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

Routledge Handbook of the Olympic and Paralympic Games

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14

Towards a shared Olympic responsibility

Paradoxes and challenges

Aurélien François, Alain Ferrand and Emmanuel Bayle

Introduction: sustainability as a foundation stone for Olympic Social Responsibility

> "The less people believe in the future the more they want to know about the future. This means for us that they want to know more about the sustainability of Olympic Games and all our actions; that they want to know better about our governance and finances; that they want to know how we are living up to our values and our social responsibility."
>
> *Speech given by IOC President Thomas Bach during the opening ceremony for the 127th Session of the IOC in Monaco on 7 December 2014*

When International Olympic Committee (IOC) President Thomas Bach said social responsibility within the Olympic movement was an essential responsibility for Olympism, his words were not chosen idly. In his speech, later printed as the preface to the IOC's Olympic Agenda 2020 (IOC, 2014), Bach referred to the concept of corporate and/or organisational social responsibility, which was first formulated in the early 1950s (Bowen, 1953). According to the ISO 26000 standard, organisations deploy social responsibility in order to "contribute to sustainable development" (International Organization for Standardization, 2014). Although this definition of social responsibility is vague, it is widely accepted and, most importantly, it extends the compass of social responsibility from large corporations to all types of organisations (Bayle et al., 2011). Consequently, it is the definition we have adopted here. Given Olympism's fundamental principles and the IOC's vision, role and position as leader of the international sports movement, the de facto head of world sport must be seen to be socially responsible in the way it addresses the social, economic and environmental impacts of its activities.

Thomas Bach's speech was unusual because the Olympic world rarely employs the term social responsibility, even though it has been a fundamental principle of the Olympic Charter since 2011. According to the Charter, Olympism "seeks to create a way of life based on the joy of effort, the educational value of good example, social responsibility and respect for universal fundamental ethical principles" (IOC, 2017).[1] However, recent usage of the term and its addition

to the charter are not at all indicative of the way the Olympic movement initially embraced this concept. In fact, the IOC appears to have practiced, albeit implicitly, a form of Olympic Social Responsibility (OSR) from its earliest days. For example, after reviving the Olympic Games (OG) in 1896, the IOC began addressing matters related to education, societal problems and even peace (Chappelet, 2009, 2011). By 1910, Pierre de Coubertin, the father of the modern OG, was arguing that sport had the power to resolve what he called "the social problem" by integrating the working class into society. Doing so involved addressing some of the scourges of the time, such as illiteracy and alcoholism (Clastres, 2018). This leitmotiv continued over the years, with Olympism's responsibilities expanding as the IOC and the Olympic movement grew. Thus, in 1994, 100 years after the IOC was founded, the environment became the third pillar of Olympism, alongside sport and culture. Following the 1992 Rio Summit, the UN began citing sport and Olympism, via the IOC, as vectors that could help address some of the late 20th-century's greatest societal problems. It was in this context that, in 1999, the IOC drew up its Agenda 21 for the Olympic movement, entitled "Sport for Sustainable Development". One of the key aspects of this strategy was to "encourage members of the Movement to play an active part in the sustainable development of our planet" (IOC, 1999). For the IOC, sustainable development became an umbrella term that covers all of its social responsibility initiatives, and the term "social responsibility" began disappearing from its strategy documents in the mid-2010s (Bayle, 2016). Today, all of the IOC's social initiatives are subsumed within the notion of sustainability, which is both one of the three pillars of Olympic Agenda 2020, alongside credibility and youth (IOC, 2014), and the subject of its Sustainability Strategy (IOC, 2016a). This strategy was greatly influenced by the United Nations' (UN) sustainable development goals, as can be seen by the IOC's promise to contribute to 17 of them, mostly those targeting poverty, climate change and injustice.

In view of the IOC's rhetoric and ambitious promises, the present chapter takes a closer look at Olympic Social Responsibility (OSR), as pursued under the IOC's sustainability strategy. We will do so by analysing the internal documents in which the IOC describes this strategy, which we will then assess in the light of the organisation's objective of sharing its social responsibility. We begin by bringing together the notions of OSR and shared social responsibility (SSR), a conceptual extension of social responsibility that, when combined with Olympism, allowed us to define a form of shared OSR. We then examine the difficulties involved in implementing such a shared OSR and highlight the paradoxes the Olympic movement will have to overcome in order to ensure all its members 'share' its vision of sustainability (IOC, 2016a). This final section not only reiterates the importance of consistency between words and deeds, it also stresses the need for the IOC to have sufficient influence over its stakeholders to ensure they work in concert to help build a better world.

