THE INDEPENDENT PSYCHOLOGICAL EFFECTS OF PARTICIPATION IN DEMONSTRATIONS

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Street demonstrations have received the lion's share of scholarly attention to collective action. This article starts by returning to this research in order to raise some methodological questions about how to collect data on demonstrations and on the validity of the subsequent results. Next, based on my own research on demonstrations, I suggest some questions that deserve to be analyzed. In particular, I argue that we should work more on the psychological effects of participation in demonstrations. One potential line of investigation would be to more systematically explore the socializing effects of political events. Indeed, vivid political events should be important catalysts because they can have significant effects. Events may have an impact at any age but socializing effects will differ based on one's position in the life cycle, from conversion for younger participants to substantiation for older participants. I hypothesize, in line with Mannheim's (1952) "impressionable years" model of socialization research, that people especially recall events as important if they happened in their adolescence or early adulthood.

Today street demonstrations constitute a legitimate form of political action for a number of actors: participants, those that are targeted, those thought to benefit from their claims and the general public. As a mode of political expression, they reflect an extensive array of practices, codified and systematized, even if they are still subject to change. They are historically constituted and culturally defined, yet they remain in constant evolution. Like any form of political action, their history is inseparable from the conjunctures that produced them and which have accompanied their progressive institutionalization.

Here, I define the street demonstration as "any temporary occupation by a number of people of an open place, public or private, which directly or indirectly includes the expression of political opinions" (Fillieule 1997). As such, street demonstrations include at least four elements. The first is the temporary occupation of open physical spaces, whether public (the street) or private (a shopping mall). This excludes numerous meeting places and assembly halls, as well as marches from workshop to workshop within a company on strike. Next is expressivity. Every demonstration's primary dimension is expressivity, whether for its participants or for the general public. This second criterion allows us to exclude gatherings of heterogeneous crowds (what McPhail [1991: 177] calls "prosaic") that lack a unifying principle, as well as political actions requiring discretion or secrecy. The third is the number of participants. Given that there is no means of sociologically determining the minimum number of individuals likely to act collectively, it is useless to set an arbitrary threshold. This factor is only mentioned to draw attention to the necessary distinction at work amongst various modes of individual political action, while still recognizing the rather amorphous distinctions between them. Finally, there is the political nature of the demonstration. Many

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apparently nonpolitical events may be indicators of a sociopolitical crisis, as has been shown in much research on the changing orientation of ceremonial rallies (for example, political burials), hooliganism, and suburban riots. Also, let us briefly consider that the demonstration should translate into or open up the expression of demands of a political or social nature. From this viewpoint, the political nature of demonstrations might be unintentional—that is, not directly perceptible by the protagonists. Our definition does not limit demonstrations merely to a street procession. While the street march constitutes the core of the demonstration, more often it is only one element within a sequence of actions, including stationary gatherings, barricades, the closing of a street or area (complete blockage or partial), sit ins, die ins, kiss ins, etc. (McPhail 1991, 2007; Fillieule 1997). In addition, the types of action blur, one following the other, all in the same spirit. It is often difficult to distinguish a march from a rally. Marches often end in rallies and this is frequently the point in time when there is confusion and incidents occur.

Beyond these core elements of what a demonstration is, there is the interaction—both concrete and symbolic—between a number of types of actors. In the physical space that brings them together, the first actors that come to mind are the demonstrators themselves. We will be careful not to consider them to be an indivisible entity. Demonstrations are usually presented as the expression of the desire of a well-defined group. This is misleading since each demonstration includes at least four groups: those who march, the object (usually a symbol, an organism, or a personality), the immediate spectators, and the social base whose feelings demonstrators claim to express. More precisely, one may distinguish the organizers or stewards of the demonstration—who may or may not be present on the ground—from simple participants. In fact, these two groups are sometimes hostile to each other outside of the cause that seems to unite them temporarily. Moreover, we must also consider the arrival of counterdemonstrators, who are as heterogeneous as their adversaries. These demonstrators and counterdemonstrators can find themselves in the physical presence of those they are challenging, such as bosses, heads of companies, politicians, or bureaucrats. Recognizing that dynamics vary greatly by particular circumstances, in most of the West the interaction between demonstrators and their targets on the ground is orderly and regulated by the forces of law and order. These forces include city and traffic police, municipal police, specialized public order forces (for example, carabinieri in Italy or mobile gendarmes in France, park police in Washington, DC near the White House), the civil guard or regular army, firemen, private militias, and intelligence officers. These forces of law and order are generally under the direct command of political authorities.

