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PATAÑJALI AND THE YOGA SŪTRAS

(Published in: *Studien zur Indologie und Iranistik* 10 (1984 [1985]), pp. 191-212)

1.1. The *Yogabhāṣya* introducing sūtra 1.21 presents a ninefold classification of yogins (YB p. 51, l. 9-12):

*te khalu nava yogino bhavanti mṛdumadhyādhimātropāyāḥ | tad yathā:
mṛdūpāyo madhyopāyo 'dhimātropāya iti | tatra mṛdūpāyas trividhaḥ:
mṛdusaṃvego madhyasaṃvegas tīvrasaṃvega iti | tathā madhyopāyas
tathādhimātropāya iti |*

“Those yogins, indeed, are [of] nine [kinds], being of gentle, moderate and vehement method; that is to say: of gentle method, of moderate method, of vehement method. Among them, the [yogin] of gentle method is of three kinds: with gentle intensity, with moderate intensity, with sharp intensity. Likewise the [yogin] of moderate method [and] likewise the [yogin] of vehement method.”¹

This classification can be depicted in the following scheme:

		method (<i>upāya</i>)		
		gentle (<i>mṛdu</i>)	moderate (<i>madhya</i>)	vehement (<i>adhimātra</i>)
intensity (<i>saṃvega</i>)	gentle (<i>mṛdu</i>)	<i>mṛdu up.</i> <i>mṛdu saṃ.</i>	<i>madhya up.</i> <i>mṛdu saṃ.</i>	<i>adhimātra up.</i> <i>mṛdu saṃ.</i>
	moderate (<i>madhya</i>)	<i>mṛdu up.</i> <i>madhya saṃ.</i>	<i>madhya up.</i> <i>madhya saṃ.</i>	<i>adhimātra up.</i> <i>madhya saṃ.</i>
	sharp (<i>tīvra</i>)	<i>mṛdu up.</i> <i>tīvra saṃ.</i>	<i>madhya up.</i> <i>tīvra saṃ.</i>	<i>adhimātra up.</i> <i>tīvra saṃ.</i>

What is disturbing, is that sūtra 1.21 does not make use of, nor does it presuppose, this ninefold classification. At best it presupposes a threefold classification of yogins, with

¹ My translations of the *Yogasūtra*, *Yogabhāṣya* and Vācaspatimiśra's *Tattvavaiśārādī* are often influenced by Woods, 1914. Technical terms are often translated following Koelman, 1970 (see the Analytical Index at the end of that book).

gentle intensity, moderate intensity, [192] and sharp intensity. Sūtra 1.21 reads: *tīvrasaṃvegānām āsannaḥ* “For the [yogins] with sharp intensity [mental absorption without object-consciousness (*asaṃprajñātasamādhi*)]² is near.” The *Yogabhāṣya* says that this sūtra concerns those who are “of vehement method” (*adhimātropāyānām*), but nothing in the sūtra indicates that this is true.³ We are therefore left with the question: wherefrom did the Bhāṣya get its ninefold classification of yogins ?

An easy answer presents itself in sūtra 1.22. This reads: *mṛdumadhyādhimātratvāt tato 'pi viśeṣaḥ* “There is a superiority (*viśeṣa*) even to that, on account of [the method] being gentle, moderate or vehement.” This sūtra does not say what exactly is gentle (*mṛdu*), moderate (*madhya*) or vehement (*adhimātra*), but by considering these as attributes of the method (*upāya*), this sūtra, together with the preceding one, comes close to justifying the ninefold classification of yogins found in the Bhāṣya. Unfortunately this is not the way the *Yogabhāṣya* looks at sūtra 1.22. Here the new division into three is imposed on the yogin who is with sharp intensity (*tīvrasaṃvega*) and of vehement method (*adhimātropāya*). The Bhāṣya comments (YB p. 52, l. 8-11):

*mṛdutīvro madhyatīvro 'dhimātratīvra iti / tato 'pi viśeṣaḥ tadviśeṣād api,
mṛdutīvrasaṃvegasyāśannaḥ, tato madhyatīvrasaṃvegasyāśannataḥ, tasmād
adhimātratīvrasaṃvegasyādhimātropāyasyāpy āśannatamaḥ samādhilābhāḥ
samādhiphalaṃ ceti /*

“Because [the method is] gently sharp, moderately sharp, vehemently sharp, [there is] ‘superiority even to that’: even to that special [mental absorption which is due to being with sharp intensity]; the attainment of mental absorption and the fruit of mental absorption is near to him who is of gently sharp intensity and also of vehement method, nearer than that to him who is of [vehement method and] moderately sharp intensity, nearest compared to that to him who is of [vehement method and] vehemently sharp intensity.”

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The *Yogabhāṣya* ends up with an elevenfold classification where the sūtras can (at best) be made to yield a ninefold classification. The reason seems to be that the Bhāṣya somehow applied the same threefold division twice over, the division namely into gentle (*mṛdu*), moderate (*madhya*) and vehement (*adhimātra*).

² *asaṃprajñātasamādhi* is the subject matter of sūtras 1.18-20.

³ One might be tempted to consider the word *adhimātropāyānām* part of the sūtra, which would then read: *adhimātropāyānām tīvrasaṃvegānām āsannaḥ*. This was actually done by some late commentators, e.g., Vijnānabhikṣu (YV p. 64, l. 19-21). However, Vācaspatimīśra emphatically rejects this (TV p. 64, l. 2-3).

This state of affairs allows of an illuminating explanation when we draw the following sūtra (1.23) and its introductory Bhāṣya into the picture. They read (YB p. 52, l. 13-16):

kim etasmād evāsannataṛaḥ samādhir bhavati, athāsyā lābhe bhavaty anyo 'pi kaś cid upāyo na vā iti

īśvarapraṇidhānād vā (sūtra 1.23)

“Is mental absorption nearer only as a result of this, or is there some other method too for its attainment, or not?