The need for a shared Olympic Social Responsibility: emergence and definition of shared social responsibility

The concept of SSR first emerged at the end of the 2000s in response to questions from European Union governments about the sustainability of Europe's societal models. In 2009, the Council of Europe put together an ad hoc committee of experts to consider possible new solutions to the social, economic and environmental problems facing Europe and the world in general. SSR was a central notion both in defining social cohesion and in the Council of Europe's new social cohesion strategy (2010), which was gradually shaped and refined on the basis of the committee's recommendations. A series of interim publications (Council of Europe, 2011, 2012) culminated in the Council of Europe Charter on shared social responsibilities,[2] which defines social responsibility as:

> the accountability of public and private institutions or individuals for the consequences of their actions or omissions in the context of mutual commitments entered into by consensus, agreeing on reciprocal rights and obligations in the fields of social welfare and the protection of human dignity, the fight against social disparities and discrimination, and the quest for justice, social cohesion and sustainability, showing respect for diversity, with due regard for the applicable legal and social rules or obligations.
>
> *(Council of Europe, 2014)*

The concept of SSR, initially conceived in political circles, is now being examined in academic studies (Galli, Elefanti and Valotti, 2013; Gneezy et al., 2010). Although this work is still at a very early stage, it appears to offer a promising way of extending the concept of CSR, notably via the current trend of considering CSR from a strategic perspective (Lee, 2008; Porter and Kramer, 2006). Moreover, the emergence of concepts such as shared value creation, defined by Porter and Kramer (2011, p. 66) as "policies and operating practices that enhance the competitiveness of a company while simultaneously advancing the economic and social conditions in the communities in which it operates", is also facilitating the adoption of the idea that organisations may have to 'share' their social responsibilities.

The relevance of shared social responsibility to Olympism

The recent strategic changes made by the IOC related to OSR lead us to consider them from the perspective of Shared Social Responsibility. Agenda 2020, which lists sustainability as one of the three pillars of Olympism, alongside credibility and youth (IOC, 2014), contains two detailed recommendations on how sustainability should be incorporated into "all aspects of the Olympic Games" (Recommendation 4) and "the Olympic Movement's daily operations" (Recommendation 5). The IOC subsequently expanded these recommendations into a detailed Sustainability Strategy (IOC, 2016a), structured around "three spheres of responsibility" (as an organisation, as the owner of the OG, as the leader of the Olympic movement) and five "focus areas" (Infrastructure and natural sites, Sourcing and resource management, Mobility, Workforce, Labour). As well as specifying several "strategic intents", the strategy lays down specific objectives with respect to each sphere of responsibility. This structure reflects the IOC's recognition that social responsibility can have a strong impact only if the principles of sustainability are embraced and applied by all stakeholders of the Olympic movement. Hence, the IOC must share its vision of sustainability as a key aspect of Olympism, so it can set guidelines and undertake joint actions, otherwise it risks, at best, failing to follow its principles, or, at worst, contradicting them.

However, the idea of OSR as 'shared' goes much further than the IOC's desire to use sustainability for strategic purposes. In fact, both SSR and OSR have been greatly influenced by supranational organisations, whose debates on how social and environmental transformations impact society have inspired organisational social responsibility since the mid-1980s. Indeed, the very notion of SSR was developed by the Council of Europe, an intergovernmental forum in which European Union Member States can compare views on social issues. In the case of OSR, the IOC has fostered close links with the UN since the 1990s, long before building its vision of social responsibility for the Olympic movement. Consequently, its sustainable development objectives (health/well-being, education, gender equality, etc.) are now largely inspired by the



Figure 14.1 The IOC's sustainability strategy and associated objectives for 2020

Source: Figure adapted from the IOC's Sustainability Strategy (2016a)

UN's Agenda 2030. As well as contributing to these objectives itself, the IOC's goal is to ensure the entire Olympic movement follows its path (IOC, 2016a).

Of all the terms used by different bodies in relation to SSR, the most significant may well be interdependence, a term that appears frequently in both the preliminary reports and the final charter produced by the Council of Europe's social commission (Council of Europe, 2011, 2012, 2014).[3] In fact, interdependence between the Olympic movement's stakeholders is so strong that the resulting network is currently referred to as the "total Olympic system" (Ferrand, Chappelet and Seguin, 2012).

