE] → PIACT) of the most parsimonious solution model are again subject to model ambiguity, i.e., the model remains ambiguous which one of the two paths explains the empirical evidence better. Both configurations share three conditions: they concur that governments of the 2000s and 2010s adopted a relatively high amount of PI reforms if they were elected on a right-leaning agenda on which immigration-related issues featured saliently and lacked executive capacity, and if an additional organisational condition is met: either the policy functions for immigration and immigrant integration are concentrated within one ministry (path 5), or the ministry is not a large one (path 6). For all their complexity (with four conditions) and model ambiguity, these paths are above conventional consistency thresholds (path 5: 0.803, path 6: 0.754) and have the highest coverage by far in the model (path 5: 0.388, path 6: 0.446). These paths capture the experiences of the same seven typical cases, that are all members of truth table row 20. The coverage is diverse insofar as the typical cases are situated in five different countries: the Howard III cabinet that governed Australia between 2002 and 2004, Austria's first Schüssel cabinet (2000-2002), Canada's first two cabinets under Prime Minister Harper (2006-2010), Germany's two successive cabinets Schröder II (2003-2005) and Merkel I (2006-2009), as well as the Netherlands Rutte I-II cabinet (2011-2014). This combination of conditions is also present in two deviant cases in kind – Australia's Howard IV cabinet (2005-2007) and Germany's Merkel II cabinet (2010-2013) – that share the same conditions but are associated with the absence of the outcome and therefore weaken the

consistency of the sufficiency relationship. These configurations are also interesting from a theoretical point of view. The combination of right-leaning cabinets and issue salience might allow further insights into the influence of issue ownership dynamics when parties in government adopt PI reforms. These paths further provide insights on the conditions under which governments in different countries adopt PI reforms when they enjoy little executive capacity, either because powers are delegated to the subnational and/or supranational levels or because of the government's weak status vis-à-vis the Parliament.

As regards their membership in the outcome, the PI reform activity of the cabinets that constitute the typical cases of this configuration was as follows. After a shift away from a PI approach to immigration policy under the first cabinet led by John Howard (cf. analysis 3, pp. 230-233), from 2002 onwards, Australian immigration policy (again) became more integrated under the third Howard cabinet (2002-2004). Immigration and immigrant integration policy were brought closer together through the obligation, introduced in 2002, for all family reunion migrants to have a sponsor who provides them with support including accommodation and financial assistance (OECD, 2007a, p. 84); the creation in 2004 of the *Settlement Grants Program* that combined funding streams in the field of settlement services for humanitarian migrants (Spinks, 2009, p. 7); and the requirement (introduced in 2006) for most visa applicants to sign a so-called "Australian Values Statement" (Spinks, 2009, p. 3). The government also created a new three-day pre-embarkation orientation for humanitarian migrants that included basic information on the political system, healthcare, public transport, the labour market, the education system, and access to settlement services (Liebig, 2007b, p. 23). In Austria, reforms under the Schüssel I cabinet (2000-2002) followed the policy trend started in the mid-1990s, focusing on language requirements and related training. A 2003 reform of the Alien Law and of the Alien Employment Law introduced a requirement for immigrants to complete a language and integration course during the first four years of stay (Bauböck & Perchinig, 2006, p. 737). Integration Agreements created in 2003 required immigrants that had been granted a residence permit to acquire the A2 level of German language during the first two years of their stay. In Canada, in the second half of the 2000s, various PI reforms strengthened the nexus between immigration and integration with the introduction of a language testing requirement for all permanent economic migrants (OECD, 2012b, p. 218), the 2010 *Canadian Immigration Integration Programme*, and the 2015 overhaul of application management for permanent skilled immigrants "Express Entry" (Desiderio & Hooper, 2016, p. 1). In Germany, under the two typical cases covering the period between 2003 and 2009, the country saw a plethora of federal immigration PI reforms, especially after the 2005 *Law on the Steering and Limitation of Immigration* formally defined immigrant integration as a task of the federal government. The law also created the *Federal Integration Programme* that was uniform for all permanent immigrants, integration courses

as a new central element of federal integration policy, and a “one-stop-shop” procedure for residence title and work permit applications (Joppke, 2007, p. 13; Liebig, 2007a, pp. 26–27; Kreienbrink, 2013, p. 407; OECD, 2013b, pp. 65–66; Bendel, 2014, p. 3). It also created *Youth Migration Services* as part of the ministry for Family and Youth’s youth policy initiative (Bendel, 2014, p. 10). The law was not a complete reversal of German immigration policy but marked a shift away from group-specific orientation and the absence of state-centric policy framework towards a systematic, strategic, and coherent integration policy (Bundesregierung, 2005, p. 3; OECD, 2013, p. 66; Scholten et al., 2016, p. 11). The *First Integration Summit* in 2006 resulted in the decision to create a national integration plan with an intercultural dialogue approach oriented towards the society as a whole rather than at specific groups to be integrated (Scholten et al., 2016, p. 11). In the following years under Merkel I, the government adopted several reforms centred on the integration of immigrants led by different ministries, such as the *National Integration Plan* (2006) that was established by the governments of Bund and Länder and the municipalities, as well as representatives from civil society, media, science and migrant organisations, and aimed at better coordinating the measures implemented by these different actors. It conceived integration as a cross-cutting policy task at all levels and established and listed overarching objectives, measures and instruments at various political levels (Burkert & Haas, 2014, p. 6). In its wake, several ministries’ sectoral policies included measures directed towards migrants, among which the Education ministry’s “Qualification Initiative” (2008), the Social Affairs ministry’s programme for labour market support for refugees (2008), and the Family ministry’s programme for the integration of young immigrants (Bendel, 2014, p. 10).

In all cases, governments enjoyed little executive capacity, either because powers are delegated to the subnational and/or supranational levels or because of the government’s weak status vis-à-vis the Parliament, and this is a necessary component of this configuration. Except for the Rutte I-II cabinet, all other cases are situated in federal settings, which means that their autonomy to determine the national agenda is likely curtailed through federal power-sharing arrangements. Indeed, the federal systems in which the cases of this configuration are situated provide for shared competences as regards immigrant integration. In Austria, the *Länder* have competences with respect to immigrant integration, but their competences for immigration policy are restricted to implementing federal legislation (Bauböck, 2001, p. 256). In Australia, the Commonwealth provides significant financial assistance for the integration services, which in turn are largely managed by state governments (Hawthorne, 2012, p. 38). In Germany, the *Länder* are competent on matters of immigrant integration; however, the federal government has in the past resorted to its constitutional powers in areas such as employment promotion, youth support and the financing of the welfare services to promote immigrant integration policies, or it has provided

funding to subnational and non-governmental actors. This practice “has resulted in a large variety of governmental and nongovernmental actors at all levels, shared responsibilities, and a plethora of co-financed and project-based activities” (Liebig, 2007, p. 25). In 2005, however, immigrant integration was formally defined as a federal task and the role of sub-national actors more clearly defined in terms of their involvement in policy implementation (Liebig, 2007a, p. 28). Finally, Canada is one of the most decentralised countries concerning the administration of immigration (Banting, 2012, p. 86; Reitz, 2012, p. 520) and there has been an increasing movement towards provincial power in this field (Paquet, 2014). Immigrant integration and settlement policy was mainly negotiated bilaterally between the central government and individual provinces (Banting, 2012, pp. 85-86), but there has been a movement towards multilateralism (Schertzer, 2015). It therefore becomes apparent that in all these cases, subnational governments play an important role in the determination of immigration policy and the vertical fragmentation of competences between the levels of the federal states constrains the federal governments’ room for manoeuvre. It is therefore highly interesting that all national governments of federal states that adopted a high amount of immigration PI during the 2000s and 2010s are situated in the same truth table row, i.e., share the same configuration of conditions.

The cases of this configuration share the INUS condition of having been elected on a right-of-centre platform. Most cases represent coalition governments. In Canada, the first two governments led by Stephen Harper (2006-2010) are associated with a conservative ideology sparked with some liberal elements (Boily, 2015), while the Australian Howard III cabinet was a National-Liberal coalition. Schüssel I (2000-2002) was a coalition of the conservative Austrian People’s Party (ÖVP) and the right-wing populist (Pelinka, 2002) Freedom Party of Austria (FPÖ) (Fallend, 2001). Interestingly, the two cabinets Schröder II (2003-2005), a coalition of the Social Democratic SPD and the Green party, and Merkel I (2006-2009), a “grand coalition” led by the Christian democrats (Egle & Zohlnhöfer, 2010), are both calibrated as right-of-centre cabinets. In its 2002 campaign, the SPD’s electoral program was positioned slightly on the right of the ideological spectrum when its positions on all policy areas are taken into account, in a clear break with the party’s ideological profile of the past two decades (Pappi & Shikano, 2004). The SPD’s pragmatic and programmatic changes under Schröder’s leadership led it to formulate positions taking into account a variety of groups and (potential) voters, by positioning itself as the “SPD of the modern centre”; this most likely led it to embrace positions traditionally associated with right-of-centre parties in its electoral campaign of 2002, especially as regards its positions towards the welfare state (Jun, 2003).

The presence of salience is a further necessary component of this configuration. The governments perceived the issue as relevant for their voters and fulfilled electoral pledges in adopting a high number of PI reforms. The literature supports that salience played a role for

the adoption of these reforms. As regards the Australian case, scholars have shown that the Howard governments' policy choices were largely dictated by its "ability to react and even exploit public attitudes" (Lewis, 2007, p. 92) as reflected in opinion polls (Baringhorst, 2004). Interest groups defending the rights of specific immigrant categories had become vocal policy actors in Australia during the previous decades (Betts, 2003), and in Canada, in 2005, a *Coalition for Immigrant Children and Youth* was established to advocate a national strategy for the education and integration of immigrant children and youth (Birjandian, 2005, p. 26). The salience of immigration-related issues was particularly high in Germany. The issue of new labour migration was high on the political agenda around 2005-2006 (Green, 2007, p. 105). This is related to the aftermath of the 2004 "visa affair" that revealed conflicts between the ministries responsible for visa affairs (Foreign Affairs) and immigration (Interior) about the former's visa policy implementation practices. This became a major administrative immigration crisis in Germany's recent history, was highly mediatised and attracted high public interest (Reichersdorfer et al., 2013). In addition, the Interior ministers' agreement to make the attendance of civic integration courses and the passing of standard language tests a prerequisite for naturalisation was a consequence of public debates on "honour killings" in the Turkish immigrant milieu and on separatism and ethnic violence in a Berlin public school (Joppke, 2007, p. 14).

While the above illustrates the presence of the political conditions of the path, the following paragraph turns to the organisational conditions. The solution term is ambiguous about the fourth INUS condition of this configuration, i.e., it does not determine which one of two conditions – the presence of a concentrated portfolio of immigration policy functions or the absence of a large ministry – is a necessary part of this configuration.

As regards the concentration of the immigration portfolio, in all cases these policy functions were rather or fully concentrated within one ministry (cf. Appendix B). In addition, however, several of the typical cases also illustrate the move towards an intensified concentration of immigration policy functions during this period (cf. Chapter 4, section 2.2). In Canada, the first Harper cabinet further concentrated immigration and integration policy competences in 2008 by transferring the multiculturalism portfolio from the *Department of Canadian Heritage* to the *Department of Citizenship and Immigration*. The move should improve coordination between all major immigration, citizenship, and multiculturalism policy programs, and in particular between the "relatively short-term settlement programs and longer-term integration programs that promote inclusion, participation, and shared citizenship" (Vineberg, 2012, p. 63). In 2003, the Schröder I government had strongly enhanced the concentration of the federal government's competences when immigrant integration policy became a competence of the *Federal Agency for Migration and Refugees (BAMF)* under the *Ministry of the Interior* (Kreienbrink, 2013, pp. 407–408). BAMF received competences from the *Federal*

Administrative Agency and from the *Ministry for Economy and Labour*. BAMF within the realm of BMI now had the “conceptual competence” for integration promotion (e.g., designing integration courses) and a department for Integration was newly created within BAMF. BAMF further became responsible for coordinating information exchange on labour migration between the administrations for immigration and labour and the Foreign Office (Kreienbrink, 2013, pp. 407–408). The 2005 *Law on the Steering and Limitation of Immigration* further consolidated BAMF’s position (Bendel, 2014, p. 3; Kreienbrink, 2013, p. 407; Liebig, 2007a, pp. 26–27; OECD, 2013b, pp. 65–66). Still, the Ministry of Economics and Labour remained responsible for labour market integration, which was not covered by the newly-established initial integration courses. Meanwhile, BAMF in 2007 received competences for the promotion of professional German language competences from BAMS as well as the administration of the financial means received out of the European Integration Fund (Kreienbrink, 2013, pp. 408, 410). In 2010, the federal integration programme (“Bundesweites Integrationsprogramm”) elaborated by BAMF catalogued the integration activities at Bund, Länder and local level and made propositions for their development (Bendel, 2014, p. 6).

In Germany, besides the concentration of policy functions in the realm of the Ministry for the Interior, another centralising move was made during this period: the Federal Chancellery emerged as a second strong actor of German immigrant integration policy in the 2000s and inter-ministerial coordination was strengthened. In 2005, an *Interministerial Working Group Integration* was created to coordinate the integration policies of the ministries and bring them together within a common conceptual framework (Bundesregierung, 2005, p. 3; Schneider, 2010, p. 338). The Chancellery initiated the *First Integration Summit* in 2006, which resulted in the decision to create a national integration plan and established ten working groups on issues related to the integration of immigrants, each of which was under the lead management of a different ministry or representative of the federal government (Scholten et al., 2016, p. 293).

There are several counterfactual cases that show that, all else being equal, left-of-centre governments are consistently associated with relatively little PI reform activity. These are Germany’s Schröder I cabinet (1998-2001) (truth table row 2) and Austria’s successive Schüssel III, Gusenbauer, and Faymann I cabinets (truth table row 18). In Germany, the Schröder I coalition cabinet of SPD and Grüne had already worked to bring about a paradigm shift in German immigration policy (Bendel, 2014, p. 3). In 2001, a report of the *Independent Commission on Immigration* (“Süßmuth-Kommission”) advocated the need of a more systematic federal immigrant integration policy with a coherent integration concept (Heckmann, 2015, p. 247). It made comprehensive propositions for integrating the competences for migration and refugees and first introduced the ideas of compulsory integration classes (“Integrationskurse”) in Germany (Schmid-Drüner, 2006, p. 194; Joppke,

2007, p. 13; Kreienbrink, 2013, p. 407; Bendel, 2014, p. 3). These recommendations proved too radical politically and given the electorate's prevailing deep scepticism about immigration, the opposition CDU/CSU dropped its initial support for the government (Green, 2007, pp. 104-105). However, there is policy continuity between the cabinets led by SPD and CDU during the 2000s. The 2005 Immigration Law – which represented a compromise version of the initial laws, several key elements of the original text having been dropped – was approved by a broad majority in both chambers of the Parliament (Schmid-Drüner, 2006).

The deviant cases – Australia's Howard IV cabinet (2005-2007) and Germany's Merkel II cabinet (2010-2013) – illustrate that the same configuration does not explain the outcome likely due to additional factors not integrated in the truth table. A common feature of both deviant cases is that they are successor cabinets to cases that are members of this configuration. In other words, once these governments were confirmed in office, their policy course changed, turning away from a PI approach to immigration policy.

During the fourth Howard cabinet starting in 2005, Australian immigration PI reform activity slowed down compared to other countries. The *National Action Plan to Build on Social Cohesion, Harmony and Security* was adopted in 2005 to intensify integration initiatives for vulnerable communities (Hawthorne, 2012, p. 44), as well as the first *Population Strategy* that testifies of the emphasis on migration in supporting regional growth (Gross, 2014; OECD, 2012b, p. 210). The Australian government turned increasingly towards policies that support the immigration of highly skilled migrants at the expense of other categories by changing the balance in the visa categories, and there was, as Hugo (2014) explains, “a strong imperative within government for immigration to contribute toward the increasing skill profile of the national population and improving productivity” (p. 875). With immigration becoming a crucial aspect of national economic modelling, the Treasury had also become more influential in “shaping the scale and composition of immigration” within the federal government (Hugo, 2014, p. 875), at the expense of DIMA. Under the second Merkel government in Germany (2010-2013), a coalition composed of CDU/CSU and the liberal FDP, immigration remained a salient issue on the coalition's agenda (Hertner, 2022) but the government adopted less PI reforms than in the previous legislature (Ratzmann & Bauer, 2020).

2.5 Employment PI in the 1980s and 1990s (analysis 5)

The analysis of unemployment policy integration in the 1980s and 1990s covers 39 cases, 17 out of which are members of the outcome.¹¹⁵ Cases with membership in the outcome are

¹¹⁵ The fuzzy scores are displayed in Appendix B, Analysis 5.

those cabinets that had the highest PI reform activity in employment policy in the nine countries during the 1980s and 1990s.

All countries with the exception of Austria contribute at least one case with membership in the outcome set. Austria's absence from the outcome set is in line with the observation that Austria adopted comparatively little employment PI reforms during these two decades and the lack of coordination between different policy areas "to be able to implement a broader, more comprehensive employment policy" (Ludwig-Mayerhofer & Wroblewski, 2004, p. 497). Countries with one cabinet with membership in the outcome are France (Jospin, 1997-2001), Germany (Kohl IV, 1995-98), and the United Kingdom (Blair I, 1997-2000). Canada has two cabinets with membership in the outcome (Mulroney II-Campbell, 1989-93; Chrétien I, 1994-96). Countries with three cases with membership in the outcome are Australia (Hawke III, 1988-89; Hawke IV-Keating, 1990-92; Howard I, 1996-98), the Netherlands (Lubbers II, 1987-89; Lubbers III, 1990-94; Kok I, 1995-98), New Zealand (Lange II-Palmer, 1988-90; Bolger I, 1991-93; Bolger II-III, 1994-96), and Sweden (Carlsson II-III, 1989-91; Bildt, 1992-94; Carlsson IV-Persson I, 1995-98).

The truth table analysis reveals that no condition is individually sufficient for neither the presence of the outcome (PIACT) nor its absence (\sim PIACT). While no condition comes close to individual sufficiency for PIACT, the condition \sim EXECDOM comes closest to sufficiency for \sim PIACT.¹¹⁶ The truth table analysis reveals that seven truth table rows are consistently associated with the outcome PIACT. These truth table rows cover 14 cases, two of which are deviant in kind (cf. Appendix B, Analysis 5). This means that the solutions generated from the truth table explain the outcome PIACT of 12 out of 17 cases with membership in the outcome; the remaining five cases are unexplained.


The most parsimonious solution for PIACT allows to identify four sufficient combinations of indispensable conditions on which the data provide evidence that they are causally relevant:

$$\begin{aligned} & \text{EXECDOM} * \text{SALG} + \sim\text{CONC} * \text{LARGE} * \text{EXECDOM} + \\ & \sim\text{LARGE} * \sim\text{EXECDOM} * \text{HGOVR} + \text{LARGE} * \text{EXECDOM} * \sim\text{HGOVR} \rightarrow \text{PIACT} \end{aligned}$$

These four INUS combinations of conditions appear as jointly sufficient for governments' high PI reform activity in unemployment policy in the 1980s and 1990s. Figure 27 gives an overview of the typical and deviant cases associated with each path. Path 2 has a deviant case. The three cases of Australia are members of three of the paths of the most parsimonious solution.

¹¹⁶ Parameters of the sufficiency relation of \sim EXECDOM and \sim PIACT: consistency = 0.649, coverage = 0.548, PRI = 0.591.

Figure 27: Solution paths and cases (analysis 5)



Executive capacity and salience (path 1), large ministry (path 2) and a left-of-centre government (path 4)

The configuration of conditions (**EXECDOM * SALG → PIACT**) of path 1 shows that cabinets that enjoyed a high amount of executive capacity, i.e., a wide-ranging dominance of the legislative agenda, and perceived the employment issue to be important for voters, were active employment PI reformers during the 1980s and 1990s. The level of consistency of this configuration is low for conventional standards (0.708), but this path has the highest coverage in the solution model. Its coverage is high both in terms of raw coverage (0.434), i.e., the part of the outcome explained by this set being 43.3 % of governments' employment PI reform activity during the 1980s and 1990s, and in terms of unique coverage (0.262), i.e., the amount

of evidence explained only by this path and no other, at 26.2 %. This path is also plausible as regards the theoretical expectations. It shows that governments that perceive the employment question as important for voters adopted employment PI reforms when they enjoyed the leeway to do so. This relationship holds for cabinets both right and left of the centre (the conservative solution even excludes this condition as contextually irrelevant, cf. Appendix B, Analysis 5), suggesting that when these two conditions were met, PI was a solution favoured by both the right and the left. This path is likewise indifferent to the way in which employment policy competences were organised ministerially, suggesting that pledge fulfilment as a driver of policy choices in governments' that dominate the legislative agenda leads to PI through political coordination indifferently of the policy coordination dynamics at play within and across the ministerial administrations.¹¹⁷ This configuration covers the experiences of as much as eight typical cases that are nested in four countries: three cabinets that governed New Zealand between 1988 and 1996 (the cabinets Lange II-Palmer, Bolger I, and Bolger II-III), the Carlsson II-III cabinet (1989-1991) in Sweden, the Mulroney II-Campbell cabinet (1989-1993) in Canada, and three cabinets that governed Australia between 1988 and 1992 (Hawke III and Hawke IV-Keating) and 1996 and 1998 (Howard I). This combination of conditions covers also two deviant cases in kind, the Swedish Carlsson I cabinet (1986-1988) and the Australian Keating II cabinet (1993-1995), which decrease its consistency.

The second configuration of conditions (**~CONC * LARGE * EXECDOM → PIACT**) shows that cabinets that combined a high amount of executive capacity, i.e., that largely dominated the national legislative agenda, and organised the ministerial employment policy functions in a fragmented way across ministries but had a large ministry that combined functions for Employment and Social Affairs, were active employment PI reformers during the 1980s and 1990s. The consistency of this configuration is moderate but above the conventional standard (0.785) and higher than that of path 1, but this path has lower coverage. Although it is able to explain 19.5 % of governments' employment PI reform activity during the 1980s and 1990s, the part of the outcome exclusively explained by this path is low at only 3.8 % because it mostly covers cases that are also covered by other paths. This path is plausible as regards the theoretical expectations. Like path 1, it demonstrates the relevance of executive capacity for employment PI reforms during the 1980s and 1990s. It combines executive capacity with a particular organisational configuration, which it shows to be sufficient for explaining the outcome indifferently of the cabinets' ideological position on the right-left scale and the salience of employment issues on the cabinets' agendas. This path captures the experiences of four typical cases, three of which are the Australian cases also covered by the first path

¹¹⁷ All the typical cases covered by the path further share the condition 'fragmented portfolio', which according to the conservative solution may be contextually relevant (cf. Appendix B, Analysis 5).

(Hawke III, Hawke IV-Keating, and Howard I) and the fourth one is the Blair I cabinet (1997-2000) in the United Kingdom. The former two are also covered by two other paths of the solution; only the Blair I cabinet is exclusively explained by this path. In addition, the Australian Keating II cabinet (1993-1995) is a deviant case in kind.

This configuration of conditions (**LARGE * EXECDOM * ~HGOVR → PIACT**) shows that left-of-centre governments with a high amount of executive capacity, i.e., a wide-ranging dominance of the legislative agenda, and that organised employment policy functions in a large ministry combined with functions for interdependent policies such as social affairs, were active employment PI reformers during the 1980s and 1990s. The level of consistency of this configuration is low for conventional standards (0.717), but it explains a decent amount – 20.2 % – of governments’ employment PI reform activity during the 1980s and 1990s, although the part of the outcome explained exclusively by this path is low at only 7.6 % because it mostly covers cases that are also covered by other paths. Like paths 1 and 2, this path demonstrates the relevance of executive capacity for employment PI reforms during the 1980s and 1990s; it is interesting from a theoretical point of view because it explains left-of-centre cabinets’ PI activity in particular. In addition, it shows that left-of-centre cabinets that enjoyed executive capacity are only consistently associated with high employment PI reform intensity when they combined employment policy functions within a large ministry with functions for interdependent policies such as social affairs. This path captures the experiences of three typical cases, among which again the Australian cases Hawke III and Hawke IV-Keating that were already covered by paths 1 and 2, and in addition France’s Jospin cabinet that governed between 1997 and 2001.¹¹⁸

Given that Australia and New Zealand have the most typical cases as well as a deviant case in these configuration, the analysis concentrates on the cases nested in these two countries.

As regards their membership in the outcome, the PI reform activity of the cabinets that constitute the typical cases of path 1 was as follows. The three successive cabinets of New Zealand between 1988 and 1996 – Lange II-Palmer, Bolger I and Bolger II-III – cover the labour market reforms of the late 1980s through which New Zealand switched from passive unemployment benefits to activation policy (OECD, 2008). These reforms integrated the employment services with the benefit administration through a “mutual obligations approach” that required job search or training in exchange for benefits (Bibbee, 2013, p. 20; McCluskey, 2008, p. 313). The Bolger I cabinet introduced major cuts to entitlements in what

¹¹⁸ These cases vary as regards the other two conditions. While the former have fragmented portfolios (~CONC) and unemployment issues are salient on the cabinet’s agenda (SALG), the latter has a concentrated portfolio for unemployment policy (CONC) and the issue of unemployment is not salient (~SALG); the conservative solution shows that these conditions may be contextually relevant for explaining the outcome.

Starke (2008) qualifies as “perhaps the most drastic example of welfare state retrenchment not just in New Zealand but the OECD as a whole” (p. 94). The regimes for different benefits were both integrated around the core family’s finances and targeted towards smaller incomes in order to strengthen work incentives and make budget savings and the system thereby shifted ways from universal social assistance to an integrated targeting regime (Garlick, 2012, pp. 142-143; OECD, 2015, p. 126). In 1995, the government introduced changes to the benefit policy that involved new ‘reciprocal obligations’ for recipients and measures to encourage the uptake of more temporary and casual forms of employment (Garlick, 2012, pp. 162–163). In the same year, the government introduced the ‘Individualised Employment Assistance’ that combined previously separate job search assistance programs for different target groups and intensified case management for long-term unemployed (Garlick, 2012, p. 200).

Four successive governments of Australia are members of these paths: as regards paths 1 and 2, the Hawke III and Hawke IV-Keating cabinets that governed between 1988 and 1992 as well as the Howard I cabinet (1996-1998) are typical cases with membership in the outcome, whereas the Keating II cabinet of the intervening years (1993-1995) is a deviant case in kind; with the exception of Howard I, these cases are also members of path 4. In Australia, the concept of the one-stop shop for welfare programs was first discussed in the mid-1970s (Halligan, 2004, p. 150) and the first large-scale labour market measures already introduced between 1972 and 1975 in order to pursue full employment, including measures to provide temporary public sector jobs, short-term training for adults, and post-secondary vocational training for youth (OECD, 2001, p. 76). In the second half of the 1980s, new needs were identified and a number of active labour market measures as well as benefit activation measures introduced. In 1986, claimants of unemployment benefits were required to register with the employment services and to report job search efforts (OECD, 2001, p. 77), and in 1989, the “Newstart” programme was introduced with a particular focus on long-term unemployed, including counselling, referrals to labour market programs, and transition-to-work incentives (OECD, 2012c, p. 163). Burgess et al. (2000) detail the reforms towards homogenised unemployment benefits and activated employment strategies. In 1991, the “Job Search and Newstart Allowance” replaced the previous unemployment benefit and shifted beneficiaries of previous benefits for long-term unemployed to this measure. It also contained an active employment strategy requiring all claimants to enter into a case management agreement with the authorities and that entailed “claimants negotiating with the authorities with regard to specific, suggested activities that they would carry out in return for their welfare payment; for example, joining a training course and applying for a certain number of jobs” (Burgess et al., 2000, pp. 175-176) and also provided for sanctions if the benefit rules or terms of the agreement were breached (OECD, 2001, p. 77).

Path 1 suggests that the combination of salience and executive capacity has the potential to explain the adoption of these relatively many employment PI reforms. In the cases nested in New Zealand, the salience of the employment issue was particularly high in all three typical cases. Given the situation of a fiscal crisis of significant proportions that the Labour governments led by David Lange already inherited when they started governing New Zealand after a landslide victory in 1984, economic issues and employment and welfare in particular were high on the agendas. Generally, the Lange II-Palmer cabinet's fulfilment rate of electoral pledges during the Labour government's second term (1987-89) has been rated as high for New Zealand's standards (McCluskey, 2008, pp. 349-351). The National Party had shifted to the right since losing the 1984 general election, but the reforms of 1990-1992 were still a major surprise given that its 1990 manifesto remained "fairly vague as to what should be done about the welfare state" (Starke, 2008, p. 94). The 1990 manifesto contained various pledges related to the themes "Getting New Zealand Working" and to "Welfare that Works", but the pledges lacked precision and only a small part of them appear as fulfilled during the term (McCluskey, 2008, pp. 356-358). Yet, the incoming National government framed its 'Economic and Social Initiative' of 1990 as a first step to "translate into action the mandate it received to redesign the welfare state" (cited in Garlick, 2012, p. 141). In explaining the National Party government's rationale behind the reforms, Boston (1993) cites the "looming fiscal crisis" National was confronted with upon taking office and which it sought to deal with based on its "increasingly neoliberal social and economic philosophy, and its desire to win the confidence of financial markets" (p. 68). In particular, Treasury (the Finance ministry) attributed much of the deterioration to domestic social and economic policy and in particular the structure of the benefit system that did not sufficiently encourage the uptake of employment (Garlick, 2012, p. 141). The National government outlined further intentions to integrate benefits related to health, tertiary education and social security into a system based on the 'core family' in a supplement to its 1991 budget "Welfare that Works", but many "changes were carried out on an ad hoc basis, while others were found to be unworkable" (Garlick, 2012, p. 146). Employment as part of the National party's economic programme was a prominent area again when National sought re-election in 1993 (McCluskey, 2008, pp. 373-377). The salience of employment-related issues was also high in Australia, which had experienced a rise in unemployment from the mid-1970s to the mid-1980s accompanied by a longer average duration of unemployment (Burgess et al., 2000, p. 176). After a recession during the early 1980s, an important review of labour market programs (the "Kirby Report") in 1985 criticised a lack of coordination across programs and influenced efforts to develop a coordinated set of policies covering education, entry-level training and labour market programmes (OECD, 2001, p. 76). A collapse of the labour market in 1993 leading to a rate of unemployment in excess of

10% led to the publication of the Labour government's White Paper "Working Nation" that outlined a package of policies to be adopted in response (Burgess et al., 2000, p. 176).

The typical cases suggest that this path applies mostly to countries with Westminster systems of government (with the exception of Sweden) and/or that implemented NPM reforms to an at least moderate degree. The governments had strong positions because they were unconstrained by sub- or supra-national levels of government and/or had a majority government status. In New Zealand, the Bolger I single party majority government in 1990 won more seats than any party had secured in New Zealand's history but found itself in different forms of minority government to majority coalition during the 1994-96 term (McCluskey, 2008).

According to the most parsimonious solution, the combination of executive capacity and issue salience has the potential to explain the high PI reform outputs independently of both the ideological position of the government and of the way in which employment policy competences were distributed through the organisational structure of the ministries. The typical cases indeed suggest that the ideology behind these welfare state reforms transcended the traditional left-right cleavage of partisanship. Neoliberalisation was a driver of reform in Australia and New Zealand of governments both right and left of the centre (Redden et al., 2020). In New Zealand, the employment reforms were part of a series of radical economic reforms whereby, according to Nagel (1998), "New Right reforms were initiated by the party of the left", and pursued and intensified after the shift to the National government. The National government "imposed yet more dramatic change [which] continued along the path of Labour's economic policies, popularly known as 'Rogernomics', despite the severity of Labour's electoral defeat on the basis of the same policies" (Vowles & Aimer, 1993, p.8). In Australia, both the Labour government of 1988 and 1992 as well as the Conservative Coalition government between 1996 and 1999 adopted important series of employment PI measures towards increased activation and homogenised benefits; however, the Coalition government's radical reforms "were to be funded by scrapping most of the previous Labour Government's active labour market programs" (Burgess et al., 2000, p. 174). In particular, Howard I abandoned the Working Nation approach and while its policy was in continuity as regards the general PI approach to employment policy pursued, it also introduced some significant changes (OECD, 2001, pp. 80–81).

There are some indications that suggest that the organisation of the ministries did not play a major role in explaining the sustained PI reform activity because the reform process was centrally steered. In the case of New Zealand, concerns that the coordination mechanisms in place for social planning were not working effectively emerged in the early 1980s. Among others, it led to the replacement of the Social Development Council with a new body, the

Social Advisory Council, that “was more closely aligned to the government of the day; while four of its members represented major government departments, the remaining eight were appointed by the Minister” (Garlick, 2012, p. 95). The measures adopted also relied heavily on the reports of a series of task forces which had been put in place in 1990, the most important of which was the Prime Minister's Change Team on Targeting Social Assistance (Boston, 1993).

Right-of-centre government, absent executive capacity, absent large ministry (path 3)

The third configuration of conditions (**~LARGE * ~EXECDOM * HGOVR → PIACT**) shows that right-of-centre cabinets that had relatively little executive capacity and did not combine employment policy functions with functions for substantively related policies within a large ministry, were active employment PI reformers during the 1980s and 1990s. Similar to path 2, the consistency of this configuration is moderate but above the conventional standard (0.779). This path explains 9.5 % of governments’ employment PI reform activity during the 1980s and 1990s, and although this subset of the outcome is rather small it appears relevant because it is not explained by any other path. From a theoretical perspective, this path is interesting because it is the only one that explains the employment PI under right-of-centre governments particularly.

This path reflects the experiences of two typical cases nested in Sweden, the Bildt and the Carlsson IV-Persson I cabinets that governed Sweden between 1992 and 1998.¹¹⁹ The fact that these two cases represent a different path to PI than the previous Carlsson II-III cabinet (1989-1991) covered by path 1 reflect some changes in context.

On the one hand, recession and massive increase in unemployment in the early 1990s altered the conditions for labour market policy in Sweden (Minas, 2011, p. 195; European Parliament, 2016), and this period in Sweden also marks the decline of the corporatist model (Lindvall & Sebring, 2005). Until the beginning of the 1990s, unions and employers were very influential in the governance of labour market policy through corporatist arrangements since both were represented in the decision-making bodies of the AMS, which has a very independent role in relation to parliament and government (Lindvert, 2015, p. 30). These arrangements were ended when the Swedish Employers Association withdrew its representatives from government boards and committees (Bengtsson, 2012, p. 5; Lindvert, 2015, p. 32). Politically, the Carlsson IV-Persson I cabinet that had come to power in late 1994 stressed the need for increasing the economic incentives for employment by reducing entry conditions and curbing benefit levels of unemployment insurance (Sjöberg, 2011, p. 6).

¹¹⁹ Both cases had fragmented portfolios for unemployment policy (**~CONC**) and the issue of unemployment was not salient on their agendas (**~SALG**), two conditions that may be contextually relevant according to the conservative solution (path 3). Both cases are members of truth table row 3. The most parsimonious solution uses the logical remainders in rows 4 and 19 for minimisation.

The transfer of some political autonomy from the central state to the municipalities also increased the latter's responsibilities for activation policy directed towards social assistance recipients (Bergmark & Minas, 2006; Minas, 2011). The reforms of these two cabinets cover a period in which most policy measures concerned transfer of competences from the central to the local state and the new forms of coordination that were developed locally. The municipalities secured greater resources and better adapted organisational structures to manage active measures, for instance when a former system of mainly targeted state grants was replaced by block grants in 1993, increasing the municipalities' autonomy to prioritise activities according to local conditions and political preferences (Bergmark & Minas, 2006, p. 17). The municipalities have arranged and financed ALMPs as training, created labour market units and political boards responsible for local labour market policies (Bengtsson, 2012, p. 8). In 1995, the municipalities became responsible for labour market policy for the unemployed youth as well as family guidance (Bergmark & Minas, 2006, p. 16), a role that was further empowered with the 1998 revision of the Social Service Act (Minas, 2011, p. 203).¹²⁰ Their role in labour market policies was strengthened in 1996 when they got the majority on local employment service committee (Minas, 2011, p. 203). Still, in 1998 the National Board of Health and Welfare introduced a national monetary standard for social assistance that replaced the monetary benefit guidelines introduced in 1985 and served as a lowest standard that the municipalities were obliged to follow (Bergmark & Minas, 2006, p. 28; Heidenreich et al., 2014, p. 187).

This period also marks the beginning of the retrenchment of the public unemployment insurance program in terms of benefit generosity, coverage as well as reciprocity rate (Lindvert, 2015; Sjöberg, 2011), and the appearance of complementary income insurance schemes provided by labour unions alongside the traditional occupational welfare arrangements (Lindellee, 2018). 1993 marked the end of the state monopoly on employment services, and the 1992 *Public procurement Act* facilitated the contracting out of public activities in welfare services. At the same time, activation became the preferred policy approach. The cabinets of the 1990s expanded the Work Line concept that became more comprehensive and covered more welfare activities. For example, to activate vulnerable groups with no regular anchoring at the labour market, the Work Line strategy in social policy increased coordination of various authorities such as the employment service and social assistance authorities (Bengtsson, 2012, p. 9). The preference for active measures transpires

¹²⁰ Complementary transfers in the field of social competences took place during this period, providing the municipalities with competences for specific groups of benefit recipients. The *Ädelreform* transferred responsibilities for long-term inpatient health care and social welfare services to disabled and elderly individuals from the county councils to the municipalities (Bergmark & Minas, 2006, p. 16). Coordination was developed locally with first experimental activities on financial coordination between social insurance and health and medical services in different areas (Bengtsson, 2012, p. 9).

also through reforms such as the introduction of trainee replacement schemes in 1991, the dismantling of the early retirement benefit in 1992, the introduction of the Employment Development scheme in 1993, of start-up grants in 1995, and of the introduction of new forms of temporary employment through the 1996 Reform of the Security of Employment Act and the introduction of Temporary Public Employment in 1997. In 1998, the government introduced an option that made the participation of young social assistance recipients in activation programmes mandatory. A program of “relief work” with local public sector employment for those affected by cyclical or seasonal unemployment was abolished in 1998 (Kluve et al., 2007, p. 63).

2.6 Employment PI in the 2000s and 2010s (analysis 6)

The analysis of unemployment policy integration in the 2000s and 2010s covers 36 cases, 18 of which are members of the outcome.¹²¹ Cases with membership in the outcome are those cabinets that had the highest PI reform activity in employment policy in the nine countries during the 2000s and 2010s.

All countries except for Canada have at least one case with membership in the outcome set. Canada’s governments did adopt policy integration reforms in unemployment policy during the 1990s, but very little so during the 2000s and 2010s (cf. Appendix A) partly as a result of the loss of federal control over employment policy (Wood & Klassen, 2008); therefore, none of Canada’s governments of the latter period qualifies for membership in the set of governments with high PI reform activity. Austria is second placed among the countries whose governments were the least active PI reformers in unemployment policy during the 2000s and 2010s with only one cabinet (Faymann I, 2009-13) that is member of the outcome PIACT. Countries with two cabinets that are members of the outcome are the Netherlands (Kok II-III, 1999-2002; Balkenende IV-V, 2007-11), New Zealand (Clark I, 2000-05; Clark III, 2006-08), Sweden (Persson II, 1999-2002; Persson III, 2003-2006), and the United Kingdom (Blair III-Brown, 2005-09; Cameron, 2010-14). The countries with the most cabinets that were active PI reformers in employment policy during the 2000s and 2010s were Australia (Howard III, 2002-04; Howard IV, 2005-07; Rudd I-Gillard I, 2008-10), France (Raffarin I-II, 2002-03; Fillon I-II, 2007-11; Ayrault-Valls, 2012-14), and Germany (Schröder I, 1999-2002; Schröder I, 2003-05; Merkel I, 2006-09).

The truth table analysis of the cases of unemployment policy integration in the 2000s and 2010s reveals that no condition is individually sufficient for the presence (PIACT) or the absence (\sim PIACT) of the outcome. The condition \sim HGOVR comes closest to individual

¹²¹ The fuzzy scores and skewness checks are displayed in Appendix B in the section on Analysis 6.

sufficiency for PIACT,¹²² while HGOVR and ~SALG come closest to sufficiency for ~PIACT.¹²³ The truth table analysis reveals that seven truth table rows are consistently associated with the outcome PIACT (cf. Appendix B, Analysis 6). The truth table rows included in the solution terms cover 17 cases, four of which are deviant in kind (lower right quadrant). The position of each case vis-à-vis the solution term and the outcome is displayed graphically in the solution plots (Appendix B, Analysis 6). Therefore, the sufficient solutions explain the outcome PIACT in 13 cases (out of 18) with membership in the outcome (upper right quadrant); the remaining five cases are unexplained (upper left quadrant).

The most parsimonious solution identifies four combinations of conditions on which the data provide evidence that they are causally relevant:

$$\sim\text{CONC} * \text{EXECDOM} + \text{CONC} * \sim\text{LARGE} + \text{CONC} * \sim\text{HGOVR} + \\ \sim\text{LARGE} * \sim\text{HGOVR} * \text{SALG} \rightarrow \text{PIACT}$$

These four INUS combinations of conditions appear as jointly sufficient for governments' high PI reform activity in unemployment policy in the 2000s and 2010s. Figure 28 gives an overview of the typical and deviant cases associated with each path.


Fragmented portfolio, executive capacity (path 1)

This configuration ($\sim\text{CONC} * \text{EXECDOM} \rightarrow \text{PIACT}$) shows that governments that enjoyed a large amount of executive capacity, i.e., that largely dominated the national legislative agenda, and where employment policy functions were fragmented across ministries, are associated with high employment PI reform activity during the 2000s and 2010s at a good level of consistency (0.826). In terms of coverage, this path is able to explain 17.2 % of governments' employment PI reform activity during this period, but its unique coverage, i.e., the amount of evidence explained only by this path and no other, is low at 4.5 %, suggesting that most cases covered by this path are also covered by other paths.

¹²² Parameters of the sufficiency relation of ~HGOVR and PIACT: consistency = 0.665, coverage = 0.619, PRI = 0.593.

¹²³ Parameters of the sufficiency relation of HGOVR and ~PIACT: consistency = 0.642, coverage = 0.676, PRI = 0.573. Parameters of the sufficiency relation of ~SALG and ~PIACT: consistency = 0.644, coverage = 0.434, PRI = 0.550.

Figure 28: Solution paths and cases (analysis 6)



This path is plausible as regards the theoretical expectations. The analysis of employment PI in the previous period had already singled out executive capacity as a necessary condition for several paths explaining a high intensity of employment PI reforms. Similar to path 2 of analysis 5, this path combined executive capacity with the fragmentation of employment policy competences across ministries (but differs insofar as it is indifferent to the type of ministry) and shows that this combination of conditions is sufficient for explaining the outcome indifferently of the cabinets' ideological position on the right-left scale and the salience of employment issues on the cabinets' agendas. This path captures the experiences of three typical cases: the Fillon I-II and Ayrault-Valls cabinets that taken together governed France between 2007 and 2014, as well as the Rudd I-Gillard I cabinet in Australia (2008-2010).¹²⁴

¹²⁴ The cases differ on the other conditions: in both French cabinets, the ministry was not a large one (~LARGE), the cabinet had a left-leaning agenda (~HGOVR) and unemployment was a salient issue (SALG), whereas in the

The French government adopted a high number of employment PI reforms during the time in office of the Fillon I-II cabinet. Firstly, it adopted a large-scale reorganisation of the Public Employment Service that merged the two services previously responsible for placement and for registration and compensation (Béraud & Eydoux, 2009; Champion & Bonoli, 2011; Hervier, 2014; Pillon & Vivés, 2016), and secondly, it reformed the social assistance benefit, strengthening the benefit's activation element. As regards the former, the objective was to simplify procedures and create a unique service provider for payments and employment search (Hervier, 2014). By integrating these services, the reform goes further than previous coordination reforms (Pillon & Vivés, 2016). The new organisation, *Pôle Emploi*, also became responsible for supporting private employers in their search for employees by linking employment offers and applications. The fusion united all instruments for activation in the hands of PES advisors and further deepened activation by enlarging the target group of “activated unemployed” that henceforth comprised all unemployed persons including beneficiaries of the minimum income (Pillon & Vivés, 2016, pp. 416–417).¹²⁵ According to observers, it is the most significant politically of all the reforms of that period and contributed to making subsequent reforms more possible (Interview 3). The reform of social integration policy adopted in the same year strengthened unemployment benefit conditionality (Béraud & Eydoux, 2009; Hervier, 2014). As regards the reform of the social assistance benefit, in 2009 France adopted the reform creating the *Active Solidarity Revenue (RSA)* that replaced a previous benefit with two means-tested allowances for low wage workers and unemployed (Gomel & Serverin, 2009; OECD, 2014c) and strengthened the activation emphasis in social assistance for those out of the labour market significantly (Gomel & Méda, 2011; Clegg, 2011; Clegg & Palier, 2014). Its focus was on the “working poor” and on increasing the income gap between those in and out of work (Clegg, 2011, p. 45) in order to combat inactivity traps (Berthet & Bourgeois, 2011, p. 11).¹²⁶ This case elucidates the role of executive capacity, but it will also be discussed more detail below given that it is also a member of path 4. The reforms benefitted from a very strong political backing by the President, who participated personally in the reform processes, and were steered directly by the Élysée palace. Insofar, they reflect the government's priority given to the “work pays” principle and consumer purchasing power in particular, and the activism and tight oversight of policy processes that have become

Australian case, the cabinet had a large ministry for Unemployment (LARGE), a right-leaning agenda (HGOVR) and the issue was not salient (~SALG). The conservative solution indicates that all these conditions might be contextually relevant (paths 1 and 3).

¹²⁵ However, since the delivery of social assistance benefits remained with separate agencies, some complexity of the organisational landscape persisted (Champion & Bonoli, 2011, p. 326). While these reforms integrated benefit payment and employment services within the national PES, services remained fragmented and weakly coordinated at the implementation level (Zimmermann et al., 2016, p. 255).

¹²⁶ Parts of the RSA were later reversed when evaluations suggested it did not effectively reach its target population (Comité National d'Evaluation du RSA, 2011; Okbani, 2013).

increasingly characteristic of the French semi-presidential system in general (Interview 3; Hassenteufel, 2012). According to observers, the structure of the government, the vertical dimension of which was emphasised and strengthened during Sarkozy's "hyper-presidential" presidency, was decisive for these reforms' agenda-setting and adoption (Hassenteufel, 2012). The process leading to the reform of social assistance mobilised strong symbols, such as the organisation of a "Grenelle de l'insertion" and a highly mediatised arbitration by the President about the financing of the reform (L'Horty, 2009; Okbani, 2014).

Concentrated portfolio, left-of-centre government (path 3)

This configuration (**CONC * ~HGOVR → PIACT**) shows that left-of-centre cabinets of the 2000s and 2010s that concentrated employment policy functions within one ministry are associated with a high intensity of employment PI reforms. The level of consistency of this configuration is low for conventional standards (0.716), but this path has the highest coverage in the solution model. Its coverage is high both in terms of raw coverage (0.476), i.e., the part of the outcome explained by this set being almost half of governments' employment PI reform activity of the 2000s and 2010s, and in terms of unique coverage (0.356), i.e., the amount of evidence explained only by this path and no other, at 35.6 %. This path is plausible in light of the theoretical expectations. It shows that governments elected on a left-leaning agenda and the concentration of bureaucratic capacity for employment policy functions work together to achieve a high intensity of employment PI reforms; this combination holds indifferently of whether or not employment related issues feature saliently on the governments' electoral agendas, and is also indifferent to both governments' executive capacity and the type of ministry. Coverage of this path is as high as it is diverse: it captures the experiences of as much as seven typical cases in six different countries. The typical cases are the Faymann I cabinet (2009-2013) in Austria,¹²⁷ the Schröder I cabinet (1999-2002) in Germany, the Raffarin I-II cabinet (2002-2003) in France, the Kok II-III cabinet (1999-2002) in the Netherlands, the Clark I (2001-2005) and the Clark III cabinets (2006-2008) in New Zealand, and the Blair III-Brown cabinet (2005-2009) in the United Kingdom. Three additional cases contradict the statement of sufficiency, i.e., they share the same combination of relevant conditions but are not members of the outcome: these are the Chrétien III cabinet (2001-2003) in Canada, the Raffarin III-Villepin cabinet (2004-2006) in France, and the Key II cabinet (2012-2014) in New Zealand.

¹²⁷ The Austrian Faymann I cabinet (2009-2013) introduced a needs-based minimum benefit that replaced the previous social assistance legislation in 2010. It further harmonised existing regulations and established a national, work-focused approach for the reintegration of the (long-term) unemployed into the primary labour market. These reforms shared several features with the German Hartz legislation, although they were not accompanied by changes in the governance structure of the labour market service (Weishaupt, 2011). In 2012, the government further harmonised the different benefits by integrating the integration subsidy administered by the *Federal Social Agency* into the integration subsidy administered by the AMS.

In order to illustrate the working of this combination of condition and the outcome, the typical case of the Schröder I cabinet that governed Germany between 1999 and 2002 is particularly suitable. Not only the literature interprets the reforms starting in 2000 as a paradigm change in German labour market policy away from status preservation and towards the activation approach that follows a decade of incremental changes to legislation and implementation (Seeleib-Kaiser, 2004; Oschmiansky et al., 2007; Fleckenstein, 2008; Hassel & Schiller, 2010; Bothfeld et al., 2012; Mohr, 2012); in addition, this case has been extensively analysed in the literature, where existing studies by Christof Schiller demonstrate the mechanism in place between the conditions highlighted by this configuration and the outcome (Schiller, 2010, 2016). In Germany, the debate about the coordination of unemployment benefits and social assistance focused on long-term unemployed beneficiaries. The German Conservative Corporatist welfare regime was traditionally divided into unemployment insurance and unemployment assistance, but the delivery of passive and active benefits had always been performed by one organisation (Champion, 2013, pp. 123-126). The third pillar, social assistance, was implemented by local authorities – efforts were uneven and the local activation system mostly rudimentary. There was a sharp administrative division between the unemployment regime and social assistance, both at the level of ministerial organisation and competences in government as well as of delivery agencies. Cooperation between the PES offices, which acted as a one-stop organisation for recipients of both unemployment benefits, and municipalities was poor. The unemployment regime, on the other hand, was heavily centralised, with the Federal Employment Agency that enjoyed a high amount of autonomy from the ministry at the centre and local one-stop-shops. Although some activation elements had been introduced starting in 1996 (Eichhorst, Grienberger-Zingerle et al., 2008), the profile of active measures for persons receiving unemployment transfers shifts from an emphasis on training to a ‘job first’ approach with the 2000 so-called ‘Job-Aktiv’ legislation (Dingeldey, 2011). In 2001, the government introduced coordination experiments between the local offices of PES and social assistance with respect to services directed at long-term unemployed persons (Champion, 2013).

Veto-powers of the Bundesrat are commonly held responsible for the limited reform capacity of the German welfare state (Fleckenstein, 2008) and consensus between the major parties therefore crucial for reform. The literature shows that from 2001 onwards, a tacit consensus emerged between the CDU and SPD and allowed a number of institutional and structural reforms to pass after compromises between the now red-green government and the CDU-led opposition that controlled the Bundesrat (Fleckenstein, 2008; Hinrichs, 2010). The presence of the left-of-centre reference party in government is the second necessary part of this solution path. The literature on the Schröder cabinets’ employment policy reforms commonly cites leadership by Chancellor Schröder and the ‘government by commission’ (Heinze, 2002)

as crucial political factors that set the reforms in motion. This points to policy entrepreneurship by the left-of-centre reference party in government. However, this entrepreneurship unfolded on the background of a policy consensus between the major parties. Social policy advisors had long pointed to the inefficiencies inherent in the administrative fragmentation of the unemployment benefits regimes (Schmid et al., 1987; Dingeldey, 2011). Such a consensus about an eventual merger of social assistance and unemployment assistance existed already in the late Kohl era; a CDU platform draft first proposed to merge both benefits in 1998 and the party also proposed to merge the unemployment benefits in its election manifestos of the early 2000s (Dingeldey, 2011, p. 70). The red-green government that came to power in late 1998 after 16 years of liberal-conservative government, continued and intensified the welfare state restructuring started by the previous centre-right government (Seeleib-Kaiser, 2004; Fleckenstein, 2008).

During the late Kohl era, according to Christof Schiller (2010, 2016), ministerial fragmentation between the competences for social assistance (ministry for Health) and unemployment assistance (ministry for Labour) fuelled inter-ministerial conflicts and prevented steps towards integrating benefits (2016, p. 156). Schiller's analyses show how the concentration of the employment portfolio within one ministry in 1998 onwards facilitated the adoption of an activation approach in German labour market policy. He argues that "the origins of those large-scale policy initiatives are to be found in the prior re-organisation of the ministerial bureaucracy. The merger of tasks and responsibilities into one ministry was conducive to the generation of a new "expertise monopoly" and the emergence of a new powerful epistemic community around the responsible ministry eventually breaking the deadlock in welfare restructuring" (Schiller, 2010, p. 45). Notably, the transfer assembled all expertise necessary for a structural labour market reform within one ministry, allowed for the emergence of a shared problem diagnosis, and signalled "an attempt to better coordinate labour market policy across policy sectors and to test new employment incentives for social assistance beneficiaries" (Schiller, 2010, pp. 50-52; also, Champion, 2013, p. 126; Schiller, 2016, p. 193). Importantly, the Federal Chancellery tightened its grip on BMAS through new hierarchy-style coordination mechanisms and knowledge-based management through which, Schiller argues, the Chancellery seek to influence the debates and impose a new supply-side orientation within the relevant ministries – finance and labour in particular – that were opposed to such a strategy (Schiller, 2016, p. 185). Although these coordination mechanisms remain short-lived and the Chancellery gives the control over the labour market policy process back to BMAS shortly afterwards (Schiller, 2016, p. 193), they provide additional plausibility to the argument that the government performed the reshuffle to reshape the policy orientations of the relevant divisions within BMAS. Fleckenstein (2008) demonstrates that a paradigm shift as a result of policy learning that took place within an expert forum created by BMAS, the

Bertelsmann Forum, where a consensus emerged among the participants that a new benefit should replace the benefit for employable social assistance beneficiaries and unemployment assistance and one agency should be responsible for the provision of the new benefit and public employment services. This forum's work was continued by an internal BMAS working group that "worked quite hidden from the rest of the ministry" (Champion, 2013, p. 139; also, Fleckenstein, 2011, pp. 124-125) and achieved agreement on several key aspects of the reforms (Hassel & Schiller, 2010, pp. 230-232).

A similar trajectory can be observed in the two cabinets representing typical cases nested in New Zealand, Clark I (2001-2005) and Clark III (2006-2008). These cabinets continued the integrated approach that had emerged during the previous period through the creation of one-stop-shops with single case managers (Garlick, 2012, p. 253) as well as changes to social benefits that homogenised benefits for different target groups through the new Community Wage merges unemployment, sickness and training benefits (cf. Analysis 5, pp. 253-257). In 2003, the government adopted the "Jobs Jolt Initiative" that focused on stronger case management, work-testing measures and possible benefits cuts, which "marked a return to the 'tough-love' and 'work-first' approach that the government had largely banished from the Department of Work and Income's operational policy on taking office in 1999" (Garlick, 2012, p. 254). The 2006 "Working New Zealand" package went further still in the homogenisation of benefits by aligning a number of rules, definitions and procedures across benefit types, and basing eligibility for employment and training services on individuals' needs rather than benefit categories, thereby strengthening the work first message across benefit streams. In 2007, the package was extended to beneficiaries of sickness and invalidity insurances, whom it required to engage with Work and Income and establish individual plans for a return to work appropriate to their condition or disability (Garlick, 2012, p. 273). This period of relatively many employment PI reforms followed a period of radical changes to the organisation of the ministries responsible for unemployment and social assistance by the previous cabinet between 1998 and 2001. Through "one of the largest processes of organisational change in the history of the New Zealand public sector" (Garlick, 2012, p. 211), in 1998 the government fused the administration of the benefit system and the provision of employment assistance, which had previously been independent functions. Thereby, it abolished the *Department of Social Welfare (DSW)* that had for two decades assumed responsibilities for income support and social policies but lacked internal integration. In 2001, the creation of the *Ministry of Social Development (MSD)*, which fused the *Department of Work and Income* and the *Ministry for Social Policy (MSP)*, ushered in "a comparatively settled era of welfare administration" (Garlick, 2012, p. 19). These major organisational reforms integrated income support and

employment assistance with an unprecedented emphasis on employment obligations.¹²⁸ As the decentralisation reform of 2002 widened the responsibilities of local governments to include social and employment policies, MSD increasingly focusses on integrated services at the local level, e.g. with the creation in 2004 of the Social Services Cluster, which would take a multi-agency approach to improving social outcomes.

The empirical cases demonstrate that this combination of conditions and the outcome holds independently of the extent of the governments' executive capacity, a condition that is excluded from the conservative solution for being contextually irrelevant. All cases are similar as regards the two additional conditions, though, being governments that combined employment policy functions into large ministries and that perceived employment-related issues as important for their electorates. The inclusion of these combination of these additional conditions into the path is plausible as regards the theoretical expectations, but given the lack of counterfactual cases, the cross-case evidence does not demonstrate the necessity of these conditions for this sufficient combination. This means that the cases need to be probed further for within-case evidence on whether these two additional conditions may have been relevant or not. As regards the salience of the employment issue, in the case of the Schröder I cabinet for instance the literature points to the effect of high problem pressure due to continuously high unemployment that contributed to setting the reform process in motion (Schulze Buschoff & Hassel, 2019). As regards the combination of employment policy functions into a large ministry for social affairs, New Zealand, the MSD in addition to concentrating employment policy functions was also a large ministry with responsibilities for social policies as regards other forms of income support, social policy and services, as well as social housing and income related rent-subsidies. Through its Social Sector Forum, the formal cross-agency mechanism involving the chief executives of various ministries, the government further aimed at strengthening the coordination of the policies on various complex social issues and argued in its 2008 briefing of the incoming government that the sector could work towards further strengthening its "integrated approach to the design, purchase and delivery of services" (Garlick, 2012, p. 299).

Concentrated portfolio, absent large ministry (path 2)

A second configuration (**CONC * ~LARGE → PIACT**) shows that governments where employment policy functions were concentrated within one ministry and the latter was *not* a

¹²⁸ In a similar vein, the legislation introduced in the Netherlands during the late 1990s and early 2000s strengthened the direct control of the ministry of Social Affairs and Employment over the PES and the unemployment insurance administration. By strengthening the ministry's control over the benefit administration processes and over the procedures for testing eligibility for Disability Benefits in particular, the government hoped to reduce the numbers of disability benefits recipients (van Berkel & de Graaf, 2011, p. 136).

large ministry, are associated with high employment PI reform activity during the 2000s and 2010s at a good level of consistency (0.784). This path has small coverage (cf. Appendix B, Analysis 6) but is theoretically interesting insofar as it explains high PI reform activity with one organisational configuration, while being indifferent to the party-political characteristics of the cabinet and executive capacity. This path captures the experiences of a single typical case, the Schröder II cabinet that governed Germany between 2003 and 2005, a period during which “German labour market policy was subjected to the most far-reaching reform since the 1960s” (Clasen & Goerne, 2011, p. 795). After the Schröder I government’s reforms had already emphasised activation (Blancke & Schmid, 2003), the focus of the Schröder II government shifted towards “negative activation” through reduced benefit generosity and tightened criteria for the definition of reasonable work requirements and sanctions (Fleckenstein, 2008). In particular, this cabinet coincides with the implementation of the Hartz IV reforms between 2003 and 2005 (Hassel & Schiller, 2010; Schiller, 2010, 2016). These reforms break with the traditional German conservative welfare state and its reliance on status maintenance and social insurance as the main form of benefit (Champion, 2013, p. 123). They merged the former unemployment assistance and social assistance benefit schemes, thereby establishing a two-tier benefit system for the working-age population that recategorised risks related to, e.g., housing, debt, and socio-psychical problems, and partly homogenised the definitions of unemployment categories and the respective benefits although some differences remained (Dingeldey, 2011).