Finally, a demonstration takes place in the presence of various publics who become aware of the demonstrators and might even be convinced by them. These publics include casual bystanders (that is, spectators who come to see the demonstration) and the staff of various print, radio, and television news outlets that are covering the event. The latter deliver their description of the facts, which they synthesize and reinterpret through selective and partial coverage of the positions and interpretations of various actors who are authorized to pronounce an opinion. These actors might include intellectuals, scientists, political or religious leaders, national or international authorities, economic actors, pressure groups, and even pollsters, who rely on the collection of “public opinion” before or after the event, or even during the event in the case of inquiries conducted during the actual marches.

In sum, demonstrations are characterized by the multiplicity of actors present and by the complexity of the struggles for meaning, which play out at various levels of interaction and interpretation. However, we should not lose sight of the fact that all this is only possible when a general agreement is reached around the shared meaning of the situation. This shared meaning is the best indicator of the relative fixity of this form of political struggle, and therefore the explicit and implicit rules of the game (that is, the legal framework and usages), which stem from a history of demonstrations and protest cultures, with their expected gestures, predictable upheavals, and frequent surprises and slips. Resorting to a demonstration, like other forms of
political action such as strikes or boycotts, then, is all part of participation in an arena of social conflicts—that is "an organized system of institutions, of procedures and of actors whose nature is to function as a way to call for action, in the double sense of expressing a demand for a response to a problem and, in the legal sense, as recourse" (Neveu 2011: 17-18).

**BRINGING THE DEMONSTRATORS BACK IN: THREE RESEARCH TRACKS**

The literature on demonstrations has developed dramatically during the last twenty years. However, this research has mainly focused on the strategic use of this mode of action by protest movements as one of many choices in the repertoire of available tactics, as well as on its institutional consequences. Hence, the neglect of the independent psychological effects of demonstrations is certainly one of the major blind spots of contemporary research in the field.

As Favre points out (2006: 193), "the act of demonstrating is also, if not first, self-centered; it is its own end and is largely indifferent to its echo in the public space." In other words, one of the questions posed here is that of its effects on the participants themselves. As Casquette states, "demonstrations are also an internal form of communication. In effect, to the extent that they provide participants with the sense of being engaged in a common cause with a large number of like-minded people who share similar feelings about an issue, mass gatherings also work as opportunities to cement a given social group" (2006: 48).

Indeed, a link is generally established *a priori* between, on the one hand, the collective character of the action—which may be seen in a demonstration as the apparent coordination of gestures, such as simultaneous shouting—and, on the other hand, the postulate that all gestures are an indication of belonging to a common cause and sharing a common enthusiasm. Finally, this unanimity would engender, at the same time, involvement (through reinforcing convictions), belief in the efficacy of the struggle (through an illusion generated by the numbers involved), and political socialization. So, it is not a question of denying *a priori* all these effects of participation in demonstrations, but rather it is a question of exploring them thoroughly before drawing definitive conclusions.

In what follows, I will emphasize the microlevel of individual effects of participation in demonstrations by exploring three long-neglected research tracks: the circular reaction and the convergence and emergence models. These models suggest that demonstrations can have three kinds of effects on participants. First, demonstrations are occasions to build or reinforce group solidarity and identity. Second, demonstrations are moments of collective excitement in which protest rituals contribute to adhesion and unanimity. Solidarity and adhesion are strongly related and we will not separate them here. It is in the mutually inclusive chanting and gesturing that solidarity and collective identity are created. The sight and sounds of others nearby behaving as one is behaving yields the sense that "we" are together in word and deed. To return to Durkheim's much discussed formula, it is the rite that creates belief. Third, there is a socializing effect in the act of demonstrating, in the same way that voting is part of the process of learning to be a citizen. More generally, this latter hypothesis comes back to the idea that political experiences provide opportunities for socialization by plunging individuals into a collective dynamic, which translates both into an intensification of interpersonal contacts and a greater attention to the flow of media information.

