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Two Uses of Anekāntavāda

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Abstract
The thesis I will present is that, whatever its exact origins, the *anekāntavāda* was primarily (though not exclusively) used for two purposes: (1) to solve the "paradox of causality", and (2) to classify non-Jaina systems of thought. The earliest texts in which the doctrine occurs present it as a solution to the paradox of causality. Only later do we find its use to classify non-Jaina philosophies.

Abbreviations
STP See Siddhasena Divākara Saṃmati-tarka-prakaraṇa

In a recent book — called *Jain Approaches to Plurality* — Melanie Barbato shows how *anekāntavāda*, from colonial times onward, came to be presented as a version of tolerance. This is a relatively new development, which some Jainas may be tempted to project back into earlier times. This, however, would be a mistake.

This leaves the question, why does *anekāntavāda* play such an important role in Jaina philosophy?

The thesis I will present is that, whatever its exact origins,[1] the *anekāntavāda* was primarily (though not exclusively) used for two purposes: (1) to solve the "paradox

[1] According to the Brahmanical *Viṣṇu Purāṇa* (3.18.9–12), the *anekāntavāda* was taught by Māyāmoha to a number of demons in order to lure them away from the Vedic path and kill them; cf. Eltschinger, V. (2012). Debate, salvation and apologetics: On the institutionalization of dialectics in the Buddhist monastic environment. In François Voegeli, Vincent Eltschinger, Danielle Feller, Maria Piera Candotti, Bogdan Diaconescu, & Malhar Kulkarni (Eds.), *Devadattīyam: Johannes Bronkhorst Felicitation Volume* (pp. 429–489). Peter Lang.: 50 f.

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of causality", and (2) to classify non-Jaina systems of thought.[2] The earliest texts in which the doctrine occurs present it as a solution to the paradox of causality. Only later do we find its use to classify non-Jaina philosophies.

Anekāntavāda as a Resolution of the Paradox of Causality

Let us first concentrate on the *anekāntavāda* as a resolution of the "paradox of causality" (Matilal, 1981: 26 ff.). The paradox of causality occupied the minds of all Indian philosophers during the early centuries of the Common Era, and had a strong and lasting effect on many of its fundamental doctrines. Indeed, it played a role in the formation of such well-known philosophical positions as *satkāryavāda*, *śūnyavāda*, *ajātivāda* and others. To this list, it appears, we can add the *anekāntavāda* (Bronkhorst, 2011).

The problem behind the "paradox of causality" can be illustrated with a simple example. How can a pot, or anything else for that matter, be produced? If there is no pot as yet, what is produced? And if the pot is already there, why should it be produced? As I have argued elsewhere,[3] the problem was the result of the acceptance of the "correspondence principle": people implicitly believed that the words in a statement correspond to entities in the situation depicted by that statement. In other words, there has to be a pot in the situation depicted by the statement "the potter makes a pot". This implicit belief — it is but rarely given an explicit formulation — inevitably led to the "paradox of causality", which all Indian philosophers from the early centuries CE had to face, and which they all proposed to solve, be it in different ways.

With this in mind, consider the following passage from Jinabhadra's *Viśeṣāvaśyaka Bhāṣya*:[4]

> In this world there are things that are being produced having been produced already, others [are being produced] not having been produced already, others

[2] This twofold distinction is not altogether different from the one proposed by various other authors. Trikha, H. (2012). Competing world views: perspectivism and polemics in the Satya-śāsana-parīkṣā and other Jaina works. *Journal of Indian Philosophy*, *40*(1), 25–45. https://doi.org/10.1007/s10781-011-9147-y.: 42) distinguishes between the following two *Bedeutungszusammenhänge* of *anekāntavāda*: (1) "In einem Zusammenhang beziehen sie sich auf die ontologische Position des Jinismus"; (2) "Der andere Bedeutungszusammenhang für *anekāntavāda* grenzt den Jinismus von gegenerischen Traditionen ab". Barbato (2018: 4–6) contrasts a historical stage in which "[t]he Jain world view … had to explain … how origination, persistence and decay could all co-exist in the Jain explanation of reality", with another one in which "*[a]nekāntavāda* was employed as a logical meta-theory, which portrayed Jainism as superior to the endless struggling between the other schools". See further Johnson, 1995: 41: "there are, according to Matilal [1981: 25], two senses of the term *anekāntavāda* — one denoting the Jaina view of reality, and the other a methodology, derived from that view, which attempts to reconcile, integrate and synthesize all other conflicting philosophic views of reality."