The organisational configuration that the path emphasises as being relevant for explaining the outcome was introduced by the Schröder II cabinet upon taking office in late 2002. After its razor-thin re-election, the SPD-led government amended the ministerial organisation in a way it believed would ensure that the integrated reform approach to employment policy would be followed through during its term in office (Champion, 2013; Schiller, 2016). On the one hand, it replaced the previous BMAS minister, who harboured “well-known reservations concerning the planned reform package” (Schiller, 2016, p. 201), with the powerful former Prime minister of North Rhine-Westphalia, who was a renowned representative of the SPD’s moderniser clan (Champion, 2013, p. 147) and had been one of the early proponents of the planned reforms (Schiller, 2010, p. 52). On the other hand, the cabinet transferred the employment units from the BMAS to the ministry for Economy, creating a new “super-ministry” for Economy and Employment (Leisner, 2002), while transferring the social policy units back to the ministry for Health.¹²⁹ While this move was made partly in a bid to attract said personality to join the federal government (Schiller, 2016, p. 201), it was plausibly also made to resolve antagonisms

¹²⁹ The “super-ministry” for Economy and Employment only lasted for one legislature and in 2005 the BMAS was re-established within its pre-2002 boundaries.

between BMAS and the ministry for Economy in questions relative to labour rights policy that had been evident during the previous legislature (Leisner, 2002). Decisively, though, the responsibilities for the social assistance of employable beneficiaries remained within the new Ministry for Economy and Employment and were integrated into the division responsible for labour market policy, which means that while the large ministry was dismantled again, the employment portfolio remained fully concentrated. Both steps signalled the new red-green government's deep and continued commitment to bringing about a decline in unemployment through the integrated approach to employment policy reform (Champion, 2013, p. 147).¹³⁰

Left-of-centre government, salience, absent large ministry (path 4)

This configuration (\sim LARGE * \sim HGOVR * SALG \rightarrow PIACT) shows that governments that were elected on a left-leaning agenda on which the employment issue featured saliently and that did *not* combine employment policy functions with substantively related policy functions within a large ministry, are associated with high employment PI reform activity during the 2000s and 2010s. The level of consistency of this sufficiency relationship is considered acceptable according to conventional standards (0.751). This path explains 22.2 % of governments' employment PI reform activity during this period, but its unique coverage, i.e., the amount of evidence explained only by this path and no other, is lower at 7.3 % given that some of the cases are also explained by other sufficient combinations. This sufficient combination of conditions is in line with the observation that left-of-centre governments come closest to being individually sufficient for the adoption of relatively many employment PI reforms during the 2000s and 2010s. The result that the combination of the reference party in government and issue salience leads to PI reform activity is plausible as regards the theoretical expectations about the combined impact of these two conditions. However, the path also shows that the sufficiency of this combination is conditioned by the absence of a 'large ministry', which makes it an interesting one for further investigation. This path captures the experiences of four typical cases in two European countries: the Persson II and III cabinets that governed Sweden between 1999 and 2006 and the successive Fillon I-II and Ayrault-Valls cabinets that governed France between 2007 and 2014. This combination of conditions is also present in a fifth case, the Austrian Schüssel III cabinet (2003-2006), which is not a member of the outcome set and therefore contradicts the sufficiency relationship as a deviant case in kind.¹³¹

¹³⁰ In this case, the Federal Audit Office revelation that the PES had manipulated job placement statistics, which led to massive public discontent with the PES administration in an election year (Blancke & Schmid, 2003) widely viewed in the literature as a window of opportunity for deciding reforms that had been politically unfeasible before due to the opposition from trade unions and left-wings of the SPD (Fleckenstein, 2008).

¹³¹ The cases that provide the evidence for this path further share the condition of a fragmented portfolio, which may be further contextually relevant. The cases are members of truth table rows 2 and 6. Minimisation further

Looking in more detail at the cases concerned by this configuration allows to outline a mechanism between these conditions. I focus on the case of France's Fillon I-II cabinet (2007-2011) as a case representing this configuration because it has the highest membership in the outcome among the typical cases (fuzzy score of 1) (cf. Appendix B, Analysis 6).

As indicated in the solution path, this high level of PI reform activity was made possible by the presence of a government elected on a left-leaning agenda that perceives the employment issue to be salient for voters, and that does *not* combine employment policy competences within a 'large ministry'. Looking in more detail at this case shows that these conditions combined as follows. These reforms were put on the agenda in an electoral context and when unemployment was a major concern of French voters. Although social policy issues tend to be very politicised in France, with deep cleavages along party lines, the main candidates for the 2007 presidential election converged around the introduction of the RSA (Interview 7). The creation of RSA stemmed from a consensus about the necessity for reform between political actors and NGOs that dated back to the early 2000s. Among these actors, the president of the NGO Emmaüs France was the most vocal defendant of such a reform. Having been mandated under the Chirac presidency with creating a commission on children's poverty in France, the final report of which was widely publicised (Interview 3), the Emmaüs president was recruited by the government for the new position of a *High Commissioner for Active Solidarity against Poverty* in a move that further rallied left-wing forces¹³² to the RSA reform project (Interview 6). In addition, the government neutralised potential opposition from the territorial *départements* by implicating them in an experimentation process that gave them an opportunity to showcase their capacity and assert their positions as leaders of decentralised integration policies (Gomel & Serverin, 2009; Loncle et al., 2010). The experimentation depoliticised the debate about social minimum transfers and built legitimacy around the reform (Okbani, 2014) which ended up meeting with widespread support (Interviews 4 and 5).

The fusion of the unemployment services was strongly politicised and mediated, too (Hervier, 2014). Like the creation of RSA, it was a specific and highly symbolic presidential campaign pledge of Sarkozy (Hassenteufel 2012, pp. 345–346). Both reforms feature prominently in the President's social policy strategy as laid out in 2007 (Sarkozy, 2007). Previous failures of similar projects comforted its opponents in believing that it would not be realised (Pillon & Vivés, 2016). The institutional complexity of the French PES had been debated for years and several reports highlighted the fragmentation of the services during the

includes the logical remainders in truth table rows 18 and 22, which leads to the elimination of the condition ~CONC.

¹³² Critics decried the reform's liberal ideology (Rigaudiat, 2009) and the incentives it created for part-time and temporary work (Lafore, 2009).

years prior to the fusion (Pillon & Vivés, 2016). The fusion was decided within the framework of the *General Revision of Public Policies (RGPP)* (Berthet et al., 2016), a series of managerial modernisation reforms that aimed at reducing public expenditure through rationalisation and enhanced efficiency (Bezes, 2010; Lafarge, 2010). The law formalising the adoption of the fusion and creation of *Pôle Emploi* received widespread support in Parliament (Hervier, 2014). This case also indicates a mechanism explaining why the absence of a large ministry was a necessary part of this path because it suggests that the abolition of the ‘large ministry’ participated in the government’s strategy to build consensus and contain opposition around the reforms. The reforms of the Fillon government in particular were backed by widespread consensus in the ministerial bureaucracies (Interview 3). In 2007, the government transferred the competences for employment policy from the Social Affairs Ministry to the Ministry of Finance. This move can be interpreted as a bid to withdraw the control of labour market issues from the Social Affairs ministry (Interview 3). Historically, social partners and interest groups (trade unions and employers’ associations) were conservative veto players that impeded PI reforms bringing together unemployment benefits and placement (Lartigot-Hervier, 2012) in order to protect their administrative ‘turf’, given that the former were the social partners’ domain and the latter the domain of the State and local authorities (Interviews 3 and 5). Contrary to the Ministry of Finance, the Social Affairs Ministry was strongly marked by left-wing influences, including extreme ones, and an extensive representation of Trotskyian unions (Interview 3). A coalition encompassing the social partners as well as numerous political actors opposed the fusion of the unemployment services in 2008. The former feared their influence would be diluted under the control of the central administration, while the latter believed the fusion unnecessary or feared conflict with the social partners (Hervier, 2014, p. 69).¹³³ These interests and strategies remained strongly embedded, although they were “increasingly challenged by integrative policy logics that are encouraging the development of a more unified benefit-and-service system for all the non-employed” since the turn of the millennium (Clegg, 2011, p. 34).

¹³³ A report to the Social Affairs ministry noted that “la fusion comporterait un risque élevé de polémique à l’échelon national et de troubles dans le fonctionnement des services” (Marimbert, 2004, pp. 150-151). The creation of *Pôle Emploi* did set off internal social movements but they remained confined to the organisation (Interview 5).

CHAPTER 6: DISCUSSION OF THE RESULTS

The analysis of the association between organisational and political conditions and governments' PI reform activity in three policies and nine countries shows that the empirical reality of the adoption of PI reforms is diverse. A commonality of the QCA analyses of all three policies and both time periods is the absence of any necessity relation between the conditions and the outcome. This means that in none of the conditions – individually or in a SUIN combination – has been found to be necessary for governments to engage in the adoption of relatively many PI reforms. Similarly, none of the analyses revealed any individually sufficient condition for the adoption of relatively many PI reforms. This is in line with earlier configurational research that found that necessary and sufficient conditions are rare in political decision-making (Fischer, 2015; Vogeler et al., 2022; but see Sager & Thomann, 2017 and Trein, Maggetti, et al., 2021). Each analysis reveals at least two combinations of INUS conditions that are consistently associated with a statement of sufficiency for the outcome. Therefore, the results confirm the expectation that the relationship between the organisational and political conditions on the one hand and governments' PI reform activity on the other hand is characterised by equifinality.

This section discusses the results of the analyses. Its first section takes a step back and explores and compares the patterns of association between combinations of conditions and the outcome that emerge when bringing the results of the six analyses. The second section complements this substantive discussion with a comparative presentation of the main solution parameter allows to compare the policies and time periods as regards the extent to which the solution terms perform in explaining the outcome. Finally, the third section draws on the case illustrations to elaborate in more detail on some potential additional conditions that emerged from the analyses and argues how these could be integrated into future studies.

1 Combinations of organisational and political conditions for PI: similarities and differences across policies and time

Most solution paths identified in the six analyses combine both organisational and political conditions. This result speaks to the PI literature and lends evidence to claims that neither political nor organisational factors alone are sufficient for explaining the adoption of integrated policies and that instead, these factors interact in causally complex combinations that vary across policies and time. In other words, this supports the claim laid down in Chapter 1 according to which organisational conditions do not matter so much as when embedded in their political context. This result also speaks to the literature on policy coordination and more particularly supports Peters' (2015) claim that merely establishing new structures does not

resolve coordination challenges in the public sector but that political factors such as leadership are crucial for coordination to become effective.

This section is meant to take a step back, comparing the solutions provided by the six analyses. In so doing, it uncovers patterns of association between combinations of conditions and the outcome that indicate similarities and differences between the policy fields as well as between the two time periods under observation. This section explores these patterns. Given the primary interest of this research in the impact of organisational structure on policy outputs, it centres on the conditions relative to the ministerial organisational structure, exploring the complex combinations of conditions in which the organisational configurations produce the outcome in the three policies and both time periods (section 1.1). It then explores how the results compare with the preliminary expectations formulated in Chapter 1, and particularly focuses on how the organisational conditions combine with the politico-institutional conditions, i.e., governments' executive capacity, the ideology of the governing parties, and the salience of the issues on the governing parties' agendas. Most paths combine organisational with political conditions. This lends support to the assumption that in order to understand the adoption of PI reforms, we should focus on the question how policy and political logics of coordination interact and combine, or, as Hustedt and Danken (2017) put it, "are reconciled or aligned by anticipation and, ultimately, hierarchy" (p. 732).

1.1 Organisational configurations and the adoption of PI reforms

The following paragraphs compare the role of the organisational conditions within the sufficient paths, i.e., explore how they combine with other conditions to produce relatively many PI reforms. In so doing, they also observe similarities and differences between the three policies and the two time periods. By bringing the analyses of the paths and case illustrations together, this comparison also systematises the evidence about the preliminary expectations (formulated in Chapter 1) on organisational and political conditions, and allows to compare how they combine to produce the outcome in the three policies.


The results are in line with the *preliminary expectation 1* (p. 45), insofar as the analyses did not identify any organisational condition as necessarily present or absent in governments that adopt relatively many PI reforms. In a first step, we get a comparative overview of the solution paths featuring the two dimensions of the organisational configurations: the first dimension concerns the distinction whether or not ministerial bureaucratic capacities for a specific policy issue are concentrated within one ministry ('portfolio concentration'), while the second dimension concerns the combination of portfolios, i.e., the distinction whether or not the jurisdiction of the ministry mainly in charge of the issue is also responsible for other substantively related policy issues ('large ministry').

All four possible combinations of organisational conditions are present in the analyses. The sufficient configurations into which the organisational conditions combine in each of the analyses present notable differences, but also some similarities, both between policies and time periods. The *preliminary expectation 2* (p. 45) suggested that the combination of a concentrated portfolio and a large ministry might be sufficient for a government to adopt a high number of PI reforms. The results do not disprove this expectation insofar as this organisational configuration on its own is consistently associated with the adoption of relatively many PI reforms in environmental policy during the 1980/1990s (path 3). In the other policies, however, the organisational conditions combine differently in the sufficient paths. This section explores the patterns that emerge from the detailed analyses in Chapter 5.

Concentrated and fragmented portfolios

Both the condition ‘concentrated portfolio’ and its negation ‘fragmented portfolio’ are INUS conditions in the solution paths of several analyses, as shown in Figure 29 and Figure 30. The results show similarities as well as differences both between the time periods and the policies as regards the sufficient combinations in which ‘portfolio concentration’ or ‘fragmented portfolio’ appear jointly with other INUS conditions. In spite of the expectation that concentrated portfolios would be detrimental to the adoption of PI because they strengthen the bureaucratic capacity of subsystems (cf. Chapter 1), the results reveal that this condition is a necessary part of several sufficient paths to the outcome in all three policies and features as an INUS condition in five out of the six analyses performed (Figure 29). However, the

Figure 29: Comparison of the solution paths featuring the presence of the condition ‘portfolio concentration’



specific combinations in which this condition combines with others to produce the outcome differ notably between the policies, as well as between the two time periods.


I will first examine the results for environmental PI. Recall that environmental portfolios evolved towards enhanced concentration over the time under study and that most countries organised their environmental policy functions in concentrated portfolios, especially after the turn of the century (cf. Chapter 4, section 2.1). The correlational analysis showed that those governments with fully concentrated or rather fragmented portfolios adopted the most PI reforms during their time in office. Most solution paths for environmental PI contain this INUS condition, either present or absent.¹³⁴ In the 1980s/1990s, the solution paths only cover governments with concentrated portfolios: the concentration of the portfolio played an important role in explaining environmental PI, especially in the 1980s and 1990s, while in the 2000s/2010s, the results suggest different pathways for governments with concentrated and with fragmented portfolios.

During the 1980s and 1990s, a concentrated environmental portfolio led to the adoption of relatively many PI reforms when the government perceived the environmental issue as important for voters. The case illustrations suggested that environmental ministerial bureaucracies that concentrated the policy functions for environmental protection were able to exert policy entrepreneurship for environmental PI more independently from political interest by the political actors, in particular the minister and head of government, especially in the UK and Sweden, where these policy functions had been concentrated for several decades; conversely, when environmental policy functions were fragmented, the adoption of PI measures appeared as more subordinate to the political preferences of the minister or head of government, as the case of New Zealand suggested (cf. pp. 194-195). However, portfolio needed the additional presence of either a large ministry or executive capacity, a combination in which the environmental ministerial bureaucracies appear to have been able to adopt PI reforms relatively independently of the party-political interests of the government. Conversely, in the absence of a large ministry, the concentrated environmental portfolio needed to be combined with issue salience. This suggests that when the environment became an object of party competition, a concentrated environmental bureaucracy could likewise exert policy entrepreneurship for environmental PI.

The solution paths of Analysis 2 show that in the 2000s/2010s, there are notable differences between the solution paths containing a concentrated versus a fragmented portfolio, which suggest that governments where ministerial bureaucratic capacity for environmental matters

¹³⁴ Only one path of the 1980s/1990s (path 4) and one path of the 2000s/2010s do not contain this condition, i.e., there are only two paths that apply to cabinets indifferently of the degree to which ministerial bureaucratic capacity for environmental matters is concentrated within one ministry.

Figure 30: Comparison of the solution paths featuring the absence of the condition ‘portfolio concentration’



was concentrated within one ministry and those where it was fragmented followed distinctly different paths to environmental PI. On the one hand, the solution paths of Analysis 2 show that in the 2000s and 2010s a *concentrated* environmental portfolio is *only* consistently associated with the outcome when the government did *not* perceive the environmental issue to be important for voters (paths 3 and 4). Taken together the case illustrations of these paths – especially when interpreted in light of the insights about the crucial role of portfolio concentration during the previous period – suggest again that the environmental ministerial bureaucracies that concentrated the policy functions for environmental protection were able to exert policy entrepreneurship for environmental PI. This interpretation is also plausible because the cases covered by these paths are nested in the same countries than those of the typical cases of analysis 1. However, portfolio concentration is now combined with a different set of party-political conditions: the environment is not an issue that the governing parties perceive as important for voters, and the case illustrations suggest that the governments’ ideological partisanship does not create clear differences in the combinations of conditions. Taken together, these paths therefore suggest both continuity and change between the typical cases of analysis 1 and the cases of paths 3 and 4 of analysis 2.

While the paths that contain a concentrated portfolio combine it with the *absence* of issue salience, two out of three paths (1, 5, 6) containing a fragmented portfolio combine it with the *presence* of salience. This combination is unexpected with regard to the preliminary

expectations (cf. Chapter 1). With cases in the Netherlands and Canada, these paths cover cases nested in countries where the policy functions for different aspects of environmental policy had always been fragmented between different ministries. The Canadian cabinets' PI reforms are best explained by a dynamic where the fragmentation of environmental policy competence both horizontally within the federal government and vertically between the levels of the state led to the adoption of PI reforms that compensated for administrative fragmentation through the institutionalisation of horizontal and vertical mechanisms of policy coordination when the issue became salient on the political agenda (cf. pp. 204-206). In the Netherlands, too, issue salience was necessary for a more sustained PI reform activity in spite of the fragmentation of the bureaucratic capacities of the ministerial environmental administration; here, however, it is also the combination of the environmental policy functions within the portfolio of a large ministry that proved necessary (cf. below).

As regards immigration PI, we observe a different pattern. Recall that most of the countries had rather or fully concentrated the ministerial policy portfolios for immigration during the second half of the 1980s, but that there was also a significant share of governments with fully fragmented portfolios of immigration policy functions (i.e., policy functions for immigration and immigrant integration policy in separate ministries) in the second half of the 1990s. During the 2000s, the share of governments with concentrated portfolios increased (cf. Chapter 4, section 2.1). The correlational analysis showed that governments where the policy functions were mostly fragmented were those that adopted the most PI reforms during their time in office. Contrary to environmental PI, most parsimonious solution paths for immigration PI *do not* contain the condition 'portfolio concentration', either present or absent, i.e., they apply to cabinets indifferently of the degree to which ministerial bureaucratic capacity for immigration-related issues is concentrated within one ministry. However, there are notable differences between the two time periods. Although only one of the two parsimonious paths of the 1980s/1990s contains a 'concentrated portfolio', this condition is present in all paths of the conservative solution, which indicates that all cases covered by the solution term have a concentrated portfolio, although it may be only contextually relevant. However, the analysis also showed that in the case of immigration policy during the 1980s/1990s, the impact of the organisational factors can only be understood in combination with the party-political ones. The case illustrations of Austria and UK showed that portfolio concentration (combined with the absence of a large ministry) only explains PI reform activity when the governments were right-of-centre ones or perceived immigration-related issues as electorally salient. Conversely, left-of-centre governments for which immigration-related issues were not salient were consistently associated with the absence of relatively high PI reform activity. The small coverage of the solution for immigration policy during the 1980s/1990s also points to additional explanatory factors. In particular, as argued above, in the literature on immigration

and integration policy countries' migratory histories and policy traditions are prominent in explaining path dependent developments (e.g., Green, 2007; Goñda et al., 2020) (cf. Chapter 2, section 2.2, as well as Chapter 6, section 3.2, for a discussion of time-related additional explanatory factors). A similar pattern emerges from the analysis of the 2000s/2010s. In Analysis 4, two (ambiguous) paths point to the same organisational configuration of a concentrated portfolio and the absence of a large ministry, in governments elected on a right-leaning agenda on which immigration-related issues featured prominently. This path covers cases that are either in continuity with predecessor governments that were also covered by the similar combination of conditions during the 1980s/1990s (Austria, Australia, Canada), but now also includes Germany and the Netherlands, two further countries who adopted relatively many immigration PI reforms after shifts of the governments to a more right-leaning agenda that embraced immigration-related issues more saliently *and* changes to the ministerial organisation by which immigration and immigrant integration policy functions were concentrated and shifted from the realm of social affairs ministries to ministries for the Interior. There is another path, however, with comparatively little coverage and particular to cases nested in the UK, where the fragmentation of the portfolio combined with the government's high executive capacity (Maggetti & Trein, 2021), explains the UK's relatively many immigration PI reforms. In this combination, different ministries being responsible for immigration regulation on the one hand and immigrant integration policy on the other, combined with the governments' capacity to adopt reforms with relative autonomy, appears to have led to several parallel (competing) immigration-related PI agendas, each with its particular issue focus and PI instruments.

Regarding employment PI, we observe a different pattern still, and again differences between the two time periods become apparent. Recall that (rather) concentrated portfolios of employment policy functions – whereby the ministerial policy functions for labour market policy on the one hand and unemployment benefits on the other are concentrated within specific ministries rather than distributed between two or more ministries – were still the exception until the mid-1990s; however, the majority of governments shifted towards a concentrated mode of organisation between the mid-1990s and early 2000s (cf. Chapter 4, section 2.4). As a result, in the 2000s, two in three governments had concentrated portfolios for employment policy functions. The correlational analysis showed that governments with (mostly) fragmented ministerial portfolios tended to adopt more PI reforms, although also among governments with concentrated portfolios, some cases with high PI reform activity became apparent. The configurational analysis provides a more differentiated picture. The analysis of the 1980s/1990s contains only one path (out of four) in which the condition 'portfolio concentration' appears in its *absence*, while the three other paths cover cabinets indifferently of the degree to which ministerial bureaucratic capacity for employment-related


issues was concentrated within one ministry. Most cases covered by this path are also covered by two other paths, however, and the case illustration did not allow to establish that the fragmentation of the portfolio was causally relevant, especially given the relevance of other factors, especially the governments' neoliberal ideology and the early uptake of NPM-inspired reforms as alternative explanations. Conversely, in the results for the 2000s/2010s, three out of four paths do contain the condition: two paths contain a 'concentrated portfolio' and a third one a 'fragmented portfolio'. The path with the highest coverage, path 3, covers a diverse set of cases of governments with varying degrees of executive capacity and comprising countries both early and more reluctant NPM reformers. The case illustrations of two very different cases as regards these two criteria, Germany and New Zealand, allowed to elucidate that left-of-centre governments in particular turned towards large-scale reorganisations of the ministerial administrations for employment and social affairs, which were followed by a series of PI reforms bringing together employment benefits and job search requirements.

Large ministries

Similar to what was observed regarding the condition 'portfolio concentration', the condition 'large ministry' as well as its negation are INUS conditions in the solution paths of several analyses, as pictured in Figure 31 and Figure 32. At first glance, this lends support to the argument that both the portfolio combination of policy functions into large ministries as well as the absence of a large ministry, i.e., an organisation of ministerial policy functions following the contours of policy fields, may both lead to the adoption of relatively many PI reforms.

On the one hand, the necessity of a 'large ministry' in several solution paths in all three policies lends support to the argument that 'large ministries' may favour the adoption of PI reforms, either because they favour the emergence of integrative administrative capacity, or because they de-politicise the inter-ministerial policy coordination by making the intra-ministerial level the decisive one for the resolution of bureaucratic divergences. On the other hand, the absence of a 'large ministry' as a necessary condition in several paths also suggests that more politicised inter-ministerial coordination may translate into the adoption of relatively many PI reforms when the inter-ministerial level is the decisive one for the arbitration between the interests of policy sectors. In the latter case, political logics of coordination driven by the governing parties' political and policy preferences were expected to be key to the explanation. The specific combinations in which the condition 'large ministry' as well as its absence combine with others to produce the outcome exhibit both differences but also similarities between the time periods and the policies under observation.


Figure 31: Solution paths featuring the presence of the condition 'large ministry'



Again, in the following I first examine the role of this condition for each policy separately, starting with environmental policy. Recall that during the 1980s and 1990s, most countries organised the ministerial policy functions as a separate, single-issue jurisdiction and that large ministries remained still relatively rare until the late 1990s, but became established as the dominant type of Environmental ministry during the 2000s and 2010s (cf. Chapter 4, section 0). The correlational analysis showed that across all four decades, governments with large ministries were had higher median PI reform activity that those without. The QCA paths paint a more differentiated picture and notably show differences in how either the presence or the absence of a large ministry combining environmental policy functions with interdependent policies were consistently associated with the adoption of relatively many PI reforms in the two time periods.

During the 1980s/1990s, only the presence of a 'large ministry' is contained in two solution paths, whereas the absence of a 'large ministry' is not consistently associated with the adoption of relatively many environmental PI reforms during this period. Conversely, the results for the 2000s/2010s show on the one hand that this condition – either present or absent – is relatively prominent in the solution paths, because four out of six do contain this condition, and on the other hand that both the presence and the absence of large ministries are necessary parts of sufficient paths to the outcome, which suggests that there were different consistent paths to environmental PI differed depending on whether or not the environmental ministry is a large one.

Figure 32: Solution paths featuring the absence of the condition 'large ministry'



During the 1980s/1990s, the two (ambiguous) paths containing a large ministry showed that it led to relatively high PI reform activity when combined with a concentrated portfolio as well as executive capacity. The case illustrations suggested that while the large ministry favoured environmental PI outputs because it enabled rather depoliticised, intra-ministerial decision-making in a case where the large ministry had been established already in the 1970s (case of the UK's DoE), in the other cases the large ministry had only been created recently. In the latter cases (Sweden and France), the association between the large ministry and the adoption of relatively many PI reforms rather appears to be linked to the political entrepreneurship by governments that adopted both administrative (creation of the large ministry) as well as policy reforms (adoption of relatively many PI reforms), and points to the contextual relevance of the left-of-centre partisanship of the government as an additional part of the explanation.

During the 2000s/2010s, the paths containing a large ministry combine it with different combinations of political conditions. This seems to suggest that governments with large ministries also adopted relatively many PI reforms and that this is true for both right-leaning governments for which the issue were not salient as well as for left-leaning governments for which environmental issue were salient. In particular, path 2, which is highly consistent while also having the highest coverage in the model, combines a large ministry with a government elected on a left-leaning agenda on which environmental issues featured prominently. This

combination of conditions is in line with several of the preliminary expectation about the effect of organisational and party-political conditions. The case illustrations of this path elucidate the adoption of relatively many PI reforms in both federal and decentralised settings, but also show that in the former, the high level of salience of the environmental issue was induced by external crises. The cases of Austria and France illustrate that the large ministries were created with the purpose of favouring a depoliticised logic of coordination of environmental matters within the realm of the large ministries (cf. pp. 212ff. and 217ff.). Another important implication from the illustrations is that in most of the cases (with the only exception of the Netherlands), the large ministries had been created within a relatively short time frame preceding the adoption of relatively many PI reforms; this suggests that both administrative and policy reforms went hand in hand and translated the environmental policy preferences. There is no clear pattern of associated with the party political factors, though: this association holds for governments elected on a left-leaning agenda and that considered environmental issues as an important issue of party competition (path 2), as well as for right-leaning governments that did not consider environmental issues as electorally salient (path 4).

Conversely, the absence of a 'large ministry' is a necessary part of two additional paths to the outcome. The low coverage of these paths is in line with the observation that more and more governments chose to combine environmental policy functions within large ministries. These paths also show that although governments with large ministries were the most active PI reformers overall, there are still consistent paths linking the absence of large ministries with the adoption of relatively many PI reforms. Interestingly, the cases of path 3, whereby the absence of large ministries is a necessary part of the path to relatively many PI reforms, precede cases covered by path 2; this also suggests a temporal pattern whereby the creation of large ministries follows rather than precedes the adoption of relatively many PI reforms.

As regards immigration PI, we observe a different pattern. Recall that the proportion of the types of ministries experienced a stark shift during the period under observation (cf. Chapter 4, section 2.2): until the first half of the 1990s, most countries combined immigration policy functions within large ministries, but from the mid-1990s onwards shifted away from this configuration and predominantly integrated immigration policy function into ministries for the Interior or organised them in separate, single-issue ministries. The correlational analysis showed that governments with large ministries combining immigration policy functions with social policy functions were those that adopted the least PI. Contrary to environmental PI, in immigration policy the presence of a large ministry does not feature in any solution path of the 1980s/1990s. In other words, those governments where immigration policy functions were combined with social policy functions are not consistently associated with relatively many immigration PI reforms, in spite of the functional interdependences between immigrant

integration and other social issues, notably employment. The cases of the early Vranitzky governments in Austria illustrated that due to the portfolio combination of immigration with social affairs and employment, policy was formulated in cooperation between the ministry and the social partners and thus favoured a policy approach to immigration policy that focused on the needs of the labour market. Conversely, the *absence* of a 'large ministry' is consistently associated with the outcome through one most parsimonious configuration; in addition (and in parallel to what was observed regarding the role of the condition 'concentrated portfolio') the *absence* of a 'large ministry' is contained in all paths of the conservative solution, which indicates that it is shared by all cases covered by the solution term, although it may be only contextually relevant. In the cases of the UK and Austrian governments covered by the solution term, the governments without a large ministry were those that integrated immigration policy functions within a ministry for the Interior, and that the latter only adopted relatively many PI reforms when the political parties in government started prioritising immigration-related issues for electoral reasons. The results for the 2000s/2010s resemble those for environmental PI during the same period insofar as the condition 'large ministry' – either present or absent – is relatively prominent in the solution paths, because it is contained in four out of six sufficient configuration. Path 6 containing the absence of a large ministry resembles closely the pattern already observed during the previous period: governments adopted relatively many PI reforms after having transferred the policy functions for immigration and immigrant integration to the ministries for the Interior. However, like observed above, the adoption of PI reforms was still contingent upon these governments' having been elected on a right-leaning agenda on which immigration-related issues featured prominently (cf. Chapter 5, section 2.4, pp. 246-247). The (ambiguous) paths containing the large ministry are limited to the case of one Swedish cabinet. Again, this reflects that, in spite of significant convergences, in immigration policy (more than in environmental policy) the timing of the adoption of relatively many PI reforms follows national trajectories, whereby the Swedish approach differed from other countries (Dahlström & Esaiasson, 2013; Borevi, 2014). Finally, regarding employment PI, we observe a different pattern still. Recall that during the first of the two periods, large ministries combining employment policy functions within a jurisdiction of a large ministry for social affairs were at first still rather marginal in the governments under study, but they became the predominant mode of ministerial organisation in the late 1990s (Chapter 4, section 2.2). The correlational data showed that governments with large ministries were not those that adopted the most PI reforms in employment policy, however (cf. Chapter 5, section 1.3). During the 1980s and 1990s, both the presence and the absence of a 'large ministry' are parts of different combinations of conditions for the outcome, whereas the analysis of the 2000s/2010s reveals only the absence but not the presence of a 'large ministry' as a necessary part of a sufficient combination of conditions; in other words,

the analysis does not reveal any configuration whereby the combination of policy functions for employment and social affairs into a large ministry appears as a necessary part of a sufficient configuration explaining an outcome of relatively many employment PI reforms in the latter period. As suggested by the case illustrations on both Germany and France (cf. Analysis 6, pp. 267-271), the withdrawal of employment policy functions from large ministries for Social Affairs and their combination with portfolios for the Economy (Germany) or Finance (France) was one key element enabling the adoption of relatively many PI reforms.

1.2 Partisan competition and PI reforms

Two preliminary expectations were formulated to conceptualise the influence of party-political competition, which structures the political logic to policy coordination (Czerwick, 2001). The *preliminary expectation 3* (p. 51) on pledge fulfilment as driving the behaviour predicted that left-of-centre governments, which the literature generally associates with the adoption of PI reforms, adopt relatively many PI reforms if the issue is politically salient on their electoral agenda (cf. Chapter 1, section 2.2).

The results of the analyses find support for this expectation in two analyses: Left-of-centre governments that had the issue saliently on their electoral agendas are consistently associated with the adoption of relatively many PI reforms in environmental policy during the 2000s/2010s (path 2). However, a 'large ministry' is an additional necessary condition. This shows that political and policy logics combined in leading to the adoption of relatively many PI reforms, because pledge fulfilment and the portfolio combination of policy functions within a large ministry were both necessary and led to the adoption of relatively many PI reforms only when combined. Similarly, left-of-centre governments on the electoral agendas of which employment issues featured saliently are consistently associated with the adoption of relatively many PI reforms in employment policy during the 2000s/2010s (path 4). Here, in contrast, the absence of a 'large ministry' is an additional necessary condition. Again, political and policy logics combined in leading to the adoption of relatively many PI reforms: as the case illustration of France's Fillon cabinet suggests (cf. pp. 270-271), both electoral pledge fulfilment as well as the un-making of a ministerial portfolio that combined employment policy functions within large ministries for Social Affairs, that reduced the social partners' influence on employment policy-making, were both necessary and led to the adoption of relatively many PI reforms only when combined. In other words, in both paths, an additional organisational condition was necessary for the pledge fulfilment expectation to be fulfilled. In other words, left-of-centre parties in government who emphasised the (environmental or employment) issue in their campaigns consistently adopted relatively many PI reforms only in environmental PI and in employment PI after the turn of the century, and only in combination with a specific portfolio combination. Conversely, this combination explains neither the

adoption of relatively many PI reforms in these two policy fields during the 1980s/1990s, nor the adoption of relatively many PI reforms in immigration policy.

The *preliminary expectation 4* (p. 52) on executive capacity predicted that the policy preferences of left-of-centre governments would be sufficient for explaining the adoption of PI reforms under the condition that the government have the room for manoeuvre to determine the legislative agenda on the issue because policy-making is centralised in the executive (Cejudo & Michel, 2017; Vogeler et al., 2022). Only one analysis lends support to this argument. Left-of-centre governments that enjoyed high executive capacity are consistently associated with the adoption of relatively many PI reforms only in employment policy during the 1980s/1990s (path 4). However, a 'large ministry' is an additional necessary condition. Unexpectedly, one path also combines right-of-centre governments with the adoption of relatively many employment PI reforms during the 1980s and 1990s (path 3), but it is combined neither with issue salience nor with executive capacity and therefore does not point to pledge fulfilment as a driver of reform. Right-of-centre cabinets are no necessary part of any sufficient combination for the adoption of relatively many PI reforms in employment policy in the 2000s/2010s. This result lends support to studies that underline the role of social democratic governments in the welfare state reforms of the 1990s and 2000s (Clasen, 2000; Bonoli, 2013; Knotz, 2021) and those scholars who argued that left-of-centre governments in particular are associated with the adoption of employment PI (Trein, Maggetti & Meyer, 2021) because their legacy as traditional advocates of a strong welfare state allowed these parties to more legitimately claim that the reforms were unavoidable and gave them greater political leeway to introduce these reforms than more conservative parties (Clasen, 2000; Bonoli, 2013; Knotz, 2021).

The results for environmental policy lend more limited support for the mechanisms associated with the presence of a left-of-centre government than those for employment PI. In environmental policy, the presence of a left-of-centre government is an INUS condition only in the analysis of PI in the 2000s and 2010s, but does not feature in any solution path of the analysis of the 1980s and 1990s. This suggests that the partisan dynamics behind environmental PI in both periods differ and are more varied as regards the mechanisms at play. A potential explanation for the observation that the presence of the reference party does not feature in the solution term for environmental PI during the 1980s and 1990s may be that environmental PI was more actively defended by Green parties during the 1980s and 1990s and only became more consistently associated with governments elected on left-leaning agendas after the turn of the century when the environmental issue became incorporated into the left-right dimension of political contestation (Dalton, 2009). However, several path (among which also in environmental PI) also contain right-of-centre governments as an INUS condition, which supports previous research that showed that environmental PI reforms are

also adopted under right-of-centre governments (Trein & Ansell, 2021) and also suggest that right-of-centre parties increasingly embraced PI as an approach particularly during the second period under analysis. As regards environmental PI, this echoes with arguments that environmental policy has over time been integrated into the discourses and policy programs of more conservative parties, e.g. as seen with the development of the ‘right-wing ecology’ (*écologie de droite*) in France after the turn of the century (Persico, 2016). Interestingly, in both paths (analysis 1, path 2, and analysis 2, path 4) right-of-centre governments are associated with a ‘concentrated portfolio’, which suggests a mechanisms whereby relatively strong environmental bureaucracies acted as policy entrepreneurs for environmental PI reforms when issue competition motivated right-of-centre governments to become active in environmental policy.

Based on the argument that parties’ ideological positions remain relevant for explaining governing parties’ behaviour and on the literature that associates PI reforms with the policy preferences of left-of-centre parties, the political expectations assumed that left-of-centre parties play the role of reference parties for PI in all three policies. Although the greater heterogeneity of left parties’ policy preferences makes this argument plausible (Trein & Ansell, 2021; Trein, Maggetti, et al., 2021), the results suggest that different parties may take on a role of reference party depending on the policy in question. In particular, the results for immigration policy do not support the assumption that left-of-centre parties’ preferences were consistently associated with the adoption of PI reforms in this policy, since there is no solution path that consistently associates left-of-centre governments with the adoption of PI reforms in immigration policy. The fact that the presence of left-of-centre cabinets comes closest to individual sufficiency for the absence of PIACT in both analyses of immigration PI (cf. pp. 221 and 235) points in the same direction. In other words, the results do not point to left-of-centre parties in government as a relevant factor explaining the adoption of PI reforms across the countries and during the time frame under study, and imply instead that there may be more variation in the impact of party ideology on PI in different policy fields than previous studies comparing PI across policies and countries suggest (Trein & Ansell, 2021). One potential explanation is that left-of-centre parties in government are more constrained in adopting PI reforms in immigration policy than in the other policy fields because they are more strongly constrained by the presence of veto points and the politicisation of the immigration issue, two factors that were shown to limit the likelihood that left parties adopt reforms liberalising migration (Abou-Chadi, 2016b). Conversely, the presence of a right-of-centre government as an INUS condition in several solution terms suggests that these governments elected on a right-leaning agenda played a major role for the adoption of immigration PI in the countries under study. In particular, these governments combine with either ‘executive capacity’ or ‘issue salience’ in different paths for immigration PI. This shows that the

preliminary expectations 3 and 4 would apply if we assumed that right-leaning governments take on the role of reference party for immigration PI. These results show that PI reforms occur under both right-and left-leaning governments but also show significant differences between the three policies as regards the conditions with which partisanship combines.

Salience, in either its presence or absence, features more prominently in the solutions for environmental PI and immigration PI, whereas most solution paths for employment PI are indifferent to salience. The presence of salience points to issues that parties perceive to be important to voters and electorally rewarding, and when associated with the adoption of PI reforms, points to pledge fulfilment as a driver of legislative activity (cf. Chapter 1, section 2.2). Salience features *only in its presence* in the solution paths for environmental PI and immigration PI during the 1980s/1990s as well as employment PI in both periods, i.e., none of the paths that result from these three analyses contain the absence of salience as an INUS condition. While the literature helped in formulating preliminary expectations involving salience, it is much more difficult, in contrast, to “interpret silence correctly” (Ruedin & Morales, 2019, p. 304).¹³⁵ The absence of issue salience as an INUS condition appears only in five paths which result from the analyses of environmental PI (paths 3 and 4) and immigration PI (paths 2, 3, 4) during the 2000s/2010s. As the illustrations related to the immigration PI reforms show, the absence of salience on the right-of-centre governing parties’ electoral agendas in some cases (cf. UK, Sweden) appears as a contextualised response to the politicisation of these issues through a radical party. When the latter were rewarded with electoral success and formed a strong opposition to the government, this translated into a high amount of reform activity during the legislature in spite of the absence of salience. This explanation echoes with research on political parties’ issue competition that explains the mainstream parties’ shift towards more restrictive immigration and integration policies with their fear of electoral losses to populist parties (for a recent review, see Careja & Harris, 2022). Here, the PI approach to immigration corresponds to a closer coupling of immigration and integration policies, whereby the integration of immigrants becomes a criteria for their access to social rights and participation in the welfare state (cf. Chapter 2, section 1.2). In terms of partisan positions and electoral strategy, such policies resonate with the welfare chauvinist agendas of radical right populist parties (Schumacher & van Kersbergen, 2016). In immigration policy, there is no specific pattern combining the absence of salience with organisational conditions, which further suggests that this policy response to an extremist challenger party is driven by political coordination logics independently of the organisational configuration of ministerial policy functions. Conversely, in environmental policy during the 2000s (paths 3 and

¹³⁵ The literature suggests that parties in government and in opposition communicate differently through their manifestos (Dolezal et al., 2018). Therefore, future studies might integrate parties’ status as members of government or of the opposition into the calibration of ‘issue salience’ in parties’ electoral campaigns.

4), similar mechanisms of whereby mainstream parties adapt their agenda in response to the success of Green party challengers are less straightforward; the evidence rather points to a general de-politicisation of environmental policy when it became framed through the lens of sustainable development after the turn of the century, as the case illustration of Sweden’s Persson II cabinet suggests. In France during the cabinets led by Raffarin then De Villepin, however, significant issue competition did take place between the major parties. Both paths to environmental PI featuring the absence of issue salience further combine it with the presence of a concentrated portfolio, which points to a entrepreneurship from the environmental administration (cf. above, section 1.1).

2 Performance of the solution terms

Making the performance parameters of QCA solutions transparent is essential to good QCA methodological practice (Baumgartner & Thiem, 2017; Greckhamer et al., 2018; Thomann et al., 2022). These parameters concern primarily the scores of consistency and coverage, but the extent of limited diversity (i.e., the percentage of truth table rows without cases) and of contradictory truth table rows also allow to interpret how well a set of conditions explains an outcome (Radaelli & Wagemann, 2019; Thiem, 2022). While the consistency scores and PRI allow to assess the quality of the explanation for those cases covered by this explanation, the scores for coverage and the percentage of contradictory truth table rows indicate how empirically relevant the explanation is and the extent to which additional explanatory factors are likely. Finally, limited diversity impacts the most parsimonious solution: if cases cluster in some truth table rows and more truth table rows remain without cases, this increases the impact of counterfactuals on the solution term. The researcher faces trade-offs when defining the respective levels of consistency and coverage for generating the solution terms; the supplementary materials to each of the analyses in Appendix B explain the levels retained for each of the analyses in detail.

Table 25: Comparison of the solution parameters for the outcome PIACT

		Consistency	Coverage	PRI	LD ¹	Contradictory TT rows ²
Environmental PI	1980s-1990s	0.803	0.511	0.776	40.6 %	21.9 %
		0.828	0.537	0.791		
	2000s-2010s	0.867	0.661	0.831	31.3 %	18.8 %
		0.867	0.661	0.831		
Immigration PI	1980s-1990s	0.810	0.387	0.756	50 %	18.8 %

	<i>2000s-</i>	0.808	0.685	0.755	43.8 %	12.5 %
	<i>2010s</i>	0.778	0.717	0.722		
		0.820	0.655	0.772		
		0.787	0.688	0.735		
Employment PI	<i>1980s-</i>	0.742	0.650	0.709	50 %	18.8 %
	<i>1990s</i>					
	<i>2000s-</i>	0.737	0.731	0.663	56.3 %	18.8 %
	<i>2010s</i>					

Note: ¹Limited diversity calculated as the percentage of truth table rows without empirical cases.

²Contradictory truth table rows calculated as the percentage of truth table rows containing cases with and without membership in the outcome.

From Table 25 we can see that the highest consistency scores are reached in the analysis of environmental PI during the 2000s and 2010s, where they match with acceptable coverage and relatively little limited diversity. The consistency scores of both analyses of employment PI are the weakest ones and slightly below the conventional level of 0.75, but this was accepted given that model ambiguity could still be avoided and the solution term's coverage, i.e., empirical relevance, be elevated slightly by including more truth table rows. The scores for coverage display some notable variation in the amounts of the empirical evidence explained by the solution terms. In immigration policy, the solution for the 1980s and 1990s appears to explain those cases covered by it well, but leaves a large part of the empirical cases unexplained.

3 Additional explanatory factors

Low coverage, contradictory truth table rows, as well as deviant cases, are indications that there may be additional conditions that I did not integrate into the theoretical framework but that have the potential to explain some variation unexplained by the framework (Radaelli & Wagemann, 2019). This is somewhat unsurprising given that this thesis has a mainly explorative, theory-building purpose, although the theoretical framework developed expectations on how the conditions combine to produce the outcome based on simpler, directional expectations (Amenta & Poulsen, 1994; Rihoux & Ragin, 2009; Maggetti & Fischer, 2017). The following paragraphs elaborate on some potentially omitted, additional conditions in more detail, drawing on evidence from the analyses above and linking them with references to the relevant literatures. Particular attention is given to the additional explanatory potential

of time and different operationalisations thereof (Maggetti, 2021) on the relationship between organisational structure and policy.

3.1 Additional political factors

Ministerial autonomy

Some case illustrations point to the degree of autonomy of ministers in their role as “double agents” of the government (Andeweg, 2000) coupled with the policy and political preferences of individual ministers as a potential additional explanatory factors. For instance, in two cases nested in New Zealand in the 1980s and 1990s, which provided diverging evidence as regards the extent to which two cabinets adopted PI reforms while being similar as regards all the conditions of the explanatory framework, the additional investigation of these cases (cf. pp. 194-195) suggested that the institutional context, in particular a short-term policy orientation induced by the strong principle of vertical accountability prevailing in ministries, and a lack of assessment of the outcome effectiveness of ministerial policy (Bührs, 2002b, p. 42), may help understand that the two successive cabinets adopted different levels of environmental PI reforms. Another factor overlooked by the theoretical framework but potentially relevant for the relationship between governments’ organisational structure and policy outputs may thus consist in the extent of autonomy and discretion enjoyed by individual ministers (Bäck et al., 2022), especially in political systems where vertical accountability to the minister and the minister’s political will is high (Molenveld et al., 2021). It has been demonstrated, for instance, that the extent to which Environmental ministries benefit from the opportunities presented by supranational bodies to strengthen national environmental policy by uploading concepts to the supranational level depends on the political interest of the minister (Jordan, 2002a). The literature on representation has demonstrated that ministers’ background impacts, for instance, on their social welfare preferences (Alexiadou, 2015, 2022). In the literature on climate PI in the EU, leadership styles have been demonstrated to affect the institutional capacity and opportunity structures for policy entrepreneurship from the administrations and encouraged either political or policy entrepreneurship dynamics for climate PI (Rietig & Dupont, 2021).

Political polarisation

The PI literature advances political polarisation as an alternative factor relative to ideological partisanship and explores its relevance for explaining the adoption of PI reforms (Trein & Ansell, 2021). In particular, it refers to the literature on proportional representation systems which has established that legislative fractionalisation leads to the representation of more diverse policy preferences (Huber & Powell, 1994; Curini & Hino, 2012). For this reason, Train and Ansell (2021) argue that a larger party system fractionalisation should make PI reforms

more likely because the electoral strength of niche political parties impacts on the major parties' policy agendas. However, their analysis of the effect of legislative fractionalisation of party systems on PI reforms does not support the hypothesised relationship and instead suggests that a higher party system fractionalisation decreases the probability that PI reforms are adopted. The literature on parties' strategic behaviour in parliament also shows that parties that oppose the government more strongly are more likely to increase their electoral performance in the next election than parties that cooperate (Tuttnauer & Wegmann, 2022), which also suggests that PI reforms as a result of compromise between government and extreme opposition parties should be less likely. As these arguments do not suggest any straightforward expectation as regards the impact of legislative fractionalisation on the adoption of PI reforms, this condition was not included in the framework.

However, there is some evidence from the case illustrations to suggest that polarisation, and in particular the rise of a niche competitor party, may contribute to explain some governments' PI reforms, particularly in immigration policy. For instance, Austria's government turned towards a PI approach to immigration policy when the salience of immigration-related issues increased and a far-right party started capitalising on these developments (cf. Analysis 3, p. 226). This resonates with the literature on the party politics of immigration, where parties across the left-right spectrum were found to emphasise immigration-related issues in particular when faced with an electoral threat by a far-right party (Abou-Chadi, 2016a; Grande et al., 2018). A similar argument could be made for environmental PI where the cases of France's Jospin cabinet as well as Sweden in the late 1980s illustrated that the environmental issue became salient for mainstream parties when Green parties entered Parliament, and both cabinets adopted relatively many PI reforms. This is in line with parts of the literature on party competition where Spoon et al. (2014) argue that mainstream parties have incentives to emphasise the environment more strongly if Green parties become successful and pose an electoral threat, although Abou-Chadi (2016a) shows that when faced with a successful Green party, other parties across the left-right spectrum rather tend to react by de-emphasising environmental issues.

3.2 Aspects of temporality

As regards the temporal dimension, the present study is limited to studying the relationship between specific organisational set-ups and the adoption of PI reforms when both are present simultaneously: in other words, it asks whether the conditions are necessary or sufficient for observing the presence of PI reforms if they are present at a specific moment in time. This research design does not allow to directly identify temporal patterns of policy change among the cases nested in one country and policy. Instead, the mechanics of each QCA neutralised this temporal variation during the so-called analytic moment (cf. Chapter 3, section 3.2).

However, several case illustrations pointed to different aspects of temporality as potential additional or alternative explanatory factors.

Time as stability

There may be time effects in the relationship between organisational conditions and the adoption of PI. Some case illustrations point to different dimensions of stability as a potential additional explanatory factor. In particular, the examination of typical cases that associated environmental administrations that concentrated environmental policy functions within one ministry with the adoption of relatively many environmental PI reforms in the early period in the UK and in Sweden revealed that some typical cases shared the additional characteristic of having concentrated these policy functions for at least a decade already (cf. Analysis 1, pp. 187-188). Both the UK's DoE and the Swedish SEPA had concentrated environmental policy functions at the national level since the 1970s. From these cases it may be hypothesised that the extent of stability of the ministerial organisational set-up, i.e., the stability of the concentrated portfolio over time, may have facilitated the adoption of PI reforms thanks to the accumulation of administrative experience. In the case of Austrian immigration PI, the Interior Ministry became a leading actor in immigration policy and shaped the turn to a PI approach only several years after the transferral of the immigration portfolio from the Social Affairs Ministry (cf. pp. 223-227). This echoes with the mechanism in Rauh's (2021) study that shows that the amount of administrative experience increases a European Commission DG's capacity to correctly anticipate the political feasibility of its preferred policy option.

This argument resonates well with the literatures on ministries as well as organisational studies examining the stability of organisations (although most studies examine stability as a dependent variable; for a recent review, see Lim, 2021). The inertia of ministerial bureaucracies is a major source of continuity of governments (Rose, 1987, p. 33) because although ministries are subject to periodic political change when ministers are replaced (e.g., as a consequence of a change of government), ministerial organisations are rather stable administratively.¹³⁶ However, in particular those ministries that reflect the core functions of the State, such as Finance, Justice, or Foreign Affairs, are subject to the least alteration (e.g., Moses & Knutsen, 2006; Fleischer et al., 2018), while ministries that fulfil newer government functions defined only in the 20th century are more amenable. In organisational studies, studies into the effects of age present conflicting results and the empirical evidence is mixed

¹³⁶ From a functional perspective, government organisations have a higher necessity to endure than many other functions in society: because most policy issues are unlikely to be solved completely, ministries face little danger to be terminated due to obsolescence (DeLeon, 1978; Peters & Hogwood, 1988). Obsolescence occurred in the cases of ministries for War, for Veterans, or for Reconstruction, although even in these cases parts of these ministries continued to exist within other ministries (such as a ministry for Reconstruction becoming part of a ministry for Housing, Construction, or Urban Development).

(Boin et al., 2010; Le Mens et al., 2011; Lim, 2021). The insights of this field might be useful for formulating mechanisms linking the organisational stability of specific organisational forms, such as large ministries, with the adoption of PI reforms, though. An organisation's capacity to survive – its 'stickiness' (Adam et al., 2007, p. 230) – is often associated with strengths such as adaptability (Kaufman, 1976) or the ability to innovate (Samuel, 2017), which might help explain why some administrations develop policy entrepreneurship for PI.¹³⁷ Other studies however argue on the contrary that as organisations grow older, they can enter into decline as a "result of dysfunctional traditions, customs, or habits that once were functional and contributed to the organizational mission" (Guy, 1989, p. 12). In other words, old organisations have more trouble adapting to changing environments and become obsolete (Le Mens et al., 2015). An argument often made about organisational instruments, and reorganisations in particular, is that they take a long time to produce the intended change (Scharpf, 1986, p. 187): any potential impact of an organisational change may take time to materialise, as reorganisation often involves a high amount of costs for the organisation on the short term (White & Dunleavy, 2010). A recent study into the effects of structural change on the behaviour of agency officials found that with more frequent structural reforms, officials attached more weight to signals from their political and ministerial principals, increasing the risk of political influence (Wynen et al., 2020). Conceivably, one might even find that reorganisations have opposite effects on the short and on the longer term (Hood et al., 1985, p. 66). These and similar arguments from organisational studies might help formulate mechanisms that integrate the effects of time seen as administrative stability into the relationship between organisational structure and PI reforms.

Arguments about the impact of stability extend beyond the organisational dimension and may also be made as regards the political aspect of ministerial stability. While ministerial bureaucracies tend to be stable, ministers are replaced more regularly: they "embody the transient element of government" (Rose, 1987, p. 32). There are large bodies of literature interested in the longevity of individual ministers' tenures (Berlinski et al., 2010, 2012; Bright et al., 2015; Dowding & Dumont, 2009, 2015; Fischer et al., 2012; Huber & Martinez-Gallardo, 2008) as well as the durability of particular government compositions (Warwick, 1994; Kam & Indriðason, 2005). Ministerial office holders are central for decision making and arbitration between competing directorates' demands especially in large ministries, and these literatures could be made fruitful for conceptualising the impact of individual ministers' accumulated

¹³⁷ However, the literature also finds a self-reinforcing effect of stability (Downs, 1967, p. 20) according to which once organisations have passed a critical age threshold, they face little risk of dismantling: "the older a bureau is, the less likely it is to die" (Downs, 1967, p. 20). Conversely, recently established organisations have not accumulated resources and established protective networks and routines (Stinchcombe, 1965; Carroll & Delacroix, 1982; Freeman et al., 1983) and are hence particularly vulnerable to termination (Bruderl & Schüssler, 1990).

experience (both policy-specific experience as well as wider experience in political roles) as an additional factor that might be integrated into future studies. Although this (in)stability of portfolios and ministers likely affects policy-making (Thompson, 2020), studies of ministerial durability and turnover have researched its impact on policy-making only occasionally. The literature on ministerial durability and stability tends to associate stability with the accumulation of policy expertise and experience and long-term relations, e.g. between ministers (Huber, 1998). Some studies of Latin American presidential democracies have shown that longer tenures of ministers facilitate the creation of coherent and durable policies and reforms (Corrales, 2004; Martinez-Gallardo, 2010, p. 138). Another study however argues that with higher turnover ministers are more likely to adopt wider considerations that go beyond narrow defence of departmentally oriented approaches (Alderman, 1995).¹³⁸

Similarly, studies rather associate political instability with disruptive processes of policy-making and implementation, in particular when it comes to adopting and implementing administrative reforms (Cohen, 2023). More recently, some studies have studied the effects of the instability of ministerial portfolios and office-holders on executive performance and the quality of policy-making. They find that ministerial instability negatively affects the degree to which governments fulfil their electoral pledges (McCluskey, 2008; Belchior & Silveira, 2023), or are efficient in absorbing EU funds (Hagemann, 2019), or highlight that ministerial instability in new democracies generates incentives for political leaders to focus on patronage and clientelism (O'Dwyer, 2006). Instability also leaves governments more exposed to the influence of policy entrepreneurs in policy-making (Mele & Ongaro, 2014).

Another dimension of stability that might prove relevant for future studies pertains to the political stability of governing cabinets, which is also related to the type of democracy, i.e., the differences between majoritarian and consensus democracies, that might shape patterns of reform activity. As regards cabinet turnover, Maggetti and Trein (2021) argue that the turnover between cabinets with different ideological partisanship should lead to a higher frequency of PI reforms in Westminster systems because these systems that “provide governments with high institutional capacity face the risk of undergoing more dramatic, i.e. large-scale, policy punctuations” as compared to consensual systems (p. 83). However, majoritarian parliaments are associated with more frequent political turnovers, which in turn should be detrimental to the emergence of long-term policy strategies that build on inter-party consensus. With a case study of the UK, a setting where governments’ institutional capacity is high, they show that the frequent alternation of government parties encouraged

¹³⁸ This factor might play out differently in different policies, though, as a recent study suggests a link between the salience of a portfolio and the stability of its office-holders: it argues that ministers occupying more policy relevant positions are more carefully screened upon selection, which favours their longevity in office (Hansen et al., 2023, based on an argument by Huber & Martinez-Gallardo, 2008, p. 172).

repeated waves of reform that, although each reform follows a PI approach, “run against the overarching goals” (p. 82) of PI agendas on the long run. Conversely, in more consensual political systems, as in Sweden, similar patterns of a high number of reforms may rather be explained by a shared long-term policy orientation of the major political parties, as the analysis of environmental PI showed: Swedish governments consistently adopted a high level of PI reforms in spite of shifts of the parties in government and the levels of salience of environmental issues (cf. pp. 192-193).

Future studies might therefore fruitfully explore temporal patterns in the relationship between the organisational set-up of policy functions and policy outputs. For instance, future studies might integrate theoretical arguments about the path dependency or learning effects linked to the organisational stability of government administrations by calibrating a condition that operationalises the time span that the organisational configuration already existed as a quantity accumulated during a life course (Fischer & Maggetti, 2017; Maggetti, 2021). Such a condition might operationalise the time span for which a particular organisational configuration survived administratively and be calibrated based on the duration of the ‘constitutional inter-election period’, which spans between three and five years in depending on the country (Seki & Williams, 2014). It would allow to distinguish between organisational configurations that were in place for a long period of time and survived political changes from those were young, and to detect policy effects associated with administrative and/or political longevity. A similar condition might be calibrated as regards the political stability or shifts of governing majorities associated with political ideologies.

Time as path dependency and feedback effects

Second, time may also play a role through legacy effects, policy learning or accumulation. From a historical institutionalist perspective, scholars argue that PI is shaped by the history of previous attempts at and forms of PI that allow for certain patterns of PI but hinder others (Ashford & Hall, 2011; van Assche & Djanibekov, 2012; Caparrós & McDonnell, 2013). Policy-makers’ choice of PI instruments is influenced by the interplay and coherence with pre-existing policies, meaning that policy choices have interactive effects (Henstra, 2016), similarly to the ‘policy dilemmas’ that result from previous attempts at PI (Nilsson & Nilsson, 2005). Rayner and Howlett (2009) argue that due to the resilience of existing policy elements, PI may follow processes of displacement, conversion, layering, drift, or exhaustion known from the policy change literature.¹³⁹ The path dependent nature of institutional change whereby the

¹³⁹ PI may occur through the roundabout replacement of sectoral policies with a new integrated policy, but also through layering, whereby integrated policies supplement rather than replace sectoral policies. When ‘integration’ involves policy replacement, it means that in order to achieve such an objective, sectoral boundaries are removed and this removal involves a redefinition of identities at the levels of policy sectors, organisations,

“inertial tendency [of] initial policy choices to persist (...) requires a good deal of political pressure” (Peters, 1999, p. 63) to produce policy change, is an additional variable that percolates from several of the case illustrations. In immigration policy, in particular, several case illustrations highlight the important elements of continuity that shape governments’ policy choices, e.g., in Australia (Hugo, 2014), Sweden (Borevi, 2014), as well as the UK (Green, 2007). In Sweden, a high degree of policy continuity as regards environmental PI (Nilsson et al., 2016) could be observed under left and right-of-centre governments during the 1990s due to the main parties’ consensual stances on environmental issues which allowed the administration to be a major driver for EPI when the governments showed little backing and commitment (Lundqvist, 1998). Conversely, during the 2000s and 2010s, two deviant cases with little immigration PI reform activity in Australia and Germany were cabinets that succeeded cabinets that were similar on all conditions, suggesting that feedback effects may have been at play here.