As Figure 14.1 shows, the IOC must behave responsibly as an organisation (sphere 1), ensure the OG are organised responsibly (sphere 2) and, as the leader of the Olympic movement, promote responsibility throughout the Olympic System (sphere 3).

This wider view of the IOC's social responsibilities encompasses the particularly dense networks of stakeholders that make up spheres 2 and 3 of the IOC's model, and highlights the need for all its stakeholders to share its vision of social responsibility. As owner of the OG (sphere 2), the IOC selects the host city for each edition of the Games and signs a contract with that city and the host country's National Olympic Committee (NOC). In addition,

> at the discretion of the IOC, other local, regional or national authorities, as well as, if relevant, other NOCs and local, regional or national authorities outside the host country, may also be a party to such agreement. Such agreement, which is commonly referred to as the Host City Contract, is executed by all parties immediately upon the election of the host city.
> *(IOC, 2017, p. 72)*

Because Host City Contracts (HCC) provide the IOC with a means of ensuring its contractual

durable legacy, which falls within the field of OSR, were included in the HCCs for the Winter Olympics and 2020 Summer Olympics, but not in the HCC for the 2016 Oly (Marmayou, 2015). The emergence of these provisions demonstrates the need for the I share a common vision of OSR with their contractual stakeholders or risk not promotin commitment. Once Organising Committees for the Olympic Games (OCOG) and O cities have accepted the IOC's vision, they must then communicate it to other stakeholde local communities, politicians) that may not be contractually bound to the OG but may or be impacted by them. If these stakeholders do not share the IOC's/OCOG's vision, tl adversely damage the event's reputation.[4]

The third sphere contains the vast network of stakeholders known as the Olympic mo (Chappelet and Kübler-Mabbott, 2008). Acting under the overall authority and leadershi IOC, it aims to "contribute to building a peaceful and better world by educating youth t sport practised in accordance with Olympism and its values" (IOC, 2017, p. 15).

Challenges and difficulties associated with implementing a shared OSR: information provided by the IOC on its sustainability strategy

Since adopting its Agenda 2020 and sustainability strategy, the IOC has greatly incre communication on sustainability, most notably by publishing an annual report. The fo paragraphs present the main components of this report, as contained in the 2016 editio 2016b). We examine all these components following the three spheres aforementioned.

As an organisation: after creating a Corporate Development, Brand and Sustainability ment in 2015, the IOC recruited a dedicated sustainability manager in 2016. This dep title reflects the desire to align the IOC's structure with its strategy (Olympic Agenda 20 strategic roadmap for the future of the Olympic movement) and the three broad pillar ibility, sustainability and youth. This drives the IOC to integrate sustainability into its day operations. It also began redeveloping its headquarters in Lausanne, so they could provid point for the Olympic movement. The IOC wanted to minimise the building's enviro impact and use the project as a test bed for several new environmental certifications and gained a place at the table in the debate on environmentally responsible construction in S land. Since then, The IOC claims that its headquarters are "one of the most sustainable in the world".[5] By using renewable energy provided by solar panels on the roof and pur ing water from Lake Geneva, it has won numerous international and Swiss awards for ability. The IOC's desire to further reduce its environmental impact is shown in severa carried out since 2014, many of which have led to partnerships aimed at minimising t tution's environmental footprint (e.g. Dow, International Union for Conservation of N

As owner of the OG: In recent years the IOC has endeavoured to raise awareness of and environmental issues among OCOGs, NOCs, host cities and other stakeholders. A some steps were taken prior to the IOC's creation of its sustainability strategy, the imp of these issues has grown substantially. As the owner of the rights to the Olympic Ga IOC requires an understanding of societal and environmental issues and the implemen concrete actions by the OCOGs, NOCs, host cities and other stakeholders involved. F the mid-2000s, the OCOGs for the Turin (Toroc, 2006) and Vancouver (Vanoc, 2010) Olympics produced sustainability reports describing their main initiatives in this area (Ch 2008). Toroc, for example, introduced an environmental management system that ena

