Ethnic Minority-Majority Asymmetry in National Attitudes around the World:

A Multilevel Analysis

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Abstract

Using data from the International Social Survey Programme, this research investigated asymmetric attitudes of ethnic minorities and majorities towards their country and explored the impact of human development, ethnic diversity and social inequality as country-level moderators of national attitudes. In line with the general hypothesis of ethnic asymmetry, we found that ethnic, linguistic and religious majorities were more identified with the nation and more strongly endorsed nationalist ideology than minorities (H1, 33 countries). Multilevel analyses revealed that this pattern of asymmetry was moderated by country-level characteristics: the difference between minorities and majorities was greatest in ethnically diverse countries and in egalitarian, low inequality contexts. We also observed a larger positive correlation between ethnic subgroup identification and both national identification and nationalism for majorities than for minorities (H2, 20 countries). A stronger overall relationship between ethnic and national identification was observed in countries with a low level of human development. The greatest minority-majority differences in the relationship between ethnic identification and national attitudes were found in egalitarian countries with a strong welfare state tradition.

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Nearly all countries around the world are composed of ethnic, linguistic or religious minority and majority groups (Gurr, 2000; Horowitz, 2000). One of the major questions with respect to this diversity concerns the relationship ethnic minorities and majorities develop with their superordinate nation states. To what extent do minority groups feel attached to a state which often they feel "is not theirs"? How strongly do majorities consider that their ethnic group overlaps with the boundaries of the nation state, thereby potentially excluding minorities in the political process? Testifying to the importance of understanding state attachment and state allegiance by ethnic minorities and majorities, the Human Development Report (2004) issued by the United Nations Development Programme, defines the compatibility between national and ethnic identification as a key element of contemporary politics around the world.

Using international survey data, the present research investigates how members of ethnic minorities and majorities diverge in their attitudes towards the nation state, assessed with national identification and endorsement of a nationalist ideology. We further study the differential relationships between ethnic identification and both national identification and nationalism as a function of membership in minority or majority groups. Much of the social psychological research on the ethnicity-nationality nexus has focused on single countries, in particular the U.S. (Citrin, Wong, & Duff, 2001; Devos & Banaji, 2005; Sears, Citrin, Cheleden, & van Laar, 1999; Sears & Savalei, 2006). The present paper takes a more global look at the relation between ethnic and national group membership. We will first assess the degree to which minority attitudes differ from majority attitudes across a large number of countries. In line with a general ethnic asymmetry hypothesis (Sidanius, Feshbach, Levin, & Pratto, 1997), our general contention is that majorities feel more identified with the nation than minorities, that they endorse nationalist attitudes more than minorities, and that they express a stronger relationship between ethnic identification and national attitudes than minorities. As

a second goal, our research investigates how three political and historical factors – the level of human development of countries, their level of ethnic diversity, and their level of social inequality – moderate the extent of this expected asymmetry between ethnic, linguistic and religious minorities and majorities.

Historical Analyses of Ethnic Asymmetry

A large body of historical analyses of ethnic conflict and nation building has documented asymmetry between ethnic minorities and majorities with respect to their feelings towards the nation-state (e.g., Horowitz, 2000). Ever since the building of nation-states in the 18th century, attitudes towards the nation by minority and majority subgroups have been shown to differ (Smith, 1986). Current forms of ethnic asymmetry can be viewed both as the product of pre-modern origins of nations and as the outcome of cultural and political nation-building processes, in particular repressive and assimilationist state policies (Gurr, 2000). Accounts which emphasize the pre-modern origins of nations have shown that many nation-states have developed around ethnic core groups, usually the national majority group (Kuzio, 2002; Schöpflin, 2000; Smith, 1986; Wimmer, 1997). Ethnic core groups have a tradition of political centralization whereby state institutions such as police, army, courts and schools are set up on the basis of a "common culture" which provides a shared language, values and traditions (Gellner, 1983): "In general, each such state presides over, maintains and is identified with, one kind of culture, one style of communication, which prevails within its borders […]" (p. 140). Gellner asserts that a strong correspondence between state and ethno-national group is necessary for economic development and political legitimacy. As a result, nation-states are likely to be ruled by elites composed of members of ethnic majority groups whose culture and language are dominant in a state controlled by the ethnic majority. Similarly, majorities are more likely to be in control of national symbols, especially those based on the official national language (Anderson, 1983). Control of state institutions is thus a central motive behind ethnic conflicts: "Everywhere the word domination was heard. Everywhere it was equated with political control. Everywhere it was a question of who were

'the real owners of the country' and who would rule over whom." (Horowitz, 2000, p. 189). Minorities therefore find themselves in positions where their rights as national citizens and formal recognition by national authorities and institutions are in jeopardy. While nations may have ethnic origins, political processes are likely to reinforce the basic asymmetry between ethnic minorities and majorities within a nation-state. Historical evidence shows that ethnic identities intersect with national identities in ways which suggest that members of majority groups feel closer to the nation-state and its ideological myths than do minority members.

Empirical Analyses of Ethnic Asymmetry

Ethnic asymmetry has been empirically evidenced with studies comparing minority and majority attitudes towards their ethnic group and towards the superordinate national group, both within the U.S. (Devos & Banaji, 2005; Peña & Sidanius, 2002) and in other national contexts (Dowley & Silver, 2000; Elkins & Sides, 2007; Liu, Lawrence, Ward, & Abraham, 2002; Sidanius et al., 1997; Staerklé, Sidanius, Green, & Molina, 2005). Intergroup research concerning subgroup relations supports the asymmetry reasoning by showing that members of a majority subgroup within a superordinate category are more likely than minority subgroups to perceive their subgroup as representing the norms and values of the superordinate category (Lipponen, Helkama, & Juslin, 2003; Mummendey & Wenzel, 1999). For dominant majority groups, identification with the subgroup and the superordinate group is therefore likely to be positively linked. In contrast, among subordinate minority groups, identification with the superordinate, national category should come, at least to some extent, at the expense of identification with one's subordinate ethnic category, or should be independent of it. Minorities may therefore experience conflict between subgroup and superordinate identifications. However, some studies which have examined the validity of the ethnic asymmetry hypothesis in the context of U.S. ethnic relations have come to rather opposite conclusions (Citrin et al., 2001; Huo, 2003), showing for example that Mexican-Americans appear to be equally or no less

likely to endorse American national values than the White American majority group (de la Garza, Falcon, & Garcia, 1996).

Moderators of Subgroup Asymmetry

In light of such contrasting findings, it becomes necessary to study some of the historical, political and economic factors of countries which could moderate asymmetry between ethnic minorities and majorities. Given that the social and historical position of ethnic minorities within nation-states varies widely across countries (e.g., numerical size, history of immigration, political and economic grievances; Elkins & Sides, 2007), it is plausible that ethnic asymmetry with respect to national attachment is not necessarily a universal occurrence, but rather a historically and politically contingent phenomenon (see Brubaker, 2004).