The incremental character of PI as change unfolded over time has increasingly been highlighted by recent PI literature that privileges a temporal dimension to the analysis of PI processes and outcomes. Some argue that the coherence of policy mixes may change over time when more recent instruments are added (Majone, 1989; Hildingsson & Johansson, 2016; Howlett, 2019; Capano & Howlett, 2020; Cejudo & Michel, 2021), to the effect that previous instruments “become anachronic later” (Cejudo & Michel, 2021, p. 2). This argument highlights that the coordination of policies into a policy regime that is coherent across time constitutes a specific dimension of PI (Metz & Glaus, 2019; Bolognesi & Nahrath, 2020; Bolognesi et al., 2021). In particular, the recent literature on “integrated policy regimes”, that analyses PI by combining it with the regimes literature, questions the positive relationship between the extent and the coherence of a PI regime. Bolognesi and colleagues argue that when an integrated regime becomes more extensive (i.e., its coverage increases) its coherence declines; for this reason, they conclude that integration over time follows nonlinear patterns (Bolognesi & Nahrath, 2020; Bolognesi et al., 2021). This echoes Majone (1989) who argued that when we are looking at “a population of policies that grows relative to the size of the [policy] space”, increasing interaction between policy domains is inevitable (p. 169). A reason for governments not moving towards more integration may be that the (low or high) level of PI already achieved is all that is politically feasible, or necessary to solve the problem

and policies (Cejudo & Michel, 2017; Perri 6 et al., 2002). It is one extreme on a dimension of possible policy solutions, with fragmentation at the other extreme (Hartlapp, 2018). Conversely, policy integration may take the form of layering that takes place if actors acknowledge that the boundaries of policy fields are an obstacle to PI but rather than dissolving them they create ‘integrative’ forms of policy-making, structures, procedures, etc. that create linkages across sectoral boundaries and relate them (Briassoulis, 2004). These layered policies may lead to incremental policy change as shown in Candel and Biesbroek’s processual approach (Candel & Biesbroek, 2016; Biesbroek & Candel, 2020).

(Candel & Biesbroek, 2016). This argument, as well as recent contributions such as Kaplaner et al. (2023), bring the PI literature close to the literature on policy accumulation (e.g., Adam et al., 2017).

In addition to the argument of political instability and turnover, patterns of variation may also be explained by policy feedback effects. Legacy effects, i.e., high or low levels of PI in the past, may influence high or low numbers of PI adopted in the present: levels of PI activity at t could feed back into the level of PI reforms at $t+1$. Trein and colleagues (2021) hypothesise that learning from previous reform periods informs the extent to which governments engage in a PI approach through both positive or negative feedback effects (Mettler, 2019). Similarly, Trein and Ansell (2021) identify a cumulative effect of PI reforms over time, whereby a higher frequency of PI reforms at t makes PI reforms at $t+1$ more likely. Arguably, cabinets may adopt a high amount of PI reforms precisely because previous cabinets failed to do so. For instance, there are cases in the data where cabinets adopted a high amount of PI reforms after previous cabinets failed to do so. Such a case is the Australian Gillard II-Rudd II cabinet that adopted several environmental PI policies following an absence of such measures at the federal level during the previous governments between 2000 and 2007 (cf. pp. 216-217). A similar pattern was observed in Canadian environmental policy during the 2000s and 2010s, where the environmental PI reform activity of the two successive Harper I and II cabinets was linked to the failure of the previous ten years of decentralised sustainable development planning in the federal government, which the analysis shows became a pressing issue when public concern turned towards environmental issues (cf. pp. 204-206) (Winfield, 2009; Rimmel, 2012; Lakanen, 2018). A similar feedback effect is plausible also in the case of the Netherlands' environmental PI reforms of the 2000s and 2010s, which are in line with neither of the preliminary hypothesis; here, the intensity of the reform activity of the 2000s and 2010s was likely linked to the relative little PI reform activity that took place during the previous decades (cf. Analysis 1).

CONCLUSION

The relation between organisational structure and policy outputs has been subject to long-standing debates (Olsen, 1997; Peters, 2015). When it comes to policy coordination and integration, the results of this research show that organisational choices are only one piece of an extensive puzzle, and certainly not a panacea (Peters, 2015). This manuscript studied the relationship between the ministerial organisation of specific policies and the adoption of policy integration reforms in parliamentary governments (1985-2014). The theoretical focus was in particular on exploring how particular organisational configurations of ministerial policy functions combine with institutional and party-political characteristics of government cabinets in explaining policy integration reforms prepared or adopted by governments. The central argument is that the coordination processes that precede the adoption of PI reforms follow policy and political logics that interact in complex ways, and that the outputs of these coordination processes are best understood through the lens of causal complexity. The empirical basis of this thesis is constituted by two fine-grained and original large-N data sets. The first contains the PI reforms in three policies adopted at the national level in nine parliamentary democracies. The second dataset covers the same time span, countries, and policies. Based on formal structural analysis, it describes the formal distribution and combination of the policy functions for these policies among the ministries of the national government.

The first part of the empirical analysis described these organisational set-ups of national governments with respect to three policy fields – environmental policy, immigration policy, and unemployment policy – over the period 1970 to 2016. Following the two dimensions of organisational configurations, it showed significant variation in the dominant organisation configurations of these policy functions, both over time as well as between the policies under study. Combining both data sets, the main empirical analysis was performed by means of a Qualitative Comparative Analysis (QCA) geared towards identifying the conditions that explain the adoption of PI reforms by governments in three different policy fields. Going beyond the impact of government organisation, the analyses also examined the impact of issue salience, governing cabinets' ideological partisanship, and the executive's dominance of the legislative agenda. The results highlight that organisational conditions may be part of explanations of policy choices, but also show that the impact of organisational factors depends on how they combine with political ones, and reveals both differences and similarities between the policies as well as time periods in how conditions combine to explain the adoption of PI reforms.

Contributions to the PI literature

By comparing the combined impact of causal conditions related to ministerial organisation and political factors on the adoption of PI reforms in three policy fields, this thesis contributes to the study of an empirically important phenomenon: the intersectorality of legislation in most policy sectors has increased over time, but with some sector-specific differences, (Kaplaner et al., 2023). The main contribution of this thesis pertains to the emerging strand of PI literature that studies the adoption of PI reforms by governments from a comparative perspective by comparing PI in different policies (Trein & Ansell, 2020; Trein & Maggetti, 2020). Scholars have previously studied party-political and ideological drivers behind the adoption of PI (e.g., Trein & Ansell, 2021; Trein & Maggetti, 2020; Trein, Maggetti, et al., 2021), the impact of institutions (e.g., Trein, 2017b), or administrative capacity for PI (Domorenok et al., 2021a, 2021b). Theoretically, this study contributes to recent advances in bringing the study of PI closer together with literatures on policy processes in general (e.g., Cejudo & Trein, 2023a, 2023b) and policy coordination processes in particular. By distinguishing the policy and political logics to policy coordination and conceptualising specific conditions related to each, this integrates arguments about the impact of organisational set-ups on policy integration and party political drivers of policy coordination linked to pledge fulfilment and issue competition as drivers for PI reforms. Therefore, this thesis also underlines that the study of PI is ripe for cross-case studies that combine different explanatory variables, such as executive capacity or issue salience, in a controlled comparison. While this study opted for holding the institutional context relatively constant by focusing on parliamentary democracies, there is still some variation even between the countries belonging to this type of regime, e.g., as regards the degree of autonomy of ministers vis-à-vis the government, the levels of interdependence between the multi-layered levels between which competences for a policy challenge are distributed, the differences between majoritarian and consensual democracies, among others. In spite of recent advances, a set of particular challenges is still associated with studying PI from a comparative perspective (Trein et al., 2018; Trein et al., 2023).

This study also points to the challenges inherent in the complexity of comparing PI in different policies or sectors. In particular, it underscores the importance of operationalising PI in a way that it focusses on one very specific policy issue or challenge (cf. Trein et al., 2018). Given that in this thesis, differences and similarities between sectors account for variation in how the conditions combine to produce the outcome, it also shows that meso-level variables are key to comparing PI in different policies (Giessen & Krott, 2009; Kaplaner et al., 2023). Another challenge is in reconciling the different levels of analysis – micro, meso, macro – at which variation may be observed (Fischer & Maggetti, 2017).

In this thesis, the focus of the explanation was placed on a different set of conditions, and the configurations in which they are consistently associated with the outcome were explored. Notably, this thesis contributes to the literature by studying how conditions related to the ministerial organisation and party-political conditions combine in explaining PI, and in so doing put organisational conditions at the core of a configurational theoretical argument that guided the exploration of the conditions under which governments adopt PI reforms. One theoretical point of departure of the thesis was that political science has much to gain from a better theorised look at the structure of government organisations (Döhler, 2020). Even organisational theorists have argued that their field should grant the analysis of formal structure a more central role (again) in order to regain relevance for organisational practice (Du Gay & Vikkelsø, 2017). Following the configurational approach in organisational studies (Fiss, 2007, 2011), in this thesis the organisational structure of ministries was conceptualised as comprising both the degree to which the policy functions for a policy are concentrated within one ministry or fragmented across two or more ministries, and the other policies that the policy is combined with within ministerial jurisdictions. Though the systematic cross-case comparison through QCA, this research provides a starting point for a more evidence-based selection of case studies for an in-depth tracing of the bureaucratic and policy processes at play in the patterns between the integration of organisations, on the one hand, and that of policies, on the other.

As discussed above (cf. Chapter 6, sections 2 and 3), and maybe relatedly, the empirical relevance (coverage) of most findings is quite weak. This is rather unsurprising given the exploratory nature of this research (Amenta & Poulsen, 1994) as well as the plethora of potential additional factors. For this reason, the QCA results were complemented with extensive illustrations to assess the plausibility of the cross-case patterns that also point at additional or alternative explanatory conditions that future studies might want to integrate. Another potentially distorting element are the effects of country-specific policy styles that are inherent to comparative reform count data (Turrini et al., 2015). Future studies may want to limit the potential sources of variation further, e.g., by narrowing down the analysis to a more limited set of countries that are similar, for instance, as regards the consensual or majoritarian type of democracies, or the federal versus centralised state organisation. For these reasons, the results can also be expected to only partly travel to other countries, especially those with different socio-economic backgrounds, or to post-Communist or authoritarian political systems (Ma & Christensen, 2020). Relatedly, this research compares ministerial organisation and PI at the national level across countries and policies and observes significant convergence in the ways in which governments organise sectoral policy functions. Future research may fruitfully delve into the potential transnational drivers of policy or organisational reform at play here (Busch & Jörgens, 2005a, 2005b; Hassenteufel, 2005; Aklin & Urpelainen, 2014).

Convergence may be forced, when it is a result of supra-national policy, or deliberate, when political actors seeking to make legitimate policy or organisational choices rely upon what has been done elsewhere, which results in mechanisms of diffusion or transfer across countries or policies.

Organisational and policy dimensions of PI: causal ordering

The PI literature has recently conceptualised different dimensions of PI and paid more explicit attention to how the dimensions interact (Candel & Biesbroek, 2016). This thesis contributes to this literature. Notably, the question arises whether the administrative dimension, which was operationalised here as different organisational configurations of policy functions, and the policy output dimensions, are to be treated as two dimensions inherent to PI, or as conceptually different. Several recent studies treat organisation and policy as two dimensions of PI, i.e., two facets of the one phenomenon (Tosun & Lang, 2017; Knill et al., 2020; Trein et al., 2021; Kaplaner et al., 2023). Empirically, Trein and Ansell (2021) have shown that PI reforms and reforms that enhance the coordination between public administrations tend to follow similar paces. However, policy-related factors are only one of many drivers of organisational choices when it comes to ministerial organisation, which is also in large part driven by (party-)political considerations (cf. Chapter 1, section 3.1) and relatively unstable. Whether or not the ‘integration’ of policy functions at the level of ministerial organisation can be considered to be part of the administrative dimension of PI is a question that remains yet to be explored more thoroughly.

Studying administrative reforms for coordination, Christensen and Lægreid (2013) find “that uncovering the linkages between administrative reforms and public policy is more complex than it appears at first sight”. They argue that the relationship between administrative structure and public policy “might be better understood as mutually affected processes rather than clear cause-effect relations” (p. 564). The concept ‘co-evolution’, which is prominent in organisational studies, has recently been used fruitfully by political scientists to study the institutional relationships between policy sectors (Trein, 2017a) and dynamics of policy regimes (Bolognesi et al., 2021). Trein and Maggetti (2020) hint at co-evolution as a useful conceptual lens for studying the relationship between a policy dimension and an administrative dimension of integration and show that reforms on these two dimensions exhibit differences in frequency and timing. Arguably, future studies might conceptualise the relationship between the organisational integration of policy competences within governments, and the integration of policies through the adoption of policy integration reforms, in terms of mutual influence and adaptation rather than a unidirectional relationship of cause and effect. In so doing, they might integrate arguments about the causal ordering, i.e., the sequential order in which events unfold (Maggetti et al., 2012).

Given that temporal effects feature prominently among the additional explanatory factors discussed (cf. Chapter 6, section 3.2), future studies should consider incorporating the effects of time and different operationalisations thereof directly into the analysis (Maggetti, 2021). The strategy chosen here was to perform separate analyses per policy and time period and to compare the solutions. The drawback of this relatively time-agnostic approach is that it cannot take into account mechanisms of path dependency, feedback effects, or learning processes (Fischer & Maggetti, 2017) which however constitute potential sources of endogeneity between the cases nested in one country and policy and at the heart of major theories of the policy process. There are possibilities to address and compensate these temporal patterns of variation among the cases nested in one country and policy during the analytic moment. Although the creation of an additional condition exacerbates the problem of limited diversity, one possibility would be to calibrate a condition that operationalises a time dimension for each country-policy dyad (De Meur et al., 2009; Fischer & Maggetti, 2017; Maggetti, 2021). For instance, one might calibrate a fuzzy-set condition that indicates the degree to which a case is a member of the set of policy processes that lead to major policy change, as Fischer (2014) does in his study of the relationship between policy processes and policy change. Other conditions operationalising temporal effects in the relationship between the conditions and the outcome could also be envisaged.

Future studies might thus treat the time frame within which one can expect to observe an effect of an organisational form on policy output as a more open empirical and theoretical question. To translate this openness into a QCA logic, a time-related different outcome might be used. More precisely, in order to account for the possibility that the organisational conditions require a certain amount of time to produce an effect, configurations might be analysed over time with lagged time windows (Aversa et al., 2015; Maggetti, 2021). For instance, one might operationalise different periods on the outcome, with a first analysis covering the occurrence of the outcome in the most immediate aftermath of a reorganisation, i.e., the first years of the existence of an organisational configuration, and a separate analysis for a later period. Such a time-related different outcome would allow to accommodate the theoretical uncertainty surrounding the time frame within which an organisational configuration can be expected to produce an outcome in terms of policy output.

The normative-functionalist bias and the issue of accumulation: is PI even desirable?

Policy integration has become a prominent feature on the agendas of good governance and better regulation and promoted by supra-national actors such as the EU (Adelle et al., 2009; Bocquillon, 2018). Concomitantly, Tosun and Lang (2017) diagnosed the literature on PI with a prescriptive bias suggesting that PI represents a political goal that scholars should aid policy-makers in accomplishing. Parts of the early environmental PI literature more or less explicitly

claimed that PI represents a political objective to be attained, and a similar argument can be made for cross-cutting challenges such as gender or equity (Mickwitz & Kivimaa, 2007, p. 71). Earlier PI studies contain a normative bias by implicitly portraying PI as a desirable policy solution (Jordan & Halpin, 2006) or assuming that governments adopt PI in a quest for better coordinated policies that tackle boundary-spanning problems more effectively (Meijers & Stead, 2004; Michaelowa, 2004; Gould, 2005; Kivimaa & Mickwitz, 2006, p. 730; Cejudo & Michel, 2017; Tosun & Lang, 2017; Duffy & Cook, 2018; Trein & Maggetti, 2020). The desirability of policy integration as compared to ‘classical’ sectorised policy-making may appear “common-sense” (Persson, 2007, p. 25) or “today’s idea in good currency” (Jordan & Halpin, 2006) and is seldom questioned (Candel, 2021).

The more recent PI research likewise identifies benefits from PI (cf. Bolognesi et al., 2021, p. 913). The benefits of PI notwithstanding, many argue that PI is only possible to a certain extent. Bornemann (2016) argues that in some situations the “whole becomes less than the sum of its parts” when an integrated policy solution is less capable of solving a policy problem than the prior non-integrated policy arenas (p. 182). Lange and Schimank (2004) described such as phenomena as “over-integration”. According to Nilsson and Persson (2012), this occurs due to overburdening at the individual, scientific, or political level, and the delaying of policy decisions (p. 68). Jeroen Candel (2017, 2021) has been the most vocal proponent to date of a scaled-down approach to PI that recognises that in some cases, a lower level of PI may be all that is feasible or required to solve a policy problem. From this perspective, the challenge resides in identifying the “minimum” level of coordination and integration necessary for crisis-avoidance (Candel et al., 2016). Although an ideal-typical level of full integration between policies may be neither feasible, nor needed nor even desirable, there may be the need at least “for a reflection mechanism that signals gaps or tensions in the governance of cross-cutting problems and that informs decision-makers so that proactive adjustments can be made” (Candel & Biesbroek, 2016, p. 226). A certain degree of competing priorities between sectors may also be inevitable, and there may be virtues inherent to the political bargain between them (cf. Jordan & Halpin, 2006).

Others find that limits and trade-offs are inherent to PI (Nilsson, 2005; Simoes et al., 2015). PI may be ‘partial’ if gains to PI in one field come at the expense of losses to PI in another field (Adelle et al., 2009; Biesbroek & Candel, 2020). For instance, the integration of environmental and climate objectives may come at the expense of other environmental challenges such as biodiversity (Sainteny, 2015). Ross (2008) reports that in the Australian state of Victoria the integration of natural resource, environment and planning functions was achieved at the expense of the loss of momentum in agricultural and environmental policy collaboration that had existed previously. A dysfunctional form of mainstreaming is ‘dilution’ (introduced in the PI literature by Liberatore, 1997; see also Persson, 2004) whereby the integration of one policy

into others weakens this policy instead of strengthening it. These concepts are valuable because they draw attention to feasibility issues, symbolism, and political value conflicts inherent to PI (Candel, 2021) and bring PI close to concepts such as ‘policy dismantling’ and ‘policy retrenchment’. Future research might fruitfully delve into the consequences of enhanced PI on third policies in order to understand the ‘collateral damages’ or benefits of PI in one policy on PI with other policies. In particular, more research is needed on the relationship between policy *integration* on the one hand and the substance and outcomes of the policies pursued through integration on the other. In other words, more research should focus on the question not only whether policy integration actually favours the objectives of all of the involved policies, but also whether those governments most active in terms of PI reforms actually promote the objectives of the policies taken individually. To take an example, the Canadian Harper governments, which were consistently active as regards the adoption of PI reforms in environmental policy, are otherwise associated with a period in Canadian environmental policy and politics that was characterised by severe cutbacks to environmental capacities and funding (Lakanen, 2018).

The outcome effectiveness of PI further depends on their implementation through local institutions and actors (Signoretta & Craglia, 2002; Runhaar et al., 2009; Sullivan & Williams, 2009; Weber & Driessen, 2010; Brodtkin, 2011; Andersson & Liff, 2012; McGann et al., 2020) whose focus and priorities may diverge from the initial intentions behind the policy design (Storbjörk & Isaksson, 2013). Case studies have demonstrated that incompatible governance frameworks can result in imperfect implementation. In the case of Swedish national waste policy, although environmental concerns were strongly integrated in national waste policy, they remained hardly integrated into local planning and decision-making processes (Nilsson et al., 2009). In Scotland, the transition from sectoral to integrated rural policy slowed down because authorities at different levels of the State used different spatial units for data collection, analysis and representation of spatial data, which hampered the creation of a more integrated spatial data infrastructure (Sang et al., 2005). PI outcomes and outputs may be linked through a feedback loop by which a country has a high number of repeated PI reforms precisely because previous reform attempts have been unsuccessful in achieving PI outcomes; in this case, a weak PI outcome would go along with a strong PI output. Future research might analyse this relation more explicitly by analysing whether (and how) the success or failure of previous PI translates into more or less PI reform activity. Since this study left the link between PI outputs and outcomes unaddressed, it should be complemented with research about the conditions under which governments adopt PI reforms that are effectively implemented, or about the effectiveness of PI as an outcome. PI reforms may be ineffectively implemented and evaluated as a failure (Casado-Asensio & Steurer, 2014; Vince, 2015; Nordbeck & Steurer, 2016; Candel, 2017). A recent meta-analysis of literature on EPI found that only about one in

four EPI policy outputs actually translate into a policy outcome (Runhaar et al., 2020, pp. 191–193). Some studies have found that the quality of the formulation and the design of integrated policy strategies is crucial for the success or failure of the implementation of PI (Nilsson et al., 2009; Vince, 2015; Candel, 2017). But the effectiveness of PI instruments also depends on the political context, as has been shown, for instance, for the use of environmental policy appraisal as an EPI instrument in the UK (Russel & Jordan, 2007, 2009).

This thesis is also limited to analysing PI at the national level. Although the framework incorporates a condition that captures variance in national governments' control of the legislative agenda-setting, which may be curtailed inter alia by the influence of subnational actors, the perspective on PI reforms adopted here is still predominantly top-down. Thereby, it largely ignores the role of sub-national actors in shaping national policy integration reforms (Lambelet, 2023) and bottom-up dynamics that originate at the level of street-level bureaucrats or target groups (Stewart, 1994; Catalano et al., 2015, 2016). This may have resulted in an insufficient appreciation of the potential effects of the vertical concentration of policy competences (either at the national or a sub-national level of the State) on the adoption of policy integration reforms at the national level. Previous research has shown that the top-down perspective cannot offer a complete picture on PI in any policy field and country (Urwin & Jordan, 2008; Cejudo & Trein, 2023a; Lambelet, 2023). On the one hand, the bottom-up perspective provides crucial insights for understanding the adoption of PI reforms especially in decentralised settings (e.g. Walker et al., 2015; Kefeli et al., 2023), and on the other, 'top-down' policy decisions interact with the local level (e.g. Hull, 2008; Urwin & Jordan, 2008; Van Bommel & Kuindersma, 2008; Matthews, 2014). Therefore, future research could focus more specifically on how ministerial organisation and policy integration co-evolve in settings that vary as regards vertical policy integration. For instance, ministerial organisation may have a different impact on the adoption of policy reforms in policy fields in which decision-making takes place at subnational or territorial level, that can be more easily integrated at the local level than at the national one, such as housing policy or child care, or when there has been devolution of policy competences to the territorial or local level (Jonas & Gibbs, 2003; Clar & Steurer, 2014).

Methodological choices

Methodologically, this research benefitted from recent advances by QCA methodologists who explore and discuss QCA's suitability and potential distinct advances in using QCA as a technique for large-N data (cf. Chapter 3, section 3.1) (for many, Emmenegger et al., 2014; Thiem, 2014). QCA is the appropriate method if theoretical arguments are formulated in set-theoretic terms (Schneider & Wagemann, 2012), but the suitability of QCA for large-N studies is still open to debate (Finn, 2022; Pagliarin et al., 2023), and using QCA for comparing a large

number of cases nested in countries as well as policies is largely uncharted territory. The methodological solution chosen here consisted in performing separate analyses and comparing the solutions generated from them. This had the advantage of providing specific solution models for each policy and time period, while also allowing for a subsequent structured comparison of these solutions in a second step. Specific conditions (and combinations thereof) were thus found to be highly relevant for one policy and/or time period, whereas other analyses revealed more diverse combinations. Nevertheless, it would also have been possible to combine all cases into one single analysis and future complementary studies may want to use the data to push the exploration of QCA's potential for large-N comparisons even further by performing a single analysis including all cases.¹⁴⁰ The combinations of conditions in the solution paths obtained through such an analysis might be considered core conditions, while those of the individual analyses might be considered more peripheral (Fiss, 2011).

The strength of QCA is that it provides a structured comparison, discerns cross-case relations, and identifies the configurations of causal conditions that explain an outcome. However, QCA does not by itself prove causality; to obtain evidence about the causal mechanisms between the condition term and the outcome, QCA must be accompanied with case studies into causal mechanisms (Beach & Pedersen, 2013, 2016; Collier, 2011). The literature on set-theoretic methods has established that QCA and process-tracing complement each other particularly well (Schneider & Rohlfing, 2013; Beach & Rohlfing, 2018; Pattyn et al., 2020). Therefore, future studies might want to complement this analysis with within-case inferences based on case studies with the aim of understanding the causal mechanisms through which the organisational structure of ministries shapes the coordination processes within and between ministries leading to the adoption of a PI reform, or its failure. Case studies might fruitfully be employed to explore ministerial fusions as “most likely” cases of organisational settings in which policy integration reforms can be expected to be adopted.

This research informs debates on whether and how ministries ought to alter their structure and operations and rearrange their objectives in order to tackle cross-cutting challenges most effectively, which is a pressing concern for organisational reformers and policy practitioners. Only recently, scholars have begun to scrutinise the circumstances under which (scarce) public resources should “be better used to deliver the services rather than coordinate them” (Peters, 2018, pp. 9–10). In particular, this thesis scrutinises the pertinence of a specific type of reforms, i.e., organisational ones, for pursuing PI, especially in the light of the high expenditure

¹⁴⁰ In this case, if one adds further conditions to distinguish between policies and/or time period, this aggravates problems with limited diversity, i.e., the extent of combinations of conditions (truth table rows) not covered by empirical observations.

typically associated with the design and implementation of administrative reorganisation (White & Dunleavy, 2010). In an extension to this research, asynchronous research design might prove particularly fruitful for comparing the effect of structure over time within the same organisation, especially comparing its effects before and after a reorganisation (Hult, 1987; Egeberg, 1999; Vestlund, 2015). To do so, future studies might conceptualise both the formal and the informal dimensions of organisational structure and study their combined impact on PI by performing case studies based on process tracing. These studies might compare, for instance, the impact of organisational integration on PI before and after a fusion. This would be a welcome addition to the (re-emerging) literature on ministries, which has been interested in ministries' organisational structure but neglected its informal dimension.

From formal to informal organisational structure

Given that few longitudinal studies so far look at the organisation of government ministries as regards specific policy fields, the comparison of ministerial structures for environmental, immigration, and unemployment policy is a welcome addition. The description of ministerial structures provides new, quantitative input for studies interested in governments' organisational choices. Information on formal organisation of ministries responsible for three policy fields (environment, employment, immigration) in nine countries and over a duration of 47 years was collected and assembled for this study. Students of central governments will find that the dataset (cf. Appendix B) and Chapter 4 present a detailed longitudinal and cross-national empirical account of the ministerial structures of three issue areas over a period of 46 years.

The results speak to recent studies that have explored the evolution of ministerial bureaucracies over several decades (e.g., Tosun, 2018; Fleischer et al., 2022; Yesilkagit et al., 2022). The empirical chapters complement previous studies by showing that the ministerial organisation of policy functions for specific sectoral policies has undergone considerable transformations in a context where sectoral ministries face assaults on their functions coming from different directions: core executives and transversal ministries such as ministries for Finance increasingly take over coordination functions in the policy-making process, and the Europeanisation of sectoral policies also affects the role of national administrations in different sectors. The data allow to observe a convergent trend across countries that has seen portfolios for sectoral policies become more concentrated within specific ministries. At the same time, the types of jurisdictions with which these policies are combined organisationally have undergone considerable changes. Thereby, it also resonates with recent research into the degree to which there is overlap in ministries' policy activities as regards specific policy fields, and according to which in some policy areas, policies are clearly dominated by a specific

ministry while in others there is no clear correspondence between a ministry and the legislative activity (Klüser & Breunig, 2022).

Theoretically, this thesis also contributes to an emerging literature that studies the impact of departmental structures on policy-making (Hegele, 2021; Klüser, 2022). This research has been very prolific in recent years. Yet, large-N studies with ministries' horizontal structure as an independent variable are still rare (Hernes, 2021). One recent study compared how portfolio combinations impacted on coordination processes in the German Länder found covariation between portfolio combinations and coordination patterns and suggested that research should focus on how portfolio combinations combine with other factors to explain coordination behaviour and outputs (Hegele, 2021).

More generally, this study also wants to encourage researchers of government to recentre their focus on the roles, functions, and politics of sectoral ministries: although the latter are central policy-making institutions, loci of policy expertise and initiative, and arbitration between the interests of policy subsystems, we still “know surprisingly little about the role of individual ministries” (Garritzmann & Siderius, 2024). Despite their crucial importance as the key policy-making institutions (Schnapp, 2001), ministries remain ‘black-boxed’ in the overwhelming majority of political science and public administration research on governments and policy-making (Döhler, 2020). Analyses of line ministries remain few and “there is a lack of comprehensive and detailed analysis of the operations of central government departments” (Smith et al., 2000, p. 146), the types of relationships they form internally among units as well as externally with other ministries, with the core coordinating institutions of the government, and across levels of government (Smith et al., 1995, pp. 50-51). Organisational theory, e.g. through its different conceptualisations of organisational structure as boundaries (Santos & Eisenhardt, 2005), has a great potential in helping political scientists open up the black box of ministerial organisation in processes of policy-making (Döhler, 2015).

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APPENDIX

The Appendix is designed to ensure the transparency of the data collection and the replicability of the coding. Since coding of PI reforms as well as of the reach of ministerial jurisdictions and the degree of concentration of policy competences requires qualitative judgment and is not entirely safe from measurement error, I quote sentences and references on which the coding is based. The final section contains the full list of references.

Appendix A contains the datasets used for this study. Appendix B contains the materials of the QCA analyses. The final section contains the full list of references used for creating the datasets.

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APPENDIX A – DATASETS

APPENDIX A.1: DATASET OF POLICY INTEGRATION REFORMS

This appendix presents the original data on policy integration reforms that was collected for the purpose of this study. Philipp Trein and Stefano Assanti (University of Lausanne) contributed to the data collection. It presents the data in tabular format, displaying the relevant reforms in chronological order for each policy fields and country.

Environmental policy

Australia

<i>Year</i>	<i>Type</i>	<i>Event and sources</i>
1974	T	The Commonwealth passed the <i>Environment Protection (Impact Proposals) Act</i> that was designed to “guarantee that the environment became a consideration in any actions taken by or on behalf of the federal government and its agencies” (Papadakis, 2002, p. 26). The act “included a legislative provision to undertake Environmental Impact Assessment (EIA)” (Ross, 2008, p. 291).
1984	T	Adoption of the <i>National Conservation Strategy</i> , “Australia’s first major environmental strategy” (Ross, 2008, p. 291) that built consensus between economic and conservation interests (Young, 1984, p. 146).
1992	M	Adoption of the <i>National Strategy for Ecologically Sustainable Development (NSES)</i> that “represent[ed] a nationwide commitment to translate the concept of sustainable development into national objectives and policy directions” (OECD, 1998a, p. 8). “In outlining guiding principles and core objectives of the NSES, the government focused on integration of concerns about the economy, environment and social equity; recognition of the ‘global dimension’ of impacts on the environment; need for ‘a strong, growing and diversified economy which can enhance the capacity for environmental protection’ and promoting ‘international competitiveness in an environmentally sound manner’; improvements in policy instruments for valuation, pricing and incentives; a precautionary approach; and community participation. Government departments were expected to incorporate these principles into their mission statements. In sum, the federal government, in dealing with the states and territories, adopted a ‘whole of government’ approach to implementing sustainable development” (Papadakis, 2002, p. 26). “At the national level, this has been the most comprehensive strategic effort, addressing developments in 33 sectors as well as cross-sectoral themes. It contains commitments to a

		raft of objectives, mostly general, using terms such as 'promote', 'encourage', 'review' and 'develop'." (Bühns, 2000, p. 110) "The strategy was gradually superseded by subsequent policy developments, but when it was published it represented the first comprehensive national initiative on EPI." (Ross, 2008, p. 292; also OECD, 2008b, p. 152)
1994	T	Adoption of the <i>National Environmental Protection Council Act</i> that required Strategic Environmental Assessment of National Environmental Protection Measures (NEPM), that are "broad framework-setting statutory instruments which (...) set agreed national objectives for protecting particular aspects of the environment." Creation of the <i>National Environment Protection Council (NEPC)</i> that became responsible for the formulation of National Environmental Protection Measures (NEPM). (OECD, 2008b, pp. 153 and 177; Ross, 2008, p. 303)
1997	I	Creation of the <i>National Heritage Trust (NHT)</i> that aimed at improving natural resources management in rural and regional areas. The NHT "allows the government to realise a national vegetation plan, rehabilitate the Murray-Darling River Basin, conduct national land and water resources audit, establish a national reserve system and tackle pollution of the coast and seas". (Ross, 2008, p. 292) (Papadakis, 2002, p. 31)
1999	I	Adoption of the <i>Environmental Protection and Biodiversity Conservation (EPBC) Act</i> that "restated Australia's commitment to integrating economic, environmental, social and equity considerations into decision-making" and became "Australia's key national act on environment management" (OECD, 2008b, pp. 169 and 229). It "incorporated many provisions of previous acts such as the Endangered Species Protection Act (1992), the Environment Protection (Impact of Proposals) Act (1974), the National Parks and Wildlife Conservation Act (1975), the Whale Protection Act (1980) and the World Heritage Properties Conservation Act (1983)". It introduces Strategic Environmental Assessment (SEA) at the national level. (OECD, 2019, p. 107)
2004	M	Adoption of the <i>Sustainability Strategy for the Australian Continent</i> that aimed to achieve integrated natural resource management of all land and marine areas of Australia as well as "an integrated approach to energy and greenhouse gas emissions" (OECD, 2008b, p. 152).
2011	M	Adoption of the <i>Sustainable Population Strategy</i> that "sought to ensure that changes in population were compatible with 'the sustainability of our economy, communities and environment'. It included four new measures directed to this: promote suburban jobs, increase strategic (environmental) assessments under the EPBC Act in high growth areas; improve information on sustainability and promote rural living" (Burnett, 2015, p. 15).
2013	I	An amendment of the EPBC Act made water resources related to energy development a matter of national significance. (OECD, 2019, p. 106)

Austria

<i>Year</i>	<i>Type</i>	<i>Event and sources</i>
1984	I	Adoption of the <i>Federal Constitutional Law on Comprehensive Environmental Protection</i> that assigned responsibilities for environmental protection to the federal government, provinces and municipalities (Orth, 2007, p. 232).
1993	T	Adoption of the <i>Environmental Impact Assessment Act</i> that established impact assessments of certain projects and for public participation. (Lauber, 2004, p. 49; OECD, 2003a, p. 116)

1997	T	Adoption of the <i>National Environmental Plan (NUP)</i> prepared by seven working groups that developed targets and measures for industry; energy and the oil industry; traffic and transportation; agriculture, forestry and water resources; natural resource management; and consumers. (Amann & Fischer-Kowalski, 2002, p. 54)
1997	I	Adoption of the <i>National Environmental Health Plan</i> that set objectives and measures concerning issues such as air and water quality, contaminated sites, food quality and safety, radiation protection, chemical safety, noise, traffic, worker safety and human settlements. (OECD, 2003a, p. 136)
1998	I	Adoption of the <i>Environmental Control Act</i> that defined the legal basis for environmental regulation. (OECD, 2003a, p. 116)
2002	T	Adoption of the <i>Climate Strategy (Klimastrategie)</i> that entailed goals to reduce emissions with regard to energy policy, waste policy, traffic, industry policy, and agriculture. (Casado-Asensio & Steurer, 2015, p. 107)
2002	M	Adoption of the <i>National Strategy for Sustainable Development</i> that established the principle of sustainability in federal policies and actions and set 20 key objectives in the areas of quality of life, competitiveness, environment and international responsibility, as well as established an overarching governance framework and was to be implemented through annual work programmes outlining specific measures and annual progress reports. (OECD, 2003a, pp. 44 and 49)
2005	T	Adoption of the <i>National Biodiversity Strategy</i> (OECD, 2013a, p. 44)
2007	T	Adoption of the second <i>Climate Strategy (2008-12)</i> (Casado-Asensio & Steurer, 2015, p. 107)
2009	M	Adoption of the <i>Austrian Strategy for Sustainable Development (ÖSTRAT)</i> (Nordbeck & Steurer, 2016; OECD, 2013a, p. 72)
2013	T	Adoption of an amendment to the <i>Climate Protection Act</i> that defined sectoral reduction targets. (OECD, 2013a, p. 51)

Canada

<i>Year</i>	<i>Type</i>	<i>Event and sources</i>
1973	T	The <i>Canadian Environmental Assessment Act</i> introduced the Environmental Assessment and Review Process for policy proposals (Sadar & Stolte, 1996, p. 215).
1988	I	Adoption of the <i>Canadian Environmental Protection Act (CEPA)</i> that consolidated and updated Canada's environmental legislation (MacDowell, 2012, p. 255).
1990	I	Adoption of the <i>Green Plan</i> , which provided "a policy framework and action plan for sustainable development in which [the government] committed itself to substantial additional spending on the environment over the following five years" (Bouder, 2002, p. 46).
1992	T	Reform of environmental assessments through the <i>Canadian Environmental Assessment Act</i> that requires federal departments, including Environment Canada, agencies, and Crown corporations to conduct environmental assessments for proposed projects where the federal government is the proponent or where the project involves federal funding, permits, or licensing (Bouder, 2002, p. 51).
1995	T	The <i>Auditor General Act</i> introduces the requirement for federal departments and agencies to create their own departmental strategies for sustainable development. The government published the ' <i>Guide to Green Government</i> ' that "presented the first government 'corporate'

		view of the sustainable development challenge, established a framework for action and launched the process for the elaboration of sustainable development strategies of all departments as well as ‘greening’ the budget: that is, incorporating the environment and sustainable development dimension into federal budgets” (Bouder, 2002, p. 46).
1995	T	The <i>Canadian Environmental Assessment Act</i> institutes the <i>Canadian Environmental Assessment Agency</i> “and set out environmental impact assessment (EIA) responsibilities and procedures” (Bouder, 2002, p. 57). It sought to administrate the environmental assessment process at a federal level by “promoting the uniformity and harmonisation of environmental assessment activities across Canada and all levels of government” (OECD, 2004b, p. 105).
1999	I	Reform of the <i>Canadian Environmental Protection Act (CEPA)</i> that “consolidates federal powers to prevent pollution, including controls on toxic substances, polluting chemicals, nutrients and fuels. It also covers disposal at sea, shipments of hazardous waste, transboundary pollution, activities on federal lands and environmental emergencies” (OECD, 2004b, p. 120).
2008	M	Adoption of the <i>Federal Sustainable Development Act (FSDA)</i> that should provide the legal framework for developing and implementing a <i>Federal Sustainable Development Strategy</i> . It requires the Minister of the Environment to develop a whole-of-government strategy every three years. The act also identified 26 federal departments and agencies that prepare their own strategies to comply with, and contribute to, the FSDS. (Benidickson, 2016, p. 51) (OECD, 2017a, p. 114)
2010	M	First cycle of the <i>Federal Sustainable Development Strategy (FSDS)</i> (2010-13) that is based on a whole-of-government view of environmental priorities at the federal level, with goals, targets, and implementation strategies across 37 departments and agencies (Remmel, 2012).
2010	T	The <i>Cabinet Directive on the Environmental Assessment of Policy, Plan and Program Proposals</i> makes strategic environmental assessment mandatory for proposals that may result in important positive or negative environmental effects (OECD, 2017a, p. 87).
2013	M	Update of the <i>Federal Sustainable Development Strategy (FSDS)</i> (2013-16) (OECD, 2017a, p. 114)
2016	M	Second update of the <i>Federal Sustainable Development Strategy (FSDS)</i> (2016-19) that “attempts to be more strategic and forward looking. It includes 13 goals linked to the UN Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs), as well as targets and short-term milestones to achieve them. For each goal and target, it identifies responsible ministers, thereby supporting the alignment of sectoral policies and environmental objectives.” (OECD, 2017a, p. 115)
2016	M	“The <i>Pan-Canadian Framework for Clean Growth and Climate Change (PCF)</i> presents Canada’s first-ever overarching plan to grow the economy, while reducing emissions and building resilience. Developed in a co-ordinated approach among federal, provincial and territorial levels, the framework aims to introduce Canada-wide carbon pricing, accelerate innovation, support clean technology and create jobs.” (OECD, 2017a, p. 15)

France

Year	Type	Event and sources
1970	I	Adoption of the <i>Programme des Cent Mesures pour l’Environnement</i> that covered a wide array of problems and policy fields, including the fight against different types of pollutions, urban and rural environments, forests, protection of fauna and flora, natural parks, research,

		environmental professions and pedagogy, information campaigns, administrative structure and international environmental issues. (Charvolin, 2003, p. 80)
1977	T	Introduction of <i>Environmental Impact Assessments (EIA)</i> for a large number of projects.
1990	I	Adoption of the <i>Plan National pour l'Environnement</i> that reviewed the current state of environmental challenges and defined objectives for various fields of environmental policy: reduction of emissions of gases damaging the ozone layer and worsening the greenhouse effect; reduction of air pollution; decontamination of domestic wastewater; reduction of agricultural pollution; reduction of waste production and recycling; sound insulation of housing; reduction of technological and natural risks; protection of nature and landscapes; strengthening of the financial, institutional and scientific means of international environmental policy. (Chabason & Theys, 1991, p. 59)
1991	I	Creation of the <i>Institut français de l'environnement (IFEN)</i> that has the mission to collect data on the environment, including on natural and technological risks.
1995	M	The <i>Law on Enhanced Environmental Protection</i> affirmed four key dimensions of sustainable development – the precautionary principle, the principle of preventive action, the polluter pays principle, and the principle of participation – as legal guiding principles. (Loi n° 95-101) (Lacroix & Zaccà, 2010, p. 209)
1999	I	Creation of a general tax on polluting activities (<i>taxe générale sur les activités polluantes, TGAP</i>) that combined five previous eco-tax instruments (on industrial and household waste, used lubricants, air pollution, and noise at airports) into one single tax. (Szarka, 2003)
1999	M	Adoption of the framework law on territorial planning and sustainable development (<i>Loi d'orientation pour l'aménagement et le développement durable du territoire</i>) that promoted sustainability through changes to the national and regional planning process. It implemented a bottom-up approach to regional planning, where subnational authorities would take up a leading role and conceive a regional development project that the national government would support financially. The law conceptually complemented existing texts on decentralization, urban development and environmental law, by creating new legal categories such as the regional environmental profiles, the regional planning and sustainable territorial development schemes, and the “collective services” provided by the environment. The bill also sought to rebalance rural and urban patterns of development, especially through transport policy measures that favored rail over road and promoted local rail networks. (Szarka, 2004, p. 18)
2000	I	The <i>Environment Code</i> gathered and ordered all of France’s environmental legislation, which was about 3000 dispersed items, and harmonised the legal situation (Code de l’environnement).
2003	T	Adoption of the first <i>National Strategy for Sustainable Development (Stratégie nationale du développement durable, SNDD)</i> for the years 2003 to 2008. The strategy consisted in 400 measures that mainly focused on agriculture, transport and energy, but it also contains mainstreaming measures, such as new information and education instruments. Its main components were the reduction of greenhouse gases, energy savings with a priority for individual housing, the protection of biodiversity, the fight against lead poisoning, research and technological innovation, and the application of a Charter for the Environment.
2004	T	Adoption of the first national biodiversity strategy (<i>stratégie nationale pour la biodiversité</i>) for 2004-10 that included a general action plan and sectoral operational action plans. The latter include agriculture, transport infrastructure, natural heritage, the sea, urban and land-use planning, linear infrastructure and overseas territories. (OECD, 2005c, pp. 82, 101)

2004	M	Adoption of the <i>Charter for the Environment</i> that was incorporated into the preamble of the Constitution in 2005 alongside human rights and economic and social rights.
2007	T	National Climate Change Adaptation Strategy (<i>Stratégie nationale d'adaptation au changement climatique</i>) developed under the responsibility of the National observatory dedicated to the effects of climate warning (ONERC) and the Inter-ministerial delegate for sustainable development. (Biesbroek et al., 2010, p. 441)
2009	T	Adoption of the <i>Grenelle I Law</i> that integrated environmental concerns into various sectoral policies: construction, urban planning, transport, energy, biodiversity, research, water, agriculture, health and health risks, waste, and public procurement.
2010	T	Adoption of the <i>Grenelle II Law</i> that operationalised the Grenelle I Law for the different sectors and objectives, and reforms environmental impact assessments. (OECD, 2016a, p. 231)
2010	M	Adoption of the <i>Second National Sustainable Development Strategy (Stratégie nationale de développement durable, SNDD)</i> for 2010-2013 that extends the measures of the first SNDD.
2010	T	Adoption of the <i>Second national biodiversity strategy</i> for 2011-2020. (OECD, 2016a, p. 232)
2015	M	Adoption of the <i>Law on energetic transition for a green growth (Loi relative à la transition énergétique pour une croissance verte)</i> . It comprised three objectives relating to climate policy, energy consumption control, and green economy. It contains detailed principles and measures concerning construction, transport, economy, renewable energy, nuclear safety. The aim was to improve public health, air quality and the environment. (OECD, 2016a, p. 190)
2015	M	Adoption of the <i>National Strategy for an ecological transition towards sustainable development (Stratégie nationale de transition écologique vers un développement durable)</i> , 2015-2020.

Germany

<i>Year</i>	<i>Type</i>	<i>Event and sources</i>
1971	T	Adoption of the <i>Environment Programme (Umweltprogramm)</i> that stated that environmental concerns should be considered in all public and private decision-making processes in 'the same manner as it is the case with regard to economic and social concerns' and established the precautionary, polluter-pays, and co-operation principles as the basic elements of German environmental policy. It formulated ambitious long-term targets for air pollution control and water protection, as well as a wide range of concrete policy actions. (OECD, 2002, p. 117) (Beuermann, 2000, p. 88)
1975	T	The federal cabinet adopted an amendment to the Joint Rules of Procedure of the Federal Ministries (<i>Gemeinsame Geschäftsordnung der Bundesministerien, GGO</i>) that introduces a non-binding procedure for the assessment of the environmental consequences of all federal legislative and regulatory acts and all other public measures by federal authorities (<i>Umweltverträglichkeitsprüfung</i>). (Bundesregierung, 1976, p. 19; Müller, 1990, p. 166; Pehle, 1998, p. 71)
1976	T	The federal government's <i>Environmental Report</i> formally defined environmental policy as a "cross-sectoral task". (OECD, 2002, p. 117)
1989	T	Development of the <i>Environmental Economic Account (Umweltökonomische Gesamtrechnung)</i> that integrated environmental burdens such as emissions, utilisation of materials and energy and pressures on soils into economic data. (OECD, 2002, p. 140)

1990	T	A law on the creation of an <i>Environmental Impact Assessment (Umweltverträglichkeitsprüfung, UVP)</i> transposed the European directive on EIA restricted to certain projects (not including public programmes); the law states the obligation for projects with potential impact on the environment to be assessed in terms of their compatibility with environmental concerns.
1994	T	An amendment to the <i>Grundgesetz</i> includes the protection of the environment and the responsibility for future generations as an objective of the state (<i>Staatsziel</i>) (art. 20a GG). (Jänicke & Weidner, 1997, p. 138)
1997	M	Adoption of the report “ <i>Transition towards sustainable development in Germany</i> ” that contains an official interpretation of sustainable development, an assessment of environment protection across different environmental media, and a description of strategies to attain sustainable development. (Beuermann, 2000, p. 93)
1999	T	The <i>Ecological Tax Reform (ökologische Steuerreform)</i> integrates environmental concerns into energy policy. It increases the price of energy consumption to provide an incentive for the increase of energy efficiency and the promotion of renewable energies, but grants exemptions for energy-intensive industries. (Müller, 2002, p. 60)
2002	M	Adoption of the <i>National sustainable development strategy (Nationale Nachhaltigkeitsstrategie, NHS)</i> whose main objectives were inter-generational equity (including resource protection, climate protection, renewable energy, land use, species diversity and innovation), a good quality of life (including mobility, farming and air quality), social cohesion and international responsibility. (OECD, 2012b, pp. 31–32) (Wurzel, 2008, p. 192)
2007	T	Adoption of the <i>National Strategy on Biological Diversity (Nationale Strategie zur biologischen Vielfalt)</i> that integrated biodiversity protection into various sectoral policies and formulated targets and timeframes, as well as the measures for attaining them. (OECD, 2012b, p. 33)
2008	T	Environmental components are integrated into the <i>Stimulus and Consolidation Package</i> (representing about 13% of the total recovery package), e.g. for energy efficient building refurbishment, research and development for electro-mobility, a car scrapping programme (“Umweltprämie”), and the revision of the passenger car tax based on CO2 emissions. (OECD, 2012b, p. 63)
2008	T	<i>Deutsche Strategie zur Anpassung an den Klimawandel</i> under the responsibility of BMU and UBA (Biesbroek et al., 2010, p. 441).
2009	M	Introduction of a sustainability criterion into the existing regulatory impact assessment procedure for new legislation, as well as into the standing orders of the federal government (OECD, 2012b, pp. 30 and 38).
2010	I	A revision of the <i>Federal Nature Conservation Act</i> consolidated the legislative framework (OECD, 2012b, p. 32).

Netherlands

<i>Year</i>	<i>Type</i>	<i>Event and sources</i>
1979	I	Adoption of the <i>General Environmental Hygiene Provisions Act</i> that enforced the coordination of licensing procedures in different sectors and provided procedural instruments for a uniform approach to environmental issues in licensing in the different sectors. (Adriaanse et al., 1989, p. 310)

1983	I	Adoption of the <i>Plan for Integration of Environmental Policy</i> that “contain[ed] recommendations on the integration of: the policies of the responsible departments, such as the Ministry for Public Housing, Physical Planning and the Environment, the Ministry of Agriculture and Fisheries, and the Ministry of Transport and Water Management; policies in the field of legislation; licensing; development of standards; and financing and education. Since then the shift from the sectoral approach towards a more integrated policy has been visible in environmental management in the Netherlands.” (Adriaanse et al., 1989, p. 311)
1984	I	The Memorandum “More than the sum of its parts” by the minister for the Environment sketched the foundations for a new system of environmental policy planning that is subsequently converted into legislation in the ‘Plans’ chapter of the Environmental Management Act. (Coenen, 1998, p. 53)
1984	T	Adoption of the <i>First Integrated Multi-Year Environmental Programme</i> jointly prepared by various ministries. (Adriaanse et al., 1989, p. 311) (de Jongh, 1996, p. 8)
1987	T	The <i>Environmental Protection Act</i> (also called Environmental Management Act) introduced formal regulations on Environmental Impact Assessments and creates the <i>Commission for Environmental Assessment (NCEA)</i> . (OECD, 2003b, p. 144)
1989	T	The <i>First National Environmental Policy Plan (NEPP1)</i> marked the shift towards integrated environmental legislation and planning built on the notion of sustainable development. (OECD, 2003b, p. 139) (Dalal-Clayton, 2013, Chapter 14)
1992	I	Production of the <i>Plan for the ecological structure of the Netherlands</i> by the Ministry of Agriculture, Nature Management and Fisheries; the Plan linked important ecological areas with each other and is subsequently approved by Parliament. (Dalal-Clayton, 2013, Chapter 14)
1993	I	Adoption of the <i>Environmental Management Act (EMA)</i> that regrouped various acts (particularly concerning chemicals, waste, air and water quality) in order to make environmental legislation more coherent, and contains chapters on environmental planning, environmental impact assessment (EIA), issuing of licences, waste management, corporate environmental reporting, enforcement of environmental legislation and public access to information. (OECD, 2015b, pp. 132–133)
1993	T	Adoption of the <i>Second National Environmental Policy Plan (NEPP2)</i> that focused on greater cooperation and integration between all actors in the implementation of NEPP1 and introduces additional policies. (Dalal-Clayton, 2013, Chapter 14) (de Jongh, 1996, p. 5)
1995	T	Introduction of the <i>Environmental Test (E-test)</i> , which is applicable to all types of legislative proposal, including primarily draft regulations such as Acts, Implementation Ordinances or Ministerial Decrees, plus proposals for amendment, to assess the environmental impacts of legislation and regulations. (Marsden, 1999, pp. 94–95)
1997	M	The <i>Policy Document/White Paper on the Environment and the Economy</i> emphasized the responsibility of economic actors for environmental protection and sustainability. (OECD, 2003b, pp. 28, 111, 119 and 128)
2001	M	Release of the <i>Fourth National Environmental Policy Plan (NEPP4)</i> that committed the government to a “transition” agenda with a horizon to 2030 to restructure production and consumption systems and sharply reduce resource use and emission. (OECD, 2015b, p. 92)
2003	T	The programme “ <i>Sustainable Action</i> ” formally links a wide range of existing programmes across levels of government and sectors, covering six policy fields (energy, mobility, agriculture, natural resources, water, construction) in relation to environmental concerns. (Dalal-Clayton & Kriekhaar, 2007)

2007	T	<i>Maak ruimte voor klimaat!</i> Adaptation to climate change in spatial planning programme, co-ordinated by the Ministry of Housing, Spatial Planning and the Environment (Biesbroek et al., 2010, p. 441).
2010	I	The <i>Act on General Provisions for Environmental Law (WABO Act)</i> creates a new “all-in-one” environmental permit, single application procedures and bundles competences for permit emission in one body. (OECD, 2015b, p. 95)
2011	M	Launch of the “Green Deals” programs as part of the <i>Sustainability Agenda</i> , that replaces non-financial barriers to regulations, legislations or licensing with voluntary agreements between the government and various private parties, covering a range of themes, incl. water, mobility, biodiversity, the bio-based economy, construction and food (OECD, 2015b, p. 102).
2013	M	Letter of the government to the House of Representatives, in which it sets out the pillars of its policy for green growth (OECD, 2015b, p. 119).
2014	M	Adoption of the ‘ <i>Nature of the Future</i> ’ approach that sees nature “as the basis of general prosperity and well-being and the interests of society as going beyond the preservation of biodiversity per se” (European Commission, 2017, p. 11).
2016	M	Adoption of the <i>Programme on Circular Economy</i> (European Commission, 2017, p. 5)

New Zealand

<i>Year</i>	<i>Type</i>	<i>Event and sources</i>
1973	T	Adoption of <i>Environmental impact assessments</i> for all public and private development project proposals that were considered to have significant environmental effects, or that required permits under environmental legislation (Bührs, 2002, p. 331).
1991	I	Adoption of the <i>Resource Management Act</i> that “provides a framework for the development of environmental policy from the national to the local level, and establishes an integrated system for granting permits (‘contents’) for all types of development, based on an assessment of their environmental effects” (Bührs, 2002, p. 332). It “replaced over 50 previous environmental statutes related to land, air and water resource management, restructured the institutional framework for environmental planning and management, and redistributed responsibility for environmental management among the central, regional and territorial levels of government” (OECD, 2007b, p. 119).
1995	I	Adoption of the <i>Environment 2010 Strategy</i> that addresses several environmental issues and was the most comprehensive environmental policy statement so far (Ton Bührs, personal communication, 7.12.2016).
1996	I	Establishment of the <i>Environment Court</i> as a specialist court that hears appeals against decisions on resource consents, proposed district and regional plans, proposed regional policy statements, abatement notices, designations, heritage protection orders and enforcement orders. It also conducts inquiries related to restricted coastal activities and water conservation orders.” (OECD, 2007b, p. 126)
2003	M	Adoption of the <i>2003 Sustainable Development Programme of Action</i> that stated the government’s formal commitment to reconcile economic development and conservation of nature, defined principles and defined objectives for government action on sustainable development (OECD, 2007b, p. 108).

2008	T	Introduction of the <i>NZ Emissions Trading Scheme (NZ ETS)</i> , with industry-wide implications, although exempting emissions from agriculture (Ton Bührs, personal communication, 7.12.2016).
2012	M	Launch of the <i>Business Growth Agenda</i> that “focuses on improving the productivity of, and the value generated by, the natural resource-based sectors (including the large export-oriented livestock production sector), while reducing their environmental impact”. (OECD, 2017b, pp. 29–30)

Sweden

<i>Year</i>	<i>Type</i>	<i>Event and sources</i>
1981	T	Introduction of <i>Environmental Assessments</i> (OECD, 2004a, p. 49)
1987	T	Adoption of the <i>Natural Resources Act</i> that provides a framework for state planning in areas of national significance, such as transport, energy production and nature conservation (SEPA, 2011, p. 18).
1988	T	Adoption of the <i>Environmental Bill</i> that introduced that view that “successful environmental management presupposes that care for the environment is integrated into the development plans for different sectors of society” and that the responsibility to prevent environmental damage needs to be shared by all sectors (Lundqvist, 1997, p. 57).
1990	T	Introduction of a ‘green tax exchange’ in the 1990 tax reform that taxed fuels and products posing potential hazards to environmental quality. (Lundqvist, 1998, p. 237) (OECD, 2004a, p. 102)
1991	T	Adoption of the 1990/91 <i>Environmental Bill</i> that “comprises measures not only in relation to atmosphere and climate, trans-national pollution, the urban environment, nature conservation, sea and water, but is also directed towards numerous other sectors and activities in Swedish society”; it stated that the ‘mission of the 1990s is to readjust all societal activities in an ecological direction’. (Lundqvist, 1998, p. 238) (Lundqvist, 2004, p. 123)
1992	T	Introduction of <i>National environmental accounts</i> that should provide a systematic description of the relationship between the environment and the economy (Nilsson & Persson, 2008, p. 227).
1993	T	Publication of “ <i>A Greener Sweden: The Environmental Strategy of the Swedish Government</i> ” (ME, 1993).
1995	T	Adoption of a directive that formulated the “general sector responsibility” of all government agencies who “are legally required to consider the implications of their work for sustainable development. This general sector responsibility requires policy makers to address environmental implications in all major sector policy bills such as transport, forestry, energy, agriculture and cultural heritage.” (Nilsson & Persson, 2008, p. 229)
1997	T	The <i>Bill on the State of the Swedish Environment</i> further emphasised the environmental responsibilities of the national agencies for road, air and railway traffic, agriculture, fisheries, and forestry who from then on were required to elaborate sectoral plans and programs with precise environmental objectives (Lundqvist, 1998, p. 241).
1997	M	Creation of the <i>national sustainable development grants</i> under the local investment programmes that support local projects to jointly stimulate employment and environmental improvement (OECD, 2004a, p. 30).

1998	M	A special sector responsibility for 24 central government agencies was established who should integrate environmental issues into their activities and act as driving forces for environmentally sustainable development in their respective sector (Nilsson & Persson, 2008, p. 229).
1999	I	Adoption of the <i>Environmental Code</i> that “not only consolidates previously fragmented legislation but also introduces environmental courts, environmental sanctions and ambient quality standards, clarifies the role of environmental impact assessment (EIA) and transposes the EU water framework directive and integrated pollution prevention and control (IPPC) directive, among others” (OECD, 2004a, p. 30).
1999	T	Adoption of 15 national <i>environmental quality objectives (EQOs)</i> that replaced some 170 environmental policy goals and provided strategic long-term orientation to environmental policy as well as policies with potential environmental implications. (OECD, 2004a, pp. 39 and 99) (Nilsson & Persson, 2008, p. 233)
2000	T	Introduction of an environmental tax reform called the “green tax shift” that reallocated taxes from labour to environmentally harmful activities, especially energy production and use. (OECD, 2004a, p. 102) (Nilsson & Persson, 2008, p. 231)
2002	M	Adoption of the <i>National Strategy for Sustainable Development</i> that formulated objectives for eight strategic core areas that integrate the social, economic and environmental aspects of development. (OECD, 2004a, p. 98)
2004	M	Revision of the <i>National Strategy for Sustainable Development</i> . (OECD, 2014b, p. 47)
2006	M	Second revision of the <i>National Strategy for Sustainable Development</i> . (OECD, 2014b, p. 47)
2009	M	Adoption of the Bill “ <i>Environmental Objectives – For More Effective Environmental Action</i> ” that “concluded that by better defining the economic value of ecosystem services and integrating these values into the economy as a whole, humanity will be better equipped to utilise ecosystems sustainably and to increase their capacity in the long term.” (Regeringskansliet and MEE 2013)
2014	I	Adoption of the <i>Strategy for Biodiversity and Ecosystem Services</i> that formulated milestone targets for ecosystem services and resilience, biodiversity and the value of ecosystem services, threatened species and habitat types, invasive alien species, knowledge about genetic diversity, a holistic approach to the use of land, the protection of land areas, freshwater areas and marine areas, and forestry. (Regeringskansliet and MEE 2013)
2015	M	Adoption of 15 <i>Global Sustainable Development goals</i> that added a social dimension to previously environmentally dominated SD agenda. (Ylva Bretzer, personal communication, 16.3.2017)

United Kingdom

<i>Year</i>	<i>Type</i>	<i>Event and sources</i>
1990	T	Adoption of the government’s <i>White Paper “This Common Inheritance”</i> that “outlined a comprehensive cross-governmental approach which was publicly endorsed by all government departments. Crucially, it sought to reorient the machinery of government to ‘integrate environmental concerns more effectively into all policy areas’ and as early in the decision-making process as possible” (Russel & Jordan, 2008, p. 249) (Voisey & O’Riordan, 1997, pp. 27–28).