(Sūtra 1.23:) Or as a result of devotion to God.”

The *Yogabhāṣya* to sūtras 1.21-23 can now be described as follows: There is a ninefold classification of yogins, as schematized above. From among them, mental absorption is near to those who are of vehement means and sharp intensity. Among these last, a further fourfold division exists: these yogins of vehement method and sharp intensity can be 1. of mildly sharp intensity; 2. of moderately sharp intensity; 3. of vehemently sharp intensity; 4. devoted to God.⁴ Perhaps we may say that mental absorption is the closer to them the higher their number in this last list.

We may contrast this with what would have resulted if the Bhāṣya on sūtra 1.21 had remained in closer agreement with the sūtra. There would then be three kinds of yogins: of gentle, moderate and sharp intensity (*saṃvega*) respectively. And the fourfold division described above would apply either to all three of these yogins, or only to the last of them. In neither case would anything be left of the ninefold classification.

This invites the following hypothesis. The author of the *Yogabhāṣya* knew that sūtras 1.21-22 presuppose a ninefold classification of yogins. However, by explaining sūtras 1.21-23 together, this ninefold classification was in danger of getting lost. In order to preserve it, the author of the Bhāṣya simply posits it in his introduction to sūtra 1.21. Sūtra 1.22 [194] is now explained in the artificial manner described above.

It is tempting to extend this hypothesis a little further. If sūtras 1.21-22 on the one hand, and sūtra 1.23 on the other, were originally not meant to be explained together, they may originally not have been together. That fact that the author of the *Yogabhāṣya* wanted to explain them together but still gives evidence that he knew their earlier meaning, may indicate that *he brought these sūtras together*. In other words, we come to the hypothesis that the author of the *Yogabhāṣya* himself collected the sūtras on which

he was to write his commentary, perhaps from different quarters, and that he sometimes gave them an interpretation which suited his purposes, even while knowing the original interpretation of those sūtras. Some more places in the *Yogabhāṣya* provide supporting evidence for this hypothesis.

1.2. Sūtras 1.24-25 read:

1.24. *kleśakarmavipākāśayair aparāmṛṣṭaḥ puruṣaviśeṣa īśvaraḥ*

“Untouched by hindrances or karman or fruition or latent deposits, God is a special kind of Self.”

1.25. *tatra niratiśayaṃ sarvajñabījam*

“In Him is the unsurpassed germ of the omniscient one.”

Those who have read my recent article on God in Sāṃkhya (Bronkhorst, 1983) cannot fail to be struck by these two sūtras. In this article I argued that the Sāṃkhya system of philosophy which is embodied in the commentaries to the *Sāṃkhyakārikā* (esp. the *Yuktidīpikā* and *Mātharavṛtti*) recognizes the existence of God (*īśvara*), even though they do not accept that God created the world. God is considered to be pure awareness, like the Selves (*puruṣa*), and the most important role He is given to play is that He is the Self of Kapila, the supreme, omniscient seer. It needs no argument that the above two sūtras fit this view extremely well, if we accept that the omniscient one (*sarvajña*) of sūtra 1.25 is Kapila.

This last supposition finds unexpected confirmation in the *Yogabhāṣya* on this sūtra, which gives the following quotation (YB p. 72, l. 5-7):

tathā cōktam: ādividvān nirmānacittam adṣṭhāya kārūṇyāt bhagavān paramarṣir āsuraye jijñāsamānāya tantraṃ provāceti

“And thus it has been said: ‘The first knower, the exalted one, the supreme seer, having assumed a created mind-complex through compassion, declared the doctrine to Āsuri, who desired to know’.”

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There can be no doubt that this quotation is about Kapila. For it is well-known that Kapila imparted the knowledge of Sāṃkhya to Āsuri. Īśvarakṛṣṇa’s *Sāṃkhyakārikā* describes it in verse 70: “The sage imparted this purifying, supreme [doctrine] to Āsuri through pity” (*etat pavitram agryaṃ munir āsuraye ‘nukampayā pradadau*). Even the

⁴ The *Yogabhāṣya* contains no indication that devotion to God is only effective for the yogins of vehement means and sharp intensity.

commentators on the *Yogabhāṣya*, beginning with Śaṅkara⁵ (PYV p. 73, l. 24-25) and more clearly Vācaspati-miśra (TV p. 78, l. 18-19), identify the first knower as Kapila. We can now say, being precise, that the quotation in the Bhāṣya is about God who assumes the form of Kapila, exactly what we supposed to be the subject matter of sūtra 1.25!

It is to be noted that this quotation about Kapila ill fits the context in which it occurs. It is preceded by the remark that “although He does not show favour to Himself, [His] motive is showing favour to living beings, [thinking:] ‘I will lift up human beings who are in the round of rebirths, at the dissolution of the mundane period and at the great dissolution, by instruction in knowledge and right living’” (YB p. 72, l. 4-5: *tasyātmānugrahābhāve ‘pi bhūtānugrahaḥ prayojanam, jñānadharmopadeśena kalpapralayamahāpralayeṣu saṁsāriṇaḥ puruṣān uddhariṣyāmīti*). There is no word here about Kapila, merely an indication that God’s activity is motivated by compassion, as is also said in the quotation. It is tempting to think that this remark — even if difficult to reconcile — was made primarily to serve as an introduction to the quotation which was somehow deemed to be inseparable from the sūtra.