It is therefore important to investigate country-level moderators of ethnic asymmetry. In research on minority-majority asymmetry using the World Values Survey data, Elkins and Sides (2007) tested a large number of institutional variables to examine the conditions under which state loyalty was undermined. They found a significant gap between minorities and majorities in state attachment, but surprisingly little variation of this gap as a function of federalist and democratic national institutions designed to deal with ethnic divisions and define power sharing between ethnic groups. In the present paper, instead of institutional and procedural variables, we focus on three other macro-social factors expected to moderate asymmetry: (1) the level of development of a country, (2) its ethnic and cultural diversity and (3) its level of social and economic inequality. These factors are assumed to cover three fundamental features of countries relevant to minority-majority relations.

Level of development. The level of development can affect ethnic asymmetry in a number of ways. First, we expect a high level of development to facilitate equal access to services which should decrease discontent by both minorities and majorities and foster a social climate which is amenable to positive attitudes towards the nation-state. A relatively low overall living standard of a country, however, is likely to exacerbate competition between ethnic groups (Scheepers, Gijsberts, & Coenders,

2002). Majorities may be tempted, in situations of hardship, to "close ranks", to seek control over state institutions, and to claim priority over scarce resources, thereby leading minorities to detach themselves from the state and its ideologies.

High human development is further associated with a relatively strong civil society (political parties, associations, interest groups, etc.) which is likely to promote integration of minorities and thereby reduce asymmetry (Howard, 2003). In contexts with low human development and a weak civil society, in turn, the state-building process is more likely to be ethnicized, with state institutions being formed and organized primarily as a function of ethnic criteria (Wimmer, 1997). In such contexts, ethnic groups are likely to perceive themselves as communities sharing a common political fate, allegiance to the nation-state thus following along ethnic lines (Azzi, 1998). These arguments lead us to expect that a high level of social and economic development should attenuate ethnic asymmetry.

Ethnic and cultural diversity. A second potential moderator of the gap between majorities and minorities concerns the degree of ethnic diversity within a national context. Two alternative hypotheses seem plausible: On the one hand, high ethnic diversity should increase the salience of ethnic subgroup membership in a country's political life, since ethnic minority groups (for example in contexts such as Canada, Spain and Latvia) are more likely to claim political rights in the name of their groups. Ongoing rights claims by minorities are likely to result in tensions between with the majority group and to lower levels of state allegiance by minorities, thereby increasing asymmetry (see Horowitz, 2000; Putnam, 2007). Prior research has indeed shown that minorities harboring political autonomy grievances feel less pride in the nation state than those who do not (Elkins & Sides, 2007). Ethnic diversity should therefore increase asymmetry between minority and majority groups. On the other hand, it also seems plausible that minorities in more homogeneous societies (such as Scandinavian or some Central European countries) are more under pressure to assimilate to majority culture which may constitute a further cause for disidentification with the nation-state, seen as solely representing the majority culture (Gurr, 2000). In this view, asymmetry should be higher in

homogeneous, low diversity contexts. Our analysis will shed light on the plausibility of these competing hypotheses.

Social and economic inequality. Inequality taps the degree to which resources within a country are distributed unevenly between social categories, and thus represents, along with ethnic diversity, another measure of cleavage within societies. High inequality is likely to follow—at least to some extent—ethnic lines such that ethnic majorities find themselves in a more advantaged situation than minorities (Sidanius & Pratto, 1999). If so, we can assume that the higher the social inequality in a country, the greater the divide between minority and majority groups will be, potentially resulting in minority discontent and lower levels of loyalty to the state. As a result, we expect that high levels of inequality lead to stronger forms of asymmetry between minorities and majorities.

Overview of the study

Two dimensions capturing important aspects of an individual's relation with a nation-state—national identification and nationalism—are used. National identification refers to a psychological process through which individuals construe part of their self-concept on the basis of national membership (Tajfel, 1981), and thereby identify with the nation in a general and abstract sense (Huddy & Khatib, 2007). Nationalism, in turn, denotes endorsement of nationalist political ideologies which stress unconditional support for political projects carried out in the name of the nation and promote the idea of superiority of one's country in relation to other countries (e.g., Dekker, Malová, & Hoogendoorn, 2003; Dowley & Silver, 2000; Kosterman & Feshbach, 1989; Reicher & Hopkins, 2001).

We expect to find evidence of ethnic asymmetry between ethnic majority and minority groups across a large number of national contexts. Asymmetry is evidenced if (a) ethnic majorities express higher levels of national identification and stronger endorsement of nationalism than minorities, and if (b) a larger positive correlation between ethnic subgroup identification and national attitudes is observed for ethnic majority groups, compared to ethnic minority groups (Sidanius & Petrocik, 2001).

Using multilevel analyses, we expect greater asymmetry in national contexts defined by low levels of

human development, high (or low) levels of ethnic diversity, and high levels of social inequality.

Method

Data were drawn from the International Social Survey Programme (ISSP) 2003 module on

national identity and supplemented with five countries from the identical ISSP 1995 module. The 1995

survey was conducted in 23 countries and the 2003 survey in 34 countries, with probability-based

nationwide samples[1]. To our knowledge, these surveys are the only large scale international datasets

which include measures of ethnic group membership as well as ethnic and national identification

necessary for testing our hypotheses.

National Sample Selection

A first dataset included all countries participating in ISSP 2003, except South Korea, totaling

33 countries. South Korea was excluded because definition of ethnic group membership on the basis of

religious group membership (the only available variable) was not warranted (43% were atheists, 31%

Christians, and 24% Buddhists). East and West German data were collapsed.

As the measure of ethnic identification was only optionally included in national questionnaires

(15 out of 34 countries in the 2003 dataset), a second dataset was created for testing hypotheses

involving ethnic identification. In order to maximize level-2 degrees of freedom for multilevel

analyses, we added the five countries which measured ethnic identification in 1995, but not in 2003

(Austria, Bulgaria, Canada, Germany and Slovenia) to the 2003 data. Consequently, analyses with the

ethnic identification measure were carried out on a restricted database including 20 countries (5

countries in 1995 and 15 in 2003).

The 2003 sample was composed of 54% of women (coding was 0 for men and 1 for women).

Overall mean age was 46 years. The age variable was standardized across countries. Using the ISSP

harmonized education measure, education level was recoded into three categories (-1: no formal

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[1] Details of national data collection, sampling and response rates can be found on the ISSP website (www.issp.org).

education to above lowest qualification, 47.4%; 0 = higher secondary education, 37.8%; 1 = university

degree, 14.9%). The ethnic identification dataset had roughly the same demographic characteristics. In

order to produce ethnic group membership effects unconfounded with individual characteristics, sex,

age and education level of respondents were used as individual level control variables in all analyses.

Ethnic Minority and Majority Classification

The countries retained for the analysis are shown in Table 1. Classification into majorities

(coded as 0) and minorities (coded as 1) was done on the basis of ethnic group membership of

respondents. As the ISPP surveys are not stratified by ethnic group membership, the number of

minority respondents is often very low. However, based on Gelman and Hill's (2006, p. 275-276)

advice to include even small groups in multilevel analyses, a decision was taken to retain countries

even when only two or three respondents were classified as minority members.

