THREE PROBLEMS PERTAINING TO THE MAHĀBHĀṢYA

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I. THE FIRST VĀRTTIKAS IN THE MAHĀBHĀŠYA

1. Introduction: The difficulty of identifying vārttikas

Academic disciplines, like other human institutions, have a tendency to become the guardians of their traditions. Indology is no exception. In the 19th century the pioneers of our field laid the foundations without which none of us would be able to carry out the work we are doing. What was done, by few people and with so few tools, is indeed impressive. What our 19th century predecessors did was to formulate theories sometimes based on little evidence. We cannot blame them for this. Without initial theories there is nothing to check, nothing to improve upon, and ultimately very little for Indologists to do.

The traditional tendency in our discipline has the unfortunate consequence that these initial theories have in many cases come to be looked upon as facts which one is not allowed to challenge unless one has very strong evidence. The formulation of other theories which are equally plausible, yet equally uncertain, is often looked upon as reproachable speculation. This is regrettable, for it may, and indeed does, lead to situations in which one scholar blames another for being speculative, while at the same time accepting without question theories propounded in the 19th century. It should be clear that a theory formulated in the 19th century is not, for that reason, more acceptable than one formulated in the 20th.

This criticism against a prevailing tendency in Indology does not apply to all Indologists. Many are refreshingly open to other points of view. They demonstrate this in their work, and in their reactions to the work of colleagues. Yet it is still worthwhile to state explicitly and emphatically that much of what we do, and ought to do, is, with as much care as possible, to formulate and test theories. The theories we have to test are both old ones, which may date back to the 19th century or even earlier, and new ones which we formulate ourselves. This applies also to what I am going to speak about today. We shall be comparing several competing theories as to which are the first vārttikas in the Mahābhāṣya, and then try to choose the most plausible one among them.

We start from the well-known theory that the Mahābhāṣya as we have it is not the work of one single author. The majority of scholars nowadays believe that most of the text was composed by someone called Patañjali. Embedded in the Mahābhāṣya are the so-called vārttikas, short nominal phrases as well as some verses, which were not composed by Patañjali. Most of the prose vārttikas are thought to have been formulated by someone called Katyāyana who, obviously, must have lived before Patañjali.
It is not immediately obvious that the manuscripts and editions of the Mahåbhåṣya contain the work of two, and possibly more, authors. Only in some exceptional cases is a vårttika explicitly ascribed to someone different from Patañjali. Indeed, there is reason to think that for many centuries no one was aware of the multiple authorship of the Mahåbhåṣya. (Here and in what follows I will often use the term ‘Mahåbhåṣya’ in order to refer to all that is contained in the manuscripts and editions, including the vårttikas.) Or they were aware of it but did not divide the text into vårttikas and Bhåṣya in the same way as we do. Bhartṛhari - perhaps the first commentator on the Mahåbhåṣya and certainly the first one part of whose commentary has been preserved - appears to have ascribed different parts of the Mahåbhåṣya proper to several authors. He certainly uses the word vårttika more than once to refer to passages from the Mahåbhåṣya proper. Other authors may have followed the presumed example of the Mahåbhåṣya when they called their work 'Vårttika', even though it contained both short nominal phrases (similar to Kåtyåyana's vårttikas) and explanatory prose. Some examples are the Tattvårthavårttika by the Jaina author Akalaña, and the Såµkhya work Yuktidåµikå which is also known [3] by the name ‘Råjavårttika’. Other works again followed the style without adopting the name 'Vårttika'.

It is not my intention to pursue these questions further at present. They have been dealt with in an article called "Vårttika" which will appear in the Wiener Zeitschrift für die Kunde Südasiens. I merely wish to draw your attention to the fact that the manuscripts of the Mahåbhåṣya do not indicate what is a vårttika and what is not. The later commentators on the Mahåbhåṣya occasionally identify vårttikas, but not until Kielhorn an attempt was made to identify each and every vårttika in the Mahåbhåṣya, and to establish a general criterion by which to identify them.

Kielhorn formulated this general criterion in a book which came out in 1876 and bore the title "Kåtyåyana and Patañjali: Their Relationship to Each Other, and to Påñini". Briefly stated, Kielhorn recognizes as prose vårttikas those sentences which are accompanied by explanatory remarks, by a paraphrase which usually repeats the words of the vårttika. Kielhorn applied this criterion in his edition of the Mahåbhåṣya, which has remained the standard edition of this text. The vårttikas are here printed in bold type, and are therefore easily distinguished from the text of the Mahåbhåṣya proper.

By and large Kielhorn's criterion has been accepted by scholars in the field. Occasionally a question has been raised concerning the correct formulation of the criterion and its correct application in particular cases. This was perhaps most recently done by S. D. Joshi and J. A. F. Roodbergen (1981: 140-41 n. 452), with regard to P.

1 The article has meanwhile appeared in WZKS 34 (1990), 123-146.
2.3.67 vt. 2 which, though explained by Patañjali, is explained with the help of different words.

Of perhaps more interest in this context is Kielhorn's habit of adding an explanation (which in these cases is identical with the vårttikas) where he thought that a certain phrase was a vårttika, thus staying in agreement with his own criterion. The vårttikas 8 to 15 on P. 1.1.21, for example, do not occur in any of [4] the manuscripts used by Kielhorn (I, p. 78, l. 8 f.; see note on p. 511). The vårttikas 5 to 7 on P. 1.1.58 (I, p. 154, l. 12 f.) are similar; most manuscripts do not repeat them. A perusal of Kielhorn's critical notes reveals numerous cases where vårttikas have been added against the evidence of the majority of manuscripts. In all these cases Kielhorn has himself created the evidence on which his criterion is based! Of course, Kielhorn has a theory to explain why many of his manuscripts do not treat presumed vårttikas as such: since the comment in the Bhāṣya is in these cases identical with the vårttika, scribes did not bother to repeat this; they added a figure 2, in which place later a stop came, which in its turn disappeared altogether from many manuscripts.²

This example shows, I think, very clearly the way of working of one of our illustrious predecessors in the last century. Kielhorn did not just report what he found in his manuscripts. On the contrary, he formulated a theory about the authorship of the different parts of his text, and on the basis of this theory he subsequently felt entitled to go to the extent of deviating from his manuscripts in some cases. It would be beyond the scope of this lecture to discuss whether or not Kielhorn was right in doing so in each and every instance. Perhaps he was, perhaps he wasn't. But I will not in general terms argue with his method of trying to get beyond, or behind his texts by formulating theories which occasionally may even suggest readings which differ from those his manuscripts provided.

Nor is it my intention to argue, more in particular, with Kielhorn's criterion for identifying vårttikas. I accept that all phrases which are subsequently explained with the help of the same words are indeed vårttikas. I am not sure that all vårttikas underwent such treatment by Patañjali. This may or may not have been the case. This question is not however going to be [5] of much relevance for the specific problem which is going to be discussed in this lecture.

2. The first vārttika according to tradition

The main question of this lecture is: Which is the first vārttika in the Mahābhāṣya? According to Kielhorn and several commentators on the Mahābhāṣya it is:

\[ \text{siddhe śabdārthasambandhe lokato 'rthaprayukte śabdaprayoge śāstreṇe dharmaniya-maḥ yathā laukikavaidikeṣu.} \]

It is discussed, in three parts, from p. 6 l. 12 to p. 9 l. 22 in volume I of Kielhorn’s edition.\(^3\)

The reason to think that this is the first vārttika lies in a passage in the Mahābhāṣya. The word siddha, it is argued, is here synonymous with nitya ‘eternal’. The question is then raised why the ambiguous term siddha is used rather than nitya. The answer is as follows (p. 6 l. 28 - p. 7 l. 2):

\[ \text{maṅgalārtham/ maṅgalika ācāryo mahataḥ śāstraughasya maṅgalārtham} \]
\[ \text{siddhaśabdadam āditaḥ prayukte maṅgalādīnī hi śāstrāṇi prathante vīrapuruṣakāṇi} \]
\[ \text{ca bhavanty āyuṣ-matpuruṣakāṇi cādhyetāraś ca siddhārthaḥ yathā syur iti/} \]

For the sake of [having] something auspicious. The teacher, being intent on something auspicious, uses the word siddha at the beginning of the great stream in the form of the science [of grammar] in order [to have] something auspicious. For sciences which begin with something auspicious spread and are such that the men [who study them become] valiant and long-lived. [The use of siddha indicates:] ‘May those who study [this science] reach their aim (siddhārtha)’.

This passage seems to indicate that the vārttika siddhe śabdārthasambandhe ... occurs at the beginning and must therefore be the first one. No commentator on the Mahābhāṣya has disputed this conclusion. Indeed, the vārttika is referred to as ‘the first vārttika’ by Śivarāmendra Sarasvatī (ādyam vārtikam; MPV I, p. 76 l. 2), while Nāgeśa emphatically states that all that precedes the vārttika derives from the author of the Bhāṣya (itaḥ pūrvaḥ tu ... bhāsyakāraśyaiva grantha iti bodhyam; NSP I, p. 55b, l. 10-11).

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\(^3\) Joshi and Roodbergen (1986: ix) argue that this is not one vārttika but three. A discussion of their arguments and of their way of dividing the vārttika(s) is beyond the scope of this lecture.
3. Bhandarkar's objections

Objections against this position were raised more than a century ago by R.G. Bhandarkar (1876). Bhandarkar argued that before the vārttika siddhe śabdārthasambandhe etc. there is at least one other vārttika in the Mahābhāṣya, viz. the sentence

\[ imāni prayojanāny adhyeyaṃ vyākaraṇam \]

"These are the uses, grammar should be studied" (Mbh I, p. 5 l. 11)

The reason for thinking that this is one of Kātyāyana's vārtikas is that this sentence is followed by *iti* and preceded by the words

\[ ācāryaḥ suḥṛd bhūtvā anvācaṣṭe \]

This expression, Bhandarkar maintained, "occurs in several places of the Mahābhāṣya, in all of which we have to understand Kātyāyana by the term ācārya" (p. 345). Moreover, "in all these instances the sentence indicated by *iti*, which stands in the place of an object to the verb *anvācaṣṭe*, is a vārtika, for it is explained just before by Patanjali, as all vārtikas are" (p. 346).

4. Weaknesses of Bhandarkar's arguments

This last remark shows immediately why Bhandarkar's alleged vārttika could not be acceptable to Kielhorn. Kielhorn's criterion is that a vārttika is followed by an explanation. The sentence *imāni prayojanāny adhyeyaṃ vyākaraṇam*, on the other hand, is preceded by an explanation.

Bhandarkar's other argument, too, shows some weaknesses which can easily be brought to light with the help of the better tools which we now possess in the form of a good edition of the Mahābhāṣya (by Kielhorn) and of a Word Index (by Pathak and Chitrao). To begin with, most of the manuscripts on which Kielhorn based his edition do not have the words suḥṛd bhūtvā in the passage under consideration. This does not necessarily mean that they are a later addition. The later tradition believed that there could be no vārttika on these early pages of the Mahābhāṣya, and this fact may have induced too observant scribes to droop the words that would prove the opposite. One might argue that suḥṛd bhūtvā was added only because all other occurrences of the two

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4 Bhartṛhari's commentary offers no help in determining the presence or absence of these words.
words ācāryaḥ anvācaṣte, with only one exception, are accompanied by the phrase suhṛd bhūtvā, but this argument is not very strong. If a scribe was knowledgeable enough to remember the usual co-occurrence of ācāryaḥ anvācaṣte and suhṛd bhūtvā, he should also remember that suhṛd bhūtvā comes always after ācāryaḥ and before anvācaṣte. In our passage, on the other hand, the order is: suhṛd bhūtvā "cārya (idam śāstram) anvācaṣte. Yet the absence of these words in many manuscripts somewhat weakens the main thrust of Bhandarkar's argument.

Bhandarkar also overlooked one passage (Mbh I, p. 208, l. 16, on P. 1.2.32) where the expression tad ācāryaḥ suhṛd bhūtvā anvācaṣte [8] obviously refers to Pāṇini. The sūtra under discussion here is P. 1.2.32 tasyādita udāttam ardhahrasvam, which describes the correct pronunciation of the svarita accent. Patañjali observes that without this sūtra one would not know how much of the svarita is udātta, and how much anudātta. The Bhāṣya then continues:

\[\text{tad ācāryaḥ suhṛd bhūtvā anvācaṣta iyad udāttam iyad anudāttam ...}\]

Therefore the Ācārya, out of friendliness, explains 'This much is udātta, this much anudātta' ... 

The Ācārya here can only be Pāṇini. However, the sentence imāni prayojanāny adhyeyam vyākaraṇam certainly does not derive from Pāṇini, so that Bhandarkar's argument is not necessarily weakened much by this fact.

In spite of the weaknesses in Bhandarkar's arguments we cannot easily discard them altogether. Whether or not the words suhṛd bhūtvā origianlly occurred in the sentence which introduces the presumed first vārttika, all manuscripts agree that the word ācārya belongs there. This word ācārya usually refers to Pāṇini, sometimes to Kātyāyana or someone else, but never, except supposedly here, to Patañjali himself. This is the conclusion reached by Kielhorn (1876: 249 (177) f.) after studying sixty occurrences of the word ācārya. This fact is puzzling, and it seems clear that Bhandarkar's case deserves further consideration.

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5 The exception is Mbh. Ilp. 349 l. 4 (on P. 7.4.24 vt. 1). With suhṛd bhūtvā the words occur Mbh. I p. 208 l. 16 (on P. 1.2.32), p. 315 l. 2 (on P. 1.4.3 vt 6), p. 368 l. 2 (on P. 2.1.1 vt. 12), p. 481 l. 3 (on P. 2.4.32 vt. 2); Il p. 157 l. 7 (on P. 3.3.127 vt. 2), p. 162 l. 20-21 (on P. 3.3.137 vt. 2), p. 163 l. 12 (on P. 3.3.141 vt. 1), p. 303 l. 15 (on P. 4.3.4 vt. 2), p. 325 l. 7 (on P. 4.3.143 vt. 2), p. 349 l. 15 (on P. 5.1.30-31 vt. 1), p. 359 l. 22 (on P. 5.1.84 vt. 1), p. 406 l. 18 (on P. 5.3.20 vt. 1), p. 409 l. 20 (on P. 5.3.35 vt. 1).
5. Bhandarkar's position modified.

There is one more flaw in Bhandarkar's arguments, which, surprisingly, does not further weaken his case but rather strengthens it, be it in a somewhat modified form.

We saw that, according to Bhandarkar, the sentence indicated by *iti* and following the expression *ācāryaḥ suhṛd bhūtvā 'nvācaṣṭē* is always a vārttika. This is not completely correct. It is rather Patañjali's paraphrase of a vārttika, not the vārttika itself, which is introduced by this expression. Sometimes Patañjali's paraphrase is a simple [9] repetition of the vārttika,6 But in other cases it is not. The following cases illustrate this:

(i) P. 1.4.3 vt. 6 reads: *hrasveyuvsthamapravṛttau ca strīvacane.* Patañjali paraphrases this as follows: *hrasvau ceyuvsthānau ca pravṛttau ca prāk ca pravṛtteḥ strīvacanāv eva nadīsaṃjñau bhavata iti vaktavyam.* This paraphrase reappears in the final sentence of Patañjali's discussion (p. 315, l. 2-3): *tad ācāryaḥ suhṛd bhūtvā 'nvācaṣṭē hrasvau ceyuvsthānau ca pravṛttau ca prāk ca pravṛtteḥ strīvacanāv eveti.*

(ii) P. 2.4.32 vt. 2 reads: *anvādesaś ca kathitānukathanamātram.* It is paraphrased: *anvādesaś ca kathitānukathanamātram draṣṭavyam.* This paraphrase occurs again in the next line (p. 481, l. 3-4): *tad ācāryaḥ suhṛd bhūtvā 'nvācaṣṭe 'nvādesaś ca kathitānukathanamātram draṣṭavyam iti.*

These cases make clear that the sentence *imāni prayojanāny adhyeyam vyākaranam* must be considered a paraphrase rather than a vārttika.