**DEMONSTRATION: A COMPLEX SOCIAL PHENOMENON UNDER STUDY**

Because a street demonstration is a complex and multiform social occurrence, studying it requires a variety of viewpoints and the adoption of a certain methodological pluralism. Research in the field, especially since the end of the 1980s, has developed considerably. Fortunately, this growth has been in a cumulative fashion, offering researchers a vast and diversified array of data.
On one hand, the long view taken by historians allows for a consideration of demonstrations in terms of political culture and memory. Demonstrations can play a role in spreading and relaying history in the living memory of participants and in the historical memory of organizations. The historical paradigm does not allow for the construction of a statistical series on a time scale since the sources are extremely disparate and the construction of quantitative indices by public authorities is a relatively recent phenomenon (post 1968, for most European countries). However, in the contemporary period, gathering protest event data—more or less homogeneous and continuous information about demonstrations in Europe and the United States—has allowed for the comparative analysis of a number of factors. First is the question of how this form of action emerges and becomes established. Second is the variety of scale and the forms it can assume in various locales. Third is its supposed effect in specific institutional contexts and particular conjunctures. In addition, protest event analysis has highlighted the nationalization and internationalization of various repertoires (see Fillieule 2007 for a critical review).

Other authors have focused more on the place of demonstrations in the repertoire of action, the strategies of professional or social groups, or the views of public authorities. Still others have more closely examined how states and police forces have historically developed the doctrines, practical rules, and operating procedures that have contributed to the construction of this type of action (see della Porta and Fillieule 2004 and Fillieule and della Porta 2006 for reviews). Case studies raise other questions and offer very different answers. For example, a better understanding of the violent demonstrations in France in the context of Algeria’s liberation war (House and Macmaster 2006 on October 17, 1961; Dewerpe 2006 on February 8, 1962) contributes to the history of the state and political groups.

In the symbolic interaction tradition, street demonstrations are first and foremost performances in which a multiplicity of actors are involved in sequences of interaction, usually structurally regulated, but whose logic can be better understood through a close examination of events and motives. A vast field of research presents itself here. From an ecological perspective—inspired by Goffman’s Behavior in Public Places (1963) and subsequently developed by Lofland and Fink (1982) in Symbolic Sit Ins—one might study the very morphology of street demonstrations or their dramaturgical dimension. This type of approach allows us to start from the idea that individuals in crowds—here, in politically oriented gatherings—are involved in social relations that effect individuals, groups, and the development of the situation. Studying these effects requires very detailed observation and examination.

McPhail’s (1991) research is among the most remarkable in this area. Since the 1970s, McPhail has systematically observed political demonstrations, gatherings, and crowds, using note taking, photography, and film. Systematic observation using a rigorous coding scheme (McPhail and Schweingruber 1999; McPhail, Schweingruber, and Berns 1997) leads him to conclude that the dynamic variation and complexity of the cycling between individual and collective actions require a model that accounts for recursive processes of causality, in which actors pursue their goals and adjust their means in a dynamic environment (McPhail 2006).

The research mentioned here is significant for those hoping to understand the nature of a street demonstration. Demonstrations cannot be reduced to a series of mechanical actions, and individuals in a crowd do not act like single human beings. While individuals behave in accordance with their predispositions and resources, they are also led to a given sequence of actions by the very logic of the interactions in which they are involved; an approach founded only on rational calculation, inattentive to the environmental dimension of the event, would fall short. However, this is still not sufficient for at least two reasons. First, one must, as Goffman suggested (1963), devote some attention to the manner in which the observable behavior of demonstrations was constructed and formalized in the long run. In other words, social situations cannot be understood from single and synchronic observations. It is also necessary to focus on the demonstrators themselves, especially their social identity and the meaning that they attribute to their action in the situation.
The recent development of sophisticated methods for gathering data during demonstrations has offered new insights into the sociography of demonstrating populations, their motives, their political opinions and formal affiliations to political parties, unions and voluntary groups. Before the end of the 1990s, very few researchers tried to collect individual data during the course of a protest event. One should mention, among a few others, John Seidler and his colleagues who studied static gatherings, focusing on exploring the mutual contagion of emotions (Seidler, Meyer, and McGillivray 1977; Meyer and Seidler 1978). Also, Ladd and his colleagues (Ladd, Hood, and Van Liere 1983), on the occasion of an antinuclear rally in Washington, DC, tried to correlate the issues defended by the organizations with the representations and beliefs of the demonstrators themselves, concluding that an ideological consensus is not a necessary precondition for participation in collective action.

One had to wait for more than a dozen years for individual surveys at rallies to be used once again. In 1994 Favre and his colleagues conducted four surveys with the primary goal of producing a methodological reflection on sampling strategies. They were specifically interested in how to ensure that each participant had the same chance of being questioned during the event (Favre, Fillieule, and Mayer 1997). Subsequently, the proposed method was replicated once in a research project on the normalization of the demonstration in Belgium (Van Aelst and Walgrave 2001). From this point on, the use of these survey designs became commonplace, particularly with the emergence and development of anti-globalization protests and rallies. Individual surveys at rallies appeared to be a powerful and appropriate method for many different reasons. These events represented real epiphanies for the movement. The public debate had revolved around labeling participants as “rioters,” “terrorists,” and “the losers of globalization,” or, on the contrary, as “rooted cosmopolitans,” and especially privileged members of society. Finally, one of the political, as well as academic, issues raised by this movement concerned the drawing of its boundaries.