[3] Most recently in Bronkhorst, 2013; see further Bronkhorst, 2019.

[4] Jinabhadra, *Viśeṣāvaśyaka Bhāṣya*, Part II, p. 385 (under verses 2183-84): *iha kiñcit jātaṃ jāyate, kiñcid ajātam, kiñcij jātājātam, kiñcij jāyamānam, kiñcit sarvathā na jāyate, vivakṣātaḥ/ .../ yatheha ghaṭo mṛdrūpādibhir jāta eva jāyate, tanmayatvāt/ sa evākāraviśeṣeṇājāto jāyate, prāgabhāvāt/ rūpādibhir ākāraviśeṣeṇa ca. [jātā]jāto jāyate, tebhyo 'narthāntaratvāt/ atītānāgatakālayor vinaṣṭānutpannatvāt kriyānupapattir vartamānamātrasamaya eva kriyāsadbhāvāj jāyamāno jāyate/.*

> [are being produced] having been produced and not having been produced, others again [are being produced] while being produced, and some are not being produced at all, according to what one wishes to express. … For example, a pot is being produced having been produced in the form of clay etc., because it is made of that. That same [pot] is being produced not having been produced concerning its particular shape, because that was not there before. ….

It is easy to see how Jinabhadra, and other Jainas with him, would answer the questions raised earlier. When a pot is produced, it is there already in one sense, in the form of clay. However, in another sense it is not yet there, because its particular shape is not yet there. The "paradox of causality" disappears (or is believed to disappear) like snow in the sun.

Jinabhadra was not the first to use the *anekāntavāda* to explain how a pot (or anything else for that matter) can be produced. In another publication (Bronkhorst, 2003: 105–106) I have argued that the canonical story of the heretic Jamāli (it occurs in the *Viyāhapannatti*) does the same. Jamāli in the story protests against the statement of Mahāvīra to the effect that what is being made has been made. I further showed that some rather innocent remarks by Mahāvīra were here used and reinterpreted so as to arrive at a solution of the paradox of causality.

Another early author who appears to use the *anekāntavāda* in this way is Kundakunda. His *Pravacanasāra* contains the following verses (2.22-23):[5]

> Each substance is one thing from the substantial viewpoint, but again it is something different from the modificational viewpoint, and not different at a specific time because it is made of that.
> According to some modification or the other it is stated that a substance exists, does not exist, is indescribable, is both or otherwise.

Kundakunda does not mention the paradox of causality in these verses, but it is clear that they were formulated to deal with it.

Balcerowicz (2001) has convincingly argued that Siddhasena the author of the *Saṃmati-tarka-prakaraṇa* (also known by the name *Sanmati-tarka-prakaraṇa*) is different from the Siddhasena who wrote the *Nyāyāvatāra* (he calls them Siddhasena Divākara and Siddhasena Mahāmati respectively).[6] The *Saṃmati-tarka-prakaraṇa*,

[5] Kundakunda, *Pravacanasāra* 2.22-23, p. 144, 146: *davvaṭṭhieṇa savvaṃ davvaṃ taṃ pajjayaṭṭieṇa puṇo/ havadi ya aṇṇam aṇaṇṇaṃ takkāle tammayattādo// atthi tti ya ṇatthi tti ya havadi avattavvam idi puṇo davvaṃ/ pajjāyeṇa du keṇa vi tad ubhayam ādiṭṭham aṇṇaṃ vā// (*Skt. *dravyārthikena sarvaṃ dravyaṃ tat paryāyārthikena punaḥ/ bhavati cānyad ananyat tatkāle tanmayatvāt// astīti ca. nāstīti ca. bhavaty avaktavyam iti punar dravyam/ paryāyeṇa tu kenāpi tad ubhayam ādiṣṭam anyad vā//)*. See Soni, 2007: 22.

[6] Dundas (1996: 147), without discussing the possibility that two different authors may be involved, points out that different audiences are addressed in the *Saṃmati-tarka-prakaraṇa* and the *Nyāyāvatāra*, the former text being intended for 'internal consumption', the latter "presumably aimed at convincing the wider Indian academic and sectarian world of Siddhasena's coreligionists' claims" in the field of logic. On Siddhasena Mahāmati, see further Balcerowicz, 2016.

he further argues, may belong to an earlier date than the *Nyāyāvatāra*,[7] and was indeed composed before Dignāga, or at any rate without knowledge of his work.