The interpretation which the *Yogabhāṣya* gives of sūtra 1.25 is quite different from the one proposed above. Here this sūtra is said to establish God’s omniscience in the following rather obscure passage (YB p. 57, l. 9-12):

yad idam atītānāgatapratyutpannapratyekasamuccayātīndriyagrahaṇam alpaṁ bahv iti sarvajñabījam etad vivardhamānaṁ yatra niratiśayaṁ sa sarvajñaḥ / asti kāṣṭhāprāptiḥ sarvajñabījasya, sātiśayatvāt, parimāṇavat iti / yatra kāṣṭhāprāptir jñānasya sa sarvajñaḥ / sa ca puruṣaviśeṣa iti /

“This [our] process-of-knowing (*grahaṇa*) the supersensuous, whether in the past or future or present, whether separately or collectively, — [this process] of which it is said that it may be small or great, is [196] the germ of the omniscient one. He in whom this germ as it increases progressively reaches its utmost excellence is the omniscient one. It is possible for the germ of the omniscient one to reach this [uttermost] limit, for it admits of degrees of excellence, as in the case of the size [of things]. He in whom the limit of knowledge is reached is the omniscient one and He is a special kind of Self.”

⁵ The identity of Śaṅkara, the author of the *Pātañjalayogaśāstravivaraṇa*, and the advaitin Śaṅkara, has been argued for by Hacker (1968); also cf. Vetter, 1979: 21-25.

The *Yogabhāṣya* here suggests that sūtra 1.25 contains an inference which shows that there must be an omniscient one. This omniscient one, the Bhāṣya adds, is the special kind of Self spoken of in the preceding sūtra, i.e., God.

This interpretation does not fit the words of sūtra 1.25. This can be most clearly seen in Vijñānabhikṣu's attempt to give a word for word explanation. It runs as follows (YV p. 78, l. 29-10):

*bījaṃ liṅgaṃ sarvajñānumāpakaṃ vakṣyamāṇaṃ yat sātīśayajātīyaṃ jñānaṃ tat
tatreśvare niratīśayam ity arthaḥ*

“The germ (*bīja*) is the sign (*liṅga*) which leads to the inference of the omniscient, viz. knowledge, which is such that it can be surpassed, as will be explained; that [knowledge] is unsurpassed there, [i.e.] in God.”

We note, to begin with, that even this word for word explanation deviates from the sūtra in a crucial respect. In this explanation that which leads to the inference of the omniscient one is *knowledge that can be surpassed*, i.e., knowledge of ordinary mortals like us. This sign (*liṅga*) or germ (*bīja*) is not, therefore, in God, as the sūtra says it is.

A second difficulty is that the word *bīja* is never used as a technical term in logical discussions. Sanskrit has many words to denote the meaning here assigned to *bīja* — among them *sādhaka*, *sādhana*, *vyāpya*, and of course *liṅga* — but *bīja* is not one of them.

A third, be it minor, difficulty is that the inference would, strictly speaking, establish *omniscience* rather than the *omniscient one*. Some later commentators preferred therefore the reading *sārvajñya* instead of *sarvajña*.⁶ But the original reading is *sarvajña*.

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Summing up: The *Yogabhāṣya* interprets sūtra 1.25 in a manner which does not fit the wording of that sūtra. Another interpretation of the sūtra offers itself: it is about the incarnation of God in Kapila. This interpretation is supported by a quotation in the Bhāṣya. This quotation, unlike the Bhāṣya itself, describes the incorporation of God into Kapila.

It is clear that the situation here described fits our hypothesis that the author of the *Yogabhāṣya*, though knowing the earlier meaning of the sūtras, reinterpreted them to suit his purposes. The present case further suggests that at least some of the sūtras were

⁶ Vijñānabhikṣu mentions it. Nāgojībhāṭṭa the author of the *Pātañjalayogasūtravṛtti* accepts it. Nāgojībhāṭṭa the author of the *Pātañjalavṛtti Bhāṣyachāyāvākhyā* says (p. 241): *sūtre sarvajñeti bhāvapradhānam*.

somehow connected with certain quotations, which the author of the *Yogabhāṣya* apparently did not dare to neglect.

1.3. We turn to sūtras 1.30-40, here reproduced with Wood's translation, which follows the traditional interpretation of these sūtras:

- 1.30. *vyādhistyānasaṃśayapramādālasāvīratibhrāntidarśanālabdhabhūmikātvānavasthitatvāni cittavikṣepās te 'ntarāyāḥ*
 “Sickness and languor and doubt and heedlessness and listlessness and worldliness and erroneous perception and failure to attain any stage [of concentration] and instability in the state [when attained] — these distractions of the mind-stuff are the obstacles.”
- 1.31. *duḥkhadaurmanasyāṅgamejayatvaśvāsaprasvāsā vikṣepasahabhuvāḥ*
 “Pain and despondency and unsteadiness of the body and inspiration and expiration are the accompaniments of the distractions.”
- 1.32. *tatpratiśedhārtham ekatattvābhyāsaḥ*
 “To check them [let there be] practice on a single entity.”
- 1.33. *maitrīkaruṇāmuditopekṣāṅām sukhaduḥkhapuṇyāpuṇyaviṣayāṅām bhāvanātaścittaprasādanam*
 “By the cultivation of friendliness towards happiness, and compassion towards pain, and joy towards merit, and indifference towards demerit [the yogin should attain] the undisturbed calm of the mind-stuff.”⁷
- [198]
- 1.34. *pracchardanaividhāraṇābhyām vā prāṇasya*
 “Or [the yogin attains the undisturbed calm of the mind-stuff] by expulsion and retention of breath.”
- 1.35. *viṣayavatī vā pravṛttir utpannā manasaḥ sthitinibandhanī*⁸
 “Or [he gains stability when] a sense-activity arises connected with an object [and] bringing the central-organ into a relation of stability.”
- 1.36. *viśokā vā jyotiṣmatī*
 “Or an undistressed [and] luminous [sense-activity when arisen brings the central-organ into a relation of stability].”
- 1.37. *vītarāgaviṣayaṃ vā cittam*

⁷ Woods, 1914: xxxii omits “[the ... mind-stuff”].

⁸ The reading *sthitinivandhinī* is met with in Śaṅkara's commentary. The other commentators, however, support the lectio difficilior - *nibandhanī*.

“Or the mind-stuff [reaches the stable state] by having as its object [a mind-stuff] freed from passion.”