To date, notwithstanding some occasional data collected on demonstrators collected, a team at the University of Florence was the first to launch an ambitious program to survey the global justice movement in Italy in various settings (Andretta, Della Porta, Mosca and Reiter 2002). This was followed by two Franco-Swiss surveys during the anti-G8 protest of Evian in Geneva and Lausanne and at the St. Denis European Social Forum in France (Fillieule and Blanchard 2004, 2005). A group coordinated by Stefaan Walgrave conducted the most ambitious survey project ever at the February 15, 2003 international protest against imminent war in Iraq. The survey was conducted simultaneously in some cities of the US, Great Britain, Spain, Italy, the Netherlands, Sweden, and Belgium (Walgrave and Rucht 2009). Finally, a team led by Klandermans, van Stekelenburg, and Walgrave has embarked on the most ambitious study of street demonstrations to date, in which approximately 80 demonstrations in nine different countries will be surveyed (see Klandermans, this issue).

While such an approach necessarily raises some methodological issues (Fillieule and Blanchard 2010), we now have access to a vast array of data on demonstrators, the way they participate, and their motives. In short, the literature shows that the sociodemographic and political profile of participants differs from that of the rest of the population in terms of its relative youth, greater affiliation with organizations, and higher level of education. Indeed, the vast majority of participants belong to interconnected networks and organizational structures. Finally, although results vary depending on the particular demonstration studied, it appears that participants are regularly involved in this sort of action. From this point of view, it is striking to observe that a good number of the participants in the anti-G8 protests in Europe have been first timers. This suggests that the power of this type of event and the nature of this cause can attract young participants (Fillieule and Blanchard 2004; Jossin 2010), which draws our attention to the possible socializing effects of the demonstration, at least on the young.
IDENTITY AND BELONGING

The question of individual effects of participation in crowds was first raised by early twentieth-century thinkers, such as Hippolyte Taine (2006), Gabriel Tarde (2011), and Gustave Le Bon (2006). These theorists sought to explain the formation of crowds by considering the psychological processes underlying collective phenomena. All three interpreted crowd formation as a form of mutual contagion of emotions among the participants—a contagion that produced a “collective soul” (Le Bon 2006). This early research does not provide us with adequate conceptual tools to study the mass phenomenon and is based on a reactionary vision, which explicitly denounces the phenomenon and condemns it to disappear without giving rise to an organized school of thought. However, the questions raised in these early works remain partially unanswered.

We will not retrace here the complex way in which these issues were framed by theories of collective behavior. Yet, we must stress that Robert Park was certainly the first, in The Crowd and the Public (1904), to present the principal postulate that in a crowd, affects and instincts combine through the mechanism of imitation to create a dynamic of collective excitement, a collective soul. Since the 1920s, Park’s research on crowds has been developed by various sociologists of the Chicago School. They advanced three major explanatory models of crowd behavior: the circular reaction, and the convergence and emergence models.

The Circular Reaction Model

Herbert Blumer forged the concept of circular reaction following the idea of hypnotic suggestion. He identified three routes by which individuals in a crowd develop an “esprit de corps,” which he describes, following Park, as “a form of group enthusiasm” (Blumer 1946: 208). This esprit de corps may first originate in a dialectic of unanimity/exclusion that allows a group (we) to distinguish itself from others (they). There we find the generally accepted idea that the formation of collective identities always occurs through the delineation or reinforcement of specific boundaries to ensure collective solidarity. The esprit de corps may also stem from the informal friendship among members of the same movement (Blumer 1946) and contribute to even more effective forms of organic solidarity since they occur in small groups, which are protected from any outside intrusion and function according to their own standards. Finally, group enthusiasm may be elicited through ceremonial and ritual behavior such as demonstrations, meetings, parades, and so on. Again, inspired by Park, Blumer insists on the idea that rituals and the symbols that accompany them (slogans, chants, flags and banners, etc.), are supposed to increase the feeling of community and of belonging to a group.

