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Individual Justice, Collective Justice, and Attitudes towards Multiculturalism

Gale Jessica

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Individual Justice, Collective Justice, and Attitudes towards Multiculturalism

THÈSE DE DOCTORAT

présentée à la
Faculté des Sciences Sociales et Politiques
de l’Université de Lausanne

pour l’obtention du grade de
Docteure en Psychologie Sociale

par
Jessica Gale

Directeur de thèse
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Prof. Assaad Azzi
Prof. Eva G. T. Green
Prof. Gabriel Mugny

LAUSANNE
(2019)
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autorise, sans se prononcer sur les opinions de la candidate, l'impression de la thèse de Madame Jessica GALE, intitulée :

«Individual justice, collective justice, and attitudes towards multiculturalism »

Jean-Philippe LERESCHE
Doyen

Lausanne, le 29 avril 2019
Abstract

Multiculturalism as a political theory and public policy has faced substantial criticism in recent decades. Some critics suggest that it segregates, essentializes, or favours specific groups, thereby renouncing dominant principles such as individual freedom and responsibility. Advocates, on the other hand, suggest multiculturalism complements such individual justice principles. The purpose of the present thesis is to merge ideas from the fields of intergroup relations, social justice and political philosophy to get at the core of a major debate surrounding multiculturalism: The degree to which its theoretical and practical emphasis on groups is compatible or not with the normative endorsement of individuals in Western liberal societies. Eight studies are presented, across four empirical chapters and one theoretical chapter, to examine how individuals as members of groups in Western societies conceptualize justice in line with multiculturalism. The chapters are organized around three main research questions, namely how (1) asymmetric intergroup positioning, (2) national identification, and (3) national context shape justice conceptions and multicultural attitudes. Correlational, experimental and secondary survey data are used. Analysing different (liberal) Swiss and European intergroup contexts, the eight studies, together, show that membership in dominant national groups shapes sensitivity for pervasive individual justice principles, at the expense of multiculturalism and its emphasis on collective justice principles. They also show that membership in subordinate groups generally increases perceived compatibility between individual and collective justice instead. This general result provides evidence for what we ultimately call the “asymmetric compatibility hypothesis”. Theoretical implications for social justice and intergroup relations research are discussed, as are practical implications of viewing multicultural attitudes through the lens of normative justice conceptions.

Résumé

Le multiculturalisme est une théorie politique controversée de gestion de la diversité culturelle. Certains auteurs suggèrent que ses principes et politiques risquent de ségrérer, d’essentialiser, ou de favoriser les minorités, mettant ainsi en cause des principes dominants de liberté et de responsabilité individuelles. D’autres au contraire indiquent que le multiculturalisme complète de tels principes de justice individuelle. L’objectif de la présente thèse est de combiner des notions provenant des domaines de relations intergroupes, de justice sociale, et de philosophie politique pour parvenir au cœur d’un débat important sur le multiculturalisme : le degré auquel son accent sur les groupes sociaux est compatible ou non avec la valorisation normative des individus dans les pays occidentaux libéraux. Huit études sont présentées, à travers quatre chapitres empiriques et un chapitre théorique, pour examiner comment les individus, en tant que membres de groupes, conceptualisent la justice en lien avec le multiculturalisme. Les chapitres sont organisés autour de trois questions de recherche principales, à savoir comment les conceptions de justices et les attitudes envers le multiculturalisme sont façonnées par (1) la position de l’individu dans la hiérarchie sociale, (2) l’identification nationale, et (3) le contexte national. Des données corrélationnelles, expérimentales et secondaires d’enquête sont utilisées. En analysant différents contextes (libéraux) suisses et européens, les huit études, dans leur ensemble, montrent que l’appartenance aux groupes nationaux dominants façonne la sensibilité pour les principes répandus de la justice individuelle au détriment des principes de justice collective (de multiculturalisme). Elles montrent également que l’appartenance aux groupes subordonnés est associée à une plus grande compatibilité perçue entre justices individuelle et collective. Ce résultat général soutient « l’hypothèse de la compatibilité asymétrique ». Les implications théoriques sont discutées au même titre que les implications pratiques d’observer les attitudes multiculturelles du point de vue des conceptions de justice.
Acknowledgements

There are many people whose support, feedback, and encouragement were crucial for the development of this thesis.

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CHAPTER 1

Introduction

In the Western world today, issues involving cultural minority groups are conspicuous. From the Black Lives Matter movement throughout North America and Europe, to the Swiss popular initiative to ban the Islamic veil, to the Catalan and Scottish referenda to separate from Spain and the UK, to protests regarding aboriginal peace and reconciliation in Australia, it is clear that tensions between dominant societies and immigrant, national and aboriginal minority groups are high. As mobility and immigration increase, cultural diversity has become a reality of the Western world. A central area of concern with this diversity is therefore the development of policies and ideals that uphold fundamental principles of “justice” and “freedom” and that promote positive relations between these minority and majority groups.

The common presence of these cultural groups implies inequalities between them. Classic democratic principles indeed advocate for the construction of national policies which respond to what the “majority” wants and needs, producing a dominant position for the majority group and subordinate positions for minority ones. It can be noted, for example, that nationally recognized languages and religions such as English and Christianity in Anglo-Saxon countries often reflect those of the dominant group(s) (Kymlicka, 1995, 2001). However, consensual forms of democracy also exist, advocating for more compromise and minority rights (Lijphart, 1977, 2012). Two broad approaches to managing cultural diversity are therefore contrasted: one which focuses on individuals composing society, inadvertently favoring the dominant group, and the other which focuses on groups composing society, thereby seeking greater equality between them.
The first approach seeks to guarantee the same rights, responsibilities and opportunities to all individuals, distinguishing between them by their individual characteristics, effort and merit (Chryssochoou, 2018; Gale & Staerklé, 2017; Knowles, Lowery, Hogan, & Chow, 2009; Novoa & Moghaddam, 2014; Plaut, Thomas, Hurd, & Romano, 2018; Rattan & Ambady, 2013; Ryan, Hunt, Weible, Peterson, & Casas, 2007). The Republican ideal in France is an example of this “individualized” approach to managing cultural diversity, whereby religious, racial, ethnic and cultural groups are trivialized to the benefit of equal treatment between individual citizens. Any categorical discrimination (both negative and positive) is not only considered illegitimate in France, but in some cases is even illegal (see Guimond, de la Sablonnière, & Nugier, 2014). In a similar way, United States policy is often referred to as a “melting pot”, whereby citizens are expected to adapt to each other to form a single, homogenous group. This assimilationist approach implies that through time, any group-based boundaries that may have historically existed are erased (McDonald, 2007; Moghaddam, 2008). It also implies that, despite good intentions, the dominant group’s customs subsist at the expense of subordinate ones, reinforcing the existing social hierarchy (see also Knowles, Lowery, Hogan, & Chow, 2009; Plaut, 2010). When it comes to immigration policy, this individualized approach involves the selection of newcomers according to their individual skill sets and educational qualifications rather than their origins (Green, 2007, 2009). Such policies and ideals are based on what is known as “colorblind” ideology in the United States and are more generally referred to as “civic integration” policies (Banting & Kymlicka, 2013; Joppke, 2004).

The second approach seeks to recognize group distinctiveness and places value in group membership (Chryssochoou, 2018; Gale & Staerklé, 2017; Novoa & Moghaddam, 2014; Plaut et al., 2018; Rattan & Ambady, 2013; Ryan et al., 2007). Given the focus on group-based differences, these policies provide legitimacy to claims made by minority groups.
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These claims can refer to, for example, language laws and holidays favoring the majority, issues regarding group-based discrimination (e.g., the Black Lives Matter movement), or the division of power and resources (Kymlicka, 1995, 2001). Switzerland’s four official languages accommodating its native linguistic regions illustrate this group-based approach, despite the country’s individualist and assimilationist policies for managing immigration (Koopmans, Statham, Giugni, & Passy, 2005). Canadian policy is most exemplary of this group-based approach to managing cultural diversity. The country is often referred to as a “mosaic” whereby citizens are encouraged to maintain their group-based customs and traditions which make them distinct, all the while mixing together and respecting the “Canadian” way of life (Berry, 2013; Novoa & Moghaddam, 2014). By implementing measures to respect minority rights and by encouraging distinct social identities, these policies allow for a heterogeneous rather than homogenous society. They are generally referred to as “multiculturalism”.

An abundance of social psychological research focusing on intergroup relations has examined antecedents and consequences of attitudes towards these individual- and group-based approaches to managing cultural diversity (see Moghaddam, 2008; Rattan & Ambady, 2013; Verkuyten, 2014, for overviews). The purpose of the present thesis was to take this research a step further and to investigate majority and minority attitudes towards multiculturalism in particular, from a social justice perspective.

The context of this thesis is within European, liberal societies. Because liberalism is characterized by an emphasis on individuals, and multiculturalism by an emphasis on groups, the tensions between what we call individual and collective (group-based) conceptions of justice (see Azzi, 1992) are central to the main research question, indicated below. It is nevertheless imperative to acknowledge straight from the outset an ambiguity involved in the term “multiculturalism”. While multiculturalism involves a group-based conception of justice,
this approach to managing cultural diversity, by definition, does not discredit, and is even embedded (as I will argue later), in individual conceptions of justice. For example, multiculturalism and the presence of diverse cultural groups can be valued by individuals and societies, while these same individuals and societies can endorse, and implement, immigration policies targeting talented individual newcomers, based on individual conceptions of justice (see Gündemir, Homan, Usova, & Galinsky, 2017). In Canada, for example, even though cultural diversity is highly valued, a “points system” drives the selection of newcomers, favouring those who are most educated and qualified (Ferrer, Picot, & Riddell, 2014). This question of compatibility, coexistence, and anchoring of individual and collective forms of justice involved in multicultural thought is a major focus of the introductory pages that follow.

At the broadest level, the core question we sought to answer in the studies herein was the following: How do differential conceptions of justice explain minority and majority attitudes towards multiculturalism? Table 1 summarizes the three sub-questions as well as the corresponding studies that address each of them.

**Research Question 1** examines how members of minority and majority groups differentially perceive compatibility between multiculturalism, based on groups, and more dominant, individual forms of justice. Studies 1, 2, 3, and 8 directly compare minority and majority perspectives. The first three studies demonstrate what occurs in Switzerland in terms of this perceived compatibility. Study 8 involves a more international analysis to determine the degree to which the basic results from Studies 1 to 3 are generalizable across European (liberal) countries.

**Research Question 2** examines how national identification in classically liberal societies shapes conceptions of justice and thus majority attitudes towards multiculturalism. Studies 4, 5, and 6 create a bridge between research questions 1 and 2 by looking at how
national majority members’ perceived (in)compatibility between multiculturalism and individual forms of justice is anchored in their identification with the nation. These studies are specifically focused on the strongly (classically) liberal country of Switzerland (see The Heritage Foundation, 2018). Study 7 focuses instead on the attraction of talented migrants as an individual justice-based way of supporting multiculturalism and examines how national identification intervenes in majority attitudes towards such an ambiguous, individualized immigration policy. This study focuses on six European countries (including Switzerland).

Table 1. Summary of Research Questions

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Research Question 1</th>
<th>Research Question 2</th>
<th>Research Question 3</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Group membership as an antecedent to individual and collective justice compatibility and multicultural attitudes</td>
<td>National identification as an antecedent to justice conceptions and multicultural attitudes</td>
<td>National context as an antecedent to justice conceptions and multicultural attitudes</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Chapter 3

- Study 1  ✓
- Study 2  ✓
- Study 3  ✓

Chapter 4

- Study 4  +  ✓
- Study 5  +  ✓
- Study 6  +  ✓

Chapter 5

- Study 7  ✓

Chapter 6

- Study 8  +

Chapter 7

- Theoretical Chapter  +  +  ✓

Note. ✓ The study/chapter addresses the research question as its central purpose. + The study addresses (at least part of) the research question as a building block to its central purpose.
Research Question 3 examines how national contexts impact minority and majority conceptions of justice. Study 8 creates a bridge between research questions 1 and 3. In this study, minority and majority individual and collective justice conceptions are first compared within and across 20 European countries. Two characteristics at the country-level are then used to explain these minority and majority justice conceptions: the degree to which each country has implemented collective justice-based policies at the national level, and the classically liberal versus post-communist orientation of these countries. Finally, a theoretical chapter written in collaboration with Colleen Ward (Victoria University of Wellington) and published in the Journal of Social Issues (Ward, Gale, Staerklé, & Stuart, 2018) integrates these empirical ideas into a larger framework. This framework is designed to inform research on multiculturalism in context.

In the following introduction, I start by defining multiculturalism with an emphasis on its policies in Western liberal societies. I then clarify what is meant by liberalism in the context of this thesis, highlighting how criticisms of this individualistic ideology provide a foundation for multicultural thought. This is followed by a comprehensive discussion of research on minority and majority multicultural attitudes and social justice conceptions, clarifying the research questions highlighted above. Finally, I provide more information on the national context(s) of the four empirical chapters that compose the present thesis.

1.1 Multiculturalism in the West

1.1.1 Broadly Defining Multiculturalism

While multiculturalism in the Western world has been defined in a number of different ways, the concept can be simplified into three broad facets (see Berry & Ward, 2016; Bloemraad & Wright, 2014; Green & Staerklé, 2013; Moghaddam, 2008; Sears, Citrin, Cheleden, & van Laar, 1999; Vertovec & Wessendorf, 2010). First, it refers to cultural diversity itself, that is, the descriptive presence of culturally diverse groups in society.
CHAPTER 1  Introduction

Depending on the context, this cultural diversity can include national, linguistic, aboriginal, ethnic, religious and immigrant minority groups. Individuals and societies can be rather supportive or opposed to the presence of these culturally diverse groups.

Second, multiculturalism refers to a normative, prescriptive ideology through which cultural identities and differences are recognized and valued. This ideology can be present in a given national context to varying degrees. Because ideology at the national level is a form of societal norm, most individuals within contexts characterized by multicultural ideology would also abide by it (Guimond et al., 2013). However, some individuals may also reject such a norm and show opposition to multicultural ideology (see also Fasel, Green, & Sarrasin, 2013; Ward, Gale, Staerklé, & Stuart, 2018).

Third, multiculturalism refers to a policy through which cultural diversity is institutionally addressed, encouraged and sustained. Countries and regions incorporate these policies to varying degrees, and again, individuals can be more or less supportive of them. Indeed, policies can be considered a reflection of general attitudes within a society. However, they are also implemented by elites and influence individual attitudes through the mass media (Elcheroth, Doise, & Reicher, 2011), illustrating a circular process.

While the first facet of multiculturalism highlighted above acknowledges what demography (i.e., cultural diversity) composes a society, the latter two ideology and policy facets involve prescriptive beliefs regarding how this cultural diversity should be managed (Calhoun, 2002; Sears et al., 1999). Within these prescriptive facets, Moghaddam (2008) differentiates between “laissez-faire” multiculturalism and “planned” multiculturalism. This is an important distinction for the present thesis as it also clarifies how multiculturalism can be based on an individualized versus group-based conception of society.

Laissez-faire multiculturalism refers to contexts where the government and majority group tolerate and passively allow minority groups to preserve their cultures and languages
(see also Verkuylten & Yogeeswaran, 2017). This form of multiculturalism is most coherent when (classical) liberalism, nationalism and/or free-market assumptions are prevalent in society. As such, individual rights to freedom and choice are guiding principles for social justice, and market forces determine status differences between groups (Bloemraad et al., 2008; Moghaddam, 2008; see also Kukathas, 2003). With this conception of social order, individuals are classified according to their individual characteristics, performance and merit (Staerkle, Delay, Gianettoni, & Roux, 2007), in line with colorblind ideology and civic integration policies.

Some philosophers however argue that the focus on individuals and their rights is “insufficient to ensure justice between ethnocultural groups” (Kymlicka, 2001, p. 10). Minorities can be exposed to injustices related to language politics and power, even when their individual rights are respected. This argument is where planned multiculturalism comes into the equation, as an interventionist approach to compensate structural inequalities implied by more traditional, or classical, liberal assumptions (Gianni, 1995; Kymlicka, 2001). Planned multiculturalism refers to contexts where minorities are actively supported through political measures and norms (see also Bloemraad, Korteweg, & Yurdakul, 2008; Ginges & Cairns, 2000). It directly addresses the idea that one cultural group should not take precedence over another (Berry, 2011; Moghaddam, 2008).

Therefore, planned multiculturalism explicitly involves a group-based conception of society, existing in response to, and to complement, the emphasis on individuals inherent to classical liberalism. Multiculturalism as a (planned) ideology involves the abstract recognition of distinct cultural groups, and multiculturalism as an interventionist (planned) policy also involves the concrete (re)distribution of resources, thereby combining group-based recognition with efforts to reduce group-based inequality. Research on the “principle-implementation gap” would suggest that while people may be supportive of the presence of
culturally diverse groups and of recognizing and valuing group-based differences, they often simultaneously oppose concrete policies that are designed to achieve these goals (see Yogeeswaran & Dasgupta, 2014b). When it comes to a desire to increase equality between groups, this principle-implementation gap is crucial as it suggests that even when people have noble ideals, there are still major obstacles to achieving equality and social change (see Dixon, Durrheim, & Thomae, 2017; Schuman, Steeh, Bobo, & Krysan, 1997). It is therefore crucial to take into account the different facets of multiculturalism when conducting empirical research on such attitudes.

In the present thesis, multiculturalism is used in the active, planned, prescriptive sense in Studies 1, 2, 3, 4 and 5. These studies examine attitudes towards multiculturalism both as an abstract ideology and as a concrete policy. Studies 6, 7 and 8 allude to a more laissez-faire form of multiculturalism. These studies examine attitudes towards the presence of culturally diverse groups (Study 6 and 8) and towards the selection of their individual members (Study 7) without reference to any active, interventionist facets of multiculturalism.

While all empirical studies do examine individuals’ attitudes as members of social groups, Study 8 also examines contextual, societal policies to aid in explaining minority and majority attitudes. Moreover, the final theoretical chapter articulates political and normative contextual processes with individual attitudes and outcomes, all ingrained in the three broad facets of multiculturalism.

In the next section, I discuss the origins of multiculturalism and how its political theory and public policy are implemented and viewed today throughout the Western world.

1.1.2 Contested Multiculturalism

Multiculturalism is a contested political theory and public policy. Emerging for the first time in Canada in 1971 as an official federal policy, multiculturalism was originally implemented as a means to support the development and growth of cultural groups, to
promote creative exchanges between them, and to assist them in overcoming obstacles that prevent them from participating fully in society (see for example Abu-Laden & Gabriel, 2002; Kymlicka, 2012). Built into the framework of the Official Languages Act (1969) which recognized both French and English as equal national languages in Canada, this policy was also constructed to support immigrants in learning one or both official languages. The purpose of multiculturalism was therefore not only to support cultural minorities in the preservation and celebration of their cultural identities and traditions, but also to compensate their disadvantages and to help them integrate into the larger society. In this Canadian context, multiculturalism has become somewhat of a success story, seen as a source of national identity and pride (Berry, 2013). In other parts of the world such as Europe, however, multiculturalism has faced substantial criticism and backlash, despite its idealistic goals (Banting & Kymlicka, 2013; Bloemraad & Wright, 2014; Green & Staerklé, 2013; Joppke, 2004; Lesinska, 2014; Vasta, 2007; Vertovec & Wessendorf, 2010; Ward et al., 2018).

At the level of political discourse, multiculturalism was proclaimed a failure in late 2010 and early 2011 by German Chancellor Angela Merkel, by former British Prime Minister David Cameron and by former French president Nicolas Sarkozy. Angela Merkel suggested, for example, that immigrants “need to do more to integrate in German society”. Concerns highlighted by David Cameron included that “Britain had encouraged different cultures to live separate lives”, calling for a need to establish a national, cohesive community. Typical criticisms of multiculturalism in Europe indeed suggest that its policies undermine a nation’s identity and social cohesion, reinforcing ways of life that differ from that of the dominant group. Moreover, this is done without demanding enough “integration” from immigrants and other minorities (see Malik, 2015), leading to the essentialization and reification of group boundaries and institutionalizing segregation between groups (Barry, 2001; Joppke, 2004). The ethnic conflict in the Balkans, for example, has been used as an illustration of the
consequences of multiculturalism (see Sears et al., 1999). In this way, multicultural policies are considered to be detrimental for both the dominant society and for minorities themselves (see also Wright & Bloemraad, 2012).

The arguments highlighted above also suggest that multiculturalism undermines the importance of individual rights and responsibilities, alluding to more “liberal”, civic “integration” policies as a viable alternative. Civic integration policies are those that are implemented to facilitate integration (or assimilation) of cultural minorities into the larger society through a focus on dominant language and work skill development (Banting & Kymlicka, 2013; Joppke, 2004, 2014). These policies are relevant both at the beginning of the immigration process when newcomers are selected and accepted (or not) into society and later on in the process when decisions are made regarding who has the right to obtain citizenship (Goodman, 2014). According to the initial, Canadian definition of multiculturalism, civic integration is in fact an integral part of multicultural policies. Some sources indeed suggest the “multiculturalism” that is criticized in Europe is flawed, focusing only on the presence, preservation and/or celebration of cultural diversity, without acknowledging that multiculturalism, by definition, also includes measures to promote cultural minority integration into the larger society (see for example Berry & Ward, 2016; Kymlicka, 2012). As Banting and Kymlicka (2013) suggest,

“There are valid justifications for the state to promote civic integration, including promoting a common language and national identity. However, these policies risk being oppressive and unfair to minorities if they are not supplemented with MCPs [multicultural policies]. Conversely, there are valid justifications for minorities to claim multicultural accommodations, but these policies may become unreasonable and destabilizing if they are not supplemented by civic integration policies. The combination of civic integration and multiculturalism is mutually, normatively
reinforcing: Each helps to both justify and constrain the other.” (p. 592, see also Kymlicka, 2001)

This citation clarifies how focusing only on multiculturalism in the form of accommodations for minority rights is a major concern. Banting and Kymlicka (2013) indeed explain that both multicultural and civic integration policies must coexist for a society to function according to “fundamental liberal values of freedom and fairness” (p. 592; see also Modood, 2013).

There is, however, a distinction between policies and practices, suggesting that even when multicultural policies exist, the practices in line with these policies are not always the same, or ideal (see for example Boese & Phillips, 2015). Some authors do explain in more detail how practices in line with both civic integration policies and multicultural ones can be inherently “illiberal”. For example, civic integration practices sometimes imply that immigrant minorities are coerced to adopt the language and work-related skills that are useful for the dominant society (which David Cameron defended as “muscular liberalism” in his 2011 speech, see for example Joppke, 2014). Liberal civic integration policies and practices are designed, instead, to support minority integration while preserving their individual freedom to select when and of which resources they wish to take advantage.

Conversely, multicultural practices supporting minority rights sometimes imply “internal restrictions” for members of immigrant minority groups, through which they are obliged to follow traditional norms of their group in the name of preserving their culture or heritage. Kymlicka (1995) contrasts these internal restrictions with “external protections”. He argues that external protections are a more liberal form of multiculturalism, as individual freedom is respected and sustained through the integration of special language or representation rights for minorities. The purpose of these rights is, indeed, to protect minorities from more dominant, societal decisions that (often inadvertently) favor the majority.
In the present thesis, the objective is not to determine whether or not multiculturalism is objectively compatible with liberal ideals. However, **Research Question 1** is based on an interest in understanding how individuals, as members of groups, come to perceive multiculturalism as compatible or incompatible with a more liberal emphasis on individuals. The European discourse highlighted above which suggests that civic integration should take precedence over multiculturalism is a way of suggesting individuals should take precedence over groups. This point exemplifies classical liberal theory from a philosophical standpoint. Like multiculturalism, the term “liberalism” is at the center of the present thesis and has different facets, meanings and interpretations, described and clarified next.

### 1.1.3 Multiculturalism as a Liberal Political Theory

According to philosophers such as Will Kymlicka (1995, 2001) and Tariq Modood (2013) multiculturalism is a “liberal” policy, having emerged in “liberal” societies (see also Levey, 2010). But what does liberalism mean?

First and foremost, liberalism as a political theory should not be confounded with typical left-right political positioning within Anglo-Saxon and North American politics. This positioning opposes liberal ideology on the left side of the political spectrum from conservative ideology on the right side. According to Heywood (2007), liberalism in this sense refers to values of “equality” and “social justice”, while conservatism refers to “nationalism” and “facism”. However, in his classic paper, Converse (1964) argues that elite discourse determines how these ideologies are defined and which values are combined within them. Indeed, in other national liberal contexts such as Switzerland, liberal ideology refers to the right or center-right side of the political spectrum, referring to individualist and capitalist values as opposed to more socialist and redistributive ones on the left (see for example Hug & Schulz, 2007).
Attempts to clarify the complexity of this political ideology have been made by addressing social and economic dimensions to this left-right dichotomy (see Feldman, 2013, for an overview). With the addition of these dimensions, liberalism in a social sense refers to left-wing ideology and liberalism in an economic sense refers to right-wing ideology. Jost, Glaser, Kruglanski, and Sulloway (2003) suggested that right-wing ideology in both a social and economic (i.e., liberal) sense is generally characterized by stronger justification of inequality, resistance to change and needs to create order and minimize insecurity than left-wing ideology. However, more recent research shows that these ideologies are more mixed and heterogeneous (Feldman & Johnston, 2014).

Political philosophers who have contributed to the development of liberal thought have been socialized in particular environments and eras, with circumstances, discourses and norms influencing the liberalism they refer to in their writings (see Levey, 2010). Most importantly for the philosophical debate on multiculturalism, liberalism as a political theory plays a broader role than the left-right ideological dichotomy. This positioning operates within a superordinate political environment *characterized as liberal*. According to Jupp (1996), a political philosopher who contributed to the development of Australian multicultural policy, multiculturalism “operates within liberal institutions […] It accepts that all humans should be treated as equals and that different cultures can coexist if they accept liberal values” (p. 40).

Liberalism, in this sense, can be broadly opposed to authoritarianism. Whether they position themselves on the left, right, or center of the political spectrum, it is my understanding that virtually *all* liberal philosophers oppose “authoritarianism”. This includes liberalism as a political theory and in a *classic* sense (Hayek, 2005).

Classical liberalism is rooted in a focus on individuals and their freedom and autonomy. Authoritarianism, instead, involves obedience to authority and oppression by the state at the expense of individual freedom. When it comes to state regimes and institutions,
authoritarian ones are characterized by strong political control and power for one individual, government and/or elite with little political freedom for the people. Classical liberalism is most explicitly, and empirically, put forward in *Studies 1 through 6* of the present thesis.

Liberalism in this “classic” sense refers to a societal system of beliefs inspired by enlightenment philosophers such as John Locke and Adam Smith. This system of beliefs involves the individual right to property (based on actions of individuals rather than on inheritance or government distribution), capitalist free-market ideology where government intervention is limited, as well as values of individual autonomy and responsibility (see MacIntyre, 1981). Friedrich Hayek (2005), a political philosopher who revived liberal ideas in the 20th century, presents this liberalism with a fierce opposition to fascism and German Nazism. He argues that Hitler’s rise to power was a direct consequence of socialist ideas, allowing for the development of a “totalitarian” state. In this way, Hayek (2005) defends competition as the only reasonable guide for individual effort and economic activity as it is “the only method which does not require the coercive or arbitrary intervention of authority” (p. 45). He thus opposes any form of authoritarianism, presenting the classical liberal argument that a “system of private property is the most important guarantee of freedom”.

Liberal philosophers who abide by such a classic system of beliefs often reject multicultural policies that involve governmental intervention to compensate minority disadvantages (see Kukathas, 2003). Such policies do imply some level of governmental redistribution and affirmative action, associated with socialist ideals. However, multiculturalism’s more abstract, ideological value in cultural diversity and recognition of cultural differences seems to be in tension with a less economic, but equally individualistic, facet of classical liberal beliefs.

An important root of multicultural theory comes from tensions between classical liberalism and what is known as “communitarianism”; a debate which occurred towards the
end of the 20th century within liberal (i.e., not authoritarian) states. This debate was sparked in part by John Rawls’ influential work on the “original position,” also inspired by classical theorists such as those mentioned above (see Rawls, 1971). In this work, Rawls acknowledges that historical injustices and inequalities exist within economically liberal regimes (referring most specifically to the United States). To correct these injustices, he argues that all members of society need to agree on a universal, basic principle of justice where prejudices related to categories such as race, gender and social class are removed from consciousness. In this way, all members of society would be treated as individuals with the same basic liberties and opportunities. However, such an idea implies that groups and communities would be erased.

Communitarian critiques of this “Rawlsian” liberalism indeed encompass a range of arguments focused on its consequences. For example, communitarian theorist Michael Walzer (1990) suggests that a major “enactment of liberty” (p. 12) in western liberal societies is the widespread increase in geographic, social, marital and political mobility. He emphasized that with increased mobility, however, comes grief and trauma, as belonging to communities is fundamental for psychological stability and well-being.

In line with this communitarian reflection, some philosophical advocates of multiculturalism propose an “atomistic” criticism of liberalism. In suggesting liberal theory conceptualizes individuals as self-sufficient, as if they live in a social vacuum, these advocates argue that social roots and group membership are imperative to personal development, self-esteem and sense-making (see MacIntyre, 1981; Sandel, 1982; Taylor, 1985). As such, in neglecting group membership through liberal ideas, individuals are deprived of a fundamental need to belong to close-knit communities. Moreover, these philosophers highlight an important paradox within liberal theory: If all members of society should agree on “universal” liberal principles, then individuals as members of communities which shape their “moral reasoning” should also have the freedom to dismiss such “universal
principles” (see also Taylor, 1992; for a more international perspective, see Staerklé, Falomir-Pichastor, Pereira, Berent, & Butera, 2015).

The emphasis on groups and communities within communitarian theory arguably provides a basis for multicultural theory, given its emphasis on the recognition of cultural groups and associated group-based rights. This is another reason why multiculturalism is sometimes considered to be in contradiction to the liberal emphasis on individuals, where there is no space for groups.

According to more modern liberal theorists, however, the liberalism criticized by communitarians has been misconstrued. For example, as a major endorser of multiculturalism and self-proclaimed liberal, Kymlicka (1988) argues that liberals do indeed acknowledge that social ties, communities and contexts determine identity and moral limitations. However, justice according to liberal principles suggests that individuals can and should have the freedom to accept, negotiate, and/or reject these limitations (see also Rawls, 1993). These theorists criticize both classic theories of liberalism as well as communitarianism for failing to seek complementary ground (see also Etzioni, 1996). Kymlicka (1995, 2001) makes a strong defense for minority rights and multicultural policies in liberal states by highlighting how minorities can be exposed to injustices related to language, politics and power, even when they experience equal treatment to national majorities (see also Gianni, 1995). This reasoning serves as a strong defense for multiculturalism with liberal ideals as the ultimate goal.

The modern liberalism Kymlicka (1988, 1995, 2001) refers to has nuances in comparison to more classical liberal theorists mentioned previously. These classical theorists focus less on issues of justice and equality at a group-based level but maintain a strong concern for individual freedom. Such nuances stem, at least in part, from differing national and socio-historical contexts. Indeed, Kymlicka’s liberalism is ingrained in the extremely diverse Canadian context where multiculturalism as a public policy was born.
The purpose of the present thesis, and especially Research Question 1, is indeed not to determine whether multiculturalism, by its very origins in Western liberal societies, is objectively compatible with “liberal” theory. Instead, I argue that differing perspectives on multiculturalism and liberalism are rooted in alternative conceptions of social justice for individuals as members of social groups. To explain how this is the case, I must first describe in more detail what these conceptions of justice entail.

1.2 Multiculturalism in Social Psychology

1.2.1 Individual and Collective Justice

In this thesis, I analyze attitudes towards multiculturalism from a social justice perspective. Psychological research (both social and political) shows that individuals within groups and societies have conceptions of what is just or fair, in a way that is often independent of their own self-interest (see Lerner, 2003; Tyler & van der Toorn, 2013). These conceptions of justice are closely tied to individual attitudes, beliefs and behaviors. They are also rather consensual within groups. At the societal level, dominant conceptions of justice build a foundation for the establishment of decision-making bodies and policies such as civic integration and multiculturalism. Like in the domains of politics and philosophy, two conceptions of justice that are often referred to in social psychological research are based on individuals versus based on groups (see for example Brickman, Folger, Goode, & Schul, 1981; Chryssochoou, 2018; Tyler & van der Toorn, 2013), known as individual and collective justice (see Azzi, 1992).

Individual justice principles encompass the normative belief that society is composed of individuals, not of groups. These individuals are considered to be masters of their own fate and to be equal at baseline. Termed “microjustice” by Brickman et al. (1981), this form of justice makes reference to a division of resources or rewards based on the “equity” principle,
that is, based on personal effort, utility and merit. Equity theory (Walster, Berscheid, & Walster, 1973; Walster, Walster, & Berscheid, 1978) proposes that individuals as social actors are motivated to perceive their relationships as fair and equitable, meaning that they strive to balance ratios between contributions they make and benefits they receive. When this balance is offset, such that contributions are perceived to be too high and benefits too low or vice versa, distress in the form of resentment or guilt is experienced and people are driven to restore equity within their relationship. According to individual justice principles, individuals are therefore considered to be rational and self-sufficient and an emphasis is placed on their own, personal responsibility. Such principles therefore take on what is known as an intragroup perspective, using normative criteria to distinguish between “winners” and “losers”, or between “good” and “bad” members of society (see Staerklé, 2009).

Collective justice principles, instead, take on a between groups perspective, emphasizing categorical distinctions between majority and minority, dominant and subordinate groups (see Staerklé, 2009). Collective justice principles encompass the belief or perception that groups within society should be taken into account when judging fairness and developing policies (Azzi, 1992). Sometimes referred to as macrojustice principles (Brickman et al., 1981), justice at the collective level is deindividuating and encompasses how rewards are or should be distributed in society between sub-groups or at a system-level (Modigliani & Gamson, 1979; Rawls, 1971). This form of justice also involves the procedural recognition of group-based needs and injustices and involves “positive” discrimination between groups. Affirmative action policies are thus a manifestation of collective justice principles, implemented to recognize and support disadvantaged groups. In extreme forms of collective justice principles, people are not considered masters of their own fate: Certain groups are considered victims of structural inequalities. Therefore, institutional efforts are made to
compensate their disadvantages, whether they be economic and/or symbolic (Azzi, 1998; Brickman et al., 1981; Kymlicka, 1995; Moghaddam, 2008).

Collective, macro-justice principles are generally less salient or consensual in Western liberal societies than individual justice principles, which are more dominant in these contexts (Lijphart, 1977). When distinguishing between ways of establishing governmental representation of two groups differing in size, for example, collective justice principles can be advanced to justify equal representation between the two groups, whereas individual justice principles can be advanced to justify proportional representation between them (see Azzi, 1992). The principle of proportionality is a foundation of democratic theory, implying that each individual should have his or her own weight and voice in a matter (Lijphart, 1977, 2012). It is in line with the principle of majority rule and is predominant and legitimized in Western societies (see also Verkuyten & Yildiz, 2006).

In theory and in practice, individual, microjustice principles and collective, macrojustice justice principles are meant to complement each other:

“to dramatize the difference between micro- [individual] and macro- [collective] justice, [...] a society with only microprinciples would risk an evolution of distributions that would be unprecedented, unacceptable to critical segments of the population, and hence unstable. A society with only macroprinciples would risk demoralization if the members felt their outcomes were not contingent on their behavior and hence that they had no control over their outcomes” (Brickman et al., 1981, p. 197).

However, these principles are often presented as if they were in opposition to each other, preferred by different members of society. Indeed, this quote resonates with the words of Banting and Kymlicka (2013) highlighted above regarding the complementarity between civic integration and multicultural policies. An explicit link can thus be made between individual
and collective conceptions of justice and diversity ideologies and policies, which are also preferred by different members of society.

**Individual and Collective Justice as Diversity Ideologies**

When it comes to diversity ideologies and policies, multiculturalism is based on the principle of *equality* between groups, albeit through *differential* treatment (i.e., collective justice; Parekh, 2000; Taylor, 1992). Colorblind or assimilationist approaches to managing cultural diversity (as the foundation to civic integration) are instead based on the principle of *equity* between individuals, albeit through *equal* treatment and without regard to group membership (i.e., individual justice). While multiculturalism focuses on the recognition of group-based differences, colorblindness, in particular, proposes that any discrimination based on race or other categorical membership is unacceptable (Guimond et al., 2014; Rosenthal & Levy, 2010; Ryan et al., 2007; Wolsko, Park, Judd, & Wittenbrink, 2000).

The term “colorblindness” finds its roots around the time of the civil rights movement in the United States, when antidiscrimination policies for Blacks were gaining support and recognition (Plaut, 2010; Rattan & Ambady, 2013; Yogeeswaran, Verkuyten, Osborne, & Sibley, 2018). While this diversity ideology is embedded in American history and fundamentally revolves around issues of race, it can also be applied to gender, class, sexual orientation, and immigrant versus native-born status. As alluded to among the initial, introductory paragraphs of this thesis, some suggest the French immigration and integration policy follows a colorblind model: “the French state, currently, does not recognize any group membership whatsoever based on religious, cultural or other grounds, it only sees ‘free and equal’ citizens” (p. 318, Felouzis, 2006, as cited in Guimond et al., 2014). But according to Koopmans (2010), it is assimilationist, with its “high degree of cultural conformity in public institutions” (p. 7).
Assimilation refers to the obligation for minority group members to let go of their ethnic heritage and to conform to majority norms traditions and customs (Bourhis, Moïse, Perreault, & Senécal, 1997; Guimond et al., 2014; Verkuyten, 2006; Wolsko, Park, & Judd, 2006). Its goal is to establish a superordinate identity, focusing on similarities between people rather than differences, but ultimately favoring the majority group. Switzerland and Germany are examples of countries where federal assimilationist ideology is predominant, where cultural rights and affirmative action for immigrants at the national level, in particular, are virtually non-existent (Koopmans, 2010; Koopmans et al., 2005).

The boundary between colorblind ideology and assimilation is somewhat obscure. While colorblindness is defined by decategorization (see Brewer & Miller, 1984), with a focus on individual similarities and differences, assimilation is defined by recategorization (see Gaertner, Dovidio, Anastasio, Bachman, & Rust, 1993), with a goal of establishing one category of people; a superordinate identity (see also Guimond et al., 2014). Levin et al. (2012) argue that colorblindness is a hierarchy-attenuating ideology, while assimilationism is a hierarchy-enhancing one. But in demonstrating motivated construals of colorblind ideology, Knowles, Lowery, Hogan, & Chow (2009) show how endorsement of colorblindness in the United States can not only be used to promote equality between individuals in society, it can also be used to legitimize status positions between groups (see also Yogeeswaran et al., 2018, for similar evidence from New Zealand). Moreover, Plaut (2010) suggests that colorblind ideology ultimately results in assimilation of existing social identities into a superordinate, unified category.

Therefore, colorblindness and assimilation diversity ideologies in Western societies are both in line with individual justice principles, portraying an intragroup perspective on the societal structure. Indeed, both imply a lack of recognition that members of specific (sub-) groups have particular needs, desires and ways of life that differ from that of the majority,
whose standards are used to judge them. Multiculturalism, instead, places positive light on these group-based particularities. Via interventionist (or planned) forms of multiculturalism, group-based disparities are legitimized through the establishment of policies that seek to attenuate the social hierarchy and compensate for group-based disadvantages, based on principles of collective justice.

1.2.2 Antecedents of Diversity Ideologies: Minority and Majority Perspectives

An abundance of psychological research (social, organizational and political) has shown that individuals as members of groups differing in power show differential attitudes towards assimilation, colorblindness and multiculturalism as diversity ideologies. These groups differing in power refer most simply to subordinate and dominant groups, otherwise known as minorities and majorities. In contemporary research, these minorities and majorities are usually operationalized as, for example, racial groups in the United States (e.g., Blacks versus Whites), or immigrants versus natives in Europe. These examples illustrate that (ethnic) minorities are often (albeit not always) of lower status and numerically inferior to (national) majorities. (Ethnic) minorities and (national) majorities therefore experience symbolic differences in particular, whereby the former are recognized as culturally distinct from the latter (Staerklé, 2009; Staerklé et al., 2007; ethnic minorities thus experience weak levels of symbolic capital). While these groups may also experience economic differences, alluding to more distributive inequalities, many (national) majorities are also of low socio-economic status, with weak material capital, thus exhibiting substantially less power than comparatively higher status (national) majorities or even higher status (ethnic) minorities (e.g., elite, wealthy and/or skilled immigrants). The power dynamics within groups recognized as culturally distinct are therefore just as heterogeneous as they are between these groups.

Throughout the following section, I will use the overarching terms minority and majority to refer to subordinate and dominant groups, low and high-status groups, immigrants
and natives, and numerical minorities and majorities. This is for reasons of simplicity and coherence. However, it is important to acknowledge that these characteristics are much more complex and intertwined, and are often confounded between groups in empirical research (a point which is at least partially addressed in Studies 2 and 3). When describing specific existing studies, I will indicate which characteristics were used to operationalize the minority versus majority perspective but I encourage the reader to keep these complexities in mind. Indeed, I use the terms minority and majority to distinguish between groups with, respectively, generally weak versus strong symbolic and/or material capital.

When distinguishing between Blacks and Whites in the United States, Ryan, Hunt, Weible, Peterson and Casas (2007) found that Blacks consistently prefer multiculturalism over colorblindness, and that Whites endorse colorblindness more than Blacks. Wolsko, Park and Judd (2006) also found that ethnic minority members in general (not only Blacks) endorse multiculturalism more than Whites, both in terms of its abstract ideology and its concrete, pro-diversity public policy. Moreover, in the Netherlands, many authors have found that Turkish and Moroccan minorities show more positive attitudes towards multiculturalism than Dutch majorities (see for example Arends-Tóth & Van de Vijver, 2003; Verkuyten, 2005; Verkuyten & Martinovic, 2006). Conversely, Dutch majorities tend to favor assimilation over multiculturalism (see also Breugelmans & van de Vijver, 2004; Verkuyten, 2006).

Explaining Minority and Majority Perspectives

A number of factors explain why, in the United States and Europe, majorities prefer individual justice-based ideologies like colorblindness and minorities prefer collective justice-based ideologies like multiculturalism. Both self-report survey and experimental studies show, for example, that colorblindness often involves negative consequences for minorities,

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3 In the real world, these group criteria are orthogonal. White minorities in South Africa, for example, are a dominant numerical minority group. Swedish minorities in Finland and Germanic minorities in Italy are both (at least in part) high status numerical minority groups. Simon et al. (2001) summarize experimental research that treats these characteristics as orthogonal.
and that multiculturalism often involves negative consequences for majorities. For example, Holoien and Shelton (2012) show that when experimentally primed with colorblindness as opposed to multiculturalism, Whites behave with more prejudice towards ethnic minority group members, sometimes even after a short delay (see Correll, Park, & Allegra Smith, 2008; see also Whitley & Webster, 2018, for a meta-analysis on how diversity ideologies predict prejudice among majorities). Moreover, in experimental organizational settings, Purdie-Vaughns, Steele, Davies, Ditlmann, and Crosby (2008) show that African Americans feel less trust and a lower sense of belonging and motivation when diversity is addressed with a colorblind rather than with a multicultural policy. This occurs above and beyond the number of minority group members included in the organization. Jansen, Vos, Otten, Podsiadlowski, and van der Zee (2016) elaborate on this finding by showing that non-Western minorities in the Netherlands demonstrate weaker productivity in colorblind organizational settings because of a weaker sense of inclusion, while Dutch majorities demonstrate weaker productivity in multicultural organizational settings, for the same reason.

This perceived sense of inclusion is critical when it comes to minorities’ and majorities’ attitudes towards diversity ideologies; in particular towards multiculturalism. Multiculturalism’s central concern is for minority rights and recognition, thereby acknowledging and empowering minorities specifically (Vorauer & Quesnel, 2017b). Indeed, Vorauer & Quesnel (2017a) show that minorities are significantly better able to express themselves when primed with multicultural ideology than when not, for example, suggesting that minority influence (see Mugny, 1982) is facilitated under conditions of multicultural ideology. However, research shows that majorities do often feel excluded from this ideology and its corresponding policies (Stevens, Plaut, & Sanchez-Burks, 2008). While multicultural policies, by their very origins, are meant to respond to the needs of all people and groups, minorities and majorities (Berry, 2011), Plaut, Garnett, Buffardi and Sanchez-Burks (2011)
show that when they are experimentally construed as being for minorities only, then
majorities (i.e., Whites in the United States) do endorse them less.

Beyond a weak sense of inclusion, there are additional explanations for majorities’
low levels of support for multiculturalism. Research shows that their weaker support is also a
result of perceived symbolic threat to their national identity or realistic threat to national
resources (Badea, Iyer, & Aebischer, 2018; Ginges & Cairns, 2000; Tip et al., 2012;
Verkuyten, 2009b; Yogeeswaran & Dasgupta, 2014b). This perceived threat is particularly
heightened by antiegalitarian beliefs (Morrison, Plaut, & Ybarra, 2010) and by scarcity of
national resources (Scheepers, Gijsberts, & Coenders, 2002).

Such explanations for majority multicultural attitudes seem to be rooted in (collective)
self-interest reasoning. They illustrate a motivation to protect the resources of oneself and
one’s group, regardless of the consequences for outgroups. Collective self-interest is similar,
yet distinct from individual self-interest (Jost, Hennes, & Lavine, 2013). While individual
self-interest alludes to equity theory and the motivation to ensure individual contributions and
benefits are balanced, collective self-interest implies solidarity with one’s group (sometimes
at the expense of one’s own, personal self-interest). A (collective) self-interest explanation for
majority multicultural attitudes is consistent with the basic premises of several social
psychological theories.

First, Realistic Conflict Theory (Levine & Campbell, 1972; Sherif, Harvey, White,
Hood, & Sherif, 1961; Sherif & Sherif, 1953) suggests that ingroup favoritism results from
competition between groups of equal status. This competition involves a perceived zero-sum
fate where if one group gains, then the other loses. Such a perspective is consistent with the
idea that majorities feel threatened by multiculturalism when national resources are scarce
(see also Esses, Jackson, & Armstrong, 1998).
Second, Social Dominance Theory (Sidanius & Pratto, 1999) takes group status into account by suggesting that regardless of competition, some individuals, and particularly members of majority groups, simply have a strong “social dominance orientation”. This means that they have a strong sense that the status differentials and hierarchy between groups in society are normal, legitimate and a “good thing”. Majority group members therefore tend to intuitively adopt “status legitimizing ideologies” which reinforce the status quo and which function to reinforce their ‘privileged’ position in society (if they are indeed privileged; see Major et al., 2002; Major & Kaiser, 2017). Because support for multiculturalism implies a desire to attenuate rather than enhance the social hierarchy (Levin et al., 2012), majority opposition based on antiegalitarian beliefs makes sense, and is implicitly (collectively) self-serving.

Third, instead of focusing on competition and hierarchy-enhancing beliefs, Social Identity Theory suggests that simply perceiving oneself as a member of a particular group and not another results in ingroup bias and favoritism (Tajfel, Billig, Bundy, & Flament, 1971). Many authors do indeed show that (respective) ingroup identification is a major determinant of majority and minority attitudes towards colorblindness, assimilationism and multiculturalism (see for example Morrison et al., 2010; Verkuyten, 2005; Verkuyten & Brug, 2004; Verkuyten & Martinovic, 2006; Wolsko et al., 2006).

But these ideological preferences may not only be a question of individual and/or collective self-interest, especially from the minority perspective (see Jost, Banaji, & Nosek, 2004). Endorsement of multiculturalism among minorities may be associated with strong levels of ingroup identification and thus with a will to attenuate the social hierarchy. Paradoxically, however, Ryan and colleagues show that this endorsement is also associated with decreased ethnocentrism and ingroup bias (Ryan, Casas, & Thompson, 2010; Ryan et al., 2007). Research on the irony of harmony shows that when minorities have decreased
levels of ingroup bias, they underestimate injustices suffered by their group and therefore lack motivation to contest the social hierarchy (Dixon, Tropp, Durrheim, & Tredoux, 2010; Saguy, Tausch, Dovidio, & Pratto, 2009). Indeed, an integral component of multiculturalism is intergroup contact to promote mutual acceptance, less conflict and greater social cohesion (see Berry & Ward, 2016; Novoa & Moghaddam, 2014; research on intergroup contact being the origin of work on the irony of harmony). This is the paradox of peace, however: When people are happy and ready to make concessions, they are substantially less likely to fight for greater equality.

In this way, recent work by Gündemir and Galinsky (2018) shows that both Whites and racial minorities generally perceive fairness under organizational multiculturalism. This perceived fairness also means that members of both groups observe little discrimination, even when discrimination is present. Well-founded claims of discrimination are moreover perceived by both groups as illegitimate. As such, multicultural ideology may help minorities feel included in an organization and increase intergroup harmony, but it also conceals discrimination and can ultimately function against minorities’ collective interests by perpetuating inequality. These studies therefore provide evidence that at least for minorities, the preference for multiculturalism is not exclusively explained by individual or collective self-interest factors. At a deeper level than (collective) self-interest, identity dynamics also have implications for how individuals as members of groups view justice within their respective societies.

1.2.3 Identity and Justice Conceptions

Focusing on social justice conceptions allows for a similar, albeit deeper, analysis of minority and majority attitudes towards diversity ideologies and policies. Brickman et al. (1981) explain that the general cause of a collective or “macro-” justice orientation is strong collective awareness and identification with one’s group. Social psychologists have long been
aware that minorities tend to identify with their group more strongly than majorities, explaining their greater sensitivity to issues of collective justice. But how can this marked sense of collective identity for minorities, compared to majorities, be explained?

Much like communitarian theory and the “atomistic” criticism of liberalism, Social Identity Theory (Tajfel & Turner, 1986) suggests that all individuals have a fundamental need to belong to a distinct group that is socially valued, generating a sense of self-esteem (see Hogg & Abrams, 1990) as well as a shared belief system (see also Reicher, Spears, & Haslam, 2010). Moreover, Optimal Distinctiveness Theory (Brewer, 1991) suggests that the groups with which people identify most strongly are those that provide an “optimal balance” between inclusion and distinctiveness needs, achieved in different ways (see Hornsey & Jetten, 2004).

Coherent with the basic tenets of these theories, a large body of literature acknowledges how power comes into play in intergroup relations, making a distinction between minority, subordinate and majority, dominant group members’ “levels” of identification (see Deschamps, 1982; Devos, Comby, & Deschamps, 1996; Iacoviello & Lorenzi-Cioldi, 2015; Lorenzi-Cioldi, 1998; Simon & Brown, 1987; see also Turner, Hogg, Oakes, Reicher, & Wetherell, 1987 for the origins of the notion of identity “levels of abstraction”). Minority, subordinate group members such as women, lower class, children, ethnic minorities or immigrants, are considered to behave and perceive themselves in conjunction with their group membership. Majority, dominant group members such as men, upper class, adults, native majorities or citizens, in turn, tend to feel more autonomous and unique from their group, perceiving themselves as individuals and “default” members of society. Deschamps (1982) articulates why:

“Membership of groups is not equally salient for all. Its salience varies for individuals considered as social actors depending upon their possession of power or lack of it;
and upon their distance from a point of reference in relation to which everyone is supposed to be able to define himself (in a society of citizens who are free and equal in their rights) but which, in reality, only tends to define those who are owners of material and symbolic capital.” (p. 88)

Indeed, in Western societies where citizens have equal rights and liberties, individuals compare themselves to a societal prototype or “point of reference”. Minorities are arguably distant from this prototype (for symbolic and/or material reasons), making them aware of their distinctiveness in society without feeling they belong. As such, they have a marked need for group-based inclusion (see also Hornsey & Jetten, 2004). The salience of their sub-group membership is thus generally strong, and this salience makes them more concerned for collective rights (Azzi, 1998).

Majorities, instead, represent the societal prototype or “point of reference” (see also Devos & Banaji, 2005). They therefore have an ideal balance between their needs for inclusion and distinctiveness as obvious members of the dominant society (thereby satisfying their need for inclusion) which is characterized by individualist norms (thereby satisfying their need for distinctiveness; see Hornsey & Jetten, 2004). They thus tend to consider themselves as individual members of society by default, exhibiting a “mask of neutrality” (Plaut, 2010), and feeling relatively “carefree” about group belongingness (see Simon, Aufderheide, & Kampmeier, 2001; Staerklé, Delay, Gianettoni, & Roux, 2007). This comfort as individuals makes them more concerned about issues of individual justice.