1.38. *svapnanidrājñānālambanam vā*

“Or [the mind-stuff reaches the stable state] by having as the supporting-object a perception in dream or in sleep.”

1.39. *yathābhimatadhyānād vā*

“Or [the mind-stuff reaches the stable state] by contemplation upon any such an object as is desired.”

1.40. *paramāṇuparamamahattvānto ‘sya vaśīkāraḥ*

“His mastery extends from the smallest atom to the greatest magnitude.”

These sūtras fall, according to the traditional interpretation, into three groups. The first group (1.30-32) describes the distractions (*vikṣepa*), the accompaniments of the distractions (*vikṣepasahabhū*), and how to check them. [199] The second group (1.33-39) gives various methods to reach stability of the mind-stuff. The third group consists of one sūtra (1.40) which describes the result of having obtained stability.

The second of these three groups is problematic. The main difficulty is that the sūtras do not fit together syntactically. Sūtras 1.33, 34 and 39 use words in the ablative case to describe how stability is obtained: by cultivation (*bhāvanātaḥ*), by expulsion and retention (*pracchardanavidhāraṇābhyām*), and by contemplation of any such object as is desired (*yathābhimatadhyānād*) respectively. The remaining sūtras (1.35, 36, 37 and 38) use nominatives in that function agreeing with *sthitinibandhanī* of sūtra 1.35.

The following considerations confirm that these remaining sūtras are a separate set. The sūtras which contain words in the ablative case (1.33, 34 and 39) describe methods which are relatively easy, practices which are clearly meant for beginners. The other set, however, describes yogic states which no beginner can be expected to have mastered as a means to obtain stability. Sūtra 1.35 speaks of ‘sense-activity connected with an object’. The Bhāṣya explains that this is consciousness of supernormal odour, taste, colour, touch and sound. This experience is obviously reserved for advanced practitioners. The same is true of sūtra 1.36, where an ‘undistressed and luminous sense-activity’ is recommended to obtain stability. Experiences of light are known to occur in mystical states, but it seems far more acceptable that they come as a result of preceding practices rather than being introductory practices themselves.

This last difficulty is easily solved by reading *sthitinibandhanī* as a Bahuvrīhi compound, meaning ‘whose support/foundation is stability’, that is in effect, ‘caused by stability’. In this way the consciousness of supernormal odour etc. of sūtra 35, and the light experience of sūtra 36, are no longer methods to gain stability, but, quite the

reverse, are caused by the latter. In order to accept this solution we must look upon sūtras 1.35 and 36, and therefore probably the whole set 1.35-38 (all without words in the ablative case) as not connected with the surrounding sūtras.

A remark in the *Yogabhāṣya* on sūtra 1.36 which fits the (presumably) correct meaning of the sūtra better than the Bhāṣya-context in which it occurs, confirms that *sthitinibandhanī* is a Bahuvrīhi compound. It reads (YB p. 95, l. 3-4):

tatra sthitivaiśāradīyāt pravṛtṭiḥ sūryendugrahamañiprabhārūpākāreṇa vikalpate
[200]

“By skill in keeping [his mind (*manas*)] in that [lotus of the heart, his] sense-activity assumes the form of the splendour of the sun or the moon or planets or gems.”⁹

Here stability (*sthitī*) is mentioned as the condition, the cause of the light experience, rather than the other way round.

In what context are the sūtras 1.35-38 to be understood? In themselves they are no more than nominal phrases which must be completed in order to convey a complete meaning. The necessary context becomes visible once we assume that sūtras 1.33, 34, and 39, were inserted. By leaving these three sūtras out, we get an acceptable sequence of sūtras, viz. 1.30, 31, 32, 35, 36, 37, 38, 40. The last six of these come to mean:

1.32. *tatpratiṣedhārtham ekatattvābhyāsaḥ*

“To check these [obstacles let there be] practice upon a single entity.”

1.35. *viśayavatī vā pravṛtṭir utpannā manasaḥ sthitinibandhanī*

“Or sense-activity which is connected with an object [and] is caused by stability of the mind, when [this sense-activity] has arisen.”

1.36. *viśokā vā jyotiṣmatī*

“Or undistressed [and] luminous [sense-activity which is caused by stability of mind, when this sense-activity has arisen].”

1.37. *vītarāgaviṣayaṃ vā cittam*

“Or [let] the mind-complex have as its object [a mind-complex] freed from passion.”

⁹ Woods (1914: 74) translates the last part: “... this sense-activity, because replendent as the sun or the moon or planets or gems, becomes transformed in appearance.” This can hardly be correct. It also deviates from Vācaspatimīśra’s understanding of the passage, who explains: ... *tadākāreṇa vikalpate nānārūpā bhavati* (TV p. 102, l. 22-23). For my translation of the compound ending *-ākāreṇa*, cf. Vetter, 1979: 24-25, n. 19.

Śāṅkara seems to have had the reading *sthitivaiśamyāt* before him (PYV p. 95, l. 13); it is not clear what this could mean in the context.

1.38. *svapnanidrājñānālambanam vā*

“Or [let the mind-complex] have as supporting object a perception in dream or in sleep.”

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1.40 *paramāṇuparamamahattvānto ‘sya vaśīkārah*

“To him (i.e., who has successfully applied the methods described to check the obstacles) there is mastery which extends from the smallest atom to the greatest magnitude.”

That this is the original connection between the sūtras seems confirmed by the way in which the *Yogabhāṣya* paraphrases the word *vaśīkāra* ‘mastery’ of sūtra 1.40. Let us recall that the author of the *Yogabhāṣya* explains sūtras 1.33-40 as if they all deal with stability of the mind and not with checking the obstacles. Nevertheless, *vaśīkāra* is unnecessarily explained as follows: “The *absence of obstacles (apratīghāta)* [which now exists] for him, that is the highest mastery” (YB p. 97, l. 6: *yo ‘syāpratīghātaḥ sa paro vaśīkārah*).