Olympics managed its operations in accordance with the precepts of ISO 20121, a new norm for sustainable event management. Consequently, London 2012 became the first OG to be certified as sustainable. The IOC highlighted London's achievement in meeting this standard, hoping to help future events to create positive social and economic legacies and reduce their negative impacts. By pushing OCOGs to incorporate the principles of sustainable development into the organisation of the OG and by providing advice on designing sustainable events, the IOC is promoting this approach. The OCOGs for the Lillehammer 2016 Youth Olympic Games (YOG) and the Rio 2016 Summer Olympics also obtained ISO 20121 certification, with the Lillehammer YOG becoming the first event in Norway to do so. As for Rio 2016, certification was obtained thanks to a partnership with Dow, a sustainability specialist, which enabled the event to reduce its carbon footprint, most notably in the field of spectator transport.

As the leader of the Olympic movement, in line with Recommendation 13 of the Olympic Agenda 2020 to "maximise synergies with Olympic Movement stakeholders", the IOC aims at influencing its stakeholders to follow good practices with respect to sustainability (IOC, 2014). In 2015, the IOC invited several Olympic International Federations (OIFs) to a forum on sustainability in order to compile a series of recommendations on social and environmental practices later shared with other Federations at the 2016 SportAccord forum (IOC, 2016b). The IOC's decision to use the forum's conclusions to help non-Olympic international federations design their own sustainability policies and strategies suggests that it has gone beyond its responsibilities as the leader of the Olympic movement. A memorandum of understanding signed by the IOC and the Global Association of International Sports Federations (GAISF) at the end of 2017 supports this premise, as it allows both organisations to provide extra services to non-Olympic Federations, especially in the fields of good governance, ethics and integrity, protecting clean athletes, development, education and sustainability. The IOC is also targeting NOCs by highlighting the need to consider their activities' social and environmental impacts. As in the case of OIFs, NOCs that received Olympic Solidarity funds to implement sustainability initiatives under the 2013–2016 quadrennial plan were required to report their best practices in the field of sustainability (Olympic Solidarity, 2016). These best practices were then turned into case studies and shared with all the NOCs. This collaborative work helped pave the way for sustainability being made the fifth key theme of the 2017–2020 Olympic Solidarity Plan and highlighted numerous areas of development that need to be addressed and shared among the IOC and its NOCs (Olympic Solidarity, 2017). Finally, in October 2018, the IOC held the "Olympism in Action" forum in Buenos Aires, just before the YOG. This event, centred around building a better world through sport, was designed to find new ideas and identify recent trends in sport, while spreading the Olympic spirit across the world.

Paradoxes associated with shared OSR

The preceding overview of the IOC's three spheres of responsibility brings out a number of difficulties to overcome if it is to succeed in its aim of sharing OSR. First, although CSR/OSR and the wider concept of sustainable development (within which the IOC views its social responsibility) are centred on the ideal of promoting the common good, implementing this ideal in the real world exposes the paradoxes and challenges that organisations, including the IOC, have to face. Consequently, many observers have criticised the concepts of CSR and sustainable development, ever since they first emerged (Friedman, 1970; Baumgartner, 2011; Gond and Moon,

exemplary as an organisation, but its overall social responsibility performance is dependent on its influence over its stakeholders, both in its capacity as the owner of the OG and as the leader of the Olympic movement.

Given the Olympic message and values, and the IOC's ambitious sustainability objectives, the institution's first obligation is to be exemplary as an organisation. Unless its internal stakeholders embrace its vision of social responsibility, it will be difficult for the IOC to share this vision with other members of the Olympic movement. The IOC is aware of this challenge and being a "role model in sustainability" is its main objective for the period up to 2030 (IOC, 2016a). However, this task will not be easy, as several recent scandals have deeply stained the Olympic movement and revealed major faults in the governance of the Olympic System. One of the most serious scandals occurred following the attribution of the 2002 Winter Olympics to Salt Lake City. The uncovered corruption resulted in ten IOC members being excluded and a further ten members receiving reprimands. Although the Salt Lake City Olympics were successful, this scandal, together with the numerous cases of doping and violence that emerged in the early 2000s, led to an unprecedented loss of trust in the IOC from the media and governments (Chappelet, 2009).