Azzi (1992) empirically illustrates these differential justice orientations for numerical minorities and majorities through an experimental study on government representation preferences. When asked to determine how two groups differing in size should be politically represented, this author shows that numerical minorities prefer equal representation between groups while numerical majorities prefer proportional representation. Indeed, the former is
consistent with collective justice principles, suggesting power between the two groups should be divided in half, and the latter is consistent with individual justice principles, alluding to majority rule.

These justice orientations are consistent with the findings on diversity ideologies, suggesting that Whites and national majorities generally prefer colorblind approaches to managing cultural diversity, and ethnic, immigrant minorities generally prefer multicultural ones. The emphasis on identity levels, moreover, allows for a less self-interested, and more normative, explanation for these preferences. The normative perspective should indeed encompass explanations that are situated at lower, more individual levels of analysis (Doise, 1982; the normative perspective being at higher, group-based, positional and societal levels of analysis). For example, I do believe that symbolic and realistic threat or concerns for inclusion from the majority perspective are fundamentally activated and driven by their sensitivity and normative concern for individual justice.

However, while these differential justice orientations illustrate general trends between majorities and minorities, they are not always consistent, depending on contextual factors (see for example Klein & Azzi, 2001) that are closely intertwined with identity dynamics for the two groups. In the following sections, I explain in more detail some complexity involved in the minority perspective on justice, followed by the majority one. I also explain how these differential group-based perspectives relate to the chapters composing the present thesis, which, I argue, make novel contributions to research on justice conceptions and multicultural attitudes.

1.2.4 Minority Perspectives on Justice: Acknowledging Complexity

A conclusion that could be drawn from the previous discussion is that minorities (i.e., members of low status, subordinate groups) are inherently oriented towards collective justice. Research suggests that in certain ideological contexts, however, there are some exceptions to
this trend. Social identity theory classically acknowledges that the minorities’ fundamental need for a positive and distinct social identity does not always lead them to identify strongly with their low status group (Ellemers, 1993; Tajfel & Turner, 1979). Especially when boundaries between groups are perceived as permeable, “social mobility” may occur, where minority members exit the low status group to join the high status one. This social mobility allows them to become members of a different, more socially valued group (Tajfel & Turner, 1979). According to Ellemers (1993), an ideological context or “social structure” which would permit such mobility is a meritocracy, where an individual’s status is supposed to result from personal effort and merit. According to Walzer (1990), this mobility is indeed the “ultimate enactment of liberty” (p. 12) in liberal societies.

Minorities are aware of this dominant individualistic ideology in liberal societies (Sampson, 1988), although their views on justice are likely anchored differently in this ideology than majorities’ views. When it comes to minorities’ identity, early research on the Common Ingroup Identity Model (Gaertner et al., 1993; see also Dovidio, Gaertner, Ufkes, Saguy, & Pearson, 2016) suggested that it is ideal when all members of society, including minorities, “recategorize” themselves into an overarching, societal identity and thus abide by such dominant individualistic beliefs. In this way, ingroup bias is reduced such that injustice and inequality claims essentially disappear. Huo, Smith, Tyler, and Lind (1996) show that when superordinate national categorization is salient for minorities, they are more accepting of political decisions made within a given country, even when minority group rights are not recognized nor endorsed in these political decisions. This is because their superordinate, national identification creates feelings of trust, confidence and perceived legitimacy in the national government’s decisions.

However, while minorities may identify with the superordinate society, especially because of a will to become fully accepted members of that society, sub-group identification
and superordinate-group identification often coexist for them (known as Dual Identity; see Dovidio, Gaertner, & Saguy, 2007; Gaertner, Dovidio, Nier, Ward, & Banker, 1999; González & Brown, 2006; see also Berry, 1997; Dovidio et al., 2016). Studies show that this dual identity is just as associated with positive feelings towards justice in society as when minorities identify exclusively with the superordinate society, letting go of their subgroup membership (Huo et al., 1996; Tyler, 2000, 2006). Moreover, recent research shows that minority groups with a migration background are most likely to engage in political claims for their group, in line with multiculturalism, when they identify simultaneously with their own subgroup as well as the dominant society (Simon, 2011; Simon & Grabow, 2010; Simon & Ruhs, 2008; see also Verkuyten, 2017; Wiley, Deaux, & Hagelskamp, 2012). An important argument in line with this recent research is that when migrants first arrive in Western liberal societies, they interpret this dominant notion of ‘fairness’ in line with individual justice principles. In witnessing and experiencing discrimination and group-based inequality, they quickly become sensitive to principles of collective justice as well, driving their political engagement and claims for group-based justice, to complement dominant individual justice principles (see Simon, 2011).

Therefore, in the context of the present thesis, we argue that adherence to dominant, individual justice norms (associated with identification with the superordinate society) does not call into question minorities’ awareness and concern for collective rights. Consistent with the common ingroup identity literature, research on attitudinal ambivalence shows that while minority group members generally support hierarchy-attenuating, collective justice-based policies which imply governmental intervention to help them, they often simultaneously adopt individualist, meritocratic, hierarchy-enhancing ideologies generally associated with liberalism (see Staerkle, 2009). Such ideologies place an emphasis on individual responsibility and should, in principle, clash with hierarchy-attenuating governmental
interventions such as affirmative action or other multicultural policies (Bobocel, Son Hing, Davey, Stanley, & Zanna, 1998; Son Hing et al., 2011; see also Son Hing, Bobocel, & Zanna, 2002 for exceptions among individuals experiencing discrimination). Yet, minority group members can be sensitive to both simultaneously. This so-called “ideological incoherence” for minority group members (a term originally imposed on them but that is no longer considered accurate) is indeed best explained by their experience of discrimination and disadvantage, by their increased social and economic vulnerability and thus by their struggle and quest to find a positive, distinct, and inclusive social identity (see Achterberg & Houtman, 2009; Likki & Staerklé, 2014).

This literature on minority identity and ideological complexity is particularly relevant for Research Question 1 in the present thesis, and for Studies 1, 2, 3 and 8. Our hypothesis was that minorities (and more specifically, members of socially or economically disadvantaged groups such as immigrants or low status natives – Studies 2 and 3) perceive compatibility between individual and collective justice, or between liberalism and multiculturalism. The majority perspective, as I argue next, is also anchored in dominant liberal, individual justice beliefs, but indeed, in a different way.

1.2.5 Majority Perspectives on Justice: Digging Deeper

The majority perspective was especially accounted for in early research on the Common Ingroup Identity Model (Dovidio et al., 2016; Gaertner et al., 1993) which suggested that intergroup harmony required that all groups “recategorize” and identify with the superordinate society. This recategorization implies that society is composed of individuals, erasing all subgroups, in line with principles of individual justice. Consistent with majorities’ preference for assimilation as a diversity ideology, research on this model suggests that majorities tend to prefer when minorities identify with the superordinate society. Unlike the minority perspective, however, this majority preference is at the expense of minority sub-
group identification. The two levels of identification are therefore perceived as incompatible for majorities (Dovidio et al., 2007, 2016; Staerklé, Sidanius, Green, & Molina, 2010).

Such an identity preference for majorities should, again, be analogous to their conceptions of justice. In this way, majorities would consider liberal, individual conceptions of justice associated with the superordinate identity as incompatible with group-based, collective conceptions of justice associated with minority sub-group identities. Research on perceived value violations clarifies this incompatibility from the majority perspective.

In an extensive collection of studies, Bobocel and colleagues examined whether individuals (i.e., majorities) perceive collective justice principles as violating individual justice principles (Bobocel et al., 1998; Son Hing et al., 2011, 2002; Zdaniuk & Bobocel, 2011). These studies specifically focused on attitudes towards affirmative action as a manifestation of collective justice, in line with multicultural policy. Discourse opposing affirmative action in the Western world generally suggests that such policies violate fundamental individual justice principles of equal treatment and meritocracy (Bobocel et al., 1998). This is because affirmative action takes into account the social categories to which individuals belong when determining their deservingness, thereby privileging members of specific groups and placing others at a disadvantage. According to these authors, meritocratic beliefs among majorities are often associated with their opposition to affirmative action (see Son Hing et al., 2011). Therefore, the majority perspective on justice is anchored in dominant, political discourse regarding the incompatibility between individual and collective justice principles.

However, Bobocel et al. (1998) also highlight that “much of the rhetoric [regarding affirmative action] suggests that what is purportedly justice-based opposition is not genuine but rather a rationalization of prejudice” (p. 653). Through multiple experimental studies, these authors show that majority opposition to affirmative action can be explained in parallel
ways both by a genuine concern for individual justice violations and by a motivation to rationalize prejudice towards minority groups. As Son Hing et al. (2011) show, it is especially when majorities both support merit-based individual justice principles (e.g., success should be possible for anyone who works hard enough) and perceive society as abiding by such principles (e.g., success is possible for anyone who works hard enough) that they show opposition to affirmative action. In this way, majorities’ opposition to affirmative action is also embedded in (neo-) liberal beliefs which legitimize the status quo (in line with social dominance theory; see also Jost et al., 2013, for a review of what is known as “status quo bias”), regardless of whether this opposition is principled or masks prejudice.

Based on the premise that policy attitudes are ingrained in fundamental perceptions of the self that drive justice conceptions, Zdaniuk and Bobocel (2011) show that majority opposition to affirmative action is explained by an “independent self-construal”, that is, seeing oneself as an independent, autonomous individual. This independent self-construal is associated with increased sensitivity to merit-based individual justice principles, which thereby explains opposition to affirmative action. This finding is consistent with the notion that majorities are oriented towards individual conceptions of justice because they tend to self-identify as individuals rather than as members of a group (Azzi, 1998; Iacoviello & Lorenzi-Cioldi, 2015; Simon et al., 2001). As such, until they are stimulated to think otherwise, it seems that the most intuitive way for (privileged) majorities to conceptualize justice is in an individualistic way that opposes justice based on groups.

It is nevertheless important to acknowledge that majorities can also show support for affirmative action, minority rights, and other collective justice principles. In Zdaniuk and Bobocel’s (2011) study, for example, a distancing from independent self-construals among majorities was associated with increased adherence to collective justice principles and thus support for affirmative action. Moreover, other research shows that support for such
principles and policies occurs especially when (privileged) majorities are made to be conscious of their advantaged position in society. This consciousness implies an awareness of the (disadvantaged, or even victimized; see Moscovici & Perez, 2007; 2009) groups that compose society, leading majorities to show more guilt and less racism (see also Powell, Branscombe, & Schmitt, 2005). Consciousness of their advantages also leads majorities to show greater support for initiatives seeking to compensate disadvantaged group members such as affirmative action policies, through feelings of anger regarding structural inequalities (see Leach, Iyer, & Pedersen, 2006). This increased group-based consciousness and sensitivity to collective justice should, however, imply a distancing from individual justice principles, as empathy and solidarity may not imply experience with disadvantage, from the majority perspective.

The most important conclusions that can be drawn from this discussion of the majority perspective are therefore the following. First, majorities are fundamentally oriented towards individual justice principles. Second, collective justice principles involved in affirmative action (and multiculturalism in general) are perceived to be incompatible with these individual justice principles, from the majority perspective. Third, while it is possible for majorities to enter an “intergroup” logic and to show support for collective justice principles, this support implies a distancing from individual justice principles from their point of view.

This majority perspective is examined in all studies of the present thesis. However, the focus on (in)compatibility between individual and collective justice principles is specific to Research Question 1 and is empirically examined in all studies except Study 7 (as shown in Table 1). The most basic expectation in Studies 1 through 6 and Study 8 was that majorities would perceive incompatibility between individual and collective conceptions of justice. However, given the comparative group-based perspective in Studies 1, 2, 3 and 8, the expectation was that, in comparison to majorities, minorities would perceive significantly
more compatibility between these two conceptions of justice, because of their unique interpretation and experience with dominant principles of individual justice.

Central to Studies 4, 5, 6 and 7, the purpose of Research Question 2 is to advance our understanding of the majority perspective. This is done by incorporating a yet-to-be explored empirical enquiry into how national identification shapes majority conceptions of justice, described in the following section. Indeed, if majority opposition to multiculturalism is anchored in their adherence to dominant (Western) societal principles of individual justice (Bobocel et al., 1998), then the degree to which they identify with a Western country should be a driving force.

1.2.6 Majority National Identification as a Driving Force

In previous sections of this introduction, I have argued that majority conceptions of justice are rooted in their individual self-definitions (see Azzi, 1998). I have also argued that these individual self-definitions are based on the notion that majorities are closest to a societal point of reference or prototype in nations characterized by free and equal citizens (see Deschamps, 1982). This reasoning suggests that majority identification with their liberal nation (and thus the societal prototype) should also explain their individual justice conceptions.

This general hypothesis under Research Question 2 is pertinent specifically within the context of Western liberal societies. Jetten, Postmes, and McAuliffe (2002) show that it is within these societies, in particular, that majorities tend to perceive themselves as independent, autonomous individuals, especially when they have a strong sense of national identification. But how does national identification relate to attitudes towards multiculturalism?

Early research showed that a strong sense of national identification among national majorities was associated with feelings of threat when faced with immigration, multicultural
ideology and minority rights (Verkuyten, 2009; see also Badea, Iyer, & Aebischer, 2018). However, more recent work suggests that this perceived threat and thus negative attitude towards immigrant outgroups actually depends on the content of national identity (see Yogeeswaran & Dasgupta, 2014a, for an overview).

National identity content can be determined by various criteria. For example, citizenship laws around the world provide information on who belongs to the national community. These citizenship laws are typically classified into two superordinate principles: *jus sanguinis* (right of blood), and *jus solis* (right of soil; Pehrson & Green, 2010). While a single country generally has components of both, more emphasis is often placed on one principle or the other. For example, Bulgaria and Ireland are countries exhibiting primarily the *jus sanguinis* model of citizenship, whereby citizenship is granted according to blood relations and heritage (regardless of whether these citizens are culturally diverse). Canada and the USA are examples of *jus solis* citizenship, where citizenship is obtained regardless of heritage, provided that an individual is born within the national territory (thus implicitly increasing cultural diversity; see also Yogeeswaran & Dasgupta, 2014a).

Using a similar distinction to these *jus sanguinis* and *jus solis* principles, research shows that psychological conceptions of nationhood can be defined through civic versus ethnic criteria (see for example Brubaker, 1990). Civic criteria imply that accepted members of the national community must participate actively in society and must abide by certain values, responsibilities and ideals. Ethnic criteria imply that accepted members must have shared ancestry, ethnicity, and religion, for example. While social psychological research has acknowledged additional conceptions of national identity (see Reijerse, Van Acker, Vanbeselaere, Phalet, & Duriez, 2013), the civic versus ethnic distinction has allowed for an important conclusion: Newcomers are perceived and received more positively in countries with a civic conception of national identity, known to be more inclusive, in comparison to
countries with an ethnic conception of national identity, which encourage homogeneity and essentialism instead (Ariely, 2012; Pehrson, Brown, & Zagefka, 2009; Pehrson, Vignoles, & Brown, 2009). Indeed, national inclusiveness is a critical characteristic of national identity which determines more positive and welcoming attitudes towards immigrants and immigration. Within countries that have incorporated cultural diversity into their national concept, for example, positive attitudes towards newcomers are demonstrated among their existing members (Devos & Mohamed, 2014; Esses, Wagner, Wolf, Preiser, & Wilbur, 2006; Reynolds, Batalha, & Subasic, 2015).

This recent work highlighting the importance of national identity content has focused almost exclusively on immigration attitudes. In the present thesis, and specifically in Studies 4, 5, 6, and 7, attitudes towards policies which manage this immigration, involving more general conceptions of justice, are investigated in a novel way.

First, Studies 4, 5, and 6 examine whether majority group members’ perceived incompatibility between individual and collective justice is rooted in their identification with a strongly liberal, European nation. Indeed, principles of individual justice are pervasive in such contexts (Deschamps, 1982) suggesting that values of individual responsibility, for example, should be emblematic of national identity. An important argument in this section of the present thesis is therefore that prototypical values defining national identity can be used to show how national identification is associated with opposition (or possibly support, in alternative contexts) to multiculturalism, based on collective justice principles.

Because majority group members are most likely to abide by individual justice principles, the purpose of Study 7 is to investigate their attitudes towards a more individual justice-based facet of multiculturalism. This facet involves the selection of individual, talented migrants as a defining component of immigration policy (Cerna, 2016; Shachar & Hirschl, 2013).
The selection of talented migrants is an ambiguous policy, implying a passive acceptance of cultural diversity while at the same time restricting the arrival of immigrants. This type of immigration policy differs from typical restrictive policies, however. Instead of construing immigration from an intergroup perspective, as in natives versus immigrants, this type of policy necessarily looks at immigration from an intragroup perspective, selecting individual migrants who are most desirable according to dominant principles of individual justice (see Green, 2007, 2009; Testé, Maisonneuve, Assilaméhou, & Perrin, 2012). Again, because these dominant principles should be emblematic of national identity, we argue that support for the selection of talented migrants should be rooted in majority group members’ national identification.

Existing multinational research shows that national majorities generally feel more strongly identified with their respective countries than minorities (see Staerklé, Sidanius, Green, & Molina, 2005; Staerklé et al., 2010). This is explained, at least in part, by the idea that national majorities tend to perceive the norms and values of their group as most representative of the superordinate national category (see Devos & Banaji, 2005; Wenzel, Mummendey, & Waldzus, 2007). Study 7 therefore examines whether national majorities are more supportive of such an individual justice-based facet of multiculturalism, in comparison to national minorities, because they have a stronger sense of national identification. Research also shows, however, that national majorities show more xenophobic and antiminority policy attitudes than minorities (Huynh, Devos, & Altman, 2015; Sarrasin, Green, Bolzman, Visintin, & Politi, 2018; Staerklé et al., 2005). The idea is therefore to show that the hypothesized effects likely encompass but also exist beyond prejudicial attitudes, defending a more fundamental, justice-based explanation. This is tested in six European, liberal countries composed of distinct majority and minority national groups.
1.3 Studying Multiculturalism from a (National) Contextual Perspective

The emphasis in the previous section on ‘national identity content’ alludes to the importance of considering the societal contexts in which multicultural attitudes and justice conceptions are shaped. In this section, I first describe in more detail the Swiss context, given the special focus on this country in the present thesis. Finally, I open to wider international comparisons, providing some precisions regarding the final empirical (Study 8) and theoretical chapters composing the present thesis.

1.3.1 Multiculturalism in Switzerland

The first six studies composing chapters 3 and 4 of the present thesis are conducted exclusively in Switzerland, a ‘multination’ state situated in the heart of Europe (Dardanelli, 2012; Ipperciel, 2011 for a discussion of whether Switzerland really is ‘multi-national’, or is, instead, ‘mono-national’). Switzerland is an ideal country to study issues regarding multiculturalism embedded in liberal contexts. On one hand, this is because of its socio-demographic characteristics. On the other hand, it is because of the country’s unique political system.

Switzerland is a “multicultural country without multicultural policies” (D’Amato, 2010). The country has four official languages and is divided into three major linguistic regions covering a total of 26 cantons. The German-speaking part of the country makes up 63% of the population and spans most of the country. The French-speaking part makes up 23% of the population, to the West. The Italian-speaking part makes up 8% of the population, specifically in the southern canton of Ticino. Finally, the Romansh-speaking part makes up 0.5% of the population and is located in the southeastern canton of Graubünden where German and Italian are also spoken. Other languages which are commonly spoken within the country include English (5.1%), Portuguese (3.7%), Albanese (3.1%) and many others. Over
64% of the population report speaking at least two languages (and 26% report speaking at least three) in their day-to-day lives (Swiss Federal Statistical Office, 2018a).

Not only is Switzerland characterized by linguistic diversity among its nationals, but the country is also home to a substantial proportion of non-nationals, including immigrants, expatriates, refugees and foreign-workers who do not have Swiss nationality. Foreigners living in Switzerland make up a quarter (25%) of the country’s population (Swiss Federal Statistical Office, 2018b). This large foreign population is due, in part, to the fact that Swiss citizenship is difficult to obtain.

Relations between national, linguistic groups in Switzerland tend to be quite harmonious, as common liberal values have long been shared between them (see Helbling & Stojanovic, 2011; Wimmer, 2008; see also Wimmer, 2011). However, tensions are more pronounced when it comes to immigrants and foreigners (Ruedin, Alberti, & D’Amato, 2015). Unlike Canada, Switzerland does not have an official, explicit federal multicultural policy which addresses the rights of both linguistic and immigrant minorities. When analyzing the Swiss federal constitution, it can be noted that rights for linguistic minorities (i.e., French, Italian, and Romansh Swiss) are clearly supported, for example: “the Confederation and the Cantons shall encourage understanding and exchange between the linguistic communities […] and take account of indigenous linguistic minorities” (Article 70; see also D’Amato, 2015). But aside from those for immigrants with Swiss citizenship - “all citizens have the same political rights and duties” (Article 136) - immigrant minority rights are left to the discretion of the cantons and communes. There is no mention of state sponsoring for the maintenance of cultural origins. On the contrary, immigrants (whether naturalized Swiss or not) are expected to assimilate to the norms established within their respective canton through civic integration policies (Duemmler, 2015; Goodman, 2014; Koopmans et al., 2005).
Moreover, not only do foreign nationals face challenges in gaining citizenship and political rights because of restrictive naturalization policies, but the circumstances under which they would be expelled from the country are stated clearly within the federal constitution: “Foreign nationals may be expelled from Switzerland if they pose a risk to the security of the country” (Article 121). Following an in-depth analysis of citizenship and immigration policy across a number of European countries, Koopmans et al., (2005) concede that

“In [...] Switzerland, we find very few claims on social and cultural rights or on discrimination. This is not because migrants have less to complain about and are better protected against discrimination than other countries. To the contrary, it is extremely difficult for migrants to put these issues on the political agenda [...] and to find public resonance and legitimacy for them because they lack formal and symbolic inclusion as equal members of the national community” (p. 91).

Therefore, foreigners are in a particularly disadvantaged position in the Swiss context.

Researchers working on Swiss immigration policy suggest it is “a politics of national identity” (Riaño & Wastl-Walter, 2006, p. 17), protecting Swiss nationals from external threats. Duemmler (2015) demonstrates how Swiss policies emphasizing civic integration trickle down through the education system such that even Swiss youth, through everyday narratives, legitimize and reproduce exclusion of foreigners. D’Amato (2015) explains how the country’s stability can be attributed to its strong national identity, making changes to immigration policy a major challenge. Nevertheless, longitudinal analyses show that the most recent historical period in Switzerland is characterized not by restrictive immigration policy (which was the case leading into the 1970s), but rather by “expanding” immigration policy (Ruedin et al., 2015). This has occurred incrementally over the past two decades. Indeed,
Ruedin et al. (2015) suggest that these recent “changes in policies reflect the fact that immigrants are increasingly accepted as a permanent feature of Swiss society.” (p. 5)

Today, Swiss immigration policy remains largely focused on individual justice principles, despite some lingering exclusionary (and intergroup-based) interpretations. To illustrate this point, it is first important to mention that the political system in Switzerland is a direct democracy. This means that the population participates in some political decisions via multiple referenda and popular initiatives each year. In recent years, a number of these political decisions were on topics related to immigration, such as the popular initiative to “stop mass immigration” in February 2014, proposing to implement strict quotas for immigrants coming from European Union countries. The initiative was accepted at 50.3% (Swiss Federal Statistical Office, 2014), possibly illustrating an anti-immigration stance for a non-negligible portion of the Swiss population.

However, there are two important facts to highlight regarding this result. First, when looking at regional tendencies, the French region was substantially less in favor of the initiative than the Germanic one (Swiss federal statistical office, 2014). Despite strict federal regulations, cantonal variation does exist (see D’Amato, 2015), and the Latin cantons appear to be less restrictive and exclusionary than the Germanic ones (Manatschal, 2011).

Second, Swiss immigration policy remains highly selective, favoring predominantly talented migrants. This is the case concerning migrants coming from non-European Union countries, although the initiative to “stop mass immigration” would have proposed a similar approach. The emphasis on talented migrants is most evident through the implementation of the Swiss “New Alien Law” which was passed in 2006. This policy’s basic principle was that “admission must serve the interest of the entire economy […] As such, professional qualifications and the ability to integrate should play decisive roles.” (D’Amato, 2015). In this way, talented migrants are valued in the Swiss context, to the extent that they benefit the
national economy, and are willing and ready to abide by Swiss (liberal) values. This type of immigration policy is in line with classical liberal principles of individual justice.

At the core of the present thesis, what is relevant about the Swiss context is the strong value placed in the classical liberal principle of individual responsibility. Some experts suggest the Swiss direct democracy is illustrative of a successfully applied form of classical liberalism (see Buchanan, 2008). The emphasis on competition to promote the country’s economy is also emblematic of classical forms of liberalism (D’Amato, 2015). Political data shows that Switzerland is effectively the most economically liberal country in Europe, finding itself in fourth place on the world stage (The Heritage Foundation, 2018).

Switzerland is therefore an ideal context to study multiculturalism within liberal societies, as it is one of the most prototypically liberal countries in the world. However, for this same reason, it is imperative to incorporate international comparisons to determine if the Swiss context is emblematic of other (liberal) societies or not, hence, Studies 7 and 8 of the present thesis. These international comparisons will be described below.

The regional differences within Switzerland make it relevant to indicate in which parts of the country our studies are conducted. The first five studies presented in this thesis, described in chapters 3 and 4, are conducted within the French-speaking region of Switzerland. Studies 2 and 3 are conducted more specifically in the diverse, metropolitan city of Lausanne where 43% of the population is composed of non-nationals (Ville de Lausanne, 2018). Study 5 is conducted in a more rural part of the French-speaking region, approximately 150 kilometers north from Lausanne. While Studies 1 and 4 are dispersed throughout the French-speaking region in general, Study 6 incorporates a nationally representative sample of the entire country. The two studies composing chapters 5 (Study 7) and 6 (Study 8) involve the Swiss national context as well as European countries outside Switzerland. Within Switzerland, however, Study 7 is situated in the French- and German-
speaking regions, and Study 8 involves, again, a nationally representative sample. As such, while the minority, French-speaking region is a significant focus of the present thesis, the Swiss confederation is relatively well represented.

1.3.2 Multiculturalism in Europe

Beyond the particular case of Switzerland, it is imperative to investigate how the majority and minority justice conceptions central to research questions on which this thesis is based might extend (or not) to additional national contexts. While Switzerland encompasses an extreme case of national liberalism, the main research questions of the present thesis should still be relevant for other liberal national contexts.

As such, Study 7 focuses on the role played by national identification in shaping individual conceptions of justice (Research Question 2), in six European countries. In this study, individual justice conceptions are exemplified through support for a specific, selective immigration policy targeting talented migrants. This type of policy has become widespread throughout Europe and the Western world over recent years (Cerna, 2016; Cerna & Czaika, 2016; de Haas, Natter, & Vezzoli, 2016; Shachar, 2016; Shachar & Hirschl, 2013). An international perspective is therefore used to test whether the hypothesized effects are consistent across the six countries.

Study 8, instead, takes on a more comparative perspective, examining whether national characteristics in 20 countries (Research Question 3) may explain majority and minority justice conceptions and multicultural attitudes (Research Question 1). These national characteristics include historically liberal versus post-communist regimes as well as the degree to which group-based policies are implemented at the national level.

European countries serve as a unique context in which to study multicultural attitudes under the umbrella of liberal societies. This is not only because of the recent European backlash against multiculturalism (Green & Staerklé, 2013; Joppke, 2004; Lesinska, 2014;
Vasta, 2007; Vertovec & Wessendorf, 2010; Ward et al., 2018). It is also because this continent is composed of predominantly liberal societies, despite the post-communist regimes to the East. Kymlicka and Opalski (2001) explain that most work on multiculturalism has been conducted within the constraints of Western countries. Elsewhere, however, processes may function in a similar, albeit nuanced way. Indeed, Western researchers often struggle to understand post-communist regimes, suggesting multicultural theory may be irrelevant there (Kymlicka & Opalski, 2001). This is because they have generally been described as “nationalizing states” where minorities are dominated rather than accommodated (Brubaker, 1996, 2011). However, this description is highly contested, as post-communist regimes are heterogeneous (Kuzio, 2005).

There are a variety of regions organizing these post-communist regimes which can be distinguished for (historically) political, cultural, religious or geographical reasons, much like in Western Europe. As Kuzio (2001) points out, the present-day countries in these regions (many appearing and/or changing after the fall of the former Soviet Union in 1991) are not composed of fixed “nationalizing states” but are instead experiencing different phases of “nation-building”, much like Western states from the eighteenth century onwards. As a result, there is heterogeneity in the degree to which their citizenship regimes are inclusive, and the degree to which they are progressive in terms of democratization, at present day (see Enyedi, 2016; Hutcheson & Korosteleva, 2005; Stanley, 2017). According to the Heritage Foundation (2018), for example, the Baltic states of Estonia and Lithuania place strong emphasis on liberal values, finding themselves in 15th and 21st place on the world stage in terms of economic freedom. Poland and Hungary place substantially less emphasis on liberal values, placing instead at 46th and 64th on the world stage in terms of economic freedom. Therefore, post-communist regimes may be less liberal and democratically progressive than the West, at an aggregate level, as a result of more recent “nation-building” and struggles associated with
the fall of communism. However, this characteristic is transitional and varies from country to country, and such heterogeneity also exists in the West (e.g., on this same index, Belgium is in 48th place while Switzerland is in 4th place in terms of economic freedom worldwide, as mentioned previously), making the West versus post-communist boundary somewhat obscure.

One purpose of Study 8 is therefore to examine how individual and collective justice conceptions of majorities and minorities (or their multicultural attitudes) compare between liberal versus post-communist regimes. The other is to examine how these conceptions compare within both Western and post-communist regimes, depending instead on the degree to which these countries have implemented policies which directly address minority claims.

Social science and policy research measure the prevalence of broad pro-minority and pro-diversity policies between countries. Some of this research also assesses the implications of these policies by comparing outcomes in countries that have incorporated them to stronger or weaker degrees. In the case of our research question, we employ the use of this top-down logic to examine how policies influence individual attitudes and outcomes.

The two main tools available which measure the prevalence of such policies are the Multiculturalism Policy Index (MPI; Banting & Kymlicka, 2013) and the Migrant Integration Policy Index (MIPEX; Huddleston, Bilgili, Joki, & Vankova, 2015). The former monitors the evolution of multiculturalism policies in 21 Western countries. The criteria for these policies depend on three sub-indexes, divided according to the type of minority groups addressed (i.e., immigrant, national or indigenous minorities). The immigrant minority sub-index includes eight policy areas, such as funding for cultural activities and mother-tongue instruction, inclusion of ethnic representation in public media, adoption of multiculturalism in school curricula, and affirmative action for disadvantaged immigrant groups. The latter measures policies put in place to integrate migrants in 38 countries, including all EU member states as well as countries on other continents. Through an assessment of eight policy areas such as
family reunification, access to citizenship and permanent residence, and antidiscrimination, a multi-dimensional indicator of migrants’ opportunities to participate in society is provided through this tool, by country (Huddleston et al., 2015).

Despite the backlash involving substantial criticisms of multiculturalism, cross-national research using the MPI shows that multicultural policies addressing migrants have gradually *increased* in prevalence throughout European countries since the 1980s (Banting & Kymlicka, 2013). Moreover, these policies have been implemented in *addition* to existing civic integration policies (see Joppke, 2014, for an alternative perspective). The Netherlands is an exception to this trend, and some (but not all) of the literature on the “backlash” against multiculturalism comes from this country (see for example Lesinska, 2014; Vasta, 2007).

Countries where these multicultural policies have become most present are characterized by several benefits for immigrants and minorities. These benefits include, for example, facilitated citizenship acquisition, higher levels of generalized trust, lower levels of discrimination (Wright & Bloemraad, 2012), and greater life satisfaction (Jackson & Doerschler, 2016). Some benefits have also been shown for majorities. While research shows that they may perceive greater discrimination and feelings of less safety in countries with stronger multicultural policies, they also show greater satisfaction with life and with their national government (Jackson & Doerschler, 2016), as well as lower levels of anti-immigrant sentiments (Hooghe & de Vroome, 2015) in these contexts. As such, the increase in multicultural policies appears to be associated with a host of positive consequences, especially for minorities, with few disadvantages for majorities.

A disadvantage of the MPI is that data for few countries are available. While these effects were found using the MPI, the MIPEX has most commonly been used to assess the outcomes of inclusive, pro-diversity policies (albeit not necessarily multicultural ones; see for example Ariely, 2012; Callens & Meuleman, 2017; Green, Visintin, Sarrasin, & Hewstone,
The MIPEX composite indicator is more about immigrant integration in an inclusive, civic integration sense than about focusing in on the interventionist, group-based orientation of multicultural policies (see also Helbling, Bjerre, Römer, & Zobel, 2017, for a more comprehensive critique of the MIPEX). However, there is a small sub-dimension of the MIPEX which explicitly measures the prevalence of governmental bodies responsible for heeding, addressing and responding to claims made by minorities (a policy which, according to Koopmans et al. (2005) quote in the previous section, is weak in the Swiss context). We argue that this indicator of “Equality Policies” is a measure of “collective justice” at the national level. **Study 8** therefore examines how the presence of such policies has an impact on majority and minority justice conceptions and attitudes towards multiculturalism.

### 1.3.3 Bringing Multiculturalism’s Complexity into Context

In providing a comprehensive discussion as to why (and how) context should be considered in psychological research on multiculturalism, the final **theoretical chapter** of the present thesis proposes a conceptual framework for future research (Ward et al., 2018). This framework emphasizes the impact of multicultural policies, multicultural norms and multicultural demographic characteristics, all at the contextual level, on majority and minority outcomes in Western societies. An important objective is to show how the three broad facets of multiculturalism can be assessed in both objective and **subjective** ways (Stuart & Ward, 2018) to explain majority and minority outcomes more accurately.

Multiculturalism at the societal level is differentially experienced by members of majority and minority groups, who, as argued throughout this introduction, both seek justice, but in different ways. We thus finish the chapter by suggesting concrete, societal strategies for effective, differentiated communication with minorities and majorities regarding multiculturalism, anchored in their respective conceptions of justice. This final chapter
therefore addresses some implications of research on justice and multiculturalism, putting the empirical chapters of the present thesis into context and into practice.

1.4 Summary of Key Contributions

The chapters composing this thesis should make a number of contributions to social psychological research on justice and multiculturalism. First and foremost, they take a social psychological perspective on a key issue in contemporary debates on multiculturalism and minority rights: The compatibility between classical liberal principles of individual justice and group-based principles of collective justice. This debate in political philosophy has occurred over recent decades and in objective terms (see Barry, 2001; Joppke, 2004, 2014, Kymlicka, 1995, 2010, 2012; Levey, 2010; Malik, 2015; Modood, 2013; Parekh, 2000). However, the present social psychological analysis highlights the importance of perception. This perception encompasses and extends beyond an individual, cognitive level of analysis (see Doise, 1982) and takes into account belief systems which are shaped by one’s majority or minority position in Western social hierarchies.

**Research Question 1.** addressed in chapters 3 and 6, focuses most explicitly on this question of perceived compatibility between individual and collective justice. By extending existing research suggesting that minorities are more supportive of multiculturalism, based on collective justice principles, than majorities, the studies composing these chapters should show that attitudes of both minorities and majorities are anchored (differently) in dominant liberal beliefs. In this way, minorities would perceive multiculturalism, based on groups, as compatible with such liberal beliefs, based on individuals, while majorities would perceive, instead, incompatibility. These dominant beliefs are generally taken for granted in existing research. However, we argue that it is critical to take them into account, empirically, as they contribute to shaping and constraining how all members of society perceive justice.
Existing research has shown how (dominant) liberal beliefs in individual justice play a role in majority opposition to collective justice-based policies (Bobocel et al., 1998; Son Hing et al., 2011). Another contribution of the present thesis is its focus on how national identification shapes adherence to these dominant beliefs, addressed by Research Question 2 in chapters 4 and 5. Social Identity Theory suggests that identifying with a group implies adherence to the group’s prototypical values (see Reicher et al., 2010). The studies composing chapter 4 should provide a novel empirical test of whether majority opposition to multiculturalism is shaped, in part, by their (liberal) national identification and thus adherence to dominant norms of individual justice.

In chapter 5, we suggest that majority support for an individualized immigration policy selecting talented migrants is rooted in their sense of national identification and thus adherence to dominant principles of individual justice, encompassing and extending beyond their prejudice towards immigrants and restrictive immigration attitudes. Immigration policies selecting talented migrants have become pervasive throughout the Western world (Cerna, 2016; Cerna & Czaika, 2016; de Haas et al., 2016; Shachar, 2016; Shachar & Hirschl, 2013). However, little social psychological research has taken an interest in understanding antecedents of support for such policies which are based on principles of individual justice.

The role played by national context is an important component of the present thesis. Addressed in chapter 6, Research Question 3 examines, in particular, the degree to which our expected effects are generalizable across European countries. The study composing this chapter should indeed provide information about the boundaries, contexts and conditions under which results from the previous chapters are true.

Finally, existing research has often suggested minority and majority attitudes towards multiculturalism are explained by the extent to which the ideology and respective policies function in favor of these groups (see for example Verkuyten, 2005, 2006). By examining
multicultural attitudes as an indicator of justice conceptions, however, we provide a normative analysis that encompasses and extends beyond face-value self-interest explanations (see Miller, 1999; Sears, Lau, Tyler, & Allen, 1980). Indeed, all chapters within the present thesis should provide a more nuanced understanding of how minorities and majorities (differentially) develop their views on multiculturalism, considering dominant norms. A hope is that this research can help scholars and policy makers to conceptualize multiculturalism and/or corresponding policies so that they meet the needs and expectations of minority and majority group members alike.
CHAPTER 2

Research Questions and Method

The purpose of this second chapter is to summarize the research questions developed in the introductory chapter as well as to provide more specific hypotheses. The methodological approaches exhibited in the empirical chapters are also discussed. Tables 2 and 3 compile this information together for each study and chapter of the present thesis.

2.1 Research Questions and Hypotheses

The research questions composing the present thesis and their basic corresponding hypotheses are summarized as follows.

Research Question 1 (RQ1): How do membership in majority and minority groups shape conceptions of justice? In other words, how do majorities and minorities differentially support multiculturalism which is based on collective justice principles?

Hypothesis 1a (H1a): Majorities are more oriented towards individual justice principles than minorities.

Hypothesis 1b (H1b): Minorities are more oriented towards collective justice principles (i.e., multiculturalism) than majorities.

Hypothesis 1c (H1c): Majorities perceive incompatibility between individual justice principles and collective justice principles (i.e., multiculturalism).

Hypothesis 1d (H1d): Minorities perceive less incompatibility between individual justice principles and collective justice principles (i.e., multiculturalism) than majorities.
Hypothesis 1e (H1e): Hypothesis 1b, 1c and 1d depend on the asymmetric criteria defining majorities and minorities (high/low status, native/immigrant) as well as the facet of multiculturalism (policy, ideology) under scrutiny.

Research Question 2 (RQ2): How does national identification in liberal societies shape majority conceptions of justice (and thus support for multiculturalism)?

Hypothesis 2a (H2a): Majorities’ perceived incompatibility between individual justice and collective justice (i.e., multiculturalism) is anchored in their identification with a liberal society.

Hypothesis 2b (H2b): Majorities are fundamentally oriented towards individual justice principles because of their strong levels of national identification, in comparison to minorities.

Research Question 3 (RQ3): How do national contexts impact minority and majority conceptions of justice (and thus support for multiculturalism)?

Hypothesis 3a (H3a): The discrepancy in justice conceptions (and thus multicultural attitudes) between minorities and majorities depends on the degree to which collective justice-based (i.e., multicultural) policies are implemented at the national level.

Hypothesis 3b (H3b): The discrepancy in justice conceptions (and thus multicultural attitudes) between minorities and majorities is particularly marked in liberal, compared to post-communist, societies.

Hypothesis 3c (H3c): Justice conceptions and multicultural attitudes are anchored within national contexts defined by varying degrees of multicultural demography, ideology and policy.

This final hypothesis helps to clarify where the final theoretical chapter of the present thesis is situated relative to the empirical chapters (see Table 2 for further details).

Altogether, the order of hypotheses is established for reasons of theoretical clarity. This order
roughly mirrors the order of chapters and studies as well (see Table 2), although there are some minor exceptions (e.g., H1a is empirically addressed in Study 7, not in Study 1). In the next section, I focus exclusively on the empirical chapters and their respective research questions, hypotheses and methodology.

2.2 Summary of Studies and Methodology by Chapter

Tables and figures are provided in this section to clarify similarities and differences between each study and chapter of the present thesis. Table 2 summarizes not only research questions and hypotheses, but also samples and study designs. Table 3 summarizes the measures used in each empirical study. Figures 1 through 4 show the conceptual models separately for each chapter.

2.2.1 Chapter 3

In Chapter 3, Studies 1, 2 and 3 propose a novel perspective on majority and minority justice conceptions and attitudes towards multiculturalism. In Study 1, native Swiss majorities are compared with cultural minorities with migration ancestry through a correlational study. First, cultural minorities should be more supportive of multicultural ideology and policy (both based on collective justice principles) than native majorities (H1b). Moreover, on one hand, native majorities should perceive incompatibility between multiculturalism (as an ideology and policy) and more dominant, classically liberal, individual justice principles of individual responsibility (H1c). In other words, when majorities have strong classically liberal beliefs, they should show opposition to multiculturalism. On the other hand, cultural minorities should perceive significantly less incompatibility than majorities (H1d).

Study 2 and 3 are designed to replicate Study 1 using an experimental approach. In both studies, participants are presented with a detailed perspective-taking scenario in which they are asked to imagine themselves as a member of one of two groups on a fictitious island.
(see Azzi, 1992). The objective is to experimentally determine *which asymmetric criteria* are driving the effects found in study 1 (see Table 2). The same hypotheses as in Study 1 are therefore advanced (H1b,c,d) except that *group status* is expected to explain perceived (in)compatibility between liberal principles and multicultural *policy*, and *cultural origin* is expected to be the more important predictor of perceived (in)compatibility between liberal principles and multicultural *ideology* (H1e). While the same measure of individual responsibility belief is used in Studies 1 and 2, two alternative prescriptive rather than descriptive indicators of classically liberal individual justice beliefs are used in Study 3, allowing for a more holistic view on the construct (see Table 3). Figure 1 summarizes the moderation conceptual model for this chapter.

*Figure 1*. Conceptual moderation model for chapter 3. While minorities should support multiculturalism more strongly than majorities (H1b), group membership (depending on asymmetric criteria) and liberal principles should also interact such that minorities (immigrants; low status group members) perceive significantly less incompatibility between liberal principles and multiculturalism (ideology; policy) than majorities (natives; high status group members; H1c, d, e).
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Chapter</th>
<th>Study</th>
<th>Research Questions (Hypotheses)</th>
<th>Context</th>
<th>Participant Recruitment Strategy</th>
<th>N</th>
<th>Majorities</th>
<th>Minorities</th>
<th>Research Design</th>
<th>Analytic Strategy</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Chapter 3</td>
<td>Study 1</td>
<td>RQ1 (H1b,c,d)</td>
<td>Switzerland (French-speaking)</td>
<td>Online snowball technique</td>
<td>141</td>
<td>Natives 91</td>
<td>Immigrants with foreign ancestry 50</td>
<td>Correlational</td>
<td>Moderation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Study 2</td>
<td>RQ1 (H1b,c,d,e)</td>
<td>Switzerland (French-speaking)</td>
<td>1st-year Social Psychology students</td>
<td>202</td>
<td>Natives, high status 103, numerical 104</td>
<td>Immigrants, low status 99, numerical 98</td>
<td>Experimental</td>
<td>Moderation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Study 3</td>
<td>RQ1 (H1b,c,d,e)</td>
<td>Switzerland (French-speaking)</td>
<td>1st-year Social Psychology students</td>
<td>164</td>
<td>Natives, high status 83</td>
<td>Immigrants, low status 82</td>
<td>Experimental</td>
<td>Moderation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chapter 4</td>
<td>Study 4</td>
<td>RQ1 (H1c) RQ2 (H2a)</td>
<td>Switzerland (French-speaking)</td>
<td>Online snowball technique</td>
<td>91</td>
<td>Natives 91</td>
<td></td>
<td>Correlational</td>
<td>Mediation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Study 5</td>
<td>RQ1 (H1c) RQ2 (H2a)</td>
<td>Switzerland (French-speaking)</td>
<td>Agriculture/Trade Apprenticeship courses</td>
<td>112</td>
<td>Natives 112</td>
<td></td>
<td>Quasi-Experimental</td>
<td>Mediation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Study 6</td>
<td>RQ1 (H1c) RQ2 (H2a)</td>
<td>Switzerland (Nationally representative)</td>
<td>World Values Survey 2007 data</td>
<td>1,234</td>
<td>Nationally representative 1,234</td>
<td></td>
<td>Correlational</td>
<td>Mediation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chapter 5</td>
<td>Study 7</td>
<td>RQ1 (H1a) RQ2 (H2b)</td>
<td>Six European countries</td>
<td>European Social Survey 2014 data</td>
<td>9,856</td>
<td>National 8,046</td>
<td>National 1,810</td>
<td>Correlational</td>
<td>Mediation (in each country)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chapter 6</td>
<td>Study 8</td>
<td>RQ1 (H1b,c,d) RQ3 (H3a,b)</td>
<td>20 European countries</td>
<td>European Social Survey 2014 data</td>
<td>36,732</td>
<td>Everyone else 34,517</td>
<td>Self-report ethnic minorities 2,215</td>
<td>Correlational</td>
<td>Multilevel Moderation</td>
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<td>Chapter 7</td>
<td>Theoretical</td>
<td>RQ1 (H1b,c,d) RQ2 (H2a,b) RQ3 (H3c)</td>
<td>Western societies</td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
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</tbody>
</table>

Table 2. Summary of Research Questions, Sample, and Design by Study and Chapter
Table 3. Summary of Measures by Study and Empirical Chapter

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Chapter</th>
<th>Study</th>
<th>National Identification Measure</th>
<th>$n_{items}$</th>
<th>$\alpha$</th>
<th>Individual Justice Principles Measure</th>
<th>$n_{items}$</th>
<th>$\alpha$</th>
<th>Multiculturalism Measure</th>
<th>$n_{items}$</th>
<th>$\alpha$</th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Chapter 3</td>
<td>Study 1</td>
<td>N/A</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Individual responsibility belief</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>.73</td>
<td>Ideology/ Policy (2)</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>.76</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Study 2</td>
<td>N/A</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Individual responsibility belief</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>.61</td>
<td>Ideology/ Policy (2)</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>.64</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Study 3</td>
<td>N/A</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>(Prescriptive) Individual responsibility/ Classical liberalism (2)</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>.75</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>.68</td>
<td>Ideology/ Policy (2)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chapter 4</td>
<td>Study 4</td>
<td>Identification with Switzerland</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>.88</td>
<td>Individual responsibility belief</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>.78</td>
<td>Ideology/ Policy (2)</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>.77</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Study 5</td>
<td>Identification with Switzerland (manipulation check for 47 agriculture vs. 65 trade apprentices)</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>.89</td>
<td>Individual responsibility belief</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>.73</td>
<td>Ideology/ Policy (2)</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>.70</td>
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<td></td>
<td>Study 6</td>
<td>Seeing oneself as a Swiss citizen</td>
<td>1</td>
<td></td>
<td>Hard work (meritocracy)</td>
<td>1</td>
<td></td>
<td>Valued ethnic cultural diversity</td>
<td>1</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chapter 5</td>
<td>Study 7</td>
<td>Feeling close to Switzerland</td>
<td>1</td>
<td></td>
<td>Individualized immigration policy (talented migrants)</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>(r)</td>
<td>in Estonia to .50 in Slovenia to .60 in Switzerland</td>
<td>N/A</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chapter 6</td>
<td>Study 8</td>
<td>N/A</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Individualized immigration policy</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>.69 in Slovenia to .82 in Sweden</td>
<td>Valued immigration cultural diversity</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>.79 in Switzerland</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note. N/A means the measure is not applicable for the corresponding study. (2) indicates two separate measures were used in the corresponding study. In Study 7, correlation ($r$) is provided instead of alpha ($\alpha$) for the measure of liberal principles because it is composed of only two items. For the multilevel study (Study 8), contextual-level variables are indicated in italics.
2.2.2 Chapter 4

In Chapter 4, Studies 4, 5, and 6 test whether majorities’ perceived incompatibility between multiculturalism (as a policy and ideology) and liberal principles of individual responsibility (H1c), illustrated in chapter 3, is anchored in their national identification (H2a). In other words, majorities who identify with the strongly liberal nation of Switzerland should abide by the individual justice belief in individual responsibility, which should thereby explain their rejection of multicultural ideology and policy. Figure 2 summarizes the mediation conceptual model for this chapter.

Figure 2. Conceptual mediation model for chapter 4. Incompatibility between liberal principles of individual justice and multiculturalism from the majority perspective (H1c) should be anchored in their strong levels of national identification (H2a).

Study 4 adopts the same native Swiss perspective as in Study 1 (a subsample of the same data set was used), incorporating a measure of national identification and using a correlational design. Study 5 compares, instead, two education-based native sub-groups in Switzerland – agricultural and trades apprentices – who differ in the degree to which they are prototypical of Swiss national identity. This study involves a quasi-experimental design. Study 6 replicates the effects from Studies 4 and 5 using nationally representative Swiss data.
from the World Values Survey (wave 5, 2007). While the measures used in Studies 4 and 5 are identical (those referring to individual responsibility and multicultural ideology and policy are also identical to Studies 1 and 2), the measures in this sixth study are naturally different (see Table 3), given the use of secondary data.

2.2.3 Chapter 5

In Chapter 5, Study 7 examines the role played by national identification in majority support for an individual justice-based immigration policy. This policy seeks to select, more specifically, individual, talented migrants. The policy is unique in that it is on one hand a means to restrict immigration and assimilate migrants to dominant (individual justice-based) norms (of hard work, for example; see Green, 2007; Testé, Maisonneuve, Assilaméhou, & Perrin, 2012). On the other hand, it can also imply ambiguous support for cultural diversity, as the selected talented migrants also bring with them their cultural origins and innovation.

In this seventh study, we put forward this ambiguity and argue that majority support for such individualized immigration policies is not only rooted in their restrictive immigration attitudes, but is also explained by their adherence to dominant liberal principles of individual justice. In an empirical sense, this adherence is illustrated through their identification with a liberal nation. European Social Survey data (wave 7, 2014) from six European liberal nations is used to test the hypothesis that majorities are supportive of this individual justice-based selection of talented migrants because of their strong levels of national identification (H2b), controlling for the alternative explanatory factors.

The minority perspective is also incorporated into this study as a comparison point. This is because one of the most basic premises of the present thesis is that majorities should demonstrate stronger concern for individual justice principles (and thus the selection of talented migrants) than minorities (H1a). Therefore, a mediation analysis (Hayes, 2018) is used to examine whether, in all six countries analysed, majorities show stronger support for
the selection of talented migrants than minorities, because majorities identify more strongly with their respective (liberal) country (see Figure 3).

Figure 3. Conceptual mediation model for chapter 5. In liberal societies, majorities should show more support for the selection of talented migrants, based on individual justice principles, than minorities (H1a), because majorities should have higher levels of national identification (H2b).

2.2.4 Chapter 6

In Chapter 6, Study 8 returns to the original comparison between majority and minority multicultural attitudes tested in the Swiss context in Studies 1, 2, and 3. However, now that the relevance of liberal contexts has been emphasized in Studies 4 through 7, an empirical, contextual comparison is made in Study 8 between 20 European countries. European Social Survey data (wave 7, 2014) is therefore used to conduct a multilevel analysis.

The most basic hypotheses first tested on the entire data set are that ethnic minorities should be more supportive of multiculturalism than majorities (H1b), that majorities should perceive incompatibility between liberal, individual justice principles and multiculturalism (H1c), and that ethnic minorities should perceive significantly less incompatibility than
majorities (H1d). Then, country-level variation is examined in order to determine the degree to which these hypotheses are relevant across countries (Hox, 2010). If, and when, variation is found, country-level indicators are used to explain in which countries hypotheses are (most strongly) confirmed.

The country-level indicators used in Study 8 are the degree to which countries have implemented multicultural (“equality”) policies which address minority claims on the one hand, and Western versus post-communist regimes on the other hand. Indeed, the discrepancy in justice conceptions (and multicultural attitudes) between minorities and majorities should depend on the degree to which collective justice-based (i.e., multicultural, equality) policies are implemented at the national level (H3a). This discrepancy should also be particularly marked in Western liberal, compared to post-communist, societies (H3b).