We shall study the *Bhāṣya* on sūtra 1.36 more closely, partly because it shows what difficulties the sūtra offered the author of the *Bhāṣya*, and partly because we can derive more information from it about the original meaning of the sūtra. It reads (YB p. 95, l. 2-9):

*hṛdayapuṇḍarīke dhārayato yā buddhisamvit, buddhisattvaṃ hi prabhāsivaram
ākāśakalpam, tatra sthitivaiśāradīyāt pravṛtīḥ
sūryendugrahamāṇiprabhārūpākāreṇa vikalpate / tathā asmitāyāṃ samāpannam
cittaṃ nistarāṅgamahodadhikalpam śāntam anantam asmitāmātram bhavati /
yatredam uktam: tam aṇumātram ātmānam anuvidyāsmīty evaṃ tāvat samjānīte
iti / eṣā cvayī viśokā viśayavatī, asmitāmātrā ca pravṛttir jyotiṣmatīty ucyate /
yayā yoginaś cittaṃ sthitipadam labhata iti //*

“[This is that] consciousness of the instrument of understanding occurring to [the yogin] who fixes his attention upon the lotus of the heart. For [1.] the *sattva* of the instrument of understanding is resplendent [and all-pervasive] like the ether. By skill in keeping [his mind] in that [lotus of the heart, his] sense-activity assumes the form of the splendour of the sun or the moon or planets or gems. Thus [2.] his mind-complex comes to a state of intentional identity with regard to the feeling of personality and becomes peaceful and infinite like an ocean without waves, and solely feeling of personality. With regard to which this has been said: ‘Pondering upon that self which is a mere atom, one is conscious in

the same way [as when one is conscious to the extent that one says] “I am”.’

This undistressed sense-activity of two kinds — [1.] connected with an object, and [2.] solely feeling of personality — is called ‘luminous’. By means of which the mind-complex of the yogin gains the stable state.”

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We note that sūtra 1.36 is said to describe two different experiences. This is obviously not the case. But the reason for this double interpretation of the sūtra appears to be present in the Bhāṣya in the form of two statements. The first¹⁰ is the one (*tatra ... vikalpata*) which supported our impression that *sthitinibandhanī* is a Bahuvrīhi compound. The second is presented as a quotation. Possibly both these statements accompanied the sūtra, thus creating the impression that it referred to two kinds of experience.

Of course the two statements, together with sūtra 1.36, can be understood to refer to one single experience, in which the self is experienced like a minute point of light, like one of the luminaries in the sky (*vyotis*). Experiences of this kind are known, e.g., to the Upaniṣads (e.g. BAU 2.3.6; 4.3.7; 5.6; Muṇḍaka Up. 3.1.5; see further Arbman, 1963: 297-334; Eliade, 1958). If this is correct, we must conclude that the author of the Bhāṣya did not know what yogic experience was meant in sūtra 1.36. Another point to be observed is that the author of the Bhāṣya felt, to all appearances, compelled to take note of the statements which accompanied the sūtra. By dropping one he could have arrived at a single explanation of the sūtra, which would have been more satisfactory.

Let me reproduce the three sūtras 1.33, 34, 39 in what appears to be their original order:

1.33. *maitrīkaruṇāmuditopekṣāṇām sukhaduḥkhaṇyāpūnyaviṣayāṇām bhāvanātaś cittaprasādanam*

“By the cultivation of friendliness towards those who are happy, compassion towards those who suffer, joy towards those who are virtuous and indifference towards those who are sinful, calming of the mind-complex.”

1.34. *pracchardanaividhāraṇābhyām vā prāṇasya*

“Or by expulsion and retention of breath.”

1.39. *yathābhīmatadhyānād vā*

“Or by meditation upon any such objects as is desired.”

¹⁰ Strauss (1926: 368) notes correctly that the author of the Yogabhāṣya occasionally quotes without indicating this. This first statement may therefore be a quotation.

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The reasons why these sūtras were inserted in exactly this way, seem to at least some extent understandable. 1.39 clearly closes a section and must therefore come at the end. 1.33 and 34, if they immediately preceded 1.39 and came after 1.38, would clearly begin a new section, with a new subject-matter. This is against the intention of the author of the Bhāṣya.

1.4. The above observations have made it plausible that the author of the *Yogabhāṣya* brought the Yoga sūtras together, perhaps from different sources, and wrote a commentary which in some cases demonstrably deviated from the original intention of the sūtras. It seem probable that deviations from the original meanings were made primarily to suit the theoretical tastes of the author of the *Yogabhāṣya*. Our discussion of sūtras 1.30-40 (§ 1.3, above) made it likely that the skills of the author of the *Yogabhāṣya* were primarily, or even exclusively, theoretical. He may not have had any direct experience of yogic states.

2. Who wrote the Bhāṣya and collected the sūtras?

2.1. The combined *Yogasūtra* and *Yogabhāṣya* calls itself at the end of the chapters: *pātañjala sāmṅkhyapravacana yogasāstra* “Patañjali’s authoritative book on Yoga, and exposition of Sāmṅkhya” (Jacobi, 1929: 584 (685); Woods, 1914: 100, 347).¹¹ The most ancient commentary known to us, by Śaṅkara, calls itself *pātañjalayogasāstravivarāṇa* “explanation of Patañjali’s authoritative books on Yoga”.¹² Śaṅkara’s commentary comments primarily on the Bhāṣya. This strongly suggests that the author of the Bhāṣya was called “Patañjali”. Some other circumstances support this.

Devapāla,¹³ the author of a commentary (*bhāṣya*) on the *Laugākṣi Gṛhya Sūtra*, appears to refer to a commentary which he wrote on the *pātañjala yogasāstra* (I, p. 16). Elsewhere (I, p. 50) he says:

*tathā ca pātañjalabhāṣye: brāhmas tribhūmiko lokaḥ prājāpatyas tato mahān /
māhendraś ca svar ity ukto divi tārā bhuvi prajāḥ //*

¹¹ Editions often add a remark to the extent that the work is a Bhāṣya composed by Vyāsa. It seems not impossible that these remarks are sometimes due to the modern editors. See the the next note.