Another question that arises is the IOC's ability to influence and control the main stakeholders involved in organising and staging Olympic events (e.g. OG and YOG). The IOC hands over the responsibility for organising these events to a small number of stakeholders (host cities, NOCs and OCOGs) with which it signs a contract. Of course, the IOC does have some power over NOCs and over OCOGs, whose executive bodies must include the host country's IOC member(s) (IOC, 2017).[6] However, host cities, especially those in countries whose culture, standards and regulations in the field of sustainability are weak, may not give sustainability the importance the IOC would like. Hence, although some OCOGs (e.g. Turin 2006 and Vancouver 2010) published sustainability reports, others such as Sochi 2014, have not followed suit. Moreover, controversies over issues such as negative environmental impacts (especially the Winter Olympics), and the building white elephants (e.g. Athens 2004, Sochi 2014, Rio 2016), weaken the idea of sustainability as one of the pillars of Olympism. A further risk comes from the recent decline in the number of candidate cities interested to host mega-events, especially the Olympics (Ferrand and Chappelet, 2015). This increases the possibility that the IOC may be 'forced' to attribute the OG to cities and countries that do not share its vision of sustainability. But, the IOC has managed to avoid this risk for forthcoming editions of the Summer Olympics. Even though only two candidates for the 2024 OG – Los Angeles and Paris – continued their bids to the final selection phase, the IOC managed to save face by awarding the 2024 Games to Paris and the 2028 Olympics to Los Angeles, both of which can call upon numerous existing facilities.

Similarly, recent scandals show how difficult it is for the IOC, as the leader of the Olympic movement, to ensure its stakeholders behave responsibly. The World Anti-Doping Agency's (WADA, 2015) revelation of 'institutionalised' doping in Russia, involving several athletes who competed at the London 2012 and Sochi 2014 Olympics, illustrates the size of the obstacles the IOC has to overcome if it is to successfully share its vision of responsibility and sustainability. After a boycott by the United States during the 1980 Moscow Olympics, and a counter-boycott by the USSR at the 1984 Los Angeles Games, Russia once again risked being absent from an Olympic Games. Officially, Russia was excluded from the 2018 PyeongChang Winter Olympics, in South Korea, but 168 Russian athletes were allowed to compete as "Olympic athletes from Russia" and under a neutral flag. This shows that despite the IOC's desire for its model of

Can Olympism really contribute to making a better world?

The IOC's greatest difficulties in ensuring its vision of sustainability arise from the discrepancy between the Olympic movement's objectives and the influence it has over its stakeholders, rather than from any mismatch between words and deeds. The paradoxes noted earlier can, in part, be attenuated by measures aimed at "contributing to a better world" (see Table 14.1).

Given the challenges OSR has to overcome, and despite the possible solutions presented here, doubts remain over Olympism's ability "to place sport at the service of the harmonious development of humankind, with a view to promoting a peaceful society concerned with the preservation of human dignity" (IOC, 2017, p. 11). Moreover, although the IOC's

Table 14.1 The road to shared OSR: paradoxes and possible solutions

	IOC as an organisation	*IOC as owner of the OG*	*IOC as leader of the Olympic movement*
Paradoxes with associated examples	Past scandals (corruption by IOC members in the attribution of some editions of the OG) continue to stain the IOC's reputation, thereby potentially drowning out its sustainability message.	Declining interest from potential host cities may lead to OG being attributed to sites that are questionable from an environmental point of view (e.g. Sochi 2014), thereby increasing the OG's negative environmental impact.	Absence of control over most stakeholders with respect to their efforts in the fields of governance/ responsibility/ sustainability, leading to a lack of results and questioning of the whole system's credibility (cf. FIFAgate and IAAF scandals, etc.)
Notions, key concepts	Exemplarity/Governance	Influence mechanisms/ Legacy	Influence mechanisms/Inter-sector collaboration/ Governance
Possible solutions	1) Ensure transparency and exemplarity within the IOC so it can share its vision, of sustainability/ responsibility, which must be irreproachable internally. 2) Continue efforts to improve governance based on existing initiatives (e.g. Association of Summer Olympic International Federations' (ASOIF) Governance Task Force).	1) Work with host cities and stakeholders to build a shared vision of what a sustainable OG legacy should look like. 2) Systematically produce independently certified sustainable development reports for the OG.	1) Share good practices in terms of governance by continuing to favour bottom-up approaches inspired by existing practices. 2) Re-think international and infra-national governance models around the issue of sharing a model of sustainability.[7]

actions are as far reaching as any multinational's, unlike a multinational it has limited control over its stakeholders and has to contend with the fragility of both the Olympic System and its stakeholders.