Using multilevel moderation analysis, this final empirical study of the present thesis therefore examines to what degree the results from studies carried out exclusively in Switzerland are generalizable to other national contexts in Europe. While moderation analysis (Hayes, 2018) is used at the individual level, cross-level moderation analysis is used to help explain country level variation (Hox, 2010). Figure 4 summarizes the multilevel conceptual model for this chapter.

Similar measures to those used at the individual level in this study appear in other empirical studies of the present thesis (see Table 3). For example, the measure of support for multiculturalism at the individual level in this study refers to support for the presence of culturally diverse immigrant groups, much like in Study 6. Moreover, the measure of support for liberal, individual justice principles at the individual level refers to support for an individualized immigration policy, like Study 7. However, this second measure involves a larger number of items than the measure used in Study 7, referring to individual characteristics that encompass, but extend beyond, the selection of talented migrants.
specifically. The use of both similar and different measures throughout the four empirical chapters allows for a well-rounded perspective on the complex individual and collective justice-based constructs we try to exemplify.

Figure 4. Conceptual multilevel moderation model for chapter 6. As in chapter 3, minorities should support multiculturalism more strongly than majorities (H1b), and group membership and individual justice principles should interact such that minorities perceive significantly less incompatibility between individual justice principles and multiculturalism than majorities (H1c, d, e). This occurs at the individual level, represented by the area above the dotted line in this figure. Moreover, cross-level interactions should appear such that the discrepancy in justice conceptions (and multicultural attitudes) between minorities and majorities depends, on the one hand, on the degree to which equality policies are implemented at the national level (H3a), and occurs, on the other hand, particularly in Western liberal, compared to post-communist, societies (H3b). These country-level indicators are situated below the dotted-line in this figure, and cross-level interactions are represented by the arrows crossing the dotted line from the county level to the individual level.
CHAPTER 3

Multiculturalism in Liberal Societies:

Group Membership and Compatibility Between Individual and Collective Justice

STUDIES 1, 2, & 3

The degree to which classical liberal, individualist principles of Western societies are seen as (in)compatible with multiculturalism and minority rights is a key issue in diverse societies. Classical liberalism is grounded in individual justice principles, suggesting that individuals are responsible for their own fate and should be treated according to their personal characteristics, regardless of group membership. Multiculturalism, in turn, is grounded in collective justice principles, recognizing cultural differences and seeking greater equality between groups. The present research investigates how asymmetric group membership in dominant and subordinate groups shapes perceived compatibility between classical liberalism and multiculturalism. A correlational study \((N = 141)\) first shows that cultural minorities perceive greater compatibility between the two justice principles compared to native majorities. A second \((N = 202)\) and third \((N = 164)\) experimental study involving the description of a fictitious society manipulated perspective-taking as a function of social status, cultural origin and numerical size of groups. The findings show that respondents taking the perspective of immigrant groups perceive greater compatibility between classical liberalism and multiculturalism as an abstract ideology compared to a native perspective, and that a low status perspective leads to greater compatibility between classical liberalism and multiculturalism as a concrete policy compared to a high status perspective. Overall, these studies suggest that membership in subordinate groups generally

increases perceived compatibility between individual and collective forms of justice.

Implications associated with growing civic integrationist policies in Europe are discussed.

3.1 Introduction

“I have finally understood what it is [sic] my problem with social justice movements: the (often implicit) idea of society based on groups against the classical liberal idea of a society based on individuals.” (Antonini, 2017, December 1)

Multiculturalism—as a political theory and a public policy—aims to foster integration of cultural minorities in the wider society by facilitating their participation in common life, by recognizing their cultural origins and differences, and by compensating their historical disadvantages (Green & Staerklé, 2013; Kymlicka, 1995, 2001; Moghaddam, 2008). A major question surrounding multiculturalism, however, is the degree to which this group-based theory is compatible with the fundamentally individualistic orientation of classically liberal societies (Kymlicka, 1995, 2001).

Is the right to wear the Muslim headscarf a symbol of individual freedom of choice, or a sign of women’s oppression under Islamic law? Are group-conscious affirmative action policies an endorsement of greater equality or, instead, a symbol of reverse-discrimination and a violation of individual responsibility principles? In this article, we argue that these alternative perspectives are shaped by belief systems associated with asymmetric group membership in dominant and subordinate groups. Existing research has amply demonstrated that ethnic minorities show greater support for multiculturalism and minority rights than national majorities (Arends-Tóth & Van de Vijver, 2003; Dandy & Pe-Pua, 2010; Verkuyten, 2005, 2006; Wolsko et al., 2006). However, little social psychological research has analysed the degree to which members of these groups consider multiculturalism to be compatible or incompatible with classical liberal principles of individual freedom and individual
responsibility. The purpose of the present research was to examine how asymmetric group membership shapes this perceived (in)compatibility.

In the following, we first define multiculturalism as a political theory, highlighting arguments in favour or against its compatibility with the liberal state. We then discuss how belief systems associated with membership in asymmetric groups come into play, followed by three studies seeking to demonstrate how asymmetric group membership determines the degree to which individuals perceive compatibility between multiculturalism and classical liberalism.

3.1.1 Multiculturalism and Justice Conceptions

Multiculturalism is multifaceted. Aside from its descriptive construal denoting the presence of culturally diverse groups in society, multiculturalism can be understood as a prescriptive ideology and as a set of public policies aimed to deal with cultural diversity (Moghaddam, 2008; Sears et al., 1999), both based on collective justice principles (see Gale & Staerklé, 2017; Green & Staerklé, 2013). Collective justice is a form of “macrojustice” situated at the group-level (see Azzi, 1992; Brickman et al., 1981), concerned with acknowledging intergroup distinctiveness and ensuring fairness and equality between subgroups in society (Azzi, 1998). In line with these principles, multiculturalism as an abstract ideology recognizes and values cultural differences, and as a concrete policy, compensates disadvantages associated with membership in culturally subordinate groups through affirmative action and minority rights (see Kymlicka, 2001; Moghaddam, 2008; Sears et al., 1999). Multiculturalism in its abstract form is relatively uncontroversial whereas concrete forms elicit more disagreement and opposition (Sears et al., 1999; Yogeeswaran & Dasgupta, 2014b). It is therefore imperative to consider multicultural ideology and policy separately in analyses of attitudes towards multiculturalism.
Attitudes towards multiculturalism tend to be a reflection of more general belief systems which guide peoples’ thoughts about the “good society” (Staerklé, 2009; Tyler & van der Toorn, 2013). For example, Verkuyten and Martinovic (2006) show that support for multiculturalism is negatively correlated with individualism, operationalized as the belief that people are responsible for their own fate. This belief is linked to individual or “micro” forms of justice and is prevalent in Western liberal societies where societal norms attribute (lack of) achievements more easily to personal dispositions than to external situations, group affiliations, or collective disadvantages (Azzi, 1998; Brickman et al., 1981; Ross, 1977; Staerklé, 2009). Classical liberalism, rooted in the enlightenment philosophies of John Locke and Adam Smith, is at the core of these societal norms, encompassing not only individual autonomy and responsibility, but also capitalist free-market ideology and the individual right to property (see for example MacIntyre, 1981). Rawls' (1971) concepts of the “veil of ignorance” and “original position” also denote principles of classical liberalism as they prescribe the disregard of structural inequalities in order to allow equal treatment of all individuals according to their personal characteristics. Given the pervasiveness of these societal norms (Deschamps, 1982), how can multiculturalism, with its emphasis on groups, complement rather than contradict the taken-for-granted individualism of classically liberal societies? While social psychology has scarcely addressed this question, such a debate has a long history in political theory.

3.1.2 Multiculturalism: Union or Separation Between Individual and Collective Justice

Some theorists argue that multicultural principles and policies complement classical liberal theory. Towards the end of the 20th century, a “communitarian critique of liberalism” emerged in North America in which (classical) liberalism3 was criticized for its universal and

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3 We use “liberalism” in the sense of political theory (e.g., Kymlicka, 1995; Mouffe, 1992) to refer to classical liberal enlightenment philosophy based on the principle of individual autonomy. It should not be confounded
“atomistic” nature, conceptualizing individuals as self-sufficient and living in a social vacuum. Such critics called for greater acknowledgement of group membership as a foundation of self-esteem, personal development and sense-making (MacIntyre, 1981; Sandel, 1982; Taylor, 1985; Walzer, 1990). At an abstract level, valuing group-based diversity became a strategy to ensure positive self-feelings and secure identities for all members of society (Verkuyten, 2006). At a concrete level, minority rights and affirmative action policies acknowledged that minorities can be exposed to injustices related to language, politics and power, even when their individual rights are respected. Kymlicka (1995, 2001) highlights how multicultural policies protect minorities from oppression of the state, heeding and legitimizing their claims and supplementing basic rights guaranteed to all individuals in liberal societies. From this perspective, multiculturalism unites individual and collective justice.

Other theorists however argue that multicultural principles and policies are in contradiction to liberal theory. One argument is that multiculturalism’s interventionist approach is incoherent with liberalism’s laissez-faire principle (see Kukathas, 2003). Another is that multiculturalism’s recognition of cultural differences reinforces the group-based divides it seeks to reconcile by encouraging essentialization and spatial segregation between groups of different cultural backgrounds (see Barry, 2001; Koopmans, 2008). Sears et al. (1999) warn of “ethnic balkanization” whereby multiculturalism increases intergroup conflict through “heightened ethnic consciousness and antagonism towards other groups” (p. 36; see also Brewer, 1997). These arguments imply negative interdependence between multiculturalism and liberalism. From this perspective, multiculturalism is associated with a separation between individual and collective justice.

In social psychology, most studies have followed the logic of incompatibility by showing that individual justice (e.g., system-justifying meritocratic principles) is perceived as
irreconcilable with collective justice (e.g., affirmative action in favour of social change; see Bobocel et al., 1998; Brickman et al., 1981; Son Hing et al., 2011). Indeed, one may argue that this incompatibility between individual and collective justice is a hallmark finding of research on attitudes towards affirmative action and other minority-targeted policies. In the present paper we argue on the contrary that it is precisely this incompatibility that needs to be unpacked, by examining the social conditions under which individuals consider these two basic forms of justice to be compatible or not. We suggest that a key moderator of perceived compatibility is asymmetric group membership, which shapes perceptions of social reality in line with one’s position in the social hierarchy (see Bourdieu, 1979; Staerklé, 2009).

3.1.3 Asymmetric Group Perspectives on Justice and Multiculturalism

We argue that compared to dominant groups, cultural minority and other subordinate groups have a fundamentally different outlook on justice and multiculturalism that ultimately leads them to perceive individual and collective justice principles as being relatively compatible. Existing research confirms that ethnic minorities generally prefer multiculturalism as an integration policy whereas national majorities generally prefer individual justice-based policies such as assimilationism or other difference-blind policies (see Arends-Tóth & Van de Vijver, 2003; Ryan et al., 2007; Verkuyten, 2005, 2006; Wolsko et al., 2006). This group-based distinction is often explained by both identity-related and instrumental motives, since multicultural policies aim to promote social recognition of cultural minority groups, to allow for their cultural maintenance, and to improve their position as a group in the social hierarchy (see Verkuyten, 2005, 2006). This research explains why cultural minorities prefer collective justice compared to national majorities. But it does not explain differences in perceived compatibility between individual and collective justice principles which, we argue, are rooted in different modes of collective self-definitions for subordinate and dominant group members.
Indeed, subordinate group members tend to identify more readily with their group compared to dominant group members who tend to self-identify as individuals (Deschamps, 1982; Lorenzi-Cioldi, 1998; Simon et al., 2001). Such a trade-off between individual and collective forms of self-definitions is highlighted by Optimal Distinctiveness Theory (Brewer, 1991) that suggests that the groups with which people identify most strongly are those that provide an “optimal balance” between inclusion and distinctiveness needs (see also Hornsey & Jetten, 2004). This optimal balance is not only conditioned by asymmetric group membership, but it also shapes conceptions of individual and collective justice.

Azzi (1998), for example, highlights that collective justice is especially of concern when group membership is salient. This tends to be more often the case for cultural minority and other subordinate groups, creating a sense of (in-group) inclusion and (intergroup) distinctiveness, compared to national majority and dominant groups. At the same time, members of cultural minority groups are acutely aware of the individualistic nature of Western society (Sampson, 1988): Being fully accepted in a Western society implies identifying with principles of individual justice as well.

This difference in collective self-definitions therefore has deep roots in the ideological makeup of society. Collectively defined cultural minorities and other subordinate groups see themselves as being more distant from an individualist “point of reference [that] tends to define those who are owners of material and symbolic capital” (Deschamps, 1982, p. 88), but at the same time they aspire to get closer to this point of reference while still remaining sensitive to intergroup (Simon et al., 2001) and collective justice concerns. Research indeed shows that subordinate groups with a migration background engage in political claims for their group especially when they identify simultaneously with their own as well as the dominant group’s values (see Simon, 2011; Simon & Ruhs, 2008). Their concern for collective justice is therefore anchored in individual justice principles.
Dominant group members, in turn, have a more straightforward balance between their needs for inclusion and distinctiveness through their very membership in a dominant group defined by individualist norms (Hornsey & Jetten, 2004; Lorenzi-Cioldi, 1998). They thus tend to self-categorize as individuals, show “mindlessness” about group belongingness (see Iacoviello & Lorenzi-Cioldi, 2015; Simon et al., 2001), and demonstrate concern for individual rather than for collective justice (Azzi, 1992, 1998; Gale & Staerklé, 2017). Of course, consciousness of their advantages can increase their collective awareness and lead to greater intergroup guilt (Powell et al., 2005; see also Moscovici & Pérez, 2007), anger and support for initiatives seeking to compensate disadvantaged group members (Leach et al., 2006). But in line with the general assumption of a fundamental incompatibility between individual and collective justice, this greater collective awareness for dominant group members is thought to imply a distancing from individualist beliefs, suggesting that support for multiculturalism would weaken as individualist beliefs increase. Overall, then, this literature leads us to believe that not only is collective justice more salient for subordinate groups, but also that individual and collective forms of justice are more compatible, or at least less incompatible, for subordinate than for dominant groups.

3.1.4 Dimensions of Intergroup Asymmetry

In most studies on intergroup differences in multicultural attitudes, authors distinguish between Whites and other ethnicities (see for example Ryan et al., 2007; Wolsko et al., 2006), or between national majorities (e.g., Dutch or natives in general) and cultural minorities (e.g., Turkish-Dutch or immigrants in general; see for example Arends-Tóth & Van de Vijver, 2003; Dandy & Pe-Pua, 2010; Verkuyten, 2005, 2006; Verkuyten & Martinovic, 2006). These natural groups, however, may confound different dimensions defining asymmetric intergroup relations, in particular socio-economic status, cultural origin and numeric group size, each of which can potentially intervene in shaping justice beliefs. To our knowledge, no studies have
yet compared these differing asymmetric characteristics when studying attitudes towards multiculturalism. A further objective of our research was thus to determine the specific dimensions of asymmetric group membership that might explain the extent to which multiculturalism, as an ideology and policy, is perceived as (in-)compatible with classical liberalism.

3.1.5 The Present Studies

The purpose of the three present studies was threefold. Study 1 investigated whether the well-established difference between national majorities and cultural minorities in support for multiculturalism was moderated by beliefs in individual responsibility, a key dimension of individual justice and classical liberalism. Study 2 sought to replicate this analysis experimentally and to disentangle specific features associated with these asymmetric groups. Finally, Study 3 sought to replicate our findings with an alternative, prescriptive measure of individual responsibility as well as with a more abstract measure of classical liberalism focusing on individual freedom. Our general hypothesis was that asymmetric group membership and belief in classical liberalism would interact such that subordinate group members perceive greater compatibility between multiculturalism and liberalism compared to dominant group members. We report all measures, manipulations, and exclusions in these studies.

All studies were conducted in Switzerland, a country where national policy favours individual responsibility and assimilation of newcomers, putting little or no emphasis on their cultural maintenance (see Koopmans, 2010). In other words, Swiss society is firmly grounded in classical liberal norms of individual justice.
3.2 Study 1

First, a correlational study was conducted comparing native majorities and cultural minorities in the degree to which they considered multiculturalism and the belief in individual responsibility to be complementary or incompatible. Multiculturalism was operationalized in two ways: As an ideology that recognizes and values cultural groups and differences, and as an affirmative action policy that seeks to compensate disadvantages associated with membership in cultural minority groups.

Our first hypothesis was that cultural minorities would support both facets of multiculturalism significantly more strongly than native majorities. Our second hypothesis was that group membership and belief in individual responsibility (as the measure of classical liberalism) would interact to predict support for multicultural ideology and policy: Differences between cultural minorities and natives should be greater when their belief in individual responsibility is strong (2a), and such a belief should be negatively associated with support for multiculturalism only for natives (2b), but not for cultural minorities. Given multiculturalism’s multifaceted yet “unidimensional” nature (i.e., based on the same underlying collective justice principles; see also van de Vijver et al., 2008, p. 102), we expected these effects to be the same for both ideology and policy. However, policy would be generally less supported than ideology (see Sears et al., 1999; Yogeeswaran & Dasgupta, 2014b).

3.2.1 Method

Participants

Participants included 141 respondents recruited through an online snowball technique in the French-speaking part of Switzerland. Analyses were conducted only after all
participants were recruited.\textsuperscript{4} Age ranged from 18 to 68 ($M = 26.86$, $SD = 10.56$; 1 non-response) and most were female (69.5%, $N = 98$). The majority had solely Swiss nationality (64.5%; $N = 91$), while the remainder were either Swiss with dual (or triple) nationality (25.5%; $N = 36$), or non-Swiss (10% $N = 14$). Given their migration ancestry or experience with alternative cultural norms, respondents with dual nationality and non-Swiss nationality were both considered to be sensitive to questions related to minority cultural status. National majorities therefore comprised participants with only Swiss nationality (coded $1$), and cultural minorities included dual or triple as well as non-Swiss citizens (coded $-1$).\textsuperscript{5}

**Procedure and materials**

All participants filled out an online questionnaire including sociodemographic characteristics and the following measures ranging from 1 (strongly disagree) to 6 (strongly agree).\textsuperscript{6}

**Belief in individual responsibility** was assessed using a 4-item scale ($\alpha = .73$, $M = 3.13$, $SD = 0.94$; centred for analyses) originally developed by Major et al. (2002)\textsuperscript{7}, adapted and translated into French. Items included, “Switzerland is a society where each individual can attain a better position in society,” “Most people who do not progress should not blame

\textsuperscript{4}Power analyses were conducted using G*Power 3.1, based on previously documented differences between dominant (white, national majority) and subordinate (ethnic minority) groups on support for multiculturalism. Effect sizes ($d$) ranged from .47 (Wolsko et al., 2006, Study 1) to 1.99 (Verkuyten, 2005, Study 4). To replicate these effects for .80 power level, a sample of 10 (5 dominant, 5 subordinate) to 118 (69 dominant, 49 subordinate) participants was needed.

\textsuperscript{5}Cultural minorities’ ancestries were mostly Western European (76%; 52% neighbouring Switzerland) and North American (6%). Analyses were also conducted with the three citizenship categories kept separate using orthogonal contrast coding. Interpretation of results remained identical (see supplementary materials).

\textsuperscript{6}The following additional measures were included in the study: Social Dominance Orientation (6 items), Right Wing Authoritarianism (3 items), National and cultural identity (4 items each) and distractors from support for multiculturalism items (7 items; worded similarly but with emphasis on justice between individuals instead of groups). These measures were used to establish construct validity of the indicators measuring support for multicultural ideology and policy.

\textsuperscript{7}This variable was originally named “individual mobility” and “endorsement of meritocracy” (see McCoy & Major, 2007; Wiley et al., 2012). However, we chose “belief in individual responsibility” for the purpose of our study because the items measure this key dimension of liberalism. Meritocracy, in the literature, is often associated with the idea that hard work brings success and that positive outcomes are contingent on deservingness; dimensions which are not present in this measure. Individual responsibility for upward mobility and perceived permeability of group boundaries, however, represent fundamental components of the belief in classical liberalism.
the system; they are responsible themselves,” “Some people cannot manage to progress in society because of social inequalities” (reverse-coded), “Some people struggle to attain a better position in society because of their origins” (reverse-coded). High scores indicated a strong belief in individual responsibility for progress, and low scores indicated a belief that structural inequalities can inhibit progress.

Support for multicultural policy was assessed with three items (α = .78, M = 3.23, SD = 1.20) referring to affirmative action policies in the domains of education, employment and government: “Schools having a large proportion of children from cultural minority groups should receive special funding in order to guarantee conditions that are favourable to success,” “In order to guarantee diversity between employees, some job posts should be reserved for qualified members of minority groups,” and “The government should show an example and hire more members of cultural minority groups” (see Berry & Kalin, 1995). These items refer to the concrete facet of multiculturalism that is concerned with both recognizing groups and decreasing inequalities.

Support for multicultural ideology was assessed with four items (α = .76; M = 4.35, SD = 0.95) inspired from existing research (see Berry & Kalin, 1995; Guimond et al., 2014; Ryan et al., 2007) and constructed to represent the abstract idea that cultural origins and group differences should be recognized and valued. Item examples include, “Cultural affiliations are a precious distinction between individuals that should be valued,” and “In general, cultural differences should be celebrated.”

3.2.2 Results

Data analysis was carried out using SPSS, version 25. Descriptive statistics and correlations were assessed first, followed by hypothesis testing. In order to retain the complete sample of respondents and to prevent a reduction in statistical power, Maximum Likelihood (ML) estimation method was applied for missing cases of items representing belief in
individual responsibility and support for multicultural ideology and policy (4.0% missing data, Little’s MCAR test, $\chi^2(191) = 195.28, p = .401$).

**Descriptive Statistics and Correlations**

The means presented above show that in general, participants had a rather weak belief in individual responsibility, demonstrating awareness that structural inequalities can hinder one’s progress in society. Moreover, they tended to be rather supportive of multicultural ideology, but significantly less so of its policy, $t(140) = 10.78, p < .001, d = 1.82$, consistent with our expectations. While the two facets of multiculturalism were positively correlated ($r = .36, p < .001$), ideology was only weakly negatively associated with the individual responsibility belief ($r = -.16, p = .053$). Policy, instead, was more strongly negatively correlated with the individual responsibility belief ($r = -.46, p < .001$).

**Hypothesis Testing**

For hypothesis testing, two two-step hierarchical regressions were conducted with each facet of multiculturalism as the outcome variable. Predictors in step 1 included national citizenship (to test our first hypothesis) and individual responsibility belief as main effects. Step 2 incorporated the interaction between citizenship and individual responsibility belief, to test our second hypothesis.

Our first hypothesis was rejected in both models. While the omnibus tests revealed significance in step 1, $F(2, 138) = 19.08, p < .001, R^2 = .22$ for multicultural policy, $F(2, 138) = 3.29, p = .040, R^2 = .05$ for multicultural ideology, no main effects of citizenship were found.\(^8\) Indeed, citizenship did not significantly predict support for multicultural policy, $B = -0.11, SE = 0.10, 95\% \text{ CI} [-0.30, 0.08], t(138) = -1.17, p = .243$, nor ideology, $B = -0.14, SE = 0.08, 95\% \text{ CI} [-0.31, 0.03], t(138) = -1.65, p = .102, d = 0.28$, although results were in the expected direction.

\(^8\) The omnibus tests revealed significance because of the negative effect of the individual responsibility belief, which was significant ($p < .001$) in predicting policy and marginal ($p = .088$) in predicting ideology.
Consistent with our second hypothesis, the interaction effect of citizenship by individual responsibility belief accounted for a significant increase in explained variance in step 2, \( \Delta F(1, 137) = 5.47, p = .021, \Delta R^2 = .03 \) for policy, \( \Delta F(1, 137) = 14.10, p < .001, \Delta R^2 = .09 \) for ideology. This significant interaction effect was negative in both models, \( B = -0.25, SE = 0.11, 95\% CI [-0.46, -0.04], t(137) = -2.34, p = .021, d = 0.40 \) for policy, \( B = -0.34, SE = 0.09, 95\% CI [-0.52, -0.16], t(137) = -3.76, p < .001, d = 0.64 \) for ideology. Figure 5 illustrates the decomposition of these interactions, including unstandardized coefficients (and standard errors) of simple effects.

![Figure 5](image)

*Figure 5.* Perceived (in)compatibility between individual responsibility and multiculturalism by citizenship (Study 1). Numbers represent unstandardized coefficients (and standard errors) of simple effects.

***\( p < .001 \), **\( p < .01 \), *\( p < .05 \).

When predicting support for multicultural policy, results were consistent with hypotheses 2a and 2b. Simple effects showed that when the belief in individual responsibility was stronger (+1 SD), native Swiss participants supported multicultural policy significantly less than participants with other nationalities (H2a), 95\% CI [-0.64, -0.08], \( t(137) = -2.55, p = .012, d = 0.44 \). When a belief in individual responsibility was weaker (or awareness of structural inequalities was stronger, -1 SD), no significant difference was found between...
Swiss and other nationalities, 95% CI [-0.16, 0.36], \( t(137) = 0.78, p = .435 \). Moreover, for native Swiss, a stronger belief in individual responsibility was associated with significantly less support for multicultural policy (H2b), 95% CI [-0.94, -0.49], \( t(137) = -6.32, p < .001, d = 1.08 \). For participants with other nationalities, support for multicultural policy was similar regardless of degree of individual responsibility belief, 95% CI [-0.57, 0.13], \( t(137) = -1.23, p = .219 \). In sum, individual responsibility and multicultural policy were negatively linked and thus considered incompatible for native Swiss citizens. However, there was no link between the two for participants with other nationalities, and the interaction effect suggested they perceived significantly less incompatibility between the two.

When predicting support for multicultural ideology, simple effects were similar. When a belief in individual responsibility was stronger (+1 SD), native Swiss participants supported multicultural ideology significantly less than participants with other nationalities (H2a), 95% CI [-0.72, -0.24], \( t(137) = -3.96, p < .001, d = 0.68 \). When a belief in individual responsibility was weaker (-1 SD), no significant differences were found between native Swiss and other nationalities, 95% CI [-0.06, 0.37], \( t(137) = 1.39, p = .166 \). For native Swiss, a stronger belief in individual responsibility was again associated with significantly less support for multicultural ideology (H2b), 95% CI [-0.54, -0.16], \( t(137) = -3.58, p < .001, d = 0.61 \). However, for participants with other nationalities, a stronger belief in individual responsibility was associated with significantly greater support for multicultural ideology, 95% CI [0.03, 0.63], \( t(137) = 2.18, p = .031, d = 0.37 \). In sum, individual responsibility and multicultural ideology were incompatible for native Swiss citizens, but compatible for those with other nationalities.

### 3.2.3 Discussion

Results from this correlational study provide preliminary evidence that national majorities and cultural minorities differ in the degree to which they perceive multiculturalism
(collective justice) as compatible with liberalism (individual justice). Multiculturalism was defined both as an abstract ideology and as a concrete policy. The non-significant main effect of citizenship (H1) suggests that native Swiss majorities and minorities with other national heritage did not differ in their support for either facet of multiculturalism. This result was unexpected and can be explained by the fact that in French-speaking Switzerland where data were collected, public opinion tends to be relatively supportive of cultural minorities in comparison to the Swiss German majority region (Manatschal, 2011).

The significant interaction terms (H2), however, show that differences between national majorities and cultural minorities were only significant when a belief in individual responsibility was strong (H2a) and that national majorities considered multiculturalism to be incompatible with liberalism (H2b), while cultural minorities perceived greater compatibility (or no link between the two). These results suggest that the distinction between cultural minorities and national majorities in support for multiculturalism so widely demonstrated in the literature (see Arends-Tóth & Van de Vijver, 2003; Dandy & Pe-Pua, 2010; van de Vijver et al., 2008; Verkuyten, 2005, 2006; Wolsko et al., 2006) can be explained by the degree to which multiculturalism, based on collective justice principles, is perceived as complementary or incompatible with the dominant societal norm of individual justice. In order to confirm this interpretation and to compensate for the limitations of Study 1 (convenience sample, relatively small minority group, pooling of non-Swiss and dual citizenship respondents into a single cultural minority group), a second, experimental study was designed. This study also sought to determine the actual criteria of asymmetric groups that lead their members to perceive (in)compatibility between multiculturalism and classical liberalism.

3.3 Study 2

Study 2 involved a realistic description of a fictitious society (see Azzi, 1992; Jetten et al., 2015). This approach allowed us to distinguish between the different asymmetric group
types, all fabricated and “unknown” to participants. It also allowed us to maintain a social context similar to the one participants experienced in their daily lives, allowing them to transpose their assumptions and conceptions of the world onto the fictitious situation presented to them (Bruckmüller & Abele, 2010; Conway, Pizzamiglio, & Mount, 1996).

The experimental design aimed to disentangle social status (high/low), cultural origin (native/immigrant ancestry) and numerical size (majority/minority) as criteria of asymmetric groups. Prior research has studied ingroup favouritism and outgroup derogation distinguishing asymmetric groups according to status, power and size (see Sachdev & Bourhis, 1991; Simon et al., 2001). Status manipulations in such studies generally relied on prestige and esteem, assigning participants to groups according to their alleged creativity (Sachdev & Bourhis, 1991) or artistic taste (Lücken & Simon, 2005). Since national majorities and cultural minorities generally differ in terms of access to cultural and material resources (see Simon & Oakes, 2006), we defined status in terms of social standing by differentiating groups based on education and career success or failure.

We expected that perceived compatibility between multiculturalism and individual responsibility would depend on the interplay between the specific criterion of intergroup asymmetry (origin, status and size) and the abstract vs. concrete nature of multiculturalism. We reasoned that since concrete (e.g., affirmation action-type) policies of multiculturalism were devised not only to enhance cultural recognition, but also to decrease social inequalities between subordinate and dominant groups (Kymlicka, 1995, 2001; Moghaddam, 2008), social status differentials should play a greater role in shaping perceived compatibility than the other two criteria (origin and size; H1). Hence, only high status group members should perceive incompatibility between multicultural (affirmative action) policy and individual responsibility, and low status group members should not. Given the dual focus of multicultural policies on
recognition and inequality reduction, however, we did not discount the possibility that status interacts with origin to reveal more nuanced effects.

Conversely, we expected that cultural origin should be a relatively more important predictor of perceived compatibility between multicultural ideology and individual responsibility compared to status and size (H2), because multicultural ideology abstractly values group-based cultural differences. We therefore expected that native group members would perceive incompatibility between multicultural ideology and individual responsibility (H2a), while immigrant group members would perceive compatibility between them (H2b).

For all hypothesis tests, differences between numerical minorities and majorities were controlled for.

### 3.3.1 Method

**Participants**

Participants included 202 students in an introductory social psychology course at a university in French-speaking Switzerland. This sample size was determined before data analysis. Age ranged from 17 to 45 ($M = 20.58$, $SD = 3.23$; 7 non-response), with 98% under 28 years old. Participants were predominantly women (71%, $N = 143$; 8 non-response) and 49% were solely Swiss ($N = 99$). The remainder were Swiss with dual (or triple) nationality (33%; $N = 67$) or non-Swiss (15%, $N = 30$; 6 non-response).

**Procedure and Materials**

During class, participants filled out a questionnaire comprised of the following experimental manipulations and measures.

**Belief in individual responsibility.** First, participants filled out the same 4-item measure described in Study 1 ($\alpha = .61$, $M = 3.13$, $SD = 0.84$).

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9 Based on interaction effects from Study 1, a power analysis conducted using G*Power 3.1 showed that 93 participants were needed to replicate the medium-sized effect ($d = .59$) on support for multicultural ideology, while 220 were needed to replicate the smaller-sized effect ($d = .38$) on multicultural policy (for .80 power).
Experimental design. Each participant was then randomly assigned to one of eight conditions, according to a 2 (status: high vs. low) x 2 (origin: native vs. immigrant) x 2 (size: majority vs. minority) experimental design. In each condition, participants read a scenario about life on an island named Ral inhabited by two groups: the Kaldan (N = 104) and the Felorese (N = 98). Participants were asked to imagine themselves as a member of one of the two groups. The Kaldan were of high social status, with more jobs and greater academic success, whereas the Felorese were of lower social status, struggling to find jobs and with weaker academic success (first experimental condition: status). Participants also read about the origins of their group, either having ancestors who immigrated to the island over 100 years ago following a natural disaster on their island of origin (N = 99), or having ancestors whose origins were native to Ral since the beginning of time (N = 103; second experimental condition: origin).\textsuperscript{10} Their group was either a numerical minority with 50 000 inhabitants (N = 100) or a numerical majority with 300 000 inhabitants on the island (N = 102; third experimental condition: size; full text in Appendix A).

Support for multicultural policy and ideology. At the end of the scenario, participants read that the governor of an adjacent island had recently suggested to the leaders of Ral to implement policies seeking to improve living conditions of the two groups on the island. Participants were asked to respond to a survey, conducted by the government of Ral, requesting the population’s opinion towards the proposed policies and measures. As members of the assigned groups, participants were asked to indicate their degree of agreement with the

\textsuperscript{10} Having ancestors living in a country for over 100 years does not imply that their offspring are immigrants, \textit{per se}, as well. However, we use the label “immigrant” to acknowledge the salient immigration background (and thus cultural minority status relative to natives) of members of this group. This distinction is relevant in the European context, in which this study was conducted. In Europe, the native, national majority group is generally dominant relative to groups with an immigration background, unlike in settler contexts where natives (i.e., aboriginals) form subordinate groups and where “immigration background” has a different meaning.
same items used in Study 1, assessing their support for multicultural policy (3 items; α = .62, M = 3.62, SD = 1.05) and ideology (4 items; α = .64, M = 4.12, SD = 0.90).\(^{11}\)

Participants then responded to a manipulation check composed of the three following sections.

**Perceived privilege** was measured by four items (α = .83). Two items assessed privilege, for example, “I feel privileged because I am a Kaldan [Felorese],” and two items assessed disadvantage (reverse-coded), for example, “I feel disadvantaged because I belong to the Kaldan [Felorese] group.” All were coded on a 6-point scale ranging from 1 (strongly disagree) to 6 (strongly agree). High scores indicated perceived privilege, low scores indicated perceived disadvantage.

**Recall and understanding of the text** was assessed using three pairs of items coded on a 6-point scale ranging from 1 (not at all) to 6 (completely). One pair referred the numerical majority/minority status of the participant’s group: “My group is larger in numbers than the other,” and, “My group constitutes less than half the population of Ral island” (r = -.85, p < .001). Another tapped into their native/immigrant status: “On Ral island, my group is native,” and, “My group took up residence on Ral island following a natural catastrophe on our island of origin” (r = -.71, p < .001). The last pair referred to their social status, represented by their access to jobs: “Almost all members of my group have a job,” and, “Members of my group sometimes have trouble finding work” (r = -.85, p < .001). Each pair was collapsed into a single score after the second item was reverse-coded. A high score indicated majority status, native status, and high social status, respectively.

**Difficulty of the exercise** was measured by two items coded on a 6-point scale ranging from 1 (not at all) to 6 (completely): “To what extent was it easy to put yourself in the place of a member of the Kaldan [Felorese] group?” and, “To what extent did you find the

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\(^{11}\) The same distractors in Study 1 were included in Study 2 (7 items; worded similarly as support for multiculturalism items, but with emphasis on individuals rather than groups).
questions difficult to respond to?” These items were treated separately ($r = -.38, p < .001$).
Participants were then asked to reflect on their experience in a section where they could comment freely.

Questions regarding sociodemographic characteristics were included at the end of the questionnaire.

3.3.2 Results
Manipulations were checked first, followed by descriptive statistics and finally hypothesis testing. Maximum Likelihood (ML) estimation method was applied for missing cases of all items (0.93% missing data) except sociodemographic ones. In order to control for characteristics representing membership in real asymmetric groups, all analyses were also performed controlling for citizenship, gender and age. Unless otherwise stated (in Appendix A), no links were found between these characteristics and any conditions or measures in the study.

Manipulation Checks
Perceived privilege. In a three-way ANOVA, tests of between-subjects effects showed that participants assigned to the high status group ($M = 4.74$, $SE = 0.09$) felt significantly more privileged than those assigned to the low status group ($M = 3.03$, $SE = 0.09$), $F(1, 194) = 182.72$, $p < .001$, $\eta^2_p = 0.49$, natives of the island ($M = 4.01$, $SE = 0.09$) felt more privileged than immigrants ($M = 3.76$, $SE = 0.09$), $F(1, 194) = 3.88$, $p = .050$, $\eta^2_p = 0.02$, and majority members ($M = 4.00$, $SE = 0.09$) felt marginally more privileged than minority members ($M = 3.77$, $SE = 0.09$), $F(1, 194) = 3.21$, $p = .075$, $\eta^2_p = 0.02$.

Recall and understanding of the text. A three-way MANOVA showed that low status group members ($M = 1.82$, $SE = 0.08$) recognized their lower status in comparison to high status group members ($M = 5.04$, $SE = 0.08$), $F(1, 194) = 755.47$, $p < .001$, $\eta^2_p = 0.80$. Immigrants ($M = 1.76$, $SE = 0.11$) recognized their immigrant status in comparison to natives
(M = 5.22, SE = 0.10), F(1, 194) = 514.86, p < .001, η² = 0.73. Minority members (M = 1.58, SE = 0.11) recognized their numerical minority status in comparison to majority members (M = 5.43, SE = 0.11), F(1, 194) = 788.15, p < .001, η² = 0.80.

**Difficulty of the exercise.** A three-way MANOVA predicting the two measures of perceived easiness and difficulty of the task showed no significant differences between the three manipulations.

**Descriptive Statistics and Correlations**

The means presented in the methods section for the overall sample show that participants were generally aware of structural inequalities in society and supportive of multiculturalism as an ideology, but rather neutral in their support for multicultural policy. Indeed, multicultural policy was, again, supported significantly less strongly than multicultural ideology, t(201) = -5.32, p < .001, d = 0.75. Interestingly, the two facets of multiculturalism were not correlated in this study (r = .06, p = .387). However, a stronger belief in individual responsibility was associated with decreased support for multicultural policy (r = -0.14, p = .046), but not ideology (r = .00, p = .956), consistent with Study 1.

**Hypothesis Testing**

Table 4 shows hierarchical regression results assessing the impact of conditions, individual responsibility belief, and interactions on support for multicultural policy and ideology. Step 1 displays main effects. No differences were found between experimental conditions on support for either facet of multiculturalism, although a stronger belief in individual responsibility was associated with marginally less support for multicultural policy, 95% CI [-0.35, -0.00], p = .046, d = 0.29, consistent with Study 1. Step 2 incorporated the interactions between experimental conditions and individual responsibility belief, testing our two main hypotheses. As expected, results were consistent with those found in Study 1, albeit pertaining to distinct groups. When predicting support for multicultural policy, the expected
interaction between status and individual responsibility was (just) significant (H1), 95% CI [-0.35, -0.01], \( p = .043, d = 0.29 \). When predicting support for multicultural ideology, the expected interaction between origin and individual responsibility was significant (H2), 95% CI [-0.40, -0.10], \( p = .001, d = 0.48 \). Figure 6 shows the decompositions of these interaction effects, including unstandardized coefficients (and standard errors) of simple effects.

Table 4
 Hierarchical regression results: Effects of conditions, individual responsibility belief and interactions on support for Multicultural (MC) policy and ideology (Study 2)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>MC Policy</th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th>MC Ideology</th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>B</td>
<td>SE</td>
<td>( t )</td>
<td>B</td>
<td>SE</td>
<td>( t )</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Step 1</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
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<td>0.07</td>
<td>-1.61</td>
<td>-0.10</td>
<td>0.06</td>
<td>-1.62</td>
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<td>-0.39</td>
<td>0.05</td>
<td>0.06</td>
<td>0.70</td>
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<tr>
<td>Size: Minority/Majority</td>
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<td>0.07</td>
<td>1.13</td>
<td>0.06</td>
<td>0.06</td>
<td>0.88</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Individual Responsibility</td>
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<td>0.09</td>
<td>-2.01*</td>
<td>0.01</td>
<td>0.08</td>
<td>0.09</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(IndResp)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Step 2</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Status*IndResp</td>
<td>-0.18</td>
<td>0.09</td>
<td>-2.03*</td>
<td>0.02</td>
<td>0.08</td>
<td>0.31</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Origin*IndResp</td>
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<td>0.09</td>
<td>-0.89</td>
<td>-0.25</td>
<td>0.08</td>
<td>-3.34**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Size*IndResp</td>
<td>0.03</td>
<td>0.09</td>
<td>0.33</td>
<td>0.13</td>
<td>0.08</td>
<td>1.67</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>( R^2_{step 1} )</td>
<td>.04</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>.02</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>( \Delta R^2 )</td>
<td>.02</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>.06**</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>F statistic</strong></td>
<td>1.88^ ( (df = 7, 194) )</td>
<td>2.43* ( (df = 7, 194) )</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Note.* **\( p < .01 \), *\( p < .05 \), \( ^* p < .10 \)

Conditions coded so that -1 represents low status, immigrant and minority groups; 1 represents high status, native and majority groups. IndResp mean centred.

Simple effects for the significant interaction term on support for multicultural policy showed that for high status group members, a stronger belief in individual responsibility was associated with weaker support for multicultural policy, 95% CI [-0.61, -0.11], \( t(194) = -2.83, p = .005, d = 0.41 \), consistent with H1. For low status group members, support for
multicultural policy remained on the same level regardless of individual responsibility belief, 95% CI [-0.24, 0.24], t(194) = -0.02, p = .981 (other simple effect descriptions in Appendix A). Low status group members therefore generally perceived less incompatibility between individual responsibility and multiculturalism policy than high status group members (see Figure 6).

Figure 6. Perceived (in)compatibility between individual responsibility and multiculturalism by experimental conditions (Study 2). Numbers represent unstandardized coefficients (and standard errors) of simple effects/slopes.

**p < .01, *p < .05, ^p < .10.

In order to explore whether this interaction between status and individual responsibility was more relevant for natives or for immigrants, a supplementary regression model was tested incorporating a triple interaction between individual responsibility, origin and status. In this model, the numerical size of the group was simply controlled for. Results revealed a marginally significant triple interaction, $B = -0.15$, 95% CI [-0.32, 0.02], $SE = 0.09$, $t(193) = -1.71$, $p = .089$, $d = 0.25$, suggesting that status and individual responsibility interacted for natives, $B = -0.32$, 95% CI [-0.56, -0.08], $SE = 0.12$, $t(193) = -2.64$ $p = .009$, $d = 0.38$, but not for immigrants, $B = -0.03$, 95% CI [-0.27, 0.21], $SE = 0.12$, $t(193) = -0.22$ $p = .825$. Indeed, high status natives perceived incompatibility between individual responsibility
and multiculturalism, $B = -0.60$, 95% CI [-0.95, -0.25], $SE = 0.18$, $t(193) = -3.39$, $p < .001$, $d = 0.49$, while low status natives did not, $B = 0.05$, 95% CI [-0.29, 0.38], $SE = 0.17$, $t(193) = 0.27$, $p = .789$ (nor did high or low status immigrants, $p = .438$, $p = .619$, respectively).

Simple effects for the significant interaction term on support for multicultural ideology (see Figure 6) showed that for natives, a stronger belief in individual responsibility was associated with significantly less support for multicultural ideology, 95% CI [-0.44, -0.02], $t(194) = -2.16$, $p = .032$, $d = 0.31$, consistent with H2a. For immigrants, a stronger belief in individual responsibility was associated with significantly more support for multicultural ideology, 95% CI [0.06, 0.48], $t(194) = 2.56$, $p = .011$, $d = 0.37$, consistent with H2b.

Participants in the experimental native group therefore perceived incompatibility between individual responsibility and multiculturalism ideology, while those in the experimental immigrant group perceived compatibility between the two.

### 3.3.3 Discussion

Results from this second study both corroborate and extend those from Study 1. Members of an experimental high status group perceived significantly less compatibility between individual responsibility and multicultural policy than members of the low status group (H1). Members of an experimental immigrant group perceived relative compatibility between multicultural ideology and individual responsibility, while members of the native group perceived them as relatively incompatible (H2).

This study has limitations. While the results were relatively consistent with those obtained in Study 1, the power of the study remained rather weak, with slightly fewer participants than anticipated to replicate both interactions from Study 1. Moreover, internal consistency of the three major measures was lower compared to those in Study 1, and the correlation between the two facets of multiculturalism was no longer significant. These outcomes may be due to participants’ struggle to answer questions as members of fictitious
experimental groups, especially when one’s assigned position differs from one’s actual position in society.

Another limitation common to both Studies 1 and 2 was the use of a relatively narrow, descriptive measure of individual responsibility, gauging the extent to which individuals believe society is currently functioning according to individual justice principles. Since classical liberalism as a political theory involves a normative perspective concerning how individuals and societies ought to function, Study 3 tested the same hypotheses with newly developed, prescriptive measures of classical liberalism.

3.4 Study 3

Study 3 served as a replication of Study 2, involving a similar description of a fictitious society. This time, to simplify the paradigm, only status and origin were manipulated orthogonally, and new measures of classical liberalism were included.

The same two hypotheses from Study 2 were maintained and adapted accordingly. Firstly, consistent with the triple interaction found in Study 2, only high status native group members should perceive incompatibility between multicultural policy and individual responsibility (H1), while low status native group members and immigrants, regardless of their status, should not. Secondly, native group members should perceive incompatibility between multicultural ideology and individual responsibility (H2a), while immigrant group members should perceive compatibility between them (H2b).

3.4.1 Method

Participants

Participants included 164 students in an introductory social psychology course at a university in French-speaking Switzerland. This sample size was determined before any data
analysis. Age ranged from 18 to 46 ($M = 20.94$, $SD = 2.89$; 2 non-response), with 98% under 27 years old. Participants were predominantly women (81%, $N = 133$; 2 non-response) and 52% were solely Swiss ($N = 86$). The remainder were Swiss with dual (or triple) nationality (28%; $N = 46$) or non-Swiss (15%, $N = 25$; 2 non-response).

**Procedure and Materials**

During class, participants filled out a questionnaire similar to the one used in Study 2, with the following changes.

**Prescriptive belief in individual responsibility.** First, participants responded to a four-item measure of prescriptive individual responsibility that was constructed and validated in a pilot study. Only the following three items were retained because of their greater coherence and improved internal consistency: “Individuals should be responsible for their progress/actions/own outcomes” ($\alpha = .75$ instead of $\alpha = .69$, $M = 4.44$, $SD = 1.01$; removed item: “Switzerland is a society where all individuals should try to obtain a better position in society”). The pilot study ($N = 65$) showed significant correlations with other indicators of classical liberalism such as free-market ideology ($r = .41$, $p = .001$), individual human right to property ($r = .36$, $p = .004$), and the previously used measure of (descriptive) belief in individual responsibility ($r = .55$, $p < .001$).

**Classical liberalism.** Participants responded to a six-item scale measuring endorsement of principles of classical liberalism (as opposed to communitarianism; $\alpha = .68$, $M = 4.52$, $SD = 0.69$) that was constructed and validated in the same pilot study. The following items were used: “Individual freedom should not be constrained by group values”, “Individual choice should have priority over group decisions”, “An individual’s identity

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12 While we were hoping for a larger sample (at least $N = 200$), this was the number of students in the class who agreed to participate in the study.

13 The item-total correlations were all satisfactory for the 3-item measure (ranging from $r = .52$ to $r = .68$) but were not for the 4-item measure ($r = .27$ for the excluded item; Nunnally & Bernstein (1994) suggest $r = .30$ is a conservative cut-off for item-total correlations). In the pilot study, the 4-item measure had better internal consistency ($\alpha = .82$ instead of $\alpha = .84$ for the 3-item measure), although the excluded item was substantially less correlated (often non-significantly) with other indicators of classical liberalism.
should not depend on the group’s identity”, as well as three reverse-coded items, “Group loyalty should be more important than individual liberty”, “The common good of the group should have priority over individual autonomy”, “Group rights should be more important than individual rights”. The pilot study showed similar internal consistency to the present study (α = .64). Supporting its external validity, the scale was correlated (either significantly or marginally) with the individual human rights to property (r = .28, p = .030), and privacy (r = .22, p = .089), and with descriptive (r = .27, p = .039) and prescriptive beliefs in individual responsibility (r = .25, p = .049).

**Experimental design.** Each participant was randomly assigned to one of four conditions, according to a 2 x 2 experimental design. The exact same scenario as in Study 2 was presented to them, except that only status (high, N = 82, versus low, N = 82) and origin (immigrant, N = 81, versus native, N = 83) were manipulated.

**Support for multicultural policy and ideology.** As in Study 2, at the end of the scenario, participants as members of their assigned groups were asked to respond to a survey regarding their opinion towards multicultural policy (three items; α = .62, M = 3.84, SD = 0.96) and ideology (four items; α = .67, M = 4.46, SD = 0.79).14

**Manipulation checks.** Participants responded to the same manipulation checks from Study 2, composed of perceived privilege (α = .74), recall and understanding of their high/low (r = -.85, p < .001) and native/immigrant status (r = -.83, p < .001), and easiness/difficulty of the exercise (two items treated separately, r = -.08, p = .209)

### 3.4.2 Results

Manipulations were checked first, followed by descriptive statistics and hypothesis testing. Maximum Likelihood (ML) estimation method was applied for missing cases of all

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14 The same distractors in Studies 1 and 2 were included in Study 3.
items (0.56% missing data) except sociodemographic ones and all analyses were also performed controlling for citizenship, gender and age (see Appendix A).

**Manipulation Checks**

**Perceived privilege.** In a two-way ANOVA, tests of between-subjects effects showed that participants assigned to the high status group ($M = 4.74, SE = 0.09$) felt significantly more privileged than those assigned to the low status group ($M = 3.36, SE = 0.09$), $F(1, 160) = 114.18, p < .001, \eta_p^2 = 0.42$, and natives ($M = 4.25, SE = 0.09$) felt significantly more privileged than immigrants ($M = 3.85, SE = 0.09$), $F(1, 160) = 9.72, p = .002, \eta_p^2 = 0.06$.

**Recall and understanding of the text.** A two-way MANOVA showed that low status group members ($M = 2.03, SE = 0.11$) recognized their lower status in comparison to high status group members ($M = 4.86, SE = 0.11$), $F(1, 160) = 331.40, p < .001, \eta_p^2 = 0.67$. Immigrants ($M = 1.82, SE = 0.12$) recognized their immigrant status in comparison to natives ($M = 5.21, SE = 0.12$), $F(1, 160) = 384.15, p < .001, \eta_p^2 = 0.71$.

**Difficulty of the exercise.** A three-way MANOVA predicting the two measures of perceived easiness and difficulty of the task showed that high status group members ($M = 3.81, SE = 0.15$) experienced greater difficulty to imagine themselves as a member of their group in comparison to low status group members ($M = 3.16, SE = 0.15$), $F(1, 160) = 9.26, p = .003, \eta_p^2 = 0.06$. No other main or interaction effects were found.

**Descriptive Statistics and Correlations**

The means presented in the methods section for the overall sample show that participants generally agreed with the idea that all individuals should be responsible for progress, and that individual freedom and autonomy should be more valued than group affiliations and loyalty. They were also fairly supportive of multiculturalism as an ideology, but again rather neutral in their support for multicultural policy which was supported less, $t(163) = -7.52, p < .001, d = 1.18$. As in Study 1, the two facets of multiculturalism were
positively correlated ($r = .30, p < .001$). Moreover, the two new sub-dimensions of liberalism, prescriptive individual responsibility belief and classical liberalism, were marginally positively correlated ($r = .13, p = .090$), although neither was significantly associated with multicultural policy ($r = -.04, p = .608, r = .09, p = .250$, respectively) or ideology ($r = -.01, p = .863, r = .10, p = .195$, respectively).

**Hypothesis Testing**

Table 5 shows hierarchical regression results assessing the impact of conditions, (prescriptive) individual responsibility belief, and interactions on support for multicultural policy and ideology. In additional analyses, the individual responsibility belief scale was replaced with the classical liberalism measure. Similarities and differences between these models are reported where relevant.

Step 1 displays main effects. No differences were found between experimental conditions on support for either facet of multiculturalism and the prescriptive belief in individual responsibility remained non-significant. Step 2 incorporated the interactions between experimental conditions and individual responsibility belief, testing our two main hypotheses. When predicting support for multicultural policy, the two-way interaction between status and individual responsibility was non-significant. However, the triple interaction in step 3 was (just) significant, in line with H1, 95% CI [-0.30, -0.01], $p = .034$, $d = 0.34^{15}$, showing that this interaction occurred only for natives, $B = -0.28$, 95% CI [-0.49, -0.06], $SE = 0.11, t(156) = -2.54$ $p = .012$, $d = 0.41$, and not for immigrants, $B = 0.03$, 95% CI [-0.15, 0.22], $SE = 0.09, t(156) = 0.34$ $p = .735$.