The main item used to classify participants either asked the national or regional origin of

respondents' ancestors, or respondents had to pick their group from a list of the major ethnic groups

within the country. In some countries, ethnic group membership was included in the demographic

participant information. We used a loose definition of ethnicity as membership in any meaningful,

ascribed group defined with racial, linguistic, national or religious criteria (Horowitz, 2000). In East

and West European countries, the classification into dominant and subordinate ethnic subgroups was

straightforward, since the dominant majority group shared the same category label as the nation (e.g.,

Russian and Russia, Swedish and Sweden). Accordingly, respondents who indicated another ethnic

origin were classified as members of "subordinate minorities." Participants who refused to answer the

ethnicity question or who indicated "mixed," "other" or unspecified origins were excluded from the

analysis. In countries for which this information was not available, we used spoken language or

religious group membership as a criterion to differentiate minorities from majorities (see Table 1 for

details).

In the U.S., European Americans (Whites) were classified as the dominant majority group, whereas African, Caribbean, Arab, Asian and Hispanic Americans were categorized as subordinate minorities. The classification for Canada differentiates English-speaking European Canadians as the dominant group from French-speaking Quebecers and African, Asian and Latino immigrants groups.[2] In New Zealand, White Europeans were classified as the majority group and immigrants of mostly Asian and Pacific descent as the minority group.

Native groups in the settler countries of Canada ($n_{95}=11$, $n_{03}=23$), the U.S. ($n_{03}=12$), and New Zealand (Maoris, $n_{03}=172$) were excluded from the analyses. For South Africa, Whites were classified as the dominant majority group and Indians as the subordinate minority group, while Blacks were considered as native groups and excluded. We do not expect the asymmetry hypothesis to apply to native groups, since they differ from other minorities in terms of their prior presence in the national territory compared to settler majorities and their strong attachment to the ancestral homeland (Sibley & Liu, 2007). Preliminary analyses have shown that native groups exhibit levels of national identification similar to majority groups, presumably because of their claims of ownership to ancestral territories. Because of this particular historical feature of native groups, and in order to keep minorities as comparable as possible across countries, natives were excluded from the asymmetry analyses.[3]

Citizenship status

A second distinction among respondents was performed on the basis of their national citizenship status. As our predictions bear on the relationship between established, resident, ethno-cultural groups and the national category, main analyses were carried out only on respondents with national citizenship of the country in which they reside. In countries where many minority members are recent immigrants without national citizenship (e.g., Sweden), or where restrictive citizenship

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[2] Blacks in the U.S. and Quebecers in Canada have played a central role in the formation of the respective nation states (e.g., Sears & Savalei, 2006), a fact which would justify a more detailed analysis of these groups. In the context of the present paper, however, this is not possible due to space restrictions. Their inclusion in the subordinate minority category is justified with their economically inferior status compared to European Americans and English Canadians, respectively.
[3] The overall results are only minimally affected by the elimination of native groups, and do not alter our main conclusions.

policies make naturalization difficult (e.g., Germany), the exclusion of non-citizens eliminated a considerable proportion of minority respondents which also explains the sometimes high proportion of unclassified respondents (see Table 1). In East European countries, excluded respondents were mainly part of ethnic groups not incorporated in the national citizenry (e.g., Croatians in Slovenia). In Latvia, the high proportion of minority members without citizenship is due to the fact that only a minority of the Russian subgroup has Latvian citizenship. The overall mean proportion of non-citizen minority members was 2.5% for the 2003 dataset. Recent research has shown that recent immigrants express less patriotism and less state identification than other minority groups (Elkins & Sides, 2007). Our classification should therefore yield a more conservative test of our hypotheses than analyses performed on all minority members, irrespective of their citizenship status. Preliminary analyses indeed confirmed this assumption, showing asymmetry effects which were either unaffected or made slightly stronger when non-citizens were included.

Country level variables

The three country level characteristics expected to moderate ethnic asymmetry were assessed with the Human Development Index (HDI), the Alesina indicator of ethnic fractionalisation (EDiv), and the Gini indicator of inequality (Ineq). The Human Development Index measures the average achievements in a country in three basic dimensions of human development: a long and healthy life (assessed with life expectancy at birth), knowledge (measured with a combination of the adult literacy rate and the combined primary, secondary, and tertiary gross enrollment ratio), and a decent standard of living (assessed with GDP per capita). We retrieved the HDI 2003 from the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP, 2005) website (http://hdr.undp.org/en/statistics). The ethnic diversity (fractionalization) indicator was taken from Alesina, Devleeschauwer, Easterly, Kurlat, and Wacziarg (2003). The Gini coefficient of income inequality and wealth distribution was taken from the UN Human development report 2005. Table 2 presents the country details for the three indicators.[4]

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[4] Preliminary analyses were carried out with a number of alternative indicators, including GDP, linguistic diversity, poverty, social, health and military spending. The three indicators were retained because they reflect social domains

Country level variables were standardized separately for the first dataset (33 countries from ISSP 2003) and the second dataset (15 countries from ISSP 2003 supplemented with 5 five countries from ISSP 1995).

Individual level measures

One item measuring *ethnic identification* was available in the ISSP dataset, assessing perceived closeness to one's ethnic group (reverse coded: 1 = *not close at all,* 2 = *not very close,* 3 = *close,* 4 = *very close*). Since our multilevel analyses test the moderating role of the three country level variables on the relationship between the individual-level variables of ethnic identification and of national ideologies, ethnic identification was standardized country by country, thereby eliminating country differences in mean levels of ethnic identification (Hofmann & Gavin, 1998).

National identification, the first dependent variable, was also measured with a single-item measure asking perceived "closeness to respondents' country" (1 = *not close at all,* 2 = *not very close,* 3 = *close,* 4 = *very close*).

Nationalism, the second dependent variable, was assessed with five items: (a) "I would rather be a citizen of country X than of any other country in the world"; (b) "The world would be a better place if people from other countries were more like people from country X"; (c) "Generally, country X is better than most other countries"; (d) "Country X should follow its own interests, even if this leads to conflict with other nations"; and (e) "People should support their own country even if the country is in the wrong." Reliability coefficients for each country are presented in Table 2.[5] The dimension of nationalism was assessed with five-point scales and recoded such that 1 represents a low level of

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hypothesized to moderate asymmetry (quality of life, diversity and inequality). Unavoidably, the indicators were correlated with each other (2003 / 1995 & 2003 dataset: HDI-Diversity: -.44 / -.46, HDI-Inequality: -.60 / -.58, Diversity-Inequality: .42 / .67).

[5] Davidov (2009) used items (b) and (c) of the ISSP 2003 dataset to test for measurement equivalence of nationalism across 34 countries. He found metric invariance across all countries, suggesting that relationships among nationalism and other theoretical constructs like ethnic group membership and ethnic identification can be meaningfully studied across these nations. However, the analysis did not support scalar invariance, making it problematic for comparing the means of nationalism across countries (which is not part of our hypothesis).

nationalism and 5 represents a high level of nationalism. The two dependent variables were then

transformed into 0 to 1 measures.