The *Saṃmati-tarka-prakaraṇa* uses the *anekāntavāda* to solve the paradox of causality in the following verses:

> These two (i.e. the 'only substance exists' standpoint and the 'only modification exists' standpoint), when joined, constitute the highest perfect vision, because separately the two do not bring about liberation from the suffering of existence. Since what is called 'pot' is not separate from the clay, it is not different from it. Since what is called 'pot' was not there before, the clay is different from it.[8]

The explicit mention of a pot leaves no room for doubt: When a pot is made, the pot is already there in the form of clay, but not in the form of the end-product.[9]

In a discussion of relatively early Jaina philosophical authors, Umāsvāti the author of the *Tattvārtha Sūtra* has his place. Unfortunately, it is hard to say much about his acquaintance with the *anekāntavāda*, and even harder to determine what, if he knew it, he needed it for. However, the *Tattvārtha Sūtra* is acquainted with the notion of *naya* 'standpoint', of which it gives a fivefold division.[10] The *Tattvārthādhigama Bhāṣya* on sūtra 1.34, moreover, discusses the conception of a pot in accordance with the different standpoints (*Tattvārthādhigama Bhāṣya* pp. 122–124). This, presumably, takes care of the problem of causality, but the text does not say so. In what then follows, the Bhāṣya rather emphasizes that the *naya*s are different non-contradictory ways of cognizing objects, with an emphasis on the sentient (*jīva*), the insentient (*ajīva*), and their negations (*Tattvārthādhigama Bhāṣya* pp. 124). Note further that sūtra 5.37 (*guṇaparyāyavad dravyam*) mentions the 'modification' (*paryāya*) that plays a role in Siddhasena's understanding of the *naya*s, as we have seen. But there is here no hint that modifications have anything to do with *naya*s, or with the paradox of causality. The expression *anekāntavāda* itself is unknown to the *Tattvārtha Sūtra*. One gains the impression that Umāsvāti was acquainted with some notions that soon came to be used (or were used by others) to solve the paradox of causality, but that he himself had a different use for them.

[7] It is not very clear what date that is. According to Balcerowicz (2001: 369) "the *Nyāyāvatāra* was definitely composed after 620/660 C. E. (Dharmakīrti) and Pātrasvāmin and before c. 800 C. E. (Haribhadrasūri)". Since now Krasser (2012: 587) has proposed, as working hypothesis, to date Dharmakīrti in the middle of the sixth century CE, the date of Siddhasena Mahāmati becomes even less precise.

[8] STP 3.51-52: *te u bhayaṇovaṇṇīyā sammaddaṃsaṇam aṇuttaraṃ hoṃti/ jaṃ bhavadukkhavimokkhaṃ do vi na pūreṃti pāḍikkaṃ// natthi puḍhavīvisiṭṭho ghaḍo tti jaṃ teṇa jujjai aṇaṇṇo/ jaṃ puṇa ghaḍo tti puvvaṃ ṇa āsi puḍhavī tao aṇṇo//.*

[9] Flügel (2012: 164) calls this passage "one of the first explicit versions of the philosophy of *anekāntavāda*".

[10] *Tattvārtha Sūtra* 1.6 (*pramāṇanayair adhigamaḥ*) and 1.34 (*naigamasaṅgrahavyavahārarjusūtraśabdā nayāḥ*). Recall that the *nayavāda*, according to Cort (2000), is but one of the two logical tools that make up *anekāntavāda*.

Anekāntavāa as a Method to Classify Non-Jaina Systems of Thought

In the passages so far considered, the *anekāntavāda* has nothing to do with views attributed to outsiders. In the passages to be considered next, it is the favourite way of classifying non-Jaina philosophical positions, or rather: of showing their inferiority to Jainism.

Trikha (2012a: 30–31) quotes two verses that express the Jaina attitude toward other philosophies. The first one comes from Siddhasena Divākara's *Dvātriṃśad-dvātriṃśikā* (4.15) and reads:

> *udadhāv iva sarva-sindhavaḥ samudīrṇās tvayi nātha dṛṣṭayaḥ/.*
> *na ca tāsu bhavān udīkṣyate pravibhaktāsu saritsv ivodadhiḥ//.*

Trikha translates:

> Like all rivers in the sea, the views [*dṛṣṭi* = philosophy] are merged in you, oh Lord (i.e., Jina Mahāvīra). And (as long as) they are divided, you are not seen [Trikha has "foreseen"] in them (as) the ocean is not in the streams.