When predicting support for multicultural ideology, the expected interaction between origin and individual responsibility was marginally significant (H2), 95% CI [-0.25, -0.00], $p = .044$, $d = 0.32$. The model using classical liberalism instead of individual responsibility

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15 The model using classical liberalism instead of individual responsibility did not reveal any significant effects predicting support for multicultural policy.
revealed the same marginally significant interaction effect, $B = -0.16$, 95% CI [-0.33, 0.02], $SE = 0.09$, $t(158) = -1.74$, $p = .085$, $d = 0.28$. While step 3 for the model predicting support for multicultural ideology is shown in Table 5 for reasons of symmetry, we neither expected nor found a significant triple interaction incorporating the status manipulation.

Table 5

Hierarchical regression results: Effects of conditions, prescriptive individual responsibility belief and interactions on support for Multicultural (MC) policy and ideology (Study 3)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>MC Policy</th>
<th></th>
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<th>MC Ideology</th>
<th></th>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>$B$</td>
<td>$SE$</td>
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<td>$B$</td>
<td>$SE$</td>
<td>$t$</td>
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<td>Step 1</td>
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<td></td>
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<td>0.08</td>
<td>1.78$^\wedge$</td>
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<td>Origin: Immigrant/Native</td>
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<td>-0.01</td>
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<td>Prescriptive Individual Responsibility (PlndResp)</td>
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<td>0.26</td>
<td>0.07</td>
<td>3.58$^{***}$</td>
<td>0.11</td>
<td>0.06</td>
<td>1.74$^\wedge$</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Status<em>Origin</em>PlndResp</td>
<td>-0.16</td>
<td>0.07</td>
<td>-2.14$^*$</td>
<td>-0.08</td>
<td>0.06</td>
<td>-1.22</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$R^2_{step 1}$</td>
<td>.03</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>.00</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$\Delta R^2_{step 2}$</td>
<td>.01</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>.03$^\wedge$</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$\Delta R^2_{step 3}$</td>
<td>.10$^{***}$</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$F$ statistic final model</td>
<td>3.36$^{**}$ $(df = 7, 156)$</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>1.15 $(df = 5, 158)$</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Note.* $^{***}p < .001$, $^{**}p < .01$, $^*p < .05$, $^\wedge p < .10$

Conditions coded so that -1 represents low status and immigrant groups; 1 represents high status and native groups. PlndResp mean centred.

Figure 7 shows the decomposition of the significant triple interaction term on support for multicultural policy. Simple effects showed that among immigrants, as in Study 2, both low status and high status group members’ support for multicultural policy remained on a
similar level regardless of prescriptive individual responsibility belief (95% CI [-0.37, 0.18], \( t(156) = -0.70, p = .486; 95\% \text{ CI} [-0.29, 0.22], t(156) = -0.26, p = .797 \), respectively). Among low status natives, support for multicultural policy also remained on a similar level regardless of individual responsibility belief, 95% CI [-0.09, 0.50], \( t(156) = 1.40, p = .163 \). However, among high status natives, a stronger belief in individual responsibility was associated with significantly weaker support for multicultural policy, 95% CI [-0.66, -0.03], \( t(156) = -2.17, p = .032, d = 0.35 \), consistent with H1 (other simple effect descriptions in Appendix A).

Immigrants and low status natives therefore generally perceived significantly less incompatibility between individual responsibility and multicultural policy than high status natives.

![Diagram](image)

**Figure 7.** Perceived (in)compatibility between prescriptive individual responsibility and multicultural policy by experimental conditions (Study 3). Numbers represent unstandardized coefficients (and standard errors) of simple effects/slopes.

***\( p < .001 \), *\( p < .05 \).

Simple effects for the marginally significant interaction term on support for multicultural ideology were all non-significant but in the expected direction. For natives, the belief in individual responsibility was not associated with support for multicultural ideology,
although the sign was indeed negative (H2a), $B = -0.16$, 95% CI [-0.34, 0.03], $SE = 0.09$, $t(158) = -1.66$, $p = .100$, $d = 0.26$. For immigrants, the belief in individual responsibility was not associated with support for multicultural ideology either, although the sign was indeed positive (H2b), $B = 0.10$, 95% CI [-0.06, 0.26], $SE = 0.08$, $t(156) = 1.19$, $p = .236$, $d = 0.24$. These non-significant simple effects are reported to aid in interpreting the marginally significant interaction term which showed that participants in the experimental native and immigrant groups marginally differed from each other, in the expected direction in the degree to which they perceived (in)compatibility between prescriptive individual responsibility and multicultural ideology.

When decomposing the same (marginally significant) interaction where classical liberalism was used instead of individual responsibility, most simple effects were again non-significant and in the expected direction. The only exception was that for immigrants, the belief that individual freedom and autonomy should be more valued than group affiliations and loyalty was associated with greater support for multicultural ideology, $B = 0.28$, 95% CI [0.02, 0.54], $SE = 0.13$, $t(158) = 2.17$, $p = .032$, $d = 0.35$, consistent with H2b and supporting the finding that immigrants perceive compatibility between liberalism and multiculturalism.

3.4.3 Discussion

Results from this third study provide additional support for the conjecture that membership in (culturally and economically) subordinate groups increases perceived compatibility between liberalism and multiculturalism. Indeed, compatibility between (prescriptive) individual responsibility and multicultural policy was contingent on one’s experimental social status, whereby high status natives perceived significantly greater incompatibility than low status natives (H1). Moreover, immigrants, regardless of their status, did not perceive incompatibility, consistent with findings obtained in Study 2.
Compatibility between individual responsibility and multicultural ideology, in turn, depended on the experimental origin of participants (H2). Not only were we able to replicate this interaction from Study 2 using an alternative, prescriptive measure of belief in individual responsibility (despite marginality and non-significant simple effects in the present study), we even found that a new measure of endorsement of classical liberalism, as opposed to communitarianism, was associated with greater support for multicultural ideology among immigrants (H2b). Consistent with the argument that individual and collective forms of justice are more compatible for members of this group, one participant wrote, “as a member of my [experimental immigrant] group, I would like to conserve my values, that shouldn’t be erased, but accepted. I would also like to have the same chances as the others, even if this implies ‘blending into the masses’”.

It is worth noting that in the present study, it seemed as though high status group members were more supportive of multicultural policy than low status group members, which could appear counterintuitive and opposite to findings from Study 2. However, this directionality was driven by the native condition at low levels of the belief in individual responsibility. Perhaps low status natives were particularly opposed to multicultural policies because they perceived benefits to disadvantaged outgroups (i.e., immigrants), reinforcing their own disadvantage. High status natives, conversely, may have felt they were in a comfortable position where they could look out for the disadvantaged, as exemplified by a participant’s comment: “Each individual should have the same living conditions; if equity is not possible as it stands then [as an experimental high status native], it seems obvious to me to use affirmative action.” This quote is interesting as it shows how support for multicultural policy (affirmative action) implies a distancing from individual justice principles (equity) for high status natives, in line with our basic claim that high status natives perceive

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16 Possibly, this new measure yielded significant results in predicting multicultural ideology, but not policy as the measure is also abstract in nature.
incompatibility between individual responsibility and multicultural policy, while low status natives do not.

3.5 General discussion

The three studies presented in this paper support the general hypothesis according to which members of dominant and subordinate groups differ in the degree to which they perceive multiculturalism (collective justice) and classical liberalism (individual justice) as (in)compatible. Indeed, across all studies, the magnitude or direction of the relationship between (descriptive and prescriptive) individual responsibility and multiculturalism was found to differ between natives and immigrants or other subordinate groups (despite some less robust findings in Study 3). While the relationship between individual responsibility and multiculturalism itself was not always significant, immigrants and other subordinate group members consistently perceived comparatively weaker incompatibility between liberalism and multiculturalism than native, dominant group members. More specifically, Study 1 provided preliminary evidence that actual cultural minorities perceived greater compatibility compared to native majorities. Studies 2 and 3 confirmed and extended this finding by experimentally differentiating the core criteria associated with membership in cultural minority versus native majority groups, that is, social status and cultural origin (and size, Study 2).

A key feature of these studies was the simultaneous inclusion of two facets of multiculturalism: ideology and policy. While both are based on collective justice principles, ideology taps the abstract and general principles of multiculturalism by emphasizing group-based cultural recognition. Policy, in turn, assesses the implementation of multicultural principles. It is therefore more concrete than ideology, highlighting the socio-economic component of multiculturalism associated not only with recognition, but also with group-based compensation of inequality. Overall, policy was less strongly supported than ideology,
with remarkably strong effects across the three studies and consistent with our expectations (see Sears et al., 1999; Yogeeswaran & Dasgupta, 2014b). However, the overall pattern of results for both facets of multiculturalism was consistent with the asymmetric compatibility hypothesis.

Existing intergroup research has shown that immigrants and other culturally subordinate groups support multiculturalism to a greater extent than natives (Arends-Tóth & Van de Vijver, 2003; Ryan et al., 2007; Verkuyten, 2005, 2006; Wolsko et al., 2006). Our studies show, however, that this is not always the case. Studies 1 and 2 suggest, for example, that the difference occurs only when the descriptive belief in individual responsibility is strong, that is, when dominant norms of individual justice are salient. In other words, natives are particularly likely to oppose multiculturalism when they see the society as a space of individual competition, but less so when they question the primacy of individual justice principles.

These findings further suggest that the meaning of individual justice and responsibility is not the same for dominant and subordinate groups. For dominant groups, classical liberal norms of individual justice—in particular the belief in individual responsibility—are known to be “system-justifying” (see Bobocel et al., 1998; McCoy & Major, 2007), legitimizing social inequalities (Major et al., 2002; Sidanius & Pratto, 1999). (High status) natives may show opposition to multiculturalism when they endorse these legitimizing norms in order to reinforce their dominant position and to oppose social change (see also Zárate, Shaw, Marquez, & Biagas, 2012). Conversely, when members of these dominant groups are aware of inequalities (which is explicit in Study 2), they may acknowledge their group-based privileges and more readily support inequality-reducing policies (see Leach et al., 2006; Powell et al., 2005; see also Moscovici & Pérez, 2007). Nevertheless, it is also plausible that dominant group members support pro-minority policies to preserve inequalities, appeasing
subordinate group members’ concerns for equality and preventing them from engaging in collective action (Chow et al., 2013). Despite the possibility of these alternative motivations, the take-home message is that for high status and native group members, a just society can be based on either individual or collective justice principles as they struggle to reconcile both by supporting them simultaneously.

For group members who are lower in the social hierarchy, however, classical liberal beliefs of individual responsibility may have a different meaning. Our findings show that unlike for (high status) natives, attitudes of immigrants and low status natives towards inequality-reducing multicultural policies do not depend on beliefs in individual responsibility. Moreover, immigrant attitudes towards multicultural ideology became more positive when beliefs in individual responsibility (in Studies 1 and 2; and freedom in Study 3) were high (vs. low). Indeed, subordinate group members, whether they be immigrants or low status natives, are acutely aware of the dominance of individual justice principles in society (Deschamps, 1982; Sampson, 1988). However, their subordinate position leads them to consider that their successful integration in society requires endorsement of both individual and collective justice principles (see Simon, 2011; Simon & Ruhs, 2008).

Another reason natives and high status groups show opposition to multiculturalism is because they feel both their national identity and their dominant material status may be threatened by multicultural ideology and/or policy (Badea, Iyer, & Aebischer, 2018; Mahfud, Badea, Verkuyten, & Reynolds, 2017; Morrison, Plaut, & Ybarra, 2010; Plaut, Thomas, Hurd, & Romano, 2018; Yogeeswaran & Dasgupta, 2014). One could argue that weak support for multicultural ideology and policy in our studies results from perceived symbolic and material threat, respectively. From this point of view, our results suggest that natives, in general, are more (symbolically) threatened by multicultural ideology and the recognition of cultural differences when dominant norms of individual justice are salient. They also suggest that high
status natives, in particular, are more (materially) threatened by multicultural policy and the reduction of inequality when these same dominant norms are salient. Two important implications stem from this interpretation: that the type of perceived threat is determined by the kind of (asymmetric) group one belongs to, and, more generally, that among dominant group members, threat perceptions are anchored in their normative concern for individual justice.

### 3.5.1 Remaining Questions and Limitations

Some of our findings were more peripheral and less consistent across studies. These include (1) the non-significant correlation between multicultural ideology and policy in Study 2, (2) the significant simple effect in Study 2 suggesting immigrants are less supportive of multicultural ideology than natives when they are aware of structural inequalities, and (3) the significant simple effect in Study 3 suggesting low status natives are significantly less supportive of multicultural policy than high status natives when they have a low level of the prescriptive belief in individual responsibility.

The first finding provides supplementary support that the ideology and policy facets of multiculturalism should be treated separately as they seem to be rather orthogonal to each other (and thus perhaps not so “unidimensional” as previously suggested), despite the fact that both are based on collective justice principles. The second finding (immigrants became more opposed to multicultural ideology in comparison to natives when the descriptive belief in individual responsibility was low) provides support for the conjecture that immigrant endorsement of multicultural ideology is conditional: In a society where some groups face greater obstacles to progress than others, immigrants may be concerned that inequalities are legitimized and essentialised through the formal recognition of cultural differences. Indeed, minorities consistently demonstrated support for cultural recognition especially when they believed individuals are and should be individually responsible, autonomous and free,
suggesting that members of culturally subordinate groups require multiculturalism and liberalism to coexist to feel they live in a just society. The third finding is reminiscent of national chauvinism (Meuleman, Bekhuis, Lubbers, & Scheepers, 2013) and rising right-wing populism (Staerklé & Green, 2018) among low status natives, who may be particularly wary of cultural minority group compensation when they, themselves, feel victimised and unrecognized as long-standing members of society. These findings should, however, be interpreted with caution given their inconsistency paired with the low power of our studies and the hypothetical nature of our scenarios.

The experimental simulation procedure used in Studies 2 and 3 has its own limitations. Researchers acknowledge that being randomly assigned to an experimental group in a fictitious society does not fully simulate what it really means to be a member of such a group (see Azzi, 1992; Jetten et al., 2015). Moreover, our complex experimental design may have left some participants struggling to remember and interpret their group membership. Taking on the role of a low status, native, numerical minority group member in Study 2, for example, may have had little intuitive meaning for participants living in Switzerland, given that it is not a settler country. The simpler orthogonal design adopted in Study 3 did compensate for some of the added complexity in Study 2.

Nevertheless, this experimental design also had its strengths. First, the design allowed us to disentangle multiple asymmetric group criteria in a controlled manner. This would have been difficult (if not impossible) using real groups. Second, the experimental method was complementary to the convenience sample and correlational approach used in Study 1, allowing us to uncover relatively consistent findings in line with our general hypothesis. Third, the scenario of a fictitious society made the immigrant vs. native conditions conceivable; a manipulation that would have been more difficult to implement with traditional, minimal experimental groups (see Sachdev & Bourhis, 1991; Simon et al., 2001).
To our knowledge, this immigrant vs. native manipulation has never been used before. Hence, we hope our approach may offer some guidance for future research on attitudes towards multiculturalism.

3.6 Conclusion

The results of our studies are relevant to consider in the context of current European cultural diversity management policies. In recent years, European countries have increasingly implemented civic integration policies (Joppke, 2017; Lesinska, 2014). The goal of these policies is to facilitate successful integration of immigrants and ethnic minorities into common life through development of dominant language and work-related skills, for example. However, these policies tend to focus on individual rights and responsibilities, placing little emphasis on cultural recognition, affirmative action, and group-based inequality.

Multiculturalism, depending on its implementation, seeks to ensure the individual liberty of all people, including those that may be disadvantaged by society’s existing laws, regulations and norms that are often – though not necessarily intentionally – more favourable for the dominant group (Gale & Staerklé, 2017; Kymlicka, 1995, 2001). Our results suggest that the coexistence of classical liberalism and multiculturalism creates a sense of justice that is particularly important for members of low status, subordinate groups. Future research should explore the specific social and psychological conditions underlying this perceived compatibility, including political and normative contexts as well as different levels of national and ethnic identity of (various religious, cultural, linguistic, socio-economic and national) group members.
CHAPTER 4

Identifying with a Liberal Nation:

A Social Justice Perspective on Majority Opposition to Multiculturalism

STUDIES 4, 5, & 6

Arguments against multiculturalism suggest that its underlying group-based political theory and public policy is incompatible with the individualistic orientation of Western liberal societies. Moreover, general opposition to multiculturalism is often reported among those who see themselves as members of native majorities. In this article, we argue that belief systems associated with national identity in a liberal society give priority to individual forms of justice which in turn explains majority opposition to multiculturalism. One correlational (N = 91) and one quasi-experimental study using two national subgroups differing in level of national identification (N = 112) show that the effect of national identification on opposition to multiculturalism is explained by a belief in individual responsibility, a key facet of individual justice. Results were replicated using representative data from the World Values Survey (N = 1234). These studies provide a novel perspective on majority multicultural attitudes as based on conceptions of social justice.

4.1 Introduction

Over recent decades throughout Europe, opposition to multiculturalism has increased. This opposition has been coupled with the rise in populist right-wing political movements (Müller, 2016), prioritizing “natives” over newcomers and favoring cultural homogeneity (Kymlicka, 2010; Staerklé & Green, 2018). Indeed, opposition to multiculturalism is often reported among those who see themselves as native majorities (see Verkuyten, 2009).

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Existing research suggests native majorities feel excluded from the multicultural emphasis on cultural minority rights, needs and distinctiveness (Plaut et al., 2011). They may also feel that their dominant position and identity within the national society is threatened by policies that compensate minority disadvantages and that recognize and promote minorities’ culture-specific festivals, holidays and languages (Badea et al., 2018; Mahfud, Badea, Verkuyten, & Reynolds, 2017; Morrison et al., 2010; Plaut et al., 2018; Yogeeswaran & Dasgupta, 2014b). On the level of political ideology, an additional argument against multiculturalism suggests that this group-based political theory and public policy is incompatible with the individualistic orientation of Western liberal societies (Joppke, 2004; Kymlicka, 2013). In this article, we argue that ideological belief systems associated with national identity that give priority to individual forms of justice explain why national majorities express opposition to multiculturalism. In doing so, we provide a perspective on multicultural attitudes that may implicate concerns for group-based inclusion and threat, but that focuses on more fundamental justice belief systems that are shaped by the groups with which people identify.

In the following, we first define multiculturalism in line with group-based forms of justice. We then outline research focusing on how the content of national identity has implications for intergroup attitudes and support or opposition to group-based forms of justice. Finally, we introduce the role played by dominant individual justice beliefs associated with Western national identity.

4.1.1 Abstract versus Concrete Multiculturalism

Multiculturalism can be defined both as an abstract prescriptive ideology that explicitly recognizes and values group-based cultural differences, and as a concrete public policy that seeks to compensate structural disadvantages experienced by cultural minority groups (Mahfud et al., 2017; Moghaddam, 2008; Sears et al., 1999; Yogeeswaran &
Dasgupta, 2014b). Both of these definitions are based on collective justice principles, in which categorical differentiation between groups drives perceptions of justice and where treatment of groups in accordance with their particular needs and disadvantages is imperative (Gale & Staerklé, 2017; Green & Staerklé, 2013). Research has demonstrated that abstract construals of multiculturalism are less controversial to national majorities than concrete policies. For example, when focusing on the broad goals of multicultural ideology, members of majority groups sometimes even see benefits to their national identity, whereas a focus on the implementation of tangible policies leads to greater perceived threat and thus to greater opposition to multiculturalism (Yogeeswaran & Dasgupta, 2014b; see also Sears et al., 1999). In our studies, we consider both abstract (ideology) and concrete (policy) facets of multiculturalism, expecting that national majority members who identify with the nation would be more opposed to its policy than to its ideology.

4.1.2 Content of National Identity

The meaning associated with national identity—that is, its content—should shape the degree to which it predicts opposition, or support, for multiculturalism (see Yogeeswaran & Dasgupta, 2014a, for an overview). For example, strongly identified national majority members have been shown to feel threatened by the presence of cultural minority groups and by multicultural policies, especially when the nation is perceived to be culturally homogenous (Verkuyten, 2009; see Falomir-Pichastor & Frederic, 2013, for an exception). In countries like the Netherlands, for example, national identification is defined by feelings of national nostalgia and autochthony (that is, a belief that a place belongs to its original inhabitants who are therefore more entitled than newcomers). Here, national identification has been shown to be associated with stronger prejudice and opposition to multiculturalism (Martinovic & Verkuyten, 2013; Smeekes, Verkuyten, & Martinovic, 2015). In a similar way, political debates regarding newcomers in assimilationist countries such as Switzerland “can be
interpreted as a politics of national identity” (Riaño & Wastl-Walter, 2006, p. 17; see also Green, Sarrasin, Fasel, & Staerklé, 2011), as exemplified by political discourse that demonstrates an exclusionary stance towards newcomers in the name of “protecting” the nation’s identity. Conversely, when a nation’s identity is defined by diversity itself—that is, when multiculturalism is part of the group’s norms and cultural minorities are included in the national concept such as in Canada—stronger national identification is associated with decreased prejudice and increased support for multiculturalism (see Devos & Mohamed, 2014; Esses, Wagner, Wolf, Preiser, & Wilbur, 2006; Reynolds, Batalha, & Subasic, 2015).

Similarly, the classic distinction between civic versus ethnic conceptions of citizenship and nationhood have been shown to differentially affect attitudes towards newcomers (see Brubaker, 1990; Pehrson & Green, 2010). Indeed, newcomers are perceived and received more positively in countries that place greater importance on residents’ legal citizenship and active participation in society than on blood relations, race, ethnicity, language or cultural tradition (Pehrson, Vignoles, et al., 2009; Reijerse, Vanbeselaere, Duriez, & Fichera, 2015). In other words, a link between national identity and negative outgroup attitudes is especially present in countries with an ethnic, homogenous and essentialist definition of national identity rather than a civic one that is, in principle, more inclusive (see also Ariely, 2012).

This existing research has focused almost exclusively on how the meaning associated with national identity predicts prejudice and/or restrictive immigration policies. Our work extends this research by focusing instead on how this meaning affects support or opposition to multicultural ideology and policy, grounded in general perceptions of justice between groups rather than in attitudes towards outgroups. Moreover, we focus on specific beliefs associated with the national group, arguing that if national majorities show opposition to multiculturalism, it is (at least in part) because they adhere to shared beliefs that are central to their national identity which they perceive to be incompatible with multiculturalism.
4.1.3 National Identity and the (Nationally) Shared Belief in Individual Responsibility

According to a basic principle of Social Identity Theory (Tajfel & Turner, 1979), identifying with a group implies adherence to the group’s norms and shared beliefs which thereby act as a guide for attitudes and behavior (see also Reicher, Spears, & Haslam, 2010). Somewhat paradoxically, however, Jetten, Postmes and McAuliffe (2002) showed that in the individualist cultures of Western countries, stronger national identification implies greater adherence to the norm that “we are all individuals.” This individualistic norm is consistent with the tendency in Western liberal countries to attribute people’s behavior, choices and progress to their internal characteristics rather than to situational factors, also known as the fundamental attribution error (Serge Moscovici, 2005; Ross, 1977). Through such an individualizing lens, minority members are easily perceived as individuals deviating from a common, national norm rather than as members of groups with alternative norms and ways of life (Staerklé, 2009). As van Oorschot (2006) suggests, immigrants, for example, are at the bottom of the (welfare) “deservingness ranking” in every European country, as they are often “blamed” for their “neediness”, considered, indeed, personally responsible (see also Laenen & Meuleman, 2017). Therefore, endorsement of this individualistic norm can be a way of showing loyalty to one’s (national) group.

At the level of political theory, the classically liberal emphasis on individual responsibility is in tension both with interventionist, redistributive measures (related to multicultural policy, see Kukathas, 2003), and especially with a communitarian, group-based vision of society. The communitarian critique of classical liberalism argues that the Western emphasis on individuals is “atomistic”, failing to acknowledge that the communities to which people belong are crucial for their development, sense-making and well-being (see for example MacIntyre, 1981; Walzer, 1990). Multiculturalism emerged around the same period as this communitarian critique (see Taylor, 1992), favoring group-based ideology and
redistributive policies in order to ensure the individual liberty of all people in society, including members of systematically disadvantaged groups (Kymlicka, 1995). In this way, multiculturalism sought to reconcile the philosophical tension between liberalism and communitarianism.

However, the way lay people view multiculturalism yields a different picture: A recent set of studies showed that this reconciliation between multiculturalism’s focus on group-based justice and liberalism’s focus on individual responsibility occurs mainly for subordinate groups such as immigrants, while dominant group members such as natives perceive the two as incompatible and negatively interdependent (Gale & Staerklé, 2019a). Indeed, research shows that members of minority and other subordinate groups are more aware of group membership and its implications than majority, dominant group members (Azzi, 1998) who perceive themselves first of all as “default” individuals rather than as group members (Iacoviello & Lorenzi-Cioldi, 2015; see also Azzi, 1992). Gale and Staerklé (2018) argue that when dominant norms of individual responsibility are salient, subordinate minority group members manage to reconcile this dominant norm with their fundamental orientation towards justice between groups (i.e., collective justice and multiculturalism), whereas dominant majorities struggle with the simultaneous endorsement of individual and collective justice principles and express opposition to multiculturalism and justice between groups. The majority perspective is therefore consistent with discourse in Western societies which tends to suggest that policies focusing on groups (like affirmative action) violate principles of equal opportunity and individual responsibility (see Bobocel et al., 1998; Son Hing et al., 2011).

The dominant norm of individual responsibility should be salient when people identify with a classically liberal nation. Accordingly, the present research focused on national majorities and tested whether their national identification increases adherence to individual
justice norms, which in turn should explain their opposition to both multicultural ideology (recognizing group-based differences) and policy (implying group-based redistribution).

4.1.4 The Present Studies

The present studies were conducted in Switzerland, an economically liberal nation where individual justice beliefs (expressed in endorsement of individual freedom, responsibility, and deservingness) are prevalent. A historical analysis suggested that the Swiss federal constitution has had similar developments to the American one, empowering the individual and focusing predominantly on economic liberties and rights since 1848 (Moser, 1994). According to some experts, federalism in Switzerland, as well as the country’s direct democracy and emphasis on competition to promote the economy, is illustrative of a successfully applied form of classical liberalism (see Buchanan, 2008; D’Amato, 2015). As a result, the national community is not so much divided by (national, religious or linguistic) ethnic groups, but is instead based on “universal moral qualities” (Wimmer, 2008, p. 1000; see also Wimmer, 2011). A study of Swiss young adults showed, for example, that when discussing their aspirations for the future, dominant themes of “free choice” and “individual responsibility” emerged in a way that reflected their “internalization” and “normalization” of liberal national norms (Schwiter, 2013). Moreover, according to the 2018 index of economic freedom (The Heritage Foundation, 2018), Switzerland is the most economically liberal country in Europe, defined by strong property rights, flexible labor regulations, low taxes, and relatively low government spending. Disciplines therefore converge to suggest that, while many other countries share its liberal characteristics emphasizing the individual, Switzerland is a prototypically (economically) liberal nation. As a result, we expected individual justice beliefs to vary as a function of the level of national identification: the more individuals identify with Switzerland, the more they should endorse individual justice beliefs.
Three studies were conducted to examine the role played by national identification and beliefs in individual justice in attitudes towards multiculturalism. Study 4 featured a correlational design, measuring national identity and testing if a stronger feeling of attachment to the nation is associated with a stronger belief in individual responsibility, thereby explaining increased opposition to multiculturalism. Study 5 sought to replicate the findings of Study 4 with a quasi-experimental design, using two national sub-groups that should differ in their degree of national identification: students undergoing an agricultural versus a commercial apprenticeship, both in rural Switzerland. Finally, Study 6 sought to demonstrate the hypothesized process with nationally representative survey data.

4.2 Study 4

The purpose of Study 4 was to test a mediation model where national identification is associated with greater adherence to individual justice beliefs that in turn should explain stronger opposition to multiculturalism. Accordingly, our first hypothesis was that stronger national identification should be associated with stronger opposition to multiculturalism, (most strongly with its concrete policy; H1). Our second hypothesis was that this negative association should be mediated by stronger adherence to the liberal belief in individual responsibility (H2). In other words, stronger national identification should predict a stronger belief in individual responsibility (H2a), which in turn should predict stronger opposition to multiculturalism (H2b).

4.2.1 Method

Participants

Participants were recruited via an online snowball technique in the French-speaking part of Switzerland (N = 141). To ensure a sample of national majority group members, those
with only Swiss citizenship were retained (N = 91). The majority were female (68%, N = 62) and the mean age was 26.93 years (SD = 10.47; 85% under 30 years old).

**Procedure and materials**

Participants were invited via social media to participate in a study on “life in society”. The online questionnaire was composed of the following measures, all assessed on a Likert scale ranging from 1 (strongly disagree) to 6 (strongly agree), as well as socio-demographic questions.

**National identification** was measured with four items (α = .88), taken in part from Falomir-Pichastor and Frederic (2013): “I feel Swiss,” “I feel committed to Switzerland,” “I identify with Switzerland,” “I feel united with the Swiss.”

**Individual responsibility belief** was measured with four items (α = .78), inspired by Major et al. (2002): “Switzerland is a society where each individual can attain a better position in society,” “Some people cannot manage to progress in society because of social inequalities” (reverse-coded), “Most people who do not progress should not blame the system; they are responsible themselves,” “Some people struggle to attain a better position in society because of their origins” (reverse-coded).

**Support for multicultural ideology** was measured with four items (α = .77), adapted from existing research (see Berry & Kalin, 1995; Guimond, de la Sablonnière, & Nugier, 2014; Ryan, Hunt, Weible, Peterson, & Casas, 2007): “Cultural affiliation is a precious distinction between individuals that should be valued,” “It is important to remember that we are shaped by the cultural groups to which we belong,” “Concentrating on cultural and ethnic

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18 Power analyses were conducted using G*Power 3.1, based on previously documented associations between national identification and rejection of multiculturalism (Verkuyten, 2009b). The effect sizes (r) in these studies were .21 (Study 1), .37 (Study 2), and .36 (Study 3). To replicate these effects for .80 power level, a sample of between 52 and 173 participants was needed.

19 Additional measures included Social Dominance Orientation (6 items), Right Wing Authoritarianism (3 items) and distractors from support for multiculturalism items (7 items; worded similarly but with emphasis on justice between individuals instead of groups). These measures were used in order to verify and establish construct validity of the indicators measuring support for multicultural ideology and policy. For more information, please contact the authors.
differences allows us to learn more about others and to mutually appreciate each other,” “In general, cultural differences should be celebrated.”

Support for multicultural policy was measured with three items specifically designed for the Swiss context and alluding to possible affirmative action measures in favor of cultural minorities (α = .79; see Gale & Staerklé, 2019a): “Schools with a large proportion of children from cultural minority groups should receive special funding in order to guarantee conditions which favor success,” “In order to guarantee a certain diversity between employees, positions should be reserved for qualified members of cultural minority groups,” “The government should set an example and hire more cultural minority group members.”

4.2.2 Results

Data analysis was carried out using SPSS, version 25. Descriptive statistics were assessed first, followed by hypothesis testing. In order to retain the complete sample of respondents and to prevent a reduction in statistical power, Maximum Likelihood (ML) estimation method was applied for missing cases of items representing national identification, belief in individual responsibility and support for multicultural ideology and policy (3.8% missing data).

Descriptive statistics and correlations

Table 6 shows that participants had strong feelings of attachment to Switzerland, and a belief in individual responsibility close to the mid-point of the scale. While participants were fairly supportive of multicultural ideology, they were significantly less so of its policy, t(90) = 9.83, p < .001, d = 2.07, even though the two were strongly correlated with each other (p < .001). Providing preliminary evidence in favor of hypothesis 1, those who felt strongly attached to Switzerland showed significantly less support for multicultural policy, but not

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20 A Principal Component Analysis showed that items of the ideology and policy measures of support for multiculturalism loaded on distinct dimensions (Eigenvalues: λ_{ideology} = 3.37 and λ_{policy} = 1.21, total variance explained: 65%)
ideology. In line with hypothesis 2a, stronger feelings of national identification were associated with a stronger belief in individual responsibility, and in line with hypothesis 2b, a stronger belief in individual responsibility was associated with weakened support for both multicultural ideology and policy.

Table 6
*Means, Standard Deviations and Bivariate Correlations between Main Variables of Interest (Study 4)*

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>M</th>
<th>SD</th>
<th>2.</th>
<th>3.</th>
<th>4.</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1. National Identification</td>
<td>4.77</td>
<td>1.01</td>
<td>.42***</td>
<td>-.41***</td>
<td>-.06</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. Individual Responsibility</td>
<td>3.21</td>
<td>0.98</td>
<td>-.61***</td>
<td>-.36**</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3. Multicultural Policy</td>
<td>3.11</td>
<td>1.17</td>
<td>.49***</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4. Multicultural Ideology</td>
<td>4.24</td>
<td>0.96</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Note. ***p < .001, **p < .01, ^p < .10*

Mediation models

Two mediation models were constructed using PROCESS v3.1 (Hayes, 2018) with support for multicultural policy and ideology as dependent variables. National identification was inserted as the independent variable and individual responsibility belief as the mediating variable in both models. Age and gender were included as control variables.

Hypothesis 1 was (partially) confirmed: Stronger national identification significantly predicted opposition to multicultural policy but not to multicultural ideology. Indeed, the total effect model for support for multicultural *policy* was significant $F(3, 87) = 11.27, p < .001, R^2 = .28$ and Figure 8 shows that the effect of national identification was negative and significant, 95% CI [-0.71; -0.28], $t(87) = -4.59, p < .001, d = 0.98$. The total effect model for support for multicultural *ideology* was non-significant, $F(3, 87) = 1.76, p = .162, R^2 = .06$, and Figure 9 shows that the effect of national identification was non-significant, 95% CI [-0.24; 0.16], $t(87) = -0.37, p = .714$. Participants who felt closer to Switzerland supported multicultural policy significantly less than those who felt less close to the country, while
support for multicultural ideology remained similar regardless of degree of national identification.

Hypothesis 2 was also confirmed. Consistent with hypothesis 2a, stronger national identification was associated with a significant increase in individual responsibility belief: The general model predicting belief in individual responsibility was significant, $F(3, 87) = 12.28, p < .001, R^2 = .30$, as was the specific effect of national identification on individual responsibility belief, 95% CI [0.24; 0.59], $t(87) = 4.64, p < .001, d = 0.99$, shown in Figures 8 and 9. Therefore, in comparison to those who felt less close to the country, participants who felt more strongly tied to Switzerland had a stronger belief that individuals are responsible for their own progress, demonstrating adherence to this dominant societal belief.

Consistent with hypothesis 2b, a stronger belief in individual responsibility was related to significantly lower support for both multicultural policy and ideology. Both models were significant, $F(4, 86) = 16.31, p < .001, R^2 = .43$, $F(4, 86) = 4.03, p = .005, R^2 = .16$, respectively, and Figures 8 and 9 show that the effect of individual responsibility belief on support for multicultural policy and ideology was negative and significant in both models (95% CI [-0.78; -0.32], $t(86) = -4.79, p < .001; d = 1.03$; 95% CI [-0.60; -0.14], $t(86) = -3.21, p = .002, d = 0.69$, respectively). Therefore, the more participants believed all individuals are responsible for their own success, the less they supported multiculturalism. This result is consistent with the idea that national majorities (the sample in this study) perceive incompatibility between individual responsibility and multiculturalism.

The role of the belief in individual responsibility as a mediator was confirmed, given that the indirect effect of national identification on support for multiculturalism through belief in individual responsibility was significant in both models, $B = -.23, SE = .07, 95\% CI [-0.39, -0.11]$ for multicultural policy, $B = -.15, SE = .07, 95\% CI [-0.30, -0.04]$ for multicultural ideology. Figure 8 shows that while the direct effect of national identification was still
significant in the final model predicting support for multicultural policy, 95% CI [-0.48; -0.05], t(86) = -2.47, p = .016, d = 0.53, the original effect of national identification was reduced in magnitude when individual responsibility was included in the model. Figure 9 shows that there was no original significant ("total") effect of national identification on support for multicultural ideology, and when the variance explained by individual responsibility belief was accounted for, the (direct) effect of national identification remained non-significant, 95% CI [-0.10; 0.33], t(86) = 1.08, p = .282 (although the sign did switch from negative to positive). The significant indirect effects allowed us to conclude that the more citizens feel connected to Switzerland, the greater their endorsement of the dominant societal norm of individual responsibility, and the more they oppose multiculturalism.

Figure 8. Individual responsibility belief mediates the negative effect of national identification on support for multicultural policy (Study 4).

Figure 9. Individual responsibility belief mediates the negative effect of national identification on support for multicultural ideology (Study 4).
4.2.3 Discussion

The results from Study 4 provide preliminary evidence that a belief in individual responsibility explains why nationals who have a strong sense of national identification may reject multiculturalism. Indeed, this belief in individual responsibility is representative of individual justice principles which are dominant in many Western nations and thus supported by national identification (Jetten et al., 2002). From the perspective of national majorities, this belief is incompatible with multiculturalism (i.e., collective justice principles).

In Switzerland, foreigners are often scapegoated in national political discourse and assimilation to dominant, national norms is generally expected of them (see Koopmans, 2010). A desire to protect the national identity may drive this assimilationist expectation. We argue that a more fundamental individual justice belief system rooted in national identity is a key factor driving opposition to multicultural policies in favor of immigrants and foreigners.

One could, however, question the directionality of our conceptual model. Is it national identification that shapes a belief in individual responsibility, which ultimately leads to a rejection of multiculturalism? Or could the reverse be true, that is, support for multiculturalism, associated with a rejection of the belief in individual responsibility, explains a distancing in terms of attachment to the nation? Existing research supports our directionality and suggests that national identification acts as a lens through which multiculturalism is viewed, understood and supported or opposed (see Verkuyten, 2009). Nevertheless, to assess the replicability of our results and to address this question ourselves, we designed a second study using a quasi-experimental design.

4.3 Study 5

In order to provide quasi-experimental rather than correlational evidence for the hypothesized process associating national identification, individual justice beliefs and opposition to multiculturalism, Study 5 compared two groups defined a priori by differential
levels of national identification. Based on research showing that students in different educational domains hold attitudes and beliefs in line with the norms associated with these domains (see Dambrun, Guimond, & Duarte, 2002; Newcomb, 1943), we reasoned that apprentices in agriculture should be more prototypical of Swiss identity (and thus identify more strongly) than apprentices in trade and commerce. As such, educational domain should serve as a group-based proxy for national identification.

Our hypotheses were similar to those in Study 4. First, we expected that apprentices in agriculture would support multiculturalism significantly less than apprentices in commerce (H1). Because agricultural workers are motivated to uphold national traditions (Riaño & Wastl-Walter, 2006), we figured the effect might occur for both multicultural policy and ideology, contrary to Study 4. Second, we expected that this difference would occur because agriculture apprentices have a stronger belief in individual responsibility, serving again as a mediator (H2). Therefore, since agriculture apprentices should be more emblematic of Swiss identity than commerce apprentices, they should have a stronger belief in individual responsibility (H2a), which should thereby be associated with stronger opposition to both multicultural policy and ideology (H2b).

4.3.1 Method

Participants

Participants were recruited through their respective vocational schools in rural Switzerland and were in the second or third year of their program (N = 129). Given our interest in a national majority perspective, only those with Swiss citizenship and who identified themselves as a member of a Swiss canton or municipality were retained (N = 112).21 The final sample included 47 apprentices in agriculture (coded +1) and 65 apprentices

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21 Based on effects from Study 4, a power analysis conducted using G*Power 3.1 showed that 58 participants were needed to replicate the effect of national identification on individual responsibility, 79 were needed to
in commerce (coded -1). Mean age of agriculture apprentices was 20.19 (SD = 3.37) and the majority were male (75%, n = 35). Mean age of commerce apprentices was 18.91 (SD = 2.19) and the majority were female (66%, n = 43). In both groups, sixty two percent of students were in their third year. Gender, age and year of study were controlled for in hypothesis testing.

**Procedure and materials**

Participants were approached during class time, with the agreement of their instructors, and were asked to fill out a questionnaire about “life in society”. The questionnaire was composed of socio-demographic questions as well as the same measures as those described in Study 4: national identification ($\alpha = .89$) used as a quasi-experimental manipulation check, individual responsibility belief ($\alpha = .73$) and support for multicultural policy ($\alpha = .75$) and ideology ($\alpha = .70$).22

4.3.2 Results

**Descriptive statistics and correlations**

Table 7 shows descriptive statistics for each group separately as well as general bivariate correlations between all variables in the study. All differences in means between agriculture and commerce apprentices in Table 7 were significant. While both groups identified quite strongly with Switzerland, apprentices in agriculture identified significantly more strongly than those in commerce, $t(100.96) = -3.97, p < .001, d = 0.79$ (equal variances not assumed). Moreover, apprentices in agriculture had a significantly stronger belief in replicate the effect of individual responsibility on support for multicultural policy, and 122 were needed for the same effect on support for multicultural ideology.

22 A Principal Component Analysis showed that items of the two measures of support for multiculturalism loaded on distinct dimensions (Eigenvalues: $\lambda_{ideology} = 2.97$ and $\lambda_{policy} = 1.28$, total variance explained: 61%). Additional measures were the same as in Study 4, although a measure of subjective social status was also included, showing that apprentices in commerce ($M = 5.96, SE = 0.23$) reported marginally higher subjective social status than apprentices in agriculture ($M = 5.21, SE = 0.28$), $F(1, 106) = 3.91, p = .051, d = 0.38$ (controlling for age, gender and year of study). Aside from this distinction, which is addressed in the discussion section for this study, subjective social status was not significantly associated with any other variables in the study and interpretation of results was identical when controlling for this measure.
individual responsibility, \( t(110) = -5.07, p < .001, d = 0.97 \) (equal variances assumed) and showed significantly weaker support for multicultural policy, \( t(86.67) = 3.08, p = .003, d = 0.66 \) (equal variances not assumed), and ideology, \( t(81.74) = 3.43, p = .001, d = 0.76 \) (equal variances not assumed), than apprentices in commerce. In general, means for commerce apprentices were close to those found in Study 4.

Table 7
Means, Standard Deviations and Bivariate Correlations between Main Variables of Interest (Study 5)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Agriculture apprentices</th>
<th>Commerce apprentices</th>
<th>2.</th>
<th>3.</th>
<th>4.</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1. National Identification</td>
<td>5.53 (0.58)</td>
<td>4.88 (1.11)</td>
<td>.31**</td>
<td>-.24*</td>
<td>-.09</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. Individual Responsibility</td>
<td>4.00 (0.95)</td>
<td>3.14 (0.84)</td>
<td>-.28**</td>
<td>-.42***</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3. Multicultural Policy</td>
<td>2.65 (1.21)</td>
<td>3.31 (0.99)</td>
<td></td>
<td>.43***</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4. Multicultural Ideology</td>
<td>3.40 (1.09)</td>
<td>4.05 (0.83)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note. ***\( p < .001 \), **\( p < .01 \), *\( p < .10 \)

Correlations between variables were consistent with those in Study 4, again providing preliminary evidence in favor of hypotheses. Firstly, those who felt strongly attached to Switzerland showed significantly less support for multicultural policy, but not ideology. Secondly, stronger feelings of national identification were associated with a stronger belief in individual responsibility, which in turn was associated with weaker support for both multicultural policy and ideology.

Quasi-experimental manipulation check

When controlling for age, gender and year of study, a one-way ANCOVA showed that agriculture apprentices (\( M = 5.63, SE = 0.14 \)) felt significantly more strongly identified with Switzerland than commerce apprentices (\( M = 4.81, SE = 0.12 \)), \( F(1, 107) = 18.79, p < .001, d = 0.83 \).
Mediation models

In order to test our hypotheses, two mediation models were constructed using PROCESS v3.1, including a heteroscedasticity-consistent standard error estimator (hc3; Hayes, 2018), with support for multicultural policy and ideology as dependent variables. Apprenticeship group was inserted as the independent variable and individual responsibility belief as a mediating variable in both models. Control variables mentioned previously were included. Figures 10 and 11 summarize unstandardized coefficients and standard errors of effects in these mediation models.

Hypothesis 1 was confirmed: Agriculture apprentices supported multicultural policy and ideology significantly less strongly than commerce apprentices (95% CI [-0.50; -0.00], t(107) = -1.99, p = .049, d = 0.38; 95% CI [-0.52; -0.09], t(107) = -2.77, p = .007, d = 0.54, respectively). Both total effect models were significant, F(4, 107) = 7.38, p < .001, R² = .20 for multicultural policy, F(4, 107) = 3.23, p = .015, R² = .12 for multicultural ideology.

Hypothesis 2 was also confirmed: In both models, there was a significant indirect effect passing through belief in individual responsibility, B = -1.11, SE = .06, 95% CI [-0.23, -0.02] for multicultural policy and B = -1.15, SE = .06, 95% CI [-0.30, -0.06] for multicultural ideology. Indeed, consistent with hypothesis 2a, apprentices in agriculture had a significantly stronger belief in individual responsibility than apprentices in commerce: The model predicting individual responsibility belief was significant, F(4, 107) = 6.57, p < .001, R² = .21, as was the effect of the apprenticeship group on individual responsibility belief (95% CI [0.21; 0.64]), t(107) = 3.90, p < .001, d = 0.75) shown in Figures 10 and 11. Moreover, consistent with hypothesis 2b, a stronger belief in individual responsibility was associated with a significant decrease in support for multicultural policy and ideology. Both models were significant, F(5, 106) = 7.49, p < .001, R² = .24, F(5, 106) = 4.79, p < .001, R² = .22, respectively, and Figures 10 and 11 show that the effect of individual responsibility belief on
support for multicultural policy and ideology was negative and significant in both models, 95% CI [-0.48; -0.03], \( t(106) = -2.25, p = .027, d = 0.44 \); 95% CI [-0.56; -0.15], \( t(106) = -3.38, p = .001, d = 0.66 \), respectively. Therefore, the more participants believed individuals are responsible for their own success, the less they supported multiculturalism, explaining why apprentices in agriculture support multiculturalism significantly less than apprentices in commerce. The direct effect of apprenticeship domain on support for multiculturalism was non-significant in both models (95% CI [-0.39; 0.11], \( t(106) = -1.12, p = .266 \), for multicultural policy, 95% CI [-0.39; 0.08], \( t(106) = -1.34, p = .182 \), for multicultural ideology), suggesting full mediations through individual responsibility belief.²³

![Diagram](image.png)

**Figure 10.** Individual responsibility belief mediates the negative effect of national identification (i.e., apprenticeship group) on support for multicultural policy (Study 5). Apprenticeship in agriculture coded 1 (apprenticeship in commerce coded -1).

²³ As an additional analysis, we incorporated year of study as a moderator in our mediation models. This would allow us to show, statistically, that the mediation models worked better for third than for second year students, supporting the idea that socialization processes within one’s educational domain were driving, over time, this distinction between apprentices in agriculture and commerce. No interactions were significant in these models, possibly due to lacking statistical power. However, the indirect effect was significant for third-year apprentices (95% CI [-0.29; -0.01] for multicultural policy; 95% CI [-0.33; -0.03] for multicultural ideology), and non-significant for second-year apprentices ([0.30, 0.12] for multicultural policy; 95% CI [-0.32, 0.00] for multicultural ideology). Moreover, in terms of difference in national identification, while a two-way ANCOVA showed that the interaction between educational domain and year of study was non-significant, a split file and a one-way ANCOVA showed that the effect of educational domain on national identification was significant among third near students, \( F(1, 65) = 17.27, p < .001, d = 1.01 \) and only a trend among second year students, \( F(1, 39) = 3.05, p = .088, d = 0.54 \).
4.3.3 Discussion

The results of Study 5 were consistent with those of Study 4: The belief in individual responsibility appears to consistently intervene to explain (in part) why identifying with Switzerland is negatively associated with support for both multicultural policy and ideology. This study focused on two national subgroups within Switzerland: apprentices in agriculture and in commerce. Likely as a result of their socialization in the respective educational domains, apprentices in agriculture considered themselves to be closer to the Swiss national prototype, compared to apprentices in commerce. While bivariate correlations in both the present study and Study 4 showed that stronger national identification was directly associated with weaker support for multicultural policy, but not ideology, apprentices in agriculture and commerce differed in their support for both. In fact, the total effect on multicultural ideology was even stronger in comparison to multicultural policy. This difference may be due to the fact that the content of national identity exemplified through these two groups concerned with symbols more than with status. Accordingly, apprentices in agriculture are likely to be more motivated to protect Swiss identity and its traditional symbols, compared to apprentices in commerce. Since apprentices in commerce saw themselves as being slightly higher in status than apprentices in agriculture, it makes sense that the difference between them in support for
multicultural policy was less important, as this policy should be more threatening to higher status groups (see Gale & Staerklé, 2019a).

The fact that apprentices in agriculture scored slightly lower than commercial apprentices in terms of perceived status raises the question of an ‘alternative interpretation’ of our results: Perhaps the reason apprentices in agriculture demonstrated a stronger belief in individual responsibility than apprentices in commerce was because they were rationalizing their lower status position in society. Indeed, system justification theory (Jost, Pelham, Sheldon, & Sullivan, 2003) suggests that members of disadvantaged groups often adopt beliefs that justify the status quo to overcome cognitive dissonance caused by their disadvantages. This includes the belief that individuals are responsible for their own progress and thus that low status positions are a result of individual deficiencies such as laziness. Such a status-legitimizing perspective is indeed coherent with our general theorizing about the belief in individual responsibility, which can frame cultural minorities as undeserving of recognition and/or redistribution (thus explaining opposition to multiculturalism; see also Joffe & Staerklé, 2007). However, the status distinction between apprentices in agriculture and commerce in our study was less important (in terms of significance and effect size) than the difference in national identification, and Swiss records do show that the objective social status (in terms of salary) of apprentices in agriculture is similar, if not even higher, than that of apprentices in commerce (“Salaire pendant l’apprentissage,” 2018). We therefore believe that the quasi-experimental conditions in our study successfully served as an indicator of national identification rather than status.

The quasi-experimental design used in this study was selected to empirically support the directionality of our conceptual model. One could however also argue in terms of self-selection by suggesting that those who reject multiculturalism and adhere to individual justice norms seek out vocational tracks that are in line with their beliefs. In order to counteract this
argument, we examined differences between second- and third-year students and found that our hypotheses were especially supported among third year students, and that the effects were generally smaller among second year students. While this difference suggests that socialization processes were likely at play, statistical power was relatively low (especially among second year students). Future research should therefore examine this question using a larger and more equal sample size.

Despite these nuances related to national identity and our quasi-experimental manipulation, the tension between individual and collective justice remains: Apprentices in agriculture, who identify more strongly with Switzerland than apprentices in commerce, have a stronger belief in individual responsibility (individual justice), which is systematically associated with a rejection of multiculturalism (collective justice). Our results therefore support the notion that attitudes towards multiculturalism are shaped by belief systems associated with national identity which are both constructed through experiences with one’s (sub-)group in society.

4.4 Study 6

The purpose of Study 6 was to overcome issues of power and sample size in Studies 4 and 5 by conducting a replication using secondary, representative survey data. Because secondary survey research involves the use of pre-existing measures, the items used in this sixth study were different from those in Studies 4 and 5, albeit representing similar constructs.

4.4.1 Method

Participants

World values survey data from Switzerland (wave 5, 2007) was used. The sample included 1241 participants of which the majority were female (55.1%; \( N = 648 \)) and the mean age was 52.45 (SD = 16.14). No participants were excluded from the study, as there was no
direct question in the Swiss data asking participants to indicate their citizenship (see WVS Methodology Questionnaire Switzerland, 2007).

Procedure and materials

**National identification** was measured with a single item, assessed on a scale from 1 (*strongly disagree*) to 4 (*strongly agree*): “I see myself as a citizen of Switzerland.” This measure implies a sense of identification with, and attachment to, the national community.

**Hard work belief** was measured with a single item whereby participants indicated the degree to which they believed that “hard work doesn’t generally bring success, it’s more a matter of luck” (*coded 1*), or rather that “in the long run, hard work usually brings a better life” (*coded 10*). A high score on this item captures a belief in individual responsibility and thus sensitivity to individual justice norms.