But what is paraphrased? Quite clearly the section of the Mahābhāṣya that deals with the uses of grammar, i.e., p. 1, l. 14 - p. 5, l. 4 in Kielhorn's edition. This long section contains two headings which might easily be looked upon as vārtikas. Both contain features that indicate that they were not written by the author of the Mahābhāṣya. We shall look at them one by one:

(i) p. 1, l. 14: *kāni punāḥ śabdānuśāsanasya prayojanāni/ rakṣohāgamalghvasandehāḥ prayojanam/*

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6 E.g., P. 3.3.127 vt. 2 is repeated at Mbh II, p. 157, l. 7; P. 3.3.141 vt. 1 at Mbh II, p. 163, l. 12-13; P. 4.3.143 vt. 2 at Mbh II, p. 324, l. 7; P. 5.1.31 vt. 1 at Mbh II, p. 349, l. 15; P. 5.1.84 vt. 1 at Mbh II, p. 359, l. 22; P. 5.3.20 vt. 1 at Mbh II, p. 406, l. 18; P. 5.3.35 vt. 1 at Mbh II, p. 409, l. 20.
This is the less peculiar of the two headings. Yet it is remarkable in that the grammatical number of the word *prayojana* differs in [10] question and answer. This does suggest that the form of the answer was fixed, in other words, that the answer is a quotation from an earlier work.

(ii) p. 2, l. 3-6: *imāni ca bhūyaḥ śabdānuśasanasya prayojanāni/ te 'surāḥ/ diṣṭāḥ śabdāḥ/ yad adhiṣṭam/ yas tu prayuṅkte/ avidvāṃsah/ vibhaktim kurvanti/ yo vā imām/ catvāri/ uta tvāḥ/ saktum iva/ sārasvatīm/ daśamyāṁ putrasya/ sudevo asi varuṇeti/

Patañjali does not know the precise significance of all the items of this list. This proves that he did not make it himself. Each of the items is the beginning of a quotation, usually from Vedic literature. In some cases Patañjali does not know which quotation is intended:

(ii-a) In the case of *catvāri* Patañjali gives two quotations from the Rgveda beginning with that word, introducing the second one with the phrase *apara aha* "someone else says". The first quotation is RV 4.58.3, which begins *catvāri śṛṅgā trayo asya pāḍā ...* The other quotation is RV 1.164.45: *catvāri vākparimitā padāni ...*

(ii-b) Patañjali does not know the full form of the quotation beginning with *daśamyāṁ putrasya*. Instead he cites a text which begins *daśamyuttarakālam putrasya nāma vidadhyād ...*

(ii-c) The pratīka *vibhaktim kurvanti* does not recur in the quoted line *prayājāh savibhaktikāḥ kāryāḥ*.

Note that both the headings are treated like vārttika in Kielhorn’s sens in that they are explained in full detail in the immediately following Bhāṣya. It is therefore not surprising that [11] at least one author explicitly calls the first of these two a vārttika. Sāyaṇa, in his introduction to his commentary on the Rgveda, makes the following remark (p. 26, l. 28-30):

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7 So also Filliozat, 1975: 27 fn. 3. Joshi and Roodbergen (1986: 26 fn. 72), following K. Ch. Chatterji, point out that “the use of the sg. *prayojanam* is typical of Kātyāyanavārttikas ..., whereas Patañjali commonly uses the pl.”

8 So Filliozat, 1975: 38 fn. 1.
tasyaitasya vyākaraṇasya prayojanaviśeṣo vararucinā vārttike darśitaḥ
‘rakṣohāgamalaghvasandeḥāḥ prayojanam’ iti/ etāni rakṣādiprayojananāni
prayojanāntarāni ca mahābhāṣye patañjalinā spaṣṭikṛtāni/

And in his commentary on the Taittirīya Saṃhitā (1.1.1) he ascribes the quoted line to Kātyāyana (p. 32, l. 20-21):

kātyāyano ’pi vyākaraṇaprayojanāny udājahāra ‘rakṣohāgamalaghvasandeḥāḥ
prayojanam’ iti/

These considerations show that Bhandarkar's arguments, if suitably adjusted, are stronger than Bhandarkar himself may have suspected. There is good reason to think that at least two vārttikas preceded the ‘first vārttika’, viz. (1) rakṣohāgamalaghvasandeḥāḥ prayojanam, and (2) te 'surāḥ/ .../ sudevo asi varuṇeti/. These two vārttikas fulfil Kielhorn's criterion of being subsequently explained by Patañjali. Moreover, they are ascribed to an Ācārya by Patañjali himself, which shows that he cannot have been their author. But once we have accepted these two (or do they together count as one?) new vārttikas as authentic, there is no reason not to follow Bhandarkar in thinking that also the very first line of the Mahābhāṣya, atha śabdānuṣāsanam, is a vārttika. This line, too, is explained by Patañjali, and must be considered to fulfil Kielhorn's criterion.

6. Traditional argument rejected.

A major problem remains however. How can we accept three new vārttikas in the very beginning of the Mahābhāṣya when Patañjali explicitly states that the vārttika siddhe śabdārthasambandhe etc. is at the beginning?

The answer given by Bhandarkar is "that these aphorisms are simply introductory, while the regular śāstra begins with siddhe śabdārtha... etc. The provision for maṅgala is therefore [12] made in this, and not in the preceding ones, just as Pāṇini secures maṅgala in the first of his regular sūtras, viz. vṛddhir ādaic, and not in the prayāhāra sūtras" (p. 346). Here again Bhandarkar's argument can be strengthened further.

In three places of the Mahābhāṣya Patañjali invokes the idea of maṅgala 'something auspicious'. The first time is in connection with the ‘first vārttika’ which we studied above; the second time in order to explain the presence of the word vṛddhi at the beginning of the first sūtra of the Aṣṭādhyāyī (I, p. 40, l. 6-9). On both of these
occasions only "sciences which begin with something auspicious" (*maṅgaladīṇī śāstrāṇi*) are mentioned. On the third occasion (Mbh I, p. 253, l. 5-7), however, "sciences which have something auspicious in the beginning, in the middle and in the end" are mentioned. Here the context is the inexplicable presence of non-modified *bhū* in P. 1.3.1 *bhūvādayo dhātravah*. It is explained as "something auspicious in the middle", a not very accurate characterization in view of the fact that P. 1.3.1 occurs nowhere near the middle of the Aṣṭādhyāyī with its eight books. Even more interesting is that Patañjali here describes the Aṣṭādhyāyī as "having something auspicious in the end". The commentator Jinendrabuddhi on the Kāśikā on this sūtra 1.3.1 specifies that *udaya* in P. 8.4.67 is the *maṅgala* in the end, but the fact is that P. 8.4.67 is not the last sūtra of the Aṣṭādhyāyī, not even in Patañjali's view. We cannot but conclude that Patañjali should not be taken too seriously in this regard.

7. Conclusion.

We see that Bhandarkar's position can be modified and strengthened so as to lead to the following result. The first vārttikas in the Mahābhāṣya are:

1. *atha śabdānuśasanam*
2. *rakṣohāgamalaghvasandehāḥ prayojanam*
3. *te 'surāḥ* etc.
4. *siddhe śabdārthasambandhe* etc.

This list of vārttikas differs from Bhandarkar's in accepting *rakṣohāgamalaghvasandehāḥ prayojanam* and *te 'surāḥ* etc. as vārttikas, while not accepting Bhandarkar's *imāni prayojanāni adhyeyāṁ vyākaraṇam*.

I have not yet mentioned, in the course of this lecture, the list of initial vārttikas proposed by S. D. Joshi in his article on Bhandarkar and Sanskrit Grammar (1976: 124). Joshi briefly recapitulates Bhandarkar's arguments, then ends up with the following list of initial vārttikas:

1. *atha śabdānuśasanam*
2. *laukikānām vaiddikānām ca*
3. *rakṣohāgamalaghvasandehāḥ prayojanam*
4. *imāni prayojanāni, adhyeyāṁ vyākaraṇam*
Joshi does not in this article reject Bhandarkar’s *imāni prayojanāni, adhyeyānā vyākaranam*, nor does he recognize *te 'surāḥ* etc. as a vārttika. In their recent translation of the Paspaśāhniṇa, on the other hand, Joshi and Roodbergen (1986) accept only the following two lines as vārttikas:

1. *atha śabdānuśasanam*
2. *rakṣohāgamalaghvasandeḥ prayojanam*

Unfortunately neither of the two positions is sufficiently argued by Joshi (and Roodbergen). Let us hope that the present lecture has now placed the discussion regarding the first vārttikas in the Mahābhāṣya on a firmer footing.
II. THE TEXT HISTORY OF THE MAHĀBHĀṢYA

1. One archetype underlying all manuscripts.

The standard edition of the Mahābhāṣya is the one published by Kielhorn about a century ago and reedited several times in the intervening period. Kielhorn's edition is based on a number of manuscripts which occasionally differ from each other in minor points, but on the whole show remarkable agreement.\(^9\) This agreement induced Kielhorn to state in an article: "According to my own view no evidence has yet been adduced to prove that the text of the Mahābhāṣya as known to us from the MSS. is not the original text of that work, and the only one that ever existed".\(^10\) In the preface to the first volume of his edition, after describing the manuscripts used, Kielhorn observes: "Generally speaking, the text of the Mahābhāṣya is the same in all the above MSS., and the differences in reading which occur are not such as to prove the existence of two or more recensions of the work. Though numerous, they rarely affect the meaning of a passage, and they are in the majority of cases accounted for by the carelessness of individual copyists, or the desire of a student to improve on the text which he was studying".\(^11\)

The situation as described by Kielhorn can be represented schematically as follows:

![Diagram](attachment://diagram.png)

All the manuscripts used for the edition of the Mahābhāṣya go back to a common archetype which, in Kielhorn's opinion, is the original text written by Patañjali.

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\(^{9}\) It may here be recalled that the critical apparatus of the third volume of Kielhorn's edition is missing in all printed editions.

\(^{10}\) Kielhorn, 1876a: 242 (170).

\(^{11}\) Kielhorn, 1880-85: I: 10.
2. Archetype not identical with Patañjali's text.

There is evidence which shows that this scheme has to be adjusted. This has been pointed out by V. P. Limaye in his Critical Studies on the Mahābhāṣya (1974), and more recently, and more exhaustively, by Wilhelm Rau in his book Die vedischen Zitate im Vyākaraṇa-Mahābhāṣya (1985). Limaye and Rau found that many Vedic quotations appeared in a corrupted form in all the manuscripts of the Mahābhāṣya used by Kielhorn. We find, for example, in the Bhāṣya on P. 5.1.119 vt. 9 the following quoted line (Mbh II, p. 368, l. 19):

\[ \text{nirvṛtyatām vai yajamāna} \] (one Ms. has jayamāna) \[ āṣāste apaśūtām gauḥ \] (some Mss. drop gauḥ)

This occurs at MS 2.18 (p. 10, l. 4) in the form

\[ \text{nirvṛtyatām vai puruṣo yamo jāta āṣāste paśūtām gauḥ} \]

and must have been the original reading also in the Mahābhāṣya. Another example is the quotation

\[ śiro me śīryate mukhe \]

in all the manuscripts of the Mahābhāṣya on P. 6.1.60 vt. 2. [16] The correct reading is

\[ śiro me śrīr yaśo mukham \]

and is found at MS 3.11.8 (p. 151, l. 16), KS 38.4 (p. 105, l. 4), VS 20.5 and TB 2.6.5.3-4. Further examples are discussed on pp. 98 to 101 of Rau's book.

Rau further draws attention to the fact that in a number of cases words in Vedic quotations appear to have been forgotten by the scribe, then added in the margin, and subsequently reintroduced by a later scribe in the wrong place. Of the three instances given by Rau I shall reproduce one. The Bhāṣya on P. 5.4.30 vt. 5 has

\[ kavyo 'si havyasūdana/ kavir asī/ raudrenāṅikena ... \]

MS 1.2.12 (p. 21, l. 16 f.) and KS 2.13 (p. 17, l. 17-18) have
THREE PROBLEMS

This passage gives the correct position of *raudreṇānikena*. In the Mahābhāṣya it is misplaced in all the manuscripts.

What can we conclude from all this? It seems obvious that all the manuscripts used by Kielhorn for his edition derive from a common archetype. This archetype, however, was not identical with Patañjali's original text. It rather was a manuscript which itself stood at the end of a tradition, and into which in the course of the transmission certain mistakes had crept. It is more than likely that this manuscript dated from a time well after Patañjali. All the other manuscripts of the Mahābhāṣya which may have existed simultaneously with this archetype manuscript, perhaps elsewhere in India, did not give rise to copies which survived to our time. Our scheme must therefore be modified in the following manner:

3. The archetype.

An attempt to discover the date and place of the archetype of the Mahābhāṣya has recently been made by M. Witzel (1986). His method is as follows. Certain mistakes in Vedic quotations are most easily explained when we take into account that the manuscripts of the Mahābhāṣya have been written in different scripts in the course of time. Some letters, or combinations of letters, may be very similar to other letters in one type of script, but not in another. Witzel has recognized some of the mistakes as having most probably been made in certain identifiable scripts. He comes to the conclusion that "some of the mistakes reported in Rau's monograph (i.e., Rau's book on
the Vedic quotation in the Mahābhāṣya) ... tend to have occurred in one of the Northern post Gupta scripts" (p. 249). "A number of them", [18] he continues (p. 251), "are only possible after the development of early Nāgarī. The similarity of bh and y, for example is found only in northern scripts, and confusion between the two is most probable after the development of early Nāgarī. It has taken place in the following quotation in the Mahābhāṣya on P. 4.1.85 vt. 6:

*bāhikam astu bhadram vaḥ*

This is a corrupted version of AV(P) 9.7.5

*bāhikam astu yad rapah*

Confusion between m and bh is only possible after ca. 1000 C.E. in northern Nāgarī scripts. It is exemplified in the quotation

*stobhair janayāmi navyam*

in the Bhāṣya on P. 3.4.30 vt. 5. The correct reading must be

*stomaṁ janayāmi navyam*

which occurs in several Vedic texts, among them RV 1.109.2.

The change from ca to i, finally, which is possible only in northern and western Nāgarī, has taken place in

*mādbhir iṣṭvā indro vṛtrahā*

quoted under P. 7.4.48 vt. 1. Here indro stands for candro, as is clear from AV 19.27.2 and AV(P) 10.7.2.

These and other arguments point to a time of about 1000 C.E. for the archetype (p. 252). Its probable homeland could be Benares, Nepal, or Gujarat; from among these Witzel prefers a western origin (p. 251).

There is another period in the text history of the Mahābhāṣya where something similar would seem to have taken place. Witzel refers to it, but many others before him have dealt with the final verses of the second Kāṇḍa of the Vākyapadīya in this [19] connection. According to these verses the tradition of the Mahābhāṣya had been neglected, but was revived by some scholars, among them an Ācārya named Candra. This much seems clear; once we try to derive more precise information from these verses, difficulties of interpretation arise.

The most important verse of the passage is VP 2.485 (in the numbering of Rau's edition). Goldstücker (1960: 258) translated:

That grammatical document [or manuscript of the Mahābhāṣya], which was obtained from the pupils of Patañjali, then remained for some time preserved in one copy only amongst the inhabitants of the Dekhan.

There can be no doubt that if Goldstücker's translation is acceptable, the verse concerned is of great interest in the present context. In that case it seems clear that there was a second occasion where one manuscript of the Mahābhāṣya came to replace all the others. This would have taken place in the period preceding Bhartṛhari, and the manuscript would be the one presumably found by Ācārya Candra.

Goldstücker's interpretation was accepted by Albrecht Weber, who translated (1862: 161):

Der den Schülern Patañjali's entfallene Grammatik-Text 'ne Weil bei den Dākshiṇātya in einer Handschrift nur bestand.

Weber went further and expressed the view that the text of the Mahābhāṣya had been devastated and newly arranged, "so that the possibility of considerable alterations, additions, and inter-[20]polations cannot be denied, and that in every case it remains a priori uncertain whether a particular example belongs to Patañjali, or is owing only to later reconstructions."

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13 The reading translated by Goldstücker is: yah patañjaliśīsyebhyya āśto vyākaranāgamah [yah patañjaliśīsyebhyyo bhyaśto ...]/ kālena dāksīṃtyeṣu granthamātre [grantha-] vyavasthitah/
14 Weber read the verse: yah patañjaliśīsyebhyyo vyākaranāgamah[ kālena dāksīṃtyeṣu granthamātre vyavasthitah]/
This is not the place to deal in extenso with Weber's ideas regarding the presumed "alterations, additions, and interpolations" in the Mahābhāṣya. Bhartrihari's verses do not have to be interpreted in this way, and Weber's supporting evidence is largely derived from the Rājarādanaṅgini, a text so much later that it seems wiser to leave it out of consideration altogether. Solid supporting evidence is completely lacking.