Trikha then quotes a verse from Hemacandra's *Anya-yoga-vyavaccheda-dvātriṃśikā* (30):

> *anyonya-pakṣa-pratipakṣa-bhāvād yathā pare matsariṇaḥ pravādāḥ/.*
> *nayān aśeṣān aviśeṣam icchan na pakṣa-pātī samayas tathā te//.*

and translates:

> In the way other statements are hostile, because they are (confronting) each other as position and counterposition, in that way your (i.e., the Jaina) tradition does not fall to a position, as it accepts all viewpoints without distinction (i.e., in equal measure).

Siddhasena's *Saṃmati-tarka-prakaraṇa*, from which we earlier quoted a passage dealing with the paradox of causality, also uses the *anekāntavāda* to categorize non-Jaina schools of thought. It is true, as Balcerowicz (2001: 363) points out, that "[t]he main antagonists in [the *Saṃmati-tarka-prakaraṇa*] are the Vaiśeṣikas, whereas the references to other schools are sporadic."[11] However, though sporadically, other schools *are* mentioned, and are categorized in accordance with the system of *naya*s.

Consider the following. Siddhasena Divākara distinguishes two standpoints (*naya*): the *dravyāstika* standpoint, according to which the "substance exists", and the *paryāyāstika* standpoint, according to which the "modification exists" (Matilal,

[11] References to Vaiśeṣika, Balcerowicz tells us, occur in verses 3.8, 3.9, 3.14, 3.24, 3.31, 3.39-40 and 3.49-50. Sāṃkhya is referred to in verse 3.48, Buddhists in verses 3.48 and 3.50.

1981: 32, with reference to *Saṃmati-tarka-prakaraṇa* 1.3). These two standpoints are used to characterize other philosophical schools in verses 3.48-49:[12]

> The system of philosophy taught by Kapila is a representation of the 'only substance exists' (*dravyāstika*) viewpoint, and that which is taught by the son of Śuddhodana (the Buddha) is an exposition of the 'only modification exists' (*paryāyāstika*) viewpoint.
> Although the philosophical system of Kaṇāda (Ulūka) applies both standpoints, it is also fallacious because the standpoints are employed each independently of the other.

In these two verses the main philosophical schools of that day — Sāṃkhya (the followers of Kapila), Buddhism (the followers of the son of Śuddhodana) and Vaiśeṣika (the followers of Ulūka) — are classified and, in doing so, shown to be insufficient.

Another example is Mallavādin's *Dvādaśāra-nayacakra*. This text has a lot more to say about other philosophical schools. To quote Frauwallner (1958: 2): "By taking into account [the] twelve modes of consideration [of the 'wheel of modes of consideration' (*nayacakra*)] Mallavâdî believes to have exhausted all possibilities in the consideration of things. This entails that all philosophical systems have to range with these modes of consideration. In order to prove them wrong their place in this framework must be defined, whereby their possible onesidedness or their errors may be uncovered."[13] Frauwallner continues (p. 3): "Thus, the main contents of Mallavâdî's work is the framing and refutation of various philosophical doctrines." As a matter of fact, the *Dvādaśāra-nayacakra* and its commentary by Siṃhasūri cite and criticize various work of Sāṃkhya, Vaiśeṣika and Mīmāṃsā, and authors such as Bhartṛhari (Houben, 2008) and Dignāga. Mallavādin's familiarity with the work of Dignāga, but not with that of Dharmakīrti, is reason for dating him somewhere between these two authors (Jambūvijaya 1988: *Prākkathanam*).

Subsequent works continue the trend by categorizing non-Jaina ideas in terms of the *anekāntavāda*[14] and, in doing so, by attributing truth, be it partial truth, to those ideas. "The idea is that the non-Jaina systems of philosophy are also partly true, but they are false inasmuch as they overlook each other." (Bhargava, 1973: 24 n. 1.) "The *anekānta* … challenges any categorically asserted proposition, ordinary or philosophical. Its philosophical goal is to ascribe a 'precarious' *value* to all such propositions. … However, it does not amount to scepticism, for the manifoldness of reality … is non-sceptically asserted." (Matilal, 2000: 5.)