**Support for multiculturalism** was measured with a single item where participants indicated the degree to which they believed “ethnic diversity erodes a country’s unity” (*coded 1*), or rather that “ethnic diversity enriches life” (*coded 10*). This is a more abstract measure of support for multiculturalism than those used in the first two studies, but one that still reflects sensitivity to collective justice principles and assesses the attitude towards the presence of diverse cultural groups in society.

4.4.2 Results

In order to retain the complete sample of respondents and to prevent a reduction in statistical power, Maximum Likelihood (ML) estimation method was applied for missing cases of items representing national identification, hard work, and support for multiculturalism (1.1% missing data). Descriptive statistics were assessed first, followed by hypothesis testing.
Descriptive statistics and correlations

Participants had strong feelings of attachment to (or membership in) the Swiss national community ($M = 3.25, SD = 0.70$), and a neutral belief that hard work brings a better life ($M = 5.47, SD = 2.68$), consistent with Studies 4 and 5. They were fairly supportive of multiculturalism ($M = 6.78, SD = 2.09$), demonstrating general adherence to the belief that ethnic diversity is enriching rather than eroding social life. In line with hypothesis 1, those who strongly felt they were members of the Swiss national community (i.e., strong national identification) showed significantly less support for multiculturalism ($r = -.11, p < .001$). In line with hypothesis 2a, stronger national identification was also associated with a stronger belief that hard work brings a better life ($r = .15, p < .001$), and in line with hypothesis 2b, a stronger belief that hard work brings a better life was associated with weakened support for multiculturalism ($r = -.12, p < .001$). These correlations are consistent with Studies 4 and 5.

Mediation model

A mediation model was constructed using PROCESS v3.1 (Hayes, 2018) with support for multiculturalism as the dependent variable. National identification was entered as the independent variable and hard work belief as the mediating variable. Age and gender were included as control variables.  

Hypothesis 1 was confirmed: Stronger national identification significantly predicted opposition to multiculturalism. The total effect model for support for multiculturalism was significant $F(3, 1237) = 5.27, p = .001, R^2 = .01$. Figure 12 shows that the effect of national identification was negative and significant, 95% CI [-0.47; -0.13], $t(1237) = -3.40, p < .001, d$

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24 Because our objective was to show that individual justice beliefs may implicitly encompass group-based concerns about threat and greater entitlement but also extend beyond them when explaining the relationship between national identification and opposition to multiculturalism, we also tested this mediation model controlling for restrictive immigration policy support and the preference for national ingroup members in the job market. Interpretation of results remained identical, except for H1 which was rejected (consistent with the model in Study 4 predicting support for multicultural ideology). Moreover, because the PROCESS macro (Hayes, 2013) cannot take into account weights, reported analyses were conducted on unweighted data. However, the same mediation analysis was also conducted with MPLUS version 5.1 (Muthén & Muthén, 1998-2012), using weighted data. Interpretation of results remained identical.
Participants who strongly felt they were members of the Swiss national community supported multiculturalism significantly less than those who felt less identified with the country.

Hypothesis 2 was also confirmed. Consistent with hypothesis 2a, stronger national identification was associated with a significant increase in the hard work belief: The general model predicting hard work belief was significant, $F(3, 1237) = 16.50, \ p < .001, \ R^2 = .04$, as was the specific effect of national identification on hard work belief, 95% CI [0.28; 0.71], $t(1237) = 4.52, \ p < .001, \ d = 0.26$ (Figure 12).

Consistent with hypothesis 2b, a stronger belief that hard work brings a better life was related to significantly lower support for multiculturalism. The complete model was significant, $F(4, 1236) = 7.36, \ p < .001, \ R^2 = .02$, and Figure 12 shows that the effect of the belief in hard work on support for multiculturalism was negative and significant, 95% CI [-0.13; -0.04], $t(1236) = -3.67, \ p < .001; \ d = 0.21$.

The role of the belief in hard work as a mediator was confirmed, given that the indirect effect of national identification on support for multiculturalism through belief in hard work was significant, $B = -.04, \ SE = .01, \ 95\% \ CI [-0.07, -0.01]$. Figure 12 shows that while the direct effect of national identification was still significant in the final model predicting support for multiculturalism, 95% CI [-0.43; -0.08], $t(1236) = -2.93, \ p = .004, \ d = 0.17$, the original effect of national identification was reduced in magnitude when hard work was included in the model. Consistent with Studies 4 and 5, when individuals felt Switzerland played an important role in their self-concept (i.e., high national identification), their adherence to the dominant societal belief of hard work and individual responsibility was increased, leading them to oppose multiculturalism more strongly than if their national identification was weaker.
4.5 General Discussion

Using correlational, quasi-experimental and survey approaches, the three studies presented in this paper support the main hypothesis according to which national identification with a typically Western (economically) liberal country is associated with stronger beliefs in individual justice which in turn explains why national majorities show opposition to multiculturalism. Our goal was to provide a perspective on multicultural attitudes that emphasizes the key role of justice beliefs shaped by the groups with which people identify.

In all three studies, a belief in individual responsibility (or in the benefits of hard work) was associated with the rejection of multiculturalism. Our findings suggest that the belief in individual responsibility is dominant in liberal societies, anchored, on the individual level, in identification with a liberal national community such as Switzerland. Research has shown that the content of national identity is a critical factor for understanding attitudes towards newcomers and policies addressing them (Pehrson, Brown, et al., 2009; Pehrson & Green, 2010; Pehrson, Vignoles, et al., 2009; Reijerse et al., 2015; Reynolds, Batalha, et al., 2015; Yogeeswaran & Dasgupta, 2014a). This past research has focused largely on citizenship regimes and the degree to which foreigners are included or excluded in the national community. In this paper, we argue that dominant justice beliefs associated with

![Figure 12. Belief in hard work mediates the negative effect of national identification on support for multiculturalism (Study 6).](diagram)
national identity should be given greater attention in studies on attitudes towards multiculturalism.

Results from all three studies show that identification with Switzerland is associated with a stronger belief in individual responsibility, consistent with the finding that national identification in Western societies is associated with a belief that “we are all individuals” (Jetten et al, 2002). Switzerland was an ideal context to test our hypotheses since this is an economically liberal country much like the United Kingdom, the United States or New Zealand, where individualism and norms of individual responsibility are prevalent. However, any national identity is characterized by a multitude of values. Consequently, values other than individual responsibility are likely to be activated through identification with a nation. Future research should identify such values associated with specific national identities that are compatible or incompatible with multiculturalism.

These studies had limitations. Firstly, a convenience sample was used in Study 4 and the sample size was relatively small (albeit within the needed range). While Study 5 involved a more targeted sample, power was still an issue, with fewer apprentices in agriculture than in commerce and not enough students to allow for a conclusive comparison between years of study. Study 6 offset the limitations inherent to the first two studies by involving a strongly powered, nationally representative sample. Given that secondary survey data was used, measures in this final study were close, but different from those in Studies 4 and 5. Despite these limitations, the pattern across the three studies was remarkably similar, reinforcing support for our claims.

4.6 Conclusion

The present research takes a social justice perspective on multiculturalism for national majorities. Prior studies have shown that national majority attitudes towards multiculturalism and immigration can be explained by a sense of material and symbolic threat to their national
identity (see Badea et al., 2018; Green & Staerklé, 2013; Verkuyten, 2009), especially if they are embedded in an exclusionary national context (Pehrson & Green, 2010; Yogeeswaran & Dasgupta, 2014a). Yet, studies explaining attitudes towards immigration and multiculturalism as a function of threatening perceptions of immigrants are potentially marred by a relative proximity between independent (perceived threat from immigrants) and dependent variables (attitudes towards immigration and multicultural policies), thereby risking a tautological explanation. Our approach avoids this potential pitfall, since attitudes towards multiculturalism are explained by justice conceptions that are conceptually and semantically independent from the target population (the justice items never mention immigrants).

Other research has demonstrated that opposition to policies that redress group-based inequalities (such as affirmative action policies) can be explained by the perception that these policies violate principles that people hold dear, such as the individual justice principle of merit and individual responsibility (Bobocel et al., 1998; Son Hing et al., 2011). These findings are compatible with our own justice-based approach inasmuch as we also argue that justice-based concerns are a key factor in understanding attitudes towards multicultural ideology and policies. We contribute to this literature by showing that these justice conceptions should not be seen as simple individual differences, but rather be integrated in a normative framework explaining where these justice conceptions originate, namely in identification with liberal countries. By bridging national identity and social justice lines of research, our approach thus suggests that for national majorities, perceived incompatibility between multiculturalism (collective justice) and individual responsibility (individual justice) is based on the endorsement of dominant national norms of individual responsibility. We hope that this justice-based perspective on multiculturalism may open other fruitful avenues for future research that seek to gain a better understanding as to why the integration of minority groups in host societies often encounters fierce resistance.
CHAPTER 5

Selecting Talented Migrants:

Majority and Minority Perspectives

STUDY 7

Many countries seek to attract talented migrants in order to match the needs of national economies. Based on individual justice principles of equity and merit, such individualised immigration policies select migrants according to their educational qualifications and professional skills. In addition to typical intergroup antagonisms between natives and immigrants, these immigration policies imply intragroup antagonisms, using normative, merit-based criteria to distinguish desirable immigrants from undesirable ones. In this research, we argue that membership in and identification with national majority groups, as opposed to national minority groups (both native), predicts support for these individualised immigration policies targeting talented migrants. Hypotheses were tested among citizens in six European countries where more than one (national) group resides (European Social Survey round 7 data; final samples Belgium, N = 1560; Estonia, N = 1613; Lithuania, N = 2103; Spain, N = 1656; Switzerland, N = 1084; the UK, N = 1840; total N = 9856). Results show that national majorities support individualised immigration policies more strongly than national minorities because they identify more strongly with the nation and its individualistic norms. These results were found while controlling for restrictive immigration attitudes and prejudice towards immigrants, suggesting that support for individualised immigration policies (“cherry picking”) depends on group membership and identification with a (liberal) nation as such. Thereby, our results conceptualize an individual

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justice-based facet of cultural diversity and multiculturalism that is rarely at the forefront of social psychological research.

5.1 Introduction

“The European Union should reform its legal labour migration policies to get its fair share of the global talent pool” (OECD Report, “Europe is underachieving,” 2016, June 7)

“America is participating in a competition for talent. If we change immigration policies and make it harder for smart people to come and stay, we’re going to start losing this battle.” (Seibel, 2017, as cited in Taylor, 2017, June 27)

“It is important that UK immigration policy post-Brexit should be based on a set of clearly defined criteria which reflect a coherent view of what type of immigration is desirable. Although not the only criterion, contributing to the skills-base and talent pool needed for the UK economy to flourish is a central consideration” (“More talent, please,” 2017, March 3)

The selection of new residents allowed to permanently enter a country is a central purpose of immigration policies. Over recent decades in Western countries, these policies have generally become less restrictive, yet more selective (de Haas et al., 2016; Helbling & Kalkum, 2017). As demonstrated in the quotes above, attracting talented migrants in particular is considered imperative today to satisfy the needs of national economies (Cerna & Czaika, 2016; Shachar, 2016). The most significant question behind immigration policy is thus no longer “how many immigrants should be allowed to enter?” but rather “what type of immigrant is desirable?” and, more generally, “who has the right to enter?” (see Green, 2009; Testé, Maisonneuve, Assilaméhou, & Perrin, 2012).

When it comes to immigration research in social and political psychology, most existing research has been concerned with immigration attitudes in general, or prejudice towards immigrants (Ceobanu & Escandell, 2010; Green & Staerklé, 2013; Hainmueller & Hopkins, 2014; Sarrasin et al., 2018). We argue instead that a nuanced analysis of attitudes towards a selective, talent-based immigration policy is necessary, as such a policy involves
processes that cannot be reduced to general immigration or intergroup attitudes. Indeed, the targeted search for global talent not only implies the typical intergroup antagonism between nationals and immigrants, but also refers to differentiation between individual immigrants, thereby articulating processes within and between groups (Dovidio, 2013).

Differentiating between individual immigrants implies the implementation of normative criteria, whereby migrants are selected according to their proximity with a prototype defined by national values (see Reijerse, Van Acker, Vanbeselaere, Phalet, & Duriez, 2013). The criteria associated with this prototype may imply categorical distinctions like skin colour, language and religious affiliation. However, in Western societies, decisions regarding migrants are most strongly influenced by individual, merit-based distinctions such as education and job qualifications (see Green, 2007). These distinctions are likely to be associated with the liberal emphasis on individual deservingness. Hence, endorsing individualist norms that are dominant in Western societies, through identification with liberal societies (see Gale & Staerklé, 2019b; Jetten, Postmes, & McAuliffe, 2002), should account for support for such policies.

The objective of the present study was thus to examine who believes that criteria involving talent and specific skill sets should be given priority when determining who can enter and live in a country. More specifically, we test the hypothesis that membership in national majority groups (as opposed to national minority groups) predicts support for individualised immigration policies, mediated by national identification and controlling for general restrictive immigration attitudes. In the following, we first define in more detail the justice concerns that underlie the selection of talented migrants. Then, we explain why majority group members, in comparison to minorities, are more sensitive to these individual justice concerns that are dominant in Western societies.
5.1.1 Justice and Individualised Immigration Policy

Talented migrants have acquired specific skill sets that are considered desirable and useful for a given national economy. The selection is based on education and career qualifications, leading to increased chances for immigration and, subsequently, residence (Cerna, 2016; Green, 2007, 2009; Shachar, 2016). In the selection process, prioritizing talent therefore implies a concern for the justice principle of equity before equality and need (Deutsch, 1975).

Equity is a defining component of individual justice. Based on the principle of proportionality between contributions and outcomes, Equity Theory (Walster et al., 1973) proposes that people as social actors are (instrumentally) motivated to perceive individual relationships as fair and equitable, by striving to establish a fair correspondence between contributions and benefits. When this balance is offset—when contributions are perceived to be too high and benefits too low or vice versa—distress in the form of resentment or guilt is experienced, leading people to attempt to restore equity within their relationship. According to this individualistic account of justice, people are perceived as rational and self-sufficient actors, backed up by the (neo-) liberal value of meritocratic achievement (Staerklé, 2009).

Equity differs from other principles of justice such as equality and need (see Deutsch, 1975) in the sense that the latter are comparatively de-individuating. Equality involves everyone receiving similar outcomes and need involves outcomes that are contingent on deprivation. Both concern how rewards are (or should be) distributed between sub-groups or at a “system” level (Modigliani & Gamson, 1979; Rawls, 1971). This is also known as collective justice, which takes form when equality and need are conceptualized in comparison to an average or a “relative minimum” (Brickman et al., 1981). For immigration policy to be based on such principles, anyone in sufficient need would be eligible to enter, beyond those who are the most qualified or “talented” (e.g., asylum seekers).
5.1.2 Multiculturalism and Individualised Immigration Policy

In terms of its significance for multicultural societies, talent-based selection of migrants is an ambiguous policy as it reflects at the same time restriction and acceptance of immigration. While such policies allow entry only for those who have something to offer to the country (see Green, 2007), they can also be understood as a means to increase cultural diversity. In Canada, for example, even though cultural diversity is valued, a “points system” drives the selection of newcomers, favouring those who are most educated and qualified (Ferrer et al., 2014). In this way, cultural diversity is appreciated to the extent that diverse groups are composed of talented individuals (see also Gündemir, Homan, Usova, & Galinsky, 2017).

Through an analysis of how the term multiculturalism is used in newspapers, May (2016) argues that while some (especially right-wing) newspapers are “otherwise very critical towards multiculturalism, [they have] a very positive appreciation of it when the term is employed in the economic field” (p. 1343). Indeed, endorsement of multiculturalism is usually associated with left-wing political ideology and is consistent with collective justice principles such as group-based equality and need (Gale & Staerklé, 2017; Green & Staerklé, 2013). However, accepting talented migrants and supporting an individualised immigration policy is a way to support what May (2016) refers to as “managerial” multiculturalism, based instead on principles of individual justice. These are principles that are more readily supported by majorities than minorities, as explained in the following section.

5.1.3 Majority Perspectives on Individualised Immigration Policy

Majorities are members of the numerically largest group in a given national society. In Western societies, this group comprises, for example, Whites relative to other ethnic groups in the United States, people of European versus Maori descent in New Zealand, English-speaking people relative to French-speaking people in Canada, or native citizens relative to
foreign-born residents in Western Europe. These are typical examples of national majority-minority relations where a numerical majority is generally (albeit not always) associated with greater prestige, social value and political power compared to numerical minorities who have a greater chance to experience (historical and/or present-day) subordination (see Simon, Aufderheide, & Kampmeier, 2001).

Prior research has shown that members of majority groups are generally oriented towards individual rather than group-based forms of justice (Azzi, 1998). Asked to establish governmental representation for two groups differing in size, for example, numerical majorities have been shown to express preference for proportional representation (whereby representation is determined by the number of individuals in each group, i.e., individual justice) rather than equal representation (whereby representation is determined by the number of groups regardless of their size, i.e., collective justice; Azzi, 1992). Moreover, in the context of migrant cultural adaptation, research shows that dominant majorities such as Whites or nationals generally prefer newcomers to assimilate to dominant cultural norms, treating everyone as individuals rather than acknowledging and addressing group-based differences (see Dovidio, Gaertner, & Saguy, 2007; Green & Staerklé, 2013; van de Vijver, Breugelmans, & Schalk-Soekar, 2008). Because the selection of talented migrants is based on individual justice principles, (dominant) majorities should support such an individualised immigration policy more strongly than minorities.

Indeed, one reason majorities prefer individual justice principles over collective justice principles may be because the former function in their favour, for example by increasing their governmental power in the case of proportional representation, by prioritizing their culture in the case of immigrant assimilation, or by benefiting their group economically in the case of attracting talented migrants. As such, individual justice principles reinforce the status quo and their privileged position in society. Another explanation may be rooted in individual self-
definitions, where majorities have a tendency to perceive themselves as individuals rather than as group members, thereby shaping their views on justice and society (Azzi, 1998; Hornsey & Jetten, 2004; Simon et al., 2001). However, a normative dynamic may also be at play, whereby socialization in Western majority groups reinforces the motivation to self-identity as an individual rather than as a group member, based on the ideological dominance of (neo-) liberal justice principles. In Western liberal societies, such majority norms tend to be rooted in individualistic values (Sampson, 1988). Research has for example shown that when majorities identify strongly with their nation (and/or as individuals), they are more likely to adhere to the individual justice principle of individual responsibility (Zdaniuk & Bobocel, 2011; Gale & Staerklé, 2019b). Indeed, supporting an individualised immigration policy is congruent with the idea that talented migrants should be hard workers, individually responsible for their success (see also Testé et al., 2012). Stronger identification with the nation should therefore also be associated with increased support for an individualised immigration policy.

The present study was conducted in six European nations characterized with important minority-majority relations. Multinational studies have shown that, in general, national majorities feel stronger ties to the nation in comparison to national minorities (Staerklé et al., 2005, 2010). This difference is explained not only by (historical) asymmetry in power and control of the state (Horowitz, 2000), but also by the idea that members of majority (sub-)groups tend to perceive the norms and values of their group as most representative of the superordinate national category (Mummendey & Wenzel, 1999; Wenzel, Mummendey, & Waldzus, 2007; see also Devos & Banaji, 2005). We therefore hypothesized that national majorities should support an individualised immigration policy more strongly than minorities because they identify more strongly with the nation (and thus its individualistic norms).
It is important to note, however, that national majorities also show more xenophobic and antiminority policy attitudes than minorities (Huynh et al., 2015; Staerklé et al., 2005), and that national identification is associated with anti-immigration attitudes as well (depending on the context; Badea, Iyer, & Aebischer, 2018; Billiet, Maddens, & Beerten, 2003; Curtis, 2014; Pehrson & Green, 2010; Wright, 2011; Yogeeswaran & Dasgupta, 2014). As such, it was imperative in the present study to account for these negative, general immigration attitudes.

5.1.4 National Minority Perspectives

National minorities, in turn, should be more critical of selective immigration policies. Optimal Distinctiveness Theory (Brewer, 1991) posits that individuals’ simultaneous need for inclusion and differentiation is satisfied through identification with a relative minority group. The smaller the group, the stronger the sense of identification with that group, as the shared identity satisfies the need for inclusion and the smaller size satisfies the need for distinctiveness from larger groups (see also Hornsey & Jetten, 2004). While minorities may simultaneously identify with the nation more generally (known as dual identity, see for example Dovidio et al., 2007; González & Brown, 2006; Simon & Grabow, 2010), the two identities tend to be more independent than they are for majorities (see Staerklé et al., 2010). Moreover, this stronger sense of collective sub-group identity is coupled with greater sensitivity towards principles of intergroup equality (see Azzi, 1992, 1998) which may be violated by an individualised immigration policy selecting people based exclusively on principles of equity and merit (see Son Hing et al., 2011). This explains why minorities should support an individualised immigration policy less strongly than majorities.

We test this hypothesis with historical national minorities (as opposed to immigrant minorities) in order to avoid any confound and thus potential ingroup bias between the sample
and the target (i.e., immigrants; see Just & Anderson, 2015). A number of European countries are ideal to test our majority-minority asymmetry hypothesis in a real-world setting.

Estonia and Lithuania are both countries where the majority group speaks the national language (that is, Estonian and Lithuanian, respectively). However, thanks to historically changing national borders, national minorities with common languages to neighbouring countries also live in particular regions of these countries: Russian-speaking people in north-eastern Estonia and in eastern Lithuania, and Polish-speaking people in south-eastern Lithuania (see Barrington, 1995, for a discussion of nationhood in Estonia and Lithuania). Switzerland, in turn, is composed of a national German-speaking majority group and two national minorities, the French-speaking in western Switzerland and the Italian-speaking in southern Switzerland (both French and Italian are official national languages; see Dardanelli, 2012; Ipperciel, 2011, for an analysis and debate regarding Swiss (multi-)nationhood).

Like Switzerland, Belgium also has distinct linguistic regions where two official national languages are spoken, in common with neighbouring countries. The Flemish (i.e., Dutch) to the North is a numerically larger group than the Walloon (i.e., French) to the South. However, in the capital city of Brussels, Francophones are the majority. Moreover, at the national level, the Walloon “minority” speaks the historically dominant language, creating tensions for the Flemish “majority” (van Velthoven, 1989), the Flemish perceive themselves as a minority in comparison to the larger, transborder, French-speaking group, and Flemish nationalist and separatist movements illustrate a strenuous relationship with the Belgian nation (see also Klein, Bouchat, Azzi, & Luminet, 2017). As such, Belgium is a multi-group country characterized by a certain ambiguity when it comes to determining which group is the majority.

In Spain as well, there are majority and national minority groups defined by language. In addition to the Spanish, Castilian majority, there is, for example, the Basque minority in
northern Spain, the Galician in north-western Spain and the Catalan minority in north-eastern Spain. Finally, while not involving linguistic regions, the United Kingdom includes a national majority, England, and the national minorities of Scotland, Wales and Northern Ireland.

The national contexts highlighted above thus all involve national and regional minorities who all claim, to different degrees, recognition and self-governance, demonstrating their sensitivity for equality and group-based justice. Additional examples of groups and countries that show such characteristics include the Corsicans in France, the German-speakers in northern Italy and the Québécois in Canada (see for example Kymlicka, 1995). In the present study, secondary survey data from the European Social Survey data was used which restricted data availability.

5.1.5 The Present Study

Our hypotheses are summarized as follows: First, national majorities should support an individualised immigration policy prioritizing talented migrants more strongly than national minorities (H1). Second, national majorities’ elevated support for an individualised immigration policy should be explained by their stronger identification with the nation in comparison to minorities (i.e., serving as a mediator; H2). In other words, national majorities should show stronger national identification than national minorities (H2a), and this stronger national identification should be associated with increased support for an individualised immigration policy (H2b). Finally, because our objective was to show that group size (and thus also political influence and power) drive these effects and because support for an individualised immigration policy can also be a way of expressing negative attitudes towards immigration more broadly, support for restrictive immigration policies and for multiculturalism in general were accounted for as conceptual control variables.
5.2 Method

5.2.1 Participants and Minority/Majority Classification

European Social Survey data (ESS; Round 7, 2014) from six countries were used, including Belgium, Estonia, Lithuania, Spain, Switzerland, and the UK (total $N = 9856$). These countries were selected based on the presence of national, regional, linguistic (except for the UK) minority groups within them, also known as historic subgroups that are formal members of each nation (i.e., different from immigrant minorities). Therefore, only national citizens were included in the analyses.

Minority (coded -1) and majority (coded 1) classification was done on the basis of the first language spoken at home in all countries except the UK where the region was used instead. Indeed, in England, only those who spoke English were maintained for analyses. For statistical reasons, since the majority group is generally overpowered and minority ones underpowered in representative survey research, the minimum cutoff size for minority groups was set to 150. All smaller groups were excluded from analyses, and only one majority versus one minority group remained in each country.26 Table 8 shows the final sample size in each country, including the size of majority and minority groups.

Gender in the final samples ranged from 48.9% female in Spain to 61.7% female in Lithuania. The mean age ranged from 47.74 ($SD = 19.21$) in Belgium to 53.37 ($SD = 18.30$) in the UK. Years of formal education ranged from 10.89 ($SD = 3.10$) years in Switzerland to 13.42 ($SD = 3.69$) in the UK. Gender, age and education were controlled for in hypothesis testing.

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26 As a result of this cutoff, the Lithuanian Polish minority, the Swiss Italian minority, the Spanish Galician and Basque minorities, and the Welsh and Northern Irish minorities in the UK were all excluded from analyses. Round 7 of the ESS included 21 countries in total. While data from additional countries were also considered, minority groups were either too small empirically (for example Swedish minorities in Finland) or were not recruited during data collection (for example Corsican minorities in France).
5.2.2 Measures

Support for an individualised immigration policy was measured with two items assessing the degree to which respondents believed that (1) good education and (2) professional qualifications (that the country needs) are important criteria to consider when deciding if a person born, raised and having lived outside the respective country (i.e., Belgium, Estonia, Lithuania, Spain, Switzerland, or the UK) can come in and live. Correlations between these two items ranged from $r = .50$ in Estonia to $r = .60$ in Switzerland, and the response scale for each item ranged from 0 (extremely unimportant) to 10 (extremely important). High scores represented the belief that individual and merit-based criteria should be used when deciding who is allowed to come live in the respective country.

National identification was measured with a single item assessing the degree to which participants felt close to the respective country. Original ESS responses were reversed so that they were coded on a scale ranging from 1 (not close at all) to 4 (very close) and high scores represented stronger identification with the nation. The measure was treated as an ordinal variable.

Support for multiculturalism, used as a conceptual control variable, was measured with six items assessing the degree to which respondents believed that the presence of immigrants in the respective country enriches or threatens the following domains: economy, cultural life, life in general, employment, welfare and criminality. Internal consistency of these items ranged from $\alpha = .63$ in Spain to $\alpha = .89$ in the UK. The response scale for each item ranged from 0 to 10 and all items were averaged to create a single variable. High scores represented the belief that the respective country is enriched by the presence of immigrants and low scores represented prejudice towards immigrants.

Two additional items exist in ESS data that are often used in conjunction with the two from this study: immigrants should be able to speak (one of) the main language(s) in the country, and immigrants should be willing to respect the country’s way of life. While these items also refer to an “individualised immigration policy” with an assimilationist orientation, that they do not necessarily make reference to “talented migrants” with an economic orientation.
Support for a restrictive immigration policy, also used as a conceptual control variable, was measured with four items assessing the degree to which respondents believed the government should authorize more or less immigrants coming from poor countries within or outside of Europe, or countries with the same or different ethnic group, to come live in the respective country. Internal consistency of these items ranged from $\alpha = .86$ in Estonia to $\alpha = .96$ in Spain. Items were responded to on a scale from 1 (many of them should be authorized) to 4 (none of them should be authorized), and all items were averaged to create a single variable. High scores represented strong support and low scores represented weak support for a restrictive immigration policy.

5.2.3 Data Analysis

SPSS version 25 was used to conduct analyses. In order to maintain the entire sample of respondents, maximum likelihood imputation was carried out on all measured data (i.e., national identification, support for individualised immigration policy, support for multiculturalism and support for restrictive immigration policy items; missing data ranging from 0.40% in Belgium to 8.44% in Lithuania), except sociodemographic information. Descriptive statistics and bivariate correlations between main variables of interest were assessed, followed by hypothesis testing.

5.3 Results

5.3.1 Descriptive Statistics

Table 8 shows means and standard deviations of the variables, both overall and for each (minority and majority) group separately.
Table 8
Sample Overview for Majority and Minority Group Membership and Respective Means and Standard Deviations of Variables

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>n</th>
<th>Individualised Immigration Policy</th>
<th>National Identification</th>
<th>Multiculturalism</th>
<th>Restrictive Immigration Policy</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Belgium</td>
<td>1560</td>
<td>6.57 (2.11)</td>
<td>3.17 (0.69)</td>
<td>4.40 (1.62)</td>
<td>2.41 (0.74)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Flemish</td>
<td>894</td>
<td>6.66 (1.93)</td>
<td>3.08 (0.67)</td>
<td>4.49 (1.53)</td>
<td>2.39 (0.73)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Wallonian</td>
<td>666</td>
<td>6.45 (2.32)</td>
<td>3.29 (0.71)</td>
<td>4.29 (1.73)</td>
<td>2.44 (0.76)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Estonia</td>
<td>1613</td>
<td>7.32 (1.98)</td>
<td>3.40 (0.66)</td>
<td>4.98 (1.53)</td>
<td>2.55 (0.69)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Estonian</td>
<td>1257</td>
<td>7.38 (1.89)</td>
<td>3.50 (0.59)</td>
<td>5.05 (1.46)</td>
<td>2.54 (0.68)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Russian</td>
<td>356</td>
<td>7.12 (2.27)</td>
<td>3.04 (0.77)</td>
<td>4.74 (1.74)</td>
<td>2.60 (0.74)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lithuania</td>
<td>2103</td>
<td>7.32 (2.00)</td>
<td>3.24 (0.66)</td>
<td>4.76 (1.52)</td>
<td>2.52 (0.81)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lithuanian</td>
<td>1945</td>
<td>7.35 (2.02)</td>
<td>3.26 (0.66)</td>
<td>4.72 (1.54)</td>
<td>2.54 (0.81)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Russian</td>
<td>158</td>
<td>7.02 (1.73)</td>
<td>3.01 (0.62)</td>
<td>5.17 (1.20)</td>
<td>2.30 (0.70)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Spain</td>
<td>1656</td>
<td>6.28 (2.51)</td>
<td>3.43 (0.76)</td>
<td>4.63 (1.32)</td>
<td>2.33 (0.88)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Castilian</td>
<td>1476</td>
<td>6.27 (2.47)</td>
<td>3.53 (0.66)</td>
<td>4.66 (1.30)</td>
<td>2.35 (0.88)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Catalan</td>
<td>180</td>
<td>6.33 (2.80)</td>
<td>2.63 (1.01)</td>
<td>4.38 (1.49)</td>
<td>2.23 (0.88)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Switzerland</td>
<td>1084</td>
<td>6.51 (2.22)</td>
<td>3.58 (0.56)</td>
<td>5.09 (1.44)</td>
<td>2.24 (0.62)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>German</td>
<td>826</td>
<td>6.69 (2.10)</td>
<td>3.61 (0.54)</td>
<td>4.93 (1.41)</td>
<td>2.29 (0.62)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>French</td>
<td>258</td>
<td>5.95 (2.48)</td>
<td>3.47 (0.62)</td>
<td>5.60 (1.39)</td>
<td>2.10 (0.60)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UK</td>
<td>1840</td>
<td>7.29 (1.98)</td>
<td>3.16 (0.80)</td>
<td>4.45 (1.93)</td>
<td>2.57 (0.78)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>English</td>
<td>1648</td>
<td>7.34 (1.94)</td>
<td>3.18 (0.79)</td>
<td>4.42 (1.92)</td>
<td>2.59 (0.77)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Scottish</td>
<td>192</td>
<td>6.84 (2.22)</td>
<td>2.98 (0.92)</td>
<td>4.74 (1.97)</td>
<td>2.44 (0.79)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Respondents were generally supportive of an individualised immigration policy, although t-tests showed that in Lithuania, Switzerland and the UK, minorities were significantly less supportive than majorities ($p = .044$, $p = .002$, $p = .003$, respectively), and in Belgium and Estonia, minorities were marginally less supportive than majorities ($p = .053$, $p = .052$, respectively), consistent with our expectations (H1). In Spain, the Catalan minority and the Castilian majority did not significantly differ in their support for an individualised approach.  

28 Means significantly higher than the midpoint of the scale in all countries, $p < .001$. 

immigration policy \((p = .779)\), possibly explained by Catalonia’s relative higher status despite their numerical minority position in the country.

National identification was high in each country,\(^{29}\) although t-tests showed that in all countries except Belgium, minorities had significantly weaker feelings of national identification than majorities \((p < .001\) in all five countries), consistent with our expectations (H2a). In Belgium, the Walloon minority had significantly stronger feelings of national identification than the Flemish majority \((p < .001)\), likely explained by Wallonia’s historically dominant position and by strong separatist movements in Flanders.

Our first conceptual control variable, support for multiculturalism, was close to the midpoint of the scale in general, especially in Estonia, although in Belgium, Lithuania, Spain and the UK, support was comparatively weak, while in Switzerland, it was comparatively strong.\(^{30}\) Moreover, t-tests showed that in Belgium, Estonia and Spain, minorities were significantly less supportive of multiculturalism (i.e., demonstrating greater prejudice towards immigrants) than majorities \((p = .016, p = .002, p = .015, \text{respectively})\), while in Lithuania, Switzerland and the UK, minorities were significantly more supportive of multiculturalism (i.e., demonstrating less prejudice towards immigrants) than majorities \((p < .001, p < .001, p = .029, \text{respectively})\). These discrepancies emphasise the need to control for support for multiculturalism in hypothesis testing.

Our second conceptual control variable, support for a restrictive immigration policy, was also close to the midpoint of the scale in general, especially in Lithuania, although in Belgium, Spain, and Switzerland, support was comparatively weak, while in Estonia and the

\(^{29}\) Means significantly higher than the midpoint of the scale in all countries, \(p < .001\).

\(^{30}\) Means in Belgium Lithuania, Spain and the UK significantly lower than the midpoint of the scale, \(p < .001\). Mean in Switzerland significantly (albeit weakly) higher than the midpoint of the scale, \(p = .033\). Mean in Estonia not significantly different from the midpoint of the scale, \(p = .611\).
UK, it was comparatively strong. Moreover, t-tests showed that in Lithuania, Switzerland and the UK, minorities were significantly less supportive of a restrictive immigration policy than majorities ($p < .001$, $p < .001$, $p = .009$, respectively), while in Belgium, Estonia and Spain, majorities and minorities did not significantly differ ($p = .196$, $p = .173$, $p = .100$, respectively). These discrepancies, again, plead in favour of incorporating this second control variable into hypothesis testing.

### 5.3.2 Bivariate Correlations

Table 9 shows overall bivariate correlations between main variables. In line with our expectations (H2b), stronger national identification was significantly associated with increased support for an individualised immigration policy in four out of six countries. While national identification was often associated with decreased support for multiculturalism and increased support for a restrictive immigration policy (especially in Switzerland), the reverse was true in the UK.

Moreover, in all countries, support for an individualised immigration policy was significantly associated with decreased support for multiculturalism (i.e., increased prejudice towards immigrants) and with increased support for a restrictive immigration policy. This shows that support for an individualised immigration policy can indeed be a reflection of negative attitudes towards immigrants and immigration, further supporting the idea to control for these variables to see if our predicted effects would go beyond them.

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31 Means in Belgium, Spain and Switzerland significantly lower than the midpoint of the scale, $p < .001$. Means in Estonia and the UK significantly higher than the midpoint of the scale, $p = .003$, $p < .001$, respectively. Mean in Lithuania not significantly different from the midpoint of the scale, $p = 232$. 
### Table 9

**Bivariate Correlations Between Main Variables of Interest**

<table>
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<tr>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Belgium</td>
<td>.043&lt;sup&gt;^&lt;/sup&gt;</td>
<td>-.277&lt;sup&gt;***&lt;/sup&gt;</td>
<td>.327&lt;sup&gt;***&lt;/sup&gt;</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>-.009</td>
<td>.055*</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>-.630&lt;sup&gt;***&lt;/sup&gt;</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Estonia</td>
<td>.174&lt;sup&gt;***&lt;/sup&gt;</td>
<td>-.062*</td>
<td>.196&lt;sup&gt;***&lt;/sup&gt;</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>-.017</td>
<td>.080**</td>
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<td></td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>-.598&lt;sup&gt;***&lt;/sup&gt;</td>
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<tr>
<td>Lithuania</td>
<td>.138&lt;sup&gt;***&lt;/sup&gt;</td>
<td>-.079&lt;sup&gt;***&lt;/sup&gt;</td>
<td>.198&lt;sup&gt;***&lt;/sup&gt;</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>.010</td>
<td>.024</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>-.528&lt;sup&gt;***&lt;/sup&gt;</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Spain</td>
<td>.108&lt;sup&gt;***&lt;/sup&gt;</td>
<td>-.243&lt;sup&gt;***&lt;/sup&gt;</td>
<td>.294&lt;sup&gt;***&lt;/sup&gt;</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>-.021</td>
<td>.162&lt;sup&gt;***&lt;/sup&gt;</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>-.502&lt;sup&gt;***&lt;/sup&gt;</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Switzerland</td>
<td>.160&lt;sup&gt;***&lt;/sup&gt;</td>
<td>-.244&lt;sup&gt;***&lt;/sup&gt;</td>
<td>.331&lt;sup&gt;***&lt;/sup&gt;</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>-.118&lt;sup&gt;***&lt;/sup&gt;</td>
<td>.137&lt;sup&gt;***&lt;/sup&gt;</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>-.573&lt;sup&gt;***&lt;/sup&gt;</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UK</td>
<td>-.032</td>
<td>-.328&lt;sup&gt;***&lt;/sup&gt;</td>
<td>.370&lt;sup&gt;***&lt;/sup&gt;</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>.204&lt;sup&gt;***&lt;/sup&gt;</td>
<td>-.117&lt;sup&gt;***&lt;/sup&gt;</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>-.668&lt;sup&gt;***&lt;/sup&gt;</td>
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</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Note.* ‘NationalID’ represents national identification. ‘IndivPolicy’ represents support for an individualised immigration policy. ‘MC’ represents support for multiculturalism. ‘RestrictPolicy’ represents support for a restrictive immigration policy.  

* ***p < .001, ** p < .01, * p < .05, ^ p < .10.*

### 5.3.3 Hypothesis Testing

Figure 13 shows our conceptual model, tested in all six countries. This model was constructed to test our hypotheses using the PROCESS macro (v3.1; Hayes, 2018) in SPSS 25. Support for an individualised immigration policy was the dependent variable, the minority versus majority group was the independent variable, and national identification served as the mediator. The model was first tested using gender, age and education as control variables.
These results are summarized in Appendix B (tables B1 and B2). However, support for multiculturalism and a restrictive immigration policy were incorporated as additional conceptual control variables and these results are described in detail below (summarized in Table 10; see Appendix B, Table B3 for omnibus tests of these models). Similarities and differences with the models omitting these control variables will be highlighted where relevant.

The total effect model including only the independent and control variables was significant in all countries \((p < .001)\). In line with our first hypothesis \((H1)\), Table 10 shows that the total effect of minority/majority group membership on support for an individualised immigration policy (path \(c'\) in Figure 13) was positive and significant, or approaching significance, in all countries except Spain. Indeed, Flemish in Belgium, Swiss-Germans in Switzerland and English in the UK, all majority groups, were significantly more supportive of an individualised immigration policy in comparison to Walloons in Belgium \((p = .018)\), Swiss-French in Switzerland \((p = .003)\) and Scottish in the UK \((p = .012)\), all minority groups. These differences were marginal between majority Estonians and minority Russians in Estonia \((p = .081)\), and between majority Lithuanians and minority Russians in Lithuania \((p = .081)\), and there was no difference between majority Castilians and minority Catalans in Spain \((p = .817)\). These results are consistent with the analysis of descriptive statistics described above.\(^{32}\)

The model incorporating national identification was also significant in all countries, \((p < .001)\). In line with hypothesis 2b, Table 10 shows that stronger national identification was associated with a significant increase in support for an individualised immigration policy (path \(b\) in Figure 13) in all countries (significance ranging from \(p = .007\) in Spain to \(p < .001\)

\[^{32}\text{The results for the total effect (path } c' \text{ in Figure 13) controlling only for socio-demographic characteristics were also very similar. However, the effect in Belgium and Estonia was in the same direction, but non-significant } (p = .217, p = .111, \text{ respectively}), \text{ and the effect in Lithuania was significant } (p = .018) \text{ instead of a trend.}\]
in Estonia, Lithuania and the UK), except Belgium where the effect was non-significant but in the same direction ($p = .177$). This result is consistent with correlations described above - although the correlation between national identification and support for an individualised immigration policy in the UK was non-significant,\(^{33}\) when the variance explained by restrictive views on immigration and multiculturalism was accounted for in the present model, the relationship became significant for this country.

The model predicting national identification was significant in all countries ($p < .001$), and the effect of minority/majority group membership on national identification (path a in Figure 13) was positive and significant in all countries except Belgium, where the effect was negative and significant (see Table 10). Consistent with preliminary analyses and hypothesis 2a, Estonians in Estonia, Lithuanians in Lithuania, Castilians in Spain, Swiss-Germans in Switzerland and English in the UK, all majorities, demonstrated significantly stronger identification with their respective nations in comparison to Russians in Estonia ($p < .001$), Russians in Lithuania ($p < .001$), Catalans in Spain ($p < .001$), Swiss-French in Switzerland ($p = .027$) and Scottish in the UK ($p < .001$), all minorities. Conversely, Flemish majorities in Belgium demonstrated significantly weaker identification with their nation in comparison to Walloon minorities ($p < .001$).\(^{34}\)

In line with our general second hypothesis (H2), the relative indirect effect through national identification reached significance for all countries except Belgium. Majorities generally supported an individualised immigration policy more strongly than minorities because they identified more strongly with the nation in Estonia (95% CI [0.04, 0.13]), Lithuania (95% CI [0.03, 0.08]), Spain (95% CI [0.02, 0.18]), Switzerland (95% CI [0.00, 0.33]) and Scottish in the UK (95% CI [0.00, 0.18]).

\(^{33}\) This relationship between national identification and support for an individualised immigration policy (path b in Figure 13) in the UK was also non-significant ($p = .455$) in the model controlling only for socio-demographic characteristics.

\(^{34}\) The effect of minority/majority group membership on national identification (path a in Figure 13) was identical in all countries when controlling only for socio-demographic characteristics.
0.04]) and the UK (95% CI [0.01, 0.05]). In Belgium, this mediation model was non-significant (95% CI [-0.03, 0.01]).

![Mediation Model Diagram]

**Figure 13.** Mediation Model: National Identification Explains Why Support for Individualised Immigration Policy Differs by Minority-Majority Group.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Path</th>
<th>a (SE)</th>
<th>b (SE)</th>
<th>c' (SE)</th>
<th>c (SE)</th>
<th>Indirect effect</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Belgium</td>
<td>-0.12*** (0.02)</td>
<td>0.07 (0.07)</td>
<td>0.12* (0.05)</td>
<td>0.13* (0.05)</td>
<td>x</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Estonia</td>
<td>0.22*** (0.02)</td>
<td>0.37*** (0.08)</td>
<td>0.10^ (0.06)</td>
<td>0.02 (0.06)</td>
<td>✔</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lithuania</td>
<td>0.13*** (0.03)</td>
<td>0.37*** (0.06)</td>
<td>0.14^ (0.08)</td>
<td>0.09 (0.08)</td>
<td>✔</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Spain</td>
<td>0.45*** (0.03)</td>
<td>0.23** (0.09)</td>
<td>-0.02 (0.09)</td>
<td>-0.13 (0.10)</td>
<td>✔</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Switzerland</td>
<td>0.04* (0.02)</td>
<td>0.36** (0.12)</td>
<td>0.23** (0.08)</td>
<td>0.21** (0.08)</td>
<td>✔</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UK</td>
<td>0.11*** (0.03)</td>
<td>0.25*** (0.06)</td>
<td>0.18* (0.07)</td>
<td>0.15* (0.07)</td>
<td>✔</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Note. Paths refer to those shown in Figure 13. Groups systematically coded so that the majority (bigger) group is coded as 1 and the minority (smaller) group is coded as -1. Gender, age, education, support for multiculturalism and support for a restrictive immigration policy included as control variables. *** p < .001, ** p < .01, * p < .05, ^ p < .10.*

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35 In the model controlling only for socio-demographic characteristics for the UK, this indirect effect was non-significant (95% CI [-0.01, 0.02]). Otherwise, all results were the same.
5.4 Discussion

The present study involving six multinational European countries shows that the desire to attract talented migrants and implement an individualised immigration policy is to some extent explained by membership in dominant, national majority groups. This effect was found above and beyond prejudiced attitudes and a general desire to restrict immigration and cultural diversity, providing evidence of intragroup determinants of immigration attitudes, in addition to intergroup factors. Indeed, the effect is shaped by identification with one’s nation and its purportedly individualistic values (Gale & Staerklé, 2019b; see also Deschamps, 1982; Sampson, 1988). Results show that national majorities support an individualised immigration policy more strongly than national minorities because they identify more strongly with the nation.

The hypothesized mediation model was supported in five out of the six countries tested, including Estonia, Lithuania, Spain, Switzerland and the UK. Belgium was the only exception, likely because of this country’s unique political situation and linguistic conflict (see Klein et al., 2017). In line with hypothesis 1, Flemish majorities showed significantly stronger support for an individualised immigration policy than Walloon minorities. However, counter to hypothesis 2a, Flemish majorities showed significantly weaker national identification than Walloon minorities. This is likely because of current Flemish nationalist and separatist movements, illustrating a strenuous relationship between this numerical majority group and the Belgian nation. Given this inconsistency, stronger national identification was not associated with significantly increased support for an individualised immigration policy in Belgium, despite that the effect was in the expected direction (see Billiet et al., 2003, for an analysis of national identity dynamics and representations among subgroups in Belgium). This effect was nevertheless strongly significant in all other countries, in line with hypothesis 2b.
Prior research shows that national identification is associated with a desire to protect
the nation from threats, predicting for example increased prejudice towards minorities and
immigrants (see for example Pehrson, Vignoles, & Brown, 2009; Verkuyten, 2009). However,
the content of national identity also determines how attitudes and beliefs are shaped (see
Pehrson & Green, 2010; Wright, 2011; Yogeeswaran & Dasgupta, 2014). In other words,
individuals’ values (and justice conceptions) are determined by the group(s) with which they
identify and by the norms associated with these groups. To illustrate this point, the
correlations in our study show that countries vary in the degree to which national
identification is associated with negative attitudes towards immigration: While in most
countries, national identification was positively associated with restrictive immigration
attitudes and sometimes opposition to multiculturalism, the reverse correlations were found in
the UK, where pro-diversity norms are prevalent and influential, thereby possibly accounting
for the positive relationship between national identification and positive immigration attitudes
(see Koopmans, 2010). But the countries involved in the present study are all liberal to
varying degrees, with prevalent norms of individual responsibility. According to the
Economic Freedom Index (Heritage Foundation, 2018), among the 44 ranked European
countries, Switzerland is ranked first, Estonia third, the UK fourth, and Lithuania eleventh,
followed by Belgium (25th) and Spain (30th). Moreover, according to the Global Talent
Competitiveness Index (Bruno & Monteiro, 2019), among the 37 ranked European countries,
Switzerland ranked again first, the UK seventh, Belgium twelfth, and Estonia fifteenth,
followed by Spain (20th) and Lithuania (21st). These rankings roughly mirror the strength of
association between national identification and support for individualised immigration
policies. Indeed, while interpretation of results was consistent across most countries, there
was also variation in the magnitude of effects. We therefore suggest that national
identification is associated with increased support for a policy based on individual justice
principles to the extent that national identity reflects these (neo-) liberal values (see Gale & Staerklé, 2019b).

The multi-national contexts examined in the present study allowed for a comparison between distinct national majority and national minority groups, inhabiting specific regions of each country. Consistent with the assumption that belonging to a minority sub-group is associated with an increased sensitivity to collective justice principles (as opposed to individual justice principles; Azzi, 1992; 1998), the national minorities in our study expressed less support for an individualised immigration policy based on individual justice principles than national majorities. However, future research should examine whether membership in such national minority subgroups allows for increased support for equality- and need-based multiculturalism such as the incorporation of refugees and asylum seekers. While existing research shows that immigrant (or ethnic) minorities support this more egalitarian facet of multiculturalism (Dovidio et al., 2007; Green & Staerklé, 2013; van de Vijver et al., 2008), this question should be further examined for national minorities (see Staerklé, Sidanius, Green, & Molina, 2005, for early research on national minority-majority differences on xenophobia).

Results of this study merit replication. Indeed, an adequately powered sample would be desirable in future research, favouring more balanced proportions between minority and majority respondents. Given the nationally representative and high-quality data provided by the European Social Survey, however, we are confident in the stability of our results. Indeed, our model was successfully replicated in five out of six countries and effects were only conflicting when asymmetric intergroup criteria (i.e., power and size) were ambiguous, in particular in Belgium. In order to provide further evidence for our conclusions, future research should incorporate experimental work to avoid post-hoc explanations related to national
circumstances and to systematically determine which factors of national group asymmetry (e.g., numeric size, political power) drives the observed effects.

5.5 Conclusion

In political and social psychological literature, there is a tendency to study multiculturalism as an ideology and as a set of policies that favour minorities, associated with the absence of prejudice and with justice conceptions primarily based on principles of equality and need. Despite its restrictive and prejudicial connotation, the notion of accepting talented migrants is a way of supporting a specific, economic and managerial (see May, 2016) type of multiculturalism. Indeed, on one hand, support for an individualised immigration policy attracting talented migrants is a way of gate-keeping and thus restricting immigration, associated with prejudiced attitudes towards immigrants and perceived threat of immigration (Green, 2007, 2009). Such policies also imply assimilation expectations, as they require immigrants to conform to dominant (Western) societal values and practices (Bourhis et al., 1997). On the other hand, however, the innovation and diversity individual talented migrants bring to the host society can be considered just as valuable as their skill sets, as exemplified in Canadian immigration policy (Ferrer et al., 2014). As such, while implications are similar, there is a difference between the selection of talented migrants based on individual qualifications and the threat of cultural diversity or expectation that immigrants assimilate to dominant cultural norms (see Hirschman, 2013; Shachar & Hirschl, 2013): While the latter involves explicit intergroup dynamics, the former involves intragroup processes that differentiate individual migrants as a function of their merit. In the context of the present study, we do not wish to discount the important underlying interpretation of individualised immigration policies as restrictive, prejudiced, and/or assimilationist; we simply wish to provide an additional, encompassing, justice-based perspective. The present study therefore introduces a novel angle for the study of multiculturalism, highlighting an individual justice-
based facet that is generally attractive for majorities (see Gündemir et al., 2017; Ward, Gale, Staerklé, & Stuart, 2018). This facet involves “cherry picking” through the targeting of “useful” migrants. Thereby, we hope that this research takes a step beyond the simple, binary intergroup oppositions in the study of immigration attitudes and multiculturalism.
CHAPTER 6

Multicultural Attitudes in Europe:
A Multilevel Analysis of Compatibility between Individual and Collective Justice36

STUDY 8

Contemporary political philosophers debate the degree to which multiculturalism, with its emphasis on groups, is compatible with Western liberal societies’ emphasis on individuals. Taking on a psychological perspective and using international survey data to conduct a multilevel comparison across European nations, the present study examines the asymmetric compatibility hypothesis according to which majority and minority groups differ in the association they demonstrate between an individualized immigration policy, based on individual justice principles, and multiculturalism, based on collective justice principles. Round 7 data from the European Social Survey was used (N = 36,732) with comparisons between countries with stronger or weaker equality policies at the national level (a MIPEX sub-dimension indicator) and between Western and post-communist European countries. Minorities perceived significantly less incompatibility between individual and collective justice than majorities, and this minority-majority asymmetric compatibility was stronger in Western countries compared to post-communist European countries. Moreover, minorities generally supported multiculturalism more strongly than majorities in Western countries and in countries with stronger equality policies. Overall, these findings support the necessity to consider the dominant, liberal, political context in which minority and majority justice conceptions and multicultural attitudes are shaped and examined. Implications and future research directions are discussed.

