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CSR and sports-event organizers

State of play, controversies and perspectives

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Introduction

This chapter examines the concept of corporate social responsibility (CSR) in relation to sports-event organizers (SEOs), focusing on two categories of sports event: National competitions run by professional leagues and sports clubs, and global and continental events organized under the auspices of international governing bodies such as the International Olympic Committee (IOC), Fédération Internationale de Football Associations (FIFA) and Union of European Football Associations (UEFA). On the national level, we compare approaches to CSR by professional leagues in two European countries – France and England – and in the two most popular spectator sports in these countries – football and rugby union (Ligue 1 and Top 14 in France, vs. The Premier League and Aviva Premiership Rugby in England) On the international level, we consider two “one-shot” mega events, the Olympic Games and the European Football Championship (via the 2016 edition, hosted by France), rather than recurring events such as Roland Garros or the Tour de France.

Before presenting our empirical study of these events, we outline the general concepts of CSR and its corollary, organizational social responsibility (OSR), together with the associated issue of sustainable development (SD). We also look at the current state of research into CSR/OSR and SD within the sport sector, a subject on which there is now a substantial literature. Examining both empirical and theoretical studies of CSR in sport reveals the numerous controversies and paradoxes arising from the ways in which SEOs deploy these inherently contentious concepts.

I CSR and sport: Context and perspectives

This section looks at the adoption of CSR within the sport sector, the impact of the context in which organizations operate, and the perspectives for sport organizations to develop their CSR. After retracing the evolution of CSR from the concept’s beginnings to the most recent developments, we describe the characteristics inherent to sport that have led to it being viewed as an “almost natural” vector for implicit social responsibility.

1.1 CSR: A new promise of responsible management?

CSR is a long-standing managerial concept that has been expanded greatly since it emerged. One relatively recent development of CSR originated with the premise that social responsibility should concern all types of organization, not just corporations. The result, known as organizational social responsibility (OSR), appears to provide the most suitable framework for examining social responsibility within the sport sector, which is also increasingly embracing the tenets of SD.

1.1.1 Origins of CSR and conceptual developments

CSR can trace its roots back at least as far as the early 20th century, although the term “social responsibility” was not coined until the mid-1950s, when it was applied to North American businessmen and defined as “*the obligations of businessmen to pursue those policies, to make those decisions, or to follow those lines of action which are desirable in terms of the objectives and values of our society*” (Bowen, 1953, p. 6). This seminal definition was quickly expanded to corporations, which began to take into account the notion of social responsibility through what became known as CSR. Although this acronym is generally taken to stand for corporate social responsibility, the term corporate societal responsibility has been preferred in some contexts.¹ Initial research into the concept of CSR, which continued throughout the final decades of the 20th century, was aimed at defining where it could and should be applied, often with the explicit goal of demonstrating links between socially responsible behaviour and company performance (Carroll, 1979, 1991). The emergence of stakeholder theory, which has been embraced by many studies of CSR, helped legitimize research into the relationship between CSR and performance. This theory introduced the idea that a company is not just accountable to its shareholders but to all the actors within its environment, who Freeman (1984, p. 46) called stakeholders and defined as “*any group or individual who can affect or is affected by the achievement of the organisation’s objectives*”. These developments led researchers in the late 1980s to explore possible links between CSR and financial performance from a functionalist perspective. By gradually making profit maximization the prime objective of CSR (Gond, 2011), this approach led to the idea that performance measures should not be solely financial, but also take into account social and environmental considerations. Methods for assessing these three components of performance, often referred to collectively as the *triple bottom line* (Elkington, 1997), have been modelled in numerous ways (Carroll, 1979, 1991; Wartick and Cochran, 1985; Wood, 1991).

Nevertheless, the failure to find concrete links between social performance and financial performance (Ulmann, 1985; Wartick and Cochran, 1985) has kept the spotlight on CSR, which is now one of the most intensively studied concepts in the management sciences (Lee, 2008). This research has led to the development of new approaches, especially since the emergence of the notion of SD, which has been a central issue on the political agenda since the 1990s,

and resulted in numerous international “CSR” standards and labels, including the OECD’s Guidelines for Multinational Enterprises (fifth edition in 2011); the Global Reporting Initiative’s (GRI) (1997) sustainability reporting guidelines (G4 edition published in 2013); the Global Compact, formed in 2000 to pursue ten principles of SD in four focus areas; the UN’s Principles for Responsible Investment, drawn up in 2005; the European Green Paper on CSR (2001); ISO standards (most notably environmental management standards: 14000/8000 and 14001/14004/14010/14012); and numerous fair trade labels.

In addition to these international incentives, national laws also impose social reporting requirements on companies, although often only on those larger than a certain size. In France, for example, social reporting requirements were first imposed on companies via article 116 of the 2001 New Economic Regulations (NRE) Act, whose provisions were expanded in 2012 by article 225 of the second Grenelle Environment Forum. The NRE Act applied only to listed companies, who have to publish reports on the actions they take to offset the social and environmental consequences of their activities, whereas the Grenelle Environment Forum applies to all companies with more than 500 employees. These laws are indicative of the tendency to impose CSR through legislation, despite the inherently voluntary nature of the concept’s underlying philosophy.