This description of the formation of an esprit de corps in a crowd is not far removed from what Durkheim—in The Elementary Forms of Religious Life, which was first published in 1912—describes as “collective effervescence.” Mariot summarizes the content of this notion, stressing that for Durkheim,

in the life of a human group, there are moments, most often traceable to their regularity, to their defined nature and the emotions they elicit, in which are recalled, developed and questioned, according to a characteristic formalization (in general through the intervention of symbols), standards, values, representations, and beliefs (the list is long) that define this group. These moments are called rites, or sometimes liturgies, or simply ceremonies. (2001: 14)

Also, Durkheim is pretty clear when he states that:

Within an assembly that ignites a common passion, we become susceptible to feelings and acts of which we are incapable when we are reduced to merely our own strengths.... It is for this reason that all parties, political, economic, or confessional, take pains to periodically hold meetings where their followers can renew their common faith by displaying it in common. To
fortify emotions which, left to themselves, would fade away, it is enough to bring together and place in closer and more active relationships those who are experiencing them. (1912: 299-300)

In moments of collective excitement—which can be engineered—"everything is held in common by everyone. The movements are stereotyped; everybody makes the same gestures in the same circumstances and this conformity of conduct merely reflects that of thought" (Durkheim 1912: 287). In Blumer, as in Durkheim, we find our two first hypotheses pertaining to the effects of participation in demonstrations on the individual. These are occasions to build or reinforce group solidarity and identity, at the same time as they are ritual occasions with socializing effects. While these notions of circular reaction and collective excitement do not explain a great deal, they nonetheless draw attention to a series of basic phenomena that help us to understand what occurs in a crowd of demonstrators and, more generally, during collective protests.

More frequently, because they are often seen as a type of rite, demonstrations elicit analyses of these functions as initiation, integration, and ceremonial renewal of groups, whether these are mass demonstrations of totalitarian regimes or more standard marches. In a demonstration the display of the group's orderly and unified strength and character are often seen as central. Thus, in 1908, for the May 1 march in Vienna, there were platforms installed at different points along the route so that participants themselves could, if only for a brief instant, appreciate the immensity of the body of which they were a part (Casquete 2006). This is also the reason why, in Bilbao, demonstrations for independence do not follow the usual routes with "stations" in front of each of the locations of power, but instead follow a much longer itinerary with a very steep route, allowing the crowd, when returning, to glimpse its own power (Casquete 2006).

The Convergence Model

In another body of research, mainly represented by Turner and Killian (1972), crowd behavior is due to convergence. For these two scholars, who refer to the theoretical tradition of "social learning," collective movements stem from common experience and the activation of existing and shared predispositions, whether of a social class, an ethnic heritage, a type or level of income, etc. The mobilization does not then revolve around contagion, but rather around convergence. To this, we may add the psychological postulate inherited from the works of Dollard and Berkowitz, according to which the aggressive conduct observable amongst individuals in crowds is a response to a state of frustration, which is deemed vital in building the "we feeling" needed for any collective action to occur (Gurr 1970).

In this model, it is not the crowd that produces a collective soul since it attracts people already predisposed to a certain type of behavior. All it takes is an encouraging dynamic to reduce inhibition and push the movement to action. These hypotheses owe a great deal to the conservative and worried mood of the post-1968 period. However, they deserve to be mentioned, if only for their continued use in the practical battles pitting authorities against the movements that oppose them, whether in the form of political-journalistic denunciations of "rioters," or again, in the manner in which the professional culture of the police is influenced (della Porta and Filiuècle 2004).

The Emergence Model

Since the end of the 1960s, the notion of the irrational and homogeneous character of the crowd has been largely abandoned by the social sciences in favor of theories that portray crowd action as rational. Studies both of large gatherings without specific orientation (see Lang and Lang 1953) and of political demonstrations—especially riots—have multiplied.
These tend to show that crowds are never homogeneous and that individual behavior is the product of strategy and calculation (Berk 1974). It is in this context of rising criticism that Turner and Killian attempt to reverse the perspective of collective behavior, stressing the diversity of motivations and individual behaviors in a crowd (1972). From this, the impression of unanimity which emerges from crowds or publics is, in their view, not due to the aggregation of identical individual behaviors, but rather to the existence of a social phenomenon, the appearance of a new standard that, as in all normal situations, acts on individual behavior (Turner and Killian 1972: 22). They conclude that “collective behavior differs from normal social behavior by the speed with which the new norms emerge and by the manner in which social control operates, not by the absence or the presence of totally different forms of social control” (Turner and Killian 1972: 61).