In recent years Weber's position has been revived by S. D. Joshi. Joshi translates VP 2.485 as follows (1976: 138):

The grammatical tradition which had slipped away from the pupils of Patañjali was preserved in the course of time merely in books among the inhabitants of the South.  

Joshi too is attracted by the supposition "that Candra etc. added to the original Bhāṣya ... and added from a variety of sources, not necessarily grammatical". Here too we may feel doubtful as long as no more solid evidence is presented. But it seems clear that Joshi too derives from verse 485 the conclusion that, if not one single copy of the Mahābhāṣya had been preserved, in any case they were few in number, few enough for Candra to be able to change the text of the Mahābhāṣya effectively.

The opinions of Goldstücker, Weber and Joshi have been seriously criticised in the course of time, most notably by Bhandarkar (1873), Kielhorn (1876a) and Cardona (1978). Yet these criticisms may not contain any solid reason to abandon the thought that the Mahābhāṣya had been preserved in but one, or a few, manuscripts before the time of Bhartrihari. The evidence [21] so far considered allows us to think that all later manuscripts ultimately derive from the manuscript constituted by Ācārya Candra or one of his colleagues on the basis of the manuscript or manuscripts he found in the South.

5. VP 2.485 needs to be interpreted differently.

In spite of this I am of the opinion that this position is not correct. In an article entitled "On the history of Pāṇinian grammar in the early centuries following Patañjali" (1983) I have collected evidence which shows that the Mahābhāṣya was widely studied in the period before Bhartrihari and before the grammarian Candragomin - who may have been identical with the mysterious Candra referred to in the Vākyapadīya. In this period changes were made in the Dhātupātha, Sūtrapātha and Ganapātha of Pāṇini's grammar, and īṣṭis and upasamkhyānas were added in the commentaries. Many of these

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16 Joshi accepts the reading: yah patañjaliśyebhyo bhraṣṭo vyākaranāgamaḥ/ kāle sa dāksinātyeṣu granthamātre vyavasthitaḥ//
changes were made under the influence of the Mahābhāṣya. This makes it hard to believe that there were only a few manuscripts of the Mahābhāṣya, all of them in one place, and rather suggests that these manuscripts were present in sufficient numbers all over India, or at least in several parts of India.

6. Variant readings recorded in the Mahābhāṣya-Dipikā.

There is however more direct evidence pertaining to the fate of the Mahābhāṣya in that period. Bhartṛhari’s commentary on the Mahābhāṣya, commonly referred to as Mahābhāṣya-Dipikā or simply Dipikā, records a number of variant readings in the text of the Mahābhāṣya, i.e., in the first seven Āṅnikas on which the surviving part of the Dipikā comments.17

(i) Mbh I, p. 2, l. 19 quotes the verse yas tu prayuṅkte kuśalo viśēse ...
Bhartṛhari (Ms 4b9-4c; Sw 13.10-24; AL 11.7-14) initially discusses the reading kuśalo viśēse also considering [22] the interpretation kuśalo ‘viśēse, i.e., aviśēse, and then continues: anyesāṁ granthah kuśalo viśēsaı̃ iti. None of Kielhorn’s manuscripts has this reading.

(ii) Mbh I, p. 5, l. 6 has om ity uktvā vṛttāntašaḥ śami tyevamāḍīn śabdān pāṭhante. Bhartṛhari (Ms 5c2-3; Sw 18.13-15; AL 14.23-24) knows both the readings vṛttāntaṭaḥ and vṛttāntaśaḥ: vṛttāntata iti/.../ tatrādyāditvāt tasiḥ/.../ anyesāṁ vṛttāntaśa iti pāṭhāḥ/. Kielhorn’s manuscripts have only vṛttāntaśaḥ.

(iii) Mbh I, p. 28, l. 18 (on Śivasūtra 5 vt. 5) reads yad ayuktā vahanty anupadistāḥ ca śrūyante. Bhartṛhari (Ms 25d6-7 and 11; Sw 94.1 and 95.1; AL 81.5-6 and 11-12) knows this reading as well as the variant yad ayuktaḥ vahanty anupadistāḥ śrūyante. Kaiyāṭa remarks (I, p. 89): kvacit tu caśābdo na pāṭhyate. This reading is unknown to Kielhorn’s manuscripts.

(iv) Mbh I, p. 30, l. 11-12 (on Śivasūtra 5 vt. 10) has ... yah kūpe kūpārthah sa kakārasya ... Bhartṛhari (Ms 26d8-9; Sw 97.24-28; AL 83.22-84.3) ascribes this reading to ‘some’, and to ‘others’ the same with the last word replaced by sakakārasya, or so it seems. It is also possible that the ‘others’ had the same reading but joined sa and kakārasya into a single compound.18

(v) Mbh I, p. 55, l. 16 (on P. 1.1.5 vt. 5) reads aparyāptaḥ caiva hi yāsūṣ samudāyasya nițive nițam caiṇam karoti. Bhartṛhari knows two readings (Ms 41d8 and 41d12-42a1; Sw 146.11 and 21; AL 125.9 and 17): the first is aparyāptas caiva yāsūṣ samudāyasya nițtive, which corresponds almost completely with Kielhorn’s edition; the

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17 A number of these were already enumerated by Kielhorn in the Preface to the First Edition, Vol. II, of his edition of the Mahābhāṣya; see Kielhorn, 1880-1885: III: 23 f.
18 The text reads: anyesāṁ granthah sakakārasya, which is of course ambiguous.
second appears to be corrupt in the manuscript\textsuperscript{19} but may have to be reconstructed in the light of a remark by Kaiyāṭa into suparyāptaçaś hi yāsuṭ samudāyasya niṭṭte. Kaiyāṭa’s remark is (I, p. 141): keśāṃcit pāṭhah suparyāptaçaś hi iti. This reading does not occur in any of Kielhorn’s manuscripts. [23]

(vi) P. 1.1.6 vt. 2 didhyad iti śyan vyatyayena (Mbh I, p. 56, l. 9) has at least one variant reading according to Bhartṛhari (Ms 42b11-c1; Sw 149.1 and 5; AL 127.10-11 and 13-14), viz. śap vyatyayena and perhaps another one. Kaiyāṭa (I, p. 142) records the variant reading so vyatyayena. Unknown to Kielhorn’s manuscripts.

(vii) Mbh I, p. 56, l. 18 (on P. 1.1.7) avidyāmanam antaram esām iti occurs in two forms in Bhartṛhari’s commentary (Ms 42d4 and 6; Sw 150.13 and 18; AL 128.18 and 21): avidyāmanam antaram yeśām and avidyāmanam antare (?) yeśām. No second reading is known to Kielhorn’s manuscripts.

(viii) Mbh I, p. 60, l. 6-7 (on P. 1.1.8) has nāsikāvacano ‘nūnāsika itīty ucyāmāne yamānusvāranām eva prasajyeta. Bhartṛhari (Ms 45d12-46a1; Sw 162.26-27; AL 140.22-23) knows both the readings yamānusvāranām and yamānusvāranām api. Unknown to Kielhorn’s manuscripts.

(ix) Mbh I, p. 66, l. 3 (on P. 1.1.11) has udāttānudāttasvaritānam. Bhartṛhari (Ms 50d7-8; AL 156.1-2; CE V.1.21) quotes this (repeating anudāttā- twice), then adds: anū[nā]sikagrahaṇam apy anyeśām vidyate. Kaiyāṭa states, similarly (I, p. 163): kvacid anunāsikagrahaṇam apy asti. This reading is not known to Kielhorn’s manuscripts.

(x) Mbh I, p. 67, l. 23-24 (on P. 1.1.11 vt. 5) has atra hiḍādi dvivacanān̄ tadaṅtām ca bhavati prayayalakṣaṇena. Bhartṛhari records two readings (Ms 54d3-5; AL 165.11-14; CE V.9.19-22): tatra hi iḍādi ca dvivacanān̄ tadaṅtām ca bhavati prayayalakṣaṇena as well as atra hi iḍādyantaṁ śṛūyate dvivacanān̄tām ca bhavati prayayalakṣaṇena. Kaiyāṭa records the variant reading iḍādyantaṁ ca śṛūyate (I, p. 167). Unknown to Kielhorn’s manuscripts.

(xi) P. 1.1.17-18 vt. 2 together with the Bhāṣya introducing and following it read (Mbh I, p. 72, l. 10-13): kimartho yogavibhāgaḥ/ū vā sākalyasya (vt. 2)/ sākalyasyaścāryasya matena ū vibhāṣā yathā syāt/ū iti u iti/anyeśām acāryānām matena v iti/. [24] All this is missing in Bhartṛhari’s commentary. Surprisingly, Bhartṛhari only knows the reading kimartho yogavibhāgaḥ sākalyavibhāsa mā bhūt (Ms 58c9; AL 176.7-8; CE V.18.5), which he apparently did not find in all his manuscripts, and which presents great problems of interpretation (see CE V Notes p. 121). No trace of this Kielhorn’s manuscripts.

\textsuperscript{19} Cf. AL 125 fn. 7.
(xii) Mbh I, p. 93, l. 8 (on P. 1.1.35) has $jñātīdhanaparyāyavācī$. According to others, Bhārtr̥hari tells us (Ms 73d5-6; AL 219.2-3; CE VI.30.26), the reading is $ajñātīdhanaparyāyavācī$. Kielhorn's manuscripts do not know this reading.

(xiii) Mbh I, p. 112, l. 16 (on P. 1.1.45 vt. 3) has $tasyāśādḥvabhimatasya$. Bhārtr̥hari (Ms 95a5-6; AL 273.14) may know this reading, besides $sādḥvabhimatasya$, if Abhyankar and Limaye were right in reconstructing: $tatra sādḥvabhimatasyeti granthaly/ta evam varṇayanti sādhūnām abhimatasyeti$. Unknown to Kielhorn's manuscripts.

(xiv) Mbh I, p. 112, l. 6 (on P. 1.1.50 vt. 2) has $kvacīd vairūpyam$. Bhārtr̥hari (Ms 104c3-4; AL 298.19, 24-25) knows the alternative reading $dvairūpyam$. Kielhorn's manuscripts don't.

(xv) Bhārtr̥hari (Ms 105c10; AL 301.23) informs us that ‘some’ read the line $uḥ sthāne ‘ṇ eva bhavati raparaś ca ...(Mbh I, p. 125, l. 17, on P. 1.1.51; repeated p. 126, l. 5, under vt. 2) without eva. Kaiyata, too, knows both readings, with and without eva (I, p. 275); none of Kielhorn's manuscripts does.

(xvi) Mbh I, p. 129, l. 5 $kalpapadasaṃghātabhakto ‘sau ... (on P. 1.1.51 vt. 9) is known in two forms to Bhārtr̥hari (Ms 107c6; AL 307.15-16). The alternative reading seems to be $kalpapadasaṃghātabhakto ‘yam$, although Kaiyata (I, p. 282) records the variant $kalpapadasaṃghāta$. No variant in Kielhorn's manuscripts.

(xvii) Mbh I, p. 130, l. 4 (on P. 1.1.52) has $kim idam algrahaṇam antyaviśeṣaṇam āhosvid ādeśaviśeṣaṇam$. Bhārtr̥hari [25] (Ms 108b9; AL 309.8) records the alternative reading $kim idam algrahaṇam antyaviśeṣaṇam/ evaṃ bhavitum arhati$. Unknown to Kielhorn's manuscripts.

The variant readings by Bhārtr̥hari show that he worked with several manuscripts. If the interpretation of Bhārtr̥hari's verses which we considered above is correct, we must assume that Bhārtr̥hari received his manuscripts, directly or indirectly, from Candra and his colleagues. We would not in that case expect so many variant readings. These variant readings may therefore be taken as an indication that Bhārtr̥hari's verses have to be interpreted differently.

7. Peculiar readings accepted in the Mahābhāṣya-Dīpikā.

This same conclusion is supported in another way too. If Bhārtr̥hari lived very near the time of the manuscripts from which all later manuscripts derive, we might expect that the text of the Mahābhāṣya which he knew, and to some extent even codified, is the ancestor of the archetype that our present manuscripts go back to. This does not seem to be the case. The Mahābhāṣya-Dīpikā contains indications that at times
it accepts without question a reading which today does not survive in any manuscripts, whereas it does not seem to be aware of the manuscript readings known to us.

Some examples of readings peculiar to Bhartṛhari will now be given. It is to kept in mind that the bad state of our one surviving manuscript of the Mahābhāṣya-Dīpikā does not allow us to draw far-reaching conclusions from simple deviations between Bhāṣya passages and their citation in the Dīpikā, as long as these deviations are not corroborated otherwise.

(i) Mbh I, p. 5, l. 28 - p. 6, l. 1 has caturbhiś ca prakārair viyopayuktā bhavaty āgamakālena svādhyāyakālena pravacanakālena vyavahārakāleneti. The manuscript of Bhartṛhari’s commentary cites the first part of this sentence as follows (Ms 6a9; Sw 21.15; AL 17.4): caturbhiś ca prakārair vidyopayulko- [26] (or: vidyopakalko-) payuktā bhavati. This is easily emended into ... vidyopayuktopayuktā ... Bhartṛhari’s following discussion shows that this was indeed his accepted reading:

caturbhiś ca prakārair vidyopayuktopayuktā bhavati/ ardho- (Ms atho-)payuktāpi saty anupayuktā bhavati nisphalatvāi/ athavā loke ekadesopayogad apy upayukta (Ms upayuktopayukta) iti gamyate/ tad yathopayuktam ghṛtam iti/ evam idaṁ naikadesopayogad upayuktam iti/ kiṁ tarhi/ samudāyopayogad upayuktam iti eva kathayati/

Knowledge when used in the four ways [to be specified in the sequel] is used [in the proper sense of the word]. Even when used half it is [properly speaking] unused because it carries not fruit. Alternatively, [something] is ‘used’ in the world even though [only] a part [of it] has been used. An example is: “Ghee has been used.” Here [however] something is not in similar fashion [considered] ‘used’ because a part [of it] has been used. Rather, one speaks [of something] as ‘used’ because the totality [of it] has been used.

This passage distinguishes throughout between two manners of ‘used’, viz. between ‘incompletely used’ and ‘completely used’: only the latter is considered really ‘used’. These two meanings of ‘used’ correspond to the two occurrences of upayuktā in the Bhāṣya passage. Kielhorn’s manuscript A preserves the reading upayuktopayuktā.

(ii) Mbh I, p. 1, l. 18-19 quotes the following line: brāhmaṇena nīṣkāraṇo dharmaḥ saḍaṅgo vedo ‘dhyeyo jñeya[h]. Bhartṛhari cites this in the form brāhmaṇena nīskāraṇo dharmaḥ saḍaṅgo vedo ‘dhyeyah[h] (Ms 3c2-3; Sw 10.6; AL 8.18-19), without jñeyah. A priori there is much to support Bhartṛhari’s reading. The words adhyeyah and jñeyah carry rather different meanings; adhi-i and its derivatives mean ‘memorizing’,
Their difference is emphasized in a [27] verse quoted on the next page of the Mahābhāṣya (I, p. 2, l. 15-16); it reads:

\[
yad adhitam avijñātaṁ nigadenaiva śabdyaṁ/\nono anagnāv iva sūskaidho na taj jvalati karhicit/
\]

What is memorized but not understood is uttered as mere Vedic recitation; like dry fuel where there is no fire, it does not burn at any time.

Moreover, it is the duty of a Brahmin to memorize the Veda (śādhyāyo dhyetavyaḥ TA 2.15; ŚB 11.5.6.3, 7.2, etc.), not to understand it.

These a priori considerations are supported by the fact that Kumārila Bhaṭṭa's Tantravārttika on Pūrva Mīmāṁsā Sūtra 1.3.24 (p. 199) quotes the above line, in a discussion on the role of grammar in which lines from the first Āhnika of the Mahābhāṣya are repeatedly dealt with, in precisely the form used by Bhartṛhari, i.e. without jñeyah. Also Kiellhorn's manuscript A is without jñeyah.

We are entitled to conclude that the manuscripts of the Mahābhāṣya used by Bhartṛhari were without jñeyah.