1.1.2 CSR, OSR and SD: Definitions and associated controversies

Although the international organizations cited earlier (UN, OECD, etc.) have helped ensure the widespread adoption of CSR around the world, CSR takes so many different forms that it is difficult to produce a comprehensive definition of the concept. For many years, the most widely accepted definition in Europe was provided by the Commission of the European Communities (2001), according to which CSR is “*a concept whereby companies integrate social and environmental concerns in their business operations and in their interactions with their stakeholders on a voluntary basis*”. As the EC’s definition recognizes, the voluntary nature of CSR is an intrinsic characteristic of actions intended to demonstrate a company’s social responsibility. Nevertheless, we prefer the definition drawn up for the ISO 26000 standard by more than 400 international experts over a period of five years (Capron, Quairel-Lanoizelée and Turcotte, 2011). In this non-certifiable standard, the International Standards Organisation defines social responsibility as “*the responsibility of an organization for the impacts of its decisions and activities on society and the environment through transparent and ethical behavior*” (ISO 26000, 2010). In addition to being universal, the definition included in ISO 26000 has two advantages over the Commission of the European Communities’ definition. First, it extends the concept of social responsibility to organizations in general, not just companies. In fact, the new standard’s objective is to encourage organizations of all sizes and all types (public bodies, associations, etc.) to restructure their management processes (R&D, purchasing, human resources, logistics, marketing, social communication, etc.)

by introducing a wide range of tools (corporate foundations, carbon balances, sustainability reports, social or non-financial performance indicators, etc.). Second, it includes the notion of SD, defined in 1987 by the World Commission on Environment and Development (Brundtland Report) as “*economic development that meets the needs of the present generation without compromising the ability of future generations to meet their own needs*”.

Hence, many types of organization, including public bodies, have begun adopting a new management paradigm centred around the notions of OSR and, more generally, SD. Numerous public bodies are now being guided by the UN’s Millennium Development Goals, originally published in 2000 for the period up to 2015, and then updated in 2015 as Sustainable Development Goals for the period up to 2030. While taking into account local specificities, these goals are being pursued via a range of management tools, such as national SD strategies, sustainable cities, local agenda 21s and natural environment protection standards. This paradigm has given rise to new forms of business (e.g., social businesses, Yunus, 2010) and to “bottom of the pyramid” (BOP) strategies (Prahalad, 2004; Payaud and Martinet, 2009, 2010) aimed at creating economic models suitable for the poorest communities in developing countries. It has also led some large corporations, such as Danone, to review their management methods. The “Danone Way”, for example, was set up to finance initiatives based on new economic models, exemplified by the famous “Grameen-Danone” joint-venture in Bangladesh (Gond and Igalens, 2012). In addition, it has raised the issue of how a country’s success is evaluated and led to the development of new indicators such as “Gross National Happiness” (Stiglitz, Sen and Fitoussi, 2009; Cohen, 2012), to complement traditional measures such as GDP. In the private sector, these “new rules of the game” have raised the prospect of (large) corporations adopting new governance and management practices and new measures of performance. This has resulted in the emergence of “true social engagement strategies” and the concept of shared value (Porter and Kramer, 2011),² the measurement of social performance (Gond, 2010), the issue of social control (Sautereau-Moquet, 2010) and social responsibility rating systems.

Nevertheless, even though CSR and OSR would appear to provide a pathway to a new, more responsible approach to management, the concepts remain contentious (Gond and Moon, 2011) and many commentators have expressed scepticism, if not outright criticism (e.g., Friedman, 1962, 1970), of the philosophy underlying the ways CSR/OSR and SD are deployed. An issue frequently highlighted by CSR’s detractors is the disconnect between words and deeds that can be seen in some organizations’ CSR strategies and practices. Consequently, although this new managerial ideology has widened the formerly narrow concept of a “Friedmanian” company, it must be viewed with caution, as some CSR/OSR initiatives may be merely a form of “greenwashing” (Friestad and Wright, 1994), that is, purely cosmetic actions intended to enhance an organization’s image. Hence, even though the CSR/OSR movement has the potential to change representations of how organizations are governed, managed and evaluated, it would

be naïve to think that it has profoundly changed the essence of financial capitalism (Boltanski and Chiapello, 1999).

1.2 CSR by SEOs: Context and stakes

CSR in the sport sector has been subject to intense study since the mid-2000s. Following a brief assessment of the state of play in this area, based on the most notable studies regarding each type of organization, we describe the two types of organization we focused on for our analysis of CSR by SEOs. Given the predominance of studies examining CSR and sport in Anglophone countries (mostly the USA and UK), we decided to compare approaches to CSR within professional sport in France and England.

1.2.1 State of play and definition of the types of SEO studied

The pioneering research into sport-organization CSR carried out in the mid-2000s (Babiak and Wolfe, 2006; Breitbarth and Harris, 2008; Smith and Westerbeek, 2007) paved the way for a plethora of subsequent studies and publications, including special issues of journals³ and entire books dedicated to CSR and sustainability in sport (Paramio-Salcines, Babiak and Walters, 2013; Rodriguez, Késenne and Dietl, 2009). However, sport’s ties with social responsibility go back much further than the relative novelty of this research stream might suggest (Bradish and Cronin, 2009; Godfrey, 2009). In fact, as Smith and Westerbeek (2007) noted, sport has several inherent characteristics (power to communicate, youth appeal, positive effects on health, ability to promote social interaction, ability to improve cultural understanding and integration, ability to raise awareness of environmental and sustainability issues and ability to provide immediate gratification benefits) that make it a natural vector for deploying CSR. These “natural” attributes facilitate the spread of CSR both in sport and *through* sport. CSR through sport concerns organizations outside the sport sector, such as sport event sponsors, which use sport for commercial ends. Although sponsors are increasingly important partners in the organization of sports events (Djballah, Hautbois and Desbordes, 2017) and essential stakeholders in the social initiatives undertaken by sport organizations, we decided to focus on CSR in sport.

Previous studies have examined the CSR/SD practices and policies of many different types of sport organization, including international governing bodies (IOC, FIFA, UEFA, etc.), national sport federations, professional leagues and clubs, SEOs, sporting goods manufacturers and sporting goods retailers (Bayle, Chappelet, François and Maltese, 2011). In fact, the exponential increase in research into CSR and sport over the last 10 years makes it almost impossible to cite every study of CSR within each type of organization. In their recent review of research into sport organization CSR, Walzel and Robertson (2016) identified more than 700 studies published in English alone between 2006 and 2016.