1990	T	Introduction of an <i>Environmental Policy Appraisal (EPA)</i> procedure through which all Whitehall departments should assess the potential environmental impacts of their policy-making activities (Russel & Jordan, 2007, p. 2).
1990	I	Adoption of the <i>Environmental Protection Act</i> that provided the statutory framework for most forms of pollution control; following the principle of <i>Integrated Pollution Control (IPC)</i> that addresses the pollution of the air, water, and land (Jordan, 2002a, p. 42).
1995	I	Adoption of the <i>Environment Act</i> .
1996	M	Production of a set of <i>Sustainable Development Indicators</i> to sit alongside the headline inflation and gross domestic product (GDP) figures, meant to show whether or not the UK is on a sustainable growth path and to flag the need for appropriate policy intervention (Jenkins, 2002, p. 585) (Jordan, 2002a, p. 47).
1997	T	Adoption of the ' <i>Greening Government Initiative</i> ' that established a parliamentary <i>Environmental Audit Committee</i> on sustainable development in the House of Commons (Jenkins, 2002, p. 586).
1999	M	Adoption of the <i>revised Strategy for Sustainable Development "A Better Quality of Life"</i> that includes 'social progress which recognises the needs of everyone' as a key objective alongside effective protection of the environment; prudent use of natural resources; and maintenance of high stable levels of economic growth and employment. It commits the government to producing an integrated system of impact assessment and appraisal tools in support of sustainable development. The revision is based on 15 sustainable development indicators. (Jenkins, 2002, p. 584) (Ross, 2005, p. 41)
1999	M	Publication of a comprehensive guidance note " <i>Policy-makers checklist: Using Impact Assessment and Appraisal – A Toolkit</i> " by the Cabinet Office that included sustainable development as an overriding government objective that needed to be part of policy appraisals. (Ross, 2005, pp. 41–42)
2001	M	The <i>Greening Government Initiative</i> was renamed <i>Sustainable Development in Government</i> and the narrow focus on improving the environmental performance of government broadened to include consideration of economic and social impacts (Jenkins, 2002, p. 585).
2002	M	Introduction of a compulsory <i>Sustainable Development Report</i> for all departments during the 2002 Spending Review (Russel & Jordan, 2009, p. 1212).
2004	M	Introduction of a more integrated and cross-government form of <i>Regulatory Impact Assessment</i> that replaced the EPA as well as ten other, separate policy appraisal systems and was meant to assess regulatory, economic, social and environmental impacts of new policy proposals (Russel & Jordan, 2007, p. 3).
2005	M	Adoption of the <i>third Strategy for Sustainable Development "Securing the Future"</i> including a UK-wide common Sustainable Development Framework consisting of a series of shared guiding principles, e.g. living with environmental limits, and four priority areas for action (climate change and energy; Sustainable consumption and production; natural resource protection and environmental enhancement; sustainable communities) (Jones, 2006, pp. 126–128).
2008	T	Adoption of <i>Adapting to climate change in England. A framework for action</i> (DEFRA, 2008) (Biesbroek et al., 2010, p. 441).
2011	M	Publication of <i>Mainstreaming sustainable development – The Government's vision and what this means in practice</i> , a paper on the Coalition government's commitment to sustainable development and the measures it is taking to mainstream it into overall government policy (DEFRA, 2011).

Immigrant integration policy

Australia

Year	Type	Event and sources
1971	T	The <i>Immigration Education Act</i> entitled all newly arrived immigrants to free English Language tuition (Liebig, 2007a, p. 24).
1977	I	Establishment of the <i>Humanitarian Programme</i> as part of the Migration Programme (OECD, 2007a, p. 80).
1978	T	Expansion of existing settlement services (English language teaching, on-arrival accommodation and orientation assistance, interpreting and translating services, assistance with overseas qualifications recognition) and introduction of new ones (Spinks, 2009, p. 2; Waxman, 1998, p. 762).
1979	T	Establishment of <i>Migrant Resource Centres (MRC)</i> that provided a broad range of services, especially employment-related ones, mainly for humanitarian migrants and family-stream migrants (Liebig, 2007a, p. 45).
1979	T	Creation of the <i>Numerical Multifactor Assessment System (NUMAS)</i> that scores migrants on factors such as age, occupational demand, education, work experience, language ability, or adaptability, as indicators of potential successful settlement (Walsh, 2008, p. 797).
1987	T	The availability of integration services for migrants was extended to five years after arrival (Leslyanne Hawthorne, personal communication, 20.4.2017).
1989	T	Creation of the <i>National Office of Overseas Skills Recognition</i> that became responsible for promoting national standards for skill recognition (Hawthorne, 2012, p. 42).
1991	T	Creation of the <i>Workplace English Language and Literacy (WELL) Programme</i> that provided grant funding to support integration of language, literacy and numeracy (LLN) education within vocational training, delivered in the workplace (Liebig, 2007a, p. 26).
1991	T	Adoption of the <i>National Integrated Settlement Strategy</i> to better coordinate settlement services across commonwealth and state portfolios and departments and non-government agencies (McKenzie & Williams, 1998, p. 63; Waxman, 1998, p. 764).
1992	I	The <i>Migration Amendment Act</i> introduced a single streamlined visa entry system (DIBP, 2015, p. 70).
1997	T	Adoption of the <i>Integrated Humanitarian Settlement Strategy (IHSS)</i> to provide a more targeted and coordinated approach to settlement services for humanitarian immigrants (Spinks, 2009, p. 6).
2002	I	The government introduced the obligation for all family reunion migrants to have a sponsor who provides them with support including accommodation and financial assistance (OECD, 2007a, p. 84).
2003	T	Introduction of a three-day pre-embarkation orientation for humanitarian migrants that included basic information on the political system, healthcare, public transport, the labour market, the education system, and on access to settlement services (Liebig, 2007a, p. 23).
2004	I	Creation of the <i>Settlement Grants Program</i> which combined funding previously provided to different actors in the field of settlement services for humanitarian migrants (Spinks, 2009, p. 7).
2005	M	Adoption of the <i>National Action Plan to Build on Social Cohesion, Harmony and Security (NAP)</i> that intensified integration initiatives (Hawthorne, 2012, p. 44).

2006	I	Most visa applications needed to include a signed <i>Australian Values Statement</i> (Spinks, 2009, p. 3).
2008	T	Creation of the <i>Complex Case Support Programme</i> that was designed to assist recently arrived refugees and other humanitarian entrants in difficult and unique circumstances that present significant barriers to settlement, such as severe physical and mental health conditions or pre-migration trauma (Spinks, 2009, pp. 6–7).
2011	M	Release of the first <i>Population Strategy</i> that emphasised the role of migration in supporting regional growth (Gross, 2014; OECD, 2012c, p. 210).
2013	T	Introduction of the <i>Community Proposal Pilot</i> (CPP) that provided an additional resettlement pathway for people in humanitarian situations (DIBP, 2017, p. 7).

Austria

<i>Year</i>	<i>Type</i>	<i>Event and sources</i>
1992	T	Introduction of the educational principle “Intercultural learning” and of measures to promote the learning of the first language in the school system (Bauböck & Perchinig, 2006, p. 739; EMN & IOM, 2004, p. 72).
1997	I	Adoption of the <i>Fremdengesetz (Alien Law)</i> that integrated two previous laws and regulated the entry, stay and settlement of foreigners; it also facilitated the access of family members to the labour market and generally aimed at implementing the principle of “integration before immigration” (Bauböck & Perchinig, 2006, p. 734; IOM & EMN, 2015, p. 31).
1997	M	The reform of the <i>Unemployment Insurance Act</i> opened the access to the emergency allowance to people without Austrian citizenship (Bauböck & Perchinig, 2006, p. 735).
1998	I	The reform of the citizenship law made the immigrant’s integration a criterion for citizenship (IOM & EMN, 2015, p. 32).
2000	T	In an integration decree applied since mid-June 2000, the AMS was instructed to further facilitate access to the labour market for certain target groups of foreigners, in particular for family members and young people (EMN & IOM, 2004, p. 66).
2003	T	A reform of the <i>Alien Law</i> and of the <i>Alien Employment Law</i> introduced a requirement for immigrants to complete a language and integration course during the first four years of stay. The reform of the <i>Alien Law</i> further introduced a single document, the proof of settlement (in German: <i>Niederlassungsnachweis</i>) for obtaining indefinite settlement and unlimited access to the labour market (Bauböck & Perchinig, 2006, p. 737; EMN & IOM, 2004, p. 67).
2003	T	Introduction of the <i>Integration Agreement</i> (in German: <i>Integrationsvereinbarung</i>) that required immigrants to acquire the A2 level of German language during the first two years of their stay (Permoser, 2012).
2003	M	The <i>National Action Plan for Social Inclusion</i> (in German: <i>Nationaler Aktionsplan für Soziale Eingliederung</i>) highlights that immigrants have a higher risk of poverty than people with Austrian citizenship (EMN & IOM, 2004, p. 58).
2003	M	The study “Quantitative and qualitative assessment of persons without medical insurance in Austria”, commissioned by the Ministries for Social Security, Generations and Consumer Protections, and for Health and Women, emphasises the situation of immigrants (EMN & IOM, 2004, p. 58).

2005	T	Extension of the requirement and duration of compulsory language courses (Bauböck & Perchinig, 2006, p. 737).
2010	T	Adoption of the <i>National Action Plan for Integration</i> (in German: <i>Nationaler Aktionsplan Integration</i>) that focuses on language and education, work and employment, rule of law and values, intercultural dialogue, health and social issues, sports and leisure, as well as housing (ÖIF 2010).
2011	T	A reform of the Alien Law modified integration policy by tightening the <i>Integration Agreement</i> (time limit reduced to two years) and introduced the obligation of third country immigrants to acquire knowledge of German prior to immigration (IOM & EMN, 2015, p. 34).
2013	T	A revision of the immigration and asylum legislation among other measures granted unlimited access to the labour market for family members of third country nationals (IOM & EMN, 2015, p. 35).
2015	T	Adoption of the “50 points plan for the integration of refugees and persons entitled to subsidiary protection” as the government’s official refugee integration strategy. Its main features concern language acquisition, access to the labour market and communication of values (BMEIA, 9.1.2016).

Canada

<i>Year</i>	<i>Type</i>	<i>Event and sources</i>
1974	T	Creation of the <i>Immigrant Settlement and Adaptation Program (ISAP)</i> that provided funding for settlement services (Immigration, Refugees and Citizenship Canada, 2011).
1982	M	The <i>Charter of Rights and Freedoms</i> enshrines the multiculturalism principle in the Constitution and affirmed equality guarantees. (Bloemraad, 2012, p. 11)(Reitz 2012, 528)
1990	T	Adoption of the <i>Federal Immigrant Integration Strategy</i> that introduced a broad view of immigrant integration and unified various elements of the settlement programme (Vineberg, 2012, pp. 39–40).
1992	T	Creation of the <i>Language Instruction for Newcomers to Canada (LINC)</i> Program that provided non-compulsory, free of charge instruction in English or French to immigrants for up to three years after their arrival (Immigration, Refugees and Citizenship Canada, 2010).
1998	I	Creation of the <i>Resettlement Assistance Programme (RAP)</i> that provided refugees with services such as help in finding permanent accommodation, general orientation to life in Canada, or assistance in finding employment (Rose, 2019, p. 7; Wilkinson & Garcea, 2017, p. 7).
1998	T	<i>Canadian Orientation Abroad (COA)</i> programme “to provide orientation sessions abroad to assist refugees and immigrants destined to Canada to prepare for their move and to begin, abroad, the process of facilitating their integration into Canadian society” (Vineberg, 2012, p. 60).
2002	I	Major reform of the immigration system with the <i>Immigration and Refugee Protection Act</i> that led to prioritisation of selection factors associated with better long-term labour market integration outcomes (Ferrer et al., 2014, pp. 849–850).
2007	T	Establishment of the <i>Foreign Credentials Referral Office</i> that was mandated to provide advice to immigrants and prospective immigrants and to develop tools for employers to assist them in assessing and recognizing the qualifications of foreign trained individuals (Banting, 2012, p. 92).

2008	I	Creation of the <i>Canadian Experience Class Program</i> that made application for permanent status easier for some skilled temporary workers and thereby strengthens the selection based on long-term integration perspectives (Ferrer et al., 2014, p. 857).
2010	T	Creation of the <i>Canadian Immigrant Integration Program</i> that provided free pre-departure orientation to some categories of skilled migrants.
2010	T	A Ministerial Instruction introduced a language testing requirement for all permanent economic migrants (OECD, 2012c, p. 218).
2012	I	The federal government announced the harmonisation of language competences through a minimum language standard and mandatory language testing for semi- and low-skilled professions (Banting, 2012, p. 105; OECD, 2013b, p. 240).
2015	T	Implementation of the Expression of Interest (EOI) system “Express Entry” for permanent skilled immigration that should “improve how these systems respond to local demand and contribute to the successful socioeconomic integration of new residents.” (Desiderio & Hooper, 2016, p. 2)

France

Year	Type	Event and sources
1973	I	Creation of the “ <i>National Network for the reception, information and orientation of foreign workers and their family members</i> ” that rationalised the existing reception structures (Keyhani, 2012).
1990	T	Creation of the <i>Regional Programmes for the Integration of the Immigrant Population (PRIPI)</i> that became the main tools for implementing integration policies locally, but their general framework and objectives were set at the national level and framed by national priorities (Bozec & Simon, 2014, p. 15).
1998	T	Introduction of the “ <i>Reception platforms</i> ” (in French: “ <i>plates-formes d’accueil</i> ”) that provided voluntary half-day instruction for certain categories of newcomers (originally only family migrants) (Joppke, 2007, p. 9).
2003	I	The <i>Immigration Law</i> (in French: <i>Loi relative à la maîtrise de l’immigration, au séjour des étrangers en France et à la nationalité</i> , “Loi Sarkozy I”) introduced new cultural requirements to get residence permits (“republican integration into society”) and made the “ <i>Contrat d’Accueil et d’Intégration</i> ” (Reception and Integration Contract) mandatory (Bozec & Simon, 2014, p. 16; Joppke, 2007, p. 10).
2004	T	Concerning vocational training, the government recognised French language training as vocational training, which allowed employers to fulfil their training obligations by providing French language training (Safi, 2014, p. 11).
2006	I	Adoption of the <i>Law on Immigration and Integration</i> (in French: <i>Loi du 24 juillet 2006 relative à l’immigration et l’intégration</i> , “Loi Sarkozy II”) that contained various dispositions, among which the creation of a competences and talents card and the obligation to sign a Reception and integration contract that strongly links integration issues to newcomers’ reception, for obtaining a residence permit (Escafré-Dublet, 2014, p. 3; Simon, 2012, p. 88).
2007	I	Adoption of the <i>Law on Immigration, Integration, and Asylum</i> (in French: <i>Loi du 20 novembre 2007 relative à la maîtrise de l’immigration, à l’intégration et à l’asile</i> , “Loi Hortefeux”) that contained various dispositions, among which new language, cultural, and financial conditions for the attribution of long-term visa, the obligation for all new entrants above 16 years to

		enter into an 'integration contract', and mandatory requirements (language, among others) for permanent residence rights (Carvalho, 2016, p. 58; Joppke, 2007, p. 11).
2008	T	Creation of the <i>ENIC-NARIC</i> , a central public organisation that acted as the main clearinghouse for skills recognition (Safi, 2014, p. 18).
2010	M	The OFII (Ministry for the Interior) and Pôle Emploi (<i>Directorate for Employment and Professional Training</i>) signed a partnership agreement that aimed at improving new migrants' access to the public employment service. One major provision was the establishment of a shared server between OFII and Pôle emploi, to facilitate information sharing between the two institutions and better tailor employment support to migrants' needs (Safi, 2014, p. 17).
2015	T	A law on the rights of asylum seekers allowed the latter to access the labour market nine months after lodging their application if the decision had not yet been taken for reasons which were not dependent on the asylum seeker (EMN, 2016a, p. 1).
2015	I	The Ministry of the Interior developed the web module entitled ' <i>Welcoming foreigners</i> ' which aimed to harmonise across the country the information provided to foreign users who wanted to request or renew their residence permits (EMN, 2016a, p. 2).
2016	T	A law introduced several changes to integration policy, among which a five-year individualised integration pathway for third-country nationals and introduced a <i>Republican Integration Contract</i> , established a new residence permit, the 'talent passport', and improved conditions for students to access the labour market (EMN, 2017a, pp. 2–3).

Germany

<i>Year</i>	<i>Type</i>	<i>Event and sources</i>
1970	T	Formulation of the 'Basic principles for the Integration of Foreign Employees' (in German: <i>Grundsätze zur Eingliederung ausländischer Arbeitnehmer</i>) that adopted an exclusive labour market perspective (Bendel, 2014, p. 2).
1973	T	The Cabinet adopted the <i>Action Programme for the Employment of Foreigners</i> (in German: <i>Aktionsprogramm zur Ausländerbeschäftigung</i>) that identified the integration of foreigners as a primary necessity (Schneider, 2010, p. 123).
1987	T	Adoption of the 'Measures for Social and Professional Integration' (in German: " <i>Maßnahmen zur sozialen und beruflichen Eingliederung</i> ") that aimed at integration into labour (Bendel, 2014, p. 2).
1990	I	The <i>Alien Law</i> (in German: <i>Ausländergesetz</i>) for the first time defined legitimate claims of immigrants and harmonised measures related to family reunion; it also established a permit system distinguishing five categories of residence status and a system of labour permits, leading to different degrees of labour market access for foreigners (Bendel, 2014, p. 3; Schneider, 2010, pp. 138–139).
1993	I	Adoption of the "Asylum Compromise" (" <i>Asylkompromiss</i> ") through the "Asylum Procedure Law" (<i>Gesetz zur Neuregelung des Asylverfahrens</i>) that – among others – re-introduced asylum seekers' limited access to the labour market (Kreienbrink, 2013, p. 405).
2000	T	Creation of a programme for the promotion of linguistic competences (in German: <i>ESF-BA-Programm</i> , 2000-2006) that completed the services of the social law for persons with immigration background by promoting linguistic competence measures for unemployed immigrants (Bundesregierung, 2005, p. 61).

2004	T	Adoption of the ' <i>National Pact for Vocational Training and Young Skilled Staff</i> ' (in German: <i>Nationaler Pakt für Ausbildung und Fachkräftenachwuchs</i> , in short: <i>Ausbildungspakt</i>) by the federal government and economic umbrella organisations. It focused on lowering young migrant's obstacles to participate in the labour market (Bendel, 2014, p. 18).
2005	I	The <i>Law on the Steering and Limitation of Immigration</i> (in German: <i>Gesetz zur Steuerung und Begrenzung der Zuwanderung</i>) formally acknowledged that immigrant integration is a task of the federal government, created the <i>Federal Integration Programme</i> that was uniform for all permanent immigrants, and created integration courses as a new central element of federal integration policy. The law further created a "one-stop-shop" procedure for residence title and work permit applications. (Bendel, 2014, p. 3; Kreienbrink, 2013, p. 407; Liebig, 2007b, pp. 26–27; OECD, 2013e, pp. 65–66)
2005	T	Launch of the programme "Integration through Qualification" within the competences of the BAMS. Its first phase (2005-2010) consisted in building a nationwide network to develop and test recommendations for improving counselling and training for foreign-born workers in order to improve their possibilities of integration the German labour market (Burkert & Haas, 2014, p. 10).
2006	T	Adoption of the 'National Integration Plan' ('Nationaler Integrationsplan', <i>NIP</i>) that conceived integration as a cross-cutting policy task at all levels and established and listed overarching objectives, measures and instruments at various political levels in support of the plan's education and integration aims (Burkert & Haas, 2014, p. 6).
2007	I	The government's Integration Commissioner presented the first overall integration concept that included all relevant political and administrative levels and all actors of integration policy, setting out over 400 measures and commitment that provide local and state officials with a federal framework (Bendel, 2014, p. 6).
2008	M	Adoption of the 'Qualification Initiative for Germany' (in German: 'Qualifizierungsinitiative für Deutschland') by the federal and Länder ministers for Education. This education policy measure establishes general targets to be achieved in education; but also includes measures destined specifically at young people with migration background (BMBF n.d.).
2008	T	Creation of the programme 'Labour market support for legal immigrants and refugees' (in German: 'Arbeitsmarktliche Unterstützung für Bleibeberechtigte und Flüchtlinge') (terminated in 2015) that was financed by the BMAS and the ESF. It was a part of the National Integration Plan of the federal government (see 2006).
2009	M	Creation of a Programme for the integration of young people with migration background as one part of the 'Children and Youth Plan of the Federation' of the BMFSFJ (Bendel, 2014, p. 10).
2011	M	<i>Second five-year round of the IQ programme</i> (launched in 2005), relaunched as the "support programme Integration through Qualification" (in German: " <i>Förderprogramm Integration durch Qualifizierung</i> ") (coordinated by BMAS, BMBF and BA). The updated network was intended to provide training and research support to employment services nationwide. The IQ programme was connected to the aims and measures of the 'Nationaler Aktionsplan Integration' via collaboration agreements with regional networks (Burkert & Haas, 2014, p. 10).
2012	T	Adoption of the <i>National Action Plan on Integration</i> (" <i>Nationaler Aktionsplan Integration</i> ", NAP-I) by the 5 th Integration Summit. Its aimed at further developing and concretising the National Integration Plan (2006). It consists in 11 thematic areas that have been elaborated by different federal ministries (Heckmann, 2015, p. 249).

2016	T	Adoption of the Integration Act (<i>Integrationsgesetz</i>). “Flüchtlinge, die eine gute Bleibeperspektive haben, sollen durch das Integrationsgesetz frühzeitig Angebote vom Staat erhalten. Im Gegenzug werden sie verpflichtet, sich selbst um Integration zu bemühen. Lehnen Asylbewerber Integrationsmaßnahmen oder Mitwirkungspflichten ab, werden Leistungen gekürzt. Weiterhin bekommen Geduldete ein Bleiberecht für die gesamte Dauer der Berufsausbildung und die anschließende Beschäftigung.” (Schulze Buschoff & Hassel, 2019, p. 406)
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Netherlands

<i>Year</i>	<i>Type</i>	<i>Event and sources</i>
1979	I	A directive interpreted the “sufficient acclimatisation” to Dutch society - a condition for obtaining citizenship after five years of stay - as meaning a “reasonable knowledge of Dutch” and a “sufficient acceptance of Dutch society” (Entzinger, 1985, p. 68).
1981	M	Introduction of full access to social housing for legally residing aliens (Bruquetas-Callejo et al., 2011, p. 144).
1983	M	The policy memorandum <i>Minderhedennota</i> outlines the new policy on minorities that aimed at creating a society in which minorities have equal opportunities and an equal social position to indigenous Dutch citizens. One of three objectives aimed at reducing the social and economic deprivation of minorities (Verweij & Bijl, 2012, p. 241).
1994	T	A new policy framework document called <i>Contourennota</i> inaugurated the government’s shift to an integration policy that emphasised the socio-economic aspects of integration and stressed the responsibilities of individuals in integration processes (Bruquetas-Callejo et al., 2011, p. 133).
1997	T	The <i>Civic Integration of Newcomers Act (Wet Inburgering Nederland, WIN)</i> obliged most non-EU newcomers to participate in a 12-month integration course, which consists of 600 hours of Dutch language instruction, civic education, and preparation for the labour market (Entzinger, 2014, p. 77; Joppke, 2007, p. 6).
1998	I	Adoption of the <i>Linkage Act</i> that became centrepiece to the principle of an ‘integrated immigration policy’. This measure made all social security benefits contingent upon an immigrant’s legal residence status, including rights and access to secondary or higher education, housing, rent subsidy, handicapped facilities and health care (Bruquetas-Callejo et al., 2011, p. 135).
2006	I	The <i>Civic integration Abroad Act</i> required non-EU residents wanting to settle in the Netherlands for a prolonged period to pass a civic integration examination in their country of origin in order to obtain a residence permit (Verweij & Bijl, 2012, p. 244).
2007	I	The <i>New Civic Integration Act</i> extended the obligation to pass a civic integration examination to all nationals of non-EU and non-EER countries, between 18 and 65 year of age and living in the Netherlands, who did not live in the country during the time span for compulsory education (in the Netherlands from 4 to 16 years) for at least eight years (Van Meeteren et al., 2013, p. 128).
2008	T	Extension of the employment opportunities for asylum applicants from 12 weeks per year to 24 weeks per year (Van Meeteren et al., 2013, p. 120).

2009	I	Introduction of a new admission scheme for highly educated migrants based on a scoring system that assessed the foreign national on education, age, and indicators for success (Van Meeteren et al., 2013, p. 121).
2013	I	Adoption of the <i>Modern Migration Policy Act</i> (in Dutch: <i>Wet modern migratiebeleid</i>) that streamlined the resident permit application process by combining the application processes for the provisional ninety-day residence permit and the long-term residence permit into one procedure (Entzinger, 1985; Bruquetas-Callejo et al., 2011; Karré et al., 2013).
2013	T	Publication of an <i>Integration Agenda 2013-16</i> that focuses on language and civic integration and stimulating social entrepreneurship, among others (EMN, 2014b, p. 2).
2014	T	Adoption of the <i>Work and Social Assistance Act</i> that introduces a Dutch language test for recipients of social assistance from 2016 onwards: Local authorities are obliged to request a certain knowledge of the Dutch language test for recipients of social assistance. If the results of the test are insufficient, the beneficiary of social assistance will have to make efforts to increase his knowledge of the Dutch language. In case, these efforts are insufficient, this may lead to a reduction of the social assistance benefit. (LABREF database)
2015	T	The civic integration examination was complemented by a module on orientation in the Dutch labour market in order to increase migrants' labour market participation (EMN, 2016c, p. 3).
2016	M	Adoption of measures to encourage the enrolment of asylum-seeking children in regular education; additional resources were deployed to support education welfare office in motivating unaccompanied minors to go to school (EMN, 2017c, p. 2).
2016	I	Introduction of preliminary labour market screenings in some asylum seeker reception centres. They aimed at increasing the chances of matching the beneficiary of international protection to a municipality where the likelihood of being integrated into the labour market quickly was high (EMN, 2017c, p. 2).

New Zealand

<i>Year</i>	<i>Type</i>	<i>Event and sources</i>
1987	I	The <i>Immigration Act</i> offered residence through four streams (occupational, business, social, humanitarian) as well as offering admission to any immigrant meeting certain criteria of education, age, or professional status irrespective of their nationality. It also identified the English language ability as a key element in the assessment of immigrants in the occupational stream (OECD, 2014d, pp. 36–37).
1991	I	The <i>Immigration Amendment Act</i> shifted the focus to a medium-term human capital model of skilled migration by introducing a points-based selection system for skilled migrants (OECD, 2014d, p. 37).
2000	M	The <i>New Zealand Health and Disability Act</i> opened access to Government funded health care to permanent migrants upon arrival.
2004	T	The <i>Settlement Strategy</i> increased or established funding for career advice and information for new migrants, assist English learning, assessment of migrants' qualifications and migrant resource centres (Woolford, 2009, p. 19).

2004	I	Changes to the <i>Skilled Migrant Category</i> introduced the allocation of points in recognition of support provided by close family already living in New Zealand (Bedford & Spoonley, 2014, p. 898; Spoonley & Bedford, 2008, p. 209).
2004	T	Creation of a career advice programme through <i>Careers New Zealand</i> that should provide migrants (including refugees) with tailored career and labour market information and guidance (New Zealand Controller and Auditor-General, 2013, p. 67).
2004	T	Creation of the <i>Settling In programme</i> of the Ministry for Social Development. The programme focused on social matters and worked closely with refugee and migrant communities to address social needs that the communities have identified (New Zealand Controller and Auditor-General, 2013, p. 68).
2005	T	Creation of the <i>Workplace Communication for Skilled Migrants course</i> funded by the government through the Tertiary Education Commission, directed towards professionally qualified immigrants who were unable to obtain work commensurate with their skills (Human Rights Commission, 2010, p. 331; Prebble, 2010).
2006	T	<i>Update of the New Zealand Settlement Strategy</i> that included improved pre-arrival information; identified measures to increase migrants' access to employment; implementation of a Home School scheme; housing support services for refugees; develop resources for teaching in literacy, numeracy, and language; individualised settlement planning services; advice on capacity building for migrant communities (New Zealand Controller and Auditor-General, 2013, p. 63).
2011	T	Adoption of the <i>Refugee Resettlement Strategy</i> with objectives in the fields of housing, employment, education, health and participation (New Zealand Immigration, n.d.).
2014	T	Adoption of the <i>Migrant Settlement and Integration Strategy</i> that set out settlement objectives and 16 success indicators covering employment, education and training, English language, inclusion, and health and well-being (New Zealand Controller and Auditor-General, 2016).
2016	M	Introduction of the minimum employment code that covered all workers in New Zealand, granting them minimum wage and paid holidays requirements regardless of nationality and visa status (OECD, 2016b, p. 44).

Sweden

<i>Year</i>	<i>Type</i>	<i>Event and sources</i>
1972	T	Introduction of the right of immigrants to receive up to 240 hours of free instruction in Swedish during paid working hours (Hammar, 1985, p. 36).
1975	M	The Swedish Parliament adopted the main principles of immigrant and minority policy, among which equality, i.e. granting immigrants the same living standard as the rest of the population (Hammar, 1985, p. 33).
1979	M	A reform of the state retirement pension granted foreign citizens access to state retirement pensions if certain residence criteria were fulfilled (Borevi, 2012, p. 43).
1984	I	The Parliament laid down guidelines for immigration policy that implied that there needed to be a balance between the integration of immigrants and the extent of immigration (Borevi, 2012, p. 48).
1985	T	Introduction of the <i>Introduction Programme</i> that aimed at preparing immigrants for (and facilitating the transition to) the labour market; recognised asylum seekers plus any family

		members joining them within two years of the original residence permit were eligible (Lemaître, 2007, p. 15).
1986	M	Reformulation of the basic principle of immigration policy that stated that immigrant groups do not have the status of ethnic minorities with special needs and interests (Borevi, 2012, p. 89; Soininen, 1999, p. 689).
1993	T	A reform of the <i>Introduction Programme</i> introduces conditionality into the payment of the introduction allowance (Borevi, 2012, p. 67).
1994	T	A reform of asylum policy introduces the obligation to work or equivalent occupations for asylum seekers (Borevi, 2012, p. 65).
1997	M	The bill on the new integration policy introduces a new policy principle according to which measures that target immigrants are limited to the first two years of immigration, after which immigrants are included in the same policy measures than the rest of the population (Borevi, 2012, p. 67).
2003	T	Creation of a labour market experiment called the <i>Work Place Introduction</i> that helped jobseekers with sufficient knowledge of Swedish at the early stage of the application process (Wiesbrock, 2011, p. 53).
2007	T	Introduction of the <i>Step-in jobs</i> and <i>New step-in jobs</i> programme that provides employers of newly arrived immigrants with a subsidy of part of the wage costs (OECD, 2016c, p. 129).
2009	T	Introduction of a language test granting financial incentives for Swedish language courses (Borevi, 2012, p. 85).
2010	T	The reform ' <i>Labour market introduction of newly arrived immigrants – individual responsibility with professional support</i> ' creates a new introduction benefit and associated conditionality mechanism (Borevi, 2012, p. 85; Wiesbrock, 2011, p. 52).
2010	I	Introduction of the <i>maintenance requirement</i> for family reunification (except for families with children) that made the granting of a residence permit to a family member subordinate to the immigrant being able to prove sufficient regular income and adequate accommodation (Borevi, 2012, p. 74; Wiesbrock, 2011, p. 53).
2010	I	Introduction of the right of asylum seekers to work during the processing period.
2012	M	Launch of a two-year programme by which the government grants financing to municipalities for work in urban areas that face problems of extensive exclusion, with a performance-based support for improvement on the integration of migrants, including achieving high employment rates and good school results (EMN, 2013a, p. 1).
2013	M	Introduction of the right for people who reside in Sweden without permission to the same subsidized health and medical care as asylum seekers, i.e., emergency care.
2013	T	The Budget Bill for 2013 contained a number of measures to improve the school results of newly arrived students as well as funding for making Swedish language courses for adult migrants more flexible and individually tailored (EMN, 2014a, p. 1).
2013	T	Creation of the <i>University and Higher Education Council</i> that aims, among others, to streamline validation of foreign university qualifications and help skilled immigrants find employment in their respective professional field (EMN, 2014a, p. 1).
2015	T	Introduction of the new scheme ' <i>Swedish from day one</i> ' that funds civil society organisation that provide, for instance, courses in Swedish to asylum seekers and people who have been granted a residence permit but still live in temporary accommodation (EMN, 2016b, p. 3).
2016	T	Introduction of a new regulation that foresees an obligatory mapping/assessment of newly arrived children's and young peoples' knowledge and previous education (EMN, 2017b, p. 3).

United Kingdom

Year	Type	Event and sources
1984	T	Creation of the <i>National Academic Recognition Information Centres (NARIC)</i> that provide advice and information on the academic recognition of diplomas and periods of study abroad (Cangiano, 2008, p. 33).
1989	M	The <i>National Health Service (Charges to Overseas Visitors) Regulations</i> allow migrants who are present for the purpose of employment (with an employer based in the UK) or self-employed to use the National Health Service free of charge and give migrant children access to state schools (Hunter, 2007, p. 14).
1992	M	<i>Social Security Contributions and Benefits Act 1992</i>
1993	M	The <i>Asylum and Immigration Appeals Act</i> allowed asylum seekers to apply for social security benefits while they were waiting for their applications or appeals to be decided, but limited their right to the provision of housing (Elliott & Quinn, 2008, p. 298).
1996	M	The <i>Employment Rights Act</i> introduces maternity and parental rights for some categories of migrant employees (Hunter, 2007, p. 29).
1998	M	The <i>National Minimum Wage Act 1998</i> introduces a minimum wage for all workers including migrants (Hunter, 2007, p. 30).
2000	M	The <i>Race Relations Amendment Act</i> creates a general duty on public authorities to actively promote equality of opportunity and good relations between people of different racial groups (Ali & Gidley, 2014, p. 9).
2001	M	The <i>English for Speakers of Other Languages (ESOL)</i> provision is incorporated into the Skills for Life policy, a national strategy to improve access to adult education (Cangiano, 2008, pp. 27–28).
2002	I	The government published the white paper ' <i>Secure Borders, Safe Haven – Integration with Diversity in Modern Britain</i> ' as a result of all immigration policy (Hunter, 2007, p. 6).
2002	I	The <i>Nationality, Immigration and Asylum Act 2002</i> introduces citizenship tests for obtaining British citizenship (Green, 2007, p. 106).
2002	I	Return to a cash payment of welfare payments of asylum seekers instead of vouchers (Green, 2007, pp. 108–109).
2002	M	Launch of the <i>Ethnic Minority Outreach Programme</i> that aims at attracting ethnic minority people to the mainstream labour market and to build links with Jobcentre Plus services (Cangiano, 2008, p. 24).
2003	T	The <i>Ethnic minority employment strategy</i> recommended a fresh approach involving a number of government departments to address the many employment barriers faced by ethnic minorities, with action on schools, jobs, housing and discrimination. It was coordinated by the <i>Ethnic Minority Employment Taskforce</i> led by the Department for Work and Pensions (Cangiano, 2008, p. 20; NAO, 2008, p. 18).
2005	T	The Home Office published its refugee integration strategy " <i>Integration Matters</i> " with a strategic upgrade of the National Refugee Integration Services that provided refugees with comprehensive support, incl. employment support, immediately after their refugee status had been recognised (Marangozov, 2014, p. 7).
2005	T	The Department for Work and Pensions' (DWP) published its refugee employment strategy " <i>Working to rebuild lives</i> " that targeted refugees' integration into the labour market (Marangozov, 2014, p. 7).

2006	M	Termination of the <i>Ethnic Minority Outreach Programme</i> (created in 2002) and integration into the Deprived Areas Fund (Cangiano, 2008, p. 25).
2008	I	The publication <i>“Managing the Impacts of Migration: A cross-government approach”</i> introduces a shift to a more holistic approach that places employment at the heart of government policy for all groups of migrants, not refugees only (Gidley, 2012, p. 348).
2008	T	Creation of the <i>Refugee Integration and Employment Service (RIES)</i> that offered 12 months of services to every person granted refugee status and focused even more on employment-related support (Marangozov, 2014, p. 7).
2009	T	The policy document <i>“Moving On Together: Government’s Recommitment To Supporting Refugees”</i> focuses on the economic (employment) and on what might be expected of refugees (their responsibility to share values and learn English), alongside a sense of the specific social needs of refugees (Gidley, 2012, p. 349).
2010	M	The <i>Equality Act</i> grants all persons, including migrants lawfully living in the UK, equal access to any publicly used facilities (McCormick, 2013, p. 349).
2012	M	The Statement on Integration Policy <i>“Creating the Conditions for Integration”</i> , published by the <i>Department for Communities and Local Government</i> introduces a mainstreaming approach to social mobility and cohesion instead of group-specific integration policy (Scholten et al., 2016, p. 14).
2013	I	The <i>“Life in the United Kingdom”</i> test becomes compulsory for all applicants for settlement (unless otherwise exempt) who in addition must demonstrate at least B1 level English language speaking and listening qualification. A new handbook was developed for this purpose (EMN, 2013b; OECD, 2013b, p. 304).
2014	I	Among several changes to the Points-Based system, it now allowed time spent in other immigration categories to ‘count’ towards qualifying for settlement (EMN, 2015).

Unemployment policy

Australia

Year	Type	Event and sources
1986	I	Introduction of benefit activation measures: a requirement for unemployment benefit claimants to register with the CES and a requirement to report job search efforts (OECD, 2001, p. 77).
1988	I	Unemployment benefits for young people under age 18 were replaced with the “Job Search Allowance” including reporting and other requirements (OECD, 2001, p. 77).
1989	I	Introduction of the “Newstart” programme of assistance for the long-term unemployed, which included counselling, referrals to labour market programmes and transition-to-work incentives (OECD, 2012a, p. 163).
1991	I	The “Job Search and Newstart Allowance” replaced the unemployment benefit, and the “newstart agreements” required that claimants enter into case management and an “activity agreement” developed with the support of the case manager. Included sanctions for those who “breached” benefit rules or the terms of the agreements (Burgess et al., 2000, pp. 175–176; OECD, 2001, p. 77).

1992	T	Introduction of the “ <i>One Nation</i> ” labour market package which increased labour market programme expenditure and created job creation measures especially targeted at young people (OECD, 2001, p. 78).
1994	T	The Government White Paper “ <i>Working Nation</i> ” developed the notion of the “Job Compact” and the concept of reciprocal obligation. Income support payments were no longer a right but conditional upon participation in employment programs. These programs shifted emphasis from passive income support to active integration of welfare and labour market programs (Burgess et al., 2000, p. 174; OECD, 2012a, p. 163).
1998	T	Introduction of the “ <i>Work for the Dole</i> ” legislation which created a workfare programme that embraced the concept of mutual obligation. It established new options for allowance recipients to satisfy activity requirements through mandated work in community organisations (Burgess et al., 2000, p. 179; Crisp & Fletcher, 2008, p. 15).
1998	M	Creation of <i>Centrelink</i> offices that worked as single points of contact for income support and employment services as well as claims and payments for a range of benefits such as age pensions, disability and unemployment assistance (Halligan, 2004, p. 148, 2015, p. 1007; OECD, 2001, pp. 81–82).
1999	T	Expansion of the “ <i>Work for the Dole</i> ” programme that extended the target group to include not only the originally targeted 18–24 years age group, but all job seekers aged between 25 and 34 years who had been unemployed for at least 12 months; in addition, all job seekers would have to fulfil some form of mutual obligation service in exchange for their support benefit (Burgess et al., 2000, p. 180).
2003	T	Reform of the “ <i>Parenting Payment Single</i> ” (PPS) and “ <i>Parenting Payment Partnered</i> ” (PPP) as part of the income support system: introduction of limited conditionality in form of compulsory attendance at an annual interview with a Centrelink advisor and in 150 hours of approved activities such as work schemes, job search or training (Fok & McVicar, 2012, p. 5).
2005	T	Reform of disability employment services that introduced case-based funding and offered eligible persons assistance to build work capacity and post placement support.
2006	M	Introduction of the “ <i>Job Capacity Assessment</i> ” as a tool for evaluating barriers to work, evaluating the need for exemptions from Newstart and Youth Allowance and (other) participation requirements, and evaluating Disability Support Pension (DSP) claims or reviews (OECD, 2012a, p. 113).
2006	T	Implementation of the “ <i>Welfare to Work</i> ” reforms that focused on reducing long-term dependence on welfare and aimed to move more welfare recipients into work. This was facilitated by placing restrictive criteria on pensions and reviewing those already on pensions; those no longer eligible for pension payments such as the <i>Disability Support Pension (DSP)</i> and <i>Parenting Payment Single (PPS)</i> were placed on <i>Newstart</i> and <i>Youth Allowance</i> (Fok & McVicar, 2012, p. 6).
2009	I	Creation of “ <i>Job Services Australia</i> ” that integrated several formerly separate programs, such as specialist services focusing on highly disadvantaged youths or adults; the <i>Job Seeker Classification Instrument (JSCI)</i> and a <i>Job Capacity/ Employment Services Assessment</i> were used to allocate clients to one of four service streams (OECD, 2012a, pp. 22–23 and 132, 2014a, p. 184).
2011	T	The <i>Social Security Legislation Amendment (Job Seeker Compliance) Bill</i> “introduced “suspension of payment for job seekers following an initial failure to attend an appointment or, in some circumstances, an activity such as training or Work for the Dole” (OECD, 2012a, p. 161).

2011	M	Integration of service delivery through creation of one-stop-shops providing Centrelink, Medicare, Child Support and CRS Australia services (Halligan, 2015, pp. 1009–1012).
2016	M	Trials for a compulsory income management scheme called ‘Cashless Debit Card’ that includes people receiving disability, parenting, carers, unemployed and youth allowance payments. The card quarantines 80% of social security payments received by all working-age people (between the ages of 15 and 64) in the trial sites in an attempt to restrict cash and purchases of alcohol, illegal drugs and gambling products (Klein, 2017).

Austria

<i>Year</i>	<i>Type</i>	<i>Event and sources</i>
1983	T	“In 1983 an amendment to the law on labour market promotion gave rise to a new ‘experimental labour market policy’ intended to develop new and innovative tools in the fight against unemployment.” (Ludwig-Mayerhofer & Wroblewski, 2004, pp. 492–493)
1993	I	Statutory anchoring of the labor foundation (<i>Arbeitsstiftung</i>) as a labor market policy instrument “um den vom Personalabbau der verstaatlichen Industrie betroffenen Arbeitskräften bei der Suche nach neuen Arbeitsplätzen zu helfen und ihre Vermittlungschancen zu erhöhen. Es ist darüber hinaus auch ein Modell zur Einbindung der ArbeitgeberInnenseite in die Verantwortung für den Verbleib gekündigter Arbeitskräfte.” In part financed via activated passive means of the PES (BMASK, 2013, p. 105 ff.)
1994	I	Subsidies to cover living expenses for participants in measures who had little or no income or who were not entitled to unemployment benefit (ALG) have been regulated within the new legal framework of the public employment service (BMASK, 2013, p. 197).
1997	T	“Mit der Implementierung des § 34a Arbeitsmarktservicegesetz wurde die gesetzliche Grundlage für die Besondere Eingliederungsbeihilfe (BESEB) geschaffen. (...) das Lohnkostenzuschüsse für Notstandshilfe(NH)-BezieherInnen, die sechs Monate oder länger vorgemerkt waren, bereitstellte. Im Unterschied zu den verwandten Maßnahmen (BEB und GEB), handelte es sich – unter dem Motto „Aktivierung passiver Mittel“ – um die Heranziehung von AIV-Leistungen in eine aktive Arbeitsmarktmaßnahme.” (BMASK, 2013, pp. 13–14)
2001	I	Tightening of requirements through a support plan for each unemployed person, the ‘individual action plans’, which considered prior profession, future career plans, and the resulting need for assistance or qualification (Ludwig-Mayerhofer & Wroblewski, 2004, p. 495).
2003	T	Pension reform that raised the effective retirement age and imposed pension cuts depending on retirement entry age (Hofer & Weber, 2006, p. 156).
2007	I	Reform of the unemployment insurance law that expanded the scope of ‘suitable’ employment to include temporary employment and longer commuting times (Atzmüller, 2009, p. 32).
2007	T	The AMS took over the administration of all employable persons receiving social welfare payments, i.e., persons who were previously supported only by municipal authorities. “This new remit for the AMS is a direct consequence of a major reorganisation of the Austrian welfare state, concluding a process that lasted over many years.” (Weishaupt, 2011, p. 5)
2010	T	Introduction of a needs-based minimum benefit (<i>Bedarfsorientierte Mindestsicherung</i> , BMS), replacing the previous social assistance legislation. Prior to this change, social assistance was

		organised by the federal states and thus was characterized by great variations in payment levels and service provision. The new system – just like the Hartz reforms in Germany (see below) – is intended to harmonise existing regulations in order to combat poverty more effectively and to roll-out a national, work-focused approach for the reintegration of the (long-term) unemployed into the primary labour market. In contrast to the development in Germany, these changes have not led to any structural changes in the AMS governance structures.” (Weishaupt, 2011, p. 5)
2011	T	In order to improve the employability of older workers, the activation approach has been applied to older workers: “A Fit2Work programme was launched in 2011, as a counselling and support service to prevent early retirement for health reasons. The Public Employment Service, the Labour Inspectorate (<i>Arbeitsinspektorat</i>), Social Insurance Institutions, Social Partners, and Ministries of Health, Finance, Economy, and Labour are all involved.” (OECD, 2013d, p. 123)
2012	M	Reform der Eingliederungsbeihilfe, durch die die Integrationsbeihilfe des Bundessozialamtes in die Eingliederungsbeihilfe integriert wird, um Doppelgleisigkeiten zu vermeiden; der Personenkreis der arbeitsmarktfernen Personen wird in den förderbaren Personenkreis aufgenommen (BMASK, 2013, p. 17).
2012	T	National Action Plan Disability (NAPD) for transition from invalidity pension to employment (LABREF database).
2012	T	Adoption of a measure to monitor early retirement incentives: “In 2012, pension entitlements under the corridor pension (early retirement from 62) was restricted to persons with at least 37.5 years of pensionable service.” (OECD, 2013d, p. 122)
2013	I	Introduction of a supplement for UI recipients who attend public employment service training schemes (LABREF database).
2013	T	Gradual abolishment of temporary invalidity pensions: Instead of temporary invalidity pensions, people are provided with support for health rehabilitation and/or professional rehabilitation, for which substantial new funds have been allocated, or by health rehabilitation. An important element of the reform is a standardised assessment of work capacity for which two centralised "competence centres" were established. The effectiveness of this measure relies on effective coordination of two large actors, i.e. the Public Employment Service and the Pension insurance Funds (LABREF database).

Canada

<i>Year</i>	<i>Type</i>	<i>Event and sources</i>
1973	I	Intensified control measures of the Unemployment Insurance program that effectively limit its reach (Pal, 1983, p. 82).
1975	M	Strengthened coordination between Unemployment Insurance and other social security programs, e.g., family allowances and the Pension Plan, and reduced program complexity (Pal, 1983, p. 83).
1977	I	Bill C-27 provides for a streamlining of the benefit structure, including other welfare aspects such as seasonal, maternity and sickness benefits, an increase in entrance requirements, as well as a ‘developmental’ use of Unemployment Insurance Funds to pay for training, work sharing and job creation (Pal, 1983, pp. 81–87; Wood, 2017, p. 13).

1989	I	The 'Labour Force Development Strategy' "shifts the program orientation from passive to active labour market measures, in line with OECD directions, as well as a new ILO Convention" (Wood, 2017, p. 13).
1993	I	Reform of the unemployment insurance act introduces changes in policy parameters that disqualify for benefits those who quit without just cause, were fired because of misconduct and refused to accept suitable employment (Lin, 1998, p. 16).
1993	T	A reform of family allowances replaced the universal Family Allowance with an income-tested Child Tax Credit and the Working Income Supplement. Thereby, the government effectively abandoned "the principle that all families raising children, regardless of income, deserve recognition of this fundamental responsibility" (Rice & Prince, 2000, p. 112).
1994	I	Another reform of the unemployment insurance act homogenises benefits by raising the replacement rate for low earnings claimants and claimants with dependents, while dropping the rate for others (Lin, 1998, p. 16).
1995	I	"In 1995 the Government of Canada embarked on a broad-ranging series of program and spending cuts to reduce the federal deficit and debt. This included reductions to provincial transfers for social assistance benefits, as well as reductions in federal spending on employment measures for disadvantaged groups. As part of a plan to realize a 10 per cent reduction in UI costs, eligibility and access to benefits and services were further tightened to ensure that the fund was self-sustaining. The program was rebranded as Employment Insurance (EI), and officially split into EI Part I (focusing on income benefits) and EI Part II (focused on employment benefits and support measures)." (Wood, 2017, p. 14)
1996	T	Major reform of income support and labour market policy with the 'Employment Insurance (EI) Act'. Its aim was "to create an integrated system" of income benefits and employment benefits. It tightens eligibility for Income Benefits, while broadening the range of persons eligible for active programmes through 'Employment Benefits and Support Measures (EBSM)', which contain key principles of activation (availability, suitability criteria, personal employment assessment and return to work plan) (OECD, 2008a, pp. 140–142).
1997	T	The 'Youth Employment Strategy' (YES) "was designed to build on and integrate existing federal government programmes targeted at youth aged 15-30 who were unemployed or underemployed" (OECD, 2008a, p. 149).
2005	M	Cross-sectoral integration of implementation structures: "All over Canada, as from 2005, only one agency, Service Canada, is responsible for delivering Government of Canada programmes and services, including EI benefits and EBSMs. Service Canada was launched with the goal to provide Canadians with one-stop access to federal programmes and services and personalised information" (OECD, 2008a, pp. 143–144).
2013	I	Employment Insurance Reform tightens criteria for suitable employment: "Program recipients were required to take any job deemed "suitable" and to use "reasonable and customary efforts" to obtain employment, even if the job was unrelated to their career, paid less money, and involved a long commute." (Wood, 2015, p. 189)

France

<i>Year</i>	<i>Type</i>	<i>Event and sources</i>
1982	M	Creation of the 'Missions locales' that offer comprehensive services at the crossroads of employment and social affairs, based on a holistic approach towards labour market

		integration of young unemployed people (Berthet et al., 2016, p. 146; Berthet & Bourgeois, 2011, p. 33).
1988	M	Creation of the minimum income scheme 'Revenu Minimal d'Insertion' (RMI) that replaces a variety of former social benefits targeted at specific groups and needs, thereby aiming to "abolish the gap between people able to work and those unable to work" (Berthet & Bourgeois, 2011, p. 4; Lévy, 2008, p. 74). However, with the RMI social protection was not conceived in terms of activation, since insertion activities have never been administered on a mandatory basis and registration with the PES remained voluntary (Barbier, 2001, pp. 16–17; Clegg, 2011, p. 36).
1992	I	In 1992, the social partners negotiated "consequential changes in the eligibility and entitlement parameters for UI. The existing UI benefits were replaced with a new single 'degressive' benefit (<i>Allocation Unique Dégressive, AUD</i>), under which the level of benefits was periodically reduced over the course of an unemployment spell" (Clegg, 2011, p. 39).
1994	I	A reform of the Public Employment service introduces a specific effort to target subsidized employment contracts on recipients of the RMI to facilitate labour market integration.
1998	T	Adoption of the National Employment Action Plan (<i>Plan National d'Action pour l'emploi</i>), which creates the 'Nouveau Départ' measure (" <i>Service personnalisé pour un nouveau départ vers l'emploi</i> "). This measure consists in individualised job search support for three target groups: young people, long-term unemployed people, and those threatened by exclusion (Pommier et al., 2001; Béraud & Eydoux, 2009, p. 13).
1998	M	The Law against exclusion widens the public employment service, which from now on includes women's rights and social action (Berthet & Bourgeois, 2011, p. 28).
2000	I	Adoption of the " <i>PARE – Plan d'Aide au Retour à l'Emploi</i> " (Back-to-work support plan) that contained the non-degressive benefit and the individualised action plan defined and implemented by the national employment agency ANPE. The PARE also reinforced sanctions. This reforms also reinforced the objectives and means of ANPE. (Berthet & Bourgeois, 2011, pp. 11–12).
2001	I	Reform and extension of the PARE renamed " <i>PARE-PAP</i> " (<i>Plan d'aide au retour à l'emploi et du Projet d'action personnalisé</i>) which generalises the PARE to all all employment seekers that have access to regular, personalised and self-reinforcing monitoring (Béraud & Eydoux, 2009, p. 13). "From 2001 the main UI benefit was as a result recast as a 'return-to-work benefit' (<i>allocation de retour à l'emploi – ARE</i>), and eligibility was henceforth conditioned not only on the payment of contributions but also on claimants signing and respecting an individualized project for help with the return to work (<i>plan d'aide au retour à l'emploi, PARE</i>)." (Clegg, 2011, p. 43)
2003	T	Creation of the <i>Revenu minimum d'Activité (RMA)</i> that replaces the RMI and reinforces the activation character of the minimum income (Berthet & Bourgeois, 2011, p. 12).
2003	M	Pension reform scales back the advantages of early retirement and activates older unemployed persons. It extends the duration of contributions necessary to qualify for a full pension and pushed back the qualifying age for entitlement and automatic access to the full rate. It terminates the provision that exempts older unemployed persons from looking for work as well as public funding of early retirement. (OECD, 2014c, p. 16)
2004	T	Creation of the <i>Specific Solidarity Allowance (Allocation de solidarité spécifique, ASS)</i> that relied on three cumulative eligibility conditions: "beneficiaries must be registered as jobseekers and must be actively looking for work; they must have worked during five of the last ten years before contract termination; and their household wealth must not exceed a

		certain ceiling” (OECD, 2014c, p. 78). Thereby, it “greatly increased the emphasis on professional relative to social forms of insertion activity for claimants” (Clegg, 2011, p. 43).
2005	M	Adoption of the <i>Social Cohesion Plan (Plan de Cohésion Sociale)</i> and the <i>Social Cohesion Law (Loi de Cohésion Sociale)</i> that addressed several issues in employment, housing, and social affairs more widely, which used to be treated in a segmented way. Implementation of the <i>Maisons de l’Emploi</i> in order to reinforce the coordination between the different services at the local level and to host job seekers. Introduction of the DUDE (<i>Dossier unique du demandeur d’emploi</i>) to facilitate communication between unemployment benefits and the institution in charge of supporting the unemployed in their job searches. The Social Cohesion Law also centralised the authority in charge of sanctioning the unemployed, which was originally the local representatives of the ministry of Employment (DDTEFP) and now shifted to the national agency of employment and the ASSEDIC (although the DDTEFP had to confirm it). Thereby, both the ANPE and the ASSEDIC became more involved in controlling the unemployed. (Berthet & Bourgeois, 2011, pp. 13–16). The Social Cohesion Law also reinforced the obligations of employment seekers: it established that the employment search must be continuous and materialise through “positive and repeated” acts by the employment seeker, and it changed the norm for “convenient” employment by suppressing the reference to the professional history of the employment seeker who can be obliged to accept an employment, a training or a subsidised employment that is unrelated to his/her professional experience (Béraud & Eydoux, 2009, p. 14).
2008	I	The <i>Law on the Rights and Responsibilities of Jobseekers (loi du 1^{er} août 2008)</i> creates the <i>Projet personnalisé d’accès à l’emploi (PPAE)</i> (replacing the former <i>Plan d’aide au retour à l’emploi</i> and the <i>Projet d’action personnalisé (PARE-PAP)</i> instruments) and the <i>Suivi mensuel personnalisé (SMP)</i> . It introduces earlier diagnostics of an employment seeker’s situation established first by Assedic, then by a local employment agency (ALE). It formalizes three “paths” for employment seekers that differ in the employment seekers’ “distance” to employment (Béraud & Eydoux, 2009, p. 13). This law “durcit les conditions pour les demandeurs d’emploi (pas plus de deux refus d’ORE, assouplissement des critères de rémunération attendue et de zone géographique de mobilité en fonction de l’ancienneté dans le chômage, suppression du critère de qualification pour les chômeurs de plus de douze mois).” (Hervier, 2014, p. 56)
2008	I	Creation of <i>Pôle Emploi</i> through the law reforming the organisation of the Public Employment Service (<i>loi de réforme de l’organisation du SPE du 13 février 2008</i>) that merged the ANPE and the Assedic networks. <i>Pôle Emploi</i> is responsible for placement (ex-ANPE), for registration and compensation (ex-Assedic) and for implementing the national solidarity benefits on behalf of the State; at the same time, it supports private employers in their search for employees by linking employment offers and applications (Hervier, 2014, p. 61). The policy objective behind the fusion is to unite in the hands of the PES advisors all the instruments for activation, to tighten pressure on unemployed persons, and to frame their employment search more strictly. The fusion further deepened activation by enlarging the target group of “activated unemployed” that henceforth comprises all unemployed persons including beneficiaries of RSA (Pillon & Vivés, 2016, pp. 416–417).
2009	M	Creation of the <i>Revenu de solidarité active (RSA)</i> (Active Solidarity Income) which replaced the RMI and the single parent allowance. It consists in a minimum income granted to low wage workers and former RMI beneficiaries. To be eligible, beneficiaries must be over 25 years of age (or parents and workers for at least two years), as well as have been working for a certain time and be in a setting of getting back to work. As a supplementary income for

		working poor, the RSA benefit is lowered if wages grow, and can be contingent upon training of coaching activities (Gomel & Serverin, 2009, p. 16). The RSA comprises two allowances, both of which are means-tested (OECD, 2014c, p. 81). The RSA also substantially strengthened the activation emphasis in SA for those out of the labour market (Clegg & Palier, 2014). Besides that, <i>“The reform established an even clearer hierarchy between professional and social forms of insertion activity in which all SA claimants should be engaged; social forms of insertion should henceforth be clearly reserved for the minority of beneficiaries with such serious problems that they could not immediately consider a return to work-related activity of any kind, and should then explicitly be a first step in a process ultimately leading to professional insertion.”</i> (Clegg, 2011, p. 45)
2009	I	Extension of the transition contracts to all areas suffering important economic difficulties: laid-off employees can enter transition contracts ("contrat de transition professionnelle, CTP"), giving them training and higher allowances for 12 months instead of previously 6 months). (LABREF database)
2009	M	The programme "Agir pour la jeunesse" extends the RSA to people under 25 years of age that worked more than two years within a period of 3 years. (LABREF database)
2010	M	Removal of age restriction on the entitlement to means-tested welfare benefits offering financial support to jobseekers resident in France and on a low income. The previous regime excluded people under 25 years of age. However, to have access to such financial support, a precondition was added that recipients of the benefit aged between 18 and 25 years must have worked for at least two years over the last 3 years prior to being unemployed. (LABREF database)
2011	I	The occupational security contract (CSP) favours the return to permanent employment of redundant workers. The CSP provides support equal to 80% of former gross income for a maximum of 12 months in favour of workers that are about to be made redundant for economic reasons (available to firms of less than 1000 employees) and provided the worker has been with the firm at least 1 year or to workers that have been receiving unemployment benefits for at least 4 months out of the last 28 months (out of last 36 months for workers older than 50 years). The contract includes evaluation of skills, professional plan and training, whilst workers actively search for a job. Two unjustified refusals of job offers lead to termination of contract. After 12 months standard unemployment scheme kicks in. (LABREF database)
2013	M	Programme "Emplois Francs" ("free tax zone" employment provision): supporting better access or return to work for young people (up to 30 years old) living in urban sensible zones, with financial support of 5000 euros given to enterprises. This provision has been created as a substitution of previous free tax zones provision where enterprises could create free of tax activities and jobs in some specific areas.
2013	I	New procedure created by merging two previous schemes ("chômage partiel" and "activité partielle de longue durée"). (LABREF database)
2015	M	It creates a personal account that puts together the different individual accounts already existing for active people: personal training account, arduousness account (or account for employees facing bad working conditions), time saving account, unemployment rechargeable rights, and complementary health insurance. (LABREF database)
2016	I	The "activity bonus" (prime d'activité): The "bonus activity" (cf. January regular report) will replace the previous "RSA activité" and the "employment bonus (prime pour l'emploi)"; it will enter into force in January 2016 and is directed towards poorer workers. The measure is now

opened to young people aged 18 years and over (previously, 26 years old plus). (LABREF database)

Germany

Year	Type	Event and sources
1977	I	The Pension Adaptation Law (<i>Rentenanpassungsgesetz</i>) obliges the Federal Employment Agency (in German: <i>Bundesanstalt für Arbeit</i>) to pay contributions to the pension system and to implement measures of professional rehabilitation for beneficiaries of unemployment insurance and unemployment assistance (Hassel & Schiller, 2010b, p. 102).
1990	I	Reform of the employment promotion act (<i>Beschäftigungsförderungsgesetz</i>) that extends the retention period of unemployment transfer payments in case of voluntary termination by the employee (Schmid, 1998, p. 162).
1994	T	Reforms of the Federal Employment Agency that should increase the cooperation of its local offices with SA offices and open up ALMP measures to SA claimants (Schiller, 2016, p. 56).
1997	I	Reform of the unemployment protection that revoked occupational protection completely, introduced a “reintegration contract” stating responsibilities of both jobseekers and the employment office as well as requirements to provide proofs of active labour search and stricter sanctions (Dingeldey, 2011, pp. 59 and 73; Eichhorst et al., 2008, p. 20).
1998	T	Publication of a guideline for inter-agency collaboration between local PES offices and municipal social assistance offices in connection to their efforts on labour market integration. The guideline was not binding but “rather recommended that the two agencies combine their efforts to reintegrate their common beneficiaries into the labour market more quickly, and to that end, documented several possible ways to do so”. “[I]t was the first time that national organisations from both sides had officially stated their support for stronger inter-agency collaboration, and the guidelines soon gave rise to a large variety of collaboration projects at local level” (Champion, 2013, p. 133).
2000	I	The “Job-Aktiv” legislation introduced further activation elements for persons receiving unemployment transfers (job placement, profiling, job-search vouchers, temporary work options, job rotation, training) with an a ‘job first’ approach and shorter promotion measures (Dingeldey, 2011, p. 62).
2000	T	The occupational inability pension was abolished and replaced by a less generous disability pension that was to be granted according to health only and not according to the labour market situation (Dingeldey, 2011, p. 66; Schulze & Jochem, 2009, p. 683).
2001	T	The MoZArT project experiments forms of coordination between local PES offices and local social assistance offices with respect to services for long-term unemployed persons (Champion 2013, 137; 141).
2003	I	Hartz I Act: This law changed the system of rights and duties of job seekers, in particular, it shifted the burden of proof to the job seeker in the event of a refusal of a job offer, that is, she/he must prove the unacceptable nature of the job (Dümig, 2010, p. 281).
2005	M	Hartz IV Act: The “unemployment benefit 2” replaced both unemployment assistance and social assistance for working-age and able-to-work recipients. The system evolved from a three-tier to a two-tier system, but the two tiers remain firmly separated from each other, e.g. concerning job-search requirements and activation more generally. While many of the former jobless SA claimants were not registered as unemployed, most of them were not classified as

		fit for work and transferred to UB2, including persons with health problems, lone parents, partners of (long-term) unemployed, who were now administratively treated as being part of a wider pool of unemployed people. (Champion, 2013, p. 137; Dingeldey, 2011, pp. 61–65) Another feature of risk-recategorisation of the Hartz reforms is that supplements for housing costs remained a part of the UB2 benefit; also, there were additional measures specifically designed for recipients of UB2 to overcome obstacles to labour market integration, including counselling in case of debt, alcohol or drug abuse, socio-psychological problems (Dingeldey, 2011, p. 62).
2006	I	Strengthening of the Hartz Acts, in particular extension of sanctions (Dümig, 2010, p. 286).
2007	M	The so-called 58-regulation, by which unemployed older than 58 were entitled to UB2 without activation requirement, was abolished (Dingeldey, 2011, pp. 67, 73).
2008	I	Reform of active labour market instruments. “Mehrere kleinere Einzelleistungen wurden abgeschafft und können nun über ein so genanntes „Vermittlungsbudget“ bewilligt werden. Über die Verwendung dieses Budgets können die Vermittler in den Arbeitsagenturen vor Ort Leistungen je nach Einzelfall und Bedarf gewähren.” (Dümig, 2010, p. 287)
2010	T	Offsetting of parental allowance against unemployment assistance (de facto abolition of the parental allowance for unemployment assistance recipients); abolition of the transitional payment for new unemployment assistance recipients; termination of federal contribution payments to the statutory pension insurance for unemployment assistance recipients, who lose the associated pension entitlements (Bandau & Dümig, 2015, p. 383).
2011	I	A reform of employment promotion measures individualised recruitment budgets, curtailed training, excluded UB2 recipients from traditional job-creation schemes and extended sanctions (Bandau & Dümig, 2015, pp. 385–386; Dingeldey, 2011, p. 74).
2011	I	The control of the PES over income support for workers about to become redundant (funded by the unemployment insurance) is strengthened (previously, the instrument was controlled by the social partners). “Just like any provider of employment-related services, providers of outplacement services must now undergo accreditation both as organizations and of the services they intend to deliver. Participants in job / transfer schemes must register with the public employment service as jobseekers.” (INSPIRES 2016)

Netherlands

<i>Year</i>	<i>Type</i>	<i>Event and sources</i>
1987	I	Reform of the regulations of the unemployment provisions schemes that integrated unemployment assistance and unemployment insurance (“Systems revolution”) and toughened eligibility criteria as well as formal job-seeking obligations for recipients considerably. (Hemerijck & Visser, 2000, p. 239; Hoogenboom, 2011, pp. 76–80)
1990	I	‘Manpower Services Act’ / ‘Job Placement Act’ (In Dutch: <i>Arbeidsvoorzieningwet</i>) that strengthens the role of employer associations in the PES and their commitment in the labour market integration of (long-term) unemployed (Hemerijck & Visser, 2000, p. 242; Hoogenboom, 2011, p. 84; van Berkel & de Graaf, 2011, p. 136).
1990	I	Reform of unemployment insurance that toughened the labour history requirements for eligibility for unemployment insurance.