It appears, then, that the *anekāntavāda* in its later development is inseparable from a preoccupation with other, non-Jaina, systems of philosophy. Followers of those other systems of philosophy are *ekāntavādin*s, "holding on to one extreme"

[12] STP 3.48-49: *jaṃ kāvilaṃ darisaṇaṃ eyaṃ davvaṭṭhiyassa vattavvaṃ/ suddhoaṇataṇaassa u parisuddho pajjavaviappo// dohi vi ṇaehi ṇīaṃ sattham ulūeṇa taha vi micchattaṃ/ jaṃ savisaappahāṇattaṇeṇa aṇṇoṇṇaniravekkhā//*. Tr. Matilal, 1981: 32–33.

[13] See also Wezler, 2002.

[14] "Haribhadra's … independent philosophical texts, such as the Anekāntajayapatāka, reveal his comprehensive understanding of the heterodox systems prevailing in his time, which enabled him to compose a reliable doxography, the Ṣaḍdarśanasamuccaya …" (Clavel, 2013: 281 n. 7).

(Samantabhadra's *Āpta-mīmāṃsā* v. 7). Before the *anekāntavāda* was used for this purpose, however, it was primarily used, as far as we can tell, as the Jaina response to the paradox of causality. Only subsequently did it acquire the additional role of being the Jaina way of dealing with non-Jaina philosophies. It may not be possible to determine the exact time when the second phase began, but a period not far removed from Dignāga seems plausible.

A Discontinuity in Jaina Philosophy

In a recent article (2008), Piotr Balcerowicz asks "why, in the sixth century, a set of new features enters the literary practice of framing *maṅgalācaraṇa*s of Jaina philosophical works, and the focus suddenly shifts from that of primarily enunciating an obeisance in praise of the *tīrthaṃ-kara*s … to an argumentation in favour of the validity that assumes a form of a proof formula …, distinctly recognisable in Mallavādin Kṣamāśramaṇa's *Dvādaśāra-naya-cakra* … and Samantabhadra's *Āpta-mīmāṃsā* …, a tendency that practically overrides the previous practice" (p. 57). To answer this question, Balcerowicz proposes the following hypothesis (p. 57–59):

> The earlier phase, up to Umāsvāti and [the] early fifth century, can be called the phase of laudation, in which the works do not seem involved in any philosophical discussion with other systems. Jaina authors compose their treatises meant for a Jaina audience, and do not form arguments either to defend their own system or to criticise other systems. That is true for the authors … Kundakunda, Umāsvāmin, Umāsvāti, but also for all the Canonical literature. These authors do not generally enter into polemics, do not defend their position, do not refute other systems. If there is any criticism expressed, it is not formulated dialectically, and it is not argued for. The authors appear happy to merely lay down their opinions on various matters and systematise Jaina tenets.
> The later, third phase that takes shape after [the] mid-sixth century, a phase which one could call the phase of argument, represented … by [the *Dvādaśāra-naya-cakra*] and [the *Āpta-mīmāṃsā*], is characterised by their predominantly critical character that features two elements: polemical approach and argumentative structure. The works aim at overthrowing rival schools and the major part of the text contains various arguments *against* adversaries, and only a smaller portion outlines the Jaina tenets. ….
> A historical, second phase in this development … is reflected, among others, in … Pūjyapāda Devanandin's *Sarvârtha-siddhi* … and Siddhasena Divākara's *Saṃmati-tarka-prakaraṇa* … This stage can be termed the phase of polemics. The authors are aware of the rivalry and ongoing discussion on various philosophical problems, which they do reflect. They also reproduce a variance of opinions on various points. However, their purpose is not that of refuting a rival school. Instead of extensively arguing in favour of or against any of them by taking recourse to detailed proof formulas and detailed formal reasoning, they as a rule restrict themselves to merely stating their position and expressing their disagreement with other ideas.

Balcerowicz's question, and the proposed answer, interests us at present because they can be used to make sense of the way in which the *anekāntavāda* is used in these texts. The texts belonging to Balcerowicz's "earlier phase" — Kundakunda and all the canonical literature (but perhaps not Umāsvāmin/Umāsvāti), and we can add the *Saṃmati-tarka-prakaraṇa* as a "hybrid" case — use it to deal with the paradox of causality. The texts of the second and third phase, on the other hand, use the *anekāntavāda* to classify incorrect, i.e., non-Jaina views.