¹² The editors has throught “coorected” this to *pātañjalayogasūtrabhāṣyavivarāṇa*.

¹³ Prof. A. Wezler drew my attention to this author.

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The quoted verse occurs in exactly this form in the *Yogabhāṣya* to sūtra 3.26, where it is called *saṃgrahaśloka*.

Vācaspatimiśra remarks in his *Nyāyavārttikatātparyāṭikā* (p. 9, l. 13-16; quoted in Jacobi, 1930: 322 (726)):

*acintyasāmarthyātīśayo hi samādhiḥ / yathāhur atrabhavantaḥ patañjalipādāḥ: ko
hi yogaprabhāvād ṛte agastya iva samudraṃ pibati sa iva ca daṇḍakāraṇyaṃ
sṛjatīti*

“For the excellence of the efficacy of mental absorption (*samādhi*) is inconceivable. As the honourable Patañjali says: ‘For who drinks the ocean, like Agastya, [who] creates the Daṇḍaka forest, like him, without the power of Yoga?’”

This question recurs, in somewhat different words,¹⁴ in the *Yogabhāṣya* on YS 4.10, as follows (YB p. 330, l. 8 - p. 331 l. 3):

*daṇḍakāraṇyaṃ ca cittabalavyatirekeṇa śārīreṇa karmaṇā kaḥ¹⁵ kartum utsaheta
samudram agastyavad vā pibet*

“And who could make the Daṇḍaka forest by bodily action, without the force of the mind-complex, or would drink the ocean like Agastya?”

It seems that Devapāla, and Vācaspatimiśra when he wrote the *Nyāyavārttikatātparyāṭikā*, thought that the *Yogabhāṣya* had been written by Patañjali.

Also Śrīdhara, the author of the *Nyāyakandalī*, a commentary on the *Prāśastapādabhāṣya*, considers the *Yogabhāṣya* a composition of Patañjali. On p. 171, l. 21-23 and p. 172, l. 1-3, he says:

*tathā cāha sma bhagavān patañjaliḥ aparīṇāminī hi bhokṛśaktir apratisaṅkramā
ca pariṇāminy arthe pratisaṅkrāteva tadvṛttim anubhavatīti ... / tathā cāha sa*

¹⁴ Jacobit (1930: 322-23 (726-27)) attaches much importance to the differences, and concludes that Vācaspatimiśra knew another work written by the author of the *Yogasūtra*. We have seen that there is reason to think that there was no single author of the *Yogasūtra*.

¹⁵ The editions read: ... *karmaṇa śūnyaṃ kaḥ* ... (in this or another order). Śaṅkara however seems to have known the reading without *śūnyaṃ*, for he paraphrases (?): *daṇḍakāraṇyaṃ cittabalavyatirekeṇa kaḥ kartum śaknoti / kaś ca pibet samudram agastyavat iti* / (PYV p. 330, l. 27 - p. 331, l. 13). The reading without *śūnyaṃ* fits Vācaspatimiśra’s remark in the *Nyāyavārttikatātparyāṭikā* better.

*eva bhagavān śuddho 'pi puruṣaḥ pratyayaṃ bauddham anupaśyati anupaśyann
atadātmāpi tadātmaka iva pratyavabhāṣate iti /¹⁶*

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These are two quotations from the *Yogabhāṣya* on YS 2.20, which here occur in the reverse order, thus (YB p. 192, l. 5-8):

*śuddho 'py asau pratyayānupaśyo yataḥ / pratyayaṃ bauddham anupaśyati tam
anupaśyann atadātmāpi tadātmaka iva pratyavabhāṣate / tathā cōktam:
apariṇāminī hi bhokṛśaktir apratisaṅkramā ca pariṇāminy arthe pratisaṅkrāteva
tadvṛttim anu patati /*

It is true that the first sentence quoted by Śrīdhara is likewise a quotation in the *Yogabhāṣya*. The second sentence quoted by Śrīdhara, however, removes all doubt: Śrīdhara thought that Patañjali had written the *Yogabhāṣya*.

A number of passages which show that also Abhinavagupta, the prolific writer from Kashmir, considered Patañjali the author of the *Yogabhāṣya*, have been collected and discussed by Raghavan (1981: 78-87).¹⁷

There is one more circumstance which seems to support the view that Patañjali wrote the *Yogabhāṣya*. The *Yogabhāṣya* calls itself, as we have seen, “exposition of Sāṃkhya” (*sāṃkhyapravacana*). Indeed, the *Bhāṣya*, far more than the sūtras, expounds a system of philosophy which is very close to the one we know from the *Sāṃkhyakārikā* and its commentaries. In fact, the most important of these commentaries, the *Yuktidīpikā*, repeatedly refers to a teacher of Sāṃkhya called “Patañjali”.

It is true that other opinions regarding the authorship of the *Yogabhāṣya* made their appearance, and even came to dominate. But this is in no way surprising. The colophons of the *Yogabhāṣya* are unsatisfactory in that they seem to attribute both sūtras and *Bhāṣya* to Patañjali. This would be exceptional. No wonder that Patañjali came to be looked upon as the author of the sūtras. But who was then said to have composed the *Bhāṣya*? The name most often mentioned in this connection became “Vyāsa”, or even “Vedavyāsa”, for the first time perhaps in Vācaspatimiśra’s

¹⁶ The last sentence is again ascribed to Patañjali by Malliṣeṇa in his *Syādvādamañjarī* ch. 15 (p. 97, l. 61-63): *āha ca patañjaliḥ / śuddho 'pi puruṣaḥ pratyayaṃ bauddham anupaśyati tam anupaśyann atadātmāpi tadātmaka iva pratibhāṣate iti /*; again in Guṇaratna’s *Tarkarahasyadīpikā* quoted by Kapadia (1947: XLIII).