1993	M	The 'Disablement Benefit Claims Reduction Act' toughens the criteria for disability benefits and extends the job opportunities that partially disabled workers had to accept (Van Der Veen & Trommel, 1999, p. 301).
1994	I	Reform of unemployment insurance that toughened the labour history requirements for eligibility for unemployment insurance.
1996	T	Reforms of social assistance and unemployment assistance abolish the latter and transfer its recipients to social assistance that is relabelled 'New Social Assistance' with several elements that increase beneficiaries' obligations concerning job search activities and training programs (Van Der Veen & Trommel, 1999, p. 304).
1996	I	Second Employment / Manpower Service Act strengthened 'activating' measures in unemployment insurance and social assistance (Hemerijck & Visser, 2000, p. 242).
1997	I	Introduction of a general labour deployment scheme incorporating several labour deployment schemes for specific categories (youth, women, migrants, middle-aged men).
2002	M	Creation of the Employees' Insurance Agency as single implementation agency responsible for administration of unemployment and disability insurance (van Berkel & de Graaf, 2011, p. 136).
2002	T	Reform of the social assistance administration: Creation of regional public Centres for Work and Income (CWI) for eligibility testing (gate-keeping) and basic labour market services (employment finding and activation) (Lindsay & McQuaid, 2009, pp. 454–456; van Berkel & de Graaf, 2011, p. 138).
2004	T	The Act on Work and Social Assistance replaces social assistance by a new scheme (Work and Income Benefit; in Dutch: 'Wet Werk en Bijstand', WWB) that contains stricter job search requirements for social assistance recipients (Inspires database: http://www.inspires-research.eu/innovativesocialpolicy/26-Act-on-work-and-social-assistance-%28WWB%29).
2004	I	The reform of unemployment insurance introduces Individual Reintegration Agreements between recipients, Employees' Insurance Agency and activation agency (Hoogenboom, 2011, p. 87).
2006	M	The 'Work and Income to Capacity to Work (WIA) Act' reform the disability regime, abolishing WAO and replacing it with WIA; this meant a shift from an emphasis on disability to the capacity to work, through which the government intended to reduce the number of beneficiaries of the disability regime (Goud & Fenger, 2014, p. 13).
2009	T	Reform of the unemployment insurance and social assistance administrations merged both into a new agency called 'WERKbedrijf' ('labourcompany') that was entrusted with reintegrating recipients and assessing claims for both benefits (van Berkel & de Graaf, 2011, p. 136).
2009	T	Reform of social assistance makes social assistance rights of persons aged 18 to 27 conditional: municipalities were now required to offer training, education, or a job, or a combination of these, to young persons, whose refusal to accept such an offer might result in a termination of the benefit (Hoogenboom, 2011, p. 88).
2010	M	'Wajong Act' adapts the disability benefits act for people with disabilities since they were under 18 years of age; it increased the focus on work of partially handicapped people and introduced various obligations to look for work in order to increase the activating effect of this benefit; it introduced a new system for determining partial disability for new claimants, whereas before all recipients were considered to be completely incapacitated for work (Inspires database: http://www.inspires-research.eu/innovativesocialpolicy/52-Adaptation-disability-law-for-people-handicapped-since-they-were-young-(nWajong))

2014	T	Adoption of the Act on 'Measures of the Work and Social Assistance Act', on clarification to Work and Security Act passed first chamber in august 2014, makes obligations concerning job search and acceptance stricter for social assistance recipients. (LABREF database)
2014	I	Adoption of the 'Work and Security Act' ('Wet Werk en Zekerheid', WW&Z) that stipulates that from 2016 onwards, suitable job offers can no longer be rejected after six months of receiving unemployment benefits. (LABREF database)

New Zealand

<i>Year</i>	<i>Type</i>	<i>Event and sources</i>
1988	I	Labour market reform integrated employment services with benefit administration through the 'mutual obligations approach', requiring job search or training in exchange for benefits (Bibbee, 2013, p. 20; OECD, 2013c, p. 114).
1991	M	The 'Economic and Social Initiative' coupled various assistance schemes to income from employment (Garlick, 2012, pp. 141–143).
1991	M	"'Welfare that Works' outlined intentions to integrate the targeting measures for health, tertiary education and social security into a system based around the finances of the 'core family'" (Garlick, 2012, p. 146).
1994	M	'COMPASS' trial: "in four Income Support offices. 'COMPASS co-ordinators' helped sole parents to develop training and employment plans, provided them with information about local employment, training and childcare services, and encouraged voluntary registration with the Employment Service (Garlick, 2012, p. 164).
1995	T	Changes to benefit policy: "a new abatement regime for domestic purposes, widow's and invalid's benefit recipients, softened stand-down criteria (to prevent hardship and encourage people to take up more temporary and casual forms of employment), and new 'reciprocal obligations' for some groups of DPB recipients and the spouses of unemployment beneficiaries. These policy announcements were accompanied by a publication, "focus on employment", which set them in the context of a broader package of employment assistance and changes to policy and services (Garlick, 2012, pp. 162–163).
1995	I	Development of 'Individualised Employment Assistance' (IEA), a long-term strategy which incorporated the Job Action and Youth Action programmes within a model for all clients: "Under this model, NZES staff conducted an assessment interview, helped the client develop a joint plan, referred them to agencies, monitored their adherence to plans, and provided post-placement support. As the duration of unemployment increased, NZES intensified its assistance. Seminars, self-service placement assistance and access to a careers information database would be supplemented by the provision of wage subsidies and training. The very long-term unemployed would be intensively case-managed through 'Job Action' or 'Youth Action', or assisted through fully subsidised wage schemes." (Garlick, 2012, p. 200)
1996	I	"the Tax Reduction and Social Policy Programme introduced a range of changes to tax and benefit levels to increase the margin between income from benefits and paid employment, and also increased both job-search assistance and the reciprocal obligations on beneficiaries." (Garlick, 2012, pp. 162–163)
1997	M	IEA is extended to all working-age beneficiaries (rather than merely the unemployed). (OECD, 1998b, p. 64; Garlick, 2012, p. 201)
1998	I	Full structural integration of the Employment Service, Income Support and the Community Employment Group into a stand-alone organisation under the responsibility of Work and

		Income that was to provide integrated services with single case managers. (OECD, 2008c, p. 128; Garlick, 2012, p. 212)
1998	M	Introduction of the 'Community Wage', that replaced the existing Unemployment, Training and Sickness Benefits, "applicants for which would need to sign a Job Seekers Agreement requiring them to actively seek work, or be available for training or up to twenty hours of community work weekly. Those who failed to comply risked the suspension of or a reduction in their benefit. Additional work expectations were placed on sole parents and the spouses of sickness and invalid's beneficiaries, and there were changes to the administration of these benefits" (Garlick, 2012, p. 173).
1999	T	"sickness benefit rates and unemployment benefit rates were aligned to remove perverse incentives that had allowed unemployment beneficiaries to claim the higher sickness rate while facing less onerous work-test requirements" (OECD, 2000, p. 83).
2002	M	"the rather blunt work-test for domestic purposes and widow's benefits was replaced by a 'Personal Development and Employment Planning Process'; annual plans set out the steps a client would take to re-enter the workforce, where their family responsibilities and personal circumstances allowed it. The reforms were supported by a higher case manager–client ratio that was intended to enable case managers to address wider issues such as schooling, community and family support networks, health and budget issues." (Garlick, 2012, p. 253)
2003	I	Creation of the 'WRK4U' (Work for You) seminars "for potential new claimants of benefits, which reinforce the message that work is available and should be considered ahead of benefit payments. These seminars were implemented early in 2003 in selected areas of the country. By late 2003, benefit applications had fallen by 10 to 20% in these areas relative to others and the programme was extended to the rest of the country." (OECD, 2005b, p. 179)
2003	T	Creation of the Jobs Jolt Initiative that included "a threat to cut benefits for jobless people who move to remote areas with little prospects for paid work (a list of such areas has been established); a requirement on those who lose potential jobs through a positive drugs test to undergo drug and alcohol education; and streamlining and automation of operational systems used to contact and potentially sanction clients who breach work-test obligations." (OECD, 2005b, p. 179) "This marked a return to the 'tough-love' and 'work-first' approach" (Garlick, 2012, p. 254)
2004	M	Creation of the Social Services Cluster that took a "multi-agency approach to improving social outcomes (...) especially by integrating service delivery and trialling initiatives in which clients were viewed 'in the context of all their service needs, not just the services offered by their own particular agency'." (Garlick, 2012, p. 276)
2006	I	'Working New Zealand' package: 'Work-Focused Support' aligned a number of rules, definitions and procedures across benefit types, and based eligibility for employment and training services on individuals' needs rather than benefit categories. "Clients were allocated to 'service streams': Work Support for people who were 'work-ready', Work Development Support for those who might be able to work in the future 'with the right support', and Community Support for those who could 'not reasonably be expected to plan a return to work in the foreseeable future'." (Garlick, 2012, p. 273)
2006	M	'Integrated Service Response to Vulnerable Families': "a long-term approach to case management for families most at risk. Dedicated Integrated Service Co-ordinators based in Work and Income offices looked at a family's circumstances in the round and connected them to other services within and outside the Ministry. In order of priority, the model had three objectives: meeting child development and safety needs; addressing other significant problems within the family; and helping the family improve their circumstances by meeting employment

		needs. MSD also implemented a new case-management tool which measured risk and resilience factors in families, and monitored social outcomes over time.” (Garlick, 2012, p. 277)
2007	M	“Working New Zealand was extended to sickness and invalid’s beneficiaries, who would experience more comprehensive case management and similar planning and activity requirements as those on domestic purposes or widow’s benefits. Those applying for or receiving sickness or invalid’s benefits were invited to engage with Work and Income to plan for a return to work appropriate to their condition or disability. More useful information on clients’ medical circumstances and likely progress towards returning to work was expected to be captured on a redesigned medical certificate.” (Garlick, 2012, p. 273)
2007	M	Introduction of a single core benefit that replaced the range of working-age benefits with a single set of criteria and reformed the case management practices of the MSD “using a three-pronged approach: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Active assistance with services focussed on getting people into work as quickly as possible, though better initial assessment, matching services, providing assistance and stronger links to services such as childcare and rehabilitation services that those out of work might need in order to overcome barriers. - Integrated support within the social assistance system, but with more incentives to take up some hours of work and clearer expectations about future work outcomes. - Streamlined delivery with clearer and simpler rules, so that case managers can devote more time to focusing on achieving employment outcomes instead of determining complex income support entitlements.” (OECD, 2005a, p. 128)
2013	M	Reform “to better recognise and support people’s work potential”. “The centrepiece of the reform is the investment approach, which sees supporting beneficiaries into work as important for lifting their long-term outcomes and for reducing long-term fiscal pressures. It supports the enhanced work requirements by increasing the efficiency with which scarce activation resources are used.” Based on three pillars: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - “the creation of three new benefit categories – Jobseeker Support, Sole Parent Support and Supported Living Payment – to replace most of the previous benefit types, increasing work obligations for many beneficiaries and their partners; - the imposition of new obligations for continued benefit receipt, which are aimed at improving beneficiaries’ ability to get a job and enhance the well-being of their families (notably by making sure that children get health checks and education); and - the establishment of an “investment approach” to setting priorities for service delivery and activation expenditures by Work and Income (W&I), the public agency responsible for assistance with job search and benefit administration”. (OECD, 2015a, p. 122)

Sweden

<i>Year</i>	<i>Type</i>	<i>Event and sources</i>
1982	M	The <i>Social Service Act</i> formulated overarching policy goals for the social services and fused the municipal services for social assistance, social work and social care (Bergmark & Minas, 2006, p. 27).
1986	I	Introduction of labour market training as a qualification for a new unemployment benefit period in 1986 (Bengtsson, 2012, p. 5).

1991	I	Introduction of training replacement schemes by which an unemployed person replaced an employed worker on leave for education (Kluve et al., 2007, p. 63; see also Bergmark, 2003, p. 295).
1992	T	The granting of early retirement benefit for labour market reasons was ended (Sjöberg, 2011, p. 13).
1993	I	“Employment development was introduced in 1993. This programme provides the participants with a job while they are ‘paid’ benefits equivalent to those they would receive while unemployed. The benefits are paid entirely by the government. For unemployed persons the programme has the advantage that they are active and that they are entitled to a new period of benefits after completing the programme.” (European Parliament, 1997) Predominant sectors were repair and maintenance work, forestry and landscape architecture and informative work to various institutions (schools, etc.) (Bergmark, 2003, p. 295).
1993	I	The “automatic adjustment of the benefit ceiling to changes in wage levels in manufacturing was removed. Since then, increases have been at the discretion of the government” (Sjöberg, 2011, p. 10).
1998	I	“At the turn of the century guarantees were introduced, which is a combination of measures such as intensified guidance, individual action plans, training and supported employment. This are usually introduced in a specific order and at fixed dates. Participants are selected based on unemployment duration and participation is obligatory for continued receipt of compensation. The first program was the 1998 Youth Guarantee (<i>Ungdomsgarantin</i>).” (Bengtsson, 2012, p. 19)
1998	I	With the revision of the Swedish Social Service Act the municipalities had “the option of making participation in activation programmes mandatory for social assistance recipients between 20 and 24 years of age (and for other long-term unemployed young adults as well)” (Minas, 2011, p. 203). “In the introduction to this government bill, it was argued that in principle social assistance should be regarded as a social right, each individual nonetheless has the obligation to contribute to society according to his or her ability” (Sjöberg, 2011, p. 9; see also Bergmark, 2003, p. 300).
1999	T	“Employment subsidies replaced relief work, recruitment subsidies and trainee replacement schemes. The target groups are long-term unemployed. The subsidy was initially 50 percent of the wage costs for a maximum period of six months. In 1999 an extended employment subsidy was introduced, which has stricter regulations and a more generous subsidy.” (Kluve et al., 2007, p. 63)
2000	I	Introduction of the ‘Activity Guarantee’, a fulltime, umbrella programme with no definite time limit for persons aged 20 or older that was, or risked becoming, long-term unemployed. The unemployed should have stable fulltime activities in a more coherent programme until finding a job or education to counteract unemployment cultures, hinder abuse of the insurance and moonlighting as well as activating those hit either by structural problems in sparsely-populated areas or in larger segregated urban areas. Also, a place in the guarantee was a solution to persons whose period of unemployment benefit had expired.” (Bengtsson, 2012, p. 19; see also Sjöberg, 2011, p. 36)
2001	T	Reform of the pension system “in order to increase incentives and remove obstacles for people to work longer and delay their retirement. The reform consisted of several changes. First the reform lowered the general gross compensation rate for a given pension age, which was deemed to be the most significant incentive of the reform to make people work longer in order to receive the same pension or higher. The reform also implemented a flexible pension-age in contrast to the previous formal pension age of 65, as well as removing an upper age

		limit for pension-withdrawal and raising the minimum age for withdrawal from 60 to 61 years.” (Inspires, 2016: http://www.inspires-research.eu/innovativesocialpolicy/82-has-not-yet-yielded-any-signifiant-increase-in-labor-demand-for-these-groups) (see also Minas & Anderson, 2014, p. 40)
2003	T	The <i>Act on Financial Coordination of Rehabilitation Measures</i> allowed institutions of various sectors (PES, regional health authorities, municipal social services and national social insurance administration) to build local associations for financial coordination that should coordinate “preventive and promotional activities aiming to improve health and to prevent sickness absence and social exclusion; and socio-medical activities, including a treatment programme for early and coordinated rehabilitation and occupational activities aiming to get people back into work, or into a rehabilitation programme, as soon as possible” (Minas, 2011, p. 208)
2006	T	“Security employments were introduced on 2006 as a measure for disabled persons with reduced working capacity whose occupational needs cannot be met in any other form of employment. (...) The employment form has a long-term intention, where the working capacity and possibility of moving over to regular employment should be tested at least once every fourth year and assessment should be made as regards the employees working capacity and the remuneration level in connection to it. The employer receives remuneration for security employments.” (Inspires, 2016: http://www.inspires-research.eu/innovativesocialpolicy/253-Security-employment)
2007	T	Introduction of a labour tax credit for workers aged 65 or above at the beginning of the tax year, with the purpose to promote work at older ages (Minas & Anderson, 2014, p. 40).
2007	I	Unemployment insurance reform that made the replacement rate of the income-dependent unemployment benefit dependent on unemployment duration and a gradually falling replacement rate was introduced (Minas & Anderson, 2014, p. 42).
2013	T	“Several changes to the Social Services Act aimed at strengthening the opportunities for those receiving social assistance to support themselves through work and to extend the social services’ possibilities to stimulate, encourage and support those receiving assistance to support themselves. In particular, new incentive to seek work introduced that entails changing the basis for calculating social assistance so that part of earned income is not included in the assessment of entitlement: for those having received income support for six consecutive months, 25 per cent of income from employment will not be taken into account when assessing their entitlement to social assistance. The calculation rule is to apply for two years.” (LABREF database) “Since 2013, legal changes in the Social Services Act allowed the local authorities to require social assistance recipients, irrespective of age, to participate in local activation projects.” (Heidenreich et al., 2014, p. 188)

United Kingdom

<i>Year</i>	<i>Type</i>	<i>Event and sources</i>
1986	I	Introduction of the ‘Restart’ programme that made job-search reviews for claimants after six months of unemployment benefit provision compulsory (Clasen, 2011, p. 32; OECD, 2014a, p. 46).

1989	I	Introduction of the ' <i>Actively Seeking Work</i> ' test that required unemployment benefit claimants to be 'actively' seeking work on a weekly basis and abolished the right to define conditions of pay and distance of 'suitable' or 'acceptable' work after 13 weeks of unemployment (Clasen, 2011, pp. 22 and 32).
1990	I	Reductions of income support were made possible for unemployment benefit claimants who failed to attend Restart interviews (Clasen, 2011, p. 32).
1996	I	Creation of the <i>Jobseeker's Allowance (JSA)</i> that merged unemployment benefit and means-tested income support for the unemployed (Clasen, 2011, p. 32).
1998	I	Introduction of <i>New Deal programmes</i> for young people under 25 (NDYP) and long-term unemployed (NDLTU) (Barbier, 2001, p. 14; Clasen, 2011, p. 33).
1999	T	Introduction of <i>New Deal programmes for Lone Parents (NDLP), for Partners (NDP)</i> and for those over age 50 (Clasen, 2011, p. 32).
1999	I	Extensive trial of joint workings between the local offices of the Employment Service and the Benefits Service (" <i>ONE</i> " pilots) (White & Dunleavy, 2010, pp. 54–57).
2001	T	Reforms of the <i>New Deal for Lone Parents</i> that introduced work-focused interviews with a personal advisor every six months and of the <i>New Deal for Partners</i> that is made mandatory for childless JSA claimants under 45 years of age (Clasen, 2011, p. 33).
2002	I	The creation of <i>Jobcentre Plus</i> offices fully integrated the administration of the benefit system and the employment services and acted "as a single gateway for all benefit claims and employment related activities". "The merger brought about a highly integrated delivery system, one of the most unified organisational structures in Europe." (Champion, 2013, p. 97; Clasen, 2011, p. 23)
2006	M	<i>Jobcentre Plus</i> became responsible not only for benefit and employment programmes for claimants of JSA, but for all working-age benefit claimants (Clasen, 2011, p. 23).
2008	I	Introduction of the <i>Employment and Support Allowance (ESA)</i> (Clasen, 2011, p. 33).
2008	T	Introduction of a work-testing condition for income support for lone parents with children aged five years and over was a "far-reaching change to the activation regime for lone parents" and "has helped to reduce the number of lone parents claiming out-of-work benefits and (...) to increase lone-parent employment, albeit to a modest extent to date" (OECD, 2014a, p. 23).
2009	I	The existing <i>New Deal</i> programmes for jobseekers were reorganised in a single new programme that was rolled out in two phases and consisted of four stages of gradually increasing levels of conditionality on jobseekers. The fourth stage of the revised Jobseekers Regime was the <i>Flexible New Deal (FND)</i> "in which jobseekers receive[d] a more intensive and specialised employment support" and "enter[ed] contracts with their providers (personal action plans), which may include participation in mandatory work-related activities." (Clasen, 2011, p. 22)
2010	I	Creation of the " <i>work for your benefit</i> " phase for long-term JSA claimants "(over twenty-four months; or earlier in some pilot areas at the discretion of advisers) [who were] required to enter a 'work for your benefit' phase of up to six months of full-time employment aimed at improving skills and 'work habits' in return for their benefit" (Clasen, 2011, p. 22).
2011	T	Introduction of the " <i>Work Programme</i> " as new flagship "back to work" scheme that replaced around 20 previous welfare-to-work programs (OECD, 2014a, p. 182).
2013	I	Introduction of the " <i>Claimant Commitment</i> " that was "a more detailed individual action plan for claimants" specifying "what claimants need to do every week to find work and comply with the JSA regime" (OECD, 2014a, p. 23).

2013	M	Introduction of the “ <i>Universal Credit</i> ” that replaced six means-tested benefits and tax credits: income-based Jobseeker's Allowance, Housing Benefit, Working Tax Credit, Child Tax Credit, income-based Employment and Support Allowance and Income Support. Contributions-based Jobseeker's Allowance and contributions-based Employment Support Allowance were not being replaced by Universal Credit (Government.uk, n.d.).
2015	I	Spending Review and Autumn Statement 2015: “Jobseeker’s Allowance claimants, and those claiming the equivalent in Universal Credit are now required to do more for their benefit. Half of all claimants are required to attend the Jobcentre weekly rather than fortnightly, and the government announced in Spending Review and Autumn Statement 2015 that, from October 2016, all new claimants will be required to attend the Jobcentre weekly at the start of their claim.” (LABREF database)
2015	I	Adoption of a National reform programme “Youth Obligation” for most 18 to 21-years-olds benefits claimants: “From the start of Universal Credit claims, 18 to 21 year olds will participate in an intensive period of support, learning, job-search and interview techniques and doing structured work preparation. Tailored, flexible support will be provided to those in work, but need to increase their earnings. After 6 months, young people still claiming Universal Credit will be expected to apply for an apprenticeship, a traineeship, gain work-based skills valued by employers, or go on a work placement to give them the skills they need to get on in work.” (LABREF database)

APPENDIX A.2: DATASET OF MINISTERIAL ORGANISATION IN THREE POLICY FIELDS

This appendix presents the original data on the organisation of ministerial policy competences for environmental policy, immigration policy, and employment policy in Australia, Austria, Canada, France, Germany, the Netherlands, New Zealand, Sweden, and the United Kingdom, that was collected for the purpose of this study.

Ministries for the environment

Australia

	Main ministry	Environmental policy functions:	Other ministries' environmental policy functions:	Other policy functions of the main ministry:	Measures
1970-1972	There was no ministry with competences for environmental policy in the federal government (Burnett, 2015, p. 4; Papadakis, 2002, p. 25).				
1973-1975	<i>Department of Environment and Conservation</i> , created in December 1972	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Environment - Conservation - water, incl. the protection and use of water resources, state grants for water resources management, storage, pipelines; - national parks; - wildlife conservation (AAO, 19.12.1972)	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Forestry (Dpt. of Primary Industry) - “[m]atters related to the specialized development and utilization of natural resources, being land, water, and minerals” for the Australian north (<i>Dpt. of Northern Development</i>) (AAO, 19.12.1972)	None	conc = 0.8 span = 1
1976-1978	<i>Department of Environment, Housing and Community Development</i> , created in December 1975	As before	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - ‘Evaluation and balanced development of (...) water (...) resources having regard to future requirements; - Geodesy, mapping’ (<i>Dpt. of National Resources</i>), - ‘Forestry’ (<i>Dpt. of Primary Industry</i>) (AAO, 22.12.1975)	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Urban and regional planning and development - Building industry, Housing - Provision of hostel accommodation in the Australian Territories and for immigrants; Leisure, including sport, physical fitness and community recreation; Youth affairs (AAO, 22.12.1975)	conc = 0.8 span = 4 adj = yes
1979-1997	<i>Department of Science and the Environment</i> created in December 1978 (AAO, 5.12.1978); <i>Department of Home Affairs and Environment</i> created in November 1980 out of the former <i>Departments of Science and the Environment, of Administrative Services,</i>	As before In the 1980s, the Department’s environmental jurisdiction grew because it came to administer various acts in the field of environmental policy that had been created in the previous decade.	As before (AAO, 5.12.1978; AAO, 3.11.1980; AAO, 13.12.1984, pp. 10, 13; AAO, 24.7.1987, p. 11; AAO, 27.12.1991; AAO, 24.3.1993)	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - (1979-1980) Science and technology (transferred from the former Department of Science), incl. research, support of research, and support of civil space programs; meteorology; ionospheric prediction service; analytical laboratory service; weights and measures (AAO, 5.12.1978) - (1981-1984) Constitutional development of various territories; Women's affairs; Support of the arts and letters; National archives; National museums; World expositions; Leisure, including 	conc = 0.85 span = 2 adj = no

	<p>and Home Affairs (AAO, 3.11.1980); <i>Department of Arts, Heritage and Environment</i> created in December 1984 (AAO, 13.12.1984); <i>Department of the Arts, Sport, the Environment, Tourism and Territories</i>, created in July 1987 (AAO, 24.07.1987); <i>Department of the Arts, Sport, the Environment and Territories</i>, created in December 1991 (AAO, 27.12.1991)</p>			<p>sport, physical fitness and community recreation (AAO, 3.11.1980)</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - (1985-1997) Cultural affairs, incl. Support for the arts; National collections; National Heritage (AAO, 13.12.1984, pp. 1-2) - (1988-1997) Sport and recreation, - (1988-1991) Tourism, including the tourist industry, International expositions and support for international conferences and special events, - (1988-1991) Administration of specific territories (AAO, 24.07.1987) - (1992-1997) Meteorology - (1992-1993) Information co-ordination and services within Australia, including advertising (AAO, 27.12.1991) - (1993-1997) Administration of specific territories (AAO, 24.3.1993) 	
1998-2007	<p><i>Department of the Environment</i>, created in October 1997 (AAO, 9.10.1997); <i>Department of the Environment and Heritage</i>, created in October 1998 (AAO, 22.10.1998)</p>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Environment - Conservation - Environmental Data and Reporting: gathering information on the state of the environment through a computer network of many agencies (Environmental Resources Information Network); gathering data for a national pollution inventory and national solid waste database (Environment Protection Agency); reporting on the state of the environment and creating environmental indicators; responsibility for a national climate data bank (Bureau of Meteorology); research on oceans and marine life, the atmosphere, climate change and the Antarctic environment (Antarctic division) (Papadakis, 2002, pp. 30-31) - Natural heritage (AAO, 22.10.1998, p. 16) 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Gathering data on natural resources (<i>Dpt. of Primary Industry and Energy</i>) - Forest industry, water, soil and natural resources, research on forestry (<i>Bureau of Agricultural and Resource Economics, Dpt. for Agriculture, Fisheries and Forestry</i>) (AAO, 22.10.1998, p. 2) - Monitoring marine and coastal environment (<i>Australian Maritime Safety Authority, Dpt. of Transport</i>) (Papadakis, 2002, pp. 30-31) - "the Treasury oversees agencies like the Australian Bureau of Statistics (which conducts environmental accounting), the Productivity Commission (which considers environmental issues in public inquiries) and the Australian Taxation Office (which manages taxes, levies, deductions and rebates linked to activities affecting the environment)." (Papadakis, 2002, pp. 30-31, italics added) 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Coordination of greenhouse policy (AAO, 22.10.1998, p. 16) - Built heritage (AAO, 22.10.1998, p. 16) 	<p>conc = 0.85 span = 1.5</p>
2008-2010	<p><i>Department of the Environment, Water, Heritage and the Arts (DEWHA)</i> (DEWHA, 2008, p. 9)</p>	<p>As before, plus all of the government's water resource functions (OECD, 2008b, p. 166)</p>	<p>As before</p>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - "responsibility for many of the domestic climate change programs. This includes primary responsibility for renewable energy programs, energy efficiency, community and household climate action and greenhouse gas abatement programs." (DEWHA, 2008, p. 18; italics added) - Cultural policy 	<p>conc = 0.9 span = 2 adj = no</p>
2011-2016	<p><i>Department of Sustainability, Environment, Water, Population and Communities (DSEWPaC)</i> created in October 2010 (DSEWPaC, 2011); <i>Department of the</i></p>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Environment - Conservation, heritage - Air quality - Land contamination - Meteorology - Water policy - Co-ordination of sustainable communities' policy 	<p>As before</p>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Housing policy, construction policy (DSEWPaC, 2011) - (2013-2016) Climate change policy (formerly in the Department of Industry, Innovation, Climate Change, Science, Research and Tertiary Education) - Cultural policy 	<p>conc = 0.9 span = 3 adj = yes</p>

Environment (III) created in September 2013

Austria

	Main ministry	Environmental policy functions:	Other ministries' environmental policy functions:	Other policy functions of the main ministry:	Measures
1970-1971	The federal government had some competences for environmental policy, but there was no specific ministry for the Environment. The <i>Ministry for Social Administration</i> had competences for emissions and air pollution (Pesendorfer, 2007, p. 48). The Chancellor's Office and the <i>Ministry for Agriculture and Fishery</i> had minor environmental functions (Sieberer et al., 2019).				
1972-1986	<i>Ministry for Health and the Protection of the Environment</i> (in German: <i>Bundesministerium für Gesundheit und Umweltschutz</i> , BMUG) created in January 1972 (Bundesministeriengesetz, 1972, p. 439)	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - "environmental hygiene", air quality, noise control, drink water supply, wastewater disposal, garbage disposal, urban and residential hygiene, spatial planning, and toxic substances, - coordination of environmental policy - research on environmental matters (Lauber, 1997, p. 609; Pesendorfer, 2007, pp. 67–68) (Bundesministeriengesetz, 1973, p. 1779)	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Forestry, water, crop protection, nature and landscape protection (<i>Ministry for Agriculture and Forestry</i>) (Bundesministeriengesetz 1973, p. 1783) - "Most environmental tasks were in the hands of several other ministries and the provinces" (Amann & Fischer-Kowalski, 2002, pp. 55–56). 	- Health policy	conc = 0.6 span = 2 adj = yes
1987-1994	<i>Ministry of the Environment, Youth, and Family</i> (in German: <i>Bundesministerium für Umwelt, Jugend und Familie</i> , BMUJF) created in April 1987 through a dissolution of BMUG and split of its functions (Sieberer et al., 2019)	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Air pollution; Waste management; Environmental policy coordination (Bundesministeriengesetz, 1986) (OECD, 2013a, p. 48) - "In an amendment to the constitution in 1988, the Ministry of the Environment, Youth and Public Health was granted considerable powers for the first time." (Amann & Fischer-Kowalski, 2002, p. 56) 	Important environmental policy functions remain in the hands of other ministries (Amann & Fischer-Kowalski, 2002, p. 57). The "complexity of the vertical distribution of powers across the federal, provincial, and municipal levels, but also the horizontal division of powers between the various federal ministries was frequently criticized, but survived basically unaltered" (Amann & Fischer-Kowalski, 2002, pp. 56–57).	- Youth and Family policy	conc = 0.6 span = 2 adj = no
1996-1999	<i>Ministry of the Environment, Youth, and Family</i> (in German: <i>Bundesministerium für Umwelt, Jugend und Familie</i> , BMUJF) created in March 1996 through a fusion of the <i>Ministry for the Environment</i> and the <i>Ministry for Youth and Family</i>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - General environmental policy - Air quality, waste, chemicals - Allocation of federal funding to the provinces, partial responsibility for environmental inspection (Amann & Fischer-Kowalski, 2002, p. 57) 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Forestry policy, water legislation, water management (<i>Ministry for Agriculture and Forestry</i>) - Environmental research (<i>Ministry of Science and Traffic</i>) - Coordination of international environmental policy (<i>Ministry of Foreign Affairs</i>) (Amann & Fischer-Kowalski, 2002, p. 57) 	- Youth and Family policy	conc = 0.6 span = 2 adj = no
2000-2016	<i>Federal Ministry for Agriculture, Forestry, Environment and Water Management</i> (in German: <i>Bundesministerium für Land- und Forstwirtschaft, Umwelt und Wasserwirtschaft</i> , BMLFUW), also called "Ministry of Life" (in	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - It fuses the environmental policy functions with those of the former Ministry for Agriculture (Pesendorfer, 2007, p. 195). - Environmental protection, coordination of environmental policy, emission protection, water management, the environmental ombudsman system, general matters of environmental impact assessment, metrology and documentation on environmental issues and control, research on environmental issues; waste management and 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - "the Ministry of Education shares responsibility with the BMLFUW on environmental education" (OECD, 2013a, p. 47 footnote 1) 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Coordination of radiation protection and nuclear issues; toxic substances (Bundesministeriengesetz, 2000, p. 69) - Agricultural policy 	conc = 1.0 span = 2.5 adj = yes

German: "Lebensministerium"), created in February 2000 (Fallend, 2001, p. 240)	recycling; protection of species; environmental and nature protection (Bundesministeriengesetz, 2000, p. 69) - Forestry policy (Bundesministeriengesetz, 2000, p. 69)		
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Canada

	<i>Main ministry</i>	<i>Environmental policy functions:</i>	<i>Other ministries' environmental policy functions:</i>	<i>Other policy functions of the main ministry:</i>	<i>Measures</i>
1970	There was no federal ministry for the Environment. Only some emergent aspects of environmental policy were treated by the federal government through the <i>Department of Fisheries and Forestry</i> , and the <i>Department of National Health and Welfare</i> . The latter had responsibility for air pollution control legislation development (CEC, 1995). "The federal government denied that environmental policy was a federal responsibility" (Boyd, 2013, p. 8).				
1971- 2016	Federal government department <i>Environment Canada</i> that combined the existing <i>Department of Fisheries and Forestry</i> with the responsibility for air pollution control legislation development transferred from the <i>Department of National Health and Welfare</i> in November 1970 (Boyd, 2013, p. 8).	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - "Environment Canada deals with the quality of the natural environment, which includes: quality of air, water, and soil; renewable natural resources and, more generally, wildlife flora and fauna; waters; meteorology; coordination of policies and programs of the federal government for the conservation and improvement of the quality of the environment; and, the application of the rules and regulations established by the Great Lakes International Joint Commission for the conservation and improvement of the quality of the environment." (CEC, 1995, italics added; Benidickson, 2016, p. 49) - "Environment Canada also has responsibilities under statutes administered by other ministries. For example, Environment Canada administers the water quality provisions of the federal Fisheries Act." (CEC, 1995, italics added; Benidickson, 2016, p. 49) 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - National parks (Heritage Canada) - Sustainable development; natural resources management (Natural Resources Canada) - Oceans and marine protected areas (Fisheries and Oceans) - Several other federal departments have minor environmental functions: Agriculture and Agri-Foods Canada, Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade, Indian Affairs and Northern Development, Industry Canada, Justice Canada and Transport Canada. (CEC, 1995) 	None	conc = 0.6 span = 1

France

	<i>Main ministry</i>	<i>Environmental policy functions:</i>	<i>Other ministries' environmental policy functions:</i>	<i>Other policy functions of the main ministry:</i>	<i>Measures</i>
1970	<i>Direction Générale de la Protection de la Nature</i> (<i>Direction Générale de la Protection de la Nature, DGPN</i>) created in April 1970 within the <i>Ministry for Agriculture</i> (Décret n° 70-315)	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - National parks and green spaces; Forestry policy; Flora and fauna policy, including hunting and fishing policy, and the management of stud farms (Décret n° 70-315)(Charvolin, 2007) 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Water policy (Délégation à l'aménagement du territoire et à l'action régionale, DATAR, subordinate to the Prime Minister) - Noise (Ministry for Health) - Environment mission (Ministry for Equipment) (Lascoumes, 2018, p. 61) 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Agriculture 	conc = 0.5 span = 2 adj = yes
1971- 1973	<i>Ministry for the Environment</i> (in French: <i>Ministère de</i>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Nature protection and environment, incl. national and regional parks (Direction générale de la protection de la nature et de l'environnement, DGPNE) 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Forestry policy (Ministry for Agriculture) (Lascoumes, 1999, p. 64; Degron, 2009) 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Hunting and fishing 	conc = 0.8 span = 1

	<i>l'Environnement</i>) created in April 1971 (Décret n° 71-245) and united the DGPN as well as the units with competences for environmental policy from DATAR and the <i>Ministry for Industry</i> .	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Water policy, incl. inter-ministerial coordination - Prevention of pollution and nuisances from dangerous installations, agricultural, commercial or industrial activities - Information and external relations service - Inter-ministerial coordination of environmental policy (Décrets n° 71-94, n° 71-245)(Lavoux, 1999, p. 86) 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - The creation of the ministry reduced the fragmentation of environmental policy competences significantly, although some competences remained in the hands of other ministries (Poujade, 1975, pp. 32–33). 		
1974-1978	<i>Ministry for Cultural Affairs and the Environment</i> (in French: <i>Ministère des Affaires Culturelles et de l'Environnement</i>) created in March 1974 (Décrets n° 74-243 and n° 74-244)	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Pollution prevention, noise prevention (Direction de la prévention des pollutions et nuisances, Inspection générale de l'environnement, IGE) - Nature protection and environment (Direction de la protection de la nature) - Water policy, incl. water police and prevention of marine waters (from 1976 onwards) (Lavoux, 1999, p. 86) - Inter-ministerial coordination of environmental policy - Transversal competences: prospective studies, research, experimentation; internal coordination, budgetary affairs (Poujade, 1975, p. 66) - Rural and urban environment (Mission de l'environnement rural et urbain) - Service de l'information, des relations et de l'action éducative 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Forestry policy (Ministry for Agriculture) (Degron, 2009) - Protection of coastlines (Ministry for Equipment) (Poujade, 1975, p. 65) - Some ministries revived their environmental competences and divisions (Bess, 2003, p. 198). 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Culture, Youth, Sports, Tourism (Décrets n° 74-578, n° 76-1085, n° 77-433) 	conc = 0.8 span = 2 adj = no
1979-1980	<i>Ministry for the Environment and Living Conditions</i> (in French: <i>Ministère de l'Environnement et du Cadre de Vie, MECV</i>) created in September 1978	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Protection of urban and rural landscapes, green spaces, regional natural parks, natural sites (Direction de l'Urbanisme et des Paysages, Direction de la protection de la nature) - Pollution prevention, waste policy (Direction de la prévention des pollutions) - Socio-economic and statistical studies (Direction des affaires économiques et internationales) - Inter-ministerial coordination of environmental policy 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Forestry policy (Ministry for Agriculture) (Degron, 2009) 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Land use planning, urbanism - Housing and construction policy - Living Conditions: Free time, community life (Délégation à la Qualité de la Vie) (Décrets n° 78-533, n° 78-918) 	conc = 0.8 span = 2.5 adj = yes
1981-1985	<i>Ministry for the Environment</i> created in June 1981, then <i>Secretary of State attached to the Prime Minister</i> in April 1983, then again <i>Ministry for the Environment</i> in August 1984	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Protection of natural sites - Quality of the environment - Prevention of industrial, agricultural, commercial pollution - Inter-ministerial coordination of environmental policy - Environmental education and information (Décrets n° 81-648, n° 83-297) - From 1984 onwards: Water policy; Landscape protection (Décret n° 84-753) 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Forestry policy (Ministry for Agriculture) (Degron, 2009) - Protection of the coastlines and marine pollution (creation of the ministry for the Sea) (Décret n° 81-648) - Rural and urban environment, protection of natural sites (ministry for Urbanism and Housing) (Prieur, 1983, p. 107) 		conc = 0.7 span = 1
1986-1996	Nomination of the <i>Ministre délégué</i> auprès du ministre de l'Équipement, du Logement, de l'Aménagement du territoire et des Transports, chargé de	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Water policy; - Prevention of pollution; - Prevention of natural risks; - Nature and landscape protection; - Research and information (<i>Direction de la recherche, des affaires économiques et internationales</i>, created in 1992) - Inter-ministerial coordination of environmental policy 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Forestry policy (Ministry for Agriculture) (Degron, 2009) - Protection of urban and natural landscapes (Division for Architecture and Urbanism) (Décret n° 85-659, art. 7) 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Hunting and fishing (from 1992 onwards) - Quality of life - Nuclear safety - Coordination of risk prevention policy (from 1992 onwards) 	conc = 0.8 span = 1.5 adj = yes

	l'Environnement (Décret n° 86-706) in April 1986; a State Secretary for the Environment directly subordinate to the Prime Minister in June 1988 (Décret n° 88-736); a Ministry for the Environment in June 1991 (Décret n° 91-514)				
1997-2001	<i>Ministry for Spatial Development and the Environment</i> (in French, <i>Ministre de l'aménagement du territoire et de l'environnement</i>) created in June 1997 (Décret n° 97-715)	As before	- Forestry policy (Ministry for Agriculture) (Degron, 2009)	- Spatial development policy - Joint authority on the Department of Nuclear Installation Safety (with the Ministry of Industry)	conc = 0.8 span = 2 adj = yes
2002-2006	<i>Ministry for Ecology and Sustainable Development</i> , created in May 2002 (Décret n° 2002-895)	- Sustainable development policy - Environmental policy (as before)	- Forestry policy (Ministry for Agriculture) (Degron, 2009)		conc = 0.9 span = 1
2007-2011	<i>State Ministry for Ecology, Sustainable Development and Planning</i> (in French: <i>Ministère de l'écologie, du développement et de l'aménagement durables</i> , MEDAD), created in May 2007, including a <i>State Secretary in charge of Ecology</i> (Décret n° 2007-1090)	- As before, plus - Maritime policy (except for fishing, marine cultures and naval construction and repair)	As before	- Energy and primary materials (until end of 2010) - Industrial security - Transports and transport infrastructure - Urbanism and land use planning, Planning of rural and forest areas; Territorial planning and development; Equipment (Décrets n° 2007-995, n° 2010-1443)	conc = 0.9 span = 5 adj = yes
2012-2016	<i>Ministry for Ecology, Sustainable Development and Energy</i> (in French: <i>Ministère de l'écologie, du développement durable et de l'énergie</i> , MEDDE), created in May 2012; renamed <i>Ministry for the Environment, Energy and the Sea, in charge of international climate policy</i> (in French: <i>Ministre de l'environnement, de l'énergie et de la mer, chargé des relations internationales sur le</i>	As before	As before	- Energy and climate policy - Transport policy - Equipment (Décrets n° 2012-772, n° 2016-243)	conc = 0.9 span = 4 adj = yes

Germany

	<i>Main ministry</i>	<i>Environmental policy functions:</i>	<i>Other ministries' environmental policy functions:</i>	<i>Other policy functions of the main ministry:</i>	<i>Measures</i>
1970-1985	The <i>Ministry of the Interior</i> was "the central Ministry for environmental protection at the federal level" (Jänicke & Weidner, 1997, p. 137).	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Pollution control: water management, air quality, noise abatement and waste disposal, "environmental hygiene" - Planning and coordination of environmental policy - Parts of environmental chemicals legislation and transport noise legislation - International and supranational aspects of environmental policy (Müller, 1986, p. 544) - Overall the concentration of environmental functions within the Interior Ministry prior to 1986 was significant compared to other countries (Weale et al., 1996, p. 263). 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Framework legislation on nature, animal and landscape protection - Forestry (Ministry for Agriculture) (Müller, 1986, p. 557) - Prevention of marine pollution (Ministry of Transport) (Sieberer et al., 2019) - The Ministry for Youth, Family Affairs and Health also had some minor environmental functions (Sieberer et al., 2019) 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Constitutional law and public administration, public service law, public safety, civil defence, border protection - Sport, culture - Refugees, displaced persons and veterans' affairs - (from 1972 onwards) nuclear safety, radiation protection 	<p>conc = 0.6 span = 4 adj = no</p>
1986-2013	<i>Federal Ministry for the Environment, Nature Protection and Nuclear Safety</i> (in German: <i>Bundesministerium für Umwelt, Naturschutz und Reaktorsicherheit, BMU</i>) created in June 1986 (Decree 5.6.1986) ¹	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Competences for environmental protection, nature conservation - Water management, waste management, soil protection, contaminated sites - International cooperation on environmental policy - Health issues related to environmental protection, - In 1989, transfer of the prevention of marine pollution (from the Ministry of Transport) (Pehle, 1998, p. 20) - In 2002, BMU obtains the responsibility for the German Federal Environmental Foundation (Sieberer et al., 2019) 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Environmental health (partly) (Ministry for Health) - Marine environment protection (Ministry of Transport) (Pehle, 1998, p. 42) - Environmental aspects of transport policy (Ministry of Transport) - Plant protection and fertiliser legislation (Ministry of Agriculture) (Pehle, 1998, p. 56) 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Safety of nuclear facilities and radiation protection; safety of industrial installations; radiation hygiene, nuclear waste; chemicals (Decree 5.6.1986) (Pehle, 1998, p. 20) - In 1990, transfer of competences through which the BMU becomes the lead department for climate policy (Böcher & Töller, 2012, p. 110). - In 2002, BMU obtains the lead for renewable energies and related research (formerly Ministry of Economy) and for the Renewable Energies Act (Erneuerbare-Energien-Gesetz, EEG) (Busse, 2003, p. 410; Stefes, 2010, p. 159). 	<p>conc = 0.9 span = 1</p>
2014-2016	<i>Federal Ministry for the Environment, Nature Protection, Construction and Nuclear Safety</i> (German: <i>Bundesministerium für Umwelt, Naturschutz, Bau und Reaktorsicherheit, BMUB</i>), created in December 2013	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Water management, protection of marine areas; - Circular economy, waste management, soil protection, contaminated sites - Environmental health, crop protection - Nature protection, biodiversity, landscape protection, sustainable forestry, rural development - European and international cooperation (BMUB Organisational plan 19.5.2014; Decree 17.12.2013) (Sieberer et al., 2019) 	None	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Building, construction industry, federal buildings, public building law, - urban development, - housing, - rural infrastructure 	<p>conc = 1.0 span = 5 adj = yes</p>

¹ Bekanntmachung des Organisationserlasses des Bundeskanzlers vom 05.06.1986, in: Bundesgesetzblatt, 1986, Teil I, p. 864.