A similar discontinuity is brought to light by Clavel (2013). She identifies a "turning point which occurred in the second half of the fifth century" (p. 302). It finds expression most notably in the fact that Jaina authors start using the word *pratyakṣa*, not only as it had been used in the earlier Jaina tradition, but also as it was used in other systems of thought.

Concluding Reflections

If we reduce our findings so far to their barest outline, we can say that, around the middle of the first millennium CE, Jaina philosophical texts underwent important changes. Logical proof, as pointed out by Balcerowicz, gains enormously in importance. The influence of Brahmanical and Buddhist thinkers becomes evident, as shown by Clavel. And on top of that, a doctrine that so far had played a relatively minor role in Jainism, the *anekāntavāda*, becomes the frame in which other, non-Jaina, philosophical views are understood and criticized. It seems clear that Jainism opened up to outside influence at that time.

Jainism was not the only current whose philosophical literature underwent major changes in the middle of the first millennium. Vincent Eltschinger has shown in some articles (2012; 2012a; 2013) that the same happened to Buddhism and Brahmanism. Drawing attention to Brahmanical apocalyptic prophecies, mainly in Purāṇas, in which heretics play a major and threatening role, Eltschinger explains (2012a: 60) that "my use of apocalyptic prophecies is aimed at showing the growth of a Brahmanical hostility that may, at least in part, explain why Brahmanical schools such as Nyāya and Mīmāṃsā turned their attention towards Buddhism, and why the Buddhist epistemologists changed their habits and the meaning of Buddhist philosophy radically during the sixth century". Eltschinger (2012a: 60 n. 143) sums up his views as to the interaction between Buddhist and Brahmanical philosophers in the following words:

> With a few exceptions (Āryadeva's *Catuḥśataka*, the pseudo-Nāgārjuna's *Vaidalyaprakaraṇa*, discussions scattered throughout Vasubandhu's *Abhidharmakośabhāṣya*), the Buddhists start criticising Brahmanical (and sporadically Jaina) philosophies systematically during the first half of the sixth century, or slightly earlier in the case of Dignāga (Dignāga, Dharmapāla, Dharmakīrti, Bhāviveka, Guṇamati, *Sagāthaka* of the *Laṅkāvatārasūtra*, etc.). The same seems to hold true of the Brahmanical philosophers' critique of Buddhist doctrines (*Nyāyabhāṣya* and *Nyāyavārttika*, *Vṛttikāragrantha* and especially [*Ślokavārttika*], *Yuktidīpikā*). More generally, sustained philosophical

> confrontation between Buddhists and non-Buddhists starts to be reflected in extant philosophical literature from the beginning of the sixth century onwards.

One could add Hugo David's observation that a radical change took place in Vedānta between the 5th and 8th centuries relating to the conception of the Scriptures of the Brahmanical tradition (David, 2016).

Our reflections about Jainism may add a small piece to the puzzle brought to light by Balcerowicz, Clavel and Eltschinger: a sudden outburst of philosophical confrontation in the middle of the first millennium. The change that David talks about may have to be seen in the same light. Our reflections have added little that might explain *why* these changes took place. We cannot but agree with Eltschinger, where he states (2012a: 61): "The factors responsible for this sudden outburst of philosophical confrontation cannot be seriously looked for *within* the competing traditions themselves, since here the reasons are most likely to be of a non-philosophical and socio-historical character." Identifying the socio-historical elements and events that may have exerted such a momentous influence on Indian philosophical debate (and perhaps on much else) is one of the big challenges waiting to be taken on by Indological research.[15] Whatever their precise character, we can confidently state that the circumstances of philosophical reflection changed radically as a result.

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[15] Kulke (1997: 91) observes: "After the decline of the Gupta empire and of the 'transient' successor state under King Harṣa in the early seventh century, the overwhelming majority of the early medieval states of India emerged from a process of continuous agrarian expansion and political integration. Since the middle of the first millennium AD this development took place mainly in those areas of the South Asian subcontinent which had lain at the periphery or even outside the core areas of ancient state formation. This process started from local nuclei of early socio-economic and political development and increasingly came to include their hinterland." Is it possible that these socio-economic and political changes were reflected in Indian philosophy? If so, how and why?

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