Overview of analyses

All analyses were carried out with the SPSS MIXED procedure. The results section first

presents descriptive statistics of national identification and nationalism by country. We will then show

multilevel regression analyses on minority-majority asymmetry with respect to the mean levels of

national identification and nationalism as well as the moderating effects of three country level

variables on this type of asymmetry. A second set of multilevel analyses investigates minority-majority

asymmetry with respect to the relationship between ethnic (subgroup) identification and national

identification / nationalism, as well as the moderating effects of the country level variables on this

relationship.

<div align="center">Results</div>

Descriptive country-by-country results

We start by summarizing country-by-country mean differences of levels of national

identification and nationalism between ethnic majority and minority members. The detailed results can

be found in the appendix. Separate ANCOVAs were performed for each national context, using ethnic

group membership (minority-majority) as the independent variable and controlling for sex, age and

education level. The results tended to show that majorities expressed higher national identification than

minorities. Furthermore these differences were statistically significant in 17 (including two marginally

significant differences) out of 33 national contexts. In all other countries, the differences were non

significant (with the exception of the Philippines which showed a marginally significant reverse

effect). For levels of nationalism a similar pattern of results was evidenced: nationalism was

significantly higher for majorities than minorities in 12 out of 33 contexts. A marginal difference in the

opposite direction was revealed for Germany, and significant opposite differences emerged for New

Zealand and the Philippines. Overall, these results provide initial evidence that majorities tend to

express higher levels of national identity and nationalism than minorities. While the observed differences were often rather modest and non-significant (partially due to small minority samples), the patterns were nevertheless consistent across the two measures.

Multilevel analyses

Multilevel analyses were performed to investigate the overall significance of the minority-majority asymmetry and to understand cross-national variation in these relationships. In all multilevel models, countries define the level-2 contexts, that is, the analysis takes into account the unique covariance structures of individual countries. All models included sex, age and education level as fixed, individual control variables at level-1 (the results of which are not shown due to space constraints). The intercept in each model refers to the predicted value of national identification or nationalism of a middle-aged male majority member with an intermediate level of education (all of which are coded as 0, see Methods section).

Before the actual analyses, we calculated the intraclass correlation coefficient (ICC) for empty models which yields the proportion of between-country variance to be explained with the appropriate level-2 variables (Hox, 2002). Since our hypotheses bear on fixed rather than random effects, the maximum likelihood (ML) estimation method was used (Snijders & Bosker, 1999, p. 56). The analysis then proceeded in two stages. In a first model, ethnic status (minority vs. majority) was entered both as a random and as a fixed effect variable (Level-1 model). The status effect was allowed to vary across countries since our hypotheses imply that ethnic group membership has differential effects on national attitudes depending on the historical and political features of national contexts (Hox, 2002). This first step tests the minority-majority asymmetry hypothesis independently of country characteristics, while controlling for country specific covariance structures. In a second step, all three country level variables and the respective interaction terms with ethnic status were entered simultaneously into one model (Complete model). The cross-level interaction terms in these models test whether ethnic asymmetry is moderated as a function of country level variables. These models account for correlations between

level-2 variables (see Footnote 4). Model fit was assessed with the -2 log likelihood (-2LL) indicator (Kreft & De Leeuw, 1998). In the tables, we also indicate whether the complete model yields a significantly better model fit than the level-1 model.

As is the case in most cross-national research, our datasets had relatively small numbers of level-2 units (33 and 20, respectively). This shortcoming can be partially compensated for with the large number of individuals within groups. Kreft and De Leeuw (1998, p. 126) indicate 20 as a minimum number of groups to detect cross-level interactions. Nevertheless, in order to increase power, we also tested the effects of each of the three country-level variables in separate models. Given that the findings are largely consistent with those obtained in the complete models and in order to avoid redundancy in the presentation of the results, we only refer to these analyses when they produce different results than those obtained in the complete models.[6]

National Identification by Ethnic Status

ICC for national identification was 6.21%, thereby justifying the use of level-2 variables in subsequent analyses (Hox, 2002). In the first step, the level-1 model on national identification revealed a highly significant estimate of ethnic status (Table 2, left panel, Level-1 model), which means that minority membership decreased national identification by 6.0% on average. The results of level-2 variation indicated that country means differed ($p < .001$) and that ethnic status slopes varied significantly across countries ($p < .01$). These findings suggest that part of this country-level variance can be explained with appropriate level-2 variables and cross-level interaction terms.

In the second step, all level-2 variables and their interaction terms were entered simultaneously. The complete model yielded a marginally significant model improvement compared to the level-1 model, as assessed with the -2LL difference, $\chi2$ (6) = 10.9, p = .09. The findings revealed a significant cross-level interaction between ethnic status and ethnic diversity and a marginally significant cross-level interaction between ethnic status and social inequality. The predicted values for minorities and

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[6] Complete tables can be obtained from the first author.

majorities were computed at one standard deviation below and above mean ethnic diversity (Figure 1a) and social inequality (Figure 1b), respectively. Figure 1a shows that the difference in national identification between minorities and majorities is greater in high diversity contexts (8.5%) than in relatively homogeneous low diversity contexts (1.9%). This finding suggests that when the effects of social inequality and human development are controlled for, minority-majority asymmetry is higher in ethnically diverse contexts (such as South Africa, Canada, Latvia, and Switzerland) than in more homogeneous contexts (e.g., Japan, Portugal, and Scandinavian countries). Figure 1b shows the predicted values of national identification as a function of ethnic status and social inequality. In relatively egalitarian countries (mostly Scandinavian and former communist countries), the difference between minorities and majorities was higher (8.1%) than in countries characterized with high levels of inequality (2.3%, e.g., South Africa, Latin American countries, Philippines, USA). This unexpected finding indicates that greater asymmetry with respect to national identification was present in relatively egalitarian contexts, as compared to contexts with high levels of inequality. Countries both low on diversity and low on inequality (e.g., Scandinavian countries) seem thus defined by competing forces which both decrease asymmetry (because of homogeneity) and increase asymmetry (because of equality).

Nationalism by Ethnic Status

An identical set of analyses was performed on mean levels of nationalism. ICC for the empty model of nationalism was 10.06%, a relatively high value considering the large size of the database (Hox, 2002). Supporting the asymmetry hypothesis, the level-1 model presented in Table 2 evidenced that on average majorities scored 2.7% higher on nationalism than minorities. Again, country means differed ($p < .001$) and ethnic status slopes varied significantly across countries ($p < .01$).

We then performed a complete analysis which included all three country-level variables and the corresponding interaction terms (Complete model, Table 2). This model yielded a significantly improved overall fit compared to the level-1 model, $\chi2 (6) = 16.8$, $p < .01$. The results show a

significant effect of social inequality which suggests higher overall levels of nationalism in countries with large inequalities. The cross-level interaction between ethnic diversity and ethnic status was marginally significant, while the interaction between inequality and ethnic status was significant at $p <$ .05. The findings tell a story similar to the one found for national identification (Figures 2a and 2b): A greater difference between minorities and majorities was found in high diversity countries (3.9%) than in low diversity countries (0.3%). A greater difference was also evidenced in egalitarian countries (5.1%) compared to countries with high levels of inequality where minorities scored even slightly higher (0.9%) on nationalism than majorities.