For most sport organizations, the events they organize form the core of their sport offer. Of all the different types of organization listed in the previous paragraph, the two that are most obviously associated with organizing sports events are international governing bodies and national federations and professional leagues and clubs. In the case of international governing bodies, the events they supervise tend to be “one-shot” mega events, most of which are better known than their parent organization (e.g., Olympic Games vs. IOC). The competitions organized by national federations and professional leagues and clubs take place on a smaller (national) scale, but they are held more frequently. These considerations led us to concentrate our study on these two types of sports organization.

Parent and Chappelet (2015) examined the diversity of sports events, categorizing them according to their size, spatial criteria, sporting criteria, financial objectives and fame, etc. Based on these criteria, events can be situated on a continuum running from small, local competitions to major international events. All event rights holders (or owners) have had to respond to the wave of social responsibility, especially given the recent spate of sport-related scandals (doping, violence, cheating, corruption, etc.), which mean that SEOs can no longer justify their failure to implement specific social responsibility actions by falling back on the old argument of sport being naturally socially responsible. Nevertheless, we hypothesized that each event’s specific characteristics will lead it to address the issues of CSR and/or SD in different ways. Hence, we decided to analyze a selection of very different SEOs and very different events. This choice enabled us to compare the way CSR is approached by major “one-shot” events (Olympic Games and European Football Championship), which are organized under the auspices of international governing bodies (IOC and UEFA, respectively) and by national events organized by national leagues (in rugby union and football). In addition, because the nature and form of a sports organization’s commitment to CSR varies according to the context in which it operates (François and Bayle, 2015; François, Bayle and Gond, 2019), we wanted to study SEOs in different contexts. We addressed this issue by including in our sample two international SEOs (IOC and UEFA), which are subject to multiple cultural influences and which have to view CSR from a “globalized” perspective, and two national SEOs from countries (France and England) with different CSR cultures and contexts.

1.2.2 The importance of context to CSR: Anglophone vs. French approaches

The context in which an organization operates has a great impact on its approach to CSR.⁴ This statement is easily verified by perusing the literature on CSR in sport, which is particularly abundant in the case of Anglophone cultures. Conversely, the literature pertaining to many European countries, including France, is much sparser, almost certainly due to the fact that the concept has not been embraced as widely in these countries. Nevertheless, wherever sport organization CSR has been studied, this research is a much more recent phenomenon than the

implementation of CSR initiatives by SEOs, some of which have been involved in CSR for several decades.

Most studies of CSR in sport (see previous) have focused on English-speaking countries, where CSR is used strategically and often takes the form of donations to local communities. This is especially the case in the United States, where the concept of CSR is in keeping with American culture and the so-called WASP (White Anglo-Saxon Protestant) values, which encourage philanthropy by businesspeople and companies (Vogel, 1991). In this context, clubs and leagues are true vectors of CSR through their close relations with their communities (Lelore, 2011). CSR activities by these organizations include programmes involving internal human resources (players and coaches), who contribute time and money to worthy causes, generally implemented via foundations (Babiak and Wolfe, 2009; Extejt, 2004), and this has been the case for many years (Table 3.1).

Tax breaks available to sport organizations (and to donor sponsors) encourage them to carry out social initiatives within their local communities. In the United States, many such actions are enhanced or complemented by actions involving athletes, who contribute to their club’s initiatives, either spontaneously or due to contractual obligations. In fact, the way sport is organized in North America, where professional sports clubs are private, commercial entities, has facilitated the development of sport organization social responsibility by making it easier to transpose social responsibility practices from the corporate world to professional sport. Nevertheless, most social responsibility initiatives remain exogenous, in other words, they are initiated either in response to external pressure (Babiak and Wolfe, 2009) or to combat negative public reactions (*ethical blowbacks*) to other aspects of an organization’s operations. Hence, the CSR philosophy in the United States is essentially a case of heightened philanthropy aimed at improving the sometimes-negative image many people have of professional sport organizations.

Table 3.1 The earliest CSR initiatives by North America’s four biggest professional leagues

| League | Year | Social Initiatives |
|--|------|--|
| National Football League (NFL) | 1973 | – Support to United Way of America (charitable organization) – Creation of the “NFL Charities” foundation |
| National Basket-ball Association (NBA) | 1994 | – Launch of the Read to Achieve programme (helping children from disadvantaged backgrounds to read) |
| National Hockey League (NHL) | 1995 | – Launch of the NHL Diversity programme (promote diversity and inclusion in hockey) |
| Major League Baseball (MLB) | 1997 | – Launch of a partnership with Boys and Girls Clubs of America (creation of neighbourhood championships) |

Source: adapted from Babiak (2010).

In France, the issue of CSR/OSR and its associated practices is still at an embryonic stage, possibly because professional sport has only recently emerged from its amateur roots. As a result, sport organizations, which have to fulfil public service as well as sporting roles, view social responsibility as an inherent part of their DNA. This characteristic is an intrinsic feature of French sport, whose operating model is a product of the way sport is run jointly by the private sector (which includes sport federations and, indirectly, clubs and leagues) and the public sector (represented by the ministry for sport). For example, many professional sports clubs receive public subsidies, in exchange for which they are expected to carry out public-service missions (in fields such as education and social inclusion through sport). As a result, OSR by French sport organizations remains highly exogenous, even though the private commercial sector has contributed to the development of OSR practices in recent years. Increasingly, OSR actions are deployed trilaterally, by a sport organization, the local authorities and sponsors, or bilaterally, by a sport organization and a private partner, through sports sponsorship or community sponsorship. Nevertheless, in contrast to the United States, community associations, foundations and endowment funds are not the main channels for social engagement. Hence, community associations, such as "ASM ô Solidaires" (ASM Clermont), and multi-partner corporate foundations involving clubs (PSCG, OL, TFC, OM) are rare, and only two French sport federations (rugby and football) have created foundations (Fondation Albert Ferrasse and Fondation du Football, since turned into an endowment fund). Following the granting of "public utility" status in 2011, the foundation created by France's Olympic Committee (Fondation Henri Sérandour) can now claim to be French sport's leading philanthropic body.