[A minor question remains: Did Kumārila obtain his reading from Bhartṛhari or independently from manuscripts of the Mahābhāṣya? There can be no doubt that Kumārila knew the Mahābhāṣya-Dīpikā: he quotes a verse20 from it which he ascribes to a ānikā to whom he also ascribes a verse which is found in the Vākyapadiya (2.14). Moreover, both Kumārila and Bhartṛhari quote a line from the Mahābhāṣya on P. 6.1.84 vt. 5 in a context which deals with the first (Paspaśa) Āhnika of the Mahābhāṣya, both in the same incorrect form, viz. ekaḥ śabdaḥ samyak jñātah [28] suprayuktah sāstravrīthā vārge lokā kāmadhug bhavati (Kumārila on Pūrva Mīmāṁsā Sūtra 1.3.24, p. 189; Bhartṛhari: Ms 4d8-9; Sw 15.10-11; AL 12.15-16). The Mahābhāṣya (III.58.14-15) has the order of the words suprayuktah sāstravrīthā reversed.21 Kumārila may for this reason be considered as giving evidence that the

\[20\] The verse is anāgāni jñānāṁ manuḥ upamā cendriyāni ca/ etāni noham gacchanti adhirgau viṣamān hitat/which occurs in the Tantravārttika on Pūrva Mīmāṁsā Sūtra 1.3.24 (p. 187), and in the Mahābhāṣya Dīpikā: Ms 3a2-3; Sw 8.16-17; AL 7.10-11. See further Swaminathan, 1963: 69-70.

\[21\] We do not have to assume that Bhartṛhari's manuscripts of the Mahābhāṣya had the line in the form given by Bhartṛhari. (i) For one thing, Bhartṛhari tends to quote passages from the Mahābhāṣya other than those in which he is directly commenting upon inaccurately. One instance of this has been discussed in Bronkhorst, 1985: 125 fn. 2. Another instance is Ms 7c9, Sw 26.17-19, AL 22.2-3: tathā coktam/ svabhāvataṁ yathā vartamānanāṁ nīmaittvavākhyānam kriyate/ tad yatathā kūpe hastadakṣinaṁ iti/. The quotation is from Mbh I.363.11-13 (on P. 2.1.1 vt. 1): svabhāvataṁ eṣāṁ sābdāṁ eṣaṁ artheṣv abhinivṛttām nīmaittvavākhyānam kriyate/ tad yatathā kūpe hastadakṣinaṁ. A third instance occurs in the third Āhnika (Ms 31b5-6; Sw 113.15-17; AL 96.4-6; CE III.3.20-22): yathā anadvāham udahāri yatvam vahasi śirasā bhagīni kumbhaṁ sācinī abhidhāvantam adrākṣiṁ iti/. This is from Mbh I.152.26 - 153.1 (on P. 1.1.58 vt. 1): tad yatathā anadvāham udahāri yaḥ vam harasi śirasā kumbhaṁ bhagīni sācinī abhidhāvantam adrākṣiṁ iti/. (Note that the Yuktidīpikā has the line in a form close to Bhartṛhari's; cf. Bronkhorst, 1990: 129 with n. 9). (ii) Moreover, this same line is quoted again in
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Reading without *jñeyaḥ* was found in Bhartrhari’s commentary and in the manuscripts of the Mahābhāṣya used by Bhartrhari, not that this was the only reading in existence in those days.

(iii) Mbh I, p. 6, l. 24-25 has *athavā pūrvapadalopo 'tra draṣṭavyah*. Bhartrhari cites this as *athavā pūrvottarapadalopo 'tra draṣṭavyah* (Ms 8c3; Sw 29.15; AL 24.16). His immediately following sentence reads *kaḥ punar ayām pūrvottarapadospāyaḥ*, which confirms that *uttara* really belongs here. Further confirmation comes a few lines later (Ms 8c6; Sw 29.22-23; AL 24.22-23) where by way of illustration it is stated: *satyabhāmā-[29]śabdena saha satyaśabdo bhāmāśabdaś ca nispādyate*. Here both ‘Satya’ and ‘Bhāmā’ are given as abbreviations of the name ‘Satyabhāmā’. But in order to obtain ‘Satya’ on the basis of ‘Satyabhāmā’, we need elision of the last part of the compound (*uttarapadalopa*). Bhartrhari similarly mentions *jye* as an (incorrect) abbreviation of *jyeśṭhā* in the same context (Ms 8c7; Sw 29.24; AL 24.24) which would be inappropriate without the word *uttara* in the Bhāṣya. The reading with *uttara* is not found in any of Kielhorn’s manuscripts.

(iv) Mbh I, p. 7, l. 20 has *na kvacid uparateti kṛtvā sarvatroparatā bhavati dravyāntarasthā tūpalabhyyate*. Bhartrhari’s commentary quotes this as (Ms 9b5-6 & 9; Sw 32.22 & 33.1; AL 27.13 & 19): *na kvacid uparateti kṛtvātaḥ sarvatroparatā bhavati ... dravyāntarasthopalabhyyate*. The element *ataḥ* is found again in this passage as quoted in the commentary on the Nirukta ascribed to Skandāsvāmin-Maheśvara (I, p. 16, l. 16 - p. 17, l. 1): *na kvacid uparatety ataḥ sarvatroparatā bhavati*. The element *tu* of Kielhorn’s edition was apparently not known to Bhartrhari, because he explains *dravyāntarasthābhivyajyāye*, again without *tu*. Skandāsvāmin-Maheśvara quote the remainder of the sentence as *piṇḍāntarasthopalabhyyate*, also without *tu*. *Ataḥ* and the reading without *tu* are not found in Kielhorn’s manuscripts.

The following example is less decisive, yet deserves consideration:

(v) Mbh I, p. 11, l. 4 has *athavābhyupāya evāpaśabdajñānaṁ śabdajñāne*. Bhartrhari cites this as *athavābhyupāya evāpaśabdajñānaṁ śabdajñānasya* (Ms 12a6; Sw 44.13; AL 37.10). The very next sentence begins *yas ca yasyābhyupāyaḥ ...,* thus suggesting that the reading *śabdajñānasya* is no error. It does not occur in Kielhorn’s manuscripts.

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22 Also in VP 2.363 (361 in Iyer’s edition) and in the Vṛtti thereon.
8. Bhartṛhari’s position in the text history of the Mahābhāṣya.

The evidence here collected shows, first of all, that Bhartṛhari knew manuscripts which have no apparent relationship with the ones surviving today. It seems therefore most reasonable to place him, not on the main line of transmission of Mahābhāṣya manuscripts, but rather among some of the side branches which apparently existed in his time. This can be depicted as follows:

![Diagram of text history]

We cannot, however, leave Bhartṛhari without paying some attention to Kielhorn's manuscript A, which in two cases - (i) and (ii) of section 7 - has the same reading as Bhartṛhari. How is this to be explained?

The most likely explanation is no doubt that a learned scribe, under the influence of Bhartṛhari's commentary, introduced these readings into the text. There is however another possibility which deserves consideration. It requires that we know something more about this manuscript A and how it has been used in the edition of the Mahābhāṣya. Kielhorn describes his use of this manuscripts in a footnote to his Preface to the First Edition of the Mahābhāṣya, a footnote which was apparently added after the preparation of the second edition, in the following words (I, p. 10, fn.1): "While revising the text for the second edition, I have occasionally compared also the MSS. A. and K., described in the preface of Vol. II.; but I have not been able to use these MSS. throughout." This means that Kielhorn's edition by itself may not always contain enough information to decide whether readings peculiar to Bhartṛhari are present in manuscript A as well. A closer comparison of manuscript A with the text of the Mahābhāṣya as known to Bhartṛhari remains a desideratum.
Kielhorn describes manuscript A in his Preface to the First Edition, Vol. II, which in Abhyankar's edition of the text has been placed in the beginning of Vol. III (pp. 11-33). We read there (p. 11) that manuscript A is "a carefully made and complete copy of the whole Mahābhāṣya, written for Ananta-sarasvatī by one Jāgeśvara at Vṛddhina-gara (Vaṇnagar) in Saṃvat 1545 and 1546." What interests us here in particular is that the manuscript came from Vaṇnagar. This is a small town in Gujarāt, north of Ahmedabad. Of all the other manuscripts used by Kielhorn none came from Gujarāt; all of them came from different parts of India.

This information is of particular interest for the following reason. There are independent reasons to think that Bhartṛhari lived in Gujarāt or northern Mahāraṭha. I have discussed these reasons in an article which came out a few years ago (1983: 395-397). Is it coincidence that the Mahābhāṣya manuscript from Gujarāt is the only one to preserve readings known to Bhartṛhari? It may be so, yet it is tempting to consider the possibility that the text tradition of the Mahābhāṣya as known to Bhartṛhari survived for a long time in Western India, and even influenced - ‘contaminated’ - the text tradition which was to become standard, and which became the basis of Kielhorn's edition of this text.

It may or may not be possible to answer the above question. If it can be answered at all, it is only on the basis of a thorough study of Mahābhāṣya manuscripts from Western India.23


We turn to another important author connected with the Mahābhāṣya; this is Kaiyaṭa. Kaiyaṭa is the most famous commentator on the Mahābhāṣya. He lived many centuries after Bhartṛhari, but admits his indebtedness to the latter in the introductory verses of his commentary. We shall see that this indebtedness may have extended farther than we would expect.

There is reason to believe that all the variant readings recorded in Kaiyaṭa's Pradīpika on the first seven Āhnikas of the Mahābhāṣya were taken from Bhartṛhari's Dīpikā.24 Seven of the variant readings mentioned by Kaiyaṭa have been noted above under numbers (iii), (v), (vi), (ix), (x), (xv) and (xvi) of section 6. There is only one further variant reading recorded by Kaiyaṭa in the first seven Āhnikas, viz., on Mbh I, p.

23 With the kind permission of the authorities I have been able to inspect two Mahābhāṣya manuscripts in Gujarāt: nr. 937 in the Shri Hemachandracharya Jain Jnanamandir, in Patan; and nr. 2796 of the Munirāja Sri Punnyavijayaji Collection in the L.D. Institute of Indology, Ahmedabad. Both these manuscripts agree with the majority of Kielhorn's manuscripts, and not with his manuscript A.

24 This was already observed by Kielhorn (1880-1885: III: 24 fn. 1).
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76, l. 17 (on P. 1.1.21 vt. 1), i.e., on p. 187 of the edition of the Pradīpa. Here the manuscript of the Mahābhāṣya-Dīpikā shows a gap; the whole of the Dīpikā on P. 1.1.21 is lost, as has been pointed out by the editors and translators of this part of the text - V. P. Limaye, G. B. Palsule, and V. B. Bhagavat - in their ‘Notes’ (see CE V Notes p. 145).

The chance that Kaiyata would record variant readings only where Bhartṛhari’s Dīpikā does so without following Bhartṛhari is diminishingly small and can be rejected. The extremely bad [33] condition of the manuscript of the Mahābhāṣya-Dīpikā, moreover, does not allow us to draw any conclusions from the fact that Kaiyata’s formulations sometimes seem to deviate from Bhartṛhari’s.

The situation being as described, it is very tempting to develop the following hypothesis. For reasons which will be considered below, Kaiyata followed Bhartṛhari throughout in the matter of variant readings. As a matter of fact, Kaiyata’s close adherence to Bhartṛhari in all other matters is patent when corresponding portions of the two commentaries are read side by side. Indeed, the introductory verses to Kaiyata’s Pradīpa mention [Bhartṛ-]hari’s commentary and compare it to the bridge (setu) used by Kaiyata, who is "like a cripple (pāṅguvat)", in order to reach the other shore of the ocean which is the Mahābhāṣya.25

We cannot of course exclude the possibility that Kaiyata derived variant readings from other manuscripts later on in his study of the Mahābhāṣya. We do not, however, have any indication that this is what he did. It may well be that all the variant readings recorded by Kaiyata, throughout the Mahābhāṣya, were copied from Bhartṛhari’s commentary.

10. The original extent of Bhartṛhari’s commentary.

This, if true, provides us with a method to find out what part of the Mahābhāṣya was commented upon by the Mahābhāṣya-Dīpikā as it was known to Kaiyata. As we know, the opinion has been defended that Bhartṛhari’s original commentary did not cover more than the first three Pādas of the Mahābhāṣya. This position has been defended most vigorously by Ashok Aklujkar (1971), who has three arguments to support it. His first argument is that Vardhamāna describes Bhartṛhari as "the explainer of three Pādas of the Mahābhāṣya" (mahābhāṣyatripādyāvyākhyātā). But [34] Vardhamāna lived in the twelfth century, which is long after Bhartṛhari.26 Aklujkar’s

25 Joshi and Roodbergen’s claim (1986: 4 fn. 8) that the reference is to the Vākyapadiya is completely unsupported and difficult to understand.
26 Note Belvalkar’s suggestion (1915: 35 fn. 3) that the ‘Tripādi’ is the Vākyapadiya, and compare this with Helārāja’s remark below.
second argument is a line in Helārāja's commentary which reads: *trailokyagāminī yena trikāṇḍī tripadī kṛtā*. Aklujkar thinks that "it is obvious that *Tripādi* is the same as *Tripāti*" (p. 162 n. 1), but Yudhiṣṭhira Mīmāṁsaka (1973: I: 376) rightly points out that this evidence is of dubious value.

Aklujkar's third argument is that I-ching gives the extent of Bhartṛhari's commentary as 25,000 ślokas. Since the surviving part of Bhartṛhari's commentary, which covers about two-thirds of the first Pāda, has an approximate extent of 5,700 ślokas, Aklujkar concludes (p. 163): "It is clear then that 25,000 śloka-s could not have been the extent of a work that covered more than three pāda-s." Aklujkar points out in a footnote that Kielhorn (1883: 226 (185)) and Y. Mīmāṁsaka (1973: I: 373) arrived at the same conclusion.

It is clear that I-ching's testimony, dating from the seventh century and being therefore the earliest evidence available, carries great weight. Let us look at it more closely. In Kielhorn's edition the first seven Āhnikas of the Mahābhāṣya - i.e., the part on which Bhartṛhari's commentary has survived - cover 132 pages. The first three Pādas fill altogether 295 pages, that is slightly more than twice as many. According to Aklujkar's theory, Bhartṛhari's commentary on the second half of the first three Pādas covered more than three times the number of pages which Bhartṛhari needed for the first seven Āhnikas. Add to this that Bhartṛhari's surviving commentary is extremely elaborate, and it will be clear that the idea that the remainder of his commentary was almost thrice as elaborate is completely unacceptable. The opposite view that his commentary became less elaborate as he proceeded, represents a real possibility, or even a probability.27

I-ching's account of the extent of Bhartṛhari's commentary is therefore compatible with the view that this commentary originally covered the whole of the Mahābhāṣya.

Aklujkar's argument is further marred by the fact that he has to provide rather forced explanations in order to account for some seeming references in later authors to parts of Bhartṛhari's commentary which according to Aklujkar never existed.

This is not the place to enter into a detailed discussion of all these problems. We considered the possibility that Kaiyaṭa derived all his variant readings in the Mahābhāṣya from Bhartṛhari's commentary. Kaiyaṭa records variant readings fairly regularly throughout the Mahābhāṣya. The last one occurs on P. 8.4.68 (III, p. 510), i.e., on the very last sūtra discussed in the Mahābhāṣya. This may be taken as additional evidence in support of the view that Bhartṛhari's commentary on the Mahābhāṣya originally covered the whole of that text.

27 Kaiyaṭa's commentary is more or less equally divided over the different portions. Barring counting mistakes, it fills 2977 lines in the Rohataka edition on the first 9 Āhnikas, 3342 lines on the remainder of the first 3 Pādas.
11. Further supporting evidence.

The theory that Kaiyata borrowed all or almost all his variant readings from Bhartrhari is attractive, but further supporting evidence would make it stronger. It is not easy to find such further evidence. Direct information regarding the shape of the Mahabhasya as it was known to Bhartrhari is lacking, apart from the small portion covered by the surviving part of Bhartrhari's commentary. We do, however, seem to have some, if ever so limited, information about the Mahabhasya as it existed in the centuries before Bhartrhari. This information is indirect and must be dealt with carefully. A few introductory remarks are therefore necessary.

The Kausika contains many phrases and passages which look like quotations from the Mahabhasya. In the majority of cases these are identical with their prototypes in the Mahabhasya. Sometimes, however, they seem to have been adjusted to the specific needs of the Kausika, and are not therefore identical with their prototypes. A third category is constituted by the cases where it is hard to see why changes should have been introduced, yet the ‘quoted’ lines differ from the corresponding lines in the Mahabhasya. Some of these last cases might be considered testimony of the, or an, earlier shape of the Mahabhasya.

It is known that the Kausika made use of one or more earlier works - most probably one or more commentaries on the Asterdhidayi - which work(s) also influenced the grammar of Candra(-gomin). It is likely that the lines in the Kausika which deviate from the Mahabhasya were borrowed, not directly from the Mahabhasya, but through the intermediary of this other work or these other works.