National Identification Predicted by Ethnic Identification

We now turn to the analyses which test the asymmetry hypothesis with respect to the relationship between subgroup (ethnic) identification on the one hand, and superordinate (national) identification and endorsement of nationalist ideology on the other. According to our main prediction, these relationships should be stronger for majorities than for minorities. In addition, we investigate the extent to which these relationships are moderated by the three country-level variables. Since the ethnic identification item was included in a limited number of national surveys, the analyses could be performed on 20 national contexts only.

A first set of analyses was performed on national identification as the dependent variable. The empty model ICC for national identification was 7.58%. In all subsequent models, ethnic status, ethnic identification and the interaction between ethnic status and ethnic identification were allowed to vary across countries. Results for the level-1 model are presented in Table 3 (left panel): the ethnic status main effect indicates that majorities scored on average 7.8% higher on national identification than minorities, the ethnic identification main effect shows that an increase of one standard deviation of ethnic identification led to an increase of 6.6% of national identification for majorities (coded as 0), and the significant interaction term between ethnic status and ethnic identification suggests that the relationship between ethnic and national identification was moderated by ethnic status. Simple slopes

relating ethnic and national identification were then computed for minorities and majorities, using the procedure described by Aiken and West (1991). In line with our key prediction, the slope relating ethnic to national identification was stronger for majorities (.066, $p < .001$) than for minorities (.017, $p < .05$), even though it was also significant for minorities. The level-2 parameters showed significant country variation ($p < .01$) as well as significant variation of ethnic status slopes ($p < .05$), of ethnic identification slopes ($p < .01$), and also of the interaction between ethnic identification and ethnic status across countries ($p < .05$). These effects justify the inclusion of level-2 variables and cross-level interaction effects in subsequent models.

The complete model yielded a significantly improved fit compared to the level-1 model, $\chi 2$ $(12) = 21.3$, $p < .05$. Because of the smaller group sample size, we also observed greater standard errors compared to the previous set of analyses (Snijders & Bosker, 1999). The findings first show that human development moderated the relationship between ethnic and national identification when the effects of the other two variables were accounted for.[7] As illustrated in Figure 3, this result indicates that in countries characterized with a lower level of development (such as South Africa, Russia, Bulgaria and Latvia), the relationship between ethnic and national identification was stronger than in contexts with a higher level of development (such as Canada, France, the Netherlands and the U.S.).[8] Similarly, we observed a significant two-way interaction between ethnic identification and social inequality, suggesting that the relationship between the two levels of identification was, again unexpectedly, stronger in low rather than high inequality contexts. This effect was qualified by a marginally significant three-way interaction between ethnic status, ethnic identification and social inequality indicating that the difference between majority and minority slopes was greater in low inequality contexts (such as Denmark, the Czech and the Slovak Republic and Germany) than in high inequality contexts (such as South Africa, New Zealand, Israel and the U.S.). Figures 4a and 4b plot

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[7] This effect was not found when human development was entered in a separate model. Additional analyses showed that social inequality needs to be included in the model for this effect to emerge.
[8] Given the presence of the three-way interaction in the model, the coefficient of the two-way interaction captures the relationship between Human development and ethnic identification for majorities only (coded as 0). The minority slope, however, is not different from the majority slope, since the three-way interaction is non-significant.

the simple slopes of this effect (Aiken & West, 1991). Slope tests revealed that both majority slopes

were significant at $p < .001$ and $p < .01$, respectively, whereas the minority slope was non-significant

in the low equality contexts and significant at $p < .01$ in high inequality contexts. These findings

indicate a tendency that ethnic identification of majorities is more strongly related to national

identification in contexts with relatively low inequality (presumably due, in many instances, to highly

developed welfare states), compared to high inequality contexts.[9]

Nationalism Predicted by Ethnic Identification

A final set of analyses was performed on nationalism (ICC for empty model was 10.62%). The

level-1 model in Table 3 (right panel) shows, beyond the already described status effect, that ethnic

identification predicted support for nationalism, and that this relationship was qualified by ethnic

status. Simple slope analyses revealed that ethnic identification was strongly predictive of the

endorsement of nationalist ideology for majorities (.041, $p < .001$), but only marginally for minorities

(.009, $p = .07$). These results are consistent with the general asymmetry hypothesis, as they

demonstrate a stronger relationship between ethnic identification and nationalism for majorities than

for minorities. The level-2 parameters showed significant country variation ($p < .01$) as well as

significant variation of ethnic status slopes ($p < .05$), of ethnic identification slopes ($p < .01$), and

marginally significant variation of the interaction between ethnic identification and ethnic status across

countries ($p = .09$).

The complete model yielded a significantly improved fit compared to the level-1 model, $\chi2$

(12) = 33.3, $p < .001$. First, a significant two-way interaction emerged between ethnic diversity and

ethnic identification which indicates a stronger relationship between ethnic identification and

nationalism in homogeneous, low diversity contexts (Figure 5). Second, all three interaction terms

involving social inequality were marginally significant. In line with the finding presented in Figure 2b,

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[9] In the separate ethnic diversity model, we found a marginally significant interaction between ethnic diversity and ethnic identification, suggesting that the relationship between ethnic and national identification was somewhat stronger in low rather than high diversity contexts.

the status*inequality interaction reveals a greater minority-majority difference in low inequality

contexts. The ethnic identification*inequality interaction, in turn, indicates a stronger overall

relationship between ethnic identification and nationalism in low rather than high inequality contexts.

This effect was qualified by the three-way interaction which reveals that the slope difference between

minorities and majorities was stronger in low rather than high inequality contexts (Figures 6a and 6b).

The overall pattern was thus similar to the one found for national identification: relative equality

within countries produces stronger asymmetry, especially for minority and majority citizens with

strong ethnic identities. Simple slope analysis revealed that the relationship between ethnic

identification and nationalism was clearly significant for majorities in both high and low inequality

contexts (ps < .001), whereas for minorities this relationship was non-significant in both contexts.[10]

Discussion

National Identification and Nationalism among Ethnic Minority and Majority Groups

Descriptive country-by-country analyses revealed that in roughly half of the 33 national

contexts, ethnic majorities were significantly more identified with the nation and more strongly

endorsed nationalist ideologies than minorities, while in most other contexts, the differences went in

the same direction, but were not significant. Only the Philippine Muslim minority showed significantly

higher support for both national attitudes than the national majority, while in Germany and New

Zealand the difference went in the opposite direction for nationalism only.

Multilevel results confirmed the existence of widespread, though relatively moderate

asymmetry between ethnic minorities and majorities as they relate to national identification and to the

endorsement of a nationalist ideology. On average, members of dominant, majority subgroups scored

6.0% higher on national identification than members of minority groups who share national citizenship

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[10] Separate models yielded significant three-way interactions for all three country-level variables and also confirmed the two two-way interactions with ethnic identification found in the complete model. The difference of nationalist attitudes was particularly strong between minority and majority citizens with a strong ethnic identity in high development and homogeneous, low diversity contexts. These effects disappeared once social inequality was entered in the model.

with the majority members. The same was true for the endorsement of nationalism, but to a lesser

degree (2.7%).