2 The deployment of CSR by SEOs

We examined CSR from a "functionalist" or "business case" perspective in which we looked at CSR as a strategic tool. We present our analysis in two parts, beginning with the case of national sport federations and professional leagues, as represented by France's and England's top-flight rugby union and football championships, which, like most professional leagues in Europe, are subject to supervision by their national federation. We then look at the case of mega events owned by large international governing bodies, focusing on the Olympic Games, controlled by the IOC and, to a lesser extent, the UEFA Euro 2016 football championship, hosted by France.

2.1 Recurring events: A comparison of CSR practices by professional rugby union and football leagues in France and England

Leagues and clubs that organize recurring events (e.g., championships) are some of the most widely studied SEOs with respect to CSR. The analysis we present here is drawn from François, Bayle and Gond's (2019) study of the first-division professional rugby union and football championships in France and England. Table 3.2 provides general facts and figures for the four leagues. We begin by

Table 3.2 Facts and figures for the first-division rugby and football championships in France (Top 14, Ligue 1) and England (Aviva Premiership Rugby, Premier League), taken from François, Bayle, and Gond (2019)

| | Top 14 | Ligue 1 | Aviva Premiership Rugby | Premier League |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Body in charge of organizing the championship | Ligue Nationale de Rugby (LNR) | Ligue de Football Professionnel | Premier Rugby Limited | FA Premier League Limited |
| Statute of the league (year it was created) | Association under federation supervision (1998) | Association under federation supervision (1946) | Limited company (1995) | Limited company (1992) |
| Number of clubs involved | 14 | 20 | 12 | 20 |
| Global turnover in 2016 | €303 million | €1,867 million | £186 million (€203 million) | £3,639 million (€3,980 million) |
| Main sources of finance in 2017 | Partnerships (GMF, Société Générale, Orange, etc.) and TV rights (Canal+) | TV rights (Canal+, Bein Sport) and partnerships | Partnerships (Aviva, Land Rover, etc.) & TV rights (BT Sport) | TV rights (Sky, BT Sport, BBC) and partnerships |

describing the contexts in which these leagues and their constituent clubs deploy CSR, and then examine the way they implement and communicate their CSR initiatives.

2.1.1 Current context: CSR as a strategic asset

All of the leagues studied have undertaken CSR initiatives for a number of years, often in the form of social engagement with charities and/or community organizations. However, these forms of engagement have gradually been superseded by more structured and more strategic actions. In France, social engagement is a key component of the strategic plans published recently by both the Ligue Nationale de Rugby (LNR), which runs the Top 14 (T14) championship, and the Ligue de Football Professionnel (LFP), which runs the Ligue 1 (L1) championship.

Having included social engagement in its 2016 strategic plan (LNR, 2016), the LNR called upon the consultants Deloitte to help it draw up a structured approach to CSR in the form of a “social engagement strategy”, which it published in 2017. Realizing the time was ripe for deploying a social strategy, the LNR created a number of programmes, which it has launched in partnership with private (SD strategy launched in 2013 by the French Rugby Federation) and public (environmental commitments by the Minister for Sport) bodies. This strategy is firmly anchored in “rugby’s values” and centred around three pillars – ensure the league’s internal stakeholders uphold rugby’s values, build on existing social actions⁵ and share values beyond the world of rugby. Programmes relating to these pillars are financed from a budget of €2.3 million, allocated for the period 2017–2021. In addition, in 2017 the LNR began examining the possibility of recruiting a dedicated CSR manager. The LFP also published a strategic plan in 2017, one of whose aims is to “define and develop an ambitious CSR plan” (LFP, 2017a). That same year, the LFP appointed a director of external communications for CSR and published a brochure called “Jouons la Collectif” (“Play Together”), which presents the social and community actions undertaken by the league’s 20 clubs (LFP, 2017b). In fact, “Jouons la Collectif” is just the latest in a series of reports published by the LFP in order to highlight the social actions carried out by the league’s clubs and demonstrate football’s positive impacts (LFP, 2013, 2015).

In the UK, Aviva Premiership Rugby (APR) grouped together its national CSR programmes into two major campaigns (*Play* and *Breakthru*), which it launched in 2013 and which it deploys through its 12 clubs (Premiership Rugby, 2013a, 2013b). The *Play* campaign includes programmes aimed at increasing participation in rugby among young people and at raising standards, whereas the *Breakthru* campaign contains programmes in the fields of health, education and social advancement through rugby. APR runs these campaigns in association with strategically selected partners within the public (British Council, Department of Culture, Media and Sport, etc.) and private (Land Rover, Aviva, etc.) sectors. Local implementation of these national partnerships is ensured by the clubs’ “community department” managers, who work in conjunction with the

APR’s Community and CSR Director, appointed in 2012 to oversee social and community programmes.

Of the four leagues we studied, it is the Premier League’s (PL) community initiatives that are the most institutionalized. The roots of this institutionalization can be traced back to the community programmes launched by successive Labour and Conservative governments in the late 1970s and 1980s, most notably the “Football in The Community” (FiTC) programme. FiTC, which was created by the Football League⁶ and Professional Footballers’ Association with support from the government (Mellor, 2008; Walters, 2009) in order to reconnect clubs with their local communities, resulted in many English football clubs creating their own community departments. In 2007, the PL began taking a more structured approach to CSR, launching its “Creating Chances” programme, which includes CSR initiatives in five areas: Community cohesion, education, health, participation in sport and international projects (Morgan, 2013). Steered by a dedicated community projects team, these initiatives are implemented locally by the PL’s 20 clubs and financed by various bodies within English football, most notably, the PL’s Charitable Fund, which allocate substantial funds to the clubs (Anagnostopoulos, 2013).