Netherlands

	<i>Main ministry</i>	<i>Environmental policy functions:</i>	<i>Other ministries' environmental policy functions:</i>	<i>Other policy functions of the main ministry:</i>	<i>Measures</i>
1970-1982	Creation of the <i>Directorate General for Environmental Protection (DGEP)</i> and of the <i>Ministry for Public Health and Environmental Hygiene</i> (Dutch: <i>Volksgezondheid en Milieuhygiene</i>)	The DGEP is set up along sectoral lines: air, water, soil, and some specific problem areas such as waste, radiation and noise (Bressers & Plettenburg, 1997, p. 113; Van Eijndhoven et al., 2001, p. 115; Wolters, 2001, p. 43; Papadakis, 2002, pp. 30–31; Van Tatenhove & Goverde, 2002, p. 49)	- Nature protection (<i>Ministry of Agriculture, Nature Protection and Fisheries</i>) - Water management and protection, water pollution control, waterways and canal system (<i>Ministry of Transport and Communications</i>) (Van Eijndhoven et al., 2001, p. 115)	- Public Health	conc = 0.5 span = 2 adj = yes
1983-2010	<i>Ministry for Housing, Spatial Planning and the Environment</i> (Dutch: <i>Ministerie van Volkshuisvesting, Ruimtelijke Ordening en Milieu, VROM</i>), created in September 1982 through integration of the environment portfolio into the former <i>Ministry for Public Housing and Spatial Planning</i> (Van Eijndhoven et al., 2001, p. 123)	- Coordination of environmental policy at government level - Supervising implementation of the Environmental Management Act - Specific legislation on pollutions, air, noise, soil, waste and hazardous substances (de Jongh, 1996, pp. 15–16)	- Nature protection, nature management policy, implementation of nature conservation strategies, biodiversity conservation, nature protection areas (<i>Ministry of Agriculture, Nature Protection and Fisheries</i>) - Water management and protection, water pollution control, waterways and canal system (<i>Ministry of Transport and Public Works</i>) - International environmental negotiations (<i>Ministry of Foreign Affairs</i>) (de Jongh, 1996, pp. 15–16; Weale et al., 2000, pp. 220–222; OECD, 2003b, p. 153)	- Public housing, public buildings - Spatial planning	conc = 0.5 span = 3 adj = yes
2011-2016	<i>Ministry of Infrastructure and the Environment</i> (in Dutch: <i>Ministerie van Infrastructuur en Milieu, IenM</i>) created in October 2010 through merger of the former <i>Ministry of Transport, Public Works and Water Management</i> and the former <i>Ministry of Housing, Spatial Planning and Environment</i> (OECD, 2015b, p. 104)	As before, plus - Water management	- Responsibility for nature and biodiversity policy lies with the <i>Ministry of Economic Affairs</i> , which was created by a merger of the former <i>Ministry of Agriculture, Nature and Fisheries</i> and the former <i>Ministry of Economic Affairs</i> .	- Spatial planning - Transport policy	conc = 0.6 span = 3 adj = yes

New Zealand

	<i>Main ministry</i>	<i>Environmental policy functions:</i>	<i>Other ministries' environmental policy functions:</i>	<i>Other policy functions of the main ministry:</i>	<i>Measures</i>
1970-1971	There was no ministry for the Environment before 1986. "Prior to 1986, environmental responsibilities were scattered over of a variety of government institutions. Sometimes it was a case of the fox guarding the chickens with some departments having responsibility for both the protection and exploitation of the resources under their control." (MfE, 1997, p. 5)				
1972-1986	The government appoints the first minister for the Environment and	- Co-ordination of environmental policy	- Forestry policy (indigenous forests protection; converting native forest into commercial plantation forest)	None	conc = 0.3 span = 1

	establishes the <i>Commission for the Environment</i> “as a de facto government department with the responsibility to provide policy advice on environmental matters and to promote the co-ordination of environmental policy.” (Bührs, 1991, 2002, p. 331)		- “Other agencies with environmental administration functions were the Department of Lands and Survey, the Ministry of Works and Development, and the Wildlife Service of the Department of Internal Affairs.” (MfE 1997, 5, italics added)		
1987-2016	The <i>Environment Act 1986</i> of December 1986 creates the <i>Ministry for the Environment</i> (MfE).	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - MfE’s functions are mainly to report on the environmental implications of policy proposals across Cabinet (Bartlett, 1997, p. 169). - In 1988, the MfE received resource management responsibilities of the Ministry of Works and Development, which is abolished (MfE 1997, 5). - As of 2007, “[t]he MfE has the power to set policy and make regulations on environmental matters of national interest by issuing national policy statements and national environmental standards” (OECD, 2007b, pp. 108–109). - By 2009, the MfE administered acts relative to soil conservation and rivers control, the environment, resource management, the protection of the ozone layer, hazardous substances and new organisms, climate change policy, aquaculture reform, marine management, and waste minimisation (MfE, 2010, p. 112). - By 2009: Land and water management, Marine and Environmental Governance, Resource Management Reform, Urban Environment, Water Reform (Natural and Built Environment Directorate); Environmental Protection Directorate; Information Directorate’, ‘Operations Directorate’ (MfE, 2010, p. 111). 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Nature conservation and protection, protection of natural areas on publicly owned land (comprising almost 23% of New Zealand) (<i>Department for Conservation</i>) (Bührs, 2002, p. 332) - Management of national parks, reserves and conservation areas (terrestrial and marine), protected indigenous forests, inland and coastal waters, and wildlife (<i>Department for Conservation</i>) (OECD, 2007b, pp. 108–109) - Sustainable development policy: As of 2007, “The Department of Prime Minister and Cabinet is the lead institution for national sustainable development policy” (OECD, 2007b, pp. 108–109) 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - climate markets, climate strategy, environment risk and innovation, international climate and innovation, international cooperation (<i>Climate and Risk Directorate</i>) 	conc = 0.5 span = 1

Sweden

	<i>Main ministry</i>	<i>Environmental policy functions:</i>	<i>Other ministries’ environmental policy functions:</i>	<i>Other policy functions of the main ministry:</i>	<i>Measures</i>
1970-1986	There was no ministry for the Environment in the Swedish government. There were “small national administrations for nature conservation, and for water and air pollution control, respectively” (Lundqvist, 1998, p. 232; Lönnroth, 2010, p. 11). The two Ministries for Agriculture and for Housing were politically responsible for environmental issues (Nilsson & Persson, 2008, p. 230).				
1987-1989	<i>Ministry for Energy and Environment</i> (in Swedish: <i>Miljö- och energidepartementet</i>) created in January 1987 (Lönnroth, 2010, p. 11)	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Nature conservation - Water pollution control - Air pollution control - The ministry concentrated the environmental responsibilities previously handled by the Ministries for Agriculture and for Housing (Lundqvist, 1998, p. 240). 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Forestry policy (<i>Ministry for Agriculture</i>) 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Energy policy (Lundqvist, 1998, p. 240) 	conc = 0.8 span = 2 adj = yes

1990-2004	<i>Ministry of the Environment</i> (in Swedish: <i>Miljödepartementet</i>) created in May 1990 and renamed <i>Ministry of the Environment and Natural Resources</i> (in Swedish: <i>Miljö- och naturresursdepartementet</i>) in December 1991 (Lundqvist, 1997, p. 49)	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Environmental protection (incl. economic instruments and the Environmental Code (“Miljöbalken”)) - Nature conservation, biodiversity and protection of wildlife (Sieberer et al., 2019) - Management of natural resources - Waste management 	- Forestry policy (<i>Ministry for Agriculture</i>)	- Control of chemical products, protection against radiation and the control and supervision of nuclear technology (Lundqvist, 1997, p. 49; Eckerberg et al., 2007)	conc = 0.9 span = 1
2005-2006	<i>Ministry for Environment and Societal Planning</i> created in January 2005	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Environmental policy - Sustainable development (OECD, 2004a, p. 98) 	- Forestry policy (<i>Ministry for Agriculture</i>)	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Climate policy - Housing policy - Energy policy (Eckerberg et al., 2007; Nilsson & Persson, 2008, p. 228) 	conc = 0.9 span = 3.5 adj = yes
2007-2016	Ministry for the Environment re-established in January 2007	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Natural environment, environmental assessment, environmental objectives (Nilsson & Persson, 2008, p. 230) (Regeringskansliet, 2014) 	- Forestry (Ministry of Enterprise and Innovation) (SFA, n.d.)	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Climate policy - Chemicals 	conc = 0.9 span = 1.5

United Kingdom

	<i>Main ministry</i>	<i>Environmental policy functions:</i>	<i>Other ministries’ environmental policy functions:</i>	<i>Other policy functions of the main ministry:</i>	<i>Measures</i>
1970	Prior to 1970, no ministry was explicitly responsible for environmental policy. There was a <i>Central Unit for Pollution Control</i> (CUPC) located in the Prime Minister’s Office and the <i>Ministry for Housing and Local Government (MHLG)</i> dealt with air and water pollution.				
1971-1976	The <i>Department of the Environment</i> (DoE) was created in November 1970 (Draper, 1977). DoE unified the three ministries of Housing and Local Government, Public Buildings and Works, and Transport, and absorbed the CUPC (Painter, 1980; Pollitt, 1984, p. 93).	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Coordination of policies concerning environmental pollution, nature conservation, habitat, clean air and noise - Research on environmental pollution and resources (the use of water, minerals and other natural resources) - European environmental policy (Jordan, 2002b) 	None (Jordan, 2002b)	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Housing, construction: housing programmes and finance; housing improvement; building regulations; new towns; sponsorship of the construction industry; building research and development - Local Government and local finances, land-use planning, regional, land use and transport planning, countryside, conservation, roads, road passenger transport, water, sewage, refuse disposal - Transport: Transport industries, highways; ports; general policy on the nationalised transport industries; railways; inland waterways; Channel tunnel; freight haulage; international aspects of inland transport; road and vehicle safety; licensing (Serpell, 1970, 1971) - Public Buildings and Works: management of government property; post; prisons - Sport and recreation 	conc = 1.0 span = 5 adj = yes
1977-2000	In September 1976, DoE splits and loses the transport portfolio	As before, plus:	None (Jordan, 2002b)	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Housing, construction: housing programmes and finance; housing improvement; building regulations; new towns; sponsorship of the 	conc = 1.0 span = 3 adj = yes

	(Draper, 1977, p. 3; Jordan, 2002a, p. 40; Radcliffe, 1985; Weale, 1997, pp. 91 and 94–95); DoE became the <i>Department for the Environment, Transport and Regions (DETR)</i> in May 1997.	- After 1999, sustainable development policy: The Sustainable Development Unit (SDU) is created in 1999 and located within DETR.		construction industry; building research and development - Local Government and local finances, land-use planning, regional, land use and transport planning, countryside, conservation, roads, road passenger transport, water, sewage, refuse disposal	
2001-2007	<i>Department of Environment, Food and Rural Affairs (DEFRA)</i> created in June 2001 through a fusion of the Environment portfolio with the <i>Ministry of Agriculture, Fisheries and Food (MAFF)</i> and a small part of the Home Office (Begg & Gray, 2004)	- Air quality; Noise - Biodiversity, Plant health - Conservation, National parks, - Flooding - Forestry - Sustainable development - Waste management - Water management; Inland waterways; Marine policy	None (Jordan, 2002b)	- Adaptation to global warming - Agriculture, Food, Animal health and animal welfare, Chemical substances and pesticides, Fisheries, Hunting, Rural development, Land management	conc = 1.0 span = 2.5 adj = yes
2008-2016	<i>Department of Environment, Food and Rural Affairs (DEFRA)</i> ; in 2008, the new <i>Department of Energy and Climate Change (DECC)</i> that takes over responsibilities for climate policy from DEFRA.	As before	As before	- Agriculture, Food, Animal health and animal welfare, Chemical substances and pesticides, Fisheries, Hunting, Rural development, Land management	conc = 1.0 span = 2 adj = yes

Ministries for immigration

Australia

	Main ministry	Immigration policy functions:	Other ministries' immigration policy functions:	Other policy functions of the main ministry:	Measures
1970-1973	<i>Department of Immigration</i> (established in 1945)	- Immigration and emigration - Nationality - Naturalisation and aliens (AAO, 16.4.1970) - Administration of the migrant hostels network (Migrant Workers' Accommodation Division) - Responsibility for the Adult Migrant English Programme - Settlement Services Branch (est. 1973): cooperation with the non-governmental sector in the delivery of settlement services (DIBP, 2015, p. 31)	None	None	conc = 1.0 span = 1
1974-1975	<i>Department of Labor and Immigration (DLI)</i> , created	- Migration	- Welfare and community services (<i>Department of Social Security</i>)	- Employment Service and Industrial Relations (AAO, 2.10.1974)	conc = 0.5 span = 2

	in June 1974 after a split of the <i>Department of Immigration</i> .	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Naturalisation and aliens (<i>Aliens Act, Australian Citizenship Act, Migration Act, Nationality and Citizenship (Burmese) Act, Passports Act</i>) (AAO, 2.10.1974) 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - English language training under the Immigration (Education) Act (<i>Department of Education</i>) - Provision of hostel accommodation for migrants (<i>Department of Housing and Construction</i>) - Passport issuing (<i>Department of Foreign Affairs</i>) (DIBP, 2015, p. 54) 		adj = yes
1976-1987	The creation of the <i>Department of Immigration and Ethnic Affairs</i> in December 1975 reversed most of the changes made in October 1974 (DIBP, 2015, p. 54).	As before, plus: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Migrant settlement (<i>Ethnic Affairs Department</i>) - Improvement of services for migrants (<i>Settlement Services Branch</i>) 	None (DIBP, 2015, p. 54)	None	conc = 1.0 span = 1
1988-1992	<i>Department of Immigration, Local Government and Ethnic Affairs</i> created in July 1987	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Migration, including refugees - Citizenship and aliens - Ethnic affairs - Post-arrival arrangements for migrants, other than migrant child education (AAO, 24.7.1987) 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Workplace-related services for immigrants, e.g. vocational language and training services and funding for migrant liaison officers (<i>Department of Employment, Education and Training</i>) - Information on government services through interpreter services and migrant liaison officers, income support programmes (<i>Department of Social Security</i>) - Torture and trauma counselling and support, and culturally appropriate health care services under the humanitarian programme (<i>Department of Human Services and Health</i>) (McKenzie & Williams, 1998, pp. 63–64) 	- Local government, regional development	conc = 0.75 span = 2 adj = yes
1993-2001	<i>Department of Immigration and Ethnic Affairs</i> created in March 1993, renamed <i>Department of Immigration and Multicultural Affairs</i> (DIMA) in March 1996	As before (AAO, 24.3.1993, p. 12) DIMA was the “key actor” with regard to migrant integration (OECD, 2007a, p. 86)	As before (McKenzie & Williams, 1998, pp. 63–64)	None	conc = 0.75 span = 1
2002-2013	<i>Department of Immigration and Multicultural Affairs and Indigenous Affairs</i> (DIMIA) created in November 2001; <i>Department of Immigration and Citizenship</i> (DIC) created in December 2007	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - “Entry, stay and departure arrangements for non-citizens - Border immigration control - Arrangements for settlement of migrants and humanitarian entrants, other than migrant child education (e.g., <i>Adult Migrant English Program</i>) - Citizenship - Ethnic affairs; multicultural affairs; indigenous affairs and reconciliation” (AAO, 26.11.2001) - “It is inter alia responsible for all issues relating to entry, stay, settlement services (with the exception of the education of migrant children), citizenship and multicultural affairs. It is thus the key actor with respect to migrant integration.” (OECD, 2007c, p. 86) - DIC from 2008 on dealt with all responsibilities of DIMIA except for “indigenous affairs and reconciliation”. (AAO, 3.12.2007) 	None (OECD, 2007c, p. 86)	None	conc = 1.0 span = 1

2014-2016	Department of Immigration and Border Protection (DIBP), created in September 2013 after a split of DIC	As before	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Most settlement and multicultural affairs programs were assumed by the Department of Human Services - Adult Migrant English Program (Department of Industry) (DIBP, 2015, p. 84) 	None	conc = 0.5 span = 1
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Austria

	Main ministry	Immigration policy functions:	Other ministries' immigration policy functions:	Other policy functions of the main ministry:	Measures
1970-1986	Ministry for Social Affairs (in German: Bundesministerium für soziale Verwaltung)	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Immigration policy - Foreigners' policy (Bauböck & Perchinig, 2006, p. 731): On this point, the coding follows Bauböck and Perchinig's analyses of the distribution of competences for integration policy between the levels of the Austrian federal state (Bauböck, 2001, p. 256; Perchinig, 2010, pp. 13–18). According to these authors, the <i>Länder</i> were also competent with respect to immigrant integration, but their competences were restricted to implementing federal legislation. Hernes (2020) diverges from this assessment by coding competences at the federal level only from 2011 onwards. 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Refugee policy, integration of refugees via the Austrian Integration Fund (Bauböck, 2001, p. 256; Perchinig, 2010, pp. 13–18) 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Social insurance, general social policy - Labour market administration and policy; labour law, labour inspection; - War victims (BSV, 1975) 	conc = 0.65 span = 3.5 adj = yes
1987-2013	Ministry of the Interior; in April 2011, a State Secretary for Integration is created within the Ministry of the Interior (Hernes, 2020).	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Immigration policy - Border control, deportation, expulsion - Nationality policy, population registry, passports - Foreigners' policy - Refugee policy, including integration of recognised refugees via the Austrian Integration Fund (until 1991) (EMN & IOM, 2004, p. 48) - Integration commission (created in 1997) (EMN & IOM, 2004, p. 50) - European Integration Network; European Refugee Fund (Bauböck & Perchinig, 2006, p. 731) 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - The Austrian Integration Fund was outsourced in 1991 and in 2002 its competences were extended so that it became co-responsible for implementing the Integration Agreements (EMN & IOM, 2004, p. 53). - Integration of asylum candidates - Health care of asylum candidates (Ministry for Health) - Employment of foreigners (Ministry for the Economy and Employment) (EMN & IOM, 2004) 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Security, public order and security, weapons and ammunition, INTERPOL, federal police - Public assemblies; elections; administrative organisation, civil service (Bundesministeriengesetz, 1987, p. 252) 	conc = 0.75 span = 3 adj = no
2014-2016	Ministry of the Interior	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Migration and immigration policy - Foreigners' policy - Asylum policy 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Immigrant integration policy; International cooperation on refugee policy (<i>Ministry for Europe, Integration, and the Exterior</i>) (IOM & EMN, 2015, p. 38) 	As before	conc = 0.5 span = 3 adj = no

Canada

	Main ministry	Immigration policy functions:	Other ministries' immigration policy functions:	Other policy functions of the main ministry:	Measures
1970-1992	Department of Manpower and Immigration, established in 1966 under the Government Organization Act	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Immigration policy - Immigrant integration policy - "The Canada Immigration Division administers the Immigration Act and Regulations and is responsible for the selection, examination, movement and admission of 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Multicultural affairs (Vineberg, 2012, pp. 25–33) 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - National employment service and technical and vocational training: "counselling programs, manpower training and mobility programs, 	conc = 0.9 span = 2 adj = yes

	Changed into <i>Employment and Immigration Canada (EIC)</i> in August 1977	immigrants to Canada, and for the exclusion or deportation of undesirable persons.” ² - Settlement services (under the responsibility of the Manpower Division) (Vineberg, 2012, pp. 25–33)		employer services and services for disadvantaged workers and students” ³ - cf also (Vineberg, 2012, pp. 25–33)	
1993	Integration branch of former EIC (<i>Department of Human Resources and Labour</i>)	- Immigrant settlement (Vineberg, 2012, p. 40)	- Immigration policy: Department of Public Security created in June 1993 following EIC split (Vineberg, 2012, p. 40) - Multiculturalism		
1994-2007	<i>Department of Citizenship and Immigration</i> (CIC, later renamed Immigration, Refugees and Citizenship Canada) created in October 1993	- Immigration policy: “The powers, duties and functions of the Minister extend to and include all matters over which Parliament has jurisdiction relating to citizenship and immigration.” (Department of Citizenship and Immigration Act, 1994) - Immigrant integration policy - Settlement services: “settlement and citizenship were grouped within a new Integration Branch, thus bringing settlement and citizenship back together” (Vineberg, 2012, p. 40)	- Multiculturalism (<i>Department of Canadian Heritage</i>) - Passport matters (<i>Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade</i>)	None	conc = 0.9 span = 1
2008-2016	<i>Immigration, Refugees and Citizenship Canada</i>	As before, plus Multiculturalism	- Passport matters (until June 2013, Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade)		conc = 1.0 span = 1

France

	<i>Main ministry</i>	<i>Immigration policy functions:</i>	<i>Other ministries’ immigration policy functions:</i>	<i>Other policy functions of the main ministry:</i>	<i>Measures</i>
1970-1972	Integration programmes were under the responsibility of the <i>Ministry of Social Affairs</i> since 1965, and within the ministry, of the <i>Direction de la Population et des Migrations (DPM)</i> created in 1966 (CII, 2006, p. 13) (Bozec & Simon, 2014, p. 14; Hernes, 2020).	Immigrant integration policy	Immigration policy (<i>Ministry of the Interior</i>) (Bozec & Simon, 2014, p. 14)	- Social affairs	conc = 0.5 span = 2 adj = yes
1973-2006	<i>Ministry for Labour, Employment, and Population</i> (in French: <i>Ministère du Travail, de l’Emploi et de la population</i>), created in April 1973 (décret n° 73-436). In May 1974, a State	Demography, Internal Migrations, Immigration, Policies for Immigrants, Naturalisations (<i>Directorate for Population and Migrations</i>) (Décret n° 2004-318) Supervision of the Social Action Fund (Fonds d’action sociale, FAS)	Immigration policy was a responsibility of various ministries, most importantly the <i>Ministry of the Interior</i> and the <i>Ministry of External Affairs</i> (Hernes, 2020).	- Labour, Employment, Professional Training, Labour Relations (General Directorate for Labour and Employment) - Participation (Inter-ministerial service)	conc = 0.5 span = 2 adj = yes

² “Government organizations”, 1973, p. 883, online: https://www66.statcan.gc.ca/eng/1973/197308950883_p.%20883.pdf.

³ “Government organizations”, 1973, p. 883, online: https://www66.statcan.gc.ca/eng/1973/197308950883_p.%20883.pdf.

	<p>Secretariat in charge of immigrant workers (in French: <i>Secrétariat d'État chargé des travailleurs immigrés</i>, SETI) is created within the <i>Ministry for Labour</i>. In June 1981, it is replaced with the <i>Secrétaire d'État chargé des immigrés</i>. The ministry in charge of integration policy is renamed to <i>Ministry for Social Affairs and Integration</i> (May 1991). In May 1995, a full <i>Ministre chargé de l'intégration et de la lutte contre l'exclusion</i> is created. In Nov 1995, the <i>Ministre délégué à la ville et à l'intégration</i>, subordinate to the <i>Ministre de l'aménagement du territoire, de la ville et de l'intégration</i>, replaced the aforementioned ministry; the position of minister is abolished in June 1997 and competences for immigrant integration policy are again with the <i>Ministry for social affairs</i> (Hernes, 2020).</p>			
2007-2010	<p><i>Ministry of Immigration, Integration, National Identity and Solidary Development</i> created in May 2007 (Décret n° 2007-1891) (Valluy, 2008; Burban, 2009; Ocak, 2015; Hernes, 2020)</p>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Immigration; incl. participation in policies to combat illegal immigration and illegal employment; coordination of collection and analysis of data on immigration and immigrant integration - Integration; incl. language policies, professional training, immigrant education, access to healthcare - Citizenship - Asylum: asylum law, naturalisation, visas (Burban, 2009, p. 30) 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Deportation (checks, surveillance in detention centres, enforcement of removal orders) (Ministry of the Interior) - Visas (Ministry for External Affairs) (Burban, 2009, p. 31) 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - International development support <p>conc = 0.9 span = 1.5 adj = no</p>
2011-2016	<p><i>Ministry of the Interior, Overseas Territories, Territories and Immigration</i> (in French: <i>Ministère de l'Intérieur, de l'Outre-Mer, des Collectivités territoriales et de l'immigration</i>) created</p>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Immigration, integration, asylum: entry, residence and professional activities of foreign nationals, fight against illegal immigration and documentary fraud involving foreign nationals, asylum, integration of immigrant populations (Décret n° 2010-1444, Art. 4) 	<p>None</p>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Internal security, public liberties, coordination of crime prevention and the fight against drug trafficking - Road safety - Territorial administration, overseas territories (Décret n° 2010-1444) <p>conc = 1.0 span = 4 adj = no</p>

Germany

	<i>Main ministry</i>	<i>Immigration policy functions:</i>	<i>Other ministries' immigration policy functions:</i>	<i>Other policy functions of the main ministry:</i>	<i>Measures</i>
1970-2002	Federal Chancellery	- Foreigners' policy, interministerial coordination (Schneider, 2010, p. 125)	- Following the dissolution of the Federal Ministry for Displaced Persons, Refugees and War Victims (in German: <i>Bundesministerium für Vertriebene, Flüchtlinge und Kriegsgeschädigte</i>) in 1969, competences are distributed to several ministries and the Bundesverwaltungsamt (BVA). - In 1978, creation of the Commissioner for foreigners (in German: <i>Ausländerbeauftragter</i>) within the Federal Ministry of Labour and Social Affairs (<i>Bundesministerium für Arbeit und Sozialordnung, BMAS</i>) (Bendel, 2014, p. 2; Schneider, 2010, p. 128); transferred to the Ministry for Families in 2002 (Bendel, 2014, p. 7).	- Policy coordination; shadowing the jurisdictions of the different ministries, coded as "6" which corresponds to the average number of divisions of the chancellery during this period. (Knoll, 2004)	conc = 0.5 span = 6 adj = no
2003-2016	Immigrant integration becomes a responsibility of the <i>Federal Agency for Migration and Refugees</i> under the <i>Ministry of the Interior</i> (Kreienbrink, 2013, pp. 407–408).	- Commissioner for foreigners (transferred in 2005) (Hernes, 2020) - Promotion of professional German language competences (transferred from BMAS) (as of 2007) (Kreienbrink, 2013, p. 408) - Administration of the means received out of the European Integration Fund (as of 2007) (Kreienbrink, 2013, p. 410)	- Integration-related policies fall within the competences of a range of other ministries, such as Economy and Labour, Family Affairs, and Education	- Public order, security - Interior	conc = 0.75 span = 3 adj = no

Netherlands

	<i>Main ministry</i>	<i>Immigration policy functions:</i>	<i>Other ministries' immigration policy functions:</i>	<i>Other policy functions of the main ministry:</i>	<i>Measures</i>
1970-1979	Ministry of Justice	- Immigration regulation and control	- Recruitment of foreigners, coordination of family reunification policy (<i>Ministry of Social Affairs and Employment</i>) - Development of a welfare policy for some vulnerable groups including guest workers, asylum seekers, and post-colonial immigrants (mainly within the <i>Ministry for Culture, Recreation and Social Work</i>) (Bruquetas-Callejo et al., 2011, pp. 134 and 141; Entzinger, 1985, pp. 85–86)	- Justice	conc = 0.5 span = 2 adj = no
1980-2002	<i>Directorate for the Coordination of Minorities Policy</i> (in Dutch: <i>Directie</i>)	- Coordination of immigrant policy: "Its main task has become to remind all other ministries of their particular	- As before, the other ministries remain fully responsible of their own domains (Entzinger, 2014, p. 62).	- Local government, cities and provinces (Bruquetas-Callejo et al., 2011, p. 143) - Interior	conc = 0.4 span = 3 adj = yes

	<i>Coördinatie Integratiebeleid Minderheden</i>) within the <i>Ministry of the Interior</i> created in September 1979 (Entzinger, 1985, p. 86); in 1998, nomination of a <i>State Secretary for Urban Policies and Integration</i> within the <i>Ministry of the Interior</i> (Bruquetas-Callejo et al., 2011, p. 146; Entzinger, 2014, p. 63; Hernes, 2020).	responsibilities in this field and to harmonize basic policy guidelines.” (Entzinger, 1985, p. 86) - Immigrant integration policy	- Immigration regulation and control (Ministry of Justice) - Recruitment of foreigners, coordination of family reunification policy (Ministry of Social Affairs and Employment) - Development of a welfare policy for some vulnerable groups including guest workers, asylum seekers, and post-colonial immigrants (from Surinam and the Netherlands Antilles) (mainly within the Ministry for Culture, Recreation and Social Work) (Bruquetas-Callejo et al., 2011, pp. 134 and 141; Entzinger, 1985, pp. 85–86)	- Public order and security	
2003-2006	Within the <i>Ministry of Justice</i> , a new <i>Minister for Migration and Integration</i> (Bruquetas-Callejo et al., 2011, p. 148; Hernes, 2020; Penninx, 2005, p. 43), renamed <i>Minister for Integration, the Protection of Juveniles, Prevention and Social Rehabilitation</i> in 2006 (Hernes, 2020).	- Coordination of integration policy - Immigration regulation and control	- Recruitment of foreign workers, coordination of family reunification policy (<i>Ministry of Social Affairs and Employment</i>)	- Justice	conc = 0.6 span = 2 adj = no
2007-2010	<i>Programme Ministry for Housing, Neighbourhoods and Integration</i> created in February 2007 under the <i>Ministry of Housing, Spatial Planning and the Environment</i> (in Dutch: <i>Volkshuisvesting, Ruimtelijke Ordening en Milieu, VROM</i>)	- Coordination of integration policy	- Migration and asylum policy, naturalisation (<i>Ministry of Justice</i>) - Recruitment of foreign workers, coordination of family reunification policy (<i>Ministry of Social Affairs and Employment</i>)	- Housing and communities - Environmental protection - Spatial policy	conc = 0.3 span = 4 adj = yes
2011-2016	A Minister without portfolio for Immigration, Integration and Asylum within the Ministry of the Interior and Kingdom Relations (EMN, 2012, p. 11)	- Migration and asylum policy (DG for Alien Affairs) - Coordination of immigration policy - Responsibility for implementing bodies - Aliens detention and removal centres - Civic integration and integration policy coordination - Integration (DG for Housing, Construction and Integration) (EMN, 2012, p. 11)	None	- Interior - Public order and security	conc = 1.0 span = 3 adj = no

New Zealand

<i>Main ministry</i>	<i>Immigration policy functions:</i>	<i>Other ministries' immigration policy functions:</i>	<i>Other policy functions of the main ministry:</i>	<i>Measures</i>
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1970-2012	Minister of Immigration within the <i>Department of Labour (DoL)</i>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Immigration control - Selection, transport, and accommodation of immigrants - Settlement policy - In 1988, the Department of Labour is reorganised into five distinct services – one of which was New Zealand Immigration – each with a general manager, a policy analysis unit, support services, and a regional network of offices (Garlick, 2012, p. 193). (McLintock, 1966) 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - English for Speakers of Other Languages (ESOL) programs (Department of Education) - Migrant employment assistance (Department of Social Development) - Language program (Internal Affairs Department) (New Zealand Controller and Auditor-General, 2013, p. 70) 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Employment policy, working conditions and relationships, workers' accommodation (McLintock, 1966) 	conc = 0.85 span = 2 adj = yes
2013-2016	<i>Ministry of Business, Innovation and Employment (MBIE)</i> resulting from a fusion (July 2012) of the Department of Building and Housing (DBH), the Department of Labour (DoL), the Ministry of Economic Development (MED), and the Ministry of Science and Innovation (MSI).	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - "The ministry manages all immigration-related activities at the government level." (OECD, 2014d, p. 40) - The MBIE brings together all the existing functions of these former ministries under a single chief executive (Te Kawa Mataaho, n.d.). - Migration Research, Evaluation and Analysis (New Zealand Controller and Auditor-General, 2013, p. 19) 	None	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Social Housing - Skills and Employment - Labour, science and enterprise, innovation; digital policy, data policy - Tertiary education - Building, resources and markets; Regional Economic Development 	conc = 1.0 span = 4 adj = yes

Sweden

	<i>Main ministry</i>	<i>Immigration policy functions:</i>	<i>Other ministries' immigration policy functions:</i>	<i>Other policy functions of the main ministry:</i>	<i>Measures</i>
1970-1991	<i>Swedish Immigration Board (SIV)</i> that depends on the <i>Ministry for Labour</i> , with a specific <i>Minister for Immigration</i> (Bergmark & Minas, 2006, p. 36; Hammar, 1985, p. 47)	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Immigration regulation, refugee matters - Immigrant integration policy 	None	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Labour, employment 	conc = 1.0 span = 2 adj = yes
1992-1994	In October 1991, immigrant integration policy is transferred to the Ministry of Culture (Borevi, 2012, p. 61; Hernes, 2020). In October 1994, immigrant integration policy is transferred to the <i>Ministry of Labour</i> (Hernes, 2020).	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Immigrant integration policy 	Immigration policy	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Cultural policy 	conc = 0.5 span = 2 adj = no
1996-2002	In March 1996, a <i>Minister for Migration</i> is created	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Immigration policy 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Newly arrived immigrants' establishment, Swedish citizenship and discrimination based on ethnic origin or religion (Minister for 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Justice policy 	conc = 0.3 span = 2 adj = no

	within the <i>Ministry for Justice</i> (Hernes, 2020)		Integration, Sport, Youth and Consumers) placed within the Ministry for the Interior, then in 1998 within the Ministry of Culture, then abolished in 2000 and the responsibility for integration transferred to the Ministry of Enterprise in 2001 (Hernes, 2020) - Migration policy (Ministry for Foreign Affairs) (Pierre & Widfeldt, 1999, p. 512) - Ethnic integration (Ministry of Home Affairs) (Pierre & Widfeldt, 1999, p. 512)		
2003-2006	In October 2002, the <i>Minister for Democracy and Integration</i> is transferred to the <i>Ministry of Justice</i> ; in 2003 it is changed to <i>Minister for Democracy, Integration and Equality</i> , in 2004 changed to <i>Minister for Democracy, Cities, Integration and Equality</i> , in 2006 changed to <i>Minister for Integration and Equality</i> (Hernes, 2020)	- Immigrant integration policy	- Immigration policy (<i>Minister for Migration</i> within the <i>Ministry for Foreign Affairs</i>) (Hernes, 2020)	As before	conc = 0.5 span = 2 adj = no
2007-2010	Ministry of Integration and Equality created in January 2007 (Widfeldt, 2008, p. 1143)	- Immigrant integration policy	- Immigration policy (<i>Minister for Migration and Asylum Policy</i> located within the <i>Ministry for Justice</i>) (Hernes, 2020)	None	conc = 0.5 span = 1
2011-2016	<i>Minister for Integration</i> within the <i>Ministry for Employment</i> ; the specialised minister is abolished in 2014; in 2016, the Minister is named <i>Minister for Employment and Integration</i> (Emilsson, 2013, p. 300; Hernes, 2020)	- Immigrant integration policy	- Immigration policy (<i>Minister for Migration and Asylum Policy</i> located within the <i>Ministry for Justice</i>) (Hernes, 2020)	- Employment policy	conc = 0.5 span = 2 adj = yes

United Kingdom

<i>Main ministry</i>	<i>Immigration policy functions:</i>	<i>Other ministries' immigration policy functions:</i>	<i>Other policy functions of the main ministry:</i>	<i>Measures</i>
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1970-2005	<i>Home Office</i> (Cerna & Wietholtz, 2011, p. 226)	All matters concerning immigration, integration, race relations and communities were clustered in the Home Office (Cerna & Wietholtz, 2011, p. 226).	None (Cerna & Wietholtz, 2011, p. 226)	- Interior, law and order, criminal policy, prisons; MI5, the Forensic Science Service - Emergency planning, fire service - The Royal Family - Equal opportunities (Dunleavy, 1989a, 1989b; Marsh et al., 2001, pp. 65–67)	conc = 1.0 span = 2.5 adj = no
2006-2009	<i>Home Office</i> (Cerna & Wietholtz, 2011, p. 226; Hernes, 2020)	- Immigration policy - Integration policy - Refugee integration	- Race and social cohesion; integration policy (<i>Department for Communities and Local Government, DCLG</i> , created in May 2006) (Heppell, 2011; Hernes, 2020)	As before	conc = 0.65 span = 2.5 adj = no
2010-2016	<i>Department for Communities and Local Government (DCLG)</i> , from May 2010 onwards	- Primary responsibility for integration policy (DCLG, 2008, p. 43) - Race and social cohesion (Ali & Gidley, 2014, p. 5)	- Immigration policy; Border Agency (<i>Home Office</i>) (EMN, 2013b, p. 1)	- Local government, regions	conc = 0.5 span = 2 adj = yes

Ministries for unemployment

Australia

	<i>Main ministry</i>	<i>Unemployment policy functions:</i>	<i>Other ministries' unemployment policy functions:</i>	<i>Other policy functions of the main ministry:</i>	<i>Measures</i>
1970-1973	<i>Department of Labour and National Service</i> (becomes the <i>Department of Labour</i> in December 1972)	- Employment Service - Industrial relations and arbitration - National Service, re-instatement in civil employment of national servicemen (AAO, 16.4.1970, p. 2540; AAO, 19.12.1972, p. 6)	- Unemployment benefits and pensions as part of the social services portfolio (sickness and invalid benefits, age pensions) (<i>Department of Social Services, DSS</i>) (AAO, 16.4.1970, p. 2543; AAO, 19.12.1972, p. 10)	- Provision of hostel accommodation, including for immigrants (until December 1972)	conc = 0.67 span = 1.5 adj = no
1974-1975	<i>Department of Labour and Immigration (DLI)</i> , created in June 1974	as before (AAO, 2.10.1974, p. 8)	as before (AAO, 2.10.1974, p. 13)	- Migration; Naturalisation and aliens (AAO, 2.10.1974, p. 8)	conc = 0.67 span = 2 adj = no
1976-1978	<i>Department of Employment and Industrial Relations</i> , created in December 1975	as before (AAO, 22.12.1975, p. 8)	as before (AAO, 22.12.1975, p. 15)	None (AAO, 22.12.1975, p. 8)	conc = 0.67 span = 1
1979-1981	<i>Department of Employment and Youth Affairs</i> created in December 1978 (AAO, 5.12.1978, p. 1) (Davis et al., 1999)	- Commonwealth Employment Service - Manpower and Training - Re-instatement in civil employment of national servicemen (AAO, 5.12.1978, p. 1)	as before (AAO, 5.12.1978)	- Youth Affairs (AAO, 5.12.1978, p. 1)	conc = 0.67 span = 1.5 adj = no
1982-1987	<i>Department of Employment and Industrial Relations</i> reinstated in May 1982	- Commonwealth Employment Service - Manpower and Training - Re-instatement in civil employment of national servicemen - Industrial relations and arbitration	as before (AAO, 7.5.1982, p. 14) In 1984, creation of the <i>Department of Community Services</i> responsible for non-income support programs excised from the DSS (Nethercote, 1999).	as before (AAO, 7.5.1982, p. 6)	conc = 0.67 span = 1.5 adj = no

	(AAO, 7.5.1982, p. 6) (Davis et al., 1999)	- Coordination of government policy on wages and labour costs (AAO, 7.5.1982, p. 6)			
1988-1995	<i>Department of Employment, Education and Training</i> created in July 1987 (AAO, 24.7.1987) (Davis et al., 1999; Nethercote, 1999)	- Employment and Training - Employment Service - Labour market programs (AAO, 24.7.1987, p. 7) (Nethercote, 1999)	- Industrial relations (<i>Department of Industrial Relations</i>) (Nethercote, 1999, pp. 15–16) - The DSS was not “significantly affected” by the 1987 restructuring (Nethercote, 1999, p. 3).	- Education, other than migrant adult education; Youth affairs; Coordination of research policy; Research grants and fellowships (AAO, 24.7.1987, p. 7) (Nethercote, 1999)	conc = 0.67 span = 2 adj = yes
1996-1998	<i>Department of Employment, Education, Training and Youth Affairs (DEETYA)</i> , created in March 1996 (Mackerras & Mcallister, 1997; Davis et al., 1999; Nethercote, 1999)	- Employment and Training - Commonwealth Employment Service - Labour market programs (AAO, 11.3.1996, p. 8)	- Income security policies and programs (DSS) - Industrial relations (<i>Department of Industrial Relations</i>) (AAO, 11.3.1996, p. 14) - Small business, manufacturing and commerce incl. industries development (<i>Department of Industry, Science and Tourism</i>) (AAO, 11.3.1996, p. 15)	as before (AAO, 11.3.1996, p. 8)	conc = 0.67 span = 2 adj = yes
1999-2001	<i>Department of Employment, Workplace Relations and Small Business (DEWRSB)</i> created in October 1998 (AAO, 22.10.1998) (Nethercote, 1999) through a fusion of the former <i>Department of Workplace Relations and Small Business (DWRSB)</i> with DEETYA's employment area (OECD, 2001, pp. 90–91)	- Employment policy, incl. employment services - Job Network, supervision of the new employment services market through the Job Network Group - Labour market programs, incl. the Work for the Dole scheme - Workplace relations policy - Small business policy - Coordination of labour market research - Australian government employment pay and conditions - Occupational health and safety, rehabilitation and compensation - Affirmative action, equal employment opportunity issues	- Income security policies and programs, incl. unemployment assistance, services for people with disabilities and families with children, community support services (newly created <i>Department of Family and Community Services (FaCS)</i> that combines residual social security functions from the former Department of Health and Family Services, the Attorney General's Department and the Child Support Agency) (AAO, 22.10.1998, p. 17) (Nethercote, 1999) (OECD, 2001, pp. 91–92) - Vocational education and training, higher education and supervision of numeracy and literacy programmes, apprenticeship centres and other programmes to assist school-to-work transitions (<i>Department of Education, Training and Youth Affairs, DETYA</i>)	None	conc = 0.67 span = 1
2002-2007	<i>Department of Employment and Workplace Relations (DEWR)</i> created in November 2001 (AAO, 26.11.2001)	as before, except for small business policy that is split off (AAO, 26.11.2001, p. 13)	as before In 2004, creation of the <i>Department for Human Services (DHS)</i> located within the Finance Department, responsible for strategically directing, coordinating and brokering improvements to service delivery for six agencies, among which Centrelink (Halligan, 2015, pp. 1007–1008).	as before	conc = 0.67 span = 1
2008-2013	<i>Department of Education, Employment and Workplace Relations (DEEWR)</i> created in December 2007 (AAO, 3.12.2007) (OECD, 2012a, p. 64)	- Employment policy, incl. employment services - Job Network, supervision of the new employment services market through the Job Network Group - Labour market and income support policies and programs for people of working age - Services to help people with disabilities obtain employment (other than supported employment) - Income support for students and apprentices - Workplace relations policy - Coordination of labour market research	- <i>Department of Families, Housing, Community Services and Indigenous Affairs (FaHCSIA)</i> : Income security policies and programs for families with children, carers, the aged and people in hardship; Services for families with children, people with disabilities and carers; Community support services - Department for Human Services (DHS): payments and social services to families and individuals through the Centrelink programme	- Education policy and programs, excl. migrant adult education - Education and training transitions policies - Training, incl. apprenticeships - Youth affairs and programs, excluding income support policies and programs - Early childhood and childcare policy and programs	conc = 0.67 span = 2 adj = yes

		<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Australian government employment - Occupational health and safety, rehabilitation and compensation - Equal employment opportunity, work and family programs (AAO, 3.12.2007, p. 14) 	(AAO 3.12.2007, pp. 19, 27) (OECD, 2012a, p. 63)		
2014-2016	<i>Department of Employment</i> created in September 2013 (AAO, 18.9.2013)	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Employment policy, incl. employment services - Job Services Australia - Labour market programs for people of working age - Workplace relations policy - Coordination of labour market research - Occupational health and safety, rehabilitation and compensation - Equal employment opportunity, work and family programs 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Income security and support policies and programmes for families with children, carers, the aged, people with disabilities and people in hardship; Income support policies for students and apprentices; Disability Employment Services (transferred in 2013) (<i>Department of Social Services</i>) (AAO 18.9.2013, p. 35) 	- Migrant adult education	conc = 0.67 span = 1

Austria

	<i>Main ministry</i>	<i>Unemployment policy functions:</i>	<i>Other ministries' unemployment policy functions:</i>	<i>Other policy functions of the main ministry:</i>	<i>Measures</i>
1970-1986	<i>Federal Ministry for Social Administration</i> (in German: <i>Bundesministerium für soziale Verwaltung, BMSV</i>)	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Job placement (Public Employment Service) - Measures for employment promotion and welfare of unemployed persons - Labour market administration and policy - Labour inspections (BSV, 1975) 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Domestic market, economic and structural policy, labour market, vocational training (<i>Ministry for Trade, Commerce and Industry</i>; in German: <i>Bundesministerium für Handel, Gewerbe und Industrie</i>) (Bundesministeriengesetz 1973, p. 1780; Bundesministeriengesetz 1986, pp. 990-991) 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Social security, social policy, assistance, welfare of war and other victims (BSV, 1975) 	conc = 0.9 span = 2 adj = yes
1987-1996	<i>Federal Ministry for Employment and Social Affairs</i> (in German: <i>Bundesministerium für Arbeit und Soziales, BMAS</i>), created in March 1987	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Labour law - Labour market policy - Social insurances incl. unemployment insurance (Bundesministeriengesetz 1987, pp. 250-251) 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Domestic market, economic and structural policy, labour market, vocational training (<i>Ministry for Economic Affairs</i>) (Bundesministeriengesetz 1987, pp. 248-249) 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - General social policy, general social assistance (Bundesministeriengesetz 1987, pp. 250-251) 	conc = 0.9 span = 2 adj = yes
1997-1999	<i>Federal Ministry for Employment, Health, and Social Affairs</i> (in German: <i>Bundesministerium für Arbeit, Gesundheit und Soziales</i>), created in February 1997 (Fallend, 1998)	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Labour law - Labour market - Unemployment insurance - Unemployment assistance (long-term unemployed) 	None	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Social affairs - Health policy 	conc = 0.9 span = 3 adj = yes
2000-2008	<i>Federal Ministry for Economy and Labour</i> (in German: <i>Bundesministerium für Wirtschaft und Arbeit, BMWA</i>), created in February 2000	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Labour law - Labour market - Unemployment insurance: "Unemployment insurance is run by the Labour Market Service (<i>Arbeitsmarktservice</i>) under the supervision of the Federal Ministry for Economic Affairs and Labour (competence in particular for unemployment benefit). The Labour Market Service's 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Social assistance (<i>Federal Ministry for Social Security and Generations</i>, in German: <i>Bundesministerium für soziale Sicherheit und Generationen</i>) (MISSOC, 2005, p. 59, 2006, p. 53) - Employment injuries insurance (<i>Federal Ministry for health and women</i>, in German: 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Economic policy: trade and industry, domestic market, energy - Housing - Regional development 	conc = 0.7 span = 4 adj = no

		Federal Office supervises 9 <i>Länder</i> offices and approx. 100 regional offices.” (MISSOC, 2006, p. 52)	<i>Bundesministerium für Gesundheit und Frauen</i>) (MISSOC, 2005, p. 59, 2006, p. 53)		
2009-2016	<i>Federal Ministry für Labour, Social Affairs and Consumer Protection</i> (in German: <i>Bundesministerium für Arbeit, Soziales und Konsumentenschutz, BMASK</i>), created in February 2009	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Labour market policy, incl. PES - Since 2012, company-specific labour market policy - Labour law and labour inspectorate (BMASK, 2017) - Social insurance, incl. pension insurance - Social assistance, incl. employment of persons with disabilities (MISSOC, 2009)(Weishaupt, 2011, pp. 5–6) 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Employment injuries insurance (Federal Ministry of Health) 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Care prevention, disability; Federal long-term care benefit - Consumer policy 	conc = 1.0 span = 3 adj = yes

Canada

	<i>Main ministry</i>	<i>Unemployment policy functions:</i>	<i>Other ministries' unemployment policy functions:</i>	<i>Other policy functions of the main ministry:</i>	<i>Measures</i>
1970-1993	<i>Department of Manpower and Immigration</i> (established in 1965), renamed <i>Department of Employment and Immigration</i> (or <i>Employment and Immigration Canada</i>) in August 1977 when the UI Commission is integrated into the Department	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - National Employment Service - Unemployment Insurance - Employment and professional training (Pal, 1983, p. 82; Wood, 2017, pp. 12–13)	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Welfare programs, income security (<i>Department of National Health and Welfare</i> (also called Health and Welfare Canada, HWC) - Labour policy (<i>Department of Labour</i>) 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Immigration policy (Vineberg, 2012, pp. 25–33) 	conc = 0.7 span = 2 adj = no
1994-2003	<i>Human Resource Development Canada (HRDC)</i> created through fusion of the former <i>Department of Employment and Immigration</i> and the former <i>Department of Labour</i> , effective in November 1993 although formally established only in July 1996 (Brodtrick, 1996, p. 144; Rice & Prince, 2000, p. 212)	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Employment, labour market development - Unemployment Insurance - Welfare programs, income security - Labour policy “HRDC is responsible for all programmes that have to do with income support and with the labour market.” (Brodtrick, 1996, p. 144)	None	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Education support, literacy programme - Postsecondary education - Pensions (Brodtrick, 1996) 	conc = 1.0 span = 3 adj = yes
2004-2005	<i>Department for Human Resources and Skills Development Canada (HRSDC)</i> , which results from a split (de facto in December 2003, formally legally in July 2005	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Employment, labour market development - Unemployment Insurance - Labour policy (Department of Humans Resources and Skills Development Act)	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Social support programmes (<i>Department of Social Development Canada, SDC</i>) 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Education support, literacy programme - Postsecondary education, student loans - Pensions 	conc = 0.7 span = 2.5 adj = yes

	through the 'Department of Humans Resources and Skills Development Act' and the 'Department of Social Development Act') of HRDC into HRSDC and the <i>Department of Social Development Canada</i> (SDC) (HRRReporter, 2003; Jeffrey, 2010)				
2006-2016	<i>Human Resources and Social Development Canada</i> reunites HRSDC and SDC (Treasury Board, 2009, p. 13); in 2008 renamed <i>Human Resources and Skills Development Canada</i> and in 2013 renamed <i>Department of Employment and Social Development</i>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Employment Insurance: benefits - Industrial Relations: workplaces - Labour market programs: employment benefits and support measures, labour market development, employment of youth and aboriginals, labour market adjustment - Occupational Health and Safety - Social Support Programs formerly under SDC (Treasury Board, 2009, p. 12) 	None	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Housing and Mortgages: Homelessness - Social Security, Service Canada, National Child Benefit, National Seniors Council, Pensions 	conc = 1.0 span = 2 adj = yes

France

	<i>Main ministry</i>	<i>Unemployment policy functions:</i>	<i>Other ministries' unemployment policy functions:</i>	<i>Other policy functions of the main ministry:</i>	<i>Measures</i>
1970-1973	<i>Ministry for Labour, Employment, and Population</i> (in French: <i>Ministère du Travail, de l'Emploi et de la population</i>) (décret n° 73-436)	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Labour, Employment, Professional Training, Labour Relations (General Directorate for Labour and Employment) (décret n° 73-436) - Supervision of the Unemployment Benefit administered by employers' associations and trade unions (Gramain et al., 2006, pp. 9-10) 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Social assistance 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Demography, Internal Migrations, Immigration, Policies for Immigrants, Naturalisations (<i>Directorate for Population and Migrations</i>) (décret n° 73-436) 	conc = 0.7 span = 2 adj = no
1974-1976	<i>Ministry for Labour</i> (in French: <i>Ministère du Travail</i>) created in June 1974 (décret n° 74-579)	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Social security (except for family benefits and pensions) (Social Security Directorate) - Supervision of the Unemployment Benefit administered by employers' associations and trade unions (Gramain et al., 2006, pp. 9-10) - Labour and Employment (General Directorate for Labour and Employment) (décrets n° 74-579 and n° 77-418) 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Social action, social security (<i>Ministry of National Solidarity</i>, in French: <i>Ministère de la Solidarité Nationale</i>) 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Immigration (<i>Directorate for Population and Migration</i>) (décrets n° 74-579 and n° 77-418) 	conc = 0.9 span = 2 adj = no
1977-1982	<i>Ministry for Labour</i> (in French: <i>Ministère du Travail</i>) as of April 1977 (décret n° 77-418); in July 1982, the competences for employment policy are transferred to the Prime	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Labour and Employment (<i>General Directorate for Labour and Employment</i>) - Supervision of the Unemployment Benefit administered by employers' associations and trade unions (Gramain et al., 2006, pp. 9-10) 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Social action, social security (<i>Ministry of National Solidarity</i>, in French: <i>Ministère de la Solidarité Nationale</i>) (décret n° 81-694) 	None (décret n° 77-418)	conc = 0.7 span = 1

	minister (décret n° 82-601)				
1983-1984	<i>Ministry of Social Affairs and National Solidarity</i> created in April 1983 (décret n° 83-272)	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Unemployment Insurance - Labour, labour relations (<i>General Directorate for Labour and Employment</i>) - Employment policy (<i>General Directorate for Labour and Employment</i>) 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Coordination of professional training policy (<i>Minister for Professional Training</i>, directly responsible towards the Prime Minister; in French: <i>Ministère de la Formation Professionnelle</i>) (décret n° 83-293) 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Social security and social policy, family policy (<i>Social Security Directorate</i>) - Immigration (<i>Directorate for Population and Migration</i>) 	<p>conc = 1.0 span = 3 adj = yes</p>
1985	<i>Ministry for Labour, Employment and Professional Training</i> (in French: <i>Ministère du Travail, de l'Emploi et de la Formation Professionnelle</i>) created in July 1985 (décret n° 84-732)	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Labour policy, labour relations - Professional Training policy - Employment policy (<i>General Directorate for Labour and Employment</i>) - Unemployment Insurance 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Social security, social policy, social assistance (<i>Ministère des Affaires Sociales et de la Solidarité</i>) (décrets n° 84-730, n° 84-732) 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Immigration (<i>Directorate for Population and Migration</i>) 	<p>conc = 0.7 span = 2 adj = no</p>
1986-1988	<i>Ministry for Social Affairs and Employment</i> (in French: <i>Ministère des affaires sociales et de l'emploi</i>) created in July 1986 (décret n° 86-695)	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Labour policy, labour relations - Employment policy - Vocational training - Professional and social insertion of young people in difficult situations - Unemployment Insurance (décret n° 86-695) 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Coordination of professional training policy (<i>Minister for Professional Training</i>, directly responsible towards the Prime Minister; in French: <i>Ministère de la Formation Professionnelle</i>) (décrets n° 83-293, n° 86-695) 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Social security and social policy, family policy (<i>Social Security Directorate</i>) - Immigration (<i>Directorate for Population and Migration</i>) 	<p>conc = 1.0 span = 3 adj = yes</p>
1989-1995	<i>Ministry for Labour, Employment, and Vocational Training</i> (in French: <i>Ministère du travail, de l'emploi et de la formation professionnelle</i>) created in June 1988 following a split of the <i>Ministry for Social Affairs and Employment</i> (décrets n° 88-822 and n° 90-665)	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Labour - Employment policy - Vocational training - Professional and social integration of young people in difficult situations (décret n° 88-822) 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Social assistance (<i>Ministère de la Solidarité, de la Santé et de la Protection Sociale</i>) (décret n° 88-824) 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - As before 	<p>conc = 0.7 span = 1</p>
1997-2001	<i>Ministry for Employment and Solidarity</i> (in French: <i>Ministère de l'Emploi et de la Solidarité</i>) created in June 1997 (décret n° 97-706)	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Labour, employment, professional training (décret n° 97-706) (<i>Délégation générale à l'Emploi et à la formation professionnelle</i> created in March 1997 through a fusion of the former delegations for employment and for professional training) (décret n° 97-244) 	None	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Social policy, social security, and fight against exclusion (<i>Direction Générale de l'action sociale, direction de la sécurité sociale</i>) - Health (<i>Direction Générale de la Santé, direction de l'hospitalisation et de l'organisation des soins</i>) - Integration (<i>Direction de la population et des migrations</i>) - Family, gender equality (<i>Délégation interministérielle à la famille, service des droits des femmes et de l'égalité</i>) (décrets n° 97-244, n° 97-706 and n° 2000-685) - Fight against urban segregation ("politique de la ville"); settlement of French citizens returning from overseas territories (décret n° 97-706) 	<p>conc = 1.0 span = 4 adj = yes</p>
2002-2003	<i>Ministry for Social Affairs, Labour and Solidarity</i> (in French: <i>Ministère des</i>	as before	as before	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Social policy, social security, and fight against exclusion (<i>Direction Générale de l'action sociale, direction de la sécurité sociale</i>) 	<p>conc = 1.0 span = 3 adj = yes</p>

	Affaires sociales, du Travail et de la Solidarité) created in May 2002 (Décret n° 2002-891)			<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Integration (Direction de la population et des migrations) - Family, gender equality (Délégation interministérielle à la famille, service des droits des femmes et de l'égalité) (décrets n° 97-244, n° 97-706 and n° 2000-685) 	
2004-2006	Ministry for Employment, Labour and Social Cohesion (in French: <i>Ministère de l'Emploi, du travail et de la cohésion sociale</i>) created in April 2004 (décret n° 2004-318); renamed <i>Ministry for Employment, Social Cohesion and Housing</i> (in French: <i>Ministère de l'emploi, de la cohésion sociale et du logement</i>) in 2005 (décret n° 2005-670)	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Employment promotion, professional training for youth and adults; labour conditions, labour law, unemployment benefits (décret n° 2004-319) - Unemployment insurance, administered jointly with the parity organisations (namely, the Associations for Employment in Industry and Commerce (associations pour l'emploi dans l'industrie et le commerce, ASSEDIC) with the National Union for Employment in Industry and Commerce (Union nationale pour l'emploi dans l'industrie et le commerce, UNEDIC) (MISSOC, 2005, p. 32-33) - Special schemes for employees; agricultural scheme; schemes for self-employed persons 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - The ministries for health and social security (in French: <i>Ministère de la santé et de la protection sociale</i>, renamed <i>Ministère des solidarités, de la santé et de la famille</i> in 2005) and for agriculture partake responsibility for the different social security schemes, incl. unemployment insurance (décret n° 2004-319; MISSOC, 2005, p. 32-33) 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - General social security scheme (sickness, maternity, invalidity, death; employment injuries, occupational diseases; old age; family) covering most employees as well as other categories (students, recipients of certain benefits) - (from June 2005 onwards) Housing, social housing, rental housing, housing benefits, rehabilitation, housing quality, construction (décret n° 2005-670) - Urbanism 	conc = 1.0 span = 3 adj = yes
2007-2010	Ministry for Economy, Finances and Employment (in French: <i>Ministère de l'Economie, des Finances et de l'Emploi</i> , MINEFE), created in May 2007 (décret n° 2007-996), in March 2008 became the <i>Ministry for Economy, Industry and Employment</i> (in French: <i>Ministère de l'Economie, de l'Industrie et de l'Emploi</i> , MEIE) (Berthet & Bourgeois, 2011, p. 16)	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Employment promotion, unemployment policy 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Labour, social relations, prevention of work accidents and professional illnesses, women's rights, parity and equality in the professional sphere (Ministry for Labour, Social Relations and Solidarity (in French: <i>Ministère du travail, des relations sociales et de la solidarité</i>) (décret n° 2007-1000)⁴ - Supervision of the Social Security Directorate (Direction de la Sécurité Sociale) (ministries for Labour, Health and the newly created Ministry of Budget, Public Accounts and Public Service) (Hassenteufel, 2012, p. 357) - Social action and social protection (ministries for Labour, Health, Housing and Budget) (décret n° 2007-1000) 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Economic policy - Finance policy - Tourism - Nuclear safety (décret n° 2007-996) 	conc = 0.5 span = 4.5 adj = no
2012-2016	Ministry for Labour, Employment, (Professional Training) and Social Dialogue (in French: <i>Ministère du Travail, de l'Emploi, (de la Formation professionnelle) et du Dialogue social</i>) created in May 2012 (décret n° 2012-774)	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Labour, employment, professional training, social dialogue, prevention of labour accidents and of work-related diseases. - Labour conditions, employees' rights - Employment promotion, professional training (décret n° 2012-774) - responsibility for unemployment insurances of all employees (including in the agricultural sector); conversely, no more responsibilities for any other social insurances. (MISSOC, 2009, 2010) 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Work accidents and professional illnesses; fight against poverty, social minimum benefits (<i>Ministry for Social Affairs and Health (and Women's rights)</i>) (in French: <i>Ministère des affaires sociales et de la santé (et des droits des femmes)</i>) created in May 2012 (décret n° 2012-769) 	None (décret n° 2012-774)	conc = 0.7 span = 1

⁴ Renamed *Ministère du travail, des relations sociales, de la famille et de la solidarité* (03/2008 – 02/2009), then *Ministère du travail, des relations sociales, de la famille, de la solidarité et de la ville* (02/2009 – 04/2010). It becomes the *Ministère du travail, de la solidarité et de la fonction publique* between 4/2010 and 11/2010.

Germany

	<i>Main ministry</i>	<i>Unemployment policy functions:</i>	<i>Other ministries' unemployment policy functions:</i>	<i>Other policy functions of the main ministry:</i>	<i>Measures</i>
1970-1998	<i>Ministry for Employment and Social Affairs</i> (German: <i>Bundesministerium für Arbeit und Sozialordnung, BMAS</i>)	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Employment promotion - Employment service - Active labour market policy - Employment insurance - Distribution of the financial burden in the field of unemployment welfare (Hoffmann, 2003, p. 289) 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Social assistance, incl. social assistance for long-term unemployed persons (<i>Ministry for Health; in German: Bundesministerium für Gesundheit</i>) 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Social insurances, International social law (Hoffmann, 2003, p. 289) 	conc = 0.7 span = 2 adj = yes
1999-2002	<i>Ministry for Employment and Social Affairs</i> (in German: <i>Bundesministerium für Arbeit und Sozialordnung, BMAS</i>) created in October 1998 (Organisationserlass, 27.10.1998)	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Employment promotion, employment service, active labour market policy - Employment insurance - Distribution of the financial burden in the field of unemployment welfare - Unemployment assistance (Hassel & Schiller, 2010a, p. 196; Hoffmann, 2003, pp. 294–295) 	None	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Social insurances, Social assistance, International social policy (Hassel & Schiller, 2010a, p. 196; Hoffmann, 2003, pp. 294–295) 	conc = 1.0 span = 2 adj = yes
2003-2005	<i>Ministry for the Economy and Employment</i> (in German: <i>Bundesministerium für Wirtschaft und Arbeit, BMWA</i>), created in October 2002 (Organisationserlass, 22.10.2002; MISSOC, 2005, pp. 24-25)	as before (Organisational decree, 22.11.2005) (Busse, 2003, p. 409)	as before	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Economic policy: Annual economic report; economic research institutes; expert council for the assessment of the macroeconomic development; macroeconomic analyses and projections, economic statistics; international foreign trade policy (in part, not European economic and financial policy (Organisationserlass, 22.11.2005) (Busse, 2003, p. 409) 	conc = 1.0 span = 2 adj = no
2006-2016	<i>Ministry for Labour and Social Affairs</i> (in German: <i>Bundesministerium für Arbeit und Soziales, BMAS</i>) (BKOrgErl, 22.11.2005; MISSOC, 2006, 2007, 2008, 2009, 2010, 2011, 2012, 2013, 2014, 2015, 2016) (Busse, 2006, pp. 260–261)	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Employment promotion, employment service, active labour market policy - Employment insurance - European and international employment policy - Distribution of the financial burden in the field of unemployment welfare - Unemployment assistance (MISSOC, 2006, 2007, 2008, 2009, 2010, 2011, 2012, 2013, 2014, 2015, 2016) 	as before	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - European and international social policy - Social insurances, social assistance (BKOrgErl, 22.11.2005) 	conc = 1.0 span = 2 adj = yes

Netherlands

	<i>Main ministry</i>	<i>Unemployment policy functions:</i>	<i>Other ministries' unemployment policy functions:</i>	<i>Other policy functions of the main ministry:</i>	<i>Measures</i>
1970-1981	<i>Ministry for Economy</i>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Labour market policy 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Unemployment insurance, social security (<i>Ministry of Social Affairs</i>) (Soentken & Weishaupt, 2015, pp. 601–602) 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Economic policy 	conc = 0.5 span = 2 adj = no

1982-2016	<i>Ministry of Social Affairs and Employment</i> (in Dutch: <i>Ministerie van Sociale Zaken en Werkgelegenheid, SZW</i>) created through the transfer of labour market policy functions from the Ministry for Economy to the Ministry of Social Affairs in September 1981	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Unemployment insurance - Employment and labour market policy, employment assistance programmes for people of working age, activation policy, general labour market policy, policy with respect to target groups, Employment Service policy (<i>Directorate for the Labour Market</i>) - Labour relations (<i>Directorate for Labour Relations</i>) - Occupational health and safety - Supervision of the PES (<i>Directorate for Supervision</i>); the supervision of PES is placed under a tripartite board in 1991, but the SZW retains a dominant position (Koning et al., 1996, p. 61) <p>(Koning et al., 1996, pp. 59–63; Lucardie, 2003, 2008; Sol et al., 2008; Otjes & Voerman, 2013) (MISSOC Sheets, Netherlands, 2006-2016)</p>	None	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Social security, income support, unemployment insurance, sickness, maternity and invalidity insurances; old age, survivors and family benefits; Social assistance: minimum income schemes, supervision of municipalities and municipal social services (<i>Directorates for National Assistance and for Social Insurance</i>) 	<p>conc = 1.0 span = 2 adj = yes</p>
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New Zealand

	<i>Main ministry</i>	<i>Unemployment policy functions:</i>	<i>Other ministries' unemployment policy functions:</i>	<i>Other policy functions of the main ministry:</i>	<i>Measures</i>
1970-1998	<i>Department of Labour (DoL)</i> (created through the Labour Department Act 1893 re-enacted in 1908 and 1954)	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - National Employment Service: employment policy - Labour laws, industrial legislation: working conditions, industrial relations and agreements, labour inspections - Data, surveys and reporting on employment, unemployment, and wages - Trade-training schemes for demobilised servicemen - Occupational health and safety <p>(McLintock, 1966)</p>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Income support, payment of monetary benefits (Benefits and pensions division), professional casework (Social Work division), social planning and coordination (Developmental Services) <p>(<i>Department of Social Security (DSS)</i>, then <i>Department of Social Welfare (DSW)</i> created in April 1972 through a fusion of DSS with the Child Welfare Division (formerly in the <i>Department of Education</i>)) (Garlick, 2012, pp. 90–94)</p>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Immigration policy 	<p>conc = 0.6 span = 2 adj = no</p>
1999-2000	<i>Department of Work and Income (WINZ)</i> created in October 1998 (OECD, 1999, pp. 55–56; Garlick, 2012, pp. 211–218)	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Administration of the benefit system, income support (Income Support Service, ISS) - Provision of employment assistance, employment obligations (New Zealand Employment Service, Community Employment Group, network of committees of the Local Employment Co-ordination Group) (Garlick, 2012, p. 207) - Student loans and allowances (Garlick, 2012, p. 211) 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Social policy advice on cross-cutting medium- to long-term social issues (<i>Ministry of Social Policy (MSP)</i> created in 1999 from the fusion of the Social Policy Agency (former DSW) and a new Purchasing and Monitoring Group) (Garlick, 2012, pp. 207 & 220) 	None (Garlick, 2012, pp. 211–218)	<p>conc = 1.0 span = 1</p>
2001-2016	<i>Ministry of Social Development</i> created in April 2001 with the fusion of MSP and WINZ (Garlick, 2012, pp. 219–300)	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Administration of the benefit system, income support (Income Support Service, ISS) - Provision of employment assistance, employment obligations (New Zealand Employment Service, Community Employment Group, network of committees of the Local Employment Co-ordination Group) (Garlick, 2012, p. 207) - Student loans and allowances (Garlick, 2012, p. 211) 	None	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Social policy advice on cross-cutting medium- to long-term social issues - Child, youth and family services (from 2006 onwards) (Garlick, 2012, pp. 266–267) - Social housing assessment and administration of the income-related rent subsidy (from 2014 onwards) 	<p>conc = 1.0 span = 2 adj = yes</p>

Sweden

	<i>Main ministry</i>	<i>Unemployment policy functions:</i>	<i>Other ministries' unemployment policy functions:</i>	<i>Other policy functions of the main ministry:</i>	<i>Measures</i>
1970-1974	Ministry of the Interior	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Labour market - Labour protection - Swedish public employment service (supervision of unemployment insurance system) 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Policies related to social welfare, financial security, social services (<i>Ministry of Health and Social Affairs</i>; in Swedish: <i>Socialdepartementet</i>) 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Housing policy - Immigration policy 	conc = 0.7 span = 3 adj = no
1975-1998	<i>Ministry of Employment</i> , created in September 1974 after a split of the Ministry of the Interior	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Labour market - Labour protection - Swedish public employment service (supervision of unemployment insurance system) 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Policies related to social welfare, financial security, social services (<i>Ministry of Health and Social Affairs</i>; in Swedish: <i>Socialdepartementet</i>) 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Immigration policy 	conc = 0.7 span = 2 adj = no
1999-2006	<i>Ministry of Enterprise, Energy and Innovation</i> (in Swedish: <i>näringsdepartementet</i>) created in October 1998 (Widfeldt, 2000; Sieberer et al., 2019)	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Employment, labour market, - National Labour Market Board - Unemployment insurance/benefits: basic allowance, optional income related benefit, Unemployment Insurance Funds (MISSOC, 2005, 2006) 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Social assistance; Social insurance (<i>Ministry of Health and Social Affairs</i>) (MISSOC, 2005, 2006) 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Small businesses - Industry - Energy - Information technology - Infrastructure 	conc = 0.7 span = 4 adj = no
2007-2016	<i>Ministry of Employment</i> reinstated in January 2007 (Widfeldt, 2008; Sieberer et al., 2019)	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Employment, labour market - Unemployment insurance/benefits: basic allowance, optional income related benefit - National Labour Market Board - Unemployment Insurance Funds (MISSOC, 2005, 2006) 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Social assistance; Social insurance (<i>Ministry of Health and Social Affairs</i>) (MISSOC, 2007 to 2016) 	None	conc = 0.7 span = 1

United Kingdom

	<i>Main ministry</i>	<i>Unemployment policy functions:</i>	<i>Other ministries' unemployment policy functions:</i>	<i>Other policy functions of the main ministry:</i>	<i>Measures</i>
1970-1995	<i>Department of Employment (and Productivity)</i> created in 1968, name shortened in October 1970, takes over functions of former <i>Ministry for Labour</i> (Pollitt, 1984, pp. 191–195)	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Manpower Services Commission (created in 1974), JobCentre network, Training Services Agency - Employment advice and placement services and benefits for working-age people with qualifying employment records - Prices and income policy (Pollitt, 1984, pp. 191–195) 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - <i>Department of Health and Social Security (DHSS/DSS)</i>, created in 1968: social security system, national insurance schemes for non-working people both of working-age and pensioners, pensions (old age, widows, disability), non-contributory benefits (The National Archives, 2012, p. 6); becomes the <i>Department of Social Security (DSS)</i> in 1988: an “integrated welfare-benefits ministry” responsible for national insurance schemes for non-working people both of working-age and pensioners (White & Dunleavy, 2010, p. 54) 	None	conc = 0.5 span = 1
1996-2000	<i>Department of Education and Employment (DoEE)</i> created in July 1995 (Webb, 1996)	As before	As before	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Education policy 	conc = 0.5 span = 2 adj = yes

2001-2016	<p><i>Department for Work and Pensions (DWP)</i> created in June 2001 through the fusion of the former DSS, parts of DoEE, and two new agencies (JobCentre Plus and Pensions Service) (Carmel & Papadopoulos, 2003; Wiggan, 2007; White & Dunleavy, 2010; Champion, 2013, pp. 118–119; Whitaker, 2016)</p>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Employment service and advice - Cash Social Security benefit (JobCentre Plus) (OECD, 2014a, p. 47) 	None	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Child support (Child Support Agency), Housing benefit, council tax benefits - Pensions (Pension Service, Disability and Carers Directorate) - Health and maternity pay (employees) 	<p>conc = 1.0 span = 3 adj = yes</p>
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
APPENDIX B – QCA MATERIALS

Calibration

This section presents the calibration of the conditions in more detail. It also contains XY plots of the raw scores and the calibration as well as skewness analyses.