6.1 Introduction

The subject of attitudes towards immigration and multiculturalism has received ample attention from social and political psychologists over recent decades (Deaux & Verkuyten, 2014; Green & Staerklé, 2013; Guimond et al., 2014; Ward et al., 2018). Indeed, the presence of immigrants and culturally diverse groups in society can be differentially valued by majority and minority groups (see Just & Anderson, 2015; Sarrasin et al., 2018), depending on a variety of individual and contextual factors (see for example Ceobanu & Escandell, 2010; van de Vijver, Breugelmans, & Schalk-Soekar, 2008, for overviews). Recent work suggests that these factors include belief systems implying sensitivity for individual and collective forms of justice.

In this view, multiculturalism is associated with collective, group-based justice principles, emphasizing categorical distinctiveness and conceptualizing society as composed of clearly identifiable subgroups (Gale & Staerklé, 2017; Guimond et al., 2014; Verkuyten, 2006). As a political theory, multiculturalism values the presence of distinct and culturally diverse groups and endorses normative recognition of differences between them through legal protection of cultural practices or language rights, for example (Licata, Sanchez-Mazas, & Green, 2011; Moghaddam, 2008; Taylor, 1992). Political philosophers debate, however, the degree to which multiculturalism, with its emphasis on groups, is normatively compatible with Western liberal societies’ emphasis on individual justice principles expressed in values of individual freedom and personal responsibility (see Barry, 2001; Joppke, 2004; Kymlicka, 1995). This compatibility debate has occurred predominantly within Western contexts such as North America and Europe, while its pertinence has been questioned in the context of post-communist or authoritarian regimes (Kuzio, 2005; Kymlicka & Opalski, 2001).

The present study tested cross-nationally the asymmetric compatibility hypothesis according to which national majorities and ethnic minorities differ in the degree to which they
perceive multiculturalism and individual justice principles as compatible. Indeed, prior research has shown that in an economically liberal national context such as Switzerland, national majorities perceive the liberal belief in individual responsibility on the one hand and multiculturalism on the other to be negatively associated with each other, that is, they are perceived as being incompatible (Gale & Staerklé, 2019a). However, this same research showed that ethnic minorities perceive greater compatibility between these individual and collective forms of justice compared to national majorities. The present study thus seeks to examine the extent to which this asymmetric compatibility hypothesis holds across a variety of liberal and post-communist contexts.

More specifically, using European Social Survey (ESS) data, this study looks at how majority and minority groups differ in the association they demonstrate between their support for an individualized immigration policy (based on individual justice principles) and their support for multiculturalism (based on collective justice principles). Using a multi-level design, we also examine the extent to which (geo)political country-level factors shape this individual-level asymmetric compatibility for majority and minority groups. In the following, we first elaborate on what we mean by an individualized immigration policy and its foundation in dominant Western individual justice principles. We then explain how multiculturalism—as a collective justice principle—can be conceptualized at the same time as an individual attitude and as a contextual policy indicator that impacts individual attitudes and beliefs.

6.1.1 Individual Justice-Based Immigration Criteria

Predominant in Western Europe, civic integration policies are designed to ensure that newcomers are on a level playing field compared to citizens, in terms of their employment opportunities and language skills, for example, but also in terms of their respect for the host country’s way of life (Kymlicka, 2012b). These policies are often implemented at the initial
stage of entry of the immigration process, in the form of individualized selection criteria such as level of education and language competences. Under such circumstances, however, high status immigrants are generally privileged, as these individuals are more likely to have valued skill sets (Goodman, 2014). Such immigrants are therefore considered to be valuable for society, increasing cultural diversity while at the same time contributing to the nation and its economy.

This civic integration perspective is the foundation of an “individualized immigration policy” (see Gale & Staerklé, 2019c), which uses individual criteria to determine if a person is allowed to enter and live in a given country. Based on equity theory that suggests that people (in liberal societies) generally perceive justice when rewards are proportional to individual effort and contribution (Walster et al., 1978), an individualized immigration policy implies that the people who are allowed entry are those who have acquired skill sets that are most useful for the country. Consequently, individuals supporting civic integration policies expect newcomers to follow dominant norms and practices and to work and behave as an individual just like any other citizen (Green, 2009), at least in public. Cultural maintenance (e.g., celebrations, spoken language) is often only tolerated in the private sphere and therefore, cultural group membership is, in principle, irrelevant for individualized immigration policies (Arends-Tóth & van de Vijver, 2004; Montaruli, Bourhis, Azurmendi, & Larrañaga, 2011).

Individualized immigration policies can be interpreted as a way of assimilating immigrants and requiring them to conform to dominant (Western) values and practices (Bourhis et al., 1997; Testé et al., 2012), or even as a way of “gatekeeping” and thus restricting immigration. Indeed, endorsement of such policies is associated with prejudiced attitudes towards immigrants and perceived threat of immigration (Green, 2007, 2009), suggesting that the emphasis on individuals implies rejection of cultural diversity and its underlying group-based worldview. This rejection has been shown to be the case especially
for members of dominant, national majority groups. For minority and other subordinate
groups, however, this incompatibility between principles of individual and collective justice is
less clear-cut. Indeed, Kymlicka (2013) suggests that individualized immigration policies do
not have to be incompatible with multiculturalism and acceptance of diverse cultural groups,
especially if these individualized policies entail the expectation that immigrants conform to
superordinate, national values that actually support multiculturalism (see also Kymlicka,
2012).

6.1.2 **Collective Justice for Minorities versus Majorities**

Among minority members, research shows that justice at a macro, group-based level is
particularly important to them, given their increased sense of group identification and
sensitivity to issues related to intergroup inequality (Azzi, 1992, 1998). This sensitivity to
group-based justice explains, in part, why minorities often support multiculturalism more
strongly than majorities (see Green & Staerklé, 2013; van de Vijver et al., 2008; Verkuyten,
2005; see also Sarrasin et al., 2018, for a comprehensive overview of the immigrant
perspective). However, when minority members simultaneously desire to become fully
accepted members in the larger (liberal) society, principles of individual justice become
necessarily important to them as well.

The necessity for minorities to focus on individual and group-based determinants of
civil, social and political rights in order to become fully accepted members in society may
explain why minorities perceive greater compatibility between individual and collective
justice principles than majorities, especially in national contexts where principles of
individual justice are normatively valued. This is consistent with the asymmetric
compatibility hypothesis. Indeed, for majorities, membership in a dominant group defined by
individualist norms leads them to self-categorize as individuals (Deschamps, 1982; Lorenzi-
Cioldi, 1998), to be carefree about group belongingness (see Simon, Aufderheide, &
Kampmeier, 2001), and to demonstrate concern for individual rather than for collective justice (Azzi, 1992, 1998; Staerklé, 2009). While awareness of their privileges may lead majorities to express greater concern for minorities and collective justice (Leach et al., 2006; Powell et al., 2005), this does not mean they have experienced what it means to be a member of a minority, disadvantaged group. Hence, endorsing collective justice is likely to be at the expense of individual justice for majorities.

### 6.1.3 Collective Justice at the National Level

There is reason to believe, however, that the extent of this minority-majority asymmetric compatibility hypothesis varies across countries. Indeed, while individual justice-based policies like civic integration are widespread in liberal societies, governments in some liberal countries have also incorporated group-based, equality-enhancing policies as a supplement to them (Banting & Kymlicka, 2013). The degree to which these policies are present within a national context likely has implications for how majorities and minorities conceptualize justice. Different hypotheses can be advanced.

Recent research has shown that attitudes of national populations reflect to some extent the respective institutional settings, in particular concerning the presence of multicultural policies (e.g., Guimond et al., 2013, 2014). On the one hand, the asymmetry between minorities and majorities in terms of perceived compatibility between individual and collective forms of justice could therefore be less pronounced in contexts with strong multicultural, equality-enhancing policies. Societal norms in such contexts allow collective justice-based policies to coexist with individual justice-based ones, suggesting all members of society should perceive less incompatibility between the two (i.e. less pronounced asymmetric compatibility).

On the other hand, not everyone abides by social norms: Equality-enhancing, collective justice policies may be especially meaningful to minorities, reinforcing their own
perceived compatibility between an individualized immigration policy (individual justice) and multiculturalism (collective justice). For majorities, such policies may change little beyond their individual attitudes and perceived norms: While they may support multiculturalism more strongly when multicultural policies are present (Guimond et al., 2013, 2014), they may still struggle to reconcile individual and collective forms of justice. In this way, the asymmetric compatibility hypothesis would be more pronounced in contexts with strong equality-enhancing policies.

In order to test whether the minority-majority asymmetric compatibility varies as a function of the group-based equality-enhancing policies, we use a sub-dimension of the Migrant Integration Policy Index (MIPEX; Huddleston, Bilgili, Joki, & Vankova, 2015) called “Equality policies” as a variable differentiating countries according to their multicultural policy orientation. The MIPEX is a numerical country-level indicator representing the degree to which policies within a given country are inclusive and tolerant towards immigrants. This composite indicator assesses a variety of policies in the domains of, for example, family reunification, political participation, antidiscrimination, and access to citizenship and permanent residency for immigrants. Its sub-dimension of Equality policies, however, specifically measures the prevalence of governing bodies that are responsible for listening, responding, and taking action in relation to minority claims. These policies in particular demonstrate willingness to institutionally recognize minority groups and to compensate disadvantages experienced by their members.

The general, composed measure of the MIPEX has been successfully used in prior research to explain attitudes towards immigration and cultural diversity (see Ariely, 2012; Green, Visintin, Sarrasin, & Hewstone, 2019; Hooghe & de Vroome, 2015; Schlueuter, Meuleman, & Davidov, 2013; Visintin, Green, & Sarrasin, 2018; see also Callens & Meuleman, 2017, who used a composite score composed of some, but not all sub-
dimensions). This research shows, for example, that more inclusive policies are associated with more positive immigration attitudes for majorities, presumably because policies are closely intertwined with shared beliefs at the national level which in turn shape individual attitudes (Guimond et al., 2013, 2014; Tankard & Paluck, 2016). To our knowledge, however, the equality policy sub-dimension of the MIPEX has never been used in previous research. This sub-dimension is particularly relevant for studying issues related to multiculturalism as it can be considered an operationalization of collective justice at the national level. Indeed, this indicator goes beyond issues of individual (civic) integration of minorities by explicitly incorporating principles of group-based, collective justice.

It should be noted, however, that multiculturalism as a political theory and a national policy has a longer history in Western countries, as opposed to former communist countries (Kymlicka & Opalski, 2001). Even though the different post-communist countries in Europe have their own political history and their own ethnic composition, they have been described, by and large, as “nationalizing states” that attempt to incorporate minorities into a majority-dominated nation-state (Brubaker, 1996, 2011). While the generalizability of such analyses is necessarily contested (Kuzio, 2005), it is nevertheless important to take into account this geopolitical dimension in cross-national analyses on the expected minority-majority asymmetric compatibility (see Staerklé, Sidanius, Green, & Molina, 2010).

As argued above, we suggest that the hypothesized minority-majority asymmetric compatibility between individual and collective justice should be anchored in contexts defined by individualist norms. The compatibility debate has occurred predominantly within these contexts, and so perceptions are likely to be most polarized. Moreover, this polarization should be particularly marked between minorities and majorities, as they may both be sensitive to the dominant individualist norms in these contexts, but with different implications for their multicultural attitudes. Therefore, this hypothesis should be evidenced in particular
within Western European nations that are characterized by a strong liberal, individual justice orientation that is anchored in their history, compared to post-communist countries.

In the present study, we therefore conduct a simultaneous comparison between countries with stronger or weaker multicultural, collective justice policies, and between Western versus post-communist countries. This dual focus both between and within these regions is crucial as it allows for acknowledgement of relevant historical distinctions (e.g., the reign and fall of the former Soviet Union and the “nation-building” that occurred thereafter in post-communist countries; see Kuzio, 2001) while at the same time taking into account important present-day heterogeneity.

6.1.4 The Present Study

The purpose of the present study was first to test the asymmetric compatibility hypothesis using representative, international survey data. Our first hypothesis was that majorities would perceive greater incompatibility between an individualized immigration policy and multiculturalism than members of minority groups (H1). The second objective was to examine whether this asymmetric compatibility could be generalized across European countries. More specifically, for reasons stated above, alternative hypotheses were advanced regarding the role played by collective justice-based policies implemented at the national level: that the asymmetric compatibility would be either less pronounced (H2a) or more pronounced (H2b) in such contexts. As for the geopolitical region, our third hypothesis was that the asymmetric compatibility should occur especially in Western European countries, as opposed to post-communist countries (H3). In order to test these hypotheses, we conducted a multilevel study on 20 European countries. Support for multiculturalism and an individualized immigration policy were measured at the individual level. National collective justice-based equality policies as well as the distinction between post-communist versus Western European countries were situated at the contextual level to explain eventual country level variation.
6.2 Method

6.2.1 Participants

Data from the European Social Survey (ESS; wave 7, 2014) were used to conduct analyses, including 36,732 participants. All countries with relevant data were included in analyses (20 countries total; see Table 11). Small numbers of level-2 units is a risk in multilevel modelling, especially for the stability of cross-level interactions. According to Kreft and De Leeuw (1998), 20 level-2 groups is the minimum number required and large sample size within each group is an additional factor to offset limited statistical power of level-2 analyses. The sample was composed of 52.90% women (coded -1; men coded 1) and the overall average age was 49.33 (SD = 18.63; grand-mean centred across countries). The overall average number of years of full-time education was 12.91 (SD = 3.95; also grand-mean centred across countries), and respondents were primarily citizens of their respective countries (94.7%; coded 1; non-citizen coded -1). Sex, age, years of education, and national citizenship were all used as individual-level control variables in analyses. Coding allowed for the intercept in analyses to represent a hypothetical average person.

6.2.2 Ethnic Majority and Minority Group Membership

Classification into majorities (coded 1) and minorities (coded -1) was done using a single variable where respondents were asked to indicate whether or not they belonged to a minority ethnic group. During interviews in each country, the term “belong” was defined and clarified when necessary as the social psychological constructs of “attachment” and “identification”. All respondents who indicated “yes” to the question were considered to be members of an ethnic minority group, and all those who responded “no” were considered...

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37 ESS wave 7 data includes Israel (21 countries total), which was excluded from the current study because Israel is not a European country and MIPEX data for Israel is unavailable.
38 Grand-mean centring was done for all predictors that were not used to calculate cross-level interactions (Enders & Tofighi, 2007).

majorities. Because the proportion of majorities to minorities differed substantially between countries, this proportion was controlled for in the final two-level model. The number of minorities and majorities in each country is summarized in Table 11.

This indicator of minority group membership has been criticized (see Burton, Nandi, & Platt, 2010; Hoffmeyer-Zlotnik & Warner, 2010). First, it is unclear which ethnic minority group(s) people are referring to when responding “yes” to this question. Second, the meaning of this indicator may vary from country to country and between different groups. Third, respondents might be reluctant to admit their membership in a minority group because of possible negative connotations. However, despite its limitations, this subjective measure of minority group membership was relevant for our research question given its social psychological nature. In order for someone to indicate that they are a member of an ethnic minority group, they need to identify with that group and to feel they belong to that group, thus implying the social psychological processes that we assume to underlie the effects predicted. Nevertheless, to verify our findings with a more objective, rather than subjective, measure of ethnic group membership, preliminary analyses were also conducted using national citizenship as a proxy (for countries where the dataset included non-national respondents). Similarities and differences between these analyses and those reported are mentioned where relevant.

39 Cross-tabulations and Chi-Square tests were used to examine objective criteria explaining self-identification as an ethnic minority group member. In all countries, non-citizens were more likely to self-identify as an ethnic minority group member than citizens (p < .001). Moreover, in all countries, respondents whose mother and/or father were not born in the country were also more likely to self-identify as an ethnic minority group member than respondents whose mother and/or father were born in the country (p < .001). While linguistic (national) minorities such as French-speakers in Belgium, French-, Italian-, and Romansh speakers in Switzerland, and Swedish-speakers in Finland were more likely to self-identify as members of an ethnic minority group than linguistic (national) majorities in these contexts, most of these linguistic minorities did not self-identify as ethnic minority group members. However, most Russian- and Polish-speakers in Lithuania, and Russian speakers in Estonia did self-identify as members of an ethnic minority group - these national minorities were also more likely to report foreign ancestry. Therefore, while national minority status occasionally explained self-identification as an ethnic minority group member, the most common explanation was foreign ancestry.
Table 11.
Sample Overview for Majority and Minority Group Membership, MIPEX Equality Policy Scores, and Bivariate Correlations between Support for an Individualized Immigration Policy and Multiculturalism by Group, According to Country

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>N</th>
<th>EQPol</th>
<th>r_{IndPol,MC}</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Austria</td>
<td>1675</td>
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<td>44</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Belgium</td>
<td>1666</td>
<td>95</td>
<td>61</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Switzerland</td>
<td>1394</td>
<td>123</td>
<td>28</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Czech Republic</td>
<td>1918</td>
<td>44</td>
<td>17</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Germany</td>
<td>2852</td>
<td>164</td>
<td>17</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Denmark</td>
<td>1424</td>
<td>64</td>
<td>39</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Estonia</td>
<td>1505</td>
<td>491</td>
<td>33</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Spain</td>
<td>1771</td>
<td>34</td>
<td>28</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Finland</td>
<td>2033</td>
<td>37</td>
<td>78</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>France</td>
<td>1780</td>
<td>93</td>
<td>61</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>United Kingdom</td>
<td>1985</td>
<td>234</td>
<td>72</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hungary</td>
<td>1575</td>
<td>111</td>
<td>72</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ireland</td>
<td>2246</td>
<td>101</td>
<td>56</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lithuania</td>
<td>1967</td>
<td>159</td>
<td>50</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Netherlands</td>
<td>1748</td>
<td>147</td>
<td>50</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Norway</td>
<td>1360</td>
<td>74</td>
<td>72</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Poland</td>
<td>1557</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>22</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Portugal</td>
<td>1201</td>
<td>27</td>
<td>83</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sweden</td>
<td>1688</td>
<td>80</td>
<td>83</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Slovenia</td>
<td>1186</td>
<td>29</td>
<td>39</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note. EQPol represents Equality Policy scores (extracted from Migrant Integration Policy Index, Huddleston et al., 2015).

***p < .001, **p < .01, *p < .05, ^p < .10

6.2.3 Individual-Level Variables

Support for an individualized immigration policy was measured using four items.

On an 11-point Likert scale, respondents were asked to indicate the degree to which they
considered four criteria to be extremely unimportant (0) to extremely important (10) when determining whether someone born, brought up and living outside the country should be allowed to come in and live there. The four items referred to educational qualifications, speaking the country’s official language, work skills that the country needs, and commitment to the way of life in the country. The four items were collapsed into a single score. Internal consistency of the measure was satisfactory across all countries, ranging from .69 in Slovenia to .82 in Sweden. A high score indicated strong support for an individualized immigration policy and average scores across countries showed fairly strong support in general ($M = 6.91$, $SD = 2.07$), with the weakest support in Norway ($M = 5.48$, $SD = 2.27$) and the strongest in the UK ($M = 7.58$, $SD = 1.77$). The variable was group-mean centred to prepare for cross-level interactions (described below; see Enders & Tofighi, 2007).

Support for multiculturalism was used as the dependent variable. Respondents were asked to indicate the degree to which they believed the country’s economy, cultural life, job market, taxes and services and crime problems are undermined or enriched by immigrants, as well as the degree to which they felt immigrants made the country a better or a worse place to live. Six items were coded on an 11-point Likert scale ranging from 0 (bad for the economy, cultural life undermined, take jobs away, generally take out more, crime problems made worse, worse place to live) to 11 (good for the economy, cultural life enriched, create new jobs, generally put in more, crime problems made better, better place to live) and were collapsed to create a single score. Internal consistency of the measure was good across all countries, ranging from .79 in Switzerland to .90 in Austria. A high score indicated strong support for multiculturalism and average scores across countries were around the midpoint of the scale, if not just below, showing moderate levels of support ($M = 4.77$, $SD = 1.71$).

Support was weakest in Hungary ($M = 3.84$, $SD = 1.68$) and strongest in Sweden ($M = 5.87$, $SD = 1.77$).

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40 A Principal Component Analysis with Varimax rotation was run in each country to ensure that the items composing the support for multiculturalism measure and the support for an individualized immigration policy measure loaded onto two separate constructs. This two-factor solution was indeed found in all 20 countries.
Since the ‘cultural’ component of multiculturalism is most evident in two of the six items (that the country’s cultural life is enriched by immigrants and that immigrants make the country a better place to live), multilevel analyses were also verified using this restricted measure of support for multiculturalism. Similarities and differences are reported where relevant.

6.2.4 Country-Level Variables

The Equality Policy Index, extracted from the 2014 Migrant Integration Policy Index (MIPEX, Huddleston et al., 2015) was used as the first country-level moderator. The Equality Policy Index assesses the existence in each country of government bodies responsible for ensuring equal treatment of all groups, especially those who experience discrimination on grounds of “race/ethnicity, religion/belief and/or nationality”. It also implies the existence of laws addressing “positive action measures” where minority claims are addressed with appropriate intervention (Huddleston et al., 2015). The variable thus represents an indicator of collective justice policy at the national level. Scores ranged from 0 to 100, with high scores representing the presence of strong group-based equality policies. Country scores for the years 2014 are provided in Table 11, showing that Portugal and Sweden had the greatest prevalence of such policies, while Czech Republic and Germany had the lowest scores. The variable was mean centred in preparation for analyses.

Western European versus post-communist countries were compared by coding post-communist countries (Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Lithuania, Poland and Slovenia) as -1 and Western countries (all remaining ones in Table 11) as 1. This variable served as the second country-level moderator. The two country-level moderators were not sufficiently correlated to instigate concern for multicollinearity (r = .349, p = .132 at the country level).
6.2.5 Data Analysis

Data were prepared, descriptive statistics were verified, and country-by-country regressions were conducted using SPSS version 25. Multilevel analyses were conducted using Mplus version 5.1 (Muthén & Muthén, 1998-2012). To test H1, an interaction was calculated at the individual level between majority/minority group membership and support for an individualized immigration policy, predicting support for multiculturalism. To test H2 and H3, cross-level interactions were calculated, independently, between the respective contextual level variables and the previous individual-level interaction, again predicting support for multiculturalism in a level 2 model.

Post-stratification weights were applied for all analyses to ensure the use of nationally representative samples (especially of majorities, although the proportion of minorities in most countries increased slightly once these weights were applied). For missing data, listwise deletion was used for sociodemographic variables (0.50% missing data) while Maximum Likelihood estimation was applied for support for individualized immigration policy and support for multiculturalism items (2.65% missing data). No data were missing for the country-level indicators.

6.3 Results

6.3.1 Preliminary Country-by-Country Analyses

Given our interest in understanding the asymmetric relationship between support for an individualized immigration policy and multiculturalism for minorities and majorities, Table 1 shows zero-order correlations for these two categories by country. Across all observed countries, majorities show a significantly negative association between the two justice principles. Correlations are also generally negative for minorities, albeit less

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41 For table summarizing results of country-by-country analyses, see Appendix C, Table C1.
consistently, ranging from significantly positive only in Portugal, to significantly and strongly negative in the Czech Republic.

Prior to multilevel analyses, multiple regressions were conducted for each country, with support for multiculturalism as the dependent variable. Predictors included ethnic minority and majority group membership, support for an individualized immigration policy, the interaction between the two, as well as control variables. The interaction effect tested our first (asymmetric compatibility; H1) hypothesis, suggesting that support for an individualized immigration policy would be negatively linked to support for multiculturalism for majorities, but not necessarily for minorities.

The interaction was statistically significant, in the expected direction, in eight of the twenty countries, namely Belgium, Switzerland, Denmark, the United Kingdom, the Netherlands, Norway, Portugal and Sweden, that is, eight Western European countries (with Portugal and Sweden having the highest score on the Equality Policy Index). These findings provide preliminary evidence of a potential moderating role of the two country-level variables on the asymmetric compatibility hypothesis. Indeed, for all other countries, the effect was non-significant, with the exception of the Czech Republic where it was significant ($p = .015$), in the opposite direction.\textsuperscript{42}

In general, these results show that in a number of European national contexts, minorities and majorities differ in the degree to which they perceive an individualized immigration policy and multiculturalism as (in)compatible. In most instances, majorities perceive greater incompatibility than minorities. As highlighted above, results also suggest that there is some level of variation between countries, both when comparing post-communist

\textsuperscript{42} When citizenship was used as an objective indicator of majority and minority group membership, ten out of eighteen countries had significant, negative interactions (Austria, Belgium, Switzerland, Denmark, Estonia, Spain, France, UK, Netherlands and Sweden) and none had significant, positive ones. In the Czech Republic, the interaction was positive but non-significant ($p = .721$). Multilevel analyses could not be conducted using citizenship as an alternative indicator, as two countries (Hungary and Poland; both post-communist European countries) did not have foreign respondents in their sample (and country-level N would be 18).
versus Western countries and in terms of national equality policies. Multilevel analyses were conducted to determine if country-level predictors account for such variation.

### 6.3.2 Multilevel Analyses: Random Intercept (Fixed Slope) Models

First, an intercepts-only model was calculated on support for multiculturalism in order to serve as a benchmark to which subsequent models are compared (see Hox, 2010). The intraclass correlation was equal to .080, meaning that 8% of the variance of support for multiculturalism was at the country level and could therefore be explained by level-2 variables (country-level variance $B = 0.235$, $SE = 0.085$, $p = .012$; individual-level variance $B = 2.705$, $SE = 0.119$, $p < .001$).

Second, a random intercepts (fixed slopes) model was calculated in order to bring preliminary analyses together into a single model (see Table 12, first column). Individual-level predictors and control variables were incorporated into this model and slopes were not yet allowed to vary across countries. Main effects of individualized immigration policy and group membership were significant, suggesting that increased support for an individualized immigration policy was generally associated with decreased support for multiculturalism, and that majorities generally supported multiculturalism significantly less than minorities. Moreover, the overall interaction between ethnic minority and majority group membership and support for an individualized immigration policy was significant ($p = .002$), in the expected direction.\(^{43}\) Consistent with the asymmetric compatibility hypothesis (H1), the decomposition of the interaction revealed that the negative association between support for an individualized immigration policy and support for multiculturalism was stronger among

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\(^{43}\) Three alternative models were tested with (a) national citizenship as an objective indicator of majority and minority group membership (Table C2 in Appendix C), (b) the alternative two-item dependent variable (Table C5 in Appendix C), and (c) ESS data from 2002 (Table C2 in Appendix C). For the three models, interpretation of the random intercepts model remained identical and the interaction effect was consistently negative and significant ($p < .001$, $p < .001$ and $p = .007$, respectively). ESS data from 2002 was indeed used to verify our results, in addition to supplementary analyses indicated elsewhere. While the same individual-level variables for 21 countries were available in this dataset, country-level variables were problematic (indicators of the Equality Policy index were only available as of 2007, and almost all countries were Western European). Therefore, we were only able to test H1 on the 2002 data.
majority respondents, $B = -0.21$, $SE = 0.02$, $p < .001$, than among minority respondents, $B = -0.12$, $SE = 0.03$, $p < .001$ (see Figure 14).

### 6.3.3 Multilevel Analyses: Random Intercept and Slope Models

Finally, models were conducted in order to bring variation across countries into the equation (see columns 2 through 5 of Table 12). First, a level-1 model testing random slopes was calculated to provide information on the degree to which the associations between predictors and support for multiculturalism varied across countries. The reduced AIC value for this model in comparison to the random intercepts model shows better model fit (see subsequent models as well; Hox, 2010). Control variables were still included in the model and their effects were not allowed to vary. Results in this model showed that the statistically significant interaction term between ethnic minority and majority group membership and support for an individualized immigration policy highlighted above ($p = .002$) did not significantly vary across countries ($p = .145$). Therefore, overall, minorities perceived less incompatibility between an individualized immigration policy and multiculturalism than majorities. The main effects of support for an individualized immigration policy and of group membership did however vary significantly across countries.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Random intercepts model</th>
<th>Random slopes model</th>
<th>Level 2 model step 1</th>
<th>Level 2 model step 2</th>
<th>Level 2 model step 3</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>( B ) (SE)</td>
<td>( B ) (SE)</td>
<td>( B ) (SE)</td>
<td>( B ) (SE)</td>
<td>( B ) (SE)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Intercept</strong></td>
<td>5.214*** (0.155)</td>
<td>5.286*** (0.122)</td>
<td>5.176*** (0.108)</td>
<td>5.201*** (0.101)</td>
<td>5.181*** (0.099)</td>
</tr>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IndivPol</td>
<td>-0.169*** (0.025)</td>
<td>-0.168*** (0.022)</td>
<td>-0.169*** (0.022)</td>
<td>-0.155*** (0.020)</td>
<td>-0.159*** (0.024)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MajoMino</td>
<td>-0.181** (0.057)</td>
<td>-0.240*** (0.031)</td>
<td>-0.241*** (0.030)</td>
<td>-0.216*** (0.039)</td>
<td>-0.213*** (0.038)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
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<td>-0.039** (0.013)</td>
<td>-0.038** (0.013)</td>
<td>-0.038** (0.013)</td>
<td>-0.029* (0.015)</td>
</tr>
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<td></td>
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<tr>
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<td>0.005 (0.005)</td>
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<tr>
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<td></td>
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<td>-0.001 (0.000)</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>MajoMino * IndivPol * EastWest</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>-0.026* (0.011)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Variance components</strong></td>
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<td>Residuals (individual level)</td>
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<td>2.302*** (0.083)</td>
<td>2.302*** (0.083)</td>
<td>2.302*** (0.083)</td>
<td>2.302*** (0.083)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Residuals (country level)</td>
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</tr>
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<td>236291.716</td>
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</tbody>
</table>

*Note.* ***\( p < .001\), **\( p < .01\), *\( p < .05\), ^\( p < .10\)

Effects of control variables (gender, age, education and citizenship at level 1; proportion of majorities to minorities at level 2) were included in the model but are not presented in the table. The effect of education was consistently significant and positive.

IndivPol: Individualized immigration policy support; group-mean centred.

MajoMino: Majority (coded 1) vs. Ethnic minority (coded -1).

EQPol: Equality policies mean centred.

EastWest: Post-Communist (coded -1) vs. Western (coded 1) European countries.
Figure 14. Level-1 interaction: Minorities perceive less incompatibility between individualized immigration policy and multiculturalism than majorities.

Three “Level 2” models were then calculated, each building on the previous one. Step 1 incorporated the level-2 variables (post-communist vs. Western European countries and equality policies at the national level) as main effects predicting support for multiculturalism. Step 2 incorporated two-way cross-level interactions to determine if these level-2 variables could explain some of the country-level variance in the main effects of support for an individualized immigration policy and of group membership. Step 3 incorporated three-way cross-level interactions. Because our theoretical reasoning as well as preliminary country-by-country analyses suggested the level-1 interaction term should vary, we decided to continue to let this interaction vary in the final models (see Aguinis, Gottfredson, & Culpepper, 2013), in particular to examine whether the level-2 predictors would explain any potential variation (in line with H2 and H3). Indeed, while the random slopes model showed non-significant country-level variation in the level-1 interaction term ($p = .145$), this is likely due to the small number of level-2 units. As Aguinis et al. (2013) suggest,
“given that [...] multilevel modelling is usually conducted with L2 sample sizes that are much smaller [than same-level research], it is possible that in many situations there may be an incorrect conclusion that τ is not different from zero due to insufficient statistical power [...] To balance Type I and Type II error considerations, our recommendation is to proceed with the cross-level interaction test even when the null hypothesis of no slope variance is retained when there is a strong theory-based rationale for a particular hypothesis” (p. 1502).

Only the full models are reported here for reasons of concision. However, simpler models were also tested where the main level-2 predictors were inserted individually (see Appendix C, Table C3 and Table C4). This is important because the full model involves only a limited number of level-2 cases, risking biased results when too many contextual variables are included in the model (see Stegmueller, 2013). Similarities and differences with these simpler models are therefore reported where relevant.

First, main effects showed that support for multiculturalism was significantly stronger in Western European countries than in post-communist countries \( (p = .008; \text{see step 1 in Table 12}) \). Second, a marginally significant cross-level interaction was found between post-communist vs. Western European countries at level-2 and support for an individualized immigration policy at level-1 \( (p = .061; \text{see step 2 in Table 12}) \). Figure 15 shows that the negative relationship between support for an individualized immigration policy and support

\[44\] In addition to these substantially simpler models, Appendix C also contains two more models that were calculated, controlling separately for economic wealth (GDP; Table C6) and inequality (GINI; Table C7) at the country-level. When controlling for GDP, respectively GINI, the 2-way cross-level interaction between geopolitical location at level-2 and support for an individualized immigration policy at level-1 was first non-significant but in the same direction \( (p = .393; \text{GDP explained this effect instead}) \), and respectively significant and negative \( (p = .024) \). The 2-way cross-level interaction between equality policies at level-2 and group membership at level-1 was non-significant but in the same direction \( (p = .185; \text{respectively } p = .115) \). The 2-way cross-level interaction between geopolitical location at level-2 and group membership at level-1 was non-significant but in the same direction \( (p = .900; \text{respectively } p = .207) \). Finally, the 3-way cross-level interaction between geopolitical location at level-2, group membership at level-1 and individualized immigration policy at level-1 remained significant \( (p = .013; \text{respectively } p = .047) \).

\[45\] Alternative models with (a) the geopolitical country location entered separately, and (b) the alternative two-item dependent variable yielded similar interpretations of the cross-level interaction between geopolitical country location and support for an individualized immigration policy \( (p = .018, p = .001, \text{respectively}) \).
for multiculturalism was particularly pronounced in Western European countries, $B = -0.19$, $SE = 0.02$, $p < .001$, compared to post-communist countries, $B = -0.12$, $SE = 0.03$, $p < .001$.

Third, a marginally significant cross-level interaction was found between the presence of equality policies at level-2 and minority/majority group membership at level-1 ($p = .086$; see step 2 in Table 12). Figure 16 shows that the same difference between minorities and majorities in support for multiculturalism was stronger in countries with more (+1 $SD$) equality policies, $B = -0.28$, $SE = 0.04$, $p < .001$, than in countries with less (-1 $SD$) equality policies, $B = -0.15$, $SE = 0.07$, $p = .028$. Fourth, a marginally significant cross-level interaction was found between post-communist vs. Western European countries at level-2 and minority/majority group membership at level-1 ($p = .070$; see step 2 in Table 12). Figure 17 shows that the difference in support for multiculturalism between minorities and majorities (majorities less supportive than minorities) was stronger in Western European countries, $B = -0.29$, $SE = 0.04$, $p < .001$, compared to post-communist countries, $B = -0.14$, $SE = 0.07$, $p = .065$.

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46 Alternative models with (a) the degree of equality policies entered separately, and (b) the alternative two-item dependent variable yielded similar interpretations of the cross-level interaction between equality policies and minority/majority group membership ($p = .055$, $p = .120$, respectively).

47 Alternative models with (a) the geopolitical country location entered separately, and (b) the alternative two-item dependent variable yielded similar interpretations of the cross-level interaction between geopolitical country location and minority/majority group membership ($p = .091$, $p = .099$, respectively).
**Figure 15.** Cross-level interaction: Negative relationship between individualized immigration policy and multiculturalism most pronounced in Western European countries.

**Figure 16.** Cross-level interaction: Equality policies at country level associated with increased minority support for multiculturalism.
Figure 17. Cross-level interaction: Western countries associated with increased minority support for multiculturalism.

A significant cross-level (three-way) interaction was found between post-communist versus Western countries and this level-1 interaction ($p = .016$; see step 3 in Table 12). The direction of this three-way interaction was negative, suggesting that Western countries are characterised by greater minority-majority asymmetric compatibility, in comparison to post-communist countries. This finding was in line with our third hypothesis as well as the direction of preliminary country-by-country analyses.\(^{48}\)

When decomposing this three-way interaction, simple slope analysis (Preacher, Curran, & Bauer, 2006) showed that the negative association between support for an individualized immigration policy and support for multiculturalism was the strongest among majority members in Western European countries, $B = -0.23$, $SE = 0.02$, $p < .001$, while the association was weaker among minorities in Western European countries, $B = -0.12$, $SE =

\(^{48}\) Alternative models with (a) post-communist vs. Western European countries entered separately in the model, and (b) the alternative two-item dependent variable yielded similar interpretations of the triple cross-level interaction (between Eastern vs. Western European countries and the simple interaction between support for an individualized immigration policy and minority/majority group membership) ($p = .007$, $p = .017$, respectively).
0.04, \( p = .001 \), among majorities in post-communist European countries, \( B = -0.14, SE = 0.03, p < .001 \), and among minorities in post-communist European countries, \( B = -0.13, SE = 0.05, p = .008 \). There was no significant cross-level (three-way) interaction incorporating the presence of equality policies in this model, rejecting our second hypothesis.\(^{50}\)

### 6.4 Discussion

Using international survey data, the present study showed that minorities and majorities differ in the degree to which they perceive incompatibility between support for an individualized immigration policy (individual justice) and multiculturalism (collective justice). This main finding was consistent across reported and alternative analyses, taking into account two indicators of minority and majority group membership (subjective and objective, respectively), two measurements of support for multiculturalism (six and two items, respectively), and two different points in time (2014 and 2002, respectively). Therefore, in line with our first, asymmetric compatibility hypothesis, results suggest that minorities generally perceive less incompatibility between individual and collective justice principles than majorities.

Furthermore, we found that this asymmetric compatibility was stronger in Western European countries compared to post-communist European countries, providing support for our third hypothesis. In Western European countries, majorities perceived significantly more incompatibility between individual and collective justice principles, not only compared to minorities in these same countries, but also compared to minorities and majorities in post-

\(^{49}\) We conducted an additional regression analysis separately for Western and post-communist European countries. Predictors were control variables, support for an individualized immigration policy, minority vs. majority group membership, and their interaction term, as in all other models. The interaction term was significant in Western European countries, \( B = -0.047, SE = 0.016, p = .003 \), but not in post-communist countries, \( B = -0.007, SE = 0.019, p = .731 \).

\(^{50}\) This effect was also non-significant in the model using the alternative two-item dependent variable. However, when the equality policy indicator was inserted separately in the model, without controlling for the other level-2 indicators, a marginally significant triple interaction was found (\( p = .064 \)). In line with preliminary country-by-country analyses, this result suggests that the presence of stronger national equality policies may be associated with marginally greater discrepancy between minorities and majorities in their compatibility between an individualized immigration policy and multiculturalism, although the distinction between post-communist and Western European countries seems to be a more powerful explanation of this country-level variation.
communist European countries. This suggests that the differential (lay) perspectives involved in the multiculturalism (based on groups) vs. liberalism (based on individuals) debate (Barry, 2001; Joppke, 2004; Kymlicka, 1995) are indeed more polarised in Western European countries (Kuzio, 2005; Kymlicka & Opalski, 2001). This conclusion was drawn from all multilevel analyses conducted, including all supplementary multilevel analyses. In a similar way, a simpler two-way interaction was found suggesting that perceived compatibility between individual and collective justice was generally more pronounced in Western countries compared to post-communist countries (in line with the contrasting majority perspectives). This result should nevertheless be interpreted with caution, as few countries were examined, for example, and results may have been driven by specific post-communist and Western European countries, thereby concealing heterogeneity in these regions. Therefore, we hope this result can be informative for future research interested in examining these same effects and developing them further with a more ideal country-level sample size.

In contrast to hypothesis 3, hypothesis 2 was rejected. Indeed, the minority-majority asymmetric compatibility did not vary as a function of country equality policies (that is, the degree to which governmental bodies are present to ensure minority claims are heard and attended to; H2). This is not exceptionally surprising, as we had competing hypotheses for this effect. Had the country-level indicator assessed a more concrete way in which this equality policy was implemented in each country (e.g., a quantification of the proportion of successful cases, where minority claims were indeed addressed and actively rectified, rather than an abstract indicator of the presence of such policies), perhaps effects would have been more present. Nevertheless, an intermediary result did appear with the use of this country-level indicator, such that the presence of such policies played a marginal role for basic support for multiculturalism by minorities: Minorities were most supportive of multiculturalism, compared to majorities, in countries with stronger equality policies (as well as in Western
countries). This result is consistent with existing research that suggests that multicultural policies do not have an impact on majority opinions towards multiculturalism or towards immigration in general (Hooghe & de Vroome, 2015; van de Vijver et al., 2008). However, it extends this research by showing that they do, in fact, influence minority opinions instead (see also Bloemraad & Wright, 2014). While social psychologists have shown that attitudes are shaped by shared beliefs which are closely intertwined with policies (Guimond et al., 2013, 2014; Tankard & Paluck, 2016), our results suggest that multicultural, group-based, equality policies do not necessarily shape shared beliefs of all groups in society. These collective justice policies at the national level are especially meaningful to minorities, possibly empowering them (see Vorauer & Quesnel, 2017), without negative consequences for majorities in terms of support for multiculturalism.

This study has a number of limitations, but also suggests directions for future research. First, the dataset used in the present study was composed of only 20 countries, which is arguably the minimum for multilevel research (Kreft & De Leeuw, 1998). With more countries and thus with a higher number of level-2 units, it is possible that the results that were approaching significance (such as the non-significant variation between countries in our level 1 interaction) would have reached significance, allowing for stronger conclusions. Important nuances within the Western vs. post-communist geopolitical regions may have also become more evident.

Second, the use of secondary survey data brought up a number of issues, including that the measures used in this study were not always ideal. For example, the items used to represent support for multiculturalism had qualitatively different meanings depending on their low or high scores. These items have been interpreted in existing research as perceived (material and symbolic) threat of immigration, in line with their low scores (see for example Schneider, 2008). This threat is nevertheless rather consistent with our current interpretation,
as perceiving the presence of culturally diverse groups as threatening can be a means of opposing principles of collective justice.

As another example, in some countries, the minority groups were very small, alluding to sampling issues, and the measure used to identify them was subjective. Future research should investigate different ethnic groups more closely, ideally with data where close attention has been paid to recruiting sufficient (or nationally representative) minorities. These minorities could include immigrant minorities (citizens or non-citizens who have close ties to another national culture after emigrating) and national minorities (citizens who are members of a native subgroup making claims for official recognition, self-governance or special representation; see Kymlicka, 1995), who are subordinate both in terms of power and culture. The perspective we have adopted in the present paper indeed suggests that minorities are de facto disadvantaged relative to majorities. As such, it would also be interesting to see whether or not high status minorities, including for example German-speaking Italians in the South Tyrol region of Italy or Catalan-speakers in North-Eastern Spain, express perspectives similar to majorities. In studying such relatively high-status minorities compared to majorities, the result pattern may under certain circumstances be similar to the one found in this study: especially if these high-status minorities feel they are disadvantaged or discriminated against on account of their group (see Son Hing, Bobocel, & Zanna, 2002). In this way, despite their objectively “advantaged” societal position, high status minorities may still be subjectively aware of their minority status and would thus be sensitive to principles of collective justice (while at the same time supporting dominant individual justice principles). This hypothesis should be tested in future research.

Third, the number of Western versus post-communist European countries included in the present analyses was not balanced. A valuable direction for future research would be to look at an even broader array of national contexts including Asian, African and American
countries. This would arguably allow for more encompassing comparisons and to more fine-grained analyses of the dimensions organizing cross-national variation.

Finally, the present study has used correlations to interpret compatibility between individual and collective justice. To complement this method, future research should directly measure compatibility between individual and collective justice. While this suggestion is not easily implementable, it would serve as an invaluable contribution to our research question and conclusions.

6.5 Conclusion

The specific area of interest of the present study was to take a social psychological perspective on a contemporary debate in political philosophy: the degree to which multiculturalism or collective justice principles are perceived as being compatible with the individual justice principles inherent to liberal societies. Results of the present study suggest that this question of compatibility between individual and collective justice is meaningful especially within classically liberal, West European societies, and that it may be less meaningful in post-communist, “nationalizing” countries that attempt to incorporate minorities in the majority-dominated nation-state (Brubaker, 1996, 2011) or that have more recently been confronted with “nation-building” and “democratization” (Kuzio, 2001, 2005). This conclusion is critical for research on multicultural attitudes as it does support the necessity to take into account the (liberal, individual justice-dominated) geopolitical context in which these attitudes are shaped.

In Western societies, individual justice and its implementation in terms of civic integration policies has important value for both majorities and minorities (Joppke, 2004). However, these policies do not seem to suffice when it comes to the minority perspective on justice. Indeed, civic integration policies are arguably the foundation upon which collective justice and respect for minority rights is built. Kymlicka (1995, 2012) argues that
multiculturalism is compatible, and thus is not in competition, with civic integrationism. When collective justice-based multicultural policies are implemented as a complement to civic integration at the national level, they should not be harmful for majorities. However, establishing such a balance between individual and collective justice in liberal societies should, indeed, be particularly empowering for minorities.
CHAPTER 7

Immigration and Multiculturalism in Context:

A Framework for Psychological Research

THEORETICAL CHAPTER

Multiculturalism is a hotly debated issue in today’s global arena. Much of the controversy arises due to different understandings of the term in public and political discourse. We argue that multiculturalism has three core components—diversity, ideology and policy—and that heterogeneous cultural groups in multicultural societies are ultimately seeking social justice, but in different ways. Moving beyond the broad social science research to the influences and impacts of multiculturalism within psychological studies, we introduce the concept of normative multiculturalism and propose an integrative framework, presenting multiculturalism as a contextual variable and examining its impact in terms of intergroup relations and subjective well-being. We also consider how multiculturalism at the societal level can be differentially experienced by immigrants and members of the receiving community. Finally, we discuss strategies for maximizing the benefits and minimizing the risks of multiculturalism, reconciling differing justice conceptions, and enhancing positive outcomes for the wider society.

7.1 Introduction

Multiculturalism has become one of the most divisive issues in today’s global arena. Proclaimed a failure in Germany, France and the United Kingdom, multiculturalism has been viewed as the cause of immigrants’ social isolation and economic disadvantage, a significant threat to both national identity and liberal values, and a major contributor to social

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CHAPTER 7  Immigration and Multiculturalism in Context

fragmentation (Joppke, 2014; Malik, 2015). This social rhetoric has led to a backlash against multiculturalism, particularly in Europe, where multiculturalism is now described as being “in retreat” (Banting & Kymlicka, 2013). An alternative perspective has emerged in other parts of the world where multiculturalism is more often deemed a political success. Seen as a source of national identity and pride in Canada and Mauritius (Berry, 2013; Ng Tseung-Wong & Verkuyten, 2015), as a potential mechanism for nation-building in Australia (Moran, 2011; despite some critiques, see Boese & Phillips, 2015; Walton et al., 2018) and as providing “the bedrock for a harmonious, stable and prosperous city-state” in Singapore (Noor & Leong, 2013, p. 719), within these contexts, multiculturalism appears to deliver a range of positive social outcomes.

Much of the controversy over multiculturalism arises because of conceptual problems due to different understandings of the term in public and political discourse. In many instances multiculturalism is taken to simply refer to the presence of culturally diverse groups. In this paper, we argue that diversity is a necessary, but not sufficient, precondition for multiculturalism, and that multiculturalism is more about how cultural diversity is experienced and managed. At the most rudimentary level, multiculturalism rests on the combination of cultural diversity in the population, ideologies based on recognition and appreciation of this diversity, and policies and practices that accommodate it (Berry & Ward, 2016). Consequently, we require a more complex, multi-faceted approach to multiculturalism that examines the main and interactive effects of its major components in relation to its social, psychological and economic outcomes.

In social science research, particularly studies by sociologists and political scientists, the diversity, policy and ideology components of multiculturalism are typically assessed at the national level on the basis of objective archival data, including censuses, policy documents and national surveys. We suggest that a complementary psychological perspective on
diversity, ideology and policy would be of benefit, a perspective that highlights individuals’ observations, understandings, and interpretations of their everyday intercultural experiences, in addition to demographic, social or political facts (Berry & Ward, 2016; Stuart & Ward, 2018). Accordingly, we propose a framework for psychological research on multiculturalism. The framework highlights the importance of context, synthesizing interdisciplinary perspectives and incorporating objective indicators of a multicultural climate at the national level as well as individuals’ normative perceptions of multiculturalism in terms of diversity, ideology and policy. The outcomes of multiculturalism are examined in terms of social connectedness, intergroup perceptions and relations, and subjective well-being. Within the framework, attention is given to the differential consequences of multiculturalism for majority and minority groups, the fundamental tensions between the rights of immigrants, including the rights to maintain cultural heritage, and the threat these rights pose to members of the receiving society (Green & Staerklé, 2013). These tensions are elaborated in terms of power imbalances and individual and collective conceptualizations of justice (Gale & Staerklé, 2017). Based on the synthesis of social psychological and cross-cultural research, we reiterate the challenges that multiculturalism presents, but conclude with recommendations for addressing concerns for justice and enhancing positive outcomes for immigrants and the societies in which they live.

7.2 National Diversity, Ideology and Policy

When Anders Breivik declared war on multiculturalism in July 2011, he left at least 77 people dead in Norway and his country in mourning. What did multiculturalism mean to him? Breivik is chronicled as being stridently anti-Muslim, based on his belief that Muslims were stridently anti-Muslim, based on his belief that Muslims were

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52 We use the term framework as described by Nilsen (2015) to refer to a structure or system of descriptive categories (i.e., constructs) and the relationships among them that account for phenomena or outcomes. As Nilsen’s discussion of frameworks, models and theories occurs in the context of implementation science, which focuses on the goal of achieving evidence-based policies and practices, this is particularly appropriate for the analysis of multiculturalism.
becoming a majority and that Christian Europe was under threat (Globe and Mail, 24 July, 2011). His views can be seen to reflect opposition to demographic diversity and a rejection of a multicultural ideology that is based on appreciation of that diversity. Along with other members of a far-right group, Breivik had grandiose plans to seize political power in Europe and implement a “cultural conservative political agenda” (New York Times, 24 July, 2011), reflecting extreme antagonism towards liberal multicultural policies. In the narrative of Anders Breivik the core diversity, ideology and policy elements of multiculturalism appear to be inextricably intertwined. This is often the case in everyday life where diversity, ideology and policy exert simultaneous and interactive effects on social and psychological outcomes, as elaborated in the remainder of this section.

Without doubt, the increase in immigration-driven heterogeneity has been a contentious issue in recent times whereby diversity has been linked to a range of negative psychological and social outcomes, including greater anti-immigrant sentiments, perceived threat, and hostile ethnic attitudes (Schneider, 2008). It has also been associated with lower levels of psychological well-being in both immigrants and majority group members (Longhi, 2014; Vedder, van de Vijver, & Liebkind, 2006). Putnam's (2007) controversial research in the United States concluded that ethnic diversity reduces social solidarity and lowers trust and altruism although these findings have not been consistently replicated in international studies. Indeed, van der Meer and Tolsma's (2014) critical review concluded that ethnic diversity is not directly related to decrements in interethnic social cohesion (see also Kesler & Bloemraad, 2010; Schmid, Ramiah, & Hewstone, 2014), making it clear that increasing diversity does not inevitably lead to conflict, reductions in social capital or psychological distress.

Multicultural policies have also come under criticism in recent years, where it is often argued that multicultural practices are far from policy ideals, constrained by an assimilationist
past (see Boese & Phillips, 2015) and essentializing and creating segregation between groups (see Green & Staerklé, 2013; Walton et al., 2018). But what does the empirical evidence tell us about the implications of these national policies in terms of social cohesion and well-being? Comparative political research provides the most robust approach to address these questions in studies that assess multicultural policies across a number of countries by using resources such as the Multicultural Policy Index (see Banting & Kymlicka, 2013) and the Migrant Integration Policy Index (Huddleston et al., 2015) to examine the relationship between these policies and their economic, social and psychological outcomes. This line of research points to the positive outcomes of multicultural policies for immigrants and ethnic minorities: lower immigrant-native wage gaps (Nieto, Matano, & Ramos, 2013), more belongingness in terms of citizenship acquisition, higher levels of trust, lower levels of discrimination (Wright & Bloemraad, 2012), and greater life satisfaction (Jackson & Doerschler, 2016).