The emergence of a “situational” standard is, therefore, the principal characteristic of collective behavior. It suggests collective behavior is an unstable phenomenon, given the rapidity of its emergence. This can be seen in Turner and Killian’s (1972: 41) sense that phenomena such as the rumor or the milling process serve to assure “the development of a collective definition of the situation [through a] symbolic interaction” (Turner and Killian 1972: 41). This is quite different from Blumer’s perspective that collective behavior is a process that permits contagion.

The contribution of these two authors to the understanding of individual effects of participation in street demonstrations is significant. They combine the hypothesis of the rationality of an actor’s sensitivity to secondary rewards of participation with the initial intuition of collective behavior. In other words, in a crowd situation, individuals are also constrained by a whole series of rules, or even by normative definitions of the situation, which determine in part the manner in which they interact. Still, the notion of an “emerging norm,” even as revised in the 1987 edition of their book, proves to be relatively metaphorical and not so operational. There too, the questions raised are central and the explanatory hypotheses are stimulating, but the responses are less than satisfying, due in part to a lack of sufficient empirical grounding and suitable investigative measures.

Turner and Killian’s propositions represent the last attempts to reconcile the development of rationalist and structuralist approaches with a thorough understanding of the multiplicity of attitudes and conduct during a demonstration. As a result, the question of individual effects of the demonstration in terms of identity and solidarity, belonging and socializing effects, has remained largely unresolved.

In his applied historical and sociological inquiry of presidential trips in France at the end of the nineteenth century, Mariot (2010) has accurately posed this problem of interpreting behavior in crowds, starting from a discussion of the idea of “effervescence.” Effervescence is the idea that participants in an event share a common experience, and that from this community of sentiments and emotions a common consciousness emerges. Beginning with the way Marcel Mauss and then Maurice Halbwachs understand social reality, Mariot highlights the socially defined character—that is, the previously instituted nature—of collective behavior. Individuals in a crowd conform to already existing operating procedures, which are imposed on them, regardless of belief or membership. In other words, according to Mariot:

> The gaiety in a social gathering is not related to its intrinsically collective aspect, but to the fact that it requires the cooperation of two partners, the man or the idea that could be the object and those that accomplish it. Thus, we understand that participants’ intimate investment may be highly variable, not necessarily consciously thought, without this raising doubts, and either weakening or strengthening the social meaning conferred on the event: this does not depend on the reflexivity or the degree of internalization of any of the participants in particular. (2006: 9-10)

As a logical consequence of this position, the understanding of individual behavior in a crowd could only advance through careful attention to actors’ social identities, their different
degrees of involvement in the situation, and the reasons that they invoke to justify what they are doing. So, an ambitious research program opens up, bringing us in particular to the two directions previously mentioned: the observation of interactions taking place in demonstrations and the exploration of individuals’ characteristics and attitudes. It would then be a matter of bringing together in situ statistical data concerning the population of participants in order to evaluate the modalities of public participation, beyond merely sociodemographic characteristics. In this respect, individual surveys at rallies are certainly one of the most promising avenues for future research.

SOCIALIZATION THROUGH PROTEST EVENT PARTICIPATION

This brings us to the question of the socializing effects of participation in demonstrations, bearing in mind that it is not enough to infer from signs of involvement in the situation any existence of lasting, thus socializing, effects on individuals. The study of the socializing effects of political events and communication about them is still largely underdeveloped (Tackett 2006). There are many reasons for this. As Sapiro writes:

Social movements are populated by adults, and only recently have socialization scholars turned their attention in any serious way to adult socialization. Moreover...[s]ocialization research has been aimed at understanding why individuals do or don’t participate in politics, not at revealing the effects of political activity. We have rarely studied the socialization effects of explicitly political organizations. (1989: 268)

On the part of social movement scholars, this is mainly due to a strong structuralist bias, which is responsible for the imbalance between research on recruitment by movements and the study of the effect of participation on activists. Generally speaking, political behavior or participation in political organizations is conceived of as a dependent rather than independent variable. Socialization research has, in turn, been aimed at understanding why individuals do or do not participate in politics, not at revealing the effects of political activity. As compared with other forms of participation, such as participation in families or schools, the socialization effects of participation in demonstrations have rarely been studied, even if the so called lifelong openness model of socialization is now more and more in favor amongst scholars (Fillieule forthcoming).