Portfolio concentration

Figure 1: Measurement of portfolio concentration



Executive dominance of the legislative agenda


Figure 2: Measure of the executive dominance of the legislative agenda in the nine countries



Government ideology ('GOVR' and 'HGOVR')

Calibration with the thresholds $e = -10$, $c = 0$, $i = 10$ results in the sets 'GOVR' and 'HGOVR' is pictured in Figure 3.

Figure 3: Calibration of 'GOVR' (left) and 'HGOVR' (right)



Descriptive statistics

Table 1: PI reform activity of governments with different organisational configurations: descriptive statistics

	Environmental policy						Immigration policy						Unemployment policy					
	<i>Min</i>	<i>Max</i>	<i>Mean</i>	<i>IQR</i>	<i>Median</i>	<i>SD</i>	<i>Min</i>	<i>Max</i>	<i>Mean</i>	<i>IQR</i>	<i>Median</i>	<i>SD</i>	<i>Min</i>	<i>Max</i>	<i>Mean</i>	<i>IQR</i>	<i>Median</i>	<i>SD</i>
<i>Portfolio concentration</i>																		
Concentrated	0.25	3.75	1.53	1	1.33	0.85	0.25	4.25	1.56	1.04	1.33	1.03	0	4	1.55	1.62	1.67	1.08
Mostly concentrated	0	2	0.89	1.14	0.88	0.72	0	4.33	1.51	1.58	1.12	1.19	0	2.33	1.28	1.33	1.33	0.74
Mostly fragmented	0	2.5	1.16	0.85	1.29	0.75	0	3	1.71	1.37	1.92	1.29	0.67	4	1.75	1.12	2	0.92
Fragmented	0.33	2.2	0.99	0.66	0.75	0.54	0	3.5	0.99	1.25	0.71	0.98	0.8	4.5	2.11	1.75	1.5	1.54
<i>Type of ministry</i>																		
Single-issue	0	3.75	1.15	1.08	1	0.87	0.33	3.5	1.45	1.2	1	0.96	0.5	2.33	1.18	0.96	0.9	0.65
Garbage-can	0	2.5	0.93	0.8	0.88	0.76	0.25	4.25	1.63	1.70	1.5	1.11	0.33	4.5	1.99	0.88	2	1.13
Large	0.33	2.6	1.47	1	1.33	0.61	0	4.33	1.04	1.25	0.67	1.08	0	3.5	1.46	1.39	1.58	0.98
<i>Organisational configurations</i>																		
Concentrated SI	0	3.75	1.3	1.11	1.12	1.02	0.33	3	1.31	0.83	1	0.81	0.5	2.33	1.04	0.77	0.71	0.73
Concentrated GC	0	1.5	0.79	0.89	0.84	0.6	0.25	4.25	1.93	1.75	1.75	1.19	0.33	4	1.81	0.92	2	0.92
Concentrated Large	0.4	2.6	1.56	1	1.5	0.63	0	4.33	1.21	1.3	1	1.14	0	3.5	1.39	1.33	1.5	1
Fragmented SI	0	2	0.93	0.72	0.71	0.57	3.5	3.5	3.5	0	3.5	0	0.67	2	1.33	1.02	1.25	0.59
Fragmented GC	0	2.5	1.14	1.06	1.04	1.05	0.25	3	1.15	0.87	0.75	0.82	0.67	4.5	2.39	1.96	1.84	1.51
Fragmented Large	0.33	2.2	1.3	0.5	1.33	0.58	0	3.5	0.88	1.5	0.6	1.04	0.67	2.75	1.82	1	2	0.85

Truth table analyses

Analysis 1: Environmental policy, 1980s-1990s

Calibrated scores

Table 2 presents the fuzzy scores for the conditions and the outcome. None of the sets is skewed but the condition LARGE is closest to skewness with 10/37 cases in the set (27.03%).

Table 2: Fuzzy scores for cases of environmental policy, 1980s/1990s

Case	CONC	LARGE	EXECDOM	GOVR	HGOVR	SALG	SALHG	PIACT
AL_Hawke2	0.9	0	1	0.93	0.93	0	0	0
AL_Hawke3	0.9	0	1	0.21	0.21	0.01	0.03	0
AL_Hawke4&Keating1	0.9	0	1	0.01	0.01	0.06	0.12	0.48
AL_Howard1	0.9	0	0.7	1	1	0.27	0.38	0.8
AL_Howard2	0.9	0.33	0.3	1	1	0	0	0.02
AL_Keating2	0.9	0	1	0.49	0.49	0.01	0.03	0.15
AT_Klima	0.05	0	0	1	1	0	0.01	0.48
AT_Sinowatz3	0.05	1	0.3	0.01	0	0.99	0.99	0.01
AT_Vranitzky2	0.05	0	0.3	0.96	0.11	0.97	1	0
AT_Vranitzky3	0.05	0	0	0.34	0.1	1	1	0.05
AT_Vranitzky4	0.05	0	0	0.84	0.05	0.95	0.97	1
CA_Chretien1	0.05	0	1	0.77	0.77	0.43	0.52	0.48
CA_Chretien2	0.05	0	1	0.87	0.87	0	0	0.05
CA_Mulroney1	0.05	0	1	0.97	0.97	0.01	0.02	0.15
CA_Mulroney2&Campbell	0.05	0	1	1	1	0	0	0.61
DE_Kohl2	0.95	0	0	0.95	0.95	0.99	0.99	0.8
DE_Kohl3	0.95	0	0	0.1	0.05	1	1	0.05
DE_Kohl4	0.95	0	0	1	1	0.95	0.95	0.38
FR_Balladur&Juppe1-2	0.81	0.33	0.3	0.65	0.2	0.3	0.09	0.05
FR_Chirac	0.81	0.33	0	1	1	0.06	0	0
FR_Cresson&Beregovoy	0.81	0.33	0	0.02	0.02	0	0.01	0.02
FR_Jospin	0.81	1	0.7	0.01	0.02	0.49	0.41	1
FR_Rocard1-2	0.81	0.33	0	0.02	0.02	0	0	0.95
NL_Kok1		0 1	0.3	0.8	0.78	0.97	0.98	0.15
NL_Lubbers1		0 1	0.3	0.7	0.03	0.6	0.94	0.48
NL_Lubbers2		0 1	0.3	0.47	0.24	0.92	0.93	0.48

NL_Lubbers3	0	1	0.3	0.01	0.07	1	1	1
NZ_Bolger1	0	0	1	0.19	0.19	1	1	0.03
NZ_Bolger2-3	0	0	1	0.12	0.12	0.99	0.99	0.95
NZ_Lange2&Palmer	0	0	1	0	0	0.5	0.55	0.02
SE_Bildt	0.95	0.33	0	1	1	0.97	0.2	0.95
SE_Carlsson1	0.81	1	1	0	0	0.99	1	1
SE_Carlsson3	0.95	0.33	1	0.02	0.1	1	1	1
SE_Carlsson4&Persson1	0.95	0.33	0	1	1	0	0.01	1
UK_Blair1	0.99	1	1	0.91	0.91	0.07	0.13	1
UK_Major2	0.99	1	1	1	1	0.76	0.81	0.91
UK_Thatcher3	0.99	1	1	1	1	0.1	0.17	1

Presence of the outcome

The first six truth table rows as regards the consistency of their association with the outcome PIACT were included in the solution. Row 20 has the lowest consistency of the rows included (consistency = 0.675, PRI = 0.544); it contains three cases, one of which is deviant in kind. Including row 20 allowed to raise the coverage slightly, by including three more cases, while sacrificing some consistency.

Table 3: Truth table

	CONC	LARGE	EXECDOM	GOVR	SALG	OUT	n	incl	PRI	cases
30	1	1	1	0	1	1	1	0.859	0.854	SE_Carlsson1
32	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	0.805	0.777	UK_Major2
31	1	1	1	1	0	1	2	0.801	0.787	UK_Thatcher3, UK_Blair1
22	1	0	1	0	1	1	1	0.743	0.690	SE_Carlsson3
29	1	1	1	0	0	1	1	0.720	0.697	FR_Jospin
20	1	0	0	1	1	1	3	0.675	0.544	DE_Kohl2, DE_Kohl4, SE_Bildt
10	0	1	0	0	1	0	3	0.667	0.485	AT_Sinowatz3, NL_Lubbers2, NL_Lubbers3
12	0	1	0	1	1	0	2	0.587	0.027	NL_Lubbers1, NL_Kok1
4	0	0	0	1	1	0	2	0.516	0.418	AT_Vranitzky2, AT_Vranitzky4
3	0	0	0	1	0	0	1	0.486	0.098	AT_Klima
6	0	0	1	0	1	0	2	0.483	0.378	NZ_Bolger1, NZ_Bolger2-3
17	1	0	0	0	0	0	2	0.450	0.406	FR_Rocard1-2, FR_Cresson&Beregovoy
5	0	0	1	0	0	0	1	0.399	0	NZ_Lange2&Palmer
19	1	0	0	1	0	0	4	0.391	0.295	AL_Howard2, FR_Chirac, FR_Balladur&Juppe1-2, SE_Carlsson4&Persson1

7	0	0	1	1	0	0	4	0.390	0.083	CA_Mulroney1, CA_Mulroney2&Campbell, CA_Chretien1, CA_Chretien2
23	1	0	1	1	0	0	2	0.364	0.200	AL_Hawke2, AL_Howard1
2	0	0	0	0	1	0	1	0.317	0.168	AT_Vranitzky3
21	1	0	1	0	0	0	3	0.300	0	AL_Hawke3, AL_Hawke4&Keating1, AL_Keating2
18	1	0	0	0	1	0	1	0.185	0.043	DE_Kohl3
1	0	0	0	0	0	?	0			
8	0	0	1	1	1	?	0			
9	0	1	0	0	0	?	0			
11	0	1	0	1	0	?	0			
13	0	1	1	0	0	?	0			
14	0	1	1	0	1	?	0			
15	0	1	1	1	0	?	0			
16	0	1	1	1	1	?	0			
24	1	0	1	1	1	?	0			
25	1	1	0	0	0	?	0			
26	1	1	0	0	1	?	0			
27	1	1	0	1	0	?	0			
28	1	1	0	1	1	?	0			


Note: Inclusion cut = 0.65, PRI cut = 0.51. Bold indicates cases that are members of the outcome.

Table 4: Conservative solution formula

	Prime Implicant	Cons.	PRI	Raw cov.	Unique cov.
1	CONC * LARGE * EXECDOM	0.880	0.876	0.275	0.174
2	CONC * EXECDOM * ~GOVR * SALG	0.881	0.871	0.146	0.044
3	CONC * ~LARGE * ~EXECDOM * GOVR * SALG	0.675	0.544	0.134	0.130
	<i>Solution</i>	<i>0.836</i>	<i>0.811</i>	<i>0.450</i>	

	Cases consistent	deviant
1	Jospin (FR) (row 29); Carlsson I (SE) (row 30); Thatcher 3 (UK), Blair 1 (UK) (row 31); Major 2 (UK) (row 32)	-
2	Carlsson III (SE) (row 22); Carlsson I (SE) (row 30)	-
3	Kohl II (DE), Bildt (SE) (row 20)	Kohl IV (DE)

Figure 4: Conservative solution plot




The most parsimonious solution generated by the truth table contains two models with four PIs. Both models have a good consistency and a low coverage; as regards the latter, the parsimonious solution explains slightly more than half of the outcome PIACT observed across all cases.

Table 5: Parsimonious solution formula

	Prime Implicant	Cons.	PRI	Raw cov.	Unique cov.
1	CONC * EXECDOM * SALG	0.912	0.899	0.210	0.038
	CONC * GOVR * SALG	0.765	0.687	0.211	0.112
3	CONC * LARGE	0.813	0.806	0.339	0.045
4	LARGE * EXECDOM	0.850	0.828	0.347	0.071
	<i>Solution (model 1)</i>	<i>0.803</i>	<i>0.776</i>	<i>0.511</i>	
	<i>Solution (model 2)</i>	<i>0.828</i>	<i>0.791</i>	<i>0.537</i>	

	Cases consistent	deviant
1	Carlsson III (SE); Carlsson I (SE); Major 2 (UK)	-
2	Kohl II (DE), Bildt (SE); Major 2 (UK)	Kohl IV (DE)
3	Jospin (FR); Carlsson I (SE); Thatcher 3 (UK), Blair 1 (UK); Major 2 (UK)	-
4	Jospin (FR); Carlsson I (SE); Thatcher 3 (UK), Blair 1 (UK); Major 2 (UK)	-

Figure 5: Parsimonious solution plot (model 1)



Absence of the outcome

The truth table for the absence of the outcome (~PIACT) contains seven rows that are considered sufficient for producing ~PIACT with a consistency threshold of 0.7 and a PRI threshold of 0.51. It made sense to maintain a consistency threshold at 0.7 because row 6, i.e., the first truth table row with OUT = 0, contains two cases, one of which is deviant in kind, i.e., a member of the row but not of the outcome; including row 6 would have led to a drop in consistency while not strengthening coverage significantly.

Table 6: Truth table

	CONC	LARGE	EXECDOM	GOVR	SALG	OUT	n	incl	PRI	Cases
5	0	0	1	0	0	1	1	1	1	NZ_Lange2&Palmer
18	1	0	0	0	1	1	1	0.964	0.957	DE_Kohl3
12	0	1	0	1	1	1	2	0.951	0.884	NL_Lubbers1, NL_Kok1
21	1	0	1	0	0	1	3	0.863	0.804	AL_Hawke3, AL_Hawke4&Keating1, AL_Keating2
2	0	0	0	0	1	1	1	0.862	0.832	AT_Vranitzky3
23	1	0	1	1	0	1	2	0.841	0.800	AL_Hawke2, AL_Howard1
7	0	0	1	1	0	1	4	0.826	0.738	CA_Mulroney1, CA_Mulroney2&Campbell, CA_Chretien1, CA_Chretien2
19	1	0	0	1	0	1	4	0.745	0.705	AL_Howard2, FR_Chirac, FR_Balladur&Juppe1-2, SE_Carlsson4&Persson1
3	0	0	0	1	0	0	1	0.704	0.480	AT_Klima
6	0	0	1	0	1	0	2	0.686	0.622	NZ_Bolger1, NZ_Bolger2-3
10	0	1	0	0	1	0	3	0.683	0.509	AT_Sinowatz3, NL_Lubbers2, NL_Lubbers3
4	0	0	0	1	1	0	2	0.652	0.582	AT_Vranitzky2, AT_Vranitzky4
17	1	0	0	0	0	0	2	0.624	0.594	FR_Rocard1-2, FR_Cresson&Beregovoy
20	1	0	0	1	1	0	3	0.473	0.260	DE_Kohl2, DE_Kohl4, SE_Bildt
22	1	0	1	0	1	0	1	0.427	0.310	SE_Carlsson3
29	1	1	1	0	0	0	1	0.356	0.303	FR_Jospin
32	1	1	1	1	1	0	1	0.322	0.223	UK_Major2
31	1	1	1	1	0	0	2	0.264	0.213	UK_Thatcher3, UK_Blair1
30	1	1	1	0	1	0	1	0.176	0.146	SE_Carlsson1
1	0	0	0	0	0	?	0			
8	0	0	1	1	1	?	0			
9	0	1	0	0	0	?	0			
11	0	1	0	1	0	?	0			
13	0	1	1	0	0	?	0			
14	0	1	1	0	1	?	0			
15	0	1	1	1	0	?	0			
16	0	1	1	1	1	?	0			
24	1	0	1	1	1	?	0			
25	1	1	0	0	0	?	0			
26	1	1	0	0	1	?	0			
27	1	1	0	1	0	?	0			
28	1	1	0	1	1	?	0			

Note: Inclusion cut = 0.7, PRI cut = 0.51

The conservative solution generated from the truth table contains one model with four PIs. Consistency is good (0.822, PRI = 0.758) and coverage is moderate (0.614).

Table 7: Conservative solution formula

$\sim\text{LARGE} * \text{EXECDOM} * \sim\text{SALG} + \text{CONC} * \sim\text{LARGE} * \text{GOVR} * \sim\text{SALG} +$

$\sim\text{LARGE} * \sim\text{EXECDOM} * \sim\text{GOVR} * \text{SALG} +$

$\sim\text{CONC} * \text{LARGE} * \sim\text{EXECDOM} * \text{GOVR} * \text{SALG} \rightarrow \sim\text{PIACT}$

	Prime Implicant	Cons.	PRI	Raw cov.	Unique cov.
1	$\sim\text{LARGE} * \text{EXECDOM} * \sim\text{SALG}$	0.796	0.740	0.379	0.244
2	$\text{CONC} * \sim\text{LARGE} * \text{GOVR} * \sim\text{SALG}$	0.771	0.731	0.216	0.075
3	$\sim\text{LARGE} * \sim\text{EXECDOM} * \sim\text{GOVR} * \text{SALG}$	0.925	0.917	0.100	0.083
4	$\sim\text{CONC} * \text{LARGE} * \sim\text{EXECDOM} * \text{GOVR} * \text{SALG}$	0.951	0.884	0.102	0.088
	<i>Solution</i>	<i>0.811</i>	<i>0.756</i>	<i>0.630</i>	

	Cases consistent	deviant
1	Lange II-Palmer (NZ); Mulroney I (CA), Chrétien I (CA), Chrétien II (CA); Hawke III (AL), Hawke IV & Keating (AL), Keating II (AL);	Mulroney II & Campbell (CA); Howard I (AL)
2	Howard II (AL), Chirac (FR), Balladur & Juppé I-II (FR); Hawke II (AL)	Carlsson IV & Persson I (SE) ; Howard I (AL)
3	Vranitzky III (AT); Kohl III (DE)	-
4	Lubbers I (NL), Kok I (NL)	-

Figure 6: Conservative solution plot




Table 8: Parsimonious solution formula


- M1: $\sim\text{LARGE} * \text{EXECDOM} * \sim\text{SALG} + \text{CONC} * \sim\text{LARGE} * \text{GOVR} * \sim\text{SALG} + \sim\text{LARGE} * \sim\text{EXECDOM} * \sim\text{GOVR} * \text{SALG} + (\sim\text{CONC} * \text{LARGE} * \text{GOVR}) \rightarrow \sim\text{PIACT}$
- M2: $\sim\text{LARGE} * \text{EXECDOM} * \sim\text{SALG} + \text{CONC} * \sim\text{LARGE} * \text{GOVR} * \sim\text{SALG} + \sim\text{LARGE} * \sim\text{EXECDOM} * \sim\text{GOVR} * \text{SALG} + (\text{LARGE} * \sim\text{EXECDOM} * \text{GOVR}) \rightarrow \sim\text{PIACT}$

	Prime Implicant	Cons.	PRI	Raw cov.	Unique cov.
1	$\sim\text{LARGE} * \text{EXECDOM} * \sim\text{SALG}$	0.796	0.740	0.379	0.244
2	$\text{CONC} * \sim\text{LARGE} * \text{GOVR} * \sim\text{SALG}$	0.771	0.731	0.216	0.075
3	$\sim\text{LARGE} * \sim\text{EXECDOM} * \sim\text{GOVR} * \text{SALG}$	0.925	0.917	0.100	0.083
4	$\sim\text{CONC} * \text{LARGE} * \text{GOVR}$	0.891	0.792	0.121	0.006
5	$\text{LARGE} * \sim\text{EXECDOM} * \text{GOVR}$	0.776	0.655	0.142	0.000
	<i>Solution Model 1</i>	<i>0.805</i>	<i>0.749</i>	<i>0.636</i>	
	<i>Solution Model 2</i>	<i>0.792</i>	<i>0.733</i>	<i>0.630</i>	

| Cases

	consistent	deviant
1	Lange II-Palmer (NZ); Mulroney I (CA), Chrétien I (CA), Chrétien II (CA); Hawke III (AL), Hawke IV & Keating (AL), Keating II (AL);	Mulroney II & Campbell (CA); Howard I (AL)
2	Howard II (AL), Chirac (FR), Balladur & Juppé I-II (FR); Hawke II (AL)	Carlsson IV & Persson I (SE) ; Howard I (AL)
3	Vranitzky III (AT); Kohl III (DE)	-
4	Lubbers I (NL), Kok I (NL)	-
5	Lubbers I (NL), Kok I (NL)	-

Figure 7: Parsimonious solution plot



Analysis 2: Environmental policy, 2000s-2010s

Calibrated scores

Table 9 presents the fuzzy scores for the conditions and the outcome. None of the sets is skewed.

Table 9: Fuzzy scores for cases of environmental policy, 2000s-2010s

Case	CONC	LARGE	EXECDOM	GOVR	HGOVR	SALG	SALHG	PIACT
AL_Howard3	0.9	0.33	0.3	1	1	0	0.01	0.34
AL_Howard4	0.9	0.33	0.3	1	1	0	0	0
AL_Rudd1&Gillard1	0.95	0	1	0.84	0.84	0.33	0.43	0.05
AL_Gillard2&Rudd2	0.95	1	0	0	0	0.99	1	0.84
AT_Schüssel1	0.99	1	0	1	0.99	0.21	0.01	1
AT_Schüssel3	0.99	1	0	0.24	0.46	0.5	0.64	0.75
AT_Gusenbauer	0.99	1	0	0.06	0.01	0.65	0.61	0.95
AT_Faymann1	0.99	1	0	0.05	0.01	0.06	0.71	0.11
CA_Chretien3	0.05	0	1	0.03	0.03	0.99	1	0
CA_Harper1	0.05	0	0	0.98	0.98	0.01	0.02	0.99
CA_Harper2	0.05	0	0	0.94	0.94	0.59	0.65	1
CA_Harper3	0.05	0	1	1	1	0.67	0.73	0.75
FR_Raffarin1-3&Villepin	0.95	0	0.7	0.09	0.07	0.08	0.12	1
FR_Fillon1-4	0.95	1	0.7	0.03	0.03	0.83	0.88	1
FR_Ayrault&Valls	0.95	1	0.7	0	0	0.27	0.23	0.84
DE_Schröder1	0.95	0	0	0.23	0.38	0.68	0.53	0.34
DE_Schröder2	0.95	0	0	0.57	0.77	0.52	0.05	0.01
DE_Merkel1	0.95	0	0	0.97	1	0.13	0.08	1
DE_Merkel2	0.95	0	0	0.9	0.93	0.73	0.82	0
NL_Kok2-3	0	1	0.7	0.05	0	0.97	1	0.75
NL_Balkenende1-3	0	1	0.3	0.97	0.67	0.02	0.29	0.08
NL_Balkenende4-5	0	1	0.3	0.71	0.76	0.05	0.29	0.95
NL_Rutte1-2	0.05	1	0	0.97	1	0.85	0.47	1
NZ_Clark1	0	0	1	0	0	0.85	0.96	0.05
NZ_Clark2	0	0	1	0	0	0.99	1	0.01
NZ_Clark3	0	0	1	0	0	0.03	0.06	0.05
NZ_Key1	0	0	1	1	1	0	0	0.05
NZ_Key2	0	0	1	0.41	0.41	0.55	0.61	0.01
SE_Persson2	0.95	0.33	0	0.26	0.26	0	0.01	1
SE_Persson3a	0.95	0.33	0	0	0	0.62	0.68	0.95
SE_Persson3b	0.95	1	0	0	0	0.62	0.68	0.34
SE_Reinfeldt1	0.95	0.33	0.3	0.76	0.76	0.95	0.92	0.08

SE_Reinfeldt2	0.95	0.33	0	0.61	0.67	1	1	0.75
UK_Blair2	0.99	1	1	0.84	0.84	0.23	0.33	1
UK_Blair3	0.99	1	1	0.29	0.29	0.09	0.15	0.34
UK_Brown	0.99	1	1	0.29	0.29	0.09	0.15	0.34
UK_Cameron	0.99	1	0.3	0.99	0.99	0.64	0.7	0.01

Presence of the outcome

Nine truth table rows are used for producing the solutions. With a consistency threshold of 0.745 and a PRI threshold of 0.51, truth table rows 18, 19, 25, 28, and 29, that have moderate consistency scores while containing cases that are inconsistent in kind, are excluded as sufficient for the outcome.

Table 10: Truth table

	CONC	LARGE	EXECDOM	HGOVR	SALG	OUT	n	incl	PRI	Cases
14	0	1	1	0	1	1	1	1	1	NL_Kok2-3
12	0	1	0	1	1	1	1	0.997	0.996	NL_Rutte1-2
4	0	0	0	1	1	1	1	0.904	0.883	CA_Harper2
3	0	0	0	1	0	1	1	0.901	0.887	CA_Harper1
30	1	1	1	0	1	1	1	0.901	0.864	FR_Fillon1-4
21	1	0	1	0	0	1	1	0.876	0.859	FR_Raffarin1-3&Villepin
26	1	1	0	0	1	1	4	0.873	0.810	AL_Gillard2&Rudd2, AT_Schüssel3, AT_Gusenbauer, SE_Persson3b
17	1	0	0	0	0	1	1	0.861	0.822	SE_Persson2
27	1	1	0	1	0	1	1	0.747	0.662	AT_Schüssel1
31	1	1	1	1	0	1	1	0.747	0.575	UK_Blair2
25	1	1	0	0	0	0	1	0.744	0.631	AT_Faymann1
29	1	1	1	0	0	0	3	0.700	0.536	FR_Ayrault&Valls, UK_Blair3, UK_Brown
18	1	0	0	0	1	0	2	0.674	0.514	DE_Schröder1, SE_Persson3a
8	0	0	1	1	1	0	1	0.661	0.525	CA_Harper3
11	0	1	0	1	0	0	2	0.639	0.562	NL_Balkenende1-3, NL_Balkenende4-5
28	1	1	0	1	1	0	1	0.579	0.397	UK_Cameron
19	1	0	0	1	0	0	3	0.538	0.424	AL_Howard3, AL_Howard4, DE_Merkel1
20	1	0	0	1	1	0	4	0.421	0.262	DE_Schröder2, DE_Merkel2, SE_Reinfeldt1, SE_Reinfeldt2
23	1	0	1	1	0	0	1	0.362	0.066	AL_Rudd1&Gillard1
7	0	0	1	1	0	0	1	0.303	0.079	NZ_Key1
5	0	0	1	0	0	0	1	0.151	0.032	NZ_Clark3
6	0	0	1	0	1	0	4	0.068	0.015	CA_Chretien3, NZ_Clark1, NZ_Clark2, NZ_Key2

1	0	0	0	0	0	?	0
2	0	0	0	0	1	?	0
9	0	1	0	0	0	?	0
10	0	1	0	0	1	?	0
13	0	1	1	0	0	?	0
15	0	1	1	1	0	?	0
16	0	1	1	1	1	?	0
22	1	0	1	0	1	?	0
24	1	0	1	1	1	?	0
32	1	1	1	1	1	?	0

Note: Inclusion cut = 0.745, PRI cut = 0.51. Bold indicates cases that are members of the outcome.

The conservative solution generated from the truth table contains one model with six PIs, has a high consistency of 0.883 and a decent coverage of 0.657. The latter means that the solution explains 65.7 % of the outcome PIACT across cases. It contains one deviant case, which is a member in the solution term but not in the outcome (lower right quadrant).


Table 11: Conservative solution formula

$$\sim\text{CONC} * \sim\text{LARGE} * \sim\text{EXECDOM} * \text{HGOVR} + \sim\text{CONC} * \sim\text{EXECDOM} * \text{HGOVR} * \text{SALG} + \text{CONC} * \sim\text{LARGE} * \sim\text{HGOVR} * \sim\text{SALG} + \text{CONC} * \text{LARGE} * \text{HGOVR} * \sim\text{SALG} + \text{CONC} * \text{LARGE} * \sim\text{HGOVR} * \text{SALG} + \text{LARGE} * \text{EXECDOM} * \sim\text{HGOVR} * \text{SALG} \rightarrow \text{PIACT}$$

	Prime Implicant	Cons.	PRI	Raw cov.	Unique cov.
(1)	$\sim\text{CONC} * \sim\text{LARGE} * \sim\text{EXECDOM} * \text{HGOVR}$	0.923	0.914	0.123	0.068
(2)	$\sim\text{CONC} * \sim\text{EXECDOM} * \text{HGOVR} * \text{SALG}$	0.951	0.943	0.100	0.043
(3)	$\text{CONC} * \sim\text{LARGE} * \sim\text{HGOVR} * \sim\text{SALG}$	0.859	0.829	0.134	0.089
(4)	$\text{CONC} * \text{LARGE} * \text{HGOVR} * \sim\text{SALG}$	0.831	0.756	0.180	0.108
(5)	$\text{CONC} * \text{LARGE} * \sim\text{HGOVR} * \text{SALG}$	0.894	0.847	0.246	0.124
(6)	$\text{LARGE} * \text{EXECDOM} * \sim\text{HGOVR} * \text{SALG}$	0.933	0.902	0.155	0.037
	<i>Solution</i>	<i>0.883</i>	<i>0.850</i>	<i>0.657</i>	

	Cases consistent	deviant
(1)	CA_Harper1; CA_Harper2	
(2)	CA_Harper2; NL_Rutte1-2	
(3)	SE_Persson2 : FR_Raffarin1-3&Vilpepin	
(4)	AT_Schüssel1; UK_Blair2	
(5)	AL_Gillard2&Rudd2; AT_Schüssel3, AT_Gusenbauer; FR_Fillon1-4	SE_Persson3b
(6)	NL_Kok2-3; FR_Fillon1-4	

Figure 8: Conservative solution plot



The most parsimonious solution has six paths but also contains model ambiguity. The model is ambiguous about paths 5 and 6; path 6 has slightly higher scores for both consistency and coverage.

Table 12: Parsimonious solution formula

Model 1: $\sim\text{CONC} * \sim\text{LARGE} * \sim\text{EXECDOM} + \text{LARGE} * \sim\text{HGOVR} * \text{SALG} +$
 $\text{CONC} * \sim\text{LARGE} * \sim\text{HGOVR} * \sim\text{SALG} + \text{CONC} * \text{LARGE} * \text{HGOVR} * \sim\text{SALG} +$
 $(\sim\text{CONC} * \text{LARGE} * \text{SALG}) \rightarrow \text{PIACT}$

Model 2: $\sim\text{CONC} * \sim\text{LARGE} * \sim\text{EXECDOM} + \text{LARGE} * \sim\text{HGOVR} * \text{SALG} +$
 $\text{CONC} * \sim\text{LARGE} * \sim\text{HGOVR} * \sim\text{SALG} + \text{CONC} * \text{LARGE} * \text{HGOVR} * \sim\text{SALG} +$
 $(\sim\text{CONC} * \sim\text{EXECDOM} * \text{SALG}) \rightarrow \text{PIACT}$


	Prime Implicant	Cons.	PRI	Raw cov.	Unique cov.
1	$\sim\text{CONC} * \sim\text{LARGE} * \sim\text{EXECDOM}$	0.925	0.914	0.126	0.069
2	$\text{LARGE} * \sim\text{HGOVR} * \text{SALG}$	0.871	0.814	0.289	0.167
3	$\text{CONC} * \sim\text{LARGE} * \sim\text{HGOVR} * \sim\text{SALG}$	0.859	0.829	0.134	0.089

4	CONC * LARGE * HGOVR * ~SALG	0.831	0.756	0.180	0.108
5	~CONC * LARGE * SALG	0.905	0.865	0.113	0.000
6	~CONC * ~EXECDOM * SALG	0.961	0.945	0.127	0.000
	<i>Solution model 1</i>	<i>0.867</i>	<i>0.831</i>	<i>0.661</i>	
	<i>Solution model 2</i>	<i>0.867</i>	<i>0.831</i>	<i>0.661</i>	

	Cases consistent	deviant
1	Harper I (CA); Harper II (CA)	-
2	Kok II-III (NL); Gillard II-Rudd II (AL), Schüssel III (AT), Gusenbauer (AT); Fillon I-IV (FR)	Persson III (B) (SE)
3	Persson II (SE); Raffarin & Villepin (FR)	-
4	Schüssel I (AT); Blair II (UK)	-
5	Rutte I-II (NL); Kok II-III (NL)	-
6	Harper II (CA); Rutte I-II (NL)	-

Path 1 is created from truth table rows 3 and 4 as well as the logical remainders provided by truth table rows 1 and 2 as counterfactuals, which led to the exclusion of 'HGOVR' from the path. Path 2 is created from truth table rows 14, 26, and 30, path 3 from truth table rows 17 and 21, path 4 from truth table rows 27 and 31, path 5 from truth table rows 12 and 14, and path 6 from truth table rows 4 and 12.

Figure 9: Parsimonious solution plots



Absence of the outcome

I now turn to the analysis of the absence of the outcome (\sim PIACT). Four truth table are used to produce the solutions, with a consistency threshold of 0.7 and a PRI threshold of 0.51. The truth table rows just below the inclusion threshold, 8 and 18, each have one case that is member of PIACT and one that is not.

Table 13: Truth table

	CONC	LARGE	EXECDOM	GOVR	SALG	OUT	n	incl	PRI	cases
6	0	0	1	0	1	1	4	0.986	0.985	CA_Chretien3, NZ_Clark1, NZ_Clark2, NZ_Key2
5	0	0	1	0	0	1	1	0.959	0.953	NZ_Clark3
23	1	0	1	1	0	1	1	0.938	0.910	AL_Rudd1&Gillard1
7	0	0	1	1	0	1	1	0.917	0.891	NZ_Key1
28	1	1	0	1	1	1	1	0.806	0.697	UK_Cameron
20	1	0	0	1	1	1	4	0.798	0.749	DE_Schröder2, DE_Merkel2, SE_Reinfeldt1, SE_Reinfeldt2
18	1	0	0	0	1	0	2	0.665	0.534	DE_Schröder1, SE_Persson3a
31	1	1	1	1	0	0	1	0.658	0.425	UK_Blair2
19	1	0	0	1	0	0	3	0.646	0.570	AL_Howard3, AL_Howard4, DE_Merkel1
8	0	0	1	1	1	0	1	0.626	0.475	CA_Harper3
29	1	1	1	0	0	0	3	0.617	0.406	FR_Ayrault&Valls, UK_Blair3, UK_Brown
27	1	1	0	1	0	0	1	0.559	0.374	AT_Schüssel1
11	0	1	0	1	0	0	2	0.551	0.447	NL_Balkenende1-3, NL_Balkenende4-5
25	1	1	0	0	0	0	1	0.545	0.346	AT_Faymann1
14	0	1	1	0	1	0	1	0.467	0.004	NL_Kok2-3
26	1	1	0	0	1	0	4	0.431	0.154	AL_Gillard2&Rudd2, AT_Schüssel3, AT_Gusenbauer, SE_Persson3b
17	1	0	0	0	0	0	1	0.414	0.274	SE_Persson2
30	1	1	1	0	1	0	1	0.379	0.143	FR_Fillon1-4
4	0	0	0	1	1	0	1	0.282	0.117	CA_Harper2
21	1	0	1	0	0	0	1	0.249	0.141	FR_Raffarin1-3&Villepin
12	0	1	0	1	1	0	1	0.239	0.004	NL_Rutte1-2
3	0	0	0	1	0	0	1	0.221	0.113	CA_Harper1
1	0	0	0	0	0	?	0			
2	0	0	0	0	1	?	0			
9	0	1	0	0	0	?	0			
10	0	1	0	0	1	?	0			
13	0	1	1	0	0	?	0			
15	0	1	1	1	0	?	0			
16	0	1	1	1	1	?	0			

22	1	0	1	0	1	?	0
24	1	0	1	1	1	?	0
32	1	1	1	1	1	?	0

Note: Inclusion cut = 0.7, PRI cut = 0.51

The conservative solution generated from the truth table contains one model with three Prime Implicants. It has a high consistency of 0.900 but a low coverage of 0.567, meaning that the solution explains 56.7 % half the outcome produced by all cases. It has one deviant case in PI 2 which accounts for the lower consistency of PI 2.


Table 14: Conservative solution formula

$\sim\text{CONC} * \sim\text{LARGE} * \text{EXECDOM} * \sim\text{GOVR} + \sim\text{CONC} * \sim\text{LARGE} * \text{EXECDOM} * \sim\text{SALG} +$
 $\text{CONC} * \sim\text{LARGE} * \sim\text{EXECDOM} * \text{GOVR} * \text{SALG} \rightarrow \sim\text{PIACT}$

	Prime Implicant	Cons.	PRI	Raw cov.	Unique cov.
1	$\sim\text{CONC} * \sim\text{LARGE} * \text{EXECDOM} * \sim\text{GOVR}$	0.969	0.968	0.248	0.220
2	$\text{CONC} * \sim\text{EXECDOM} * \text{GOVR} * \text{SALG}$	0.791	0.732	0.189	0.186
3	$\sim\text{LARGE} * \text{EXECDOM} * \text{GOVR} * \sim\text{SALG}$	0.931	0.911	0.161	0.132
	<i>Solution</i>	<i>0.900</i>	<i>0.883</i>	<i>0.567</i>	

	Cases consistent	deviant
1	Clark III (NZ); Chrétien III (CA), Clark I (NZ), Clark II (NZ), Key II (NZ)	-
2	Schröder II (DE), Merkel II (DE), Reinfeldt I (SE); Cameron (UK)	Reinfeldt II (SE)
3	Rudd I-Gillard I (AL); Key I (NZ)	-

Figure 10: Conservative solution plot



The parsimonious solution generated by the truth table contains three Prime Implicants, too. As is generally the case with parsimonious solutions, it is slightly less consistent than the conservative solution but has a higher coverage.

Table 15: Parsimonious solution formula


$$\sim\text{CONC} * \sim\text{LARGE} * \sim\text{GOVR} + \text{CONC} * \text{GOVR} * \text{SALG} + \sim\text{LARGE} * \text{EXECDOM} * \text{GOVR} * \sim\text{SALG}$$

→ $\sim\text{PIACT}$

	Prime Implicant	Cons.	PRI	Raw cov.	Unique cov.
1	$\sim\text{CONC} * \sim\text{LARGE} * \sim\text{GOVR}$	0.942	0.937	0.263	0.221
2	$\text{CONC} * \text{GOVR} * \text{SALG}$	0.783	0.715	0.224	0.187
3	$\sim\text{LARGE} * \text{EXECDOM} * \text{GOVR} * \sim\text{SALG}$	0.931	0.911	0.161	0.114
	<i>Solution</i>	<i>0.880</i>	<i>0.857</i>	<i>0.582</i>	

	Cases consistent	deviant
1	Clark III (NZ); Chrétien III (CA), Clark I (NZ), Clark II (NZ), Key II (NZ)	-
2	Schröder II (DE), Merkel II (DE), Reinfeldt I (SE); Cameron (UK)	Reinfeldt II (SE)
3	Rudd I-Gillard I (AL); Key I (NZ)	-

Figure 11: Parsimonious solution plot



Analysis 3: Immigration policy, 1980s-1990s

Calibrated scores

Table 16 presents the fuzzy scores for the conditions and the outcome. None of the sets is skewed.

Table 16: Fuzzy Scores for cases of immigration policy, 1980s-90s

	CONC	LARGE	EXECDOM	GOVR	HGOVR	SALG	SALHG	PIACT
AL_Hawke2	0.99	0	1	0.93	0.93	0.99	0.98	0.68
AL_Hawke3	0.68	1	1	0.21	0.21	0.01	0	1
AL_Hawke4&Keating1	0.68	1	1	0.01	0.01	0.03	0.02	1
AL_Keating2	0.68	0	1	0.49	0.49	0.03	0.02	0.05
AL_Howard1	0.68	0	0.7	1	1	0.93	0.92	0.23
AT_Sinowatz3	0.19	1	0.3	0.01	0	0.01	0	0.01
AT_Vranitzky2	0.68	0	0.3	0.94	0.09	0.01	0.01	0.03
AT_Vranitzky3	0.68	0	0	0.34	0.1	0.05	0.02	0.11
AT_Vranitzky4	0.68	0	0	0.84	0.05	0.78	0.09	1
AT_Klima	0.68	0	0	1	1	0.48	0.59	1
CA_Mulroney1	0.95	1	1	0.97	0.97	1	1	0.03
CA_Mulroney2	0.95	1	1	1	1	0.87	0.86	0.93
CA_Chretien1	0.95	0	1	0.77	0.77	0.01	0	0.23
CA_Chretien2	0.95	0	1	0.87	0.87	0.96	0.96	0.93
FR_Chirac	0	1	0	1	1	0.95	1	0.01
FR_Rocard1-2	0	1	0	0.02	0.02	0.77	0.76	0.68
FR_Cresson&Beregovoy	0	1	0	0.02	0.02	0.95	0.95	0.01
FR_Balladur&Juppe1-2	0	1	0.3	0.65	0.2	0.22	0.75	0.03
FR_Jospin	0	1	0.7	0.01	0.02	0.01	0	0.18
DE_Kohl1	0	0	0	1	1	0.04	0.04	0.23
DE_Kohl2	0	0	0	0.95	0.95	0.18	0.31	0.68
DE_Kohl3	0	0	0	0.1	0.05	0.15	0.22	0.32
DE_Kohl4	0	0	0	1	1	0.2	0.3	0.03
NL_Lubbers1	0	1	0.3	0.7	0.03	0.03	0.07	0.03
NL_Lubbers2	0	1	0.3	0.47	0.24	0.18	0.41	0.01
NL_Lubbers3	0	1	0.3	0.01	0.07	0.24	0.62	0.18
NL_Kok1	0	1	0.3	0.8	0.78	0.84	0.98	0.99
NZ_Lange1	0.9	1	1	0.05	0.05	0.12	0.11	0.68
NZ_Lange2&Palmer	0.9	1	1	0	0	1	1	0.23
NZ_Bolger1	0.9	1	1	0.19	0.19	0.03	0.03	0.05
NZ_Bolger2-3	0.9	1	1	0.12	0.12	0.82	0.81	0.01
SE_Carlsson1-3	0.99	1	1	0	0	0.01	0	0.05

SE_Bildt	0	0	0	1	1	0.4	0.82	1
SE_Persson1	0	0	0	1	1	0.03	0.02	0.23
UK_Thatcher2	0.99	0	1	1	1	0.18	0.17	0.05
UK_Thatcher3	0.99	0	1	1	1	0.49	0.49	0.68
UK_Major2	0.99	0	1	1	1	1	1	0.98
UK_Blair1	0.99	0	1	0.91	0.91	0.18	0.17	1

Presence of the outcome

The scores of the conditions SALG and HGOVR are slightly superior to those of SALHG and GOVR, respectively, in the analysis of individual sufficiency.⁵ Therefore, the truth table analysis includes SALG and HGOVR (and excludes SALHG and GOVR). Three truth table rows (18, 19, 24) are members of the outcome with a consistency cut of 0.7 and a PRI cut of 0.51. All truth table rows below these thresholds have consistency values that are too low for being considered members of the outcome. The consistency cut of 0.7 fits the truth table structure well because there is a big gap in the consistency scores between the last row that is included in the solutions (row 24, consistency = 0.809) and the first row that is not included (row 23, consistency = 0.503).

Table 17: Truth table

	CONC	LARGE	EXECDOM	HGOVR	SALG	OUT	n	incl	PRI	cases
18	1	0	0	0	1	1	1	1	1	AT_Vranitzky4
19	1	0	0	1	0	1	1	0.935	0.912	AT_Klima
24	1	0	1	1	1	1	4	0.809	0.746	AL_Hawke2, AL_Howard1, CA_Chretien2, UK_Major2
23	1	0	1	1	0	0	4	0.503	0.357	CA_Chretien1, UK_Thatcher2, UK_Thatcher3, UK_Blair1
32	1	1	1	1	1	0	2	0.500	0.443	CA_Mulroney1, CA_Mulroney2
3	0	0	0	1	0	0	5	0.498	0.353	DE_Kohl1, DE_Kohl2, DE_Kohl4, SE_Bildt, SE_Persson1
29	1	1	1	0	0	0	5	0.490	0.431	AL_Hawke3, AL_Hawke4&Keating1, NZ_Lange1, NZ_Bolger1, SE_Carlsson1-3

⁵ The explanation why HGOVR explains the outcome slightly better than GOVR is due to the impact of the Austrian coalition cabinets led by Chancellor Vranitzky in the late 1980s and early 1990s where the slightly left-of-center SPÖ led coalitions with the right-of-center ÖVP. Following the first of these two coalitions, the right-of-center ÖVP shifted notably towards left emphases in its manifesto to the election leading to the Vranitzky III cabinet, while the coalition leader SPÖ remained on a similar position as regards its left-right placement. Therefore, the Vranitzky II and Vranitzky III cabinets differ qualitatively as regards the calibration of GOVR, while they are similar as regards their membership in HGOVR. When using HGOVR, the cases share the same membership on the conditions and outcome in truth table row 17; in contrast, when using GOVR, Vranitzky II is instead a contradictory case in kind in a different truth table row.

10	0	1	0	0	1	0	2	0.445	0.278	FR_Rocard1-2, FR_Cresson&Beregovoy
13	0	1	1	0	0	0	1	0.428	0.295	FR_Jospin
1	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	0.415	0.174	DE_Kohl3
12	0	1	0	1	1	0	2	0.408	0.349	FR_Chirac, NL_Kok1
21	1	0	1	0	0	0	1	0.386	0.104	AL_Keating2
30	1	1	1	0	1	0	2	0.243	0.022	NZ_Lange2&Palmer, NZ_Bolger2-3
17	1	0	0	0	0	0	2	0.235	0.153	AT_Vranitzky2, AT_Vranitzky3
9	0	1	0	0	0	0	5	0.198	0.042	AT_Sinowatz3, FR_Balladur&Juppe1-2, NL_Lubbers1, NL_Lubbers2, NL_Lubbers3
2	0	0	0	0	1	?	0			
4	0	0	0	1	1	?	0			
5	0	0	1	0	0	?	0			
6	0	0	1	0	1	?	0			
7	0	0	1	1	0	?	0			
8	0	0	1	1	1	?	0			
11	0	1	0	1	0	?	0			
14	0	1	1	0	1	?	0			
15	0	1	1	1	0	?	0			
16	0	1	1	1	1	?	0			
20	1	0	0	1	1	?	0			
22	1	0	1	0	1	?	0			
25	1	1	0	0	0	?	0			
26	1	1	0	0	1	?	0			
27	1	1	0	1	0	?	0			
28	1	1	0	1	1	?	0			
31	1	1	1	1	0	?	0			

Note: inclusion cut = 0.70, PRI cut = 0.51

The conservative solution generated from the truth table contains one model with three Prime Implicants, has a high consistency of 0.902 but a very low coverage of 0.326, which means that the conservative solution explains a mere 32.6 of the outcome PIACT across cases. It covers one qualitatively deviant case that is included in Prime Implicant two.

Table 18: Conservative solution term

CONC * ~LARGE * ~EXECDOM * HGOVR * ~SALG +

CONC * ~LARGE * EXECDOM * HGOVR * SALG +

CONC * ~LARGE * ~EXECDOM * ~HGOVR * SALG → PIACT


	Path	Cons.	PRI	Raw cov.	Unique cov.
(1)	CONC*~LARGE*~EXECDOM*HGOVR*~SALG	0.935	0.912	0.051	0.039
(2)	CONC*~LARGE*EXECDOM*HGOVR*SALG	0.809	0.746	0.226	0.221
(3)	CONC*~LARGE*~EXECDOM*~HGOVR*SALG	1	1	0.048	0.040
	<i>Solution</i>	<i>0.845</i>	<i>0.804</i>	<i>0.312</i>	

	Cases consistent	deviant
(1)	Klima (AT) (TT row 19)	
(2)	Hawke 2 (AL), Chretien 2 (CA), Major 2 (UK) (TT row 24)	Howard 1 (AL) (TT row 24)
(3)	Vranitzky 4 (AT) (TT row 18)	

Note: Consistency threshold 0.70, PRI threshold 0.51.

The conservative solution plot (Figure 12) shows low coverage through the small number of cases in the upper right quadrant and good level of consistency with one deviant case in kind in the lower right quadrant.

Figure 12: Conservative solution plot



The parsimonious solution has two paths and a good consistency of 0.810 (PRI = 0.756), but coverage remains very low at 0.387. It is created with nine logical remainder TT rows.

Table 19: Parsimonious sufficient solution

~LARGE * SALG + CONC * ~EXECDOM * HGOVR → PIACT

	Sufficient path	Cons.	PRI	Raw cov.	Unique cov.
(1)	~LARGE * SALG	0.809	0.755	0.368	0.315
(2)	CONC * ~EXECDOM * HGOVR	0.902	0.857	0.072	0.018
	<i>Solution</i>	<i>0.810</i>	<i>0.756</i>	<i>0.387</i>	

	Cases consistent	deviant
(1)	Vranitzky 4 (AT) (TT row 18); Hawke 2 (AL), Chrétien 2 (CA), Major 2 (UK) (TT row 24)	Howard 1 (AL) (TT row 24)
(2)	Klima (AT) (TT row 19)	

Note: Consistency threshold 0.70, PRI threshold 0.51.

Figure 13 shows the distribution of cases for the parsimonious solution and the outcome PIACT.

Figure 13: Parsimonious solution plot



Figure 14: Prime Implicant 1 (parsimonious solution)





Figure 15: Prime Implicant 2 (parsimonious solution)



Absence of the outcome

In order to avoid contradictory truth table rows, a threshold of 0.75 was used for consistency and a threshold of 0.68 for the PRI. Six truth table rows are used to produce the solutions for the absence of the outcome (\sim PIACT). The truth table row closest to the inclusion threshold, 10, contains one case that is member of \sim PIACT (Cresson-Beregovoy) and one that is member of PIACT (Rocard I-II).

Table 20: Truth table

	CONC	LARGE	EXECDOM	HGOVR	SALG	OUT	n	incl	PRI	Cases
9	0	1	0	0	0	1	5	0.965	0.958	AT_Sinowatz3, FR_Balladur&Juppe1-2, NL_Lubbers1, NL_Lubbers2, NL_Lubbers3
21	1	0	1	0	0	1	1	0.928	0.896	AL_Keating2
30	1	1	1	0	1	1	2	0.914	0.889	NZ_Lange2&Palmer, NZ_Bolger2-3
17	1	0	0	0	0	1	2	0.862	0.847	AT_Vranitzky2, AT_Vranitzky3
1	0	0	0	0	0	1	1	0.786	0.697	DE_Kohl3
13	0	1	1	0	0	1	1	0.760	0.705	FR_Jospin
10	0	1	0	0	1	0	2	0.750	0.676	FR_Rocard1-2, FR_Cresson&Beregovoy
23	1	0	1	1	0	0	4	0.724	0.643	CA_Chretien1, UK_Thatcher2, UK_Thatcher3, UK_Blair1
12	0	1	0	1	1	0	2	0.683	0.651	FR_Chirac, NL_Kok1
3	0	0	0	1	0	0	5	0.614	0.503	DE_Kohl1, DE_Kohl2, DE_Kohl4, SE_Bildt, SE_Persson1
32	1	1	1	1	1	0	2	0.602	0.557	CA_Mulroney1, CA_Mulroney2
29	1	1	1	0	0	0	5	0.558	0.507	AL_Hawke3, AL_Hawke4&Keating1, NZ_Lange1, NZ_Bolger1, SE_Carlsson1-3
24	1	0	1	1	1	0	4	0.377	0.174	AL_Hawke2, AL_Howard1, CA_Chretien2, UK_Major2
19	1	0	0	1	0	0	1	0.323	0.088	AT_Klima
18	1	0	0	0	1	0	1	0.088	0	AT_Vranitzky4
2	0	0	0	0	1	?	0			
4	0	0	0	1	1	?	0			
5	0	0	1	0	0	?	0			
6	0	0	1	0	1	?	0			
7	0	0	1	1	0	?	0			
8	0	0	1	1	1	?	0			
11	0	1	0	1	0	?	0			
14	0	1	1	0	1	?	0			

15	0	1	1	1	0	?	0
16	0	1	1	1	1	?	0
20	1	0	0	1	1	?	0
22	1	0	1	0	1	?	0
25	1	1	0	0	0	?	0
26	1	1	0	0	1	?	0
27	1	1	0	1	0	?	0
28	1	1	0	1	1	?	0
31	1	1	1	1	0	?	0

Note: inclusion cut = 0.75, PRI cut = 0.68

The conservative solution generated from the truth table contains three Prime Implicants. It has a decent consistency level (0.819) but coverage is low with 0.426, i.e., the solution explains only 42.6 % of the absence of the outcome.

Table 21: Conservative sufficient solution

- M1: $\sim\text{CONC}*\text{LARGE}*\sim\text{HGOVR}*\sim\text{SALG} + \text{CONC}*\sim\text{LARGE}*\sim\text{HGOVR}*\sim\text{SALG} + \text{CONC}*\text{LARGE}*\text{EXECDOM}*\sim\text{HGOVR}*\text{SALG} + (\sim\text{CONC}*\sim\text{EXECDOM}*\sim\text{HGOVR}*\sim\text{SALG}) \rightarrow \sim\text{PIACT}$
- M2: $\sim\text{CONC}*\text{LARGE}*\sim\text{HGOVR}*\sim\text{SALG} + \text{CONC}*\sim\text{LARGE}*\sim\text{HGOVR}*\sim\text{SALG} + \text{CONC}*\text{LARGE}*\text{EXECDOM}*\sim\text{HGOVR}*\text{SALG} + (\sim\text{LARGE}*\sim\text{EXECDOM}*\sim\text{HGOVR}*\sim\text{SALG}) \rightarrow \sim\text{PIACT}$

	Path	Cons.	PRI	Raw cov.	Unique cov.
(1)	$\sim\text{CONC}*\text{LARGE}*\sim\text{HGOVR}*\sim\text{SALG}$	0.852	0.830	0.246	0.053
(2)	$\text{CONC}*\sim\text{LARGE}*\sim\text{HGOVR}*\sim\text{SALG}$	0.877	0.847	0.096	0.036
(3)	$\text{CONC}*\text{LARGE}*\text{EXECDOM}*\sim\text{HGOVR}*\text{SALG}$	0.914	0.889	0.080	0.068
(4)	$\sim\text{CONC}*\sim\text{EXECDOM}*\sim\text{HGOVR}*\sim\text{SALG}$	0.912	0.890	0.244	0.000
(5)	$\sim\text{LARGE}*\sim\text{EXECDOM}*\sim\text{HGOVR}*\sim\text{SALG}$	0.855	0.821	0.104	0.010
	<i>Solution M1</i>	<i>0.865</i>	<i>0.836</i>	<i>0.443</i>	
	<i>Solution M2</i>	<i>0.866</i>	<i>0.839</i>	<i>0.453</i>	

Note: Consistency threshold 0.77, PRI threshold 0.68.

	Cases consistent	deviant
(1)	Sinowatz 3 (AT), Ballardur & Juppe 1&2 (FR), Lubbers 1 (NL), Lubbers 2 (NL), Lubbers 3 (NL) (<i>TT row 9</i>); Jospin (FR) (<i>TT row 13</i>)	
(2)	Vranitzky 2 (AT), Vranitzky 3 (AT) (<i>TT row 17</i>); Keating 2 (AL) (<i>TT row 21</i>)	
(3)	Lange 2-Palmer (NZ), Bolger 2-3 (NZ) (<i>TT row 30</i>)	

(4)	Kohl 3 (DE) (TT row 1); Sinowatz 3 (AT), Balladur & Juppe 1&2 (FR), Lubbers 1 (NL), Lubbers 2 (NL), Lubbers 3 (NL) (TT row 9)
(5)	Kohl 3 (DE) (TT row 1); Vranitzky 2 (AT), Vranitzky 3 (AT) (TT row 17)

Figure 16: Conservative sufficient solution




Table 22: Parsimonious solution formula

Model 1: $\sim\text{CONC} * \sim\text{HGOVR} * \sim\text{SALG} + \sim\text{LARGE} * \sim\text{HGOVR} * \sim\text{SALG} + \sim\text{EXECDOM} * \sim\text{HGOVR} * \sim\text{SALG} + (\text{EXECDOM} * \sim\text{HGOVR} * \text{SALG}) \rightarrow \sim\text{PIACT}$


Model 2: $\sim\text{CONC} * \sim\text{HGOVR} * \sim\text{SALG} + \sim\text{LARGE} * \sim\text{HGOVR} * \sim\text{SALG} + \sim\text{EXECDOM} * \sim\text{HGOVR} * \sim\text{SALG} + (\text{CONC} * \text{LARGE} * \sim\text{HGOVR} * \text{SALG}) \rightarrow \sim\text{PIACT}$

	Path	Cons.	PRI	Raw cov.	Unique cov.
(1)	$\sim\text{CONC} * \sim\text{HGOVR} * \sim\text{SALG}$	0.836	0.798	0.305	0.048
(2)	$\sim\text{LARGE} * \sim\text{HGOVR} * \sim\text{SALG}$	0.874	0.838	0.149	0.026
(3)	$\sim\text{EXECDOM} * \sim\text{HGOVR} * \sim\text{SALG}$	0.922	0.906	0.286	0.017

(4)	EXECDOM * ~HGOVR * SALG	0.810	0.740	0.118	0.004
(5)	CONC * LARGE * ~HGOVR * SALG	0.914	0.889	0.080	0.000
	<i>Solution Model 1</i>	<i>0.853</i>	<i>0.822</i>	<i>0.462</i>	
	<i>Solution Model 2</i>	<i>0.867</i>	<i>0.841</i>	<i>0.458</i>	

	Cases consistent	deviant
(1)	Kohl III (DE); Balladur-Juppe I-II (FR), Lubbers I (NL), Lubbers II (NL), Lubbers III (NL); Jospin (FR)	
(2)	Kohl III (DE); Vranitzky II (AT), Vranitzky III (AT); Keating II (AT)	
(3)	Kohl III (DE); Balladur-Juppe I-II (FR), Lubbers I (NL), Lubbers II (NL), Lubbers III (NL); Vranitzky II (AT), Vranitzky III (AT); Sinowatz III (AT)	
(4)	Lange II-Palmer (NZ), Bolger II-III (NZ)	
(5)	Lange II-Palmer (NZ), Bolger II-III (NZ)	

Figure 17: Parsimonious sufficient plot



Analysis 4: Immigration policy, 2000s-2010s

Calibrated scores

Table 23 presents the fuzzy scores for the conditions and the outcome. None of the sets are skewed.