However, multicultural policies produce mixed effects for majority group members. The policies may be resented and seen as threatening, and under some circumstances they are associated with perceptions of greater discrimination and feelings of less safety by the majority group. At the same time, multicultural policies are related to a rise in majorities’ satisfaction with life and with their national government (Jackson & Doerschler, 2016). Schlueter et al. (2013) demonstrated that liberal policies for immigrant integration are associated with lower levels of perceived threat in their European study while Hooghe and de Vroome (2015) reported that multicultural policies are linked to lower levels of anti-immigrant sentiments. Jackson and Doerschler (2016) suggest that policies that offer both the maximum benefits to minorities and the least detriment to majorities may be the best way forward.
Beyond diversity and policy, ideology forms the third pillar of multiculturalism. In ideological terms multiculturalism reflects an appreciation of diversity and rests on the joint value placed on cultural maintenance and equitable participation. The ideological endorsement of the maintenance and participation principles of multiculturalism varies markedly across countries. With respect to cultural maintenance, findings from the Eurobarometer public opinion poll across 27 European countries indicates that agreement with the general premise that ethnic diversity enriches national culture varies from 32% in Malta to 86% in Sweden. In the case of equitable participation, the specific proposition that there should be more ethnic minority Members of Parliament received a lower level of endorsement ranging from 17% in Bulgaria and Cyprus to 66% in Sweden and France (European Commission, 2007).

International comparative studies of multicultural ideology have largely concentrated on the national (e.g., GDP) and individual (e.g., age, income) level predictors of these attitudes. In some instances, however, studies have examined the outcomes of valuing diversity, most commonly in relation to attitudes toward immigrants and immigration. International Social Survey research has shown that those who appreciate cultural heterogeneity and support cultural maintenance in immigrant groups are willing to accept more immigrants (Ceobanu & Escandell, 2010). Similarly, when diversity is viewed as beneficial, individuals have stronger pro-immigrant sentiments (O’Rourke & Sinnott, 2006). In contrast, when there is resistance to diversity, there is also greater social distrust and perceived ethnic threat (Coenders, Lubbers, & Scheepers, 2005).

7.3 Psychological Contributions to the Multiculturalism Debate

The discussion thus far has considered the three dimensions of multiculturalism based on national indicators of diversity (e.g., ethnic fractionalization), policy (e.g., the Multicultural Policy Index) and ideology (e.g., the International Social Survey Program).
However, citizens are not always aware of national-level policies, and opinion polls have shown that diversity estimates are often out of line with population data (Transatlantic Trends, 2010). Consequently, individuals’ perceptions of diversity, ideology and policy may be equally important in understanding the antecedents and consequences of multiculturalism. As such, psychology has much to contribute to contemporary discourses on multiculturalism.

7.3.1 Multiculturalism and Everyday Experiences of Diversity: Contextual Factors and Perceived Norms

A psychological perspective on the three core components of multiculturalism addresses a gap in our understanding of cultural diversity, intercultural contact, and their consequences by linking perceptions and interpretations of multiculturalism to cultural norms. Guimond et al. (2014, p. 142) have argued that intercultural ideologies, including views of multiculturalism, are not “located solely in individual minds,” but are shared by members of a social group and become normative. Norms act as social guides and provide the context for judging what is right and wrong, just and unjust (Green & Staerklé, 2013). Norms also influence individuals’ attitudes and behaviors, including intergroup perceptions and relations (Nesdale, Griffith, Durkin, & Maass, 2005).

Guimond and colleagues were the first to propose that the relationship between national multicultural policies and the personal endorsement of multiculturalism is mediated by perceived multicultural norms (Guimond et al., 2013). Moreover, their causal model of intergroup attitudes in Canada, Germany, the United States and the United Kingdom demonstrated that country differences in anti-Muslim prejudice could not be adequately explained in terms of individual differences in support for multiculturalism, but was primarily dependent on perceived differences in multicultural norms across socio-political contexts. Although to date Guimond et al. (2013, 2014) have been the only researchers that have empirically investigated the relationship between national policies, perceived norms and out-
group prejudice, subsequent research has highlighted the importance of normative ideological climates and normative intercultural contact on intergroup relations (Fasel et al., 2013; Schachner, Brenick, Noack, Van de Vijver, & Heizmann, 2015). At regional, district and neighborhood levels normative positive intercultural contact is associated with decrements in individuals’ out-group prejudice (Christ et al., 2014) and in the classroom, a climate of positive normative intercultural contact predicts more friendships between immigrant and native-born school children (Titzmann, Brenick, & Silbereisen, 2015).

Stuart and Ward (2018) extended Guimond et al.’s (2013) line of research introducing the concept of normative multiculturalism, i.e., individuals’ perceptions of a normative multicultural climate, defined in terms of: contact with diversity, multicultural ideology, and multicultural policies and practices. After constructing and validating a three-factor measure of Normative Multiculturalism, they examined the main and interactive effects of each dimension on social connectedness (trust, national attachment and perceived threat) in a predominantly White British sample. Their findings revealed that perceived normative multicultural ideology predicted greater national attachment and trust as well as lower levels of perceived threat. Perceived normative multicultural policies and practices also predicted greater national attachment, but were associated with greater threat perceptions. Of particular note was the interaction of the three facets of normative multiculturalism. Specifically, the association between policies and threat was attenuated under conditions of a strong normative multicultural ideology and normatively frequent intercultural contact. These results have significant implications: The three facets of normative multiculturalism operate in conjunction within a national context, and socio-political conditions can reduce perceptions that policies supporting cultural maintenance and equitable participation for immigrants are threatening to the majority.
There is also evidence that the dimensions of normative multiculturalism can play out differently across national contexts and between majority and minority groups. For example, perceived normative contact with diversity, multicultural policies and practices, and multicultural ideology all predict greater national attachment in the United States, but the positive effects of multicultural ideology are limited to Hispanic Americans and not found in Whites (Watters, Ward, & Stuart, 2018). Although normative multiculturalism in the United Kingdom is generally associated with feelings of greater trust and belonging, lower levels of perceived discrimination and greater psychological well-being, normative multicultural policies and practices do predict greater perceived threat for Whites but (marginally) less perceived threat for Indians (Ward, Stuart, & Watters, 2016).

7.4 An Integrative Framework for the Psychological Study of Multiculturalism

What is clear from the previous sections is that multiculturalism is a complex, multifaceted phenomenon, and its diversity, policy and ideological elements can be examined as objective indicators of a national context or in terms of perceived national multicultural norms. As will be discussed later in this section, multiculturalism can also be construed in terms of personal cultural ideologies. Moreover, the core dimensions of multiculturalism can exert differential effects on intercultural relations and subjective well-being. These critical points, as well as the importance of group status, are captured in our integrative framework, which situates key psychological processes and outcomes in a demographic, social and political context.
Figure 18. An integrative framework for the psychological study of multiculturalism.
Our framework is inspired by work by Guimond et al. (2013) and draws attention to the contextual antecedents of “everyday multiculturalism,” that is, how diversity is experienced and evaluated (see Figure 18). Its major function is to integrate the empirical research on multiculturalism discussed in this paper rather than to represent a comprehensive model of psychological research on the antecedents and outcomes of multiculturalism. The framework highlights the importance of contextual elements – diversity, policy and ideology – and how these elements not only exert direct effects on social and psychological outcomes, but also underpin psychological processes that link context to perceived social norms, norms to individuals’ cultural ideologies, and ideologies to intercultural relations and subjective well-being. It differs from and extends Guimond et al.’s (2013) conceptual and empirical distinction between perceived multicultural norms and personal multicultural attitudes and the roles they play in intergroup relations by: 1) identifying three components of multiculturalism, both in terms of objective national criteria and subjectively perceived norms; 2) highlighting the role of group membership in key psychological processes and outcomes; and 3) incorporating well-being into the integrative framework (see also Ward, Szabo, & Stuart, 2016).

7.4.1 The Centrality of Perceived Multicultural Norms

In keeping with Guimond et al. (2013), the framework presents the national socio-political context as an antecedent to perceived norms. In accordance with social and political research (e.g., Hooghe & de Vroome, 2015; Jackson & Doerschler, 2016), the national context is also depicted as exerting a direct influence on intergroup relations and well-being. However, psychological research suggests that the effects of perceived multicultural norms on these social and psychological outcomes, compared to the effects of national context, are more proximal and direct (e.g., Guimond et al. 2013, 2014; Stuart & Ward, 2018). This is because norms define accepted standards of behavior and consequently function as a major
source of social influence, as illustrated by Breugelmans and van de Vijver (2004), for example, who found that perceived norms for “multiculturalism as a threat” predicted decreased acceptance of multiculturalism and lower levels of out-group contact by majority group members while the reverse was true for normative “support for multiculturalism.”

Based on Guimond et al.’s (2013, 2014) theory and research, the framework includes a path from perceived normative multiculturalism to personal cultural ideologies, findings that were also reported by Breugelmans and van de Vijver (2004) and by Stuart and Ward (2018). The mechanisms involved in the link between social norms and personal ideologies or behaviors have not been investigated specifically in relation to multiculturalism, and while there is a general consensus in the social and behavioral sciences that norms guide behaviors and attitudes, the underlying processes remain contentious. To these ends, Reynolds, Subašić and Tindall (2015) described four theoretical approaches to social norms and behavioral change: rational choice, evolutionary selection, the theory of planned behavior and internalization on the basis of social identity. These approaches differ in the extent to which norms are seen as internalized versus influenced via external forces and the extent to which emphasis is placed on social learning, conformity, cooperation, expectations, and self-interest. However, Reynolds et al. (2015) make a strong case for a social identity approach as it specifies which “others” shape “our” norms (p. 50), which, in turn, create expectations for the alignment of our behaviors and attitudes with specific “others”. This has clear relevance for the issue of group membership that is discussed below.

Finally, intergroup and well-being outcomes are predicted by personal cultural ideologies. Studies have shown that favorable attitudes toward multiculturalism are associated with stronger endorsement of policies that support social change for indigenous and minority groups and more liberal policies about the number and sources of immigrants (Urbiola, Willis, Ruiz-Romero, Moya, & Esses, 2017; Ward & Masgoret, 2008). The link
between the personal endorsement of multiculturalism and positive intergroup experiences has been explained in terms of decreased out-group distance and perceived threat, greater tolerance of minorities, stronger egalitarian ideals, and a general belief that multiculturalism has positive consequences for society in general (Hui, Chen, Leung, & Berry, 2015; Musso, Inguglia, Lo Coco, Albiero, & Berry, 2017; Ward & Masgoret, 2006). Beyond this, personal cultural ideologies that are supportive of multiculturalism have also been related to more flexible acculturation expectations for both immigrant and native-born groups (Arends-Tóth & van de Vijver, 2003) and to higher levels of self-esteem in minority and majority group members (Verkuyten, 2009a).

7.4.2 The Importance of Group Membership

Group membership occupies a central position in our framework. Status (i.e., majority versus minority and immigrant versus native-born) not only directly affects personal cultural ideologies, but also perceived multicultural norms, intergroup relations and subjective well-being. Furthermore, it moderates the relationships amongst these variables.

In liberal Western democracies there is strong evidence that ethnic minorities show more positive attitudes towards multiculturalism than national majorities (Arends-Tóth & van de Vijver, 2003; Dandy & Pe-Pua, 2010; van de Vijver, Breugelmans, & Schalk-Soekar, 2008; Verkuyten, 2006; Ward & Masgoret, 2008). These findings are in line with Social Identity Theory (SIT), which posits group membership can be a source of self-esteem and that individuals are motivated to protect and enhance the status of their in-group (Tajfel & Turner, 1986). Given that ethnic minorities are often structurally disadvantaged relative to national majorities, the concrete implementation of multicultural policies can increase their group’s status in society while allowing for the maintenance of their cultural identity (see Verkuyten, 2006). Beyond enhancing group status, ethnic minorities hold positive attitudes towards
multiculturalism because it offers a sense of belonging and inclusion in a society where their
cultural group is not the dominant one.

In contrast to minorities, majorities in many Western societies tend to have more
neutral or ambivalent attitudes towards multiculturalism (van de Vijver et al., 2008;
Verkuylten. 2006). There is a variety of intergroup theories that account for this trend. In
addition to SIT (Tajfel & Turner, 1986), Integrated Threat Theory (Stephan, Ybarra, &
Bachman, 1999), the Unified Instrumental Model of Group Conflict (Esses, Jackson, Dovidio,
& Hodson, 2005) and Social Dominance Theory (Sidanius & Pratto, 1999) provide bases for
interpreting these findings. In general, these theories suggest that opposition to
multiculturalism arises from realistic and symbolic threat, competition for scarce resources,
and the motivation to protect the in-group’s dominant status. However, intergroup theory also
points to contact with diverse others as diminishing the negative effects of threat and
competition (Kotzur, Tropp, & Wagner, 2018; Pettigrew & Tropp, 2006), and research has
shown that more frequent (positive) intercultural contact is associated with a greater valuing
of diversity (Green, Fasel, & Sarrasin, 2010; Hui et al., 2015).

Beyond the well-known factors highlighted in social psychological theories of
intergroup relations, we suggest that divergent conceptions of justice may also contribute to
majority-minority differences in the endorsement of multiculturalism. In Western
democracies, individualistic values are fundamental and pervasive. They emphasize
individual freedom, responsibility, rights and justice, underpin meritocratic principles, and
operate in societies where “it is deemed legitimate to judge people according to their unique
qualities, aptitudes and contributions, rather than according to their belonging to social
categories” (Licata et al., 2011, p. 898). Majorities are especially sensitive to such principles
while for immigrant and minority communities—who are keenly aware of the subordinate
position they occupy in society—the group, rather than the individual, often assumes greater
importance (Azzi, 1998; Green & Staerklé, 2013). Multiculturalism places emphasis on increasing equality and justice between groups as a supplement to the Western emphasis on justice between individuals. Not only is this collective group-based justice principle more appealing to immigrants and minorities, it is also seen as largely compatible with individual justice by members of these groups (Gale & Staerklé, 2019a). Majority groups in Western democracies, in contrast, are less aware of group membership and its implications and are more satisfied with principles and policies addressing individuals (see Azzi, 1998). They also see individualistic values and multiculturalism as relatively incompatible, believing that one might undermine the other. These findings provide additional insights into why majorities support multiculturalism less than minorities (Gale & Staerklé, 2019a).

As can be seen in our framework, majority-minority and immigrant-native differences extend beyond personal cultural ideologies to their antecedents and outcomes. There are notable differences in perceived multicultural norms between minority and majority groups. Hispanic-Americans and British Indians view contact with diversity as more normative than their white counterparts. Moreover, majority Whites in the United States, but not the United Kingdom, perceive normative multicultural ideology to be stronger than do minorities (Ward et al., 2016). With respect to social and psychological outcomes, national surveys have shown that there are often asymmetries in intergroup perceptions with majorities tending to be viewed more positively by minorities than the reverse (Sibley & Ward, 2013), and life satisfaction has been found to be lower in immigrants compared to native-borns (Arpino & de Valk, 2018).

Group status also moderates the associations of both national-level indicators of multiculturalism and perceived multicultural norms with intergroup attitudes and interactions. The contextual effects of national-level diversity and ideology often diverge for majority and minority groups as is the case for multicultural policies, which are associated with decrements
in perceived discrimination for immigrants (Wright & Bloemeraad, 2012), but increments for majorities (Jackson & Doerschler, 2016). Moreover, while studies have shown that perceived normative multiculturalism, in general, has favorable consequences for both majorities and minorities in terms of greater social connectedness and well-being, the ideological component often has stronger positive effects for minorities while the policy dimension has more negative effects for majorities (Stuart & Ward, 2018; Ward et al., 2016). The same is true for the moderating influence of group status on the associations between personal cultural ideologies and intergroup variables. In a study of native- and Turkish-Dutch, majority group members who endorsed multiculturalism were less likely to demand immigrant adoption of the national culture in public spheres while immigrants who endorsed multiculturalism were more willing to do so (Arends-Tóth & van de Vijver, 2003). The role of group status in moderating the relationships between national level indicators of multiculturalism and perceived multicultural norms and between those perceived norms and personal cultural ideologies has not yet been investigated; this is a topic that should be considered in future research.

7.4.3 Strengths and Limitations of the Integrative Framework

The framework presented here is limited in that it does not incorporate all of the demographic (e.g., education), dispositional (e.g., social dominance orientation) or situational (e.g., contact) predictors of cultural ideologies and intergroup relations. However, we believe it does highlight how psychological research can make important advances in our understanding of individual attitudes and experiences of multiculturalism embedded in context. This has been previously advocated by Fasel et al. (2013) with their emphasis on ideological climates, norms, and person x context interactions, and by Ward and Geeraert (2016) with their recommendation for more attention to process and context in acculturation research. It also provides an avenue for linking macro national-level research findings from
sociology and political science to psychological studies of individuals’ everyday experiences of multiculturalism. Moreover, we maintain that the framework has significant value for application, that is, recommending ways to maximize the benefits and minimize the risks of multiculturalism. This is discussed in the next section.

7.5 Maximizing the Benefits and Minimizing the Risks of Multiculturalism

Increased cultural diversity has become an objective reality throughout the Western world. As many have acknowledged before us, managing this cultural diversity to optimize intergroup harmony and to ensure a functional, just society for all its members is, therefore, crucial. Multiculturalism is, however, in the midst of a “global backlash” in which opposition has increased, and politicians claim that appropriate multicultural policies are difficult to implement effectively (Boese & Phillips, 2015; Joppke, 2014). Despite claims of its failure, Banting and Kymlicka (2013) suggest that this discourse is not representative of the reality of global trends, with international research showing that policies are becoming increasingly multicultural, accommodating diversity and ensuring cultural maintenance while at the same time fostering engagement and participation in the wider society. Kymlicka (2013) warns that anti-multiculturalism rhetoric may still have negative repercussions however, as it can undermine an “inclusive sense of identity and belonging” despite the existence of policies, and a more positive “rhetoric may be an essential component of their success” (p. 108).

So where to from here, and what can psychology contribute to positive social change? To address these questions, two additional points warrant careful consideration: 1) at the contextual level multicultural policies and practices operate on the basis of the dual principles of cultural maintenance and participation; and 2) for multicultural success the expectations and needs of both majority and minority groups must be recognized and addressed. As a basis for recommending strategies to maximize the benefits and minimize the risks of
multiculturalism, we discuss these issues in conjunction with key components of our framework, i.e., multicultural policies, multicultural norms and group membership.

7.5.1 Introducing Multicultural Policies and Setting Multicultural Norms

Given that multicultural policies at the national level affect intergroup relations and subjective well-being, at least partially through perceived cultural norms (Guimond et al., 2013, 2014; Jackson & Doerschler, 2016), initiating and strengthening multicultural policies can lead to more positive social and psychological outcomes. Moreover, Nyborg et al. (2016) agree that policy can support social norm changes, but argue that this is more likely to occur in conjunction with “tipping points.” Specifically, the probability of policy changing norms is increased if the norm changes are incentivized and involve highly visible behaviors, conditional cooperation (i.e., willingness to cooperate more when others cooperate more), social learning of personal moral responsibility by observing others, and receiving feedback on one’s behavior. (Green, 2016), however, has argued that policy is less likely to precipitate norm change than activism.

Social psychological research has concentrated more on shifting perceived norms to change behaviors (Miller & Prentice, 2016). This often involves “marketing social norms” by disseminating a message about the high incidence of desirable behavior among relevant group members (e.g., neighbors, classmates). Personalized normative feedback has also been used as an intervention strategy although in these cases the primary goal is to identify and correct inaccurate perceptions of objective norms. Most relevant to the discussion of normative multiculturalism appears to be theory and research on norms and public good, where an individual’s behavior is seen as impacting the wider group. In these circumstances, those who share the same immediate circumstances or are in closer physical and geographical proximity make the most powerful normative reference group (Goldstein, Cialdini, & Griskevicius, 2008). This suggests that multicultural norm-setting in organizations, educational institutions
or even close-knit communities may be more effective than referencing national norms. As theory and research on normative multiculturalism are in the earliest stages, these issues deserve serious attention in future studies.

7.5.2 Addressing Group Membership

Common In-Group Identity

Feelings of belonging and an inclusive identity reflect multicultural ideals and are crucial for social cohesion and well-being. According to the Common In-group Identity Model (Espinosa et al., 2018; Gaertner et al., 1993), an inclusive in-group identity is likely to arise when national majorities and ethnic minorities perceive commonalities between themselves. This can be encouraged in a variety of ways, including increasing intercultural contact. For example, studies have shown that normative contact with diversity is associated with stronger national identities in New Zealand and the United States (Stuart & Ward, 2018), that social interaction among culturally diverse European students fosters a stronger European identity (Stoeckel, 2016) and that both Catholic and Protestant students in religiously integrated schools are more likely to identify as Northern Irish compared to those in segregated educational institutions (Hayes, McAllister, & Dowds, 2007). Encouraging cooperation and interdependence during intergroup contact further supports a common identity (see Sherif et al. 1961) and is especially useful for improving intergroup relations in contexts where groups are in conflict or where “overt bigotry” is a norm (see Dovidio et al., 2016, p. 37). Research has also demonstrated that encouraging national majority group members to think about their similarities with ethnic minorities and their common superordinate group membership (e.g., an inclusive school, community or nation in which they live) can reduce in-group bias and prejudice and increase trust and support for pro-minority policies such as multiculturalism (see Dovidio et al., 2016, for a review).
The dynamics of achieving a common in-group identity and its consequences are somewhat more complex for minority group members. In order to address and overcome group-based disparities and structural inequalities, ethnic minorities must also be permitted to maintain their sub-group cultural identity while identifying with the superordinate group. The resulting dual identification (González & Brown, 2006; see also Berry & Ward, 2016) can be promoted through contexts in which the superordinate group’s representation encompasses complex (diverse, inclusive) prototypes (see Waldzus, Wenzel, & Weber, 2003). Acknowledgement of cultural differences is precisely what allows for group-conscious multicultural policies such as affirmative action and minority rights to be implemented in contexts where intergroup relations are stable, where no systematic exclusion occurs, and where minorities are “more focused on achieving the promised inclusion in society, being treated fairly, and being respected for what makes them different as well as what they have in common with the majority group” (Dovidio et al., 2016, p. 37).

While minorities do tend to assume simultaneous identification with their ethnic group as well as the superordinate society, majorities are more accepting of superordinate identification with less emphasis on subgroups (Staerklé et al., 2010). This is because identification with the superordinate society is often synonymous with majority group members’ prototypical ethnic status (e.g., Devos & Banaji, 2005), as well as their norms and belief systems. The paradox is that these belief systems are generally individualistic, rather than multicultural, bringing us into a discussion of recent research on justice conceptions from the perspective of groups experiencing power asymmetry, such as majorities versus minorities.

**Justice Considerations**

Congruent with the idea that minorities tend to assume simultaneous identification with the superordinate society and their ethnic group, minorities also perceive compatibility
between principles of individual justice such as meritocracy and principles of collective, group-based justice such as multiculturalism (Gale & Staerklé, 2019a). Majorities, on the other hand, tend to prefer superordinate identification where individualistic beliefs and individual justice principles can be emphasized, over subgroup identification where group-based justice can take precedence. Along these lines, recent work has shown that immigrant and low status group members are more supportive of multiculturalism than native and high-status group members only when they believe they live in a society which respects meritocratic, individual justice principles, where individuals are able to progress according to their own responsibility. In contrast, when members of immigrant groups feel they live in a socially stratified society in which group membership impedes individual progress, their support for multiculturalism can be significantly lower (while this is not the case for natives; see Gale & Staerklé, 2019a). This suggests that individual justice and multiculturalism must coexist for minorities to feel they live in a just society.

This line of research has implications for determining the ways in which to maximize the benefits and minimize the risks of multiculturalism in Western democracies. The findings suggest that ethnic minorities and national majorities not only perceive multiculturalism in fundamentally different ways, but they also experience and view the world, justice and society in different ways. If ethnic minorities are supportive of multiculturalism in a meritocratic society that emphasizes individual responsibility, then it is crucial to ensure both that individual justice principles are respected in a country (e.g., antidiscrimination, individual freedom and responsibility) and that collective forms of justice such as multiculturalism complement this individual justice. This is why the dual principles of cultural maintenance and societal participation inherent to multiculturalism are so important: For minorities, one cannot exist without the other. From a majority perspective, in contrast, we argue that in order to increase their support for multiculturalism, it needs to be framed in a way that matches their
fundamental orientation towards individual justice, in which all members of society are taken into account. Therefore, when targeting majorities, relatively less emphasis should be placed on groups.

**Diminishing Majority Resistance to Multiculturalism**

Majority groups are especially important to target when seeking to maximize the benefits of multiculturalism as they are, indeed, often resistant: For multiculturalism to be successful and for positive social change to occur, diversity, ideology and policy need the support of members of these dominant groups. But who exactly is this majority or dominant group?

Both in scientific literature and in everyday life, national majorities are defined as native, high status and numerical majority group members (Gale & Staerklé, 2019a). Taken together, these three criteria reflect the majority’s powerful position in society. However, majority group members do not always match the three criteria at the same time. For example, while in most European countries the dominant group tends to be white and native, in nation states built on colonization and immigration such as Canada, the United States, Australia and New Zealand, the dominant group is composed of white people of European descent. This group is the numerical majority and is socially valued, but their ancestors were immigrants themselves and relative to them, native groups are generally disadvantaged and historically subordinate (Kymlicka, 1995). In such contexts, encouraging people to think of themselves in terms of their immigration origins (e.g., of European descent) instead of their race (e.g., White) can lead to less prejudice, stronger identification with ethnic minorities and greater support for multiculturalism (Morrison & Chung, 2011).

Existing research shows that a number of other strategies can be used to increase majorities’ or dominant group members’ perception of justice in multiculturalism. For example, as Whites, relative to racial minorities in the United States, tend to associate
multiculturalism with exclusion, it is important that multiculturalism is framed in an inclusive way, targeting all groups including the dominant one. Under these conditions, the association between multiculturalism and exclusion is reduced, and majorities show more positive attitudes towards cultural diversity (Plaut et al., 2011). Such an inclusive approach to policy might also help overcome the issue that majorities feel more threatened when confronted with concrete multicultural policies to benefit minorities (e.g., the recognition and celebration of ethnic minorities’ culture-specific festivals and holidays) as opposed to abstract multicultural principles that already appear more inclusive (e.g., valuing cultural diversity in general). Research shows that construing multiculturalism in concrete as opposed to abstract terms increases majorities’ prejudice towards minority groups largely because they feel their national identity is threatened (Yogeeswaran & Dasgupta, 2014b). Diversity policies should use language that addresses all members of society, fostering feelings of inclusion for everyone, without the risk of excluding minority or majority group members (Stevens et al., 2008).

Perceived threat is indeed a major determinant of majorities’ opposition to multiculturalism that can also include perceived competition for resources such as jobs, money and power (see Esses et al., 1998). A variety of situations can lead to such perceived competition, like increasing numbers of out-group members (e.g., in conditions where the national majority is a numerical minority) or the presence of highly skilled out-group members (e.g., when immigrants or ethnic minorities are of relatively high status). Scarcity of a resource (e.g., limited availability of jobs) or a desire for unequal distribution of resources (e.g., social dominance orientation) can also increase perceived competition (see also Thomsen, Green, & Sidanius, 2008). Esses et al. (1998) suggest that encouraging the media to portray immigrants and ethnic minorities as a benefit to society (e.g., highly skilled people creating new jobs) and reframing zero-sum competition by directly targeting erroneous beliefs
are ways to reduce such perceived threat and opposition to multiculturalism in these contexts. These strategies may allow for an increase in multicultural norms, perceived by majorities as respecting individual justice principles, and “a more inclusive national identity, over time” (Esses et al., 2006, p. 666). They may also increase the likelihood that both majority and minority groups can reap the benefits of multiculturalism.

7.6 Concluding Comments

Multiculturalism is a complex, multi-faceted phenomena that has evoked intense and often acrimonious debate among policy-makers, social scientists and citizens. We contend that cultural diversity is a fundamental feature of multiculturalism, but that the ideological appreciation of this diversity and its accommodation by multicultural policies and practices that ensure cultural maintenance and inclusive, equitable participation are equally important. When viewed this way, multiculturalism has not failed; rather, most Western democracies have failed to become multicultural. This is not to advance a naively idealistic view of cultural diversity and intercultural contact. Multiculturalism may work, but multiculturalism is hard work. There are underlying tensions between individual and collective conceptions of justice; there are different costs and benefits for majority and minority groups; and there are massive discrepancies in national receptiveness to diversity. Despite these differences, we have offered a conceptual framework that integrates the contextual antecedents and the psycho-social outcomes of multiculturalism and have proposed directions for future research. Following this, we have also suggested approaches to maximize the benefits and minimize the risks of cultural diversity for both majorities and minorities. Although we have focused on national-level antecedents to perceived multicultural norms and their psychological and social outcomes in our discussion of multiculturalism, we believe the processes and outcomes are also relevant to school (Schachner et al., 2015; Titzmann et al., 2015) and community levels of analysis where intercultural interactions between immigrants and natives are often closer
and more intimate (Huo, Dovidio, Jiménez, & Schildkraut, 2018; Silka, 2018). In the end we hope that these reflections may go at least some way to understanding and resolving the challenges that multiculturalism currently presents in the global arena.
Multiculturalism – an inevitable demographic reality in the Western world, yet, a political theory and public policy which has faced substantial criticism in recent decades. In the present thesis, I considered philosophical and practical debates around the best way to manage cultural diversity as a starting point (Barry, 2001; Joppke, 2004, 2014, Kymlicka, 1995, 2012b; Malik, 2015; Modood, 2013; Parekh, 2000), highlighting two broad approaches: One focusing on individuals, arguably maintaining the social hierarchy, and the other focusing on groups, thereby seeking to attenuate it (Chryssochoou, 2018; Gale & Staerklé, 2017; Guimond et al., 2013; Knowles et al., 2009; Novoa & Moghaddam, 2014; Plaut et al., 2018; Rattan & Ambady, 2013; Yogeeswaran et al., 2018). I argued that individuals, as members of minority and majority groups in liberal societies, have differential views on justice and thus on multiculturalism as a normative solution to cultural diversity. To do this, I relied on existing research which shows that members of (dominant, national) majority groups favour justice between individuals, and that members of (subordinate, cultural) minority groups favour justice between groups (see Azzi, 1998; Ryan, Hunt, Weible, Peterson, & Casas, 2007; Verkuyten, 2014). The social psychological focus of this thesis was therefore on how multicultural attitudes are not isolated in individuals’ minds, but instead, are shaped by the societies in which they live, and by the social groups to which they belong and identify.

The meaning of multiculturalism in the present thesis had a particular emphasis on cultural diversity stemming from immigration. This kind of cultural diversity can involve the presence of (short-term) newcomers such as seasonal workers, refugees, asylum-seekers and other low status immigrants, as well as high status newcomers like expatriates or even long-
standing foreigners with permanent residency. As open-ended questions in studies composing the present thesis suggest, these are the types of groups that come to mind when people think of ‘cultural minorities’ in Switzerland especially, with a noted emphasis on ‘culturally distant’ immigrants such as Muslims. The purpose of this thesis, however, was not to focus on attitudes towards specific immigrant or other cultural minority groups (with the exception of Study 7 where we focused on the selection of talented migrants). The objective was, instead, to examine general **multicultural attitudes** representing **social justice conceptions**.

Three general research questions structured the present thesis, all examining normative antecedents to multicultural attitudes. The first focused on the role of group membership; the second focused on the role of national identification; and the third focused on the role of national context. In the following, I first summarize the findings with regards to each research question. Then, I highlight some methodological limitations and alternative explanations of the empirical work presented in the preceding chapters, with some suggestions for future research. In doing so, I also defend the collective validity and impact of the eight studies we conducted. Finally, I discuss the theoretical and practical implications of our findings.

### 8.1 Addressing the Research Questions

#### 8.1.1 Research Question 1 – The Role of Group Membership

With Research Question 1, I aimed to take a social psychological perspective on a contemporary debate from the domain of political philosophy: The degree to which group-based principles of collective justice are compatible with liberal principles of individual justice (Barry, 2001; Joppke, 2004; Kymlicka, 1995; Levey, 2010; Modood, 2013). More specifically, I expected that minorities would perceive significantly greater compatibility between individual and collective justice than majorities. This was based on the argument that their differentiated orientations evidenced in the literature (i.e., minorities towards justice between groups and majorities towards justice between individuals; see Azzi, 1998) are
shaped and constrained within the context of liberal societies which emphasize dominant norms of individual freedom and responsibility. Indeed, in everyday discourse, these dominant norms are often considered to be violated by group-based policies such as affirmative action (Bobocel et al., 1998), at least from the majority perspective. However, an argument was that minorities should be in a position both to endorse and to interpret the limits of individual justice principles, allowing them to perceive substantially less incompatibility between individual and collective forms of justice.

In line with existing research, the first three hypotheses\textsuperscript{53} were generally confirmed, with some inconsistencies. First, majority (i.e., national majority) group members were significantly more supportive of an individualized immigration policy based on individual justice principles than minority (i.e., national minority) group members (H1a). Second, minority (i.e., ethnic, immigrant, and low status) group members were sometimes more supportive of multiculturalism as a value, ideology and policy, than majority (i.e., high status and native) group members (H1b). Results for this second hypothesis were mixed, however, largely because of their dependence on concerns for dominant individual justice principles (see below). Third, majority (i.e., high status and native) group members perceived incompatibility between liberal, individual justice principles, and multicultural, collective justice principles (H1c).

Adding to existing research, the last two hypotheses were also generally confirmed. First, minority (i.e., ethnic, immigrant, and low status) group members perceived significantly less incompatibility between liberal, individual justice principles and multicultural, collective justice principles than majority (i.e., native and high status) group members (H1d). Second, the discrepancy in perceived compatibility between minorities and majorities depended on the asymmetric criteria defining these groups as well as on the facet of multiculturalism under

\textsuperscript{53} The content and numeration of these hypotheses refers to those proposed in the method chapter of this thesis (see section 2.1).
scrutiny (H1e). More specifically, when attitudes towards multicultural ideology were examined, immigrants and natives differed in this perceived compatibility. When attitudes towards multicultural policy were examined, low status and high status (natives) differed in this perceived compatibility. We believe that this occurred because of the nuanced meanings attached to multicultural ideology versus policy. While the former addresses symbolic issues of cultural identity and recognition, speaking especially to the cultural (i.e., immigrant or native) status of groups, the latter addresses both symbolic and resource-based issues, speaking also to the socio-economic (i.e., low or high) status of groups.

These findings suggest that liberal principles of individual justice serve as a foundation from which members of minority groups endorse multiculturalism, likely as a means for improving fairness in society via positive social change (see Zarate et al., 2012). From my perspective, both the recognition and resource-based facets of multiculturalism are ways of achieving this social change, but by satisfying different concerns that are salient to members of different social groups. Multiculturalism in the form of recognition (operationalized as multicultural ideology) is a way to promote social change for groups lacking that recognition under principles of individual justice. These groups include immigrants or other groups differing, culturally, from the national majority. Multiculturalism in the form of redistribution (operationalized as multicultural policy and affirmative action) is a way to promote social change for groups lacking material resources under principles of individual justice, such as, also, low status natives (despite generally weak endorsement by this group as representations of multiculturalism in Europe rather focus on immigrant ‘outgroups’). I will come back to the notion of social change below, and encourage the reader to keep these recognition and redistribution nuances in mind when I do. But the last finding in line with these reflections serves as a major contribution to existing research on multicultural attitudes: It highlights the need to specify and distinguish which facet(s) of
multiculturalism, and which asymmetric feature(s) defining minority and majority groups, are addressed in empirical work.

### 8.1.2 Research Question 2 – The Role of National Identification

National identification plays an important role in shaping justice conceptions and multicultural attitudes. Indeed, Research Question 2 was based on existing research which suggests that the content of national identity is crucial for understanding how individuals in societies endorse or reject newcomers and multiculturalism in general (Ariely, 2012; Green, Visintin, & Sarrasin, 2018; Pehrson & Green, 2010; Reijerse et al., 2015; Wright, 2011; Yogeeswaran & Dasgupta, 2014a). This existing research has focused predominantly on inclusiveness of national identity and on civic versus ethnic conceptions of nationhood. However, with Research Question 2, I suggested that examining the prototypical beliefs defining this national identity is another way of addressing how identification with a nation can shape such attitudes and justice conceptions. This is because identifying with any social group implies thinking and behaving in a way that is coherent with the group’s shared norms, values, understandings, and thus, belief system (see Reicher, Spears, & Haslam, 2010).

Building on the extant literature and on Research Question 1, the first expectation in line with Research Question 2 was that majorities’ perceived incompatibility between classical liberal principles and multiculturalism (and thus between individual and collective justice; see H1c) would be anchored in their identification with a liberal society (H2a). Consistent with this hypothesis, we found that strong levels of national identification among majorities in the liberal country of Switzerland were indeed associated with strong liberal beliefs in individual responsibility, thereby explaining, at least in part, their opposition to multiculturalism.

The second expectation in line with Research Question 2 was that majorities would be more strongly oriented towards principles of individual justice compared to minorities (see
H1a) because of their stronger levels of identification with a liberal society (H2b). Consistent with this hypothesis, we found that in five out of six European countries, (dominant) national majorities were significantly more supportive of an individualized immigration policy, selecting talented migrants, than (subordinate) national minorities, because they identified more strongly with their respective (economically liberal) country. In other words, in all five countries, stronger levels of national identification were associated with stronger support for an individual justice-based immigration policy, and this occurred after teasing out and controlling for more group-based restrictive and prejudicial immigration attitudes.

This hypothesis was not confirmed in one country – Belgium – likely because of the ambiguous power and complex identity dynamics between the Flemish majority and the Walloon minority. In all other countries examined, the national majority group was more clearly in a position of power relative to national minorities, explaining their greater sense of national identity (Staerklé et al., 2005, 2010) and support for an individual justice-based immigration policy.

8.1.3 Research Question 3 – The Role of National Context

The aim of Research Question 3 was to examine how the contrasting minority and majority justice conceptions found in response to Research Question 1 played out across different national contexts. These national contexts varied first in terms of the degree to which collective justice-based equality (i.e., multicultural) policies were implemented at the national level (H3a). Second, the national contexts varied in terms of European geopolitical region, forming a comparison between liberal Western and post-communist societies (H3b).

As a reminder, regarding hypothesis 1b, we did not always find that minorities were more supportive of multiculturalism than majorities. Taking into account the role of national context, this difference in support was found only in countries that had more pronounced equality policies (H3a) and in Western European compared to post-communist countries.
(H3b). It appears therefore that minorities are particularly empowered in contexts where collective justice-based policies are implemented at the national level to supplement individual justice ones.

As another reminder, in line with hypothesis 1c and 1d, we did consistently find that majorities perceived incompatibility between liberal, individual justice principles and multicultural, collective justice principles, and that minorities perceived significantly less incompatibility than majorities. However, this “asymmetric compatibility” between minorities and majorities was especially evident in Western European countries compared to post-communist countries (H3b). The degree to which equality policies were implemented at the national level did not have such an effect. Therefore, despite limited statistical power at the country level in this study (justifying a need for future research to delve deeper into this topic), it appears that opinions regarding the compatibility between group-based principles of collective justice and liberal principles of individual justice are particularly polarized in Western European societies. These societies indeed represent the liberal ideological context in which the philosophical debate on this compatibility has occurred (Kymlicka & Opalski, 2001).

In the final theoretical chapter of the present thesis, Colleen Ward and I presented a framework to inform future research on multicultural attitudes and outcomes in context (Ward et al., 2018). This context was defined both in objective and subjective terms and focused on multiculturalism’s multifaceted nature. Based on existing research, we explained how multiculturalism, in terms of demography, ideology and, policy, likely plays out differently for members of minority and majority groups. The framework therefore provided an integrative perspective on multicultural attitudes of individuals as members of groups in different societal contexts.
8.2 Limits, Alternative Explanations, and Future Directions

In this section, I discuss some methodological shortcomings of the empirical chapters composing the present thesis. However, I also highlight some methodological strengths, emphasizing the impact and theoretical implications of our findings. These shortcomings and strengths are discussed in addition to those mentioned within the empirical chapters.

8.2.1 Methodological Concerns

Operationalizing Minorities and Majorities

As mentioned at various instances throughout the present thesis, an important challenge in social psychological research is the operationalization of majority and minority groups. Existing research often focuses on groups differing in power, such as racial groups in the United States (e.g., Blacks versus Whites), or immigrants versus natives in Europe. In our studies, we sometimes used similar distinctions, raising a number of methodological issues. Firstly, when we collected correlational data ourselves (such as in Study 1), convenience samples were used to distinguish between immigrant minorities and native majorities. A more meticulous approach would have been to seek out specific (e.g., immigrant, religious or linguistic) minority groups in order to establish a more pointed comparison to native majorities. Seeking out native majority group members differing in their social status would have also been relevant, in order to acknowledge some heterogeneity or diversity within this group as well. Yet, looking at specific minority and majority groups and acknowledging heterogeneity inherent to these groups was not the purpose of this initial study, as our fundamental objective was to understand how justice conceptions of cultural minorities differed from those of native majorities in general. Indeed, when thinking about ‘cultural minority groups’ in Switzerland, people do spontaneously think of immigrants, foreigners and refugees, in general, as well as religious (e.g., Muslim) groups. Cultural diversity can be represented in a variety of different ways, however, including in terms of social class,
language, race or even gender and sexual orientation. Examining justice conceptions of specific immigrant or other (subordinate) minority groups, as well as native group members differing in their access to material or symbolic capital, is an important avenue for future research.

Second, when we used secondary survey data, the size of minority groups was substantially smaller than the size of majority groups, creating a statistical power imbalance between the two groups. This issue was especially striking in the multilevel study (Study 8), as one country (i.e., Poland) had as few as 12 self-identified members of an (ethnic) minority group. Had our main model not been complemented with additional analyses (involving an alternative data set and operationalization of group membership), this issue could have severely brought into question the validity of our findings. In this study, the use of a subjective measure of ethnic minority group membership was nevertheless helpful, as the processes inherent to our theorizing suggest that minority group members need to be aware of their group membership and position in the social hierarchy in order to perceive (less in)compatibility between individual and collective justice (than majorities). While all remaining respondents were lumped together into the default majority category, neglecting to acknowledge heterogeneity within this group (see discussion above), the measure used in this study was complementary to (objective) indicators of group membership used elsewhere in the present thesis.

However, we also distinguished between different types of asymmetric groups inherent to these common, simplistic minority-majority distinctions. More specifically, we recognized that groups differing in power can be distinguished according to their origins (native versus immigrant), status (high versus low), or size (numerical majority versus minority). In Studies 2 and 3 in particular, we used a perspective-taking exercise by experimentally assigning participants to these different types of groups (see Azzi, 1992). It is
important to acknowledge that this perspective-taking exercise may not accurately exemplify membership in real groups. Nevertheless, this study design did complement the methodology used in other studies: The experimental nature of the study meant that we had control over, on the one hand, the type of minority and majority groups examined, and, on the other hand, the comparable size of the respective asymmetric groups.

Future research should continue to disentangle different types of asymmetric groups not only experimentally (see Simon, Aufderheide, & Kampmeier, 2001), but also by targeting real groups. While the perspective of (real) immigrant and national minorities were both separately examined in the context of the present thesis, they were not directly compared. Future research could therefore examine the convergences and divergences in multicultural attitudes, justice conceptions and also (national) identity conceptions of these different types of minority groups, for example, known to make distinct multicultural claims (see Kymlicka, 1995).

**Normative Justice Explanations, Political Positioning and Self-Interest**

The “alternative explanations” that merit discussion regarding the findings of this thesis concern our central emphasis on normative justice conceptions. In the studies responding to Research Question 2, for example, one could argue that the associations found between national identification, the (meritocratic) belief in individual responsibility and support for an individualized immigration policy are not linked to dominant liberal and individual justice beliefs but simply reflect right-wing or conservative political positionings. First, national identification is sometimes framed as a means through which individuals express traditional values and support for the status quo (see for example Kemmelmeier & Winter, 2008; Roccas, Schwartz, & Amit, 2010). Second, the belief in individual responsibility has been shown to be associated with status legitimizing ideologies such as

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54 Moreover, low status and high status natives, for example, were never directly compared to each other: When participants were assigned to the ‘native’ group in the scenario, the ‘other’ group was always an immigrant one.
social dominance orientation (Sidanius & Pratto, 1999) and right-wing authoritarianism (Altemeyer, 1988; see Major & Kaiser, 2017). Third, support for an individualized immigration policy targeting talented migrants is known to be associated with right-wing exclusionary attitudes and prejudice towards immigrants (see Green, 2007, 2009). Moreover, from the majority perspective, all these indicators were negatively associated with support for multiculturalism, which is known to be hierarchy attenuating in line with more left-wing political positioning (see Levin et al., 2012; see also Bot & Verkuyten, 2018).

To counteract this possible “alternative explanation” of our findings based on underlying political positionings, we often conducted complementary analyses to control for such right-wing indicators in our studies. The fundamental message we sought to convey was that basic political positioning did not provide enough insight into our effects, arguing that deeper, more normative group-based dynamics were at play. However, as I will discuss further below, the reasoning alluding to support (or rejection) of the status quo is entirely coherent with, and even inherent to, the interpretation we wanted to convey.

In our studies, we acknowledge (and even argue) that endorsement of individual justice principles is generally associated with the legitimation of the social hierarchy. In liberal societies, these are dominant and widely shared social norms and as such, endorsing them should be motivated by a desire for social stability (see Jost, Hennes, & Lavine, 2013). Conversely, in these same liberal societies in which collective justice principles are less ubiquitously embedded in the national concept, endorsement of multiculturalism is more likely to be associated with contestation of the social hierarchy and thus driven by a desire for social change. This polarization is coherent with our presentation of the majority perspective. However, the key purpose of Research Question 1 was to examine whether minorities interpret these social stability versus social change ideologies (see also Zárate, Shaw,
as less negatively interdependent than majorities. Our findings suggest the minority perspective does indeed differ from the majority perspective.

There is nevertheless also an alternative explanation that can be advanced for the minority perspective, such that their perceived compatibility between multiculturalism and individual justice principles could be viewed through a utilitarian lens. As a reminder, in Studies 1 and 2, results showed that (immigrant, low status) minorities were most supportive of multiculturalism when they believed that all individuals in society can progress and succeed regardless of group membership. One could argue that minorities therefore viewed multicultural policy and ideology as a tool to boost their advancement in a society where boundaries between groups are already permeable (see Gale & Staerklé, 2017). If our research had ceased after Studies 1 and 2, this could have been a viable interpretation. However, Study 3 incorporated individual justice measures alluding to how individuals and societies ought to be, rather than how they presently are. The inclusion of these prescriptive, in addition to descriptive, indicators of individual justice beliefs supports the argument that the perceived compatibility between individual and collective justice for minorities may not be driven by self-interest, but is instead, indeed, normative. Future research could incorporate implicit rather than explicit methods (see Nosek et al., 2007) and/or direct items assessing perceived compatibility (rather than using correlations) to further strengthen the validity of our claims.

Validity and Impact of Findings

The use of different measures tapping into the same constructs is a strength of the present thesis. Indeed, when assessing adherence to principles of individual justice, not only did we measure both descriptive and prescriptive (classical liberal) beliefs, but we also included support for a more concrete, individualized immigration policy, based on the same
overarching micro-/individual justice principles of equity and merit (see Brickman, Folger, Goode, & Schul, 1981).

Moreover, existing research often lumps together multiculturalism’s various facets. This may be valid given multiculturalism’s general emphasis on groups and apparent unifactorial structure (see van de Vijver, Breugelmans, & Schalk-Soeke, 2008). Our use of three different measures, alluding to multiculturalism as an ideology, policy, and value placed in demographic cultural diversity, allows for a certain triangulation and validity in our results. However, our findings also point towards the need for future research to examine nuances and divergences between multiculturalism’s more abstract ideology, focusing on identity, and more concrete policies (see also Yogeeswaran & Dasgupta, 2014b), often incorporating resource-based concerns.

The use of existing survey data creates an added challenge when trying to measure (and distinguish between the various facets of) multicultural attitudes. While Study 8 involved an indicator of the value placed in demographic cultural diversity, this same measure has been used in existing research to represent perceived threat of immigration (as a low score; see for example Schneider, 2008). This measure does involve both identity and resource-related components, and I do defend that perceiving immigration as threatening is a way of rejecting collective justice principles. However, it is important to acknowledge that the items’ formulations were not conceptualized for the purpose of our specific research questions, and a more comprehensive analysis of the integration of (individual, group-based, societal; symbolic, material, and other forms of) threat within justice conceptions is warranted in future research.

Finally, while there were a number of limitations involved in our operationalization of minority and majority groups (discussed above), the diversity of these indicators allowed for stronger conclusions. Indeed, an important point to retain from these studies is the remarkable
convergence in the findings (also across countries), regardless of which indicators of group membership, adherence to individual justice principles, or support for multiculturalism were used.

8.2.2 Theoretical Implications and Outlook

Research in general risks being biased or constrained by the ideological contexts in which empirical studies are conducted. For example, when I first started to plan the studies composing this thesis, I implicitly leaned towards (both individual and collective) self-interest explanations for the majority and minority multicultural attitudes I expected to find. In addition to many theorists and researchers before and after him (see for example Kagan, 1989; Lerner, 2003; Sears, Lau, Tyler, & Allen, 1980), Miller (1999) eloquently explained that the norm of self-interest, associated with rationality inherent to classical (or neo-) liberalism and individualism, is pervasive in Western societies. This descriptive and prescriptive norm leads people to behave and express themselves as if they are more concerned about their self-interest than they genuinely are. The norm serves as a vicious circle, impacting not only how people function, but also how empirical research is conducted and interpreted. As Miller (1999) states,

“People act and sound as though they are strongly motivated by their material self-interest because scientific theories and collective representations derived from those theories convince them that it is natural and normal to do so. [...] Interpreting the presence of self-interested behavior to suggest that self-interest is inevitable and universal rather than historically and culturally contingent only serves to strengthen the layperson's belief that pursuing self-interest is normatively appropriate, rational, and enlightened.” (p. 1059)

I do believe that a strength of the studies composing this thesis is that they provide additional, empirical support for the notion that self-interest is a norm. Existing research may suggest that
minorities are more supportive of multiculturalism than majorities because the ideology and policy function in minorities’ best interests (see for example Verkuyten, 2005, 2006). Majorities, conversely, may be threatened by multiculturalism, believing that the ideology and policy function against their best interests (see Badea, Iyer, & Aebischer, 2018; Verkuyten, 2009). However, in taking on a normative perspective, we show that minority support and majority opposition to multiculturalism is contingent on their belief in dominant principles of individual justice, ingrained in Western liberal societies.

The emphasis on context was an important focus of the present thesis. Our final empirical study, in particular, showed the relevance of examining the asymmetric compatibility hypothesis (according to which minorities perceive greater compatibility between individual and collective justice than majorities) in national contexts “differing” in terms of their geopolitical location and implemented policies. While we differentiated between Western and post-communist European countries in particular, one could argue that many, if not most, of these countries are today characterized by liberal political norms (with the exception of some; Hjerm, 2003; Kuzio, 2001). The discussion therefore merits to be expanded to additional contexts that are more consensually “illiberal” (or “nondemocratic”; see Staerklé et al., 2015), where intergroup conflict may be more severe, and where individuals as members of groups may be substantially more fixed in their inherited position in the social hierarchy. How would dominant values and beliefs be associated with justice conceptions and/or policy attitudes in such contexts?

When examining the role played by dominant beliefs and values in shaping how individuals as members of groups view specific policies, Henry and Reyna (2007) suggest that the social groups targeted by these policies need to be considered: It is the groups themselves, over and above the general policies, that are perceived to emulate or violate the values in question. According to these authors, the value-violation explanation extends
beyond prejudice or political ideology. This was the focus of our study which examined antecedents of support for a policy selecting talented migrants (Study 7) and helps introduce my reflections regarding liberal versus illiberal contexts.

Selecting talented migrants can be a means of supporting cultural diversity, but through the lens of dominant individual justice principles of equity and merit. As such, the selection of talented migrants should be supported to the extent that these individuals are perceived as emulating these dominant values (of equity and merit) that are held to the highest standard. When adhering to these dominant values, supporting such a selective policy would be associated with a motive to reinforce the status quo and establish social stability. However, in contexts where norms of individual justice are less important, policies favouring the selection of talented migrants may be viewed differently; as a means, instead, for social change. This may be the case particularly in national contexts that are less liberal or meritocratic and that are more illiberal, nepotistic, or socially stratified. While Western societies are in some ways characterized by social stratification (e.g., the United States is highly meritocratic but also deals with substantial inequality, with a Gini coefficient that is among the highest in the Western world, World Bank, 2016), there are also extreme cases where inequality is explicitly institutionalized - for example, within the Indian caste system. Focusing on the individual and his/her talent in this ideological context may not legitimize the social hierarchy, but may, instead, imply social change.