There is evidence which supports this. Some of the deviating phrases in the Kausika are found identically in Candra's grammar. The following are examples:

(i) All the manuscripts inspected by Kielhorn give the following example in the Mahabhasya on P. 1.3.20 vt. 2: vyaddate pipilikh pataangamukham. The Kausika on P. 1.3.20 and Candra on C. 1.4.55 give the same example as vyaddate pipilikh pataangasya mukham.

(ii) The Mahabhasya on P. 1.3.27 vt. 1 (all manuscripts) reads: uttapate pani/ vitapate pani/. The Kausika and Candra on C. 1.4.74 read this as uttapate paniim (....) vitapate paniim.

28 One point has been discussed in Bronkhorst, 1983: 374-75.
(iii) The Mahābhāṣya on P. 1.4.52 vt. 7 (all manuscripts) illustrates: bhakṣayanti/ bhakṣayati balīvardān yavān. The Kāśika and Candra on C. 2.1.49 have: bhakṣayanti/ bhakṣayati balīvardān sasyam.\(^{30}\)

(iv) The Mahābhāṣya on P. 2.2.24 vt. 13 (I, p. 242, l. 1; all manuscripts) reads: keśāṇam samāhāraś cūḍā asya keśacidāḥ. Some manuscripts of the Kāśika and Candra on C. 2.2.46 read: keśasamghātaś cūḍā aasya keśacidāḥ.

This enumeration is by no means complete; yet it shows that we have to choose one out of two alternatives. The first one is that the Kāśika, and presumably Candra, quoted directly from the Mahābhāṣya. In that case we have to accept that the Mahābhāṣya which they knew differed from its present form in certain respects. The second and more likely alternative is that the Bhāṣya quotations in the Kāśika and in Candra reached these texts through the intermediary of one or more other, earlier, texts. The deviations in the Kāśika may then bear witness to the state of the Mahābhāṣya in the time before Candra, or they must be explained as due to the carelessness or imagination of the author(s) of these earlier texts.

All this shows that the deviant readings in the Kāśika must be treated with caution. We should furthermore be aware that the tendency in recent centuries may have been to adjust the text of the Kāśika to the accepted text of the Mahābhāṣya, i.e., to the text as we find it in Kielhorn’s edition. It is difficult, probably impossible, to determine the extent to which this adjustment has affected the manuscripts of the Kāśika, but we can form an impression by comparing the corrupt Vedic quotations in the Mahābhāṣya with the Kāśika. We have seen that Rau could correct a number of these quotations. Most of these quotations do not occur in the Kāśika, but some do, and they present the following picture:

(i) Rau (1985: 54) proposes the following emendation for a line quoted in the Mahābhāṣya on P. 7.4.48 vt. 1 (III, p. 351, l. 25; p. 352, l. 3): mādhiṣṭvā candro vṛtrahā. Both the Mahābhāṣya and the Kāśika contain the presumably incorrect line mādbhir īṣṭvā indro vṛtrahā.\(^{38}\)

(ii) Rau (1985: 38) proposes to read dadbhiḥ psātam for adbhiḥ psātam in the Bhāṣya on P. 8.3.37 vt. 2 (III, p. 431, l. 14-15) and in the same supposedly incorrect form in the Kāśika.

(iii) An interesting case is the line dārviyā parijman in the Bhāṣya on P. 7.1.39 vt. 1 (III, p. 256, l. 23). Limaye (1974: 619) proposes the emendation urviyā pari khyan. The Kāśika has both these lines.

\(^{30}\) For a discussion of the meaning of this line in its context, see Wezler, 1986.
Against these cases where the Kāśikā seems to have adopted readings from the recent version of the Mahābhāṣya, there are others where the Kāśikā appears to embody a different, and better, tradition:

(i) The Mahābhāṣya on P. 6.1.76 vt. 1 (III, p. 51, l. 22) quotes: na (c)chāyāṁ kuraṇaḥ 'param. The last word must be 'param, and this is how the line is quoted in the Kāśikā (apparently in all the manuscripts used by the editors).

(ii) The Bhāṣya on P. 6.2.199 vt. 1 (III, p. 140, l. 12) misquotes the line tricakreṇa trivandhureṇa trīvṛṭa rathena. The first word tricakreṇa belongs at the end, and that is where we find it in the Kāśikā.

(iii) Kielhorn himself was sometimes convinced of the superiority of the reading in the Kāśikā. On P. 5.4.27 vt. 5 (II, p. 434, l. 14) he accepts the reading āyur varcasyam against the evidence of all his manuscripts, on the strength of the occurrence of āyur varcasyaḥ in his manuscript of the Kāśikā on P. 5.4.25. (Note that all the manuscripts used by Aryendra Sharma et al. have vāyur varcasyaḥ, which agrees better with some of Kielhorn's manuscripts.)

This evidence justifies a certain amount of confidence that the Kāśikā may provide us with independent Bhāṣya readings in certain cases. These readings, moreover, may date back to the time preceding Candra, if indeed they reached the Kāśikā through earlier works.

With this in mind, we look at the Bhāṣya on P. 5.3.45 vt. 1, where we find the illustration pathi dvairdhāni. A number of Kāśikā manuscripts read matidvairdhāni in this context; the reading pathi dvairdhāni in other manuscripts may be explained by the influence from the Mahābhāṣya tradition. The reading matidvairdhāni is moreover recorded by Kaiyāṭa as a variant! Kaiyāṭa never records reading found in the Kāśikā, so we may be sure that this reading occurred at some time in some manuscripts of the Mahābhāṣya. The fact that the Kāśikā has this reading may be taken as an indication that it may have been in existence in the time before Candra.

Even more interesting in this connection is Kaiyāṭa's rejection of the reading paṭukalpā in the Bhāṣya on P. 6.3.35 vt. 4; Kaiyāṭa prefers darśanīyakalpā. But paṭukalpā occurs under the corresponding rule in Candra's grammar, C. 5.2.31, even though Kaiyāṭa's criticism of this form would also hold in Candra's grammar. We may

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31 Kielhorn is again influenced by the Kāśikā on P. 4.1.66 (II, p. 227, l. 7), where he chooses the reading dhīvabandhū because he finds it in the Kāśikā. Here too Kielhorn's manuscripts of the Kāśikā differ from those used by Aryendra Sharma et al.; the latter have throughout virabandhū at all the places indicated by Kielhorn, or nothing at all.
conclude from this that here again the variant reading recorded by Kaiyaṭa existed already during the time of, or before, Candra.\footnote{A correct evaluation of this and the next case is hampered by the fact that the third volume of Kielhorn’s edition of the Mahābhāṣya has no critical apparatus.}

Kaiyaṭa records the variant \textit{dirghaputapratisedhaḥ} for \textit{dirghapratisedhaḥ} in P. 8.4.68 vt. 1. The \textit{Kāśikā} on this sūtra contains the line \textit{dirghaputayoḥ cānena vivṛtena akārena grahaṇāṃ nesyaḥ}, which may indicate that it knew - directly or indirectly - the vārttika concerned with the variant recorded by Kaiyaṭa.

These three cases support the view that at least some, and perhaps all the variant readings recorded by Kaiyaṭa existed before Candra, and may indeed have been borrowed by Kaiyaṭa from Bhartṛhari.

12. Kaiyaṭa’s manuscripts.

We turn to the question why Kaiyaṭa borrowed his variant readings from Bhartṛhari. In order to answer this question we may recall that Kaiyaṭa most probably lived in the eleventh century, not long after the probable date of the archetype of extant Mahābhāṣya manuscripts. We may further bring to mind that Kaiyaṭa hardly ever has a reading which deviates from the extant manuscripts, except where he records variant readings, i.e., where we suspect the influence of Bhartṛhari. It seems therefore that Kaiyaṭa used as manuscripts one or more descendants from the archetype and those only. Few variant readings had yet found their way into these manuscripts.

Some remarks by Kaiyaṭa himself support this view. Commenting on the concluding lines of the Bhāṣya on P. 6.1.162, Kaiyaṭa expresses the view that the correct order of sentences has been changed due to the carelessness of a scribe (\textit{lekhakapramādāt tu sthānantare nyastāḥ}). On the concluding lines of the Bhāṣya on P. 8.4.47, similarly, Kaiyaṭa claims that carelessness of a scribe is responsible for the incorrect shape of the text (\textit{pātho ‘yam lekhakapramādan naṣṭaḥ}). Kaiyaṭa does not give any indication that he knew a manuscript which had the sentences in the correct order. In other words, he admits that the manuscript(s) he used could have been affected by one single scribe. This leaves two possibilities: either Kaiyaṭa used no more than one manuscript; or he used several, but considered it possible - or even certain - that they all derived from one shared archetype.

To what extent can Kaiyaṭa’s position with regard to the text of the Mahābhāṣya be connected with the enigmatic account of [41] the history of the Mahābhāṣya in the fourth book of Kalhaṇa’s Rājataraṅgiṇī? Kaiyaṭa’s name suggests that he came from Kashmir, and the Rājataraṅgiṇī deals with the history of Kashmir. Verses 4.488-89 recount that the Mahābhāṣya had ceased to be studied in Kashmir; a revival was brought about by kind Jayāpiṇḍa, who was a pupil of the grammarian Kṣīra.\(^{33}\)

If we take Kalhaṇa at his word it will not be possible to connect the events here described with the archetype of the Mahābhāṣya underlying the manuscripts known to Kaiyaṭa, and to us. King Jayāpiṇḍa ruled in the eighth century, and the archetype of the Mahābhāṣya dates from around 1000. But we may consider the possibility that Kalhaṇa’s account is not fully reliable here. Apart from the Rājataraṅgiṇī there is no evidence that Jayāpiṇḍa did what is here ascribed to him. Nor do we know of a grammarian named Kṣīra who lived in that century. We do know, however, of a grammarian Kṣīra(svāmin) in Kashmir who lived in or before the middle of the eleventh century (Belvalkar, 1915: 43; Mīmāṃsaka, 1973: II: 89 f.). If we tentatively assume that Kalhaṇa wrongly attributed an event connected with the grammarian Kṣīrasvāmin, which took place in the eleventh century, to king Jayāpiṇḍa, and therefore to the eighth century, the three strands which we have considered - the archetype of the Mahābhāṣya, Kaiyaṭa, and the account in the Rājataraṅgiṇī - come together in the beginning of the eleventh century, in Kashmir. It must of course be admitted that this conclusion is highly speculative, but perhaps these speculations can give rise to fruitful research in the future.


With Kaiyaṭa we have come back at the point from which we started. It seems likely that Kaiyaṭa belongs to the text [42] tradition of the Mahābhāṣya to which also Kielhorn’s edition belongs. This text tradition goes back to one shared archetype, which seems to date from a time not long before Kaiyaṭa.

The idea that this archetype itself is a descendant of the text used by Bhārtrihari cannot be taken for granted. The text commented upon by Bhārtrihari deviates in some essential points from the text of the archetype. What is more, it is clear from

\(^{33}\) Rājataraṅgiṇī 4.488-89 read: deśantaid agamayya vyaścaśarāt kṣamāpatih / prāvartaya vicchinnam mahābhāṣyam svamaṭdā / kṣīrābhīdhāc chābdavidyopādhyāyat saṃbhṛtaśrutiḥ / budhaiḥ saha yayau ṛddhiṁ sa jayāpiṇḍapāṇḍitāḥ/.
Bhartṛhari’s commentary that he used different manuscripts which differed from each other in a number of points.
III. THE MAHĀBHĀSYA AND THE DEVELOPMENT OF INDIAN PHILOSOPHY

1. The date of the Mahābhāṣya.

The Mahābhāṣya is an old text; this much we know. But how old is it exactly? In the second lecture of this series we say that the Mahābhāṣya was commented upon by Bhartṛhari. It was also clear that the text must have been in existence for quite a while before Bhartṛhari: Bhartṛhari knows a number of variant readings, and what is more, the extant manuscripts of the Mahābhāṣya do not seem to derive from the copies used by Bhartṛhari. Then there are the verses at the end of the second Kāṇḍa of the Vākyapadiya, according to which the tradition of the Mahābhāṣya had been largely lost. All this makes clear that the Mahābhāṣya already in the days of Bhartṛhari had a long history.

Bhartṛhari lived no later than the fifth century C.E. The Mahābhāṣya must date from several centuries before this at the latest.

Is it possible to determine the date of the Mahābhāṣya more precisely? The question has been much debated, and it seems certain that the Mahābhāṣya was written around 150 B.C.E., or later. The crucial evidence in the Mahābhāṣya consists of some examples, among them the following two:

(i) \textit{aruṇad yavanaḥ sāketam} "The Yavana besieged Sāketa".
(ii) \textit{aruṇad yavanaḥ madhyamikām} "The Yavana besieged Madhyamikā".

These two examples occur under P. 3.2.111 vt. 2, and illustrate the use of the suffix laṅ in order to describe an event [44] that took place in the past before today, was not witnessed by the speaker but might have been witnessed by him, and is widely known. The Yavana in the examples has been identified as kind Menander. Patañjali must therefore have been a contemporary of Menander, which determines his date to be around 150 B.C.E.

Several scholars have pointed out that this argument is valid only if we can be sure that Patañjali himself introduced these examples. If he borrowed them from an earlier grammarian, they merely indicate that Patañjali lived after this date of around 150 B.C.E.

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34 See Cardona, 1976: 298-99, for a brief survey of the relevant literature.
35 For a useful survey see Joshi and Roodbergen, 1976: i-xxxiv.
This is not the place to try to reach a final solution to this problem. It has occupied the minds of prominent Indologists for a long time, without having been definitely solved. This is unfortunate because much depends on the correct solution of this problem. Once Patañjali's date can be fixed with some degree of certainty, we have a fixed point in the literary history of India, where there is a dearth of such fixed points. We need Patañjali's date in order to make informed guesses about the date of Pāṇini, and the date of Pāṇini is one of the two main pillars on which traditionally our ideas of Vedic chronology are based.

I must add, however, that most scholars accept that Patañjali lived about 150 B.C.E., and that I shall do the same in the remainder of this lecture. But we must keep in mind that this date is not absolutely certain.

2 The relevance of the Mahābhāṣya for the study of Indian philosophy.

It seems, then, that the Mahābhāṣya existed already before the beginning of the Christian era. This raises interesting questions about the relationship between the Mahābhāṣya and the development of systematic philosophy in India. The treatises which we now possess on the different systems of Brahmanic philosophy all seem to date from the Christian era at the earliest, and in a number of cases from a demonstrably later date. The Mahābhāṣya appears to belong to a period when systematic philosophy in India was in its infancy, or even did not yet exist. It is therefore well worth studying from a philosophical point of view. But I am not going to present you with a complete philosophical study of the Mahābhāṣya during this lecture. That would of course be impossible. I shall rather confine myself to a single question, namely the question of the nature of the word and of the individual sound.

We start from some observations made by Erich Frauwallner in a short article about the infiltration of linguistic theory into the Indian philosophical systems ("Das Eindringen der Sprachtheorie in die indischen philosophischen Systeme", 1960).

Frauwallner argued that ideas about the nature of the word entered from grammar into the Brahmanical systems. In this context he mentioned Mīmāṃsā in particular. This system looks upon the constituent sounds of words as being eternal, but denies the existence of a whole word different from the sounds. In this way the eternity of the Veda is meant to be proved, which is odd. Frauwallner explains the difficulty with the help of the influence of Vaiśeṣika ideas on Mīmāṃsā. The idea of the sound as an eternal entity was borrowed from the grammarians. The grammarians, however, also accepted the word as an eternal entity. Philosophical ideas borrowed

36 The contents of this article are largely repeated and expanded in Frauwallner, 1961.
from Vaiśeṣika left no space for words as independent entities; only sounds could be accepted as such.

Frauwallner is aware of the chronological implications of this view. It means that the doctrine of eternal sounds is relatively recent in Mimāṃsā. And indeed, Frauwallner can adduce arguments which make it probable that the Mimāṃsā sūtras (MiSū 1.1.6-23) in which this view is defended, are a later insertion into the Sūtra text. If we remove these sūtras the remainder fits well together. Sūtra 1.1.5 establishes that the [46] connection between word and meaning is natural (autpattika). Sūtra 1.1.24 takes up this same issue and raises the objection that if such be the case (utpattau), sentences would not naturally have a meaning. Frauwallner draws attention to the similarity in wording between the two sūtras: autpattika in the one, utpatti in the other. He finally points out that the so-called Vṛttikāragrantha, which occurs in Śabara's Bhāṣya on MiSū 1.1.5, ascribes the doctrine that words are nothing but their constituent sounds to Upavarsa, an early commentator on the Mimāṃsā Sūtra.37

Frauwallner compares the eternal individual sounds of the Mimāṃsakas with the varṇasphoṭa of the grammarians, and thinks that they owe their existence to this concept. The idea of a varṇasphoṭa is however derived from that of a padasphoṭa. This in its turn means that a development must have taken place within the grammatical tradition in the time before these ideas made their appearance in the Mimāṃsā texts. Patañjali's Mahābhāṣya is unfortunately of little use for studying this development. In Frauwallner's opinion Patañjali has no understanding whatsoever of linguistic theory and of philosophy.