This asymmetry was also uncovered with respect to the role of ethnic identification in

construing attitudes towards the nation: the more majorities were identified with their ethnic subgroup,

the more they identified with the nation and endorsed its nationalist ideology. Among members of

subordinate groups, in contrast, the relationships between the two national attitudes and subnational

identity were either nonexistent or at least less positive than the relationship among majorities. These

findings suggest that for dominant ethnic majorities there is a strong positive association between

loyalty to one's nation and loyalty to one's ethnic subgroup. For subordinate minorities, on the other

hand, ethno-cultural identification is largely orthogonal to national identification and nationalism,

thereby implying that ethno-cultural and national loyalties generally refer to two independent

dimensions of identity and self-definition. We can therefore conclude that the asymmetry in attitudes

towards the nation-state between members of ethnic minority and majority groups appears to be a

fairly generalized phenomenon, but which nevertheless varies considerably from country to country.

Some of this variation was captured with the country-level moderators studied in our research.

National-level Characteristics as Moderators of Ethnic Asymmetry

Our findings provided mixed support for the moderating role of human development, ethnic

diversity and social inequality of countries. The level of human development within countries did not

have an impact on mean differences of national identification and nationalism between minorities and

majorities. However, when controlling for diversity and inequality, human development had an impact

on the relationship between ethnic and national identification: in low development contexts (e.g., South

Africa, Russia, Bulgaria and Latvia), ethnic identification was more strongly related to national

identification than in highly developed contexts (e.g., Canada, France, the Netherlands and the U.S.),

for both minorities and majorities. Assuming that a strong overall relationship between ethnic and

national identification reflects an ethnic conception of the nation-state, this finding suggests that the

nation is somewhat more likely to be viewed as ethnically defined in low rather than high development contexts. While it is difficult to know what exactly drives this result, we may speculate that such attitudes reflect institutional settings and a state building process (e.g., the control of state institutions by ethnic majorities or the political dominance of the majority language) which are more likely to be based on ethnic criteria in less developed contexts (Wimmer, 1997). Yet, given that ethnic status does not moderate this effect, our hypothesis is not confirmed. Instead, it appears that ethnic minorities in low development contexts establish an equally strong relationship between ethnic and national identification as majorities. This finding might be due to the fact that minorities in low development contexts are less likely to originate from (recent) immigration (as is the case in many high development contexts), but are rather longstanding residents in the given country. Their allegiance to the nation is therefore presumably higher.

Human development produced another, seemingly contradictory result for nationalism: Minority-majority asymmetry between highly identified citizens was greater in high rather than low development contexts, but this result disappeared once inequality was controlled for. Given the correlation in the ethnic identification dataset between human development and social inequality ($r = -.58$), this result is likely to be due to higher equality in high development contexts.

In line with the prediction according to which high ethnic diversity increases asymmetry, ethnic diversity moderated mean differences between minorities and majorities for both national identification and nationalism. Ethnic diversity decreased both national identification and nationalism of minorities, but did not affect national attitudes of majorities. These results suggest that relatively homogeneous contexts exert a pressure for assimilation for minorities, thereby reducing asymmetry effects in terms of endorsement of national attitudes. For ethnic identification, however, a pattern more in line with the alternative hypothesis emerged: in ethnically homogeneous contexts, ethnic identification was found to play a greater role in predicting national identification and nationalism than in ethnically diverse contexts, especially when social inequality was not controlled for. Yet, the

moderating effect of status disappeared once social inequality was accounted for, because diversity and inequality are correlated ($r = .67$). It is therefore difficult to tell apart the respective impacts of ethnic diversity and social inequality. Notwithstanding this correlation, the findings suggest that ethnic homogeneity (often coupled in the real world with low inequality) gives rise to a majority-dominated national context which increases an ethnic conception of the nation (homogeneity increases asymmetry), while attenuating minority-majority differences in national attitudes (diversity increases asymmetry).

The most consistent results were found with respect to social and economic inequality. First, high levels of within-country inequality increase overall levels of nationalism, possibly reflecting popular support for nationalist foreign policies pursued by some countries with high levels of inequality (e.g., the U.S., Russia). Second, somewhat paradoxically and contrary to our expectations, *low* levels of inequality decrease national identification and nationalism of minorities compared to majorities, while no difference between minorities and majorities was found in high inequality contexts. In terms of ethnic identification between minorities and majorities, we observed that country-level *equality* fuelled the relationship between ethnic identification and both national identification and nationalism for majorities, while for minorities this relationship was weaker in egalitarian contexts.

To sum up then, differences between ethnic minorities and majorities in terms of national attitudes were strongest for citizens who were highly identified with their ethnic groups in highly developed, ethnically homogeneous and egalitarian, welfare-state based national contexts. Since the three country-level variables were correlated with each other, these effects are likely to at least partially reflect the same underlying mechanism. Yet, we also found that when controlling for diversity and human development, the effects of social inequality remained, by and large significant. The fact that we found a consistent pattern for the effects of social inequality for both national identification and nationalism further underscores the key role played by social inequality in accounting for the minority-majority asymmetry. This suggests that social and economic inequality is the most reliable

moderator of ethnic asymmetry among the variables under scrutiny, and this in the unexpected direction that equality actually *increases* asymmetry.

These findings point towards a stronger, majority-defined ethnic conception of the nation-state in countries with a strong welfare state tradition, founded on the primacy of social rights and on the egalitarian redistribution of resources (low Gini inequality scores in our dataset characterize for example Denmark, Germany, the Czech Republic and the Slovak Republic). This result can be seen in light of research on the relationship between cultural diversity and economic redistribution which has shown that a strong welfare state calls for the definition of clear boundaries between national citizens who are entitled to benefits and those who are not (see Alesina & Glaeser, 2004; Banting & Kymlicka, 2006). Our results may indirectly reflect such a political strategy which consists of demarcating the circle of beneficiaries by membership in the ethnic majority group.

The only finding at odds with this equality-based foundation of asymmetry concerns the stronger impact of ethnic identification on national identification (but not on nationalism) in low development contexts, at least when diversity and inequality were controlled for. This finding may seem paradoxical since inequality and human development are negatively correlated (at *r* = -.58). It therefore seems plausible that two contextual features of national contexts are independently at work in moderating minority-majority asymmetry, one involving a history of ethnicity-based nation-building presumably associated with low levels of human development, the other one based on more developed and relatively homogeneous nations-states characterized with egalitarian welfare state policies which require an unambiguous definition of potential recipients. In both instances, we can assume that ethnic group membership is a relatively salient feature of the country's political culture, although for different reasons.