2.1.2 Communication and implementation of CSR initiatives: Proof that context is more important than sector

We analyzed the communication and implementation dimensions of the four leagues’ and their constituent clubs’ CSR practices by assessing five indicators for each dimension. In the case of CSR communication, we assessed the media used, presence/absence of reporting, type of vocabulary used, communication about partners and orientation of the message; in the case of CSR implementation, we assessed number, type and scope of initiatives, means of delivery and partner involvement. Our analyses revealed major differences between the two countries on both dimensions of CSR.

These differences were most striking in the case of CSR communication, where they affected all five indicators. For example, English clubs use more communication channels (2.67 and 3.7 channels for APR and PL clubs, respectively) than French clubs (0.64 and 1.2 channels for T14 and L1 clubs, respectively) and CSR communication by the two French leagues and their clubs tends to be weak and non-strategic, whereas CSR communication by the two English leagues and their clubs is generally strong. In fact, because CSR is more culturally rooted and accepted in the UK than it is in France, communication has always been an integral part of CSR by English clubs and is characterized by its strategic nature, as is shown by the fact that the clubs do not hesitate to set out mission statements regarding their CSR initiatives, which they communicate via numerous channels. Furthermore, only two French football clubs (Lyon⁷ and Saint Etienne), compared with a third of APR clubs and half of PL clubs, issue reports detailing their social engagement. Indeed, PL clubs are leaders in this area, as Chelsea was

the first European club to publish an annual CSR report (in 2006), and Manchester United's (since 2011), Manchester City's and Tottenham's (both since 2015) CSR reports go as far as evaluating their actions' impacts.

We also found substantial differences between the two countries in terms of CSR implementation, most notably with respect to number of initiatives carried out and means of delivery. Compared with French clubs, English clubs carry out more CSR actions, many of which are bottom-up projects and local versions of national programmes. These actions are often implemented via foundations, which have become the standard channel through which English rugby and football clubs deploy CSR (all PL clubs and all APR clubs except London Irish, Northampton Saints and Wasps have set up a foundation). In contrast, only three T14 clubs and eight L1 clubs have set up a community association, endowment fund or foundation.⁸ Using foundations and other similar structures allows initiatives to be implemented more strategically by giving greater exposure to associated sponsors and stakeholders.

2.2 Major "one-shot" events: The cases of the IOC and UEFA

So-called mega sports events are organized under the supervision of major sports institutions such as the IOC, FIFA and UEFA. Smaller world and continental championships are organized by other international or continental federations. The globalization of sport over the last few decades, as typified by the emergence of major new players such as Qatar, which hosted 85 international events in 2016, has been accompanied by a huge increase in the number of international competitions owned or controlled by international federations. For example, the 25 international Olympic federations organized 2,162 events in 2013, compared with just 160 in 1975.⁹ The number and type of CSR and SD initiatives associated with these events is greatly dependent on both the requirements imposed by their owners and local priorities, which vary according to the host country's political, economic and cultural characteristics. The following section explores CSR within two organizations responsible for organizing one-shot mega events – the Olympic Games, controlled by the IOC, and the European Football Championship, controlled by UEFA. We begin by examining the genesis and development of CSR and SD within the IOC and then look at the way UEFA has integrated the notion of sustainability into its flagship event, focusing on its latest edition, Euro 2016, which was hosted by France.

2.2.1 Olympic social responsibility: Genesis and development

The IOC is unarguably the world's most powerful sport organization and therefore a potential leader in terms of social responsibility. In fact, the IOC has been aware of the need to convey a certain degree of Olympic social responsibility ever since its earliest years, during which Coubertin's elitist, liberal, pacifist and

educational view of sport underpinned the foundation of Olympism's core values and ethics and shaped its governing body.

This initial phase of Olympic social responsibility was transformed by the "Samaranch revolution" of the 1980s, when Juan Antonio Samaranch led the IOC into the age of liberal capitalism and the market economy. As the world entered a new era, symbolized by the end of the Cold War and the break up of the Soviet Bloc, Samaranch remoulded Coubertin's original ideals to accommodate liberal economics and globalization. This period also saw the publication of the Brundtland Report (1987) and the Rio Earth Summit (1992), which catapulted SD to the top of the world's political agenda. The IOC quickly began using SD as a new argument to prove its legitimacy, adding the environment to sport and culture as one of the pillars of Olympism in 1994, creating a Sport and Environment Commission in 1995, and publishing its Agenda 21 "Sport for Sustainable Development" in 1999. The Olympic Games, especially the Winter Games as of Lillehammer 1994, expressed a desire to be ever greener and environmentally virtuous. More generally, the IOC increased its partnerships with UN agencies and began the intensive diplomacy that would finally bear fruit in 2009 when the IOC was granted observer status at the UN General Assembly. Nevertheless, a number of scandals during this period severely tarnished the reputations of the IOC and the Olympic Movement, leading to the creation of new regulatory bodies (Court of Arbitration for Sport, 1984, and World Anti-Doping Agency, 1999) and new attempts to improve the organization's governance (Chappelet, 2015).

Samaranch was succeeded as IOC president by Jacques Rogge, who oversaw the publication of two symbolic documents on "sustainability", the Olympic Movement's preferred term for SD and CSR/OSR. RIO+ 2010 provided a list of SD actions carried out by the IOC and by Organising Committees of the Olympic Games (OCOGs), while ISO standard 20121: "Event sustainability management systems – Requirements with guidance for use" was presented as being part of London 2012's SD legacy.

SD was also the theme of a 2012 forum for international federations entitled "Increasing the positive impact of your event: Sustainable Event Management". Although this forum demonstrated the international sports movement's growing awareness of the need to produce its events as responsibly as possible, very few federations have been prepared to commit their sport to any sort of centralized social strategy, whether aimed at addressing problems within society or at promoting development through sport.