Frauwallner's low opinion of Patañjali has been criticized by subsequent scholars,38 but only in general terms. The question remains whether we can learn anything from the Mahābhāṣya about the problem that engaged Frauwallner, that is, about the nature of sound and word. The remainder of this lecture will be dedicated to this question.

3. The nature of sound and word.

Regarding the nature of sound we can be brief. It appears that Patañjali knew the idea of an individual sound conceived of as an entity, different from its particular pronunciation by various [47] people in differing circumstances. His use of the word sphoṭa confirms this.

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37 Frauwallner, 1961: 121 (319); 1968: 38.
Patañjali uses the word *sphoṭa* at only two occasions, both times in connection with individual speech sounds. On P. 1.1.70 vt. 5 he distinguishes between the *sphoṭa*, which is the *śabda*, and the *dhvani*, which is a quality of the *śabda*. ²⁹ It is true that the two passages in which Patañjali uses the term *sphoṭa* pose some difficulties of interpretation, ²⁰ but these do not affect the main conclusion that for Patañjali there existed a sound entity different from the ‘noise’ that expressed, or perhaps: accompanied, it.

Patañjali is also aware of the notion of an eternal and unchanging sound (*varṇa*). We find it under Śivasūtra 1 vt. 12, ²¹ while under P. 1.1.70 vt. 5 Patañjali calls the sounds fixed (*avasthita*).

The relationship between sounds and words is perhaps most clearly discussed in the second Āhnika of the Mahābhāṣya (I, p. 30, l. 1 ff.). The question raised is whether individual sounds have meaning or not. A number of arguments support the view that they do, among them the observation that a collection (*samghātā*) of sounds has meaning. Other arguments are adduced to show that individual sounds have no meaning, which comes closer to Patañjali’s own opinion that most single sounds have no meaning, while certain verbal roots, suffixes, nominal stems and particles which consist of one sound do have meaning. Somewhere in this discussion Patañjali makes the remark (I, p. 31, l. 10):

\[
\textit{samghātasyaikatvam arthaḥ}
\]

This seems to mean: "The collection is one single [entity, and this] one-ness is the meaning."

[48]

This remark is very noticeable, because there was no need whatsoever for Patañjali to make it. It is made by way of explanation of an expression in a vārttika (Śivasūtra 5 vt. 13) which reads *samghātasyaikārthyaḥ* "because a collection has one single meaning". Patañjali here goes beyond the vārttika he is explaining, in that he states that a collection is a single entity. This statement is not further explained, nor does it play a significant role in the discussion.

It is not hard to imagine why Patañjali postulates the existence of a collection of sounds as one single entity. Individual sounds do not occur simultaneously, not even in

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²⁹ I, p. 181, l. 19-20: *evaṁ tarhi sphoṭah śabdo dhvaniḥ śabdaguṇah*

²⁰ See Joshi, 1967: 13 f.

²¹ I, p. 18, l. 14-15: *nityeṣu ca śabdeṣu kūṭasthair avicālibhir varṇair bhavitavyam anapiyopajanaṁvānāriṁbhiiḥ.*
a single word. In another context\(^\text{42}\) Patañjali points out that in the word \textit{gauḥ} the sounds \textit{au} and \textit{ḥ} are not there while \textit{g} is being pronounced, and similarly about the other sounds. For sounds disappear as soon as they have arisen (\textit{uccaritapradhvamsinaḥ khalv api varṇāḥ}). No single sound is the companion of another sound (\textit{na varṇo varṇasya saḥāyaḥ}). Seen in this way it is hard to assign any form of existence whatsoever to words.

Yet Patañjali looks upon words as existing entities and, what is more, as eternal entities. Part of a \textit{vārttika} in the first \textit{Āhnika}\(^\text{43}\) reads \textit{siddhe śabdārthasaṃbandhe}; Patañjali analyzes this as \textit{siddhe śabde ‘ṛthasaṃbandhe ca} (\textit{Mbh I, p. 6, l. 17}) and interprets \textit{siddha} to mean \textit{nitya} ‘eternal’. In Patañjali’s interpretation therefore (which is almost certainly different from the one intended by the author of the \textit{vārttika}) the word, its meaning (or denoted object), and the relation between the two are here stated to be eternal. But for a word to be eternal it has to exist first, and this makes it all the more understandable that Patañjali postulates the existence of a collection of sounds as one single entity.

In order to understand what kind of entity a word is we return to the passage where Patañjali explained that the sounds of a word are not pronounced simultaneously. After this Patañjali [49] quotes a verse, then comments upon it in the following manner (\textit{Mbh I, p. 356, l. 9-13}):

\begin{quote}
\textit{buddhiviṣayam evaśabdānāṁ paurvāpyam/ iha ya eṣa manuṣyāḥ}
\textit{prekṣāpūrvakāṁ bhavati sa paśyaty asmin arthe ‘yaṁ śabdaḥ prayoktavyo ‘śmiṁs tāvac chabde ‘yaṁ tāvad varṇas tato ‘yaṁ tato ‘yaṁ iti/}
\end{quote}

The first sentence seems to mean:

The sequence of sounds has the mind as its realm.

A more satisfactory translation would of course be possible if we could look upon \textit{buddhi} as a Tatpurṣa compound. We could then translate:

The sequence of sounds is the object of the mind.

I am not, however, aware of an instance where \textit{viṣaya} is a neuter word. The rest of the passage translates:

\(^{42}\) On P. 1.4.109 vt. 10, \textit{Mbh I, p. 356, l. 5 f.}
\(^{43}\) See note 3, above.
A man who thinks before he acts, sees: "In this meaning that word must be used, in this word first this sound, then that one, and then that one."

S. D. Joshi, in the Introduction to his edition and translation of the Sphoṭaniṁrṇaya (1967: 12), concludes from this passage that "the unity of words exists only in our mind". I fail to see how this conclusion can be drawn from the text. It rather states that the mind creates the sequence of sounds while pronouncing a word. This is confirmed by the last quarter of the preceding verse, which has:

\[
\text{buddhau kuryāt paurāparyam}
\]

[The wise one] produces the sequence in his mind.

The fact that the mind creates the sequence of sounds, does not imply that the real word, or the unity of words, exists only in the mind. A better interpretation would seem to be that the mind acts as an intermediary between the non-mental real word and the equally non-mental sounds.

Similar criticism could be directed against Joshi's remark (1967: 10) that "by the term buddhinirgrāhyaḥ 'grasped by the intellect' (on Śivasūtra 1 vt. 12) Patañjali indicates that word is a mental or psychical entity". Patañjali describes the word in the very same line as ākāśadeśaḥ 'situated in ether', which seems to prove that no mental entity can be meant.44

The mind is necessary if we assume that the collection (sāṃghāta) is a single entity without a sequence of sounds in it. The fact that the mind intervenes between the sāṃghāta and the sequence of sounds does not entail that this sāṃghāta is of a mental nature. Patañjali, at any rate, does not say anything of the kind.45

The kind of sāṃghāta which Patañjali seems to speak about can hardly be described as a ‘collection’. If our interpretation up to this point is correct, it is rather an entity in its own right and no collection in the literal sense at all. The next question we have to turn to is whether or not Patañjali distinguished different types of verbal sāṃghātas.

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44 I, p. 18, l. 19-20: śrotropalabdhir buddhinirgrāhyah prayogenābhijvalita aṅkāśadeśaḥ śabdāḥ.
45 The Vṛttikāra quoted in the Śābara Bhāṣya rejects the word as an existing entity, even though he accepts something mental, viz. samskāra, as an intermediary between sounds and understanding (Frauwallner, 1968: 38-41). The entity rejected by the Vṛttikāra appears to be similar to the one accepted by Patañjali.
4. Patañjali’s padasaṃghāta and varṇasaṃghāta.

We find the two expressions padasaṃghāta and varṇasaṃghāta under P. 3.2.49 vt. 3. The vārttika under which they occur reads: karmaṇi sami ca. It is explained by Patañjali in the following manner, correctly as it seems (II, p. 104, l. 2):

\[\text{karmany upapade sampuṁrved dhanter an vaktavyo 'ntyasya ṭo vā vaktavyaḥ} \]

When [a word denoting] the grammatical object is upapada, [the suffix] aN must be prescribed after the root han [51] preceded by sañ; and [ must be prescribed as optionally [taking the place] of the final [sound of han].

Patañjali then gives two examples:

\[\text{varṇasaṃghātaḥ/ padasaṃghātaḥ} \]

[This explains] varṇasaṃghāṭa [besides] varṇasaṃghāta, padasaṃghāṭa [besides] padasaṃghāta.

The grammatical formation here given is peculiar, and has a direct bearing on the philosophical question we are investigating. Normally the word saṃghāta is derived with the suffix GHaÑ in the sense bhāva by P. 3.3.18 (bhāve). This is actually done e.g. by Jinendrabuddhi in his Nyāsa on P. 7.3.32 (VI, p. 37) and by Bhānuji Dikṣita in his Rāmāśrami on Amarakoṣa 2.5.39 (p. 258-59). What is more, Patañjali himself uses the word saṃghāta often as a separate word, not being part of a compound, and therefore without a word denoting the grammatical object as upapada. In all these cases the above derivation is not valid, so that Patañjali himself must have derived the uncompounded word differently, most probably with the suffix GHaÑ as well. Why then does he derive saṃghāta differently in these two compounds?

One possible answer might be considered to lie in P. 2.2.14 karmaṇi ca. This rule forbids compound formation on the basis of an objective genitive; an example would be varṇañāṃ samghātaḥ and padañāṃ samghātaḥ. However, the vārttikas and Bhāṣya on P. 2.2.14 make clear that this prohibition is only valid where both object and subject are mentioned; it should not therefore prevent simple compounds like varṇasaṃghātaḥ and padasaṃghātaḥ.

There is another reason to reject the view that Patañjali merely wants to secure the compounding of varṇañāṃ samghātaḥ and padañāṃ samghātaḥ in spite of P. 2.2.14. The result in that case would be simply varṇa- and pada-samghāta. As it is, also the
forms varṇa- and pada-saṃghāta, with retroflex ṭ, are derived. We cannot but conclude that Patañjali here derives some special compounds in some special meanings.

Turning to the meaning we note that varṇa- and pada-saṃghāta are derived with the kṛt-suffix aN. This suffix has the meaning ‘agent’ by P. 3.4.67 (kartari kṛt). Derived with aN the words saṃghāta and saṃghāta in, say, varṇasaṃghāta / -saṃghāta mean therefore "what collects (sound / sounds)". Derived with GHāN, on the other hand, the compound varṇasaṃghāta would mean "collection of sounds". The later grammarians agree with this distinction in meaning. The Kāśikā on P. 3.2.49, for example, explains the compounds derived with aN as follows (I, p. 221): varṇān saṃhantī varṇasaṃghātaḥ, varṇasaṃghātaḥ/ padānī saṃhantī padaasaṃghātaḥ, padaasaṃghātaḥ/.

What is the difference between "a collection of sounds / words" and "what collects sound(s) / word(s)"? Laddu (1971: 316) proposes to understand the forms derived with aN as "one who collects the sounds, a phonetician" and "one who collects or codifies words, a lexicographer" respectively. But he admits that no trace of such usage can be found in the surviving literature.

Another solution is possible. For Patañjali, as we have seen, a word is an entity in its own right, not just a collection of sounds; for him a word rather "collects sounds", or perhaps "joins a word together". We see that it is not yet clear whether a word is designated by the expression varṇasaṃghāta or rather by pada-saṃghāta; we shall return to this question later. At this point it is important to understand that for Patañjali a word is no collection in the strict sense of the term, but rather a ‘collector’.

5. The Mahābhāṣya on P. 1.1.51 vt. 9.

We now have to study a passage in the Mahābhāṣya — the only one as far as I am aware — where one of these two terms is used. The expression pada-saṃghāta occurs here as part of a larger compound, which does not fail to evoke problems in its own right. The context is as follows. In the Bhāṣya on P. 1.1.51 vt. 9 a discussion occurs in which the word nārkalpi figures. This word is derived from nṛkalpa with the suffix iN, by P. 4.1.95 (ata iṁ). Nṛkalpa itself consists of the noun nṛ ‘man’ and the suffix kalpaP, prescribed by P. 5.3.67 (iṣadasaṃptau kalpadeśyadesīyarah). In the derivation of nārkalpi the r in nṛ is replaced by ā (P. 7.2.117 taddhīteṣv acāṃ ādeḥ), which is then followed by r (P. 1.1.51 ur an raparaḥ). This results in

nā-ṛ-kalpi.

46 This is not the place to discuss the peculiar form saṃghāta. Note however that Burrow (1971: 550) proposes to see in saṃghāta the non-cerebralized form of the root ghaṭ.
The question is whether \( r \) is part of preceding \( nā \) or of following \( kalpi \). If it is part of \( nā \) there is a difficulty. \( Nṛ \) in \( nṛkalpa \) is technically called a \( pada \), by P. 1.4.17 (\( svādiṣ्य asarvanāmastihaṇe \)). But then \( nār \) in \( nārkalpi \) is a \( pada \) too. This would lead to the undesired consequence that \( r \) be replaced by a \( visarjanīya \), by P. 8.3.15 (\( kharavasānayor visarjanīyaḥ \)).

Can this problem be solved by stating that \( r \) is rather part of following \( kalpi \)? Patañjali says no. He explains (I, p. 129, l. 5-6):

\[
\text{kalpipadasamghātabhakto 'sau notsahate 'vayavasya padāntatāṃ vihantum iti}
\text{ktvā visarjanīyaḥ prāṇoti/}
\]

The commentators agree in interpreting \( padasaṃghāta \) here as \( pratyayamasudāya \) ‘collection of suffixes’. This is understandable, for \( kalpi \) is the result of combining the two suffixes \( kalpaP \) and \( iÑ \). This interpretation would justify the following translation:

That \([\text{sound } r, \text{ even though}]\) part of the collection of suffixes \( kalpi \), cannot do away with the fact that a portion \([\text{of this expression } kalpi]\) is the final \([\text{sound}]\) of a \( pada \). As a result \([\text{substitution of } ]\) \( visarjanīya \) would take place.

Yet this interpretation of \( padasaṃghāta \) is not acceptable, for various reasons. The first one is that \( pada \) means ‘word’, not ‘suffix’. In order to appreciate the second reason we must turn to a number of passages in the Mahābhāṣya where Patañjali uses closely similar words and phrases. We first take the Bhāṣya on P. 1.1.47 vt. 7, which reads (I, p. 117, l. 1-2):

\[
samghātabhakto 'sau notsahate 'vayavasyegantarāṇaḥ vihantum
\]

[54]
We notice the close similarity of this sentence with the earlier one. Here the addition of the augment \( nUM \) in the nom. nt. dual of such dvīgu compounds as \( pañcāratnini \) (from \( pañcāratni \) ‘five cubits’) is under discussion. The assumption has been made that \( nUM \) is part of what precedes it. Patañjali’s statement here means:

That \([\text{sound } n, \text{ i.e., the augment } nUM, \text{ though}]\) part of the collection \([\text{pañcāratnī-n}]\), cannot do away with the fact that a part \([\text{of this collection, viz., } pañcāratnī]\) ends in a vowel \([\text{belonging to the } pratyāhāra]\) \( iK \).
The ‘collection’ here is the combination of the two parts that are relevant in the discussion, in this case of the part ending in $i$, pañçaratnî, and of $nUM$.

Patañjali repeats the same sentence under P. 7.1.73 (I, p. 266, l. 5), where he makes the same point. Here the examples are pañçatrapunâ and pañçatrapunah. Here too the augment $nUM$, though part of the collection pañçatrapu-$n$, cannot do away with the fact that the part pañçatrapu ends in an $iK$ vowel.