Conclusion

A number of caveats of this research need to be mentioned. First, in terms of methodology, the measures used in the ISSP survey are not ideal for a definitive test of these hypotheses. It is regrettable

that ethnic and national identity could only be assessed with single items, thereby hampering the validity and reliability of these measures. Due to superior measurement quality, our nationalism findings may therefore be more reliable (Davidov, 2009). Another methodological shortcoming concerns the sampling of minority groups. The dataset often contained an inadequately small number of minority group members who were also legal citizens of the country. Given the social and political importance of understanding how ethnic groups relate to multiculturalism and nationhood in ever more diverse societies, future surveys on these topics should use ethno-cultural group membership as a stratification criterion in order to sample an appropriate number of non-majority members in each country. Furthermore, we were confronted, as all comparative attitude research, with the relatively low number of level-2 units for multilevel analyses. The findings must therefore be treated with some circumspection. Still, the ISSP is the most appropriate international survey to investigate ethnic asymmetry, and the pooling of the two datasets for the ethnic identification analyses as well as the large number of individuals within groups compensates, at least to some extent, for these data limitations.

All of these caveats notwithstanding this research was, to our knowledge, the first attempt to study cross-nationally how ethnic subgroup identification by minorities and majorities relates to national identification and nationalism, and to explore the degree to which asymmetries in these relationships are moderated by country-level factors. Notwithstanding some exceptions, national identification and nationalism were by and large similarly moderated by ethnic status, ethnic identification and country-level characteristics. Our results confirm those obtained by Elkins and Sides (2007) for the World Values Survey, namely that there is a "significant gap between the [national] attachment of majorities and that of minorities" (p. 705), but show in addition the central role of country-level characteristics which measure social cleavages within countries, that is, social inequality and ethnic diversity.

The political significance of our findings, however, is subject to debate. One could argue that a few percentage points of difference between minorities and majorities have few apparent implications for political and social life in multi-ethnic states. This is hard to know, but our point is that these differences are contingent upon the historical, political and economic context of nation-states on the one hand, and on the level of ethnic identification of citizens on the other. Our research has uncovered some of the factors which are likely to increase the gap between ethnic minorities and majorities in terms of their state loyalty and their endorsement of nationalist policies. In these contexts, ethnicity is also more likely to be a salient feature of political life. Whether or not the described minority-majority asymmetry translates into real-world politics then depends on the specific national circumstances. Nationhood and ethno-national attachment are long term processes that evolve as a function of political decisions regarding ethnic differences within the nation-state (Brubaker, 2004). Thoroughly integrating political and historical factors in future research on ethnic asymmetry should shed more light on the nature of the differences between ethnic minorities and majorities with respect to their attitudes towards the nation-state.

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Appendix

Cross-national Descriptive Statistics of National Identification (Nid) and Nationalism

(Nlm), Scale Reliability of Nationalism, and Country-Level Indicators

	ISSP 2003					Country-level indicators		
	Δ Nid	η^2	Δ Nlm	η^2	α	HDI	EDiv	Ineq
Australia	.04	–	.00	–	.68	.96	.09	.35
Austria	.04*	.5	.06***	1.7	.69	.94	.11	.30
Bulgaria	.05*	.4	.03+	.3	.56 [a]	.81	.40	.32
Canada	.11***	4.3	.03**	.8	.60	.95	.71	.33
Chile	.04	–	-.11	–	.62	.85	.19	.57
Czech Republic	.02	–	.04*	.5	.69	.87	.32	.25
Denmark	.03	–	.01	–	.66	.94	.08	.25
Finland	.10***	1.2	.04*	.3	.70	.94	.13	.27
France	.01	–	-.01	–	.74	.94	.10	.33
Germany(E&W)	.00	–	-.04+	.3	.66	.93	.17	.28
Great Britain	-.09	–	.06	–	.76	.94	.12	.36
Hungary	.10*	.6	.04	–	.59	.86	.15	.27
Ireland	.12+	.3	.06	–	.65	.95	.12	.36
Israel	.17***	10.9	.01	–	.63	.92	.34	.36
Japan	-.20	–	.09	–	.67	.94	.01	.25
Latvia	.12***	4.4	.07***	4.4	.63	.84	.59	.34
Netherlands	.08*	.3	.09**	.7	.70	.94	.11	.31
New Zealand	.00	–	-.05*	.8	.62	.93	.40	.36
Norway	.03	–	.02	–	.68	.96	.06	.26
Philippines	-.06+	.3	-.08**	1.0	.54	.76	.24	.46
Poland	.14	–	.02	–	.74	.86	.12	.34
Portugal	.03	–	.04*	.4	.62	.90	.05	.39
Russia	.04*	.2	.01	–	.70	.80	.25	.31
Slovak Republic	.18***	6.1	.11***	3.7	.72	.85	.25	.26
Slovenia	.06*	.5	.01	–	.70	.90	.22	.28
South Africa	.05+	.7	-.03	–	.72	.66	.75	.58
Spain	.19***	8.6	.14***	8.4	.74	.93	.42	.33
Sweden	.10**	.7	.00	–	.69	.95	.06	.25
Switzerland	.05**	1.2	.08***	4.1	.65	.95	.53	.33
Taiwan	-.06	–	.05	–	.52	.93	.27	.34
Uruguay	.02	–	-.01	–	.60	.84	.25	.45
USA	.11***	3.0	.05***	1.2	.68	.94	.49	.41
Venezuela	-.14	–	-.04	–	.52	.77	.50	.49

Note. Mean differences (with significance levels) between majority and minorities in national identification (Δ Nid) and nationalism (ΔNlm), corrected for age, sex, and education level (scale from 0 to 1). Positive differences denote higher value for majorities. η^2 = effect size for significant effects (in %). Dashes indicate that effect size was not computed due to non-significance. Countries in *italics* were included in the ethnic identification analyses (1995 countries when ethnic identification was unavailable in 2003 database).

HDI: Human development index 2003 (UNDP, 2005), EDiv: Ethnic fractionalisation index (Alesina et al., 2003), Ineq: Gini coefficient of income inequality and wealth distribution (UNDP, 2005).

[a] In Bulgaria, the item *[Country] should follow its own interests, even if this leads to conflicts with other nations* was missing.