Table 23: Fuzzy scores (analysis 4)

	CONC	LARGE	EXECDOM	GOVR	HGOVR	SALG	SALHG	PIACT
AL_Howard2	0.68	0	0.3	1	1	0.08	0.07	0.05
AL_Howard3	0.99	0	0.3	1	1	1	1	0.95
AL_Howard4	0.99	0	0.3	1	1	1	1	0.27
AL_Rudd1&Gillard1	0.99	0	1	0.84	0.84	0.88	0.87	0.05
AL_Gillard2&Rudd2	0.99	0	0	0	0	0.01	0	0.12
AT_Schüssel1	0.68	0	0	1	0.99	1	0.58	0.95
AT_Schüssel3	0.68	0	0	0.24	0.46	0.57	0.49	0.32
AT_Gusenbauer	0.68	0	0	0.06	0.01	1	1	0.01
AT_Faymann1	0.68	0	0	0.05	0.01	1	0.95	0.36
CA_Chretien3&Martin1	0.95	0	1	0.03	0.03	1	0.99	0.01
CA_Harper1	0.99	0	0	0.98	0.98	0.98	0.97	0.76
CA_Harper2	0.99	0	0	0.94	0.94	1	1	0.81
CA_Harper3	0.95	0	1	1	1	1	1	0.05
FR_Raffarin1-3&Vilpepin	0	1	0.7	0.09	0.07	0.1	0.08	0.64
FR_Fillon1-2	0.95	0	0.7	0.03	0.03	0.32	0.31	0.19
FR_Ayrault&Valls	0.99	0	0.7	0	0	0.02	0.02	0.27
DE_Schröder1	0	0	0	0.23	0.38	0.64	0.66	0.02
DE_Schröder2	0.68	0	0	0.57	0.77	0.91	0.93	0.99
DE_Merkel1	0.68	0	0	0.97	1	0.8	0.84	0.98
DE_Merkel2	0.68	0	0	0.9	0.93	0.93	0.98	0.1
NL_Kok2-3	0	1	0.7	0.05	0	0.63	0.2	0
NL_Balkenende1-3	0.05	0	0.3	0.97	0.67	0.32	0.05	0.19
NL_Balkenende4-5	0	1	0.3	0.71	0.76	0.7	0.05	0.19
NL_Rutte1-2	0.99	0	0	0.97	1	0.99	0.99	0.98
NZ_Clark1	0.9	1	1	0	0	0.97	0.7	0.27
NZ_Clark2	0.9	1	1	0	0	0.98	0.98	1
NZ_Clark3	0.9	1	1	0	0	0.89	0.89	0.01
NZ_Key1	0.9	1	1	1	1	1	1	0.05
NZ_Key2	0.99	1	1	0.41	0.41	0.69	0.68	0.19
SE_Persson2	0	0	0	0.26	0.26	0.01	0	0.01
SE_Persson3	0	0	0	0	0	0.05	0.04	0.02
SE_Reinfeldt1	0	0	0.3	0.76	0.76	0.28	0.2	0.99
SE_Reinfeldt2	0	1	0	0.61	0.67	0.09	0.06	0.99

UK_Blair2	0.99	0	1	0.84	0.84	0.01	0.01	1
UK_Blair3	0.19	0	1	0.29	0.29	0.01	0.01	0.95
UK_Brown	0.19	0	1	0.29	0.29	0.01	0.01	0.73
UK_Cameron	0	1	0.3	0.99	0.99	0.83	0.82	0.36

Presence of the outcome

In the analysis of individual sufficiency, the scores of the conditions HGOVR and SALG are slightly superior to those of GOVR and SALHG, respectively. Therefore, the truth table analysis includes SALG and HGOVR (and excludes SALHG and GOVR). Four truth table rows (5, 11, 20, 23) are members of the outcome with a consistency cut of 0.7 and a PRI cut of 0.51. Like in Analysis 3, the consistency threshold of 0.7 fits the structure of the truth table well because there is a big gap in the consistency scores between the last row that is included in the solutions (row 20, consistency = 0.805) and the first row that is not included (row 21, consistency = 0.679).

Figure 18: Truth table

	CONC	LARGE	EXECDOM	HGOVR	SALG	OUT	n	incl	PRI	cases
5	0	0	1	0	0	1	2	0.945	0.922	UK_Blair3, UK_Brown
11	0	1	0	1	0	1	1	0.910	0.859	SE_Reinfeldt2
23	1	0	1	1	0	1	1	0.814	0.752	UK_Blair2 AL_Howard3, AL_Howard4, AT_Schüssel1, CA_Harper1, CA_Harper2, DE_Schröder2, DE_Merkel1, DE_Merkel2,
20	1	0	0	1	1	1	9	0.802	0.757	NL_Rutte1-2
13	0	1	1	0	0	0	1	0.614	0.349	FR_Raffarin1-3&Vilpepin
2	0	0	0	0	1	0	1	0.593	0.297	DE_Schröder1 NL_Balkenende1-3,
3	0	0	0	1	0	0	2	0.560	0.415	SE_Reinfeldt1
19	1	0	0	1	0	0	1	0.538	0.265	AL_Howard2
21	1	0	1	0	0	0	2	0.528	0.232	FR_Fillon1-2, FR_Ayrault&Valls AT_Schüssel3, AT_Gusenbauer,
18	1	0	0	0	1	0	3	0.510	0.145	AT_Faymann1
17	1	0	0	0	0	0	1	0.509	0.072	AL_Gillard2&Rudd2 NL_Balkenende4-5,
12	0	1	0	1	1	0	2	0.452	0.088	UK_Cameron NZ_Clark1, NZ_Clark2,
30	1	1	1	0	1	0	4	0.418	0.320	NZ_Clark3, NZ_Key2
14	0	1	1	0	1	0	1	0.403	0.114	NL_Kok2-3
1	0	0	0	0	0	0	2	0.333	0.128	SE_Persson2, SE_Persson3 AL_Rudd1&Gillard1,
24	1	0	1	1	1	0	2	0.325	0.128	CA_Harper3

22	1	0	1	0	1	0	1	0.232	0.007	CA_Chretien3&Martin1
32	1	1	1	1	1	0	1	0.185	0	NZ_Key1
4	0	0	0	1	1	?	0			
6	0	0	1	0	1	?	0			
7	0	0	1	1	0	?	0			
8	0	0	1	1	1	?	0			
9	0	1	0	0	0	?	0			
10	0	1	0	0	1	?	0			
15	0	1	1	1	0	?	0			
16	0	1	1	1	1	?	0			
25	1	1	0	0	0	?	0			
26	1	1	0	0	1	?	0			
27	1	1	0	1	0	?	0			
28	1	1	0	1	1	?	0			
29	1	1	1	0	0	?	0			
31	1	1	1	1	0	?	0			

Note: Inclusion cut = 0.7, PRI cut = 0.51. Bold indicates cases that are members of the outcome.

The conservative solution generated from the truth table contains one model with four Prime Implicants, has a good consistency of 0.833 and a moderate coverage of 0.629, which means that the conservative solution explains 62.9 % of the outcome PIACT across cases.

Table 24: Conservative sufficient term

$\sim\text{CONC} * \sim\text{LARGE} * \text{EXECDOM} * \sim\text{HGOVR} * \sim\text{SALG} +$
 $\text{CONC} * \sim\text{LARGE} * \text{EXECDOM} * \text{HGOVR} * \sim\text{SALG} +$
 $\text{CONC} * \sim\text{LARGE} * \sim\text{EXECDOM} * \text{HGOVR} * \text{SALG} +$
 $\sim\text{CONC} * \text{LARGE} * \sim\text{EXECDOM} * \text{HGOVR} * \sim\text{SALG} \rightarrow \text{PIACT}$

	Path	Cons.	PRI	Raw cov.	Unique cov.
(1)	$\sim\text{CONC} * \sim\text{LARGE} * \text{EXECDOM} * \sim\text{HGOVR} * \sim\text{SALG}$	0.945	0.922	0.123	0.092
(2)	$\text{CONC} * \sim\text{LARGE} * \text{EXECDOM} * \text{HGOVR} * \sim\text{SALG}$	0.814	0.752	0.088	0.055
(3)	$\text{CONC} * \sim\text{LARGE} * \sim\text{EXECDOM} * \text{HGOVR} * \text{SALG}$	0.802	0.757	0.387	0.379
(4)	$\sim\text{CONC} * \text{LARGE} * \sim\text{EXECDOM} * \text{HGOVR} * \sim\text{SALG}$	0.910	0.859	0.070	0.070
	<i>Solution</i>	<i>0.833</i>	<i>0.790</i>	<i>0.629</i>	

	Cases consistent	deviant
(1)	Blair III (UK), Brown (UK)	-

(2)	Blair II (UK)	
(3)	Howard III (AL), Schüssel I (AT), Harper I (CA), Harper II (CA), Schröder II (DE), Merkel I (DE), Rutte I-II (NL)	Howard IV (AL), Merkel II (DE)
(4)	Reinfeldt II (SE)	

Out of the 14 cases that are members of the outcome, the conservative solution explains high PI reform activity of eleven cases (Figure 19, upper right quadrant), while three cases (upper left quadrant) remain unexplained. Two cases are members of the solution term but not members of the outcome and thus deviant in kind (lower right quadrant). These qualitatively deviant cases are members of truth table row 20.

Figure 19: Conservative solution plot



The parsimonious solution displays model ambiguity. It contains six Prime Implicants, four of which are ambiguous. All models have decent levels of both consistency and coverage. While model 3 is the most consistent one, model 2 has the highest coverage.

Table 25: Parsimonious solution formula


- Model 1: $\sim\text{CONC} * \sim\text{LARGE} * \text{EXECDOM} + \text{EXECDOM} * \text{HGOVR} * \sim\text{SALG} + (\text{LARGE} * \sim\text{EXECDOM} * \sim\text{SALG} + \text{CONC} * \sim\text{EXECDOM} * \text{HGOVR} * \text{SALG}) \rightarrow \text{PIACT}$
- Model 2: $\sim\text{CONC} * \sim\text{LARGE} * \text{EXECDOM} + \text{EXECDOM} * \text{HGOVR} * \sim\text{SALG} + (\text{LARGE} * \sim\text{EXECDOM} * \sim\text{SALG} + \sim\text{LARGE} * \sim\text{EXECDOM} * \text{HGOVR} * \text{SALG}) \rightarrow \text{PIACT}$
- Model 3: $\sim\text{CONC} * \sim\text{LARGE} * \text{EXECDOM} + \text{EXECDOM} * \text{HGOVR} * \sim\text{SALG} + (\text{LARGE} * \text{HGOVR} * \sim\text{SALG} + \text{CONC} * \sim\text{EXECDOM} * \text{HGOVR} * \text{SALG}) \rightarrow \text{PIACT}$
- Model 4: $\sim\text{CONC} * \sim\text{LARGE} * \text{EXECDOM} + \text{EXECDOM} * \text{HGOVR} * \sim\text{SALG} + (\text{LARGE} * \text{HGOVR} * \sim\text{SALG} + \sim\text{LARGE} * \sim\text{EXECDOM} * \text{HGOVR} * \text{SALG}) \rightarrow \text{PIACT}$

	Path	Cons.	PRI	Raw cov.	Unique cov.
(1)	$\sim\text{CONC} * \sim\text{LARGE} * \text{EXECDOM}$	0.821	0.756	0.142	0.067
(2)	$\text{EXECDOM} * \text{HGOVR} * \sim\text{SALG}$	0.799	0.673	0.167	0.055
(3)	$\text{LARGE} * \sim\text{EXECDOM} * \sim\text{SALG}$	0.794	0.687	0.099	0.029
(4)	$\text{LARGE} * \text{HGOVR} * \sim\text{SALG}$	0.847	0.740	0.081	0.000
(5)	$\text{CONC} * \sim\text{EXECDOM} * \text{HGOVR} * \text{SALG}$	0.803	0.757	0.388	0.000
(6)	$\sim\text{LARGE} * \sim\text{EXECDOM} * \text{HGOVR} * \text{SALG}$	0.754	0.704	0.446	0.033
	<i>Solution Model 1</i>	<i>0.808</i>	<i>0.755</i>	<i>0.685</i>	
	<i>Solution Model 2</i>	<i>0.778</i>	<i>0.722</i>	<i>0.717</i>	
	<i>Solution Model 3</i>	<i>0.820</i>	<i>0.772</i>	<i>0.655</i>	
	<i>Solution Model 4</i>	<i>0.787</i>	<i>0.735</i>	<i>0.688</i>	

	Cases consistent	deviant
(1)	Blair III (UK), Brown (UK)	-
(2)	Blair II (UK)	-
(3)	Reinfeldt II (SE)	-
(4)	Reinfeldt II (SE)	-
(5)	Howard III (AL), Schüssel I (AT), Harper I (CA), Harper II (CA), Schröder II (DE), Merkel I (DE), Rutte I-II (NL)	Howard IV (AL), Merkel II (DE)
(6)	Howard III (AL), Schüssel I (AT), Harper I (CA), Harper II (CA), Schröder II (DE), Merkel I (DE), Rutte I-II (NL)	Howard IV (AL), Merkel II (DE)

Figure 20 shows the distribution of cases on the parsimonious solution and on the outcome PIACT.

Figure 20: Parsimonious solution plot



Absence of the outcome

I now turn to the analysis of the absence of the outcome (\sim PIACT). For the truth table, a consistency threshold of 0.7 is combined with a PRI threshold of 0.6. The latter accounts for the observation that there is a big gap in PRI between truth table rows 2 (PRI = 0.703) and 13 (PRI = 0.586). Also, the case of truth table row 13 (France's Raffarin-Villepin cabinets) is a member of the outcome PIACT; including it into the solution for the absence of the outcome would weaken the consistency of the solution while enhancing coverage only very slightly.

Table 26: Truth table

	CONC	LARGE	EXECDOM	HGOVR	SALG	OUT	n	incl	PRI	cases
32	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	NZ_Key1
22	1	0	1	0	1	1	1	0.995	0.993	CA_Chretien3&Martin1
14	0	1	1	0	1	1	1	0.923	0.886	NL_Kok2-3
17	1	0	0	0	0	1	1	0.913	0.836	AL_Gillard2&Rudd2

12	0	1	0	1	1	1	2	0.911	0.851	NL_Balkenende4-5, UK_Cameron
18	1	0	0	0	1	1	3	0.905	0.834	AT_Schüssel3, AT_Gusenbauer, AT_Faymann1
1	0	0	0	0	0	1	2	0.902	0.872	SE_Persson2, SE_Persson3
24	1	0	1	1	1	1	2	0.901	0.872	AL_Rudd1&Gillard1, CA_Harper3
21	1	0	1	0	0	1	2	0.858	0.768	FR_Fillon1-2, FR_Ayrault&Valls
19	1	0	0	1	0	1	1	0.833	0.735	AL_Howard2
2	0	0	0	0	1	1	1	0.831	0.703	DE_Schröder1
13	0	1	1	0	0	0	1	0.755	0.586	FR_Raffarin1-3&Villepin
3	0	0	0	1	0	0	2	0.690	0.585	NL_Balkenende1-3, SE_Reinfeldt1
30	1	1	1	0	1	0	4	0.673	0.618	NZ_Clark1, NZ_Clark2, NZ_Clark3, NZ_Key2
11	0	1	0	1	0	0	1	0.452	0.141	SE_Reinfeldt2
23	1	0	1	1	0	0	1	0.434	0.248	UK_Blair2
5	0	0	1	0	0	0	2	0.349	0.078	UK_Blair3, UK_Brown
20	1	0	0	1	1	0	9	0.340	0.188	AL_Howard3, AL_Howard4, AT_Schüssel1, CA_Harper1, CA_Harper2, DE_Schröder2, DE_Merkel1, DE_Merkel2, NL_Rutte1-2
4	0	0	0	1	1	?	0			
6	0	0	1	0	1	?	0			
7	0	0	1	1	0	?	0			
8	0	0	1	1	1	?	0			
9	0	1	0	0	0	?	0			
10	0	1	0	0	1	?	0			
15	0	1	1	1	0	?	0			
16	0	1	1	1	1	?	0			
25	1	1	0	0	0	?	0			
26	1	1	0	0	1	?	0			
27	1	1	0	1	0	?	0			
28	1	1	0	1	1	?	0			
29	1	1	1	0	0	?	0			
31	1	1	1	1	0	?	0			

Note: inclusion cut = 0.70, PRI cut = 0.60

The conservative solution generated from the truth table contains six Prime Implicants all of which are highly consistent with a statement of sufficiency for \sim PIACT.

Table 27: Conservative solution formula

$CONC * \sim LARGE * \sim HGOVR + \sim LARGE * \sim EXECDOM * \sim HGOVR +$
 $CONC * \sim LARGE * \sim EXECDOM * \sim SALG + CONC * EXECDOM * HGOVR * SALG +$
 $\sim CONC * LARGE * \sim EXECDOM * HGOVR * SALG + \sim CONC * LARGE * EXECDOM * \sim HGOVR *$
 $SALG \rightarrow \sim PIACT$

	Path	Cons.	PRI	Raw cov.	Unique cov.
(1)	CONC * \sim LARGE * \sim HGOVR	0.847	0.792	0.277	0.098
(2)	\sim LARGE * \sim EXECDOM * \sim HGOVR	0.873	0.835	0.307	0.138
(3)	CONC * \sim LARGE * \sim EXECDOM * \sim SALG	0.881	0.813	0.131	0.030
(4)	CONC * EXECDOM * HGOVR * SALG	0.934	0.917	0.173	0.155
(5)	\sim CONC * LARGE * \sim EXECDOM * HGOVR * SALG	0.911	0.851	0.067	0.053
(6)	\sim CONC * LARGE * EXECDOM * \sim HGOVR * SALG	0.923	0.886	0.056	0.040
	<i>Solution</i>	<i>0.867</i>	<i>0.834</i>	<i>0.712</i>	

	Cases consistent	deviant
(1)	Gillard II-Rudd II (AL); Schüssel III (AT), Gusenbauer (AT), Faymann I (AT); Fillon I-II (FR), Ayrault-Valls (FR); Chrétien III-Martin I (CA)	-
(2)	Persson II (SE), Persson III (SE); Schröder I (DE); Gillard II-Rudd II (AL); Schüssel III (AT), Gusenbauer (AT), Faymann I (AT)	-
(3)	Gillard II-Rudd II (AL); Howard II (AL)	-
(4)	Rudd I-Gillard I (AL), Harper III (CA); Key I (NZ)	-
(5)	Balkenende IV-V (NL), Cameron (UK)	-
(6)	Kok II-III (NL)	-

Figure 21: Conservative solution plot




Table 28: Parsimonious solution formula


$$\sim\text{CONC} * \text{SALG} + \sim\text{EXECDOM} * \sim\text{HGOVR} + \text{CONC} * \sim\text{LARGE} * \sim\text{HGOVR} + \text{CONC} * \sim\text{EXECDOM} * \sim\text{SALG} + \text{EXECDOM} * \text{HGOVR} * \text{SALG} \rightarrow \sim\text{PIACT}$$

	Path	Cons.	PRI	Raw cov.	Unique cov.
(1)	$\sim\text{CONC} * \text{SALG}$	0.774	0.659	0.247	0.076
(2)	$\sim\text{EXECDOM} * \sim\text{HGOVR}$	0.854	0.803	0.348	0.103
(3)	$\text{CONC} * \sim\text{LARGE} * \sim\text{HGOVR}$	0.847	0.792	0.277	0.097
(4)	$\text{CONC} * \sim\text{EXECDOM} * \sim\text{SALG}$	0.881	0.813	0.132	0.028
(5)	$\text{EXECDOM} * \text{HGOVR} * \text{SALG}$	0.882	0.783	0.740	0.149
	<i>Solution</i>	<i>0.826</i>	<i>0.783</i>	<i>0.740</i>	

	Cases consistent	deviant
(1)	Schröder I (DE); Balkenende IV-V (NL), Cameron (UK); Kok II-III (NL)	-
(2)	Persson II (SE), Persson III (SE); Schröder I (DE); Gillard II-Rudd II (AL); Schüssel III (AT), Gusenbauer (AT), Faymann I (AT)	-

- | | | |
|-----|--|---|
| (3) | Gillard II-Rudd II (AL); Schüssel III (AT), Gusenbauer (AT),
Faymann I (AT); Fillon I-II (FR), Ayrault-Valls (FR) | - |
| (4) | Gillard II-Rudd II (AL); Howard II (AL) | - |
| (5) | Rudd I-Gillard I (AL), Harper III (CA); Key I (NZ) | - |

Figure 22: Parsimonious solution plot



Analysis 5: Employment policy, 1980s-1990s

Calibrated scores

None of the sets is skewed.

Table 29: Fuzzy scores (analysis 5)

Case	CONC	LARGE	EXECDOM	GOVR	HGOVR	SALG	SALHG	PIACT		
AL_Howard1	0.17	1	0.7		1	1	0.73	0.65	1	
CA_Chretien1	0.98	1		1	0.77	0.77	0.38	0.23	1	
FR_Jospin	0.98	1	0.7		0.01	0.02	0.01	0	1	
NZ_Bolger2-3	0.05	0		1	0.12	0.12	0.96	0.97	1	
UK_Blair1	0.01	1		1	0.91	0.91	0.34	0.2	1	
SE_Carlsson2-3	0.27	0		1	0.02	0.1		1	0.99	
SE_Carlsson4&Persson1	0.27	0		0	1	1	0	0	0.99	
AL_Hawke3	0.17	1		1	0.21	0.21	0.68	0.58	0.95	
AL_Hawke4&Keating1	0.17	1		1	0.01	0.01	0.99		1	0.95
CA_Mulroney2&Campbell	0.27	0		1	1	1	0.93	0.94	0.95	
DE_Kohl4	0.27	1		0	1	1	0.01	0.01	0.95	
NL_Lubbers3	0.98	1	0.3		0.01	0.07	0.04	0.01	0.95	
NZ_Bolger1	0.05	0		1	0.19	0.19	0.89	0.87	0.95	
NL_Kok1	0.98	1	0.3		0.8	0.78	0.05	0.02	0.79	
NL_Lubbers2	0.98	1	0.3		0.47	0.24	0.02	0.05	0.69	
NZ_Lange2&Palmer	0.05	0		1	0	0	0.94	0.95	0.69	
SE_Bildt	0.27	0		0	1	1	0.08		0	0.69
AL_Hawke2	0.17	0		1	0.93	0.93	0.01	0.01	0.46	
AT_Vranitzky3	0.9	1		0	0.34	0.1	0.08	0.11	0.46	
FR_Cresson&Beregovoy	0.27	0		0	0.02	0.02	0.05	0.04	0.46	
UK_Thatcher3	0.01	0		1	1	1	0.06	0.05	0.46	
AT_Vranitzky4	0.9	1		0	0.84	0.05	0.01	0.17	0.14	
FR_Chirac	0.98	1		0	0.99		1	0	0	0.14
UK_Thatcher2	0.01	0		1	1	1	0		0	0.14
UK_Major2	0.01	0		1	1	1	0.03	0.03	0.08	
DE_Kohl2	0.27	1		0	0.95	0.95	0.48	0.5	0.06	
DE_Kohl3	0.27	1		0	0.1	0.05	0.78	0.82	0.06	
AL_Keating2	0.17	1		1	0.49	0.49	0.98	0.98	0.05	
FR_Rocard1-2	0.27	0		0	0.02	0.02	0.15	0.1	0.05	
NL_Lubbers1	0.98	1	0.3		0.7	0.03	0.5	0.35	0.05	
NZ_Lange1	0.05	0		1	0.05	0.05	0.28	0.17	0.05	
AT_Klima	0.9	1		0	1	1	0.15	0.1	0.03	

CA_Mulroney1	0.27	0	1	0.97	0.97	0.28	0.17	0.03
FR_Balladur&Juppe1-2	0.27	0	0.3	0.65	0.2	0.01	0.01	0.03
SE_Carlsson1	0.27	0	1	0	0	0.98	0.99	0.02
AT_Sinowatz3	0.9	1	0.3	0.01	0	0.78	0.83	0.01
AT_Vranitzky2	0.9	1	0.3	0.96	0.11	0	0.15	0.01
CA_Chretien2	0.98	1	1	0.87	0.87	0.06	0.05	0.01
DE_Kohl1	0.27	1	0	1	1	0.15	0.13	0.01

Note: The cases are arranged in the order of their set membership in the outcome.

Presence of the outcome

In the analysis of individual sufficiency, the scores of the conditions HGOVR and SALG are slightly superior to those of GOVR and SALHG, respectively. Therefore, the truth table analysis includes SALG and HGOVR (and excludes SALHG and GOVR). Seven truth table rows are members of the outcome with a consistency cut of 0.69. Lowering the consistency threshold slightly, the truth table mirrors the structure of the truth table better since there is a gap in the consistency scores between row 29 (consistency = 0.699), that is only minimally below the conventional threshold of 0.7, and row 31 (consistency = 0.636), which contains two cases, one of which is deviant in kind.

Table 30: Truth table

	CONC	LARGE	EXECDOM	HGOVR	SALG	OUT	n	incl	PRI	cases
15	0	1	1	1	0	1	1	0.927	0.915	UK_Blair1
3	0	0	0	1	0	1	2	0.875	0.838	SE_Bildt, SE_Carlsson4&Persson1
8	0	0	1	1	1	1	1	0.838	0.801	CA_Mulroney2&Campbell
16	0	1	1	1	1	1	1	0.764	0.732	AL_Howard1
14	0	1	1	0	1	1	3	0.760	0.729	AL_Hawke3, AL_Hawke4&Keating1, AL_Keating2
6	0	0	1	0	1	1	5	0.728	0.695	NZ_Lange2&Palmer, NZ_Bolger1, NZ_Bolger2-3, SE_Carlsson1, SE_Carlsson2-3
29	1	1	1	0	0	1	1	0.699	0.600	FR_Jospin
31	1	1	1	1	0	0	2	0.636	0.521	CA_Chretien1, CA_Chretien2
11	0	1	0	1	0	0	3	0.518	0.417	DE_Kohl1, DE_Kohl2, DE_Kohl4
25	1	1	0	0	0	0	6	0.495	0.327	AT_Vranitzky2, AT_Vranitzky3, AT_Vranitzky4, NL_Lubbers1, NL_Lubbers2, NL_Lubbers3
27	1	1	0	1	0	0	3	0.465	0.291	AT_Klima, FR_Chirac, NL_Kok1
5	0	0	1	0	0	0	1	0.304	0.097	NZ_Lange1
10	0	1	0	0	1	0	1	0.303	0.009	DE_Kohl3

7	0	0	1	1	0	0	5	0.296	0.033	AL_Hawke2, CA_Mulroney1, UK_Thatcher2, UK_Thatcher3, UK_Major2
1	0	0	0	0	0	0	3	0.250	0	FR_Rocard1-2, FR_Cresson&Beregovoy, FR_Balladur&Juppe1-2
26	1	1	0	0	1	0	1	0.224	0.005	AT_Sinowatz3
2	0	0	0	0	1	?	0			
4	0	0	0	1	1	?	0			
9	0	1	0	0	0	?	0			
12	0	1	0	1	1	?	0			
13	0	1	1	0	0	?	0			
17	1	0	0	0	0	?	0			
18	1	0	0	0	1	?	0			
19	1	0	0	1	0	?	0			
20	1	0	0	1	1	?	0			
21	1	0	1	0	0	?	0			
22	1	0	1	0	1	?	0			
23	1	0	1	1	0	?	0			
24	1	0	1	1	1	?	0			
28	1	1	0	1	1	?	0			
30	1	1	1	0	1	?	0			
32	1	1	1	1	1	?	0			

The conservative solution generated from the truth table contains one model with four Prime Implicants, has a good consistency of 0.762 and a moderate coverage of 0.582, which means that the conservative solution explains 58.2 % of the outcome PIACT across cases.

Table 23: Conservative solution formula

$$\sim\text{CONC} * \text{EXECDOM} * \text{SALG} + \sim\text{CONC} * \text{LARGE} * \text{EXECDOM} * \text{HGOVR} + \\ \sim\text{CONC} * \sim\text{LARGE} * \sim\text{EXECDOM} * \text{HGOVR} * \sim\text{SALG} + \\ \text{CONC} * \text{LARGE} * \text{EXECDOM} * \sim\text{HGOVR} * \sim\text{SALG} \rightarrow \text{PIACT}$$

	Path	Cons.	PRI	Raw cov.	Unique cov.
(1)	$\sim\text{CONC} * \text{EXECDOM} * \text{SALG}$	0.748	0.721	0.378	0.298
(2)	$\sim\text{CONC} * \text{LARGE} * \text{EXECDOM} * \text{HGOVR}$	0.791	0.770	0.112	0.032
(3)	$\sim\text{CONC} * \sim\text{LARGE} * \sim\text{EXECDOM} * \text{HGOVR} * \sim\text{SALG}$	0.875	0.838	0.081	0.080
(4)	$\text{CONC} * \text{LARGE} * \text{EXECDOM} * \sim\text{HGOVR} * \sim\text{SALG}$	0.699	0.600	0.111	0.091
	<i>Solution</i>	<i>0.762</i>	<i>0.727</i>	<i>0.582</i>	

Cases	consistent	deviant
(1)	Lange II-Palmer (NZ), Bolger I (NZ), Bolger II-III (NZ), Carlsson II-III (SE); Mulroney II-Campbell (CA); Hawke III (AL), Hawke IV-Keating I (AL); Howard I (AL)	Carlsson I (SE); Keating II (AL)
(2)	Blair I (UK); Howard I (AL)	
(3)	Bildt (SE), Carlsson IV-Persson I (SE)	
(4)	Jospin (FR)	

The solution plot displays the cases that contribute to the solution (upper right quadrant), are deviant (lower right quadrant) and remain unexplained (upper left quadrant).

Figure 24: Conservative solution plot




Table 25: Parsimonious solution formula

EXECDOM * SALG + ~CONC * LARGE * EXECDOM + ~LARGE * ~EXECDOM * HGOVR +
 LARGE * EXECDOM * ~HGOVR → PIACT

	Path	Cons.	PRI	Raw cov.	Unique cov.
(1)	EXECDOM * SALG	0.708	0.681	0.434	0.262
(2)	~CONC * LARGE * EXECDOM	0.785	0.771	0.195	0.038
(3)	~LARGE * ~EXECDOM * HGOVR	0.779	0.733	0.095	0.095
(4)	LARGE * EXECDOM * ~HGOVR	0.717	0.666	0.202	0.076
	<i>Solution</i>	<i>0.742</i>	<i>0.709</i>	<i>0.650</i>	

	Cases consistent	deviant
(1)	Lange II-Palmer (NZ), Bolger I (NZ), Bolger II-III (NZ), Carlsson II-III (SE); Mulroney II-Campbell (CA); Hawke III (AL), Hawke IV-Keating I (AL); Howard I (AL)	Carlsson I (SE); Keating II (AL)
(2)	Hawke III (AL), Hawke IV-Keating I (AL); Blair I (UK); Howard I (AL)	Keating II (AL)
(3)	Bildt (SE), Carlsson IV-Persson I (SE)	
(4)	Hawke III (AL), Hawke IV-Keating I (AL); Jospin (FR)	Keating II (AL)

Absence of the outcome

Table 31: Truth table

	CONC	LARGE	EXECDOM	GOVR	SALG	OUT	n	incl	PRI	cases
26	1	1	0	0	1	1	1	0.995	0.994	AT_Sinowatz3
10	0	1	0	0	1	1	1	0.993	0.991	DE_Kohl3
5	0	0	1	0	0	1	1	0.925	0.903	NZ_Lange1
1	0	0	0	0	0	1	2	0.897	0.853	FR_Rocard1-2, FR_Cresson&Beregovoy
27	1	1	0	1	0	1	6	0.822	0.772	AT_Vranitzky2, AT_Vranitzky4, AT_Klima, FR_Chirac, NL_Lubbers1, NL_Kok1
7	0	0	1	1	0	1	5	0.806	0.735	AL_Hawke2, CA_Mulroney1, UK_Thatcher2, UK_Thatcher3, UK_Major2
31	1	1	1	1	0	1	2	0.673	0.580	CA_Chretien1, CA_Chretien2
11	0	1	0	1	0	1	3	0.669	0.592	DE_Kohl1, DE_Kohl2, DE_Kohl4 AT_Vranitzky3, NL_Lubbers2,
25	1	1	0	0	0	0	3	0.622	0.372	NL_Lubbers3
29	1	1	1	0	0	0	1	0.504	0.321	FR_Jospin

3	0	0	0	1	0	0	3	0.472	0.355	FR_Balladur&Juppe1-2, SE_Bildt, SE_Carlsson4&Persson1
8	0	0	1	1	1	0	1	0.367	0.212	CA_Mulroney2&Campbell
14	0	1	1	0	1	0	3	0.355	0.271	AL_Hawke3, AL_Hawke4&Keating1, AL_Keating2
16	0	1	1	1	1	0	1	0.355	0.269	AL_Howard1
6	0	0	1	0	1	0	5	0.323	0.240	NZ_Lange2&Palmer, NZ_Bolger1, NZ_Bolger2-3, SE_Carlsson1, SE_Carlsson2-3
15	0	1	1	1	0	0	1	0.212	0.087	UK_Blair1
2	0	0	0	0	1	?	0			
4	0	0	0	1	1	?	0			
9	0	1	0	0	0	?	0			
12	0	1	0	1	1	?	0			
13	0	1	1	0	0	?	0			
17	1	0	0	0	0	?	0			
18	1	0	0	0	1	?	0			
19	1	0	0	1	0	?	0			
20	1	0	0	1	1	?	0			
21	1	0	1	0	0	?	0			
22	1	0	1	0	1	?	0			
23	1	0	1	1	0	?	0			
24	1	0	1	1	1	?	0			
28	1	1	0	1	1	?	0			
30	1	1	1	0	1	?	0			
32	1	1	1	1	1	?	0			

Note: Inclusion cut = 0.65, PRI cut = 0.51.

Table 26: Conservative solution formula

$\sim\text{CONC} * \sim\text{LARGE} * \text{EXECDOM} * \sim\text{SALG} + \sim\text{CONC} * \sim\text{LARGE} * \sim\text{GOVR} * \sim\text{SALG} +$
 $\text{CONC} * \text{LARGE} * \text{GOVR} * \sim\text{SALG} + \text{LARGE} * \sim\text{EXECDOM} * \sim\text{GOVR} * \text{SALG} +$
 $\text{LARGE} * \sim\text{EXECDOM} * \text{GOVR} * \sim\text{SALG} \rightarrow \text{PIACT}$

	Path	Cons.	PRI	Raw cov.	Unique cov.
(1)	$\sim\text{CONC} * \sim\text{LARGE} * \text{EXECDOM} * \sim\text{SALG}$	0.831	0.776	0.231	0.171
(2)	$\sim\text{CONC} * \sim\text{LARGE} * \sim\text{GOVR} * \sim\text{SALG}$	0.900	0.859	0.124	0.064
(3)	$\text{CONC} * \text{LARGE} * \text{GOVR} * \sim\text{SALG}$	0.764	0.713	0.313	0.055
(4)	$\text{LARGE} * \sim\text{EXECDOM} * \sim\text{GOVR} * \text{SALG}$	0.997	0.996	0.099	0.067
(5)	$\text{LARGE} * \sim\text{EXECDOM} * \text{GOVR} * \sim\text{SALG}$	0.757	0.705	0.297	0.040
	<i>Solution</i>	<i>0.788</i>	<i>0.740</i>	<i>0.715</i>	

Cases consistent	deviant
------------------	---------

(1)	Lange I (NZ); Hawke II (AL), Mulroney I (CA), Thatcher II (UK), Thatcher III (UK), Major II (UK)	-
(2)	Rocard I-II (FR), Cresson-Beregovoy (FR); Lange I (NZ)	-
(3)	Vranitzky II (AT), Vranitzky IV (AT), Klima (AT), Chirac (FR), Lubbers I (NL); Chrétien II (CA)	Kok I (NL); Chrétien I (CA)
(4)	Kohl III (DE); Sinowatz III (AT)	-
(5)	Kohl I (DE), Kohl II (DE); Vranitzky II (AT), Vranitzky IV (AT), Klima (AT), Chirac (FR), Lubbers I (NL), Kok I (NL)	Kohl IV (DE)

Figure 27: Conservative solution plot




Table 32: Parsimonious solution formula

	Path	Cons.	PRI	Raw cov.	Unique cov.
(1)	CONC * GOVR	0.750	0.683	0.392	0.068
(2)	~EXECDOM * SALG	0.915	0.896	0.158	0.032
(3)	~LARGE * EXECDOM * ~SALG	0.807	0.746	0.231	0.151
(4)	~CONC * LARGE * ~EXECDOM	0.741	0.698	0.138	0.000
(5)	~CONC * ~EXECDOM * ~GOVR	0.932	0.900	0.138	0.000

(6)	~CONC * ~GOVR * ~SALG	0.832	0.750	0.164	0.000
(7)	~LARGE * ~GOVR * ~SALG	0.841	0.786	0.130	0.000
(8)	LARGE * ~EXECDOM * GOVR	0.773	0.731	0.340	0.026
	<i>Solution Model 1</i>	<i>0.773</i>	<i>0.720</i>	<i>0.753</i>	
	<i>Solution Model 2</i>	<i>0.765</i>	<i>0.711</i>	<i>0.753</i>	
	<i>Solution Model 3</i>	<i>0.766</i>	<i>0.713</i>	<i>0.759</i>	
	<i>Solution Model 4</i>	<i>0.767</i>	<i>0.715</i>	<i>0.779</i>	
	<i>Solution Model 5</i>	<i>0.759</i>	<i>0.706</i>	<i>0.779</i>	
	<i>Solution Model 6</i>	<i>0.760</i>	<i>0.709</i>	<i>0.785</i>	

Cases	
(1)	Vranitzky II (AT), Vranitzky IV (AT), Klima (AT), Chirac (FR), Lubbers I (NL), Kok I (NL); Chrétien I (CA), Chrétien II (CA)
(2)	Kohl III (DE); Sinowatz III (AT)
(3)	Lange I (NZ); Hawke II (AL), Mulroney I (CA), Thatcher II (UK), Thatcher III (UK), Major II (UK)
(4)	Kohl III (DE); Kohl I (DE), Kohl II (DE), Kohl IV (DE)
(5)	Rocard I-II (FR), Cresson-Beregovoy (FR); Kohl III (DE)
(6)	Rocard I-II (FR), Cresson-Beregovoy (FR); Lange I (NZ)
(7)	Rocard I-II (FR), Cresson-Beregovoy (FR); Lange I (NZ)
(8)	Kohl I (DE), Kohl II (DE), Kohl IV (DE); Vranitzky II (AT), Vranitzky IV (AT), Klima (AT), Chirac (FR), Lubbers I (NL), Kok I (NL)

Analysis 6: Employment policy, 2000s-2010s

Calibrated scores

Table 33 displays the fuzzy set membership scores attributed to all cases. None of the sets is skewed. The conditions SALG and SALHG are almost skewed with 69.44 % of cases > 0.5.

Table 33: Fuzzy scores (analysis 6)

Case	CONC	LARGE	EXECDOM	GOVR	HGOVR	SALG	SALHG	PIACT
AL_Howard2	0.17	0	0.3	1	1	0.55	0.38	0.04
AL_Howard3	0.17	0	0.3	1	1	0.95	0.99	0.72
AL_Howard4	0.17	0	0.3	1	1	0.97	1	0.72
AL_Rudd1&Gillard1	0.17	1	1	0.84	0.84	0.04	0.04	0.72
AL_Gillard2&Rudd2	0.17	1	0	0	0	1	1	0.04
AT_Schüssel1	0.27	0	0	1	0.99	0.02	0.38	0.19
AT_Schüssel3	0.27	0	0	0.24	0.46	0.74	0.57	0.16
AT_Gusenbauer	0.27	0	0	0.07	0.01	0.46	0.59	0.27
AT_Faymann1	0.98	1	0	0.05	0.01	0.97	0.77	1
CA_Chretien3	0.98	1	1	0.03	0.03	0.99	0.99	0.02
CA_Harper1	0.98	1	0	0.98	0.98	0.76	0.69	0.01
CA_Harper2	0.98	1	0	0.94	0.94	0.04	0.04	0.01
CA_Harper3	0.98	1	1	1	1	0.3	0.18	0.05
FR_Raffarin1-2	0.98	1	0.7	0.09	0.07	0.96	0.98	1
FR_Raffarin3&Villepin	0.98	1	0.7	0.09	0.07	0.96	0.98	0.37
FR_Fillon1-2	0.01	0	0.7	0.03	0.03	0.95	0.95	1
FR_Ayrault&Valls	0.27	0	0.7	0	0	0.87	0.83	0.97
DE_Schröder1	0.98	1	0	0.23	0.38	0.99	1	0.94
DE_Schröder2	0.98	0	0	0.57	0.77	0.43	0.29	0.97
DE_Merkel1	0.98	1	0	0.97	1	0.05	0.01	0.99
DE_Merkel2	0.98	1	0	0.9	0.93	0	0	0.16
NL_Kok2-3	0.98	1	0.7	0.05	0	0.86	0.99	0.72
NL_Balkenende1-3	0.98	1	0.3	0.97	0.67	0.59	0.82	0.42
NL_Balkenende4-5	0.98	1	0.3	0.71	0.76	0.78	0.82	0.94
NL_Rutte1-2	0.98	1	0	0.97	1	0.05	0.22	0.27
NZ_Clark1	0.98	1	1	0	0	1	1	1
NZ_Clark3	0.98	1	1	0	0	1	1	0.72
NZ_Key1	0.98	1	1	1	1	0.1	0.07	0.02
NZ_Key2	0.98	1	1	0.41	0.41	1	1	0.04
SE_Persson2	0.27	0	0	0.26	0.26	0.92	0.92	0.72
SE_Persson3	0.27	0	0	0	0	0.97	0.98	0.72
SE_Reinfeldt1	0.27	0	0.3	0.76	0.76	0.96	0.98	0.03

SE_Reinfeldt2	0.27	0	0	0.61	0.67	0.98	0.88	0.05
UK_Blair2	0.98	1	1	0.84	0.84	0.92	0.92	0.09
UK_Blair3&Brown	0.98	1	1	0.29	0.29	0.75	0.67	1
UK_Cameron	0.98	1	0.3	0.99	0.99	0.03	0.03	1

Note: The cases are arranged in alphabetical order.

Presence of the outcome

In the analysis of individual sufficiency, the scores of the conditions HGOVR and SALG are slightly superior to those of GOVR and SALHG, respectively. Therefore, the truth table analysis includes SALG and HGOVR (and excludes SALHG and GOVR).

Table 34: Truth table

	CONC	LARGE	EXECDOM	HGOVR	SALG	OUT	n	incl	PRI	cases
26	1	1	0	0	1	1	2	0.944	0.917	AT_Faymann1, DE_Schröder1
15	0	1	1	1	0	1	1	0.889	0.810	AL_Rudd1&Gillard1
6	0	0	1	0	1	1	2	0.871	0.866	FR_Fillon1-2, FR_Ayrault&Valls
19	1	0	0	1	0	1	1	0.788	0.628	DE_Schröder2
2	0	0	0	0	1	1	3	0.706	0.572	AT_Schüssel3, SE_Persson2, SE_Persson3
30	1	1	1	0	1	1	8	0.694	0.612	CA_Chretien3, FR_Raffarin1-2, FR_Raffarin3&Vilpepin, NL_Kok2-3, NZ_Clark1, NZ_Clark3, NZ_Key2, UK_Blair3&Brown
1	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	0.682	0.279	AT_Gusenbauer
28	1	1	0	1	1	0	3	0.650	0.533	CA_Harper1, NL_Balkenende1-3, NL_Balkenende4-5
27	1	1	0	1	0	0	5	0.520	0.415	CA_Harper2, DE_Merkel1, DE_Merkel2, NL_Rutte1-2, UK_Cameron
4	0	0	0	1	1	0	5	0.492	0.291	AL_Howard2, AL_Howard3, AL_Howard4, SE_Reinfeldt1, SE_Reinfeldt2
31	1	1	1	1	0	0	2	0.490	0.325	CA_Harper3, NZ_Key1
32	1	1	1	1	1	0	1	0.475	0.300	UK_Blair2
3	0	0	0	1	0	0	1	0.392	0.026	AT_Schüssel1
10	0	1	0	0	1	0	1	0.223	0.058	AL_Gillard2&Rudd2
29	1	1	1	0	0	?	0			
25	1	1	0	0	0	?	0			
24	1	0	1	1	1	?	0			
23	1	0	1	1	0	?	0			
22	1	0	1	0	1	?	0			
21	1	0	1	0	0	?	0			
20	1	0	0	1	1	?	0			

18	1	0	0	0	1	? 0
17	1	0	0	0	0	? 0
16	0	1	1	1	1	? 0
14	0	1	1	0	1	? 0
13	0	1	1	0	0	? 0
12	0	1	0	1	1	? 0
11	0	1	0	1	0	? 0
9	0	1	0	0	0	? 0
8	0	0	1	1	1	? 0
7	0	0	1	1	0	? 0
5	0	0	1	0	0	? 0

Note: Inclusion cut = 0.69, PRI cut = 0.51.

Six truth table rows are included in the minimisation process. Row 30 is included because it is only minimally below the conventional 0.7 threshold and has a higher PRI than row 2.

Table 35: Conservative solution formula

CONC * LARGE * ~HGOVR * SALG + ~CONC * ~LARGE * ~HGOVR * SALG +
~CONC * LARGE * EXECDOM * HGOVR * ~SALG + CONC * ~LARGE * ~EXECDOM * HGOVR *
~SALG → PIACT

	Path	Cons.	PRI	Raw cov.	Unique cov.
(1)	CONC * LARGE * ~HGOVR * SALG	0.715	0.656	0.378	0.367
(2)	~CONC * ~LARGE * ~HGOVR * SALG	0.773	0.700	0.202	0.183
(3)	~CONC * LARGE * EXECDOM * HGOVR * ~SALG	0.889	0.810	0.052	0.041
(4)	CONC * ~LARGE * ~EXECDOM * HGOVR * ~SALG	0.788	0.628	0.066	0.047
	<i>Solution</i>	<i>0.745</i>	<i>0.678</i>	<i>0.668</i>	

	Cases consistent	deviant
(1)	Faymann I (AT), Schröder I (DE); Raffarin I-II (FR), Kok II-III (NL), Clark I (NZ), Clark III (NZ), Blair III-Brown (UK)	Chrétien III (CA), Raffarin III-Villepin (FR), Key II (NZ)
(2)	Persson II (SE), Persson III (SE); Fillon I-II (FR), Ayrault-Valls (FR)	Schüssel III (AT)
(3)	Rudd I-Gillard I (AL)	-
(4)	Schröder II (DE)	-

Figure 28: Conservative solution plot




Table 36: Parsimonious solution formula (analysis 6)

$\sim\text{CONC} * \text{EXECDOM} + \text{CONC} * \sim\text{LARGE} + \text{CONC} * \sim\text{HGOVR} + \sim\text{LARGE} * \sim\text{HGOVR} * \text{SALG} \rightarrow$
 PIACT

	Path	Cons.	PRI	Raw cov.	Unique cov.
(1)	$\sim\text{CONC} * \text{EXECDOM}$	0.826	0.746	0.172	0.048
(2)	$\text{CONC} * \sim\text{LARGE}$	0.784	0.598	0.160	0.051
(3)	$\text{CONC} * \sim\text{HGOVR}$	0.716	0.624	0.476	0.356
(4)	$\sim\text{LARGE} * \sim\text{HGOVR} * \text{SALG}$	0.751	0.682	0.222	0.073
	<i>Solution</i>	<i>0.737</i>	<i>0.663</i>	<i>0.731</i>	

	Cases consistent	deviant
(1)	Fillon I-II (FR), Ayrault-Valls (FR); Rudd I-Gillard I (AL)	-
(2)	Schröder II (DE)	-
(3)	Faymann I (AT), Schröder I (DE); Raffarin I-II (FR), Kok II-III (NL), Clark I (NZ), Clark III (NZ), Blair III-Brown (UK)	Chrétien III (CA), Raffarin III-Villepin (FR), Key II (NZ)
(4)	Persson II (SE), Persson III (SE); Fillon I-II (FR), Ayrault-Valls (FR)	Schüssel III (AT)

Absence of the outcome

Table 37: Truth table

	CONC	LARGE	EXECDOM	HGOVR	SALG	OUT	n	incl	PRI	cases
3	0	0	0	1	0	1	1	0.984	0.974	AT_Schüssel1
10	0	1	0	0	1	1	1	0.952	0.942	AL_Gillard2&Rudd2
1	0	0	0	0	0	1	1	0.877	0.721	AT_Gusenbauer AL_Howard2, AL_Howard3, AL_Howard4, SE_Reinfeldt1, SE_Reinfeldt2
4	0	0	0	1	1	1	5	0.792	0.709	UK_Blair2
32	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	0.775	0.700	CA_Harper3, NZ_Key1
31	1	1	1	1	0	1	2	0.754	0.675	DE_Schröder2 CA_Harper2, DE_Merkel1, DE_Merkel2, NL_Rutte1-2,
19	1	0	0	1	0	0	1	0.643	0.372	UK_Cameron AT_Schüssel3, SE_Persson2, SE_Persson3
27	1	1	0	1	0	0	5	0.603	0.515	CA_Harper1, NL_Balkenende1-3, NL_Balkenende4-5
2	0	0	0	0	1	0	3	0.602	0.420	CA_Chretien3, FR_Raffarin1-2, FR_Raffarin3&Villepin, NL_Kok2-3, NZ_Clark1, NZ_Clark3, NZ_Key2,
28	1	1	0	1	1	0	3	0.595	0.461	UK_Blair3&Brown
30	1	1	1	0	1	0	8	0.470	0.329	AL_Rudd1&Gillard1
15	0	1	1	1	0	0	1	0.422	0.012	AT_Faymann1, DE_Schröder1
26	1	1	0	0	1	0	2	0.385	0.083	FR_Fillon1-2, FR_Ayrault&Valls
6	0	0	1	0	1	0	2	0.165	0.134	
5	0	0	1	0	0	?	0			
7	0	0	1	1	0	?	0			
8	0	0	1	1	1	?	0			
9	0	1	0	0	0	?	0			
11	0	1	0	1	0	?	0			
12	0	1	0	1	1	?	0			
13	0	1	1	0	0	?	0			
14	0	1	1	0	1	?	0			
16	0	1	1	1	1	?	0			
17	1	0	0	0	0	?	0			
18	1	0	0	0	1	?	0			
20	1	0	0	1	1	?	0			
21	1	0	1	0	0	?	0			
22	1	0	1	0	1	?	0			
23	1	0	1	1	0	?	0			
24	1	0	1	1	1	?	0			
25	1	1	0	0	0	?	0			
29	1	1	1	0	0	?	0			

Note: Inclusion cut = 0.7, PRI cut = 0.51.

Six truth table rows with eleven cases are included in the minimisation. The consistency threshold of 0.7 seems reasonable since it reflects the structure of the truth table well, given the huge gap between these rows' consistency scores (row 31 consistency = 0.754, row 19 consistency = 0.643, PRI = 0.372). The resulting conservative solution has a good consistency level (0.831) but – as expected – low coverage (0.527).

Table 38: Conservative solution formula

$\sim\text{CONC} * \text{LARGE} * \sim\text{EXECDOM} * \sim\text{HGOVR} + \sim\text{CONC} * \text{LARGE} * \sim\text{EXECDOM} * \sim\text{SALG} + \text{CONC} * \text{LARGE} * \text{EXECDOM} * \text{HGOVR} + \sim\text{CONC} * \sim\text{LARGE} * \sim\text{EXECDOM} * \text{HGOVR} * \text{SALG} \rightarrow \sim\text{PIACT}$

	Path	Cons.	PRI	Raw cov.	Unique cov.
(1)	$\sim\text{CONC} * \sim\text{LARGE} * \sim\text{EXECDOM} * \text{HGOVR}$	0.827	0.763	0.230	0.136
(2)	$\text{CONC} * \text{LARGE} * \text{EXECDOM} * \text{HGOVR}$	0.806	0.765	0.212	0.208
(3)	$\sim\text{CONC} * \sim\text{LARGE} * \sim\text{EXECDOM} * \sim\text{SALG}$	0.940	0.900	0.127	0.032
(4)	$\sim\text{CONC} * \text{LARGE} * \sim\text{EXECDOM} * \sim\text{HGOVR} * \text{SALG}$	0.767	0.683	0.154	0.154
	<i>Solution</i>	<i>0.831</i>	<i>0.781</i>	<i>0.527</i>	

	Cases consistent	deviant
(1)	Schüssel I (AT); Howard II (AL), Reinfeldt I (SE), Reinfeldt II (SE)	Howard III (AL), Howard IV (AL)
(2)	Harper III (CA), Key I (NZ); Blair II (UK)	
(3)	Gusenbauer (AT); Schüssel III (AT)	
(4)	Gillard II-Rudd II (AL)	

Figure 29: Conservative solution plot




Table 39: Parsimonious solution formula

M01: CONC*EXECDOM*HGOVR + (~CONC*~LARGE*HGOVR + ~CONC*~LARGE*~SALG + ~CONC*LARGE*~EXECDOM) -> ~PIACT

M02: CONC*EXECDOM*HGOVR + (~CONC*~LARGE*HGOVR + ~CONC*~LARGE*~SALG + ~CONC*LARGE*~HGOVR) -> ~PIACT

M03: CONC*EXECDOM*HGOVR + (~CONC*~LARGE*HGOVR + ~CONC*~LARGE*~SALG + ~CONC*LARGE*SALG) -> ~PIACT

M04: CONC*EXECDOM*HGOVR + (~CONC*~LARGE*HGOVR + ~CONC*LARGE*~EXECDOM + ~CONC*~EXECDOM*~SALG) -> ~PIACT

M05: CONC*EXECDOM*HGOVR + (~CONC*~LARGE*HGOVR + ~CONC*LARGE*~HGOVR + ~CONC*~EXECDOM*~SALG) -> ~PIACT

M06: CONC*EXECDOM*HGOVR + (~CONC*~LARGE*HGOVR + ~CONC*LARGE*SALG + ~CONC*~EXECDOM*~SALG) -> ~PIACT

M07: CONC*EXECDOM*HGOVR + (~CONC*~LARGE*~SALG + ~CONC*LARGE*~EXECDOM + ~CONC*~EXECDOM*HGOVR) -> ~PIACT

M08: $\text{CONC} * \text{EXECDOM} * \text{HGOVR} + (\sim \text{CONC} * \sim \text{LARGE} * \sim \text{SALG} + \sim \text{CONC} * \text{LARGE} * \sim \text{HGOVR} + \sim \text{CONC} * \sim \text{EXECDOM} * \text{HGOVR}) \rightarrow \sim \text{PIACT}$

M09: $\text{CONC} * \text{EXECDOM} * \text{HGOVR} + (\sim \text{CONC} * \sim \text{LARGE} * \sim \text{SALG} + \sim \text{CONC} * \text{LARGE} * \text{SALG} + \sim \text{CONC} * \sim \text{EXECDOM} * \text{HGOVR}) \rightarrow \sim \text{PIACT}$

M10: $\text{CONC} * \text{EXECDOM} * \text{HGOVR} + (\sim \text{CONC} * \text{LARGE} * \sim \text{EXECDOM} + \sim \text{CONC} * \sim \text{EXECDOM} * \text{HGOVR} + \sim \text{CONC} * \sim \text{EXECDOM} * \sim \text{SALG}) \rightarrow \sim \text{PIACT}$

M11: $\text{CONC} * \text{EXECDOM} * \text{HGOVR} + (\sim \text{CONC} * \text{LARGE} * \sim \text{HGOVR} + \sim \text{CONC} * \sim \text{EXECDOM} * \text{HGOVR} + \sim \text{CONC} * \sim \text{EXECDOM} * \sim \text{SALG}) \rightarrow \sim \text{PIACT}$

M12: $\text{CONC} * \text{EXECDOM} * \text{HGOVR} + (\sim \text{CONC} * \text{LARGE} * \text{SALG} + \sim \text{CONC} * \sim \text{EXECDOM} * \text{HGOVR} + \sim \text{CONC} * \sim \text{EXECDOM} * \sim \text{SALG}) \rightarrow \sim \text{PIACT}$

		inclS	PRI	covS	covU	(M1)	(M2)
1	CONC*EXECDOM*HGOVR	0.832	0.784	0.256	0.192	0.208	0.195
2	~CONC*~LARGE*HGOVR	0.793	0.724	0.239	0.009	0.116	0.116
3	~CONC*~LARGE*~SALG	0.940	0.900	0.127	0.000	0.032	0.032
4	~CONC*LARGE*~EXECDOM	0.926	0.907	0.059	0.000	0.055	
5	~CONC*LARGE*~HGOVR	0.929	0.894	0.072	0.000		0.054
6	~CONC*LARGE*SALG	0.902	0.863	0.068	0.000		
7	~CONC*~EXECDOM*HGOVR	0.824	0.752	0.242	0.000		
8	~CONC*~EXECDOM*~SALG	0.916	0.854	0.139	0.000		

M1	0.815	0.762	0.538
M2	0.814	0.761	0.538
M3	0.813	0.760	0.538
M4	0.815	0.762	0.538
M5	0.814	0.760	0.540
M6	0.814	0.760	0.540
M7	0.831	0.780	0.530
M8	0.829	0.777	0.531
M9	0.829	0.777	0.531
M10	0.831	0.780	0.530
M11	0.829	0.777	0.531
M12	0.829	0.777	0.531

		(M3)	(M4)	(M5)	(M6)	(M7)	(M8)
1	CONC*EXECDOM*HGOVR	0.198	0.208	0.195	0.198	0.208	0.195
2	~CONC*~LARGE*HGOVR	0.116	0.116	0.116	0.116		
3	~CONC*~LARGE*~SALG	0.032				0.032	0.032
4	~CONC*LARGE*~EXECDOM		0.047			0.047	
5	~CONC*LARGE*~HGOVR			0.048			0.049
6	~CONC*LARGE*SALG	0.055			0.048		
7	~CONC*~EXECDOM*HGOVR					0.108	0.110
8	~CONC*~EXECDOM*~SALG		0.032	0.034	0.034		

		(M9)	(M10)	(M11)	(M12)
1	CONC*EXECDOM*HGOVR	0.198	0.208	0.195	0.198
2	~CONC*~LARGE*HGOVR				
3	~CONC*~LARGE*~SALG	0.032			
4	~CONC*LARGE*~EXECDOM		0.046		
5	~CONC*LARGE*~HGOVR			0.047	
6	~CONC*LARGE*SALG	0.049			0.047
7	~CONC*~EXECDOM*HGOVR	0.109	0.108	0.108	0.108
8	~CONC*~EXECDOM*~SALG		0.032	0.032	0.032

cases

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2  CONC*EXECDOM*HGOVR  CA_Harper3,NZ_Key1; UK_Blair2
-----
2  ~CONC*~LARGE*HGOVR  AT_Schüssel1; AL_Howard2,AL_Howard3,AL_Howard4,SE_Reinfeldt1,SE_Reinfeldt2
3  ~CONC*~LARGE*~SALG  AT_Gusenbauer ; AT_Schüssel1
4  ~CONC*LARGE*~EXECDOM  AL_Gillard2&Rudd2
5  ~CONC*LARGE*~HGOVR  AL_Gillard2&Rudd2
6  ~CONC*LARGE*SALG  AL_Gillard2&Rudd2
7  ~CONC*~EXECDOM*HGOVR  AT_Schüssel1; AL_Howard2,AL_Howard3,AL_Howard4,SE_Reinfeldt1,SE_Reinfeldt2
8  ~CONC*~EXECDOM*~SALG  AT_Gusenbauer ; AT_Schüssel1
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Figure 30: Parsimonious solution plot