The expression saµghåtabhakta is used at a few other occasions, always in the following phrase:

\[
\text{asau (or: ayaµ)} \text{ saµghåtabhakto na śakyah (or: aśakyah) X-graha\text{-}ena grah¥tum}
\]

X varies with the circumstances. At one place the phrase indicates that the prefix $aT$, though part of the collection (saµghåta), is not denoted by the term dhåtu ‘verbal root’.

The infix $mUK$, similarly, in examples like pacamåna, is not part of what is denoted by he expression adupadesa "what is taught as ending in a". Again, the prefix $aT$ added to a verbal root belonging to the list gadådi, is part of the collection (saµghåta), yet is not covered by the term gadådi.

In all these cases Patañjali uses the term saµghåta to refer to the collection of the two parts that are relevant in the discussion. If we now return to the original passage which contains the compound kalpipadasaµghåtabhakta, we see that the interpretation of the commentators will not do. They think that saµghåta here refers to the collection of suffixes which constitutes kalpi, but that collection is not immediately relevant in the discussion. What is relevant is the collection r-kalpi, or, perhaps, nå-r-kalpi. The most natural interpretation of kalpipadasaµghåta in the circumstances seems to me: "collection of kalpi with [the preceding] pada". If we accept this interpretation, Patañjali’s statement comes to mean:

That [sound r, even though] part of the collection of kalpi with [the preceding] pada (i.e., nå-r-kalpi), cannot do away with the fact that a portion [of this collection, viz., the sound r] is the final [sound] of a pada.

Of course, another interpretation is possible as well. One might urge that the collection under discussion is not nå-r-kalpi, but merely r-kalpi. Patañjali’s kalpipadasaµghåta

47 On P. 1.3.60 vt. 3 (I, p. 286, l. 1).
48 On P. 6.1.186 vt. 3 (III, p. 112, l. 12); and on P. 7.2.82 vt. 1 and 3 (III, p. 303, l. 7-8 and l. 16-17).
49 On P. 8.4.17 vt. 1 (III, p. 459, l. 7).
would then have to be interpreted as: "the padasaµghåta [which is] (r-)kalpi". This interpretation is open to the criticism that if Patañjali meant rkalpi, he might have said rkalpi rather than just kalpi. If, in spite of this criticism, this last interpretation is accepted, it must be concluded that padasaµghåta is here used in a peculiar sense. Kalpi, and rkalpi, is no pada in Pāṇini’s technical sense, but it can well be looked upon as a ‘word’ in some way. It is at least conceivable that Patañjali, knowing that the term pada would be inappropriate here, chose a term which he knew was used in non-grammatical circles, a term which had not been narrowly defined like Pāṇini’s pada, viz., padasaµghåta.

In support of this interpretation one might adduce the fact that nārkalpi is not the only example which is discussed in this passage of the Mahåbhåśya. Other examples are nārkuṭa and nārpatya. The second halves of these examples are paddas, so Patañjali’s choice of a non-technical synonym of pada in order to [56] designate kalpi might be considered understandable. Note that this interpretation of Patañjali’s use of padasaµghåta presupposes that padasaµghåta was in use primarily in non-grammatical circles, or at any rate had no technical grammatical meaning. It further makes only sense on the assumption that a padasaµghåta is not a "collection of words", say a sentence, but rather a single word conceived of as an indivisible entity. On this assumption varnasamghåta would refer to a single speech sound conceived of as a single undivided entity.

We must not conclude too much from this possible interpretation of Patañjali’s use of kalpipadasaµghåtabhakta. This interpretation is far from certain, and, as we have seen, a more conventional interpretation is possible, in which padasaµghåta does not refer to a single concept at all. The question of the precise interpretation of padasaµghåta will however engage our attention once more towards the end of this lecture.

6. Comparable ideas outside grammar.

We have to turn to the question whether Patañjali’s ideas stand isolated in early India. We have seen already that Patañjali makes several of his remarks in the context of some vårttikas. But all the points which allowed us to form a picture of Patañjali’s ideas were new in the Mahåbhåśya; they were not, or not clearly, present in the vårttikas. It seems therefore reasonable to conclude that these ideas were not yet, or not yet fully, known to Kåtyåyana.

In Patañjali’s ideas we can distinguish two separate aspects. For him words are (i) entities with an independent existence, (ii) which are, moreover, eternal. Some
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authors, such as Joshi and Roodbergen (1986: xi, 114), concentrate on the second aspect, the eternality. They conclude that Patañjali attempts "to introduce the Mīmāṃsā doctrine of the nityatva of the word". We have seen already that this position is chronologically not without difficulties, not to speak of the problem that in Mīmāṃsā not the word as independent entity came to be looked upon as eternal, but rather the sounds which constitute it. Joshi and Roodbergen do not discuss these difficulties, and we may conclude that the connection with Mīmāṃsā is unlikely at best.

There is a passage in the Mahābhāṣya which seems to point in another direction. P. 1.2.45 vt. 11 reads:

\[\text{samghāarthavatvāc ceti ced drṣṭo hy atadarthena guṇena guṇino 'rthabhāvaḥ} \]
And if [you say that individual sounds have meaning] because collections (samghāta) have meaning, [the answer is no,] because subsidiary parts that do not serve a certain purpose are seen to constitute something that does serve that purpose.

The Bhāṣya explains the vārttika and then gives the following example (I, p. 220, l. 22-24):

\[\text{yathā ... rathāṅgāni vihṛtāni pratyekāṃ vrajikriyāṃ praty asamarthaṃ bhavanti tatsamudāyaś ca rathaḥ samartha evam eṣāṃ varṇānāṃ samudāyā arthavanto 'vayavā anarthakā iti//} \]
For example, the parts of a chariot when taken apart are not each of them fit for movement; their combination (samudāya), i.e. the chariot, is fit [for that]. In the same way the combinations of these sounds have meaning [even though] the parts have not.

This example does not add much to our understanding of the entities called samghāta by Patañjali, but it suggests an interesting connection with another intellectual current in early India. Another text which, like the Mahābhāṣya, has been brought into connection with the realm of king Menander contains the same example. This text is the Milindapañha.

The Milindapañha is a semi-canonical text of the southern Buddhists which claims to reproduce a discussion between king Milinda — this is the Indian name for Menander — and the Buddhist monk Nāgasena. The oldest parts of this text can safely be assumed to go back to a time not long after Menander, and must have been composed in the north-west of the Indian subcontinent. It is in the oldest parts that we
find the discussion which contains the same example of the chariot. It occurs in a very important passage of the Milindapañha, the passage namely where Milinda and Nāgasena meet for the first time. In the beginning of the second book (Lakkhanapañha) (p. 25 f.)\textsuperscript{50} king Milinda asks the monk Nāgasena his name. Nāgasena uses the opportunity to point out that ‘Nāgasena’ is but a conventional term, and that no person (puggala) can be observed (na h’ettha puggalo upalabbhati). In the ensuing discussion we learn that neither the hair, nor the nails, nor any of the other constituents of the body or their combination, none of the five Skandhas nor their combination, and also nothing outside the five Skandhas is Nāgasena. Then follows the simile. A chariot is neither the pole nor the axle, nor any of the other constituents or their combination, and also nothing outside them.

The simile of the chariot illustrates something which became a central issue among the Buddhists. The simile is found already in a canonical Buddhist Sūtra (SN I.135), but the problem it illustrates becomes more central in the Buddhist Abhidharma works. Does the whole exist besides its parts? The Buddhists are unanimous in denying this. There is no whole besides the parts; no wholes exist at all.\textsuperscript{51}

This is not the place to enter into a discussion of the dharma theory which came to occupy such an important place among the [59] Buddhists. It may be sufficient to state that the Buddhists came to accept a limited number of dharmas as the only really existing entities. Everything else, including everything composed of dharmas, did not exist in the ultimate sense. The dharmas were enumerated, the total number differing somewhat among the schools. Usually the number of dharmas in the later enumerations was not far removed from a hundred. Another, probably related, feature of many Buddhist schools was their claim that everything is momentary; that is to say, in the ultimate sense only momentary dharmas exist. (There are some exceptions, but it would take us too far to discuss them.)

The most important Abhidharma school of the Buddhists is known by the name Sarvāstivāda. Unfortunately but few of the works of this school have been preserved in Sanskrit, but many — including all their canonical Abhidharma texts — have survived in Chinese translation. The Sarvāstivāda school became characterized by the consequent manner in which they tried to think out the dharma theory, whatever the

\textsuperscript{50} For a translation of this passage see, e.g., Rhys Davids, 1890: 40 f.; Frauwallner, 1956: 66 f.; Linne, 1976: 122 f. This portion belongs to the oldest kernel of the Milindapañha since it occurs in the Chinese version: T. 1670, vol. 32, p. 696a, l. 9 f. For a translation of the Chinese version see Demiéville, 1925: 97 f. The Chinese and Pali versions are compared in Thích Minh Chau, 1964: 47 f.

\textsuperscript{51} Something similar is perhaps meant in the Mahābhāṣya on P. 6.1.1 vt. 13 (III, p. 3, l. 15-16): \textit{avaya\textbar makah samudāya\textbar abhyantarohi samudāya\textbar ‘vayava\textbar tad yathā\textbar vrksah pracalana\textbar samah\textbar avayavai\textbar pracalati/}. 
result. The best known doctrine of this school is that all the three times — past, present, and future — exist (sarvam asti), but this was not even their most extreme doctrine.

7. The linguistic dharmas of the Sarvástivādins.

In the present context we are most interested in the Sarvástivāda ideas about words and language. The belief that only momentary dharmas really exist led to difficulties. It implied that words and sentences, and even individual sounds, do not really exist.

This was not to the liking of the Sarvástivādins. They solved the problem by postulating the existence of some highly remarkable dharmas, called nāmakāya, padakāya and vyañjanakāya. These dharmas have been discussed by Padmanabh S. Jaini (1959), who expressed the opinion that they owe their origin to the influence of the theory of sphoṭa and of the Mīmāmsaka theory of eternal words. This opinion is open to doubt. We [60] have seen already that the Mīmāmsā theory does not appear to be old. The relationship of the Sarvástivāda linguistic dharmas to the grammatical tradition will be discussed in a while. Here it must be observed that the nāmakāya, padakāya and vyañjanakāya are already enumerated in the lists of so-called cittaviprayuka sanskrātas in several canonical Abhidharma texts of the Sarvástivādins: in the Dharmaskandha (T. 1537, vol. 26, p. 500c, l. 22, cf. p. 501b, l. 21), the Prakaraṇapāda (T. 1541, vol. 26, p. 628c, l. 23-24, p. 634c, l. 19-20; T. 1542, vol. 26, p. 694a, l. 28-29, p. 699b, l. 23) and the Jñānaprasthāna (T. 1543, vol. 26, p. 774b, l. 5-15; T. 1544, vol. 26, p. 920b, l. 15-25). The first chapter of the Prakaraṇapāda is also known as a separate work called Pañcavastukā;52 here too we find the 'linguistic dharmas' enumerated and explained (T. 1556, vol. 28, p. 997c, l. 27-29; T. 1557, vol. 28, p. 998c, l. 25, p. 1001a, l. 28-29; Imanishi, 1969: 8). They are of course a regular feature of later Sarvástivāda and related works.53

The precise interpretation of the terms nāmakāya, padakāya and vyañjanakāya varies in the later texts. For our present purposes it is not necessary to study this in detail. One peculiarity of the later interpretations may however be noted: the word pada in padakāya has come to be interpreted to mean ‘sentence’ or ‘verse foot’. Stcherbatsky (1922: 24 n. 1) considered this "a case exhibiting clearly the desire to have a

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52 It is not impossible that the Pañcavastukā was an earlier work which was later incorporated into the Prakaraṇapāda.
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terminology of its own”. Jaini on the other hand thought that this unusual meaning of the term *pada* can be traced to Pali (p. 98 f.). He [61] supports this with an example from the Saṃyutta Nikāya, which however does not carry much conviction; there is no reason to doubt that *pada* in this passage simply means ‘word’.

There is no need to show that *pada* in Buddhism always meant ‘sentence’ or ‘verse foot’; it did not always have that meaning in the compound *padakāya*. In the Prakārāṇapāda — the earliest text which explains the term *padakāya* — *pada* means ‘word’. *Padakāya* is here explained as "a whole of speech sounds" (T. 1541, vol. 26, p. 628c, l. 24; T. 1542, vol. 26, p. 694a, l. 28-29; T. 1556, vol. 28, p. 997c, l. 28). This interpretation of *pada* is more natural and therefore more satisfactory than ‘sentence’ or ‘verse foot’. It leaves us however with the problem why this word acquired a different meaning later. One would be tempted to think that *nāmakāya* and *padakāya* were at one time synonymous. This, of course, would entail that there was a time when there were not three, but only two linguistic dharmas.

8. The original number of linguistic dharmas.

The conjecture that originally the Sarvāstivādins accepted only two linguistic dharmas tallies well with the fact that Patañjali’s Mahābhāṣya enumerates but two linguistic entities, *varṇasaṃghāta* and *padasaṃghāta*. It is true that this latter fact should not be given too much weight, but it does give us some extra reason to seriously consider the possibility that the Sarvāstivādins originally had only two linguistic dharmas.

There is some evidence to support this. Before we turn to it, it will be necessary to say something about the Sarvāstivāda canonical Abhidharma texts. These texts, or at least some of them, have not been preserved in the forms in which they were written. The Dharmaskandha, for example, is rather the end-product of a development. Frauwallner (1964: 73-80; 1971: 103 f.) has adduced reasons to think that both the Sarvāstivāda [62] Dharmaskandha and the Pali Abhidhamma Vibhaṅga developed out of a common original text. The details of this development are not known to us, nor do we know when exactly this development came to an end. We only know that the end products of these two developments — the Dharmaskandha and the Vibhaṅga — differ greatly from each other.

In the case of the Dhātukāya some insight into the history of the text is made possible by its relationship to the Pali Dhātukathā on the one hand, and to the fact that

54 SN II.36: ekena padena sabbo attho vutto.
55 Viz., the word *phassa* which figures prominently in the preceding discussions.
this text, possibly in adjusted form, has been included in the fourth chapter of the Prakaraṇapāda on the other. Frauwallner (1964: 85 f.), who also studied this question, came to the conclusion that a part of the Dhātukāya developed beyond the stage embodied in the fourth chapter of the Prakaraṇapāda, while another part is further developed in the fourth chapter of the Prakaraṇapāda. We see that adjustments and emendations were still added in the texts in relatively recent times.

The researches of Yukio Sakamoto (1935) take us to even more recent dates. Sakamoto compared the quotations from the Prakaraṇapāda in the Mahāvibhāṣā with the readings in the Prakaraṇapāda itself, and came to the conclusion that the Prakaraṇapāda still underwent changes after the compilation of the Mahāvibhāṣā!

It becomes clear from the above that most, perhaps all, of the Chinese translations of Abhidharma works which we possess are translations of emended, and therefore non-original, texts. In order to penetrate as far as possible to the earliest form of a certain idea, we must therefore not just use early texts, but where possible early translations as well.

The two Chinese translations of the Prakaraṇapāda which we possess were both made after the time when emendations were introduced into the text, and the same is true of one of the two Chinese translations of the Pañcavastuka, its separate first chapter. The other translation of the Pañcavastuka, however, is old and may have been made by An Shih-kao, the first translator of whom we know. It may therefore date back to the second century C.E. What does this old translation tell us about the number of linguistic dharmas?

The oldest translation of the Pañcavastuka, which is probably the oldest translation we possess of any Abhidharma work into Chinese, knows only two linguistic dharmas! The clumsiness of this translation makes it hard to determine which two Sanskrit terms were here being translated. The first one reads in Chinese ming tzu, which may stand for nāmakāya or padakāya. I shall use the term padakāya for convenience' sake, not because I have any reason to think that this term rather than nāmakāya was used. The second term reads chüeh in Chinese, which literally means 'cut' or 'break'. This translation was apparently chosen to represent the constituent portions of a word, i.e., the vyañjana or rather the vyañjanakāya.

This same old translation of the Pañcavastuka explains the term vyañjanakāya with the words: tzu wei chü. This can be translated as "sound as a totality". This seems to indicate that vyañjanakāya was not considered a Tatpuruṣa compound but rather a

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56 For details see Imanishi, 1969: 4.
57 So Demiéville, 1953: 446.
58 See T. 1557, vol. 28, p. 1001a, l. 25 f. This conclusion was confirmed by Prof. E. Zürcher, in a private communication.
Karmadhāraya. We saw above that the old meaning of padakāya was, similarly, a collection of speech sounds, therefore ‘word’ rather than ‘collection of words’. We may conclude that vyañjanakāya and padakāya (or was it nāmakāya?) initially named single sounds and single words conceived of as single, indivisible entities.