The third and most recent phase in Olympic social responsibility began with the election of Thomas Bach as IOC president in 2013, when the IOC began addressing the challenge of defining and implementing a coherent, global and integrated OSR strategy. A few large, commercial sport organizations, such as the NBA, appear to have adopted this type of approach, bringing together the league, franchises, players and partners. However, such integrated CSR strategies are very rare in the world of sport (Bayle, Chappelet, François and Maltese, 2011).

According to “The IOC Sustainability Strategy”, a framework document summarizing the IOC’s recent reflections on this issue, published at the end of 2016, sustainability is one of the three pillars of the Olympic Agenda 2020 (alongside credibility and youth). This document also contains two recommendations on how the Olympic Games (Box 3.1) and the Olympic Movement in general (Box 3.2) can incorporate sustainability.

Box 3.1 Recommendation 4: Include sustainability in all aspects of the Olympic Games

The IOC to take a more proactive position and leadership role with regard to sustainability and ensure that it is included in all aspects of the planning and staging of the Olympic Games.

- 1 Develop a sustainability strategy to enable potential and actual Olympic Games organizers to integrate and implement sustainability measures that encompass economic, social and environmental spheres in all stages of their project;
- 2 Assist newly elected Organizing Committees to establish the best possible governance for the integration of sustainability throughout the organization;
- 3 The IOC to ensure post-Games monitoring of the Games legacy with the support of the National Olympic Committee and external organizations such as the World Union of Olympic Cities (UMVO).

Box 3.2 Recommendation 5: Include sustainability within the Olympic Movement’s daily operations

- 1 The IOC to embrace sustainability principles:
 - The IOC to include sustainability in its day-to-day operations. The IOC to include sustainability in its procurement of goods and services, as well as events organization (meetings, conferences, etc.)
 - The IOC to reduce its travel impact and offset its carbon emissions
 - The IOC to apply the best possible sustainability standards for the consolidation of its Headquarters in Lausanne

- 2 The IOC to engage and assist Olympic Movement stakeholders in integrating sustainability within their own organization and operations by:
 - Developing recommendations
 - Providing tools, e.g., best practices and scorecards
 - Providing mechanisms to ensure the exchange of information between Olympic stakeholders
 - Using existing channels, such as Olympic Solidarity, to help and assist in implementing initiatives
- 3 To achieve the above, the IOC to cooperate with relevant expert organizations such as the United Nations Environment Programme (UNEP).

The IOC Sustainability Strategy, which centres around three areas of responsibility and five key themes (Figure 3.1), draws on both the IOC’s strategic plan




Figure 3.1 The IOC Sustainability Strategy (IOC, 2016)

and the 17 SD objectives targeted by the UN in 2015, which include eradicating poverty, combatting climate change and combatting injustice and inequality. The UN's "2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development" describes how organizations can contribute to SD and makes sport and sport institutions important partners for achieving SD objectives.¹¹

2.2.2 Euro 2016: Another approach to integrating sustainability

Just like the IOC, UEFA is aware of the importance of having a coherent sustainability strategy for its flagship event. In the case of Euro 2016, this strategy was drawn up by the organizing committee and the event's internal and external stakeholders on the basis of a three-stage analysis aimed at the following:

- 1 Identifying the main stakeholders and their commitment to environmental, social and economic issues.
- 2 Setting priorities as a function of risks (probability and impact) and according to stakeholder expectations, the GRI's G4 guidelines, benchmarking, external assessments, examples of good practices, and the feasibility of corrective action plans.
- 3 Approving key issues and integrating them into concrete SD projects.

The resulting strategy was the subject of two "social responsibility and sustainable development" reports, published a year before (N-1) and a year after (N+1) the event and drawn up in line with the GRI's G4 guidelines and events supplement. The strategy targeted four areas that fell within UEFA's responsibility




Figure 3.2 Euro 2016's eight strategic priorities for CSR/SD, taken from the Euro 2016 N+1 CSR/SD report, figure adapted from Union of European Football Association (2016)

(governance, tournament, preparations, behind the scenes) and identified eight priorities for CSR and/or SD actions (Figure 3.2). The Euro 2016 organizing committee also followed the lead of the London 2012 OCOG and applied for ISO 20121 certification. As a result, its CSR strategy, just like its quality management system, had to be designed from a continuous improvement perspective. In order to measure the strategy's success, UEFA defined eight strategic priorities containing 15 specific objectives with associated performance indicators (Table 3.3).

Table 3.3 Overview of priorities, objectives, main outcomes and performance, and lessons learned for organizers of the next edition, taken from the Euro 2016 N+1 CSR/SD report table

| Priorities | Objectives | Main outcomes and performance | Lessons learned |
|--------------------------------------|---|---|---|
| Total football, total access! | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Coordinate and monitor the operational implementation of Access for All in partnership with CAFE and the stadiums • Create accessible stadiums at UEFA EURO 2016 to ensure an inclusive welcome and match experience for disabled fans | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • 16,328 tickets for wheelchair users (including companions) and 6,423 tickets for easy-access seats. This accounts for about 0.9% of spectators, whereas people with such mobility problems account for about 3.8% of the population in the EU. • 50% of venues met minimum European standards for wheelchair user numbers (UEFA/CAFE standard) | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • For 2020, UEFA is to consider removing rows or building platforms to improve sightlines • Access assessments should also be undertaken much earlier in the process at future final rounds, with advice given on navigation and signage ahead of the tournament |
| Tobacco-free tournament | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Make all stadiums tobacco-free for UEFA EURO 2016 matches (with the support of Healthy Stadia) | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • The smoking of tobacco products was prohibited in all indoor and outdoor areas within the stadium perimeter, but fans did not always respect this policy | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • The stadium perimeter was too ambitious; the policy should have been limited to the stadium bowl. More preventive action is also needed to facilitate communication with fans |