¹⁷ We do not have to follow Raghavan (1981: 84) in thinking that Abhinavagupta’s citations of the *Vyāsa* *Bhāṣya* as Patañjali’s are “slight mistakes natural in an encyclopaedic writer like Abhinavagupta”.

commentary *Tattvavaiśa*[206]*radī* to YS 1.1 (p. 2, l. 4).¹⁸ Clearly this is a name which belongs to a mythological, rather than historical person¹⁹ (cf. Jacobi, 1929: 584 (685)). Moreover, Vādirāja's *Nyāyaviniścayavivarāṇa* calls the author of the *Yogabhāṣya* "Vindhyavāsin", which is the name of another well-known Sāṃkhya teacher.²⁰ The confusion which apparently reigned merely supports the view that Patañjali wrote the *Yogabhāṣya*.²¹

2.2. Against this there is a major objection. The opinions of the *Yogabhāṣya* do not tally with the ones ascribed to Patañjali in the *Yuktidīpikā*; they do, on the other hand, tally with those ascribed to Vindhyavāsin.²²

The *Yuktidīpikā* tells us that Patañjali denied the separate existence of *ahaṃkāra*, the second evolute, because its function is fulfilled by *mahat*, the first evolute (YD p. 27, l. 20-21: ... *naivāhaṃkāro vidyata iti patañjaliḥ / mahato 'smipratyayarūpatvābhyupagamāt /*). Vindhyavāsin, however, did distinguish between these two; *ahaṃkāra* is for him one of the non-particularized ones (*aviśeṣa*) which come forth out of *mahat* (YD p. 91, l. 5-6: *mahataḥ ṣaḍ aviśeṣāḥ sṛjyante pañca tanmātrāṇy ahaṃkāraś ceti vindhyavāsimatam*). The *Yogabhāṣya* on sūtra 2.19 agrees with Vindhyavāsin, but uses the word *asmitāmātra* instead of *ahaṃkāra* (YB p. 185, l. 4-6: ... *pañcaviśeṣāḥ / ṣaṣṭhaś cāviśeṣo 'stimātra iti / ete sattāmātrasyātmano mahataḥ ṣaḍ aviśeṣapariṇāmāḥ* ...). Elsewhere (on sūtra 3.47; p. 304, l. 3) the *Bhāṣya* identifies *asmitā* and *ahaṃkāra*, or rather, calls the former the characteristic mark of the latter (... *asmitālakṣaṇo 'haṃkāraḥ* ...), so that [207] the agreement on this point between Vindhyavāsin and the *Yogabhāṣya* is established.

The *Yuktidīpikā* ascribes to Patañjali the view that each Self (*puruṣa*) is, in the course of time, accompanied by many subtle bodies, each of which comes into being

¹⁸ Note that Vācaspatimiśra ascribed the *Yogabhāṣya* to Patañjali in his *Nyāyavārttikatātparyatīkā* (§ 2.1, above). It is not known which of these two works was written earlier; see Srinivasan, 1967:64.

¹⁹ It may not be without significance that the author of the *Sarvadarśanasiddhāntasaṅgraha* (who calls himself in the colophons Śāṅkarācārya, but is different from the author of the *Brahmasūtrabhāṣya*) describes a *vedavyāsapakṣa* (ch. 11) which he distils from the Mahābhārata, not from the *Yogabhāṣya* which falls under his chapter 10 on the *patañjalipakṣa*.

²⁰ Vol. I, p. 231, l. 9-10: *yac ca tatraiva vindhyavāsino bhāṣyam — "bhoktrbhogyaśaktyor atyantāsaṅkīrṇayor avibhāgaprāptāv iva satyām bhogaḥ prakalpatē" iti ...*. The quotation occurs in the *Bhāṣya* to YS 2.6, p. 138, l. 2-3. Note that Vādirāja speaks in the preceding line (l. 8) of "Patañjali's sūtra *dṛgdarśanaśaktyor ekātmatevāsmitā*" (i.e., YS 2.6).

²¹ This conclusion had already been reached by P. V. Kane (see 1939: 163, which refers to an article in the Pathak Commemoration Volume unfortunately not accessible to me) but on meagre evidence.

²² For a readable description of Vindhyavāsin's ideas, see Frauwallner, 1953: 401 f.

and disappears again.²³ Vindhyavāsin, on the other hand, does not consider such subtle bodies necessary: since sense organs are omnipresent, they need no such vehicles to be carried to a next body; their fluctuation (*vr̥tti*) takes care of the new birth.²⁴ The *Yogabhāṣya* sides with Vindhyavāsin against Patañjali in the following passage (to YS 4.10; p. 329, l. 6 - p. 330, l. 3):

*ghaṭaprasādapradīpakalpaṃ saṃkocavikāsi cittam śarīraparimāṇākāramātram ity
apare pratipannāḥ / tathā cāntarābhāvaḥ saṃsaraṇaṅ ca yuktaṃ iti / vr̥ttir evāśya
vibhunaś cittasya saṃkocavikāsinīty ācāryāḥ /*

“Others think that, like a lamp in a jar or in a palace, the mind-complex is subject to contraction and expansion, [and] has but the size and the form of the body. And thus an intermediate stage and the cycle of rebirths is possible. The teachers[, however, say] that only the fluctuations of the mind-complex, which is omnipresent, is subject to contraction and expansion.”

According to Vindhyavāsin, the mind (*manas*), which is the eleventh organ, experiences all things (YD p. 91, l. 9-10: *ekādaśam iti vindhyavāsi / tathānyeṣāṃ mahati sarvārthopalabdhiḥ, manasi vindhyavāsiṅ* /). The *Yogabhāṣya* expresses the same view, or so it seems, under sūtra 2.19 (p. 182, l. 8): *ekādaśaṃ manaḥ sarvārtham*.