This conclusion may have an effect on the correct interpretation of the terms varṇasamghāta and padasamghāta.

Let us focus our attention on varṇasamghāta. According to Patañjali this term is to be analyzed as varṇaḥ / varṇan samhanti. What does this mean exactly? It might be understood in the sense that a varṇasamghāta "collects sounds" and is therefore a collection of sounds. Another, equally plausible interpretation is that a varṇasamghāta joins a sound together, unites all the constituent elements of a single sound so as to form one sound. A varṇasamghāta is then a single sound. The term padasamghāta can similarly denote a single word — conceived of as one indivisible entity — rather than a collection of words. This interpretation has the advantage that it agrees best with the original vyañjanakāya and padakāya of the Buddhists.

Interpreted in this way the two terms varṇasamghāta and padasamghāta correspond to the two entities which we know were familiar to Patañjali. The varṇasamghāta would be the individual sound, conceived of as an independent entity, and possibly eternal; the padasamghāta would be the word, also an independent entity, and also eternal.

10. The origin of linguistic philosophy.

The above discussion has taken it more or less for granted that Patañjali’s varṇa- and pada-saṃghāta on the one hand, and the vyañjana- and pada-kāya of the Buddhists on the other, are related entities. The similarities between these concepts leave, in my opinion, little room for doubt. But if they are related we must face the question who borrowed from whom. Chronological considerations do not give us an answer. Our present knowledge of the Buddhist canonical Abhidharma literature does not allow us to put a date to the introduction of the linguistic dharmas into their texts. And even the date of Patañjali is not fully beyond doubt, as we have seen. From a purely chronological point of view all we can say is that both options are still open: either
Patañjali antedates the introduction of the linguistic dharmas into the Buddhist scriptures, or vice versa.

But other considerations may yet be strong enough to reach very probable conclusions. It seems clear that Patañjali’s ideas about varṇasaṃghāta and padasaṃghāta cannot really be considered his own. They play no role whatever in his discussions and the terms are introduced as examples only. What is more, these ideas are the result of a concern for ontological questions which does not otherwise characterize Patañjali’s discussions. Ontological questions form however the backbone of Buddhist Abhidharma. The lists of dharmas are lists of what there is.

The Buddhist dogmatists were equally interested in what is not there. All composite things and, of course, the human soul or person (pudgala) did not exist in the opinion of the most influential Buddhist sects. This ontological concern could not but confront the Buddhists with the question whether words and sounds exist. The momentariness of almost all dharmas allowed for no possibility that words and sounds, because they are extended in time, had any real existence. The Sarvāstivādins solved the problem by postulating that words and sounds really existed as separate dharmas, and this was an understandable response to a real and possibly pressing problem. It seems safe to conclude that Patañjali derived his ideas concerning the varṇa- and pada- saṃghāta from the Buddhists. This does not necessarily entail that the Buddhists knew the terms used by Patañjali — varṇasaṃghāta and padasaṃghāta. The possibility cannot be excluded that Patañjali did not borrow these ideas from the Buddhists directly, but rather through the intermediary of others. This might also explain the differences between the views of Patañjali and those of the Buddhists; especially noteworthy in this connection is the fact that for Patañjali the word is eternal, for the Buddhists momentary.

11. Change of terminology in Sarvāstivāda?

We may yet consider the alternative, and less likely, possibility that varṇasaṃghāta and padasaṃghāta were originally Buddhist terms. The Chinese expressions in the earliest translation are so vague that they may translate these two terms, or the more usual vyañjanakāya and padakāya; they do not allow of a decision. We have also seen that the canonical Abhidharma texts of the Sarvāstivādins, or at least some of them, underwent changes in the course of their history. Could it be that these changes extended to individual terms?

The Chinese translation of the Pañcavastuka presumably made by An Shih-kao is our most important source in questions like this. At the same time it is so clumsy and
often unintelligible that we cannot hope to derive much elucidation from it. There is however one case which deserves mention.

The last dharma enumerated under the heading rūpa is normally called avijñapti in the surviving Sarvāstivāda texts. Avijñapti literally means ‘non-information’, and the term is used to designate a dharma which plays a role in connecting a deed with its result. At the position where we expect avijñapti in the Pañcavastuka, An Shih-kao’s translation has the two Chinese characters pu keng (T. 1557, vol. 28, p. 998, l. 15). This means literally ‘non-change’ or something like it, and it is hard to see how this can be a rendering of avijñapti. However, another term was in use among at least some Buddhists, viz. avipraṇāsa. This term was used to designate something closely similar to avijñapti. The literal sense of avipraṇāsa is ‘non-perishing’, and it seems very likely that An Shih-kao found this term in the text he translated.

But avipraṇāsa is no Sarvāstivāda term. That is to say, it does not occur in the surviving Sarvāstivāda texts. Probably the oldest surviving text which uses the term is Nāgārjuna’s Mūlamadhyamakakārikā chapter 17. This chapter leaves no doubt regarding its general meaning. It is stated that the result of actions comes about on account of avipraṇāsa. Avipraṇāsa is furthermore characterized as a dharma taught by the Buddha. It remains however obscure exactly which Buddhists used this term. The commentaries on the Mūlamadhyamakakārikā do not help us much either. They ascribe the use of this term to ‘others’. This is also true of Vasubandhu’s Karmasiddhiprakaraṇa. The term occurs once in the Mahābhārata, where we read (crit. ed. 15.42.4): avipraṇāsaḥ sarvesāṃ karṇaṇām iti niscayaḥ. This seems to indicate that it was known to non-Buddhists too.

Lamotte attributes the use of avipraṇāsa to the Śāṃmitiyanas on the basis of a remark by K’uei-chi referred to by La Vallée Poussin (1928: 71). The Śāṃmitiyanikāya-śāstra — one of the few texts of this school that have been preserved, in Chinese translation — does indeed contain a passage which mentions the avipraṇāsa (T. 1649, vol. 32, p. 462a, l. 13-14). This does not however exclude the possibility that at an earlier time also the Sarvāstivādins used the term. It is in this context noteworthy that Nāgārjuna knows both the terms avijñapti and avipraṇāsa (see MMK 17.4). This may imply that already in his time avijñapti had wholly or largely replaced avipraṇāsa among the Sarvāstivādins, so that he borrowed the idea of avipraṇāsa from

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59 For a further discussion of avijñapti and avipraṇāsa see Lamotte, 1936: 156 f., 162 f.
60 MMK 17.15: tasmañ avipraṇāsena jāyate karmanāṃ phalam.
61 MMK 17.20: karmapuṣṭo ’vipraṇāsas ca dharmo buddhena deśitaḥ.
63 Lamotte, 1936: 231.
64 See Thich Thiên Châu, 1977: 253-54.
another school of Buddhists, perhaps from the Sāṃmitīyas. Alternatively it may mean that within Sarvāstivāda there were different currents, one of which used avipraṇāśa, another avijñapti.

This second alternative seems to find support in the fact that Nāgārjuna knows only three saṃskṛtalakṣaṇas, instead of the usual four. They are specified in MMK 7.3 as utpāda, sthiti and bhaṅga, while MMK 7.1 refers to them jointly as trilakṣaṇī. The surviving Sarvāstivāda texts enumerate four saṃskṛtalakṣaṇas: jāti, sthiti, jarā and anītyata. It would not be justified to draw conclusions from the differences in the way these dharmas are designated by Nāgārjuna and the surviving Sarvāstivāda texts; [68] Nāgārjuna was bound by the restraints of metre and may have chosen the terms accordingly. What is more, he refers to the second one, sthiti, using the different designation sthāna in MMK 7.34. The difference in number, on the other hand, may be significant. It is true that there were other schools of Buddhism which recognized only three saṃskṛtalakṣaṇas, and it was indeed usual to refer to a Sūtra according to which there are three of them. This Sūtra is referred to in this context in the Kathāvatthu (1.227; PTS ed. p. 61); and in the Abhidharmakośabhāṣya (on verse 2.45; see La Vallée Poussin, 1923-31: I: 223 f.). It is however interpreted differently by the upholders of different views. Nāgārjuna’s way of dealing with these lakṣaṇas creates the impression that he regards them as existing entities, as dharmas, and this seems typical for Sarvāstivāda. One might therefore tentatively conclude that Nāgārjuna knew a current within this school which accepted only three of these dharmas. An Shih-kao’s translation of the Pañcavastuka, be it noted, has all four of them.

12. Patañjali’s acquaintance with Buddhism.

The saṃskṛtalakṣaṇas take us back to the question whether Patañjali, the author of the Mahābhāṣya, was directly acquainted with Buddhist doctrine. These lakṣaṇas are closely associated with the view that everything is momentary. Some passages in the Mahābhāṣya suggest that its author was acquainted with this point of view.65 On P. 3.2.123 vt. 5 it is stated that according to ‘others’ the present time does not exist. This position is supported by a number of verses which are then quoted (II, p. 123, l. 24 - p. 124, l. 9). By way of example the first one will here be reproduced:

\[
\text{na vartate cakram iṣur na pātyate} \\
\text{na syandante saritāḥ sāgarāya/} \\
kūṭastho 'yaṃ loko na viceṣṭīṭāsti}
\]

The wheel doesn't turn, nor is the arrow shot,  
the rivers do not flow towards the ocean,  
the world's unchangeable, there is no mover;  
one who sees this, he is not blind.

Crisper is a passage on P. 4.1.3 (II, p. 198, l. 7-9):

\[
\text{pravṛtti˙ khalv api nityā/ na hiha kaścit svasmīn ātmāni mūhūrtam apy}
\text{avatīṣṭhate/ vardhate vā yāvad anena vardhitavyam apāyena vā yujyate/}
\]

Activity is uninterrupted, for nothing in this world keeps its own identity even for a moment. Either it rises as long as it must rise, or it is destroyed.

13. Chronology of the pañcavastuka.

The evidence which we have considered so far supports the view that Patañjali borrowed his philosophical notions regarding the nature of the word from the Buddhists, most probably from the early Sarvāstivādins. This in turn sheds some light on the chronology of certain developments in Abhidharma Buddhism. We had occasion to point out that the canonical Abhidharma texts of the Sarvāstivādins underwent changes until a late date. This makes the task of disentangling the old from the new in these texts particularly precarious. The occurrence of a certain dharma, or of a set of dharmas, in the Dharmaśāstra — a text whose nucleus goes back to a period soon after the death of the Buddha — does not for that reason guarantee that that particular dharma or those particular dharmas are equally old. They may have been inserted into the text during one of its revisions. Questions of this type might be asked in particular about the linguistic dharmas discussed above: nāmakāya, padakāya and vyañjanakāya. If our above arguments are correct, we can answer such questions as follows: At least two of these linguistic dharmas figured already in the time of the Mahābhāṣya or even earlier, i.e., possibly in or before 150 B.C.E.

These observations can be extended beyond the linguistic dharmas, to the so-called pañcavastuka. This is the systematization of all dharmas in five categories named (i) rūpa, (ii) citta, (iii) caitasika, (iv) cītavitprayukta sāṃskāra, and (v) asāṃskṛta. This categorization of all dharmas represents a major step forward in the development of Abhidharma in that it embodies an attempt to exhaustively collect and order all
elements of existence. Frauwallner (1963: 33-34) has rightly drawn attention to the importance of the appearance of the *pañcavastu*ka in Abhidharma philosophy, and has compared this development with the systematizations of reality in Sāṃkhya and Vaiśeṣika. Frauwallner finds it hard to believe that among these three attempts at systematization the Buddhists were the first. He considers it far more likely that the *pañcavastu*ka came into existence under the influence of the Hindu philosophical systems. He draws from this the chronological inference that the *pañcavastu*ka arose around the beginning of our era, certainly not much before it.

The present study provides reasons to doubt Frauwallner's conclusions. The linguistic dharmas occur, in the surviving texts, always in the context of the *pañcavastu*ka system of categories. This cannot by itself be considered proof that the linguistic dharmas were not already in existence before the *pañcavastu*ka, but a closer inspection makes that rather unlikely. The fourth category of the *pañcavastu*ka, viz., that of the *cittaviprayukta samśkāras*, contains many dharmas which cannot but be considered the outcome of an attempt to think problems out and solve them. The linguistic dharmas are striking examples. Like the *pañcavastu*ka itself, they embody an attempt to bring order in the mass of dharmas inherited from earlier times. Both *pañcavastu*ka and linguistic dharmas therefore seem to belong to the same period, and may indeed derive from one and the same person. The *pañcavastu*ka, moreover, created in its fourth category a place for such unusual dharmas as the *padakāya* and the *vyāñjanakāya*. If anything, the *pañcavastu*ka may therefore be older than the linguistic dharmas.

In view of the above it may be necessary to reconsider Frauwallner's dating of the origin of the *pañcavastu*ka. Frauwallner's chronology was of course highly tentative, and our present reflections cannot claim to have given us indubitable certainty. Yet we now have some evidence, more evidence than Frauwallner could muster, that the breakthrough of traditional Abhidharma to some kind of systematic philosophizing took place around the time of Patañjali, or even earlier. In absolute dates, this may have been as early as 150 B.C.E.

We have come to the end of this lecture, in which we have tried to pierce through the veil which covers the beginnings of linguistic philosophy in India. This veil is too thick for us to reach absolutely certain and clear results, but some increase of understanding may have been attained. Frauwallner still thought that the beginnings of linguistic philosophy had to be looked for somewhere in the development of Sanskrit grammar. He complained about the lack of materials for the period between Patañjali and Bharṭṛhari, and about the uselessness of the Mahābhāṣya. Subsequent scholars have pointed out that the Mahābhāṣya does contain some philosophical ideas about the nature of the word. The present lecture has tried to specify these ideas, and to trace them back even further. It has led to the remarkable conclusion that linguistic philosophy in India may be heavily indebted to Buddhism, from which it may have derived some of its ideas. An unexpected result of this investigation has been that the Mahābhāṣya may help us date certain early and important developments in Abhidharma Buddhism. It seems not unlikely that the first serious attempts to bring order in the inherited dharmas — which led to the system of categories called pañcavastu, and to the postulation of a number of new dharmas, among them the padakāya and the vyāñjanakāya — took place in a time preceding the date of the Mahābhāṣya, possibly before 150 B.C.E.
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(Foundations of Language, Supplementary Series, 5.)


### ABBREVIATIONS

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Abbreviation</th>
<th>Description</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>AL</td>
<td>Abhyankar and Limaye’s edition of Bhartṛhari’s Mahābhāṣya-Dipikā</td>
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<tr>
<td>AV</td>
<td>Atharva Veda (Śaunakīya)</td>
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<tr>
<td>AV(P)</td>
<td>Atharva Veda (Paippalāda)</td>
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<tr>
<td>C.</td>
<td>Sūtra in Candra’s grammar</td>
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<tr>
<td>CR</td>
<td>‘Critical edition’ of Bhartṛhari’s Mahābhāṣya-Dipikā</td>
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<tr>
<td>KS</td>
<td>Kāṭhaka Saṃhitā</td>
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<tr>
<td>Mbh</td>
<td>Mahābhāṣya (ed. Kielhorn)</td>
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<tr>
<td>MiSū</td>
<td>Mīmāṃsā Sūtra</td>
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<tr>
<td>MMK</td>
<td>Mūlamadhyamakakārikā</td>
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<tr>
<td>MPV</td>
<td>Mahābhāṣya Pradīpa Vyākhyānāni, ed. M. S. Narasimhacharya</td>
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<tr>
<td>Ms.</td>
<td>Manuscript of Bhartṛhari’s Mahābhāṣya-Dipikā</td>
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<td>MS</td>
<td>Maitrāyaṇi Saṃhitā</td>
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<tr>
<td>P.</td>
<td>Pāṇinian sūtra</td>
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<td>PTS</td>
<td>Pali Text Society</td>
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<tr>
<td>RV</td>
<td>Rg Veda</td>
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<tr>
<td>ŚB</td>
<td>Śatapatha Brāhmaṇa</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SN</td>
<td>Samyutta Nikāya</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sw</td>
<td>Swaminathan’s edition of Bhartrhari’s Mahābhāṣya-Dipikā</td>
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<td>T.</td>
<td>Taishō edition of the Chinese Tripiṭaka</td>
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<td>TA</td>
<td>Taittirīya Aranyaḥaka</td>
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<td>TB</td>
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<td>VP</td>
<td>Vākyapadiya of Bhartṛhari</td>
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