*** $p < .001$, ** $p < .01$, * $p < .05$, + $p < .10$.

Author note

Table 1

Sample Overview, Classification into Dominant Majority and Subordinate Minority Groups

	1995			2003			Main minorities
	Majo	Mino	Uncl	Majo	Mino	Uncl	
Australia[a]				1966	107	110	European, Asian
Austria	885	97	25	773	132	101	Czech, Hungarian, Balkan
Bulgaria	926	162	17	917	130	22	Turkish, Roma
Canada	742	605	196	645	443	123	French, Black, Asians, Latinos
Chile[b]				1484	3	18	Muslim, Hindu
Czech Rep.				1049	148	79	Moravian, German, Slovak
Denmark				1091	48	183	Asian, Black, European
Finland[a]				1255	93	31	Swedish
France				1400	173	96	North African, Jewish
Germany	1748	58	88	1037	71	179	Russian, Polish, European
Great Britain[b]				827	17	29	Muslim, Hindu
Hungary				1001	19	1	Roma
Ireland				1019	10	36	British, American
Israel[a]				826	372	20	Israel Arabs
Japan				1090	2	10	Chinese
Latvia				586	195	219	Russian, Polish
Netherlands				1700	44	79	Creole, Turkish
New Zealand				705	60	271	Chinese, Pacific Islanders
Norway				1366	20	83	West European, Asian
Philippines[b]				1148	52	0	Muslim
Poland[b]				1275	2	0	Muslim
Portugal				1394	106	102	(Other)
Russia				2128	237	18	Caucasian, Jewish, Byelorussian
Slovak Rep.				1029	118	5	Hungarian
Slovenia	950	75	11	997	77	19	Hungarian, Croatian, Serbian
South Africa				303	226	1954	Indians
Spain[a]				982	158	72	Catalan, Gallego, Basque
Sweden				1078	43	65	Finnish, Balkan, Middle East
Switzerland[a]				713	222	102	French, Italian, Balkan, Spanish
Taiwan				2004	7	5	Other Asian
Uruguay				635	123	350	Brazilian, Argentinean
USA				945	208	63	Black, Latino, Asian
Venezuela[b]				1135	3	61	Muslim, Hindu
Total	5251	997	337	36503	3669	4506	

Note. Majo = Dominant Majority; Mino = Subordinate Minority; Uncl = Unclassified (respondents with mixed origins and minority members without national citizenship were left unclassified and excluded from all analyses). Maoris in New Zealand, Natives in the U.S and in Canada, Blacks and Coloreds in South Africa were not classified (see text). In Portugal all minority groups were classified as "Other". Countries in *italics* were included in the ethnic identification analyses (1995 countries when ethnic identification was unavailable in 2003 database).
[a] Classification based on language.
[b] Classification based on religion.

Table 2

Multilevel Analyses on National Identification and Nationalism (33 national contexts)

	National identification				Nationalism			
	Level-1 model		Complete model		Level-1 model		Complete model	
	Est.	*SE*	*Est.*	*SE*	*Est.*	*SE*	*Est.*	*SE*
Intercept	.789	.011	.790	.011	.582	.011	.584	.009
Ethnic status (0=Majority, 1=Minority)	-.060***	.012	-.052***	.010	-.027**	.009	-.021***	.008
Human development			.011	.015			.000	.014
Ethnic diversity			.008	.013			.004	.011
Social inequality			.015	.015			.028*	.013
Status * *Human development*			-.010	.014			-.005	.011
Status * *Ethnic diversity*			-.033**	.011			-.018+	.009
Status * *Social inequality*			.029+	.015			.030*	.012
VARIANCE COMPONENTS								
Residual (Individual-level)	.0535***	.0004	.0535***	.0004	.0287***	.0002	.0287***	.0002
Intercept (Country-level)	.0038***	.0009	.0036***	.0009	.0036***	.0009	.0028***	.0007
Ethnic status	.0031**	.0010	.0020**	.0007	.0020**	.0006	.0014**	.0005
-2LL	-3316.5		-3327.4+		-27961.4		-27978.2**	

Note. N=38'998 (National identification) and 39'534 (Nationalism). Effects of control variables (sex, age and education) are not shown. Level-2 variables are in italics. Significance levels for -2LL of complete models indicate model improvement compared to Level-1 model.
*** $p < .001$, ** $p < .01$, * $p < .05$, + $p < .10$.

Table 3

Multilevel Analyses on National Identification and Nationalism, with Ethnic Identification as Predictor Variable (20 national contexts)

	National identification				Nationalism			
	Level-1 model		Complete model		Level-1 model		Complete model	
	Est.	*SE*	*Est.*	*SE*	*Est.*	*SE*	*Est.*	*SE*
Intercept	.785	.016	.787	.016	.582	.015	.582	.015
Ethnic status (0=Majo, 1=Mino)	-.078***	.015	-.074***	.014	-.036**	.012	-.030*	.011
Ethnic ID	.066***	.007	.065***	.006	.041***	.004	.039***	.003
Ethnic status * Ethnic ID	-.045**	.013	-.041**	.012	-.035***	.007	-.033***	.004
Human development (HDI)			.016	.022			.006	.021
Ethnic diversity			-.002	.022			.018	.021
Social inequality			.035	.027			.008	.026
Status * *HDI*			-.023	.019			-.002	.014
Status * *Ethnic diversity*			-.027	.020			-.023	.015
Status * *Social inequality*			.006	.023			.035+	.017
Ethnic ID * *HDI*			-.025**	.008			-.007	.005
Ethnic ID * *Ethnic diversity*			-.011	.008			-.010*	.005
Ethnic ID * *Social inequality*			-.023*	.010			-.010+	.006
Status * Ethnic ID * *HDI*			.012	.015			-.005	.005
Status * Ethnic ID * *Ethnic diversity*			-.005	.016			.007	.005
Status * Ethnic ID *Social inequality*			.036+	.018			.014+	.006
VARIANCE COMPONENTS								
Residual (Individual-level)	.0517***	.0005	.0517***	.0005	.0297***	.0003	.0297***	.0003
Intercept (Country-level)	.0051**	.0016	.0046**	.0015	.0047**	.0015	.0042**	.0014
Ethnic status	.0035*	.0014	.0028*	.0012	.0022*	.0008	.0016*	.0007
Ethnic identification	.0010**	.0003	.0005**	.0002	.0003**	.0001	.0002**	.0001
Ethnic status * Ethnic identification	.0022*	.0022	.0016*	.0008	.0005+	.0003	.0000	.0001
-2LL	-2591.9		-2613.2*		-15466.3		-15499.6***	

Note. N = 22'711 (National identification) and 23'099 (Nationalism). Effects of control variables (sex, age and education) are not shown. Level-2 variables are in italics. Significance levels for -2LL of complete models indicate model improvement compared to Level-1 model.
*** $p < .001$, ** $p < .01$, * $p < .05$, + $p < .10$.

Figures 1a and 1b

Predicted values for national identification by ethnic status and ethnic diversity / social inequality of country

Figures 2a and 2b

Predicted values for nationalism by ethnic status and ethnic diversity / social inequality of

country

Figure 3

Simple slopes for national identification predicted by ethnic identification and level of human

development of country

Note. Unstandardized multilevel regression coefficients.
*** $p < .001$, ** $p < .01$, * $p < .05$, + $p < .10$.

Figures 4a and 4b

Simple slopes for national identification predicted by ethnic identification, ethnic status and

level of social inequality of country

Note. Unstandardized multilevel regression coefficients.
*** $p < .001$, ** $p < .01$, * $p < .05$, + $p < .10$.

Figure 5

Simple slopes for nationalism predicted by ethnic identification and level of ethnic diversity of

country

Note. Unstandardized multilevel regression coefficients.
*** $p < .001$, ** $p < .01$, * $p < .05$, + $p < .10$.

Figures 6a and 6b

Simple slopes for nationalism predicted by ethnic identification, ethnic status and level of

social inequality of country

Note. Unstandardized multilevel regression coefficients.
*** $p < .001$, ** $p < .01$, * $p < .05$, + $p < .10$.