As a consequence, not only does participation in social movements depend on political socialization, but it also has to be considered as having potentially socializing effects, which means that protest events must be studied as explicit and implicit socializing agents. Therefore, we need a fresh analysis of activist socialization, seeing it as a process of individual transformation stemming from involvement, and with immediate or deferred repercussions in all domains of social existence (in subsequent commitment, of course, but also professional and affective life). Beyond exposure to political events, it is a matter of studying the ways in which political commitment affects all individual behavior and perceptions. In other words, this perspective asserts that all participation, “however sustained or intense, has secondary socializing effects” (Fillieule 2005: 39). This is certainly all the more true for people in their late adolescence and early adulthood, as stated in the impressionable years model. There are three assumptions behind this model. First, young people experience political life as a “fresh encounter,” in Mannheim’s words, that can seldom be replicated later. Second, dispositions and attitudes that are subjected to strong information flows and that are regularly practiced should become stronger with age. Third, the young may be especially open to influence because they are becoming more aware of the social and political world around them just at the life stage when they are seeking a sense of self and identity.

Finally, it is clear that much work is needed in order to build a comprehensive and solid theoretical model for the study of the multiple socializing effects of protest participation. In
fact, the act of demonstrating endorses a role, distinguished by socialization, as it might be correctly called, in that it is not merely structurally determined (role taking). In fact, individuals are always negotiating the meanings of interaction with others (i.e., role making). Involvement in demonstrations is a moment when a repertoire of institutional activist conduct is learned and comes into play, defined by gestures and techniques, as well as representations and sentiments, all especially activated in the more or less ritualized confrontation with the forces of order or eventual counterdemonstrators (see Tilly 2008 for a similar remark). One might hypothesize from this that experimentation with demonstrations also functions as a mode of political socialization. Political socialization is a complex phenomenon to observe. Its effects depend on the individuals and their previous socialization (the desire for the drama of the demonstration is not socially neutral), but also on the logic of the situation (noticeably tied to the occurrence of violence) and, more generally, the sociopolitical contexts that determine as a last resort the social desirability of activist roles. Muxel (1990) offers an illustration of these socializing effects of participation in a demonstration in her repeated investigations of a group of adolescents, some of whom had participated in student movement demonstrations in 1986. She shows that these demonstrations marked the political choices of the young people who participated, suggesting the existence of a generational effect.

With his greater attention to the effect of demonstration performances on individuals and with closer scrutiny of the ethnocentric analysis of public actions of the association ACT UP, Broqua (2005) shows how these actions are powerful generators of a lasting feeling of collective belonging and emotional mobilization for those who participate. In addition, and more precisely, Broqua and Fillieule (2009) attempt to understand the complex dramaturgical mechanisms by which the organizers of public action achieve a pervasive emotional register, both internally (activist socialization and identity creation) and externally (strategic identities, pressure on targets, and demonstration of the justice of the cause). They also show how the implementation of such an emotional register affects participants, both immediately and in the long term. This is what stories told after the event indicated, and they show which moments of public action played a central role. Two elements are crucial here for the two authors. On the one hand, the range of these effects is extremely varied, from a simple feeling of belonging to a powerful experience related to an awakening consciousness (for example, with respect to a situation of injustice or oppression). On the other hand, these effects are neither simply nor directly the product of strategies determined in advance by the advocates of a cause. They also emerge in the course of public performances and face-to-face interactions among actors, bringing us precisely to the heart of individual effects of participation in demonstrations.

CONCLUSION: AVENUES FOR FUTURE RESEARCH

The literature on demonstrations and protest events has developed dramatically in the last twenty years, mainly due to the extended use of protest event analysis and individual surveys at demonstrations. However, the almost exclusive analytic concern with the institutional consequences of protest—and the subsequent neglect of its independent psychological effects—is certainly one of the major blind spots of contemporary research in the field. More work needs to be done to develop stronger theories and identify fundamental mechanisms.

Two obstacles must be overcome to achieve this. First and foremost, the individual actors must resume their rightful place in the study of protest. Social movement understandings were once dominated by a conservative bias that conceives of demonstrators and protest actions as the product of deprivation and abnormal conduct. With the emergence of resource mobilization theory, these interpretations were replaced by models that emphasize the costs and benefits of participation in collective action, as well as the importance of social movement organizations in mobilizing resources and distributing positive or negative incentives. Resource mobilization theory was further refined with the growing importance in explanatory models of
the so-called “political opportunity structure,” which helped to stress contextual factors in collective action. Structural factors, political contexts, and organizations—not the actors themselves—have been at the center of social movement research for more than thirty years. That direction has been further reinforced by the quasi-exclusive recourse to methods such as organizational surveys or protest event analysis. As a result, scholars have certainly gone too far in neglecting the actors themselves, those who engage in collective action, their social and biological characteristics, their motivations, and their irreducible heterogeneity. Even the more recent developments in social movement theory, by taking into account cultural factors and drawing upon both US and European research, have left unexplored the individual who actually participates in demonstrations, protest activities, and, broadly speaking, social movements.