(Continued)

Table 3.3 (Continued)

| Priorities | Objectives | Main outcomes and performance | Lessons learned |
|--|--|--|---|
| Anti-racism and anti-discrimination | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> Enforce a zero-tolerance approach, educate people and ensure that discrimination inside stadiums is reported, investigated and sanctioned | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> Eight instances of racism/discrimination or misconduct were reported Two national associations were sanctioned following incidents | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> Communication was enhanced by enthusiastic volunteers and the use of all possible channels (the media, half-time announcements, the big screen, tickets, signage, etc.). Stewards did not cooperate effectively, which needs to be improved for future events Expanding the scope of anti-discrimination measures to protect and train stewards could be a good idea |
| Fan embassies | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> Create a fan-friendly, safe and secure environment in the host cities Provide the best possible welcome, advice and support to fans, in cooperation with Football Supporters Europe (FSE) Liaise between national team supporters' organizations and host cities | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> 19 of the 24 teams had fan embassies, which was proportionally lower than in 2012 (when 14 of the 16 teams had fan embassies). This is because seven teams were appearing at a UEFA EURO for the first time A fan guide app and a 24-hour helpline were made available to fans. | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> Communication for UEFA EURO 2020 will be more digital FSE to obtain recognition as the voice of the fans Support in communicating social responsibility activities such as the no-smoking policy to be enhanced |

| Priorities | Objectives | Main outcomes and performance | Lessons learned |
|--|--|--|--|
| Public transport and mobility | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> Minimize the environmental impact of transport Ensure good mobility to, between and within the host cities for spectators, visitors and residents Encourage public transport and walking | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> 80,000 individual fans visited fan embassies, using their services a total of 202,500 times between them 150,000 additional seats in public transport in France during event Internal public transport policy 35,000 tonnes of CO₂ equivalent offset by UEFA and national associations | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> City combi-tickets to be ensured Shared mobility app to be improved Offsetting of fans' travel to be included in tickets prices Hybrid/electric vehicles in car fleet |
| Waste management | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> Implement a 3R policy (reduce, reuse, recycle) to achieve 50% recycling rate Zero waste to landfill Improved awareness among the general public | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> Overall reduction in volume of waste Recycling rate of 38% within stadiums Creative solutions adopted in cooperation with NGOs to find second lives for items Implementation of energy-efficient devices and technologies Use of water-saving solutions 71% of items produced in Europe; 51% of sourcing budget spent on items produced in Europe | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> Dual-bin system for public areas in different cities/countries must be coordinated well in advance 3R policy must be set out more clearly in contracts with partners and suppliers Organizers required to purchase certified renewable electricity |
| Energy and water optimization | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> Reduce the environmental impact of energy use Minimize the need for water | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> 71% of items produced in Europe; 51% of sourcing budget spent on items produced in Europe | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> Stronger due diligence could have been done on CSR as regards suppliers of sensitive branded |
| Sourcing of products and services | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> Promote responsible sourcing of products and services | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> 71% of items produced in Europe; 51% of sourcing budget spent on items produced in Europe | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> Stronger due diligence could have been done on CSR as regards suppliers of sensitive branded |

(Continued)

Table 3.3 (Continued)

| Priorities | Objectives | Main outcomes and performance | Lessons learned |
|------------|---|--|--|
| | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Help buyers to consider environmental and social issues within the supply chain and encourage suppliers and licensees to follow social responsibility and sustainability guidelines | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Sourcing guide developed for buyers • Large sustainability projects in partnership with major suppliers | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> goods and merchandising (children's toys and textiles). • Certification should be part of the selection process for suppliers (e.g., ISO 20121) |

Source: adapted from Union of European Football Association (2016)

These two case studies illustrate the increasingly proactive approaches adopted by the owners of mega sports events, whether they manage their events directly, as in the case of UEFA and the Euro football championship, or whether they oversee an outside organizing body, as in the case of the IOC and OCOGs.

2.3 CSR by SEOs: Specificities and paradoxes

Although the examples described previously show the progress made with respect to CSR and SD over the last few years, the issue remains contentious and the deployment of CSR has given rise to a number of paradoxes. This section begins by briefly summarizing the CSR practices adopted by the SEOs in our study and then describes paradoxes and contradictions within CSR practices, focusing on the issue of Olympic social responsibility and sustainability.

2.3.1 Specificities of SEO CSR by type of event

There are major differences in the way organizers of recurring events, run by leagues and clubs, and organizers of "one-shot" mega events, supervised by international governing bodies, address the issues of CSR and sustainability.

CSR relating to recurring events raises the issue of the terminology used to refer to social responsibility practices, as organizers of such events often concentrate mostly on social engagement and often overlook the other two classic dimensions (economic and environmental) of CSR and SD. In addition, our analysis shows a

high degree of convergence in the types of social engagement adopted by all T14, L1, APR and PL clubs, whose actions tend to use the power of sport to address issues relating to health, education and social inclusion. On the other hand, few clubs have developed actions targeting environmental issues, although the environment is gradually rising up the CSR agendas of certain clubs, most notably L1 clubs and, to a lesser extent, PL clubs. Despite operating in very different contexts, the convergence towards implementing ever more explicit and strategic CSR actions means that similarities between the two countries in the ways clubs communicate and deploy CSR should not stop there. The most obvious sign of this convergence is the increased use of foundations and endowment funds by French clubs, which suggests that the formerly implicit and non-strategic nature of French clubs' social engagement is giving way to a more explicit way of using CSR to achieve strategic objectives.¹²

Sustainability is a much more central concern in the case of "one-shot" mega events, whose organizers have to pay particular attention to their event's environmental impact. As a result, a large amount of information about the impacts and sustainability of mega sports events has been collected by a wide variety of bodies, which may or may not be closely associated with the event (owners, organizers, consultants, public bodies), and at different times in the life of an event (before, during, after). The data collected is of many different types (strategies, measures of impacts, sustainability reports) and is generally compiled into reports that are published before and/or after major events such as the Winter Olympics (e.g., Vancouver 2010), Summer Olympics (e.g., London 2012, Rio 2016), FIFA World Cup (e.g., Rio 2014) and UEFA Euro (e.g., France 2016) (Table 3.4).