For the IOC's approach to succeed it must create a vision of sustainability that is shared inside and outside the Olympic System. Inter-sector collaboration will be a key factor in achieving this as it will generate closer ties with actors such as social entrepreneurs or non-governmental agencies. Consequently, the IOC must define a model of sustainability that is not based solely on the world of sport. Doing so will require introducing innovative management systems based on the network of stakeholders involved in supporting, disseminating, shaping and transforming the model, so they can ensure it considers their interests.

These management systems will enable stakeholders inside and outside the sports sector to build social capital based on confidence, networks and reciprocity (Putnam, 1995). In addition, the strategy must be global and, at the same time, include local mechanisms for developing the capabilities of local communities.[8] However, implementing these principles may not be enough to overcome all the criticisms of a movement whose controversies, especially with respect to the staging of the OG, keep coming back. But their application will undoubtedly increase the credibility of Olympism's model of sustainability and thereby facilitate the inter-sector collaboration needed to build and implement it. The question remains as to whether OSR is truly shared across the Olympic System, which stretches across the globe and which does not always have the culture and or ability to take the actions needed to respond to these societal challenges.

Conclusion

This chapter's goal was to show the paradoxes and challenges involved in sharing the IOC's preferred model of sustainability across all the stakeholders in the Olympic movement. When viewed through the lens of social responsibility, shared OSR does not appear to be that easy to implement, especially when its objective is as ambitious as "contributing to a better world".

Examining the IOC's latest sustainability initiatives shows both the efforts it is making to meet this objective and the road still left to travel. In fact, the growing challenges facing Olympism and the OG could well lead to ethical blowbacks (through poor governance, corruption, cult of money, doping, and the geopolitical and economic instrumentalisation of sport) and pose risks to the reputations of both the IOC and the organisations within the Olympic System. However, neither the IOC nor the OIFs currently have any real power or control over other stakeholders within the Olympic System, although the IOC tries to impose its will as best it can, for example, via HCCs. Thus, according to the IOC's 2016 Annual Report, subtitled "Credibility, Sustainability and Youth", the HCC for the 2024 OG was "modified to reflect the enhanced positioning of sustainability and legacy" (IOC, 2016b, p. 44).[9] It will be interesting to see how these promises of change, made six years before the Paris 2024 Olympics, affect the way the IOC and the stakeholders involved in organising the event co-construct sustainable initiatives and whether they develop a truly shared OSR. Hence, although we are not questioning the IOC's ideal of sustainability, we are not convinced it has the influence required to ensure its stakeholders share the responsibility of working towards this ideal.

Notes

1 Excerpt from the 1st fundamental principle of the Olympic Charter, which came into force on 15 September 2017.

2 Charter adopted by the Committee of Ministers on 22 January 2014 (Council of Europe, 2014).
3 The 'Scope' section of the charter highlights the fact that:

> Shared social responsibilities involve special care for the weakest members of society and expecting their co-operation with policies and institutions striving to improve their economic and social situation; such responsibilities call for a new approach in a context of interdependence.

4 The OG have always been subject to social protests, although contestation has been stronger at some editions than at others. This was the case for the 2016 Rio Olympics, where protest by a minority of Brazilians helped seriously damage the Games' reputation (cf. Soares Gonçalves, Bautès and de Luna Freire, 2016).
5 https://www.aipsmedia.com/index.html?page=artdetail&art=26609&ANOC-General-AssemblyIOC-Thomas-Bach.
6 According to Rule 35 of the Olympic Charter.
7 There are at least two ways in which approaches to sustainable development could be territorialised. The first is to give territories substantial latitude in how they embrace the model of Olympic sustainability, based on their specific characteristics. The second would be to set up an Olympic foundation to promote development through sport in conjunction with UN bodies and local NGOs.
8 According to the Western Australian Department for Community Development (2006), "Community capacity building is about promoting the 'capacity' of local communities to develop, implement and sustain their own solutions to problems in a way that helps them shape and exercise control over their physical, social, economic and cultural environments".
9 According to the HCC, the co-signatories (host city, NOC and OCOG) must "carry out all activities foreseen under the HCC in a manner which embraces sustainable development and contributes to the United Nations' Sustainable Development Goals" (article 15.1). They must also "define, implement and communicate a comprehensive and integrated sustainability programme" (article 15.2).

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