Another major flaw in research on protests stems from an insufficient emphasis on the performances themselves and on studying them with appropriate field methodologies. This limitation is not unique to social movement research. Observational studies are rare in political sociology and, for the most part, we study the product and assume it is the result of the process. However, to study process, the process needs to be observed, not merely inferred. This is particularly the case in research on demonstrations. To study what happens in a demonstration, we need to think of different methods of inquiry and observation and undoubtedly will have to take a more ethnographic approach. We may have to resort to a variety of methodologies, among them field methodology, such as participant observation and ethnographic study, the collection of life histories, and visual methods. For example, Philipps (2012) shows how, through the microsociological analysis of visual protest material (banners, posters, flags, shirts, etc.), we can enrich our understanding of who joined the demonstrations and what the protesters’ motives and interests were, and obtain hints of possible frictions and the limits of mobilization. If extended to the filming, coding, and analyzing of individual behaviors and movements, as McPhail’s research suggests, visual methods could improve results and provide further information for the interpretations of protest events since they can include objects and aspects that are not on hand with interviews, written documents, or statistical outcomes. Yet another example is the protest surveys conducted by Klandermans and his team. The contributions to this special issue are the first results from this project.

Beyond the radical methodological changes recommended here, research could explore several avenues that have been neglected until now. I conclude by briefly mentioning two possible directions. One of the most promising tracks for future research in this respect would be to evaluate the degree to which actual participation in demonstrations transforms individual patterns of political thinking and behavior, and to outline the ways in which it does so. Developing further research in this direction is all the more important in the subfield of social movements since young people often favor unconventional modes of action such as demonstrations, blockades, etc., which then often constitute their first significant involvement with the political system and have strong cognitive effects (Fillieule and Tartakowsky 2008). The dramatic growth of the so-called alterglobalization movement all over the world, with its strong appeal to the younger generation, is no doubt a rich field of observation for studying such processes and their possible effects on subsequent movements (Jossin 2010). Recent emergence of the Indignados and Occupy movements in Europe and America will certainly constitute another fertile empirical field of research.

Another direction refers to the study of the impact of political events on “engaged observers” and even “bystander publics” in the vein of Stewart, Settles, and Winter (1998), who suggest that those who were attentive to the movements in the sixties but not very active in them showed lasting political effects years later. Such inquiries could also help to develop, at a microsociological level, some interesting questions about how groundbreaking movements can play an important role in resocializing other groups in the politics of protest, as the American civil rights movement did with many subsequent movements.
NOTES

1 That is, the distinguishable delegations who have assembled under different banners, so-called “affinity groups,” whose members are responsible to and for one another and, more generally, individuals who most of the time assemble with one or more companions (family, friends, colleagues) in small groups with whom they remain throughout the gathering and with whom they subsequently disperse (McPhail 1991; and Fillieule 1997).

2 In the literature on the biographical consequences of activism, there is no explicit distinction made between the socializing effects of being involved in a movement (what we can call organizational molding) and the effects of participation in protest events, with the exceptions of McAdam (1988), and Whalen and Flacks (1989), as well as research dealing with black student activism in the civil rights and black power movements, and with rioters (Gurin and Epps 1975). The latter suggests that the riots themselves appeared to have generated a type of “riot ideology” that further resocialized not only the direct participants but also those who only vicariously experienced them, a result that has recently been confirmed by studies on not-so-committed participants (Sherkat and Blocker 1997). Yet the value of this research lies primarily in analyzing how movements teach young blacks to question the overall white system of domination through specific mechanisms and set-ups like mass meetings, workshops, and citizen and freedom schools. It does not directly address the questions we are interested in here.

3 Some important surveys support the formative years hypothesis; for example, Jennings’s (2002) study of the durability of protesters as a generation unit, not to mention the numerous studies that allow us to determine that the American cohorts’ coming of age in the 1960s constitutes a distinctive political generation (see references in note 2).

4 As a matter of fact, ACT-UP was the most creative social movement organization of the last two decades of the twentieth century. It both found dramatic ways of stating grievances and claims and, on occasion, managed to be ingenious in developing civil disobedience tactics that disrupted its adversaries’ business as usual (see Broqua 2005; Gimp and Ralet 1990; and Gould 2009).

REFERENCES


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