Many classical social psychological theories are organized around these two basic concepts of social stability and social change. For example, Moscovici’s theory of minority influence suggested that social influence does not always stem from processes of conformity to existing societal norms, implying social stability (see Moscovici, 1976). Instead, through targeted strategies, social influence also stems from minorities, through means of innovation, proposing alternative ideas and implying social change (see also Butera, Falomir-Pichastor,
Mugny, & Quiamzade, 2017; Mugny, 1982; Mugny, Kaiser, Papastamou, & Pérez, 1984). As another example, social identity theory (Tajfel & Turner, 1979) describes the conditions under which minorities are likely to engage in individual mobility, reinforcing the status quo and social stability, or to engage in collective action, contesting the status quo and fighting for social change. The role of ideological context in this theory is indeed crucial (see Ellemers, 1993).

Our results suggest that in Western liberal societies, majorities are more supportive of the selection of talented migrants than minorities. However, in societies characterized by less emphasis on the individual and instead, by impermeability of group boundaries, such a policy might be more strongly endorsed by (disadvantaged) minorities as opposed to (advantaged) majorities. This is because a policy focusing on individuals may, in this context, imply social change. In sum, the same individual justice-based ideology and policy can be endorsed via a motive for social stability or for social change, depending, I believe, on the way individuals (meritocracy; permeability of group boundaries) or groups (social stratification; impermeability of group boundaries) are construed in the national context.

Following this same argument, endorsement of multiculturalism as a group-based approach for managing cultural diversity can also be associated with a motive for social stability rather than social change, depending on the ideological context. Our findings from Studies 1 and 2 seem to illustrate this point from the minority perspective. Results from these studies demonstrated that minorities were most supportive of multiculturalism when they perceived society as abiding by liberal principles of individual responsibility and thus permitting individual mobility. However, (immigrant) minorities were significantly less supportive of multiculturalism (as an ideology, in particular) when their belief that society permits individual mobility was weaker – that is, when they believed society was instead characterized by structural inequalities, implying impermeable boundaries between groups
(see Major et al., 2002; McCoy & Major, 2007). Indeed, if boundaries between groups are impermeable, then minorities may view a greater likelihood of perverse consequences of multicultural ideology, such as segregation and essentialization of groups (see Barry, 2001; Sears, Citrin, Cheleden, & van Laar, 1999). Therefore, in the absence of dominant liberal norms focusing on the individual (and without policies to support these dominant norms; see Ward et al., 2018), multiculturalism may be viewed as a means to strengthen social stability rather than to fight for social change.

In a society which is perceived to be socially stratified, multiculturalism indeed appears to be insufficient to attain social justice for minorities. As suggested by Dovidio, et al. (2016), when groups are excessively emphasized in the national fabric and when “intergroup relations are characterized by tension” (p. 37) individual justice-based approaches to managing cultural diversity such as colorblindness are more appropriate for improving intergroup relations and for positive social change (see also Joppke, 2004). Conversely, multiculturalism, with its emphasis on group-based distinctions, is most appropriate for positive social change when relations between groups are stable and when minorities “are focused on achieving the promised inclusion in society” (Dovidio et al., 2016, p. 37).

The present discussion encompasses a debate within social psychology that has been ongoing for decades. On the one hand, some authors argue that social change is more effectively obtained when focusing on individuals as members of a common group (see for example David & Turner, 1996; Gaertner, Dovidio, Anastasio, Bachman, & Rust, 1993). On the other hand, some argue that social change is more effectively obtained when focusing on distinct subgroups within society (see for example Dixon, Tropp, Durrheim, & Tredoux, 2010; Durrheim, Mtose, & Brown, 2011; Mugny & Papastamou, 1982). Social psychologists and political scientists tend to acknowledge the two faces of approaches focusing on individuals as members of a common group (Knowles et al., 2009; Miller, 1996; Swift &
Marshall, 1997) - that they seek to combat group-based structural inequality but with perverse consequences. These consequences involve, for example, the creation of a normative belief that individuals who struggle to succeed are deserving of their eventual failures, paradoxically reinforcing structural inequalities and social stability (see Gilens, 1999; Staerklé, 2009). At the same time, the focus on groups inherent to multiculturalism has been criticized from a variety of social and political perspectives (see Kymlicka, 2010, for an overview). While social psychological research tends to focus on the benefits of this group-based ideology and policy for positive social change (see Plaut et al., 2018, for an overview), there is also evidence of its perverse consequences, illegitimating, for example, discrimination claims (Gündemir & Galinsky, 2018) and thus creating social stability and a certain “irony of harmony” effect (see Dixon, Tropp, Durrheim, & Tredoux, 2010; Saguy, Tausch, Dovidio, & Pratto, 2009).

The fundamental argument I would like to convey is that the (social stability vs. social change) way in which these individual and group approaches to managing cultural diversity are construed likely depends on the ideological context serving as a point of reference. Indeed, these differential perspectives may be inextricably anchored in the (liberal or illiberal) society or region in which one lives, the (minority or majority) group to which one belongs, and the dominant beliefs with which one identifies.
Conclusion

As I have suggested throughout the present thesis, multiculturalism as a political theory and public policy may have the most positive consequences for intergroup relations in liberal societies where individual justice is the dominant norm. However, a major challenge in these societies is getting members of both minorities and majorities on board to support multicultural initiatives. In chapter 7, Colleen Ward and I argued that it is important to ‘speak the respective languages’ of majority and minority group members when presenting or defending multicultural policies, as the former are more concerned about justice between individuals, and the latter about justice between groups (Ward et al., 2018; see also Gündemir, Homan, Usova, & Galinsky, 2017).

Communication strategies are therefore particularly important when it comes to influencing peoples’ multicultural attitudes. For example, the group-based orientation of multiculturalism (both in terms of recognition and redistribution to reduce social inequalities), as well as its respect for liberal principles of individual justice, can be conveyed in the media and incorporated into educational curricula. In this way, people may be more aware that multiculturalism takes many forms and can involve, for example, affirmative action, dual or triple citizenship, and the celebration of cultural differences via funding for cultural activities and language education. They may also be more aware that these group-based initiatives exist in order to (1) politically/normatively endorse cultural diversity as an (economic) benefit to society and to all groups and cultures, including the dominant one, and (2) to ensure individual freedom for all members of society, including those who are systematically (symbolically and/or economically) disadvantaged. However, the source (e.g., politician, reporter, or teacher) of such messages and their respective group membership is crucial: Existing research shows that social influence may be most effective when a source defends a justice conception that is counter-normative of their group (i.e., national majority members
providing arguments in line with collective justice; cultural minority members providing arguments in line with individual justice; see Politi, Gale, & Staerklé, 2017).

It is nevertheless important to acknowledge that the term multiculturalism is presently tainted in many parts of the world, such as Europe, given the backlash against multiculturalism over recent years (Green & Staerklé, 2013; Joppke, 2014; Lesinska, 2014; Vasta, 2007; Vertovec & Wessendorf, 2010). Perhaps the outrage against multiculturalism and its perverse consequences justifies the introduction of a new term that encapsulates less baggage. “Interculturalism” has been introduced as a possible alternative to multiculturalism, both from a philosophical (Cantle, 2012; Meer & Modood, 2012; Meer, Modood, & Zapata-Barrero, 2016) and social psychological (Verkuyten, 2017, 2018) standpoint. This intergroup ideology is similar to the initial, Canadian definition of multiculturalism (Kymlicka, 2012a), but seems to be an affirmative response to other forms of multiculturalism that place less emphasis on societal unity (see Barrett, 2013). As such, interculturalism may be a viable replacement for European multiculturalism (Cantle, 2012; see also Taylor, 2012), as the European conception of multiculturalism seems to emphasize cultural maintenance and collective justice, with little consideration of cultural adoption, social cohesion and individual justice (Berry & Ward, 2016; Kymlicka, 2012b). Interculturalism might therefore speak to majorities’ concerns about multiculturalism, without neglecting minority needs, in contexts where multiculturalism has taken on a particularly problematic, threatening (see Verkuyten, 2009), exclusionary (for majorities; see Plaut, Garnett, Buffardi, & Sanchez-Burks, 2011) and segregationist connotation. Interculturalism as a term would therefore convey complementarity between individual and collective justice principles in Europe, perhaps responding more successfully to both minority and majority justice concerns.

Analyzing multicultural attitudes as based on individual and collective justice conceptions allows one to view ideological conflict between minorities and majorities through
a constructive lens. It is my view that focusing on alternative, interest-based interpretations of multicultural attitudes is valid in its own right, but is also a risk when their anchoring within a normative context is not acknowledged. Indeed, if individuals are simply motivated by their own (individual or collective; material or symbolic) self-interest, then perspective-taking exercises, for example, seem futile or even detrimental. The encompassing, normative analysis proposed in the present thesis should allow scholars, policy-makers and ordinary people to view disagreements on ideal approaches to managing cultural diversity as based on individuals’ social realities, shaped by their group membership and assumptive (taken for granted) beliefs. This perspective leaves space for empathy and compassion, creating hope that intergroup conflict is surmountable, and that social change is achievable.
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Appendix A

Additional Results

Study 1

Procedure and Materials

Support for multicultural policy and ideology

- A Principal Component Analysis revealed that support for multicultural policy and ideology loaded on separate dimensions (Eigenvalues: $\lambda_{\text{ideology}} = 3.03$ and $\lambda_{\text{policy}} = 1.47$, total variance explained: 64%). A confirmatory factor analysis using Amos version 22 confirmed that a model with two latent variables fit the data reasonably well (CFI = .974, TLI = .958, RMSEA = .062, SRMR = .058, $\chi^2 = 20.105$, $p = .093$).

Hypothesis Testing

- When predicting support for both multicultural policy and ideology, interpretation of results remained identical when controlling for age and gender and when the three citizenship categories were kept separate using orthogonal contrast coding. Indeed, Swiss citizens did not significantly differ from the other two groups in support for multicultural ideology ($p = .114$), nor policy ($p = .062$; although this was a trend). Dual citizens and non-Swiss citizens did not differ either ($p = .335$ for ideology, $p = .175$ for policy). Moreover, Swiss citizens significantly differed from the other two groups in the relationship between individual responsibility belief and support for multicultural ideology ($p < .001$) and policy ($p = .023$) while dual citizens and non-Swiss citizens did not differ in this relationship ($p = .451$, $p = .769$, respectively).

- When controlling for left-right political orientation, the interaction on support for multicultural ideology remained significant ($p < .001$) and for multicultural policy became a trend ($p = .093$).

Study 2

Manipulation Checks

- Two additional checks were conducted to ensure the eight conditions were similar for individual responsibility belief scores, given its use as a moderator, as well as for their sociodemographic makeup. A 3-way ANOVA verified that belief in individual responsibility did not significantly differ between any conditions. Cross tabulations showed that sociodemographic characteristics in all conditions were also similar. The only difference found regarded gender: The proportion of men was comparably high in high status and majority conditions. All analyses were also performed controlling for gender.

Perceived privilege

- A significant interaction ($p = .017$) between conditions showed that low status natives felt significantly more privileged than low status immigrants, while high status natives and immigrants did not differ.
Hypothesis Testing

- When predicting support for multicultural policy, the simple interaction between status and individual responsibility was a trend when control variables were inserted into the model ($p = .071$). When controlling for left-right political orientation, the interaction was just barely non-significant ($p = .112$), but was still in the expected direction ($t(134) = -1.60$; although 59 participants failed to respond to this item, explaining a substantial reduction in statistical power).

- When predicting support for multicultural ideology, the interaction between origin and individual responsibility remained significant when control variables were inserted into the model, including left-right political orientation ($p < .001$).

- Simple effects from the decomposition of the significant simple interaction term on support for multicultural policy showed that when a belief in individual responsibility was stronger, high status group members showed significantly less support than low status group members, 95% CI [-0.47, -0.06], $t(194) = -2.53$, $p = .012$, $d = 0.36$. When a belief in individual responsibility was weaker (i.e., awareness of structural inequalities was stronger), high and low status group members did not significantly differ in their support, 95% CI [-0.17, 0.24], $t(194) = 0.35$, $p = .727$.

- Simple effects from the decomposition of the significant triple interaction term on support for multicultural policy showed that among immigrants, high and low status group members did not significantly differ in their support, regardless of whether their belief in individual responsibility was stronger, $B = -0.23$, 95% CI [-0.51, 0.05], $SE = 0.14$, $t(193) = -1.62$, $p = .107$ or weaker, $B = -0.19$, 95% CI [-0.48, 0.10], $SE = 0.14$, $t(193) = -1.27$, $p = .204$. Among natives, when a belief in individual responsibility was stronger, high status group members supported multicultural policy marginally less than low status group members, $B = -0.29$, 95% CI [-0.58, -0.00], $SE = 0.15$, $t(193) = -2.00$, $p = .047$. When a belief in individual responsibility was weaker, high status group members showed marginally more support than low status group members, $B = 0.25$, 95% CI [-0.03, 0.53], $SE = 0.14$, $t(193) = 1.76$, $p = .081$.

- Simple effects from the decomposition of the significant interaction term on support for multicultural ideology showed that when a belief in individual responsibility was stronger, natives supported multicultural ideology marginally less than immigrants, 95% CI [-0.35, 0.00], $t(194) = -1.94$, $p = .054$, $d = 0.28$. Interestingly, when a belief in individual responsibility was weaker, natives supported multicultural ideology significantly more than immigrants, 95% CI [0.07, 0.42], $t(194) = 2.81$, $p = .006$, $d = 0.40$.

Study 3

Additional Results from the Pilot Study

- In the pilot study, the (descriptive) belief in individual responsibility measure from Study 1 and 2 was significantly correlated with the two new measures, and also with free market ideology ($r = .37$, $p = .003$) and the individual human right to privacy ($r = .33$, $p = .008$), consistent with classical liberalism.
Manipulation Checks
- No differences were found between the four conditions for (prescriptive) individual responsibility and classical liberalism scores (used as moderators), nor for their sociodemographic makeup.

Recall and understanding of the text
- Immigrants also considered themselves to be of marginally lower status than natives ($p = .082$).

Difficulty of the exercise
- No differences were found between the four conditions for (prescriptive) individual responsibility and classical liberalism scores (used as moderators), nor for their sociodemographic makeup.

Hypothesis Testing
- When predicting support for multicultural policy, the triple interaction between individual responsibility, status and origin was a trend when control variables were inserted into the model ($p = .072$). When political orientation was controlled for, the interaction became non-significant ($p = .271$) but was still in the expected direction ($t(102) = -1.11$; although 53 participants failed to respond to this item, explaining a substantial reduction in statistical power).

- When predicting support for multicultural ideology, the interaction between origin and individual responsibility remained significant when control variables were inserted into the model ($p = .038$).

- When predicting support for multicultural ideology, the interaction between origin and classical liberalism was strengthened when control variables were inserted into the model ($p = .036$).

- Simple effects from the decomposition of the significant triple interaction term on support for multicultural policy showed that among immigrants, high and low status group members did not significantly differ in their support, regardless of whether their belief in individual responsibility was stronger, 95% CI [-0.37, 0.19], $t(156) = -0.62, p = .534$ or weaker, 95% CI [-0.43, 0.12], $t(156) = -1.11, p = .268$. Among natives, when a belief in individual responsibility was stronger, high and low status group members did not significantly differ in their support, 95% CI [-0.18, 0.40], $t(156) = 0.78, p = .440$. When a belief in individual responsibility was weaker, high status group members showed significantly more support than low status group members, 95% CI [0.37, 0.98], $t(156) = 4.40, p < .001, d = 0.70$.

- Simple effects from the decomposition of the significant interaction term on support for multicultural ideology showed that when a belief in individual responsibility was stronger, natives supported multicultural ideology less than immigrants, but not significantly, $B = -0.14$, 95% CI [-0.31, 0.04], $SE = 0.09, t(158) = -1.54, p = .125, d = 0.25$. When a belief in individual responsibility was weaker, natives supported multicultural ideology more than immigrants, but not significantly, $B = 0.12$, 95% CI [-0.06, 0.30], $SE = 0.09, t(158) = 1.35, p = .180, d = 0.21$. 

- In additional analyses, simple effects from the decomposition of the marginally significant interaction term on support for multicultural ideology showed that when endorsement of classical liberalism was stronger, natives supported multicultural ideology less than immigrants, but not significantly, $B = -0.13, 95\% \text{ CI}\ [-0.30, 0.05], SE = 0.09, t(158) = -1.45, p = .149, d = 0.23$. When endorsement of classical liberalism was weaker (and so endorsement of communitarianism was stronger), natives supported multicultural ideology more than immigrants, but not significantly, $B = 0.09, 95\% \text{ CI}\ [-0.09, 0.26], SE = 0.09, t(158) = 1.01, p = .314, d = 0.16$. For natives, endorsement of classical liberalism was not associated with support for multicultural ideology, $B = -0.03, 95\% \text{ CI}\ [-0.28, 0.21], SE = 0.12, t(158) = -0.25, p = .802$.

- The interaction term representing the effect of classical liberalism by status on support for multicultural policy was non-significant, $B = -0.03, 95\% \text{ CI}\ [-0.24, 0.19], SE = 0.11, t(158) = -0.25, p = .801$. The triple interaction incorporating origin was also non-significant, $B = 0.09, 95\% \text{ CI}\ [-0.13, 0.30], SE = 0.11, t(156) = 0.80, p = .423$. 

-
Vous allez maintenant lire une description d’une île appelée Ral. Veuillez la lire attentivement, en essayant d’imaginer la vie sur cette île. Nous vous demanderons aussi de vous mettre à la place des habitants de Ral. Essayez alors de penser comme si vous étiez à la place de la personne qui vous est attribuée.

LA VIE SUR L’ÎLE DE RAL


Couvrant une superficie d’environ 1 500 km², l’île de Ral a d’abondantes ressources naturelles : sur la côte nord-ouest se trouve une vaste forêt couvrant des montagnes vallonnées, la partie sud-ouest abrite des fermes et de la végétation, à l’est il y a une rivière provenant de nombreux lacs plein de poissons, et au bord de la mer se trouvent de belles plages. Les Feloreses et les Kaldans partagent l’île en ayant des relations respectueuses entre eux. En effet, les deux populations sont assez répandues à travers l’île et vivent souvent dans des communautés mélangées. Mais bien qu’ils partagent la terre, les Kaldans sont beaucoup plus [moins] nombreux que les Feloreses. En outre, les deux groupes ont aussi des traditions, des langues et des religions différentes, même s’ils suivent les mêmes lois qui sont valables pour tous les habitants de l’île.

Au niveau des conditions de vie, il y a également quelques différences entre les groupes. Par rapport à l’emploi, par exemple, les Kaldans ont presque tous un travail alors que les Feloreses ont souvent plus de difficultés à trouver un emploi. A l’école, les enfants Kaldans réussissent en général mieux que les enfants Feloreses. Il en résulte une certaine inégalité dans la mesure où les conditions de vie de la majorité [minorité] Kaldan sont en général meilleures que celles de la minorité [majorité] Felorese. Lors de sa récente visite sur l’île, le gouverneur de l’île adjacente a remarqué cette tendance, et a proposé une série de mesures afin de rapprocher davantage les conditions de vie des deux groupes. Pour connaître l’avis des habitants de l’île concernant ces mesures, le gouvernement a interrogé la population.

En tant que membre du groupe majoritaire [minoritaire] Kaldan [Felorese], veuillez répondre aux questions de cette enquête.
LA VIE SUR L’ÎLE DE RAL


Couvrant une superficie d’environ 1500 km$^2$, l’île de Ral a d’abondantes ressources naturelles : sur la côte nord-ouest se trouve une vaste forêt couvrant des montagnes vallonnées, la partie sud-ouest abrite des fermes et de la végétation, à l’est il y a une rivière provenant de nombreux lacs plein de poissons, et au bord de la mer se trouvent de belles plages. Les Feloreses et les Kaldans partagent l’île en ayant des relations respectueuses entre eux. En effet, les deux populations sont assez répandues à travers l’île et vivent souvent dans des communautés mélangées. Mais bien qu’ils partagent la terre, les deux groupes ont aussi des traditions, des langues et des religions différentes, même s’ils suivent les mêmes lois qui sont valables pour tous les habitants de l’île.

Au niveau des conditions de vie, il y a également quelques différences entre les groupes. Par rapport à l’emploi, par exemple, les Kaldans ont presque tous un travail alors que les Feloreses ont souvent plus de difficultés à trouver un emploi. A l’école, les enfants Kaldans réussissent en général mieux que les enfants Feloreses. Il en résulte une certaine inégalité dans la mesure où les conditions de vie du groupe originaire [immigré] Kaldan sont en général meilleures que celles du groupe immigré [originaire] Felorese. Lors de sa récente visite sur l’île, le gouverneur de l’île adjacente a remarqué cette tendance, et a proposé une série de mesures afin de rapprocher davantage les conditions de vie des deux groupes. Pour connaître l’avis des habitants de l’île concernant ces mesures, le gouvernement a interrogé la population.

En tant que membre du groupe originaire [immigré] Kaldan [Felorese], veuillez répondre aux questions de cette enquête.
### Appendix B

**Table B1**

*Summary of Mediation Model Results (Unstandardized Coefficients and Standard Errors) for Six Countries Controlling only for Age, Gender and Education*

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Path</th>
<th>a (SE)</th>
<th>b (SE)</th>
<th>c’ (SE)</th>
<th>c (SE)</th>
<th>Indirect effect</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Belgium</td>
<td>-0.12*** (0.02)</td>
<td>0.06 (0.08)</td>
<td>0.07 (0.05)</td>
<td>0.07 (0.05)</td>
<td>x</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Estonia</td>
<td>0.22*** (0.02)</td>
<td>0.39*** (0.08)</td>
<td>0.09 (0.06)</td>
<td>0.01 (0.06)</td>
<td>✔</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lithuania</td>
<td>0.13*** (0.03)</td>
<td>0.39*** (0.07)</td>
<td>0.20* (0.08)</td>
<td>0.15^ (0.08)</td>
<td>✔</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Spain</td>
<td>0.45*** (0.03)</td>
<td>0.31*** (0.09)</td>
<td>-0.04 (0.10)</td>
<td>-0.18^ (0.11)</td>
<td>✔</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Switzerland</td>
<td>0.05** (0.02)</td>
<td>0.47*** (0.12)</td>
<td>0.33*** (0.08)</td>
<td>0.30*** (0.08)</td>
<td>✔</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UK</td>
<td>0.09** (0.03)</td>
<td>0.04 (0.06)</td>
<td>0.25** (0.07)</td>
<td>0.24** (0.07)</td>
<td>x</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Note.* Paths refer to those shown in Figure 13. Groups systematically coded so that the majority (bigger) group is coded as 1 and the minority (smaller) group is coded as -1. Gender, age, education included as control variables. *** *p < .001, ** *p < .01, * *p < .05, ^ *p < .10.*
Table B2

*Summary of Mediation Model Results (Omnibus Tests) for Six Countries, Controlling only for Age, Gender and Education*

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Path</th>
<th>a</th>
<th>b &amp; c</th>
<th>c'</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>$F$ statistic ($df$)</td>
<td>$R^2$</td>
<td>$F$ statistic ($df$)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Belgium</td>
<td>31.00*** (4,1555)</td>
<td>.074</td>
<td>8.53*** (5,1554)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Estonia</td>
<td>71.15*** (4,1608)</td>
<td>.150</td>
<td>21.60*** (5,1607)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lithuania</td>
<td>11.43*** (4,2098)</td>
<td>.021</td>
<td>13.28*** (5,2097)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Spain</td>
<td>107.70*** (4,1651)</td>
<td>.207</td>
<td>9.420*** (5,1650)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Switzerland</td>
<td>16.61*** (4,1079)</td>
<td>.058</td>
<td>13.32*** (5,1078)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UK</td>
<td>53.22*** (4,1835)</td>
<td>.104</td>
<td>9.19*** (5,1834)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Note.* Paths refer to those shown in Figure 13. As a reminder, ‘a’ refers to the model containing the effect of group membership on national identification, ‘b’ & ‘c’ refer to the model containing the effects of group membership *and* national identification on support for an individualized immigration policy, and ‘c’’ refers to the total effect model containing only the effect of group membership on support for an individualized immigration policy. As such, when $R^2$ has a higher value in the model containing ‘b & c’ than in the model containing only ‘c’’, the mediator (i.e., national identification) adds explanatory value. *** $p < .001$
Table B3

*Summary of Mediation Model Results (Omnibus Tests) for Six Countries Controlling for Age, Gender, Education, Support for Multiculturalism and Support for a Restrictive Immigration Policy*

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Path</th>
<th>a F statistic (df)</th>
<th>$R^2$</th>
<th>b &amp; c F statistic (df)</th>
<th>$R^2$</th>
<th>c' F statistic (df)</th>
<th>$R^2$</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Belgium</td>
<td>21.45*** (6,1553)</td>
<td>.077</td>
<td>32.89*** (7,1552)</td>
<td>.126</td>
<td>37.26*** (6,1553)</td>
<td>.126</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Estonia</td>
<td>47.89*** (6,1606)</td>
<td>.152</td>
<td>21.82*** (7,1605)</td>
<td>.087</td>
<td>21.42*** (6,1606)</td>
<td>.074</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lithuania</td>
<td>8.21*** (6,2096)</td>
<td>.023</td>
<td>20.90*** (7,2095)</td>
<td>.065</td>
<td>18.56*** (6,2096)</td>
<td>.051</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Spain</td>
<td>75.74*** (6,1649)</td>
<td>.216</td>
<td>28.69*** (7,1648)</td>
<td>.109</td>
<td>32.14*** (6,1649)</td>
<td>.105</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Switzerland</td>
<td>12.90*** (6,1077)</td>
<td>.067</td>
<td>25.80*** (7,1076)</td>
<td>.144</td>
<td>28.20*** (6,1077)</td>
<td>.136</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UK</td>
<td>53.09*** (6,1833)</td>
<td>.148</td>
<td>52.07*** (7,1832)</td>
<td>.166</td>
<td>56.99*** (6,1833)</td>
<td>.157</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Note.* Paths refer to those shown in Figure 13. As a reminder, ‘a’ refers to the model containing the effect of group membership on national identification, ‘b’ & ’c’ refer to the model containing the effects of group membership and national identification on support for an individualized immigration policy, and ‘c’’ refers to the total effect model containing only the effect of group membership on support for an individualized immigration policy. As such, when $R^2$ has a higher value in the model containing ‘b & c’ than in the model containing only ‘c’’, the mediator (i.e., national identification) adds explanatory value. *** $p < .001$
### Table C1: Country-by-Country Regressions

#### Preliminary Analyses

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Austria B (SE)</th>
<th>Belgium B (SE)</th>
<th>Switzerland B (SE)</th>
<th>Czech Republic B (SE)</th>
<th>Germany B (SE)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>IndivPol</td>
<td>-0.33*** (0.02)</td>
<td>-0.29*** (0.02)</td>
<td>-0.15*** (0.02)</td>
<td>-0.09*** (0.02)</td>
<td>-0.25*** (0.01)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MajoMino</td>
<td>-0.44*** (0.09)</td>
<td>-0.32*** (0.08)</td>
<td>-0.12^ (0.07)</td>
<td>-0.53*** (0.13)</td>
<td>-0.08 (0.07)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Interaction</td>
<td>-0.02 (0.05)</td>
<td>-0.10* (0.04)</td>
<td>-0.08** (0.03)</td>
<td>0.18* (0.07)</td>
<td>0.01 (0.03)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$F$ (df) Step 2</td>
<td>88.65*** (7,1763)</td>
<td>55.13*** (7,1753)</td>
<td>33.55*** (7,1509)</td>
<td>19.01*** (7,1954)</td>
<td>85.59*** (7,3008)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Denmark B (SE)</th>
<th>Estonia B (SE)</th>
<th>Spain B (SE)</th>
<th>Finland B (SE)</th>
<th>France B (SE)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>IndivPol</td>
<td>-0.25*** (0.02)</td>
<td>-0.02 (0.02)</td>
<td>-0.21*** (0.02)</td>
<td>-0.22*** (0.02)</td>
<td>-0.27*** (0.02)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MajoMino</td>
<td>-0.20^ (0.10)</td>
<td>-0.01 (0.04)</td>
<td>-0.04 (0.14)</td>
<td>-0.38** (0.12)</td>
<td>-0.26** (0.09)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Interaction</td>
<td>-0.18*** (0.04)</td>
<td>0.00 (0.02)</td>
<td>0.01 (0.07)</td>
<td>-0.06 (0.06)</td>
<td>-0.01 (0.04)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$F$ (df) Step 2</td>
<td>45.50*** (7,1480)</td>
<td>25.36*** (7,1987)</td>
<td>66.95*** (7,1797)</td>
<td>60.86*** (7,2062)</td>
<td>65.15*** (7,1865)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>United Kingdom B (SE)</th>
<th>Hungary B (SE)</th>
<th>Ireland B (SE)</th>
<th>Lithuania B (SE)</th>
<th>Netherlands B (SE)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>IndivPol</td>
<td>-0.42*** (0.02)</td>
<td>-0.23*** (0.02)</td>
<td>-0.24*** (0.02)</td>
<td>-0.10*** (0.02)</td>
<td>-0.23*** (0.02)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MajoMino</td>
<td>-0.36*** (0.06)</td>
<td>0.00 (0.08)</td>
<td>-0.11 (0.10)</td>
<td>-0.14* (0.06)</td>
<td>-0.33*** (0.06)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Interaction</td>
<td>-0.07* (0.03)</td>
<td>0.00 (0.04)</td>
<td>0.03 (0.05)</td>
<td>0.03 (0.04)</td>
<td>-0.07* (0.03)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$F$ (df) Step 2</td>
<td>120.10*** (7,2211)</td>
<td>26.00*** (6,1679)</td>
<td>69.55*** (7,2339)</td>
<td>21.05*** (7,2118)</td>
<td>53.23*** (7,1887)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Norway B (SE)</th>
<th>Poland B (SE)</th>
<th>Portugal B (SE)</th>
<th>Sweden B (SE)</th>
<th>Slovenia B (SE)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>IndivPol</td>
<td>-0.22*** (0.02)</td>
<td>-0.06** (0.02)</td>
<td>-0.02 (0.02)</td>
<td>-0.25*** (0.02)</td>
<td>-0.21*** (0.02)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MajoMino</td>
<td>-0.27** (0.08)</td>
<td>-0.13 (0.22)</td>
<td>-0.24 (0.17)</td>
<td>-0.44** (0.08)</td>
<td>-0.37** (0.14)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Interaction</td>
<td>-0.08* (0.03)</td>
<td>-0.12 (0.11)</td>
<td>-0.20* (0.09)</td>
<td>-0.07* (0.03)</td>
<td>-0.03 (0.07)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$F$ (df) Step 2</td>
<td>48.27*** (7,1425)</td>
<td>12.78*** (6,1652)</td>
<td>26.39*** (7,1220)</td>
<td>86.25*** (7,1761)</td>
<td>32.85*** (7,1207)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Note.* ***$p < .001$, **$p < .01$, *$p < .05$*, $^p < .10$  
Effects of control variables (gender, age, education and citizenship) were included in the models but are not presented in the table.  
IndivPol, MajoMino and control variables inserted in step 1; Interaction inserted in step 2 ($F$ statistic refers to the final model).  
IndivPol: Individualized immigration policy support; group-mean centred.  
MajoMino: Majority (coded 1) vs. Ethnic minority (coded -1).  
Interaction: MajoMino*IndivPol
Table C2
Preliminary Analyses Using Alternative Citizenship Indicator and 2002 ESS data: Coefficients (and Standard Errors) for Random Intercepts and Random Slopes Models Predicting Support for Multiculturalism

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Citizenship as majority/minority group membership</th>
<th>2002 ESS data</th>
<th>Random slopes model</th>
<th>B (SE)</th>
<th>Random intercepts model</th>
<th>B (SE)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Random intercepts model</td>
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<tr>
<td>Intercept</td>
<td>5.107***</td>
<td>5.196***</td>
<td></td>
<td>5.283***</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Individual level</td>
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<tr>
<td>IndivPol</td>
<td>-0.143***</td>
<td>-0.143***</td>
<td></td>
<td>-0.147***</td>
<td>-0.137***</td>
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<tr>
<td>MajoMino</td>
<td>-0.368***</td>
<td>-0.456***</td>
<td></td>
<td>-0.237***</td>
<td>-0.219***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MajoMino*IndivPol</td>
<td>-0.074***</td>
<td>-0.070***</td>
<td></td>
<td>-0.038**</td>
<td>-0.041**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Residuals (individual level)</td>
<td>2.347***</td>
<td>2.296***</td>
<td></td>
<td>2.140***</td>
<td>2.114***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Intercept (country level)</td>
<td>0.201*</td>
<td>0.123*</td>
<td></td>
<td>0.233*</td>
<td>0.190**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IndivPol</td>
<td>0.006**</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>0.004*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MajoMino</td>
<td>0.073***</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>0.038**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MajoMino * IndivPol</td>
<td>0.002 (0.001)</td>
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<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>AIC</td>
<td>234040.107</td>
<td>233352.847</td>
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<td>228816.433</td>
<td>228457.769</td>
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</table>

Variance components

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>2002 ESS data</th>
<th>Random slopes model</th>
<th>B (SE)</th>
<th>Random intercepts model</th>
<th>B (SE)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>
| Null model using citizenship as majority/minority group membership same as reported model. Null model 2002 ESS data ICC 0.097; country-level variance $B$ = 0.264, $SE$ = 0.106, $p$ = .013; individual-level variance $B$ = 2.459, $SE$ = 0.111, $p$ < .001.
Effects of control variables (gender, age, education and citizenship) were included in the model but are not presented in the table.
IndivPol: Individualized immigration policy support; group-mean centred.
MajoMino: Majority (coded 1) vs. Ethnic minority (coded -1).
Table C3
Step-by-Step Coefficients (and Standard Errors) from Random Intercepts Model to Multilevel Models (with Equality Policies at the Country Level)
Predicting Support for Multiculturalism

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Random intercepts model</th>
<th>Random slopes model</th>
<th>Level 2 model step 1</th>
<th>Level 2 model step 2</th>
<th>Level 2 model step 3</th>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>( B ) ( (SE) )</td>
<td>( B ) ( (SE) )</td>
<td>( B ) ( (SE) )</td>
<td>( B ) ( (SE) )</td>
<td>( B ) ( (SE) )</td>
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<tr>
<td>Intercept</td>
<td>5.214*** (0.155)</td>
<td>5.286*** (0.122)</td>
<td>5.284*** (0.116)</td>
<td>5.282*** (0.115)</td>
<td>5.280*** (0.111)</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Individual level</strong></td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>IndivPol</td>
<td>-0.169*** (0.025)</td>
<td>-0.168*** (0.022)</td>
<td>-0.168*** (0.021)</td>
<td>-0.169*** (0.021)</td>
<td>-0.169*** (0.022)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MajoMino</td>
<td>-0.181** (0.057)</td>
<td>-0.240*** (0.031)</td>
<td>-0.237*** (0.030)</td>
<td>-0.234*** (0.029)</td>
<td>-0.233*** (0.029)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MajoMino*IndivPol</td>
<td>-0.043** (0.014)</td>
<td>-0.039** (0.013)</td>
<td>-0.038** (0.012)</td>
<td>-0.038** (0.012)</td>
<td>-0.038** (0.012)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Country level</strong></td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>EQPol</td>
<td></td>
<td>0.003 (0.006)</td>
<td>0.004 (0.006)</td>
<td>0.007 (0.006)</td>
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<tr>
<td>IndivPol * EQPol</td>
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<td>0.000 (0.001)</td>
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<tr>
<td>MajoMino * EQPol</td>
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<td>-0.003^ (0.002)</td>
<td>-0.003* (0.002)</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>MajoMino * IndivPol * EQPol</td>
<td></td>
<td>-0.001^ (0.001)</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Variance components</strong></td>
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<tr>
<td>Residuals (individual level)</td>
<td>2.344*** (0.090)</td>
<td>2.302*** (0.083)</td>
<td>2.302*** (0.083)</td>
<td>2.302*** (0.083)</td>
<td>2.302*** (0.083)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Intercept (country level)</td>
<td>0.203** (0.077)</td>
<td>0.189* (0.085)</td>
<td>0.180* (0.086)</td>
<td>0.182* (0.085)</td>
<td>0.175* (0.083)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IndivPol</td>
<td>0.008** (0.003)</td>
<td>0.008** (0.003)</td>
<td>0.007* (0.003)</td>
<td>0.008* (0.003)</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>MajoMino</td>
<td>0.027** (0.009)</td>
<td>0.027** (0.009)</td>
<td>0.022** (0.008)</td>
<td>0.021** (0.008)</td>
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<tr>
<td>MajoMino * IndivPol</td>
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<td>0.001 (0.001)</td>
<td>0.001 (0.001)</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>AIC</td>
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<td>236303.512</td>
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</table>

Note. ***\( p < .001 \), **\( p < .01 \), *\( p < .05 \), ^\( p < .10 \)

Effects of control variables (gender, age, education and citizenship at level 1) were included in the model but are not presented in the table. No additional level 2 variables were incorporated into this model.

IndivPol: Individualized immigration policy support; group-mean centred.

MajoMino: Majority (coded 1) vs. Ethnic minority (coded -1).

EQPol: Equality policies mean centred.
Table C4
Step-by-Step Coefficients (and Standard Errors) from Random Intercepts Model to Multilevel Models (Distinguishing Western vs. Post-Communist Countries at the Country Level) Predicting Support for Multiculturalism

<table>
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<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Random intercepts model B (SE)</th>
<th>Random slopes model B (SE)</th>
<th>Level 2 model step 1 B (SE)</th>
<th>Level 2 model step 2 B (SE)</th>
<th>Level 2 model Step 3 B (SE)</th>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Individual level</strong></td>
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<td></td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Intercept</td>
<td>5.214*** (0.155)</td>
<td>5.286*** (0.122)</td>
<td>5.180*** (0.121)</td>
<td>5.196*** (0.116)</td>
<td>5.167*** (0.114)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IndivPol</td>
<td>-0.169*** (0.025)</td>
<td>-0.168*** (0.022)</td>
<td>-0.168*** (0.022)</td>
<td>-0.151*** (0.021)</td>
<td>-0.156*** (0.022)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MajoMino</td>
<td>-0.181** (0.057)</td>
<td>-0.240*** (0.031)</td>
<td>-0.237*** (0.029)</td>
<td>-0.200*** (0.038)</td>
<td>-0.196*** (0.038)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MajoMino*IndivPol</td>
<td>-0.043** (0.014)</td>
<td>-0.039** (0.013)</td>
<td>-0.038** (0.013)</td>
<td>-0.038** (0.013)</td>
<td>-0.027* (0.011)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Country level</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EastWest</td>
<td></td>
<td>0.257** (0.090)</td>
<td>0.203* (0.087)</td>
<td>0.272** (0.101)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IndivPol * EastWest</td>
<td></td>
<td>-0.045* (0.019)</td>
<td>-0.028 (0.021)</td>
<td></td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>MajoMino * EastWest</td>
<td></td>
<td>-0.085^ (0.050)</td>
<td>-0.090^ (0.048)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MajoMino * IndivPol * EastWest</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>-0.029** (0.010)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Variance components</strong></td>
<td></td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Residuals (individual level)</td>
<td>2.344*** (0.090)</td>
<td>2.302*** (0.083)</td>
<td>2.302*** (0.083)</td>
<td>2.302*** (0.083)</td>
<td>2.302*** (0.083)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Intercept (country level)</td>
<td>0.203** (0.077)</td>
<td>0.189* (0.085)</td>
<td>0.138* (0.062)</td>
<td>0.130* (0.059)</td>
<td>0.129* (0.060)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IndivPol</td>
<td>0.008** (0.003)</td>
<td>0.008** (0.003)</td>
<td>0.006* (0.003)</td>
<td>0.006* (0.003)</td>
<td>0.006* (0.003)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MajoMino</td>
<td>0.027** (0.009)</td>
<td>0.026** (0.009)</td>
<td>0.020** (0.006)</td>
<td>0.021** (0.006)</td>
<td>0.021** (0.006)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MajoMino * IndivPol</td>
<td>0.001 (0.001)</td>
<td>0.001 (0.001)</td>
<td>0.001 (0.001)</td>
<td>0.000 (0.001)</td>
<td>0.000 (0.001)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AIC</td>
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<td>236303.512</td>
<td>236296.868</td>
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</table>

Note. ***p < .001, **p < .01, *p < .05, ^p < .10
Effects of control variables (gender, age, education and citizenship at level 1) were included in the model but are not presented in the table. No additional level 2 variables were incorporated into this model.
IndivPol: Individualized immigration policy support; group-mean centred.
MajoMino: Majority (coded 1) vs. Ethnic minority (coded -1).
EastWest: Eastern (coded -1) vs. Western (coded 1) European countries.
Table C5
Step-by-Step Coefficients (and Standard Errors) from Random Intercepts Model to Multilevel Models Predicting Support for Multiculturalism (2-item Measure)

<table>
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<th>Level 2 model step 2</th>
<th>Level 2 model Step 3</th>
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<td>B (SE)</td>
<td>B (SE)</td>
<td>B (SE)</td>
<td>B (SE)</td>
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<tr>
<td>Intercept</td>
<td>5.821*** (0.177)</td>
<td>5.890*** (0.152)</td>
<td>5.740*** (0.107)</td>
<td>5.757*** (0.087)</td>
<td>5.737*** (0.099)</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Individual level</strong></td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>IndivPol</td>
<td>-0.224*** (0.025)</td>
<td>-0.221*** (0.022)</td>
<td>-0.222*** (0.022)</td>
<td>-0.201*** (0.018)</td>
<td>-0.219*** (0.021)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MajoMino</td>
<td>-0.211*** (0.061)</td>
<td>-0.265*** (0.040)</td>
<td>-0.268*** (0.039)</td>
<td>-0.243*** (0.045)</td>
<td>-0.239*** (0.044)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MajoMino*IndivPol</td>
<td>-0.054*** (0.15)</td>
<td>-0.051*** (0.013)</td>
<td>-0.049** (0.015)</td>
<td>-0.050*** (0.014)</td>
<td>-0.027 (0.016)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Country level</strong></td>
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<tr>
<td>EQPol</td>
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<td>0.008 (0.006)</td>
<td>0.008 (0.006)</td>
<td>0.008 (0.006)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EastWest</td>
<td></td>
<td>0.378** (0.118)</td>
<td>0.348*** (0.085)</td>
<td>0.394*** (0.097)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IndivPol * EQPol</td>
<td></td>
<td>0.000 (0.001)</td>
<td>0.000 (0.001)</td>
<td>0.000 (0.001)</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>IndivPol * EastWest</td>
<td></td>
<td>-0.052** (0.015)</td>
<td>-0.032 (0.019)</td>
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<tr>
<td>MajoMino * EQPol</td>
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<td>-0.004 (0.002)</td>
<td>-0.04 (0.002)</td>
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<tr>
<td>MajoMino * EastWest</td>
<td></td>
<td>-0.076^ (0.046)</td>
<td>-0.079 (0.049)</td>
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<tr>
<td>MajoMino * IndivPol * EQPol</td>
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<td>0.000 (0.001)</td>
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<tr>
<td>MajoMino * IndivPol * EastWest</td>
<td></td>
<td>-0.033* (0.014)</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Variance components</strong></td>
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<tr>
<td>Residuals (individual level)</td>
<td>3.680*** (0.133)</td>
<td>3.624*** (0.122)</td>
<td>3.624*** (0.122)</td>
<td>3.625*** (0.122)</td>
<td>3.625*** (0.122)</td>
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<tr>
<td>Intercept (country level)</td>
<td>0.351* (0.136)</td>
<td>0.342* (0.153)</td>
<td>0.179* (0.087)</td>
<td>0.175* (0.083)</td>
<td>0.173^ (0.092)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IndivPol</td>
<td>0.010* (0.004)</td>
<td>0.009* (0.004)</td>
<td>0.005^ (0.003)</td>
<td>0.007 (0.008)</td>
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<tr>
<td>MajoMino</td>
<td>0.031** (0.009)</td>
<td>0.028** (0.009)</td>
<td>0.012 (0.009)</td>
<td>0.012 (0.010)</td>
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<tr>
<td>MajoMino * IndivPol</td>
<td>0.002 (0.001)</td>
<td>0.002 (0.002)</td>
<td>0.002 (0.001)</td>
<td>0.000 (0.005)</td>
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<tr>
<td>AIC</td>
<td>253420.925</td>
<td>252966.564</td>
<td>252958.581</td>
<td>252954.571</td>
<td>252953.698</td>
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Note. ***p < .001, **p < .01, *p < .05, ^p < .10
Null model ICC 0.087; country-level variance B = 0.407, SE = 0.149, p = .006; individual-level variance B = 4.274, SE = 0.182, p < .001.
Effects of control variables (gender, age, education and citizenship at level 1; proportion of majorities to minorities at level 2) were included in the model but are not presented in the table.
IndivPol: Individualized immigration policy support; group-mean centred.
MajoMino: Majority (coded 1) vs. Ethnic minority (coded -1).
EQPol: Equality policies mean centred.
EastWest: Post-Communist (coded -1) vs. Western (coded 1) European countries.
Table C6
Step-by-Step Coefficients (and Standard Errors) from Random Intercepts Model to Multilevel Models Predicting Support for Multiculturalism, Controlling for GDP

<table>
<thead>
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<th>Random intercepts model</th>
<th>Random slopes model</th>
<th>Level 2 model step 1</th>
<th>Level 2 model step 2</th>
<th>Level 2 model step 3</th>
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<td>B (SE)</td>
<td>B (SE)</td>
<td>B (SE)</td>
<td>B (SE)</td>
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<tr>
<td>Intercept</td>
<td>5.214*** (0.155)</td>
<td>5.286*** (0.122)</td>
<td>5.193*** (0.118)</td>
<td>5.190*** (0.116)</td>
<td>5.162*** (0.117)</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>IndivPol</td>
<td>-0.169*** (0.025)</td>
<td>-0.168*** (0.022)</td>
<td>-0.168*** (0.022)</td>
<td>-0.161*** (0.019)</td>
<td>-0.166*** (0.021)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MajoMino</td>
<td>-0.181** (0.057)</td>
<td>-0.240*** (0.031)</td>
<td>-0.237*** (0.029)</td>
<td>-0.198*** (0.041)</td>
<td>-0.193*** (0.040)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MajoMino*IndivPol</td>
<td>-0.043** (0.014)</td>
<td>-0.039** (0.013)</td>
<td>-0.039** (0.013)</td>
<td>-0.038** (0.012)</td>
<td>-0.027** (0.010)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Country level</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>EQPol</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>EastWest</td>
<td></td>
<td>0.224* (0.091)</td>
<td>0.217* (0.108)</td>
<td>0.284* (0.122)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IndivPol * EQPol</td>
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<td>-0.001 (0.001)</td>
<td>-0.001 (0.001)</td>
<td>-0.001 (0.001)</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>IndivPol * EastWest</td>
<td></td>
<td>-0.018 (0.019)</td>
<td>0.001 (0.024)</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>MajoMino * EQPol</td>
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<td>-0.003 (0.002)</td>
<td>-0.003 (0.002)</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>MajoMino * EastWest</td>
<td></td>
<td>-0.086^ (0.051)</td>
<td>-0.093* (0.049)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MajoMino * IndivPol * EQPol</td>
<td></td>
<td>0.000 (0.000)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MajoMino * IndivPol * EastWest</td>
<td></td>
<td>0.000 (0.000)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Variance components</td>
<td></td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Residuals (individual level)</td>
<td>2.344*** (0.090)</td>
<td>2.302*** (0.083)</td>
<td>2.302*** (0.083)</td>
<td>2.302*** (0.083)</td>
<td>2.302*** (0.083)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Residuals (country level)</td>
<td>0.203** (0.077)</td>
<td>0.189* (0.085)</td>
<td>0.144* (0.067)</td>
<td>0.124* (0.052)</td>
<td>0.117* (0.051)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IndivPol</td>
<td>0.008** (0.003)</td>
<td>0.008** (0.003)</td>
<td>0.004^ (0.002)</td>
<td>0.005* (0.003)</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>MajoMino</td>
<td>0.027** (0.009)</td>
<td>0.027** (0.009)</td>
<td>0.016* (0.007)</td>
<td>0.016* (0.007)</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>MajoMino * IndivPol</td>
<td>0.001 (0.001)</td>
<td>0.001 (0.001)</td>
<td>0.001 (0.001)</td>
<td>0.000 (0.001)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AIC</td>
<td>236854.273</td>
<td>236303.512</td>
<td>236297.784</td>
<td>236294.006</td>
<td>236291.566</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note. ***p < .001, **p < .01, *p < .05, ^p < .10

Effects of control variables (gender, age, education and citizenship at level 1; GDP at level 2) were included in the model but are not presented in the table.

GDP consistently had no effect, except for the cross-level interaction between GDP and IndivPol which was positive and significant (p = .018). This effect suggests that in more wealthy countries, the negative relationship between IndivPol and support for multiculturalism is particularly strong. It also suggests that this negative relationship is better explained by GDP than by the geopolitical location of Western versus post-communist countries.

IndivPol: Individualized immigration policy support; group-mean centred.

MajoMino: Majority (coded 1) vs. Ethnic minority (coded -1).

EQPol: Equality policies mean centred.

EastWest: Post-Communist (coded -1) vs. Western (coded 1) European countries.
<table>
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<th>Level 2 model</th>
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<td>model</td>
<td>model</td>
<td>step 1</td>
<td>step 2</td>
<td>step 3</td>
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<tr>
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<td>$B$ ($SE$)</td>
<td>$B$ ($SE$)</td>
<td>$B$ ($SE$)</td>
<td>$B$ ($SE$)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Intercept</strong></td>
<td>5.214*** (0.155)</td>
<td>5.286*** (0.122)</td>
<td>5.181*** (0.123)</td>
<td>5.197*** (0.121)</td>
<td>5.177*** (0.121)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Individual level</strong></td>
<td></td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>IndivPol</td>
<td>-0.169*** (0.025)</td>
<td>-0.168*** (0.022)</td>
<td>-0.168*** (0.021)</td>
<td>-0.153*** (0.020)</td>
<td>-0.156*** (0.022)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MajoMino</td>
<td>-0.181** (0.057)</td>
<td>-0.240*** (0.031)</td>
<td>-0.237*** (0.030)</td>
<td>-0.206*** (0.043)</td>
<td>-0.204*** (0.041)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MajoMino*IndivPol</td>
<td>-0.043** (0.014)</td>
<td>-0.039** (0.013)</td>
<td>-0.039** (0.012)</td>
<td>-0.038** (0.013)</td>
<td>-0.030* (0.013)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Country level</strong></td>
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<tr>
<td>EQPol</td>
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<tr>
<td>EastWest</td>
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<tr>
<td>IndivPol * EQPol</td>
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<tr>
<td>IndivPol * EastWest</td>
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<tr>
<td>MajoMino * EQPol</td>
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<tr>
<td>MajoMino * EastWest</td>
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<tr>
<td>MajoMino * IndivPol * EQPol</td>
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<tr>
<td>MajoMino * IndivPol * EastWest</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Variance components</strong></td>
<td></td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Residuals (individual level)</td>
<td>2.344*** (0.090)</td>
<td>2.302*** (0.083)</td>
<td>2.302*** (0.083)</td>
<td>2.302*** (0.083)</td>
<td>2.302*** (0.083)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Residuals (country level)</td>
<td>0.203** (0.077)</td>
<td>0.189* (0.085)</td>
<td>0.132* (0.059)</td>
<td>0.123* (0.052)</td>
<td>0.119* (0.052)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IndivPol</td>
<td>0.008*** (0.003)</td>
<td>0.008*** (0.003)</td>
<td>0.006* (0.003)</td>
<td>0.006* (0.003)</td>
<td>0.006* (0.003)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MajoMino</td>
<td>0.027** (0.009)</td>
<td>0.027** (0.009)</td>
<td>0.015** (0.006)</td>
<td>0.015** (0.006)</td>
<td>0.015** (0.006)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MajoMino * IndivPol</td>
<td>0.001 (0.001)</td>
<td>0.001 (0.001)</td>
<td>0.001 (0.001)</td>
<td>0.001 (0.001)</td>
<td>0.001 (0.001)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>AIC</strong></td>
<td>236854.273</td>
<td>236303.512</td>
<td>236298.683</td>
<td>236298.424</td>
<td>236296.080</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Note.***p < .001, **p < .01, *p < .05, ^p < .10
Effects of control variables (gender, age, education and citizenship at level 1; GINI at level 2) were included in the model but are not presented in the table.

GINI had no significant effects.
IndivPol: Individualized immigration policy support; group-mean centred.
MajoMino: Majority (coded 1) vs. Ethnic minority (coded -1).
EQPol: Equality policies mean centred.
EastWest: Post-Communist (coded -1) vs. Western (coded 1) European countries.