It may here be recalled that at least one work attributes the *Yogabhāṣya* to Vindhyavāsin (see above, § 2.1).

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Perhaps the most interesting and significant opinion of Vindhyavāsin is mentioned in a passage of the *Yuktidīpikā* which deals, among other things, with innate (*sāṃsiddhika*) knowledge. This is the kind of knowledge which characterizes a supreme seer. We read (YD p. 123, l. 30-32):

*vindhyavāsinas tu nāsti ... sāṃsiddhikaṃ ... / tatra paramarṣer api
sargasamghātavyūhottarakālam eva jñānaṃ niṣpadyate yasmād
gurumukhābhipratipatteḥ pratipatsyata it[i]*

²³ P. 121, l. 9-12: *patañjales* (Mss *pātañjales*; ed. Chakravarti *pātañjale*) *tu sūkṣmaśarīraṃ yat siddhikāle pūrvam indriyāni bījadeśaṃ nayati tatra tatkr̥tāśayavaśāt dyudeśaṃ yātanāsthānaṃ vā karaṇāni vā prāpaya nivarate / tatra caivaṃ yuktāśayasya karmavaśād anyad utpadyate yad indriyāni bījadeśaṃ nayati tad api nivarate, śarīrapāte cānyad utpadyate / evam anekāni śarīrāṇi /*

²⁴ P. 121, l. 12-13: *vindhyavāsinas tu vibhutvād indriyāṇām bījadeśe vr̥tṭyā janma / tattyāgo maraṇam / tasmān nāsti sūkṣmaśarīraṃ /* Note that Kumārila's *Ślokaṅkārttika*, *Ātmavāda* v. 62 (p. 704, l. 3), confirms that Vindhyavāsin did not accept an intermediate body: *antarābhavadehas to niṣiddho vindhyavāsinā*. Also see Medhātithi to *Manusmṛti* 1.55 (p. 30, l. 15): *sāṃkhyā api kecin nāntarābhavam icchanti vindhy[av]āsaprabhṛtayaḥ*.

“But according to Vindhyavāsin there is no innate [knowledge]. In this [view] the knowledge even of a supreme seer does not come into existence until after the arrangement of the whole at creation; from this [seer that knowledge] will [eventually] be understood [by later mortals], because [they] have learned [it] from the mouth of a teacher.”

Whatever the precise meaning of this passage, it is clear that Vindhyavāsin had a lower estimate of a supreme seer and therefore of Kapila than most of his colleagues. This, in its turn, agrees beautifully with the *Yogabhāṣya* which never mentions Kapila. The one sūtra which is about Kapila is reinterpreted, as we have seen (§ 1.2, above), in such a way that Kapila could remain unmentioned.

2.3. In view of the above it is tempting to look upon the *Yogabhāṣya* as the work of Vindhyavāsin or on from his school (cf. Chakravarti, 1951: 141; Frauwallner, 1953: 410 f., 482 n. 212). But the work itself calls its author “Patañjali”. The evidence available does not seem to allow a final solution. Among the possibilities, two are probable: 1. Vindhyavāsin²⁵ considered himself a follower of Patañjali (*pātañjala*); 2. Vindhyavāsin wrote the *Yogabhāṣya* in the name of Patañjali.²⁶ Both these possibilities [209] leave room for the fact that Patañjali is quoted in the *Yogabhāṣya* itself (on YS 3.44).

3. Our above investigation has adduced evidence in support of the opinion that the Yoga sūtras did not all originally belong together. This opinion had been expressed before (Deussen, 1920: 508 f.; Hauer, 1958: 224 f.; Frauwallner, 1953: 427 f.; cf. Staal, 1975: 91 f.), but no one seems to have noticed that the *Yogabhāṣya* has preserved the scars of the operation in which the sūtras were brought together. These scars allow us to hypothesize that the sūtras were brought together by the author of the *Yogabhāṣya*. This person, it appears, was no expert in practical yogic matters. His skills were primarily theoretical.

²⁵ “Vindhyavāsin” may not be a proper name; see Chakravarti, 1951: 142 ff. A verse from Kamalaśīla’s commentary to the *Tattvasaṅgraha* give “Rudrila” as his real name (Chakravarti, 1951: 144, 147).

²⁶ Of course we are not compelled to accept that only one Patañjali existed who had connections with Sāṃkhya.

Besides the two possibilities mentioned in the text, a third one would be that the *Yogabhāṣya* had two authors. Frauwallner (1953: 483, n. 221) states that there are clear traces of a composite origin of the work, but does not make this statement more specific. I am aware of one contradiction only: The *Bhāṣya* on sūtra 1.45 does not fully agree with the *Bhāṣya* on sūtra 2.19 (see Chakravarti, 1951: 241-42). Since the latter passage expresses Vindhyavāsin’s view (§ 2.2, above), the former should then be attributed to Patañjali. But this former passage mentions *ahaṃkāra*, and seems to consider it the same as *mahat*. Patañjali, however, did not accept *ahaṃkāra*, because its function is taken care of by *mahat*; see § 2.2, above.

Another study (Bronkhorst, 1981) has brought to light that the *Yogabhāṣya* was never meant to be representative of anything but the Sāṃkhya philosophy. One would therefore expect that the *Yogabhāṣya* was written by an exponent of the Sāṃkhya system. And indeed, the available evidence points to two persons, Patañjali and Vindhyavāsin, both of whom are known as Sāṃkhya teachers primarily from the *Yuktidīpikā*.

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ABBREVIATIONS

PYV	<i>Pātañjalayogaśāstravivarāṇa</i> of Śāṅkara
TV	<i>Tattvavaiśārādī</i> of Vācaspatimiśra
YB	<i>Yogabhāṣya</i>
YD	<i>Yuktidīpikā</i>
YS	<i>Yogasūtra</i>
YV	<i>Yogavārttika</i> of Vijñānabhikṣu