Table 3.4 Reports relating to the sustainability of sports events. Source: compiled by the authors.

| Event | Report | Year |
|---|--|--|
| Vancouver 2010 Olympic Games | Sustainability report | 2006–2007, 2007–2008, 2008–2009, 2009–2010 |
| | Olympic Games Impact Carbon Neutral Discussion paper | 2007, 2009, 2011, 2013 2007 |
| | Sustainability report | 2012 |
| London 2012 Olympic Games | Olympic Games Impact Carbon Footprint Study | 2010/2015 2010 |
| | Sustainability report | 2014 |
| 2014 FIFA World Cup UEFA EURO 2016 | Sustainability report | 2014 |
| | Social responsibility and SD | 2015, 2016 |
| Rio 2016 Olympic Games | Sustainability report | 2014 |

2.3.2 Paradoxes and contradictions: The case of Olympism, or how to contribute to a better world

Despite the desire of SEOs to embrace CSR and deploy CSR initiatives within the Olympic Movement, a number of contradictions and shortfalls remain. For example, the bodies engaged to carry out impact studies prior to large events are often contracted to do so by the SEO, which raises questions about the independence and impartiality of their assessments (Gouguet and Brocard, 2014).

Thanks to massive public investment and an SD approach that is often supported and promoted by the OCOG's public partners, the Olympic Games remain the flagship vehicle for the Olympic Movement and the IOC. Nevertheless, the scope of SD actions varies greatly according to the national context (Beijing/London; Vancouver/Sochi) and Olympic Games' impacts and legacies, whether in the host country or elsewhere, remain difficult to evaluate, notwithstanding attempts to measure impacts over the longer term. Similarly, the way the IOC has structured its OSR/SD around three key themes (youth, sustainability and credibility) is open to criticism. First, the youth component of the IOC's strategy is largely borne by the Youth Olympic Games, which involves only a relatively small number of young athletes. Hence, the IOC cannot be said to have a true strategy for young people, despite obvious changes in young people's behaviours, including declining interest in the Olympic Games, in competitive sport and clubs and a tendency to do less physical exercise, leading to health problems and shorter life expectancy. Second, in terms of sustainability, the IOC's social objectives are divided into five key areas (sport for all, development through sport, women and sport, education, peace through sport), but these themes are more a declaration of intent than a structured and forceful policy. Finally, in terms of credibility, although the IOC has been attempting to address the issues of good and responsible governance since the early 2000s, it has little influence over other organizations within the Olympic Movement (national Olympic committees – NOCs, international and national federations). Thus, the widely reported governance crises that shook the Olympic system in 2015 (FIFAgate and the Russian-doping cover-up at the International Association of Athletics Federations) and 2016 (illegal sale of Olympic tickets by Patrick Hickey, an influential IOC member) are serious threats to the credibility of both the IOC as an institution and the Olympic Movement as a whole. To these scandals can be added suspicions of corruption against the former pole-vault champion and IOC member Sergei Bubka and against Frank Fredericks. These events show that the Olympic Movement is finding it difficult to truly reform its governance, despite attempts to promote the principles set out in the "Basic Universal Principles of Good Governance", introduced by the IOC in 2008, and a new governance framework drawn up by the Association of Summer Olympic International Federations (ASOIF) in 2016.

What is more, no single department within the IOC has been given overall responsibility for the organization's social strategy, which compounds the already

complex task of implementation. In fact, in a classic case of "silo mentality", responsibility for the different components of the IOC's sustainability strategy (Figure 3.1) is scattered across numerous departments and commissions. Furthermore, NOCs vary greatly in terms of their autonomy and strength, with only about 20 out of 205 NOCs truly working on these issues,¹³ and many international federations are poorly organized, unprofessional and uninterested in CSR and/or SD (which tends to be limited to developing sport in poorer countries and the process of attributing major events). Although the IOC's social strategy has resulted in the creation of international partnerships and global initiatives (UN, NGOs, multinationals, etc.), these partnerships are not very active around the world and can therefore be seen as mostly "cosmetic".¹⁴ Thus, even though having a positive impact is an inherent aspect of Olympism and part of its *raison d'être*, any actions taken tend to focus uniquely on elite Olympic sport.

It could be thought that the ever-larger sums of money the IOC redistributes to NOCs and international federations would give it the power to impose OSR/SD on the Olympic Movement, but this is not the case. In fact, even in a context of reduced bids to host the Olympic Games, redistributing resources is more a way of maintaining the Olympic system's political and economic balances and of protecting an economic model based mostly on TV rights,¹⁵ than a lever that can be used to prompt greater social responsibility by individual bodies within the system. Consequently, members of the Olympic Movement, whether NOCs, international federations or athletes, deploy OSR as they see fit. Many athletes, for example, have launched their own, personal initiatives, often in the form of charitable and community actions implemented via a foundation. Nevertheless, the Olympic symbol still has enormous power with the public, which the IOC could harness to take action on many of the world's most urgent economic, social, educational, health and environmental problems.

Conclusion

Today, SEOs are highly aware of the need to run their events in a responsible and sustainable way, and they know that if they achieve this, these events become extremely powerful tools for promoting sustainable development among their stakeholders. Nevertheless, many SEOs have insufficient resources and qualified staff to integrate a truly comprehensive CSR and/or SD approach into the organization's managerial system. Unlike large corporations, some of which have revised their production and economic models and their performance-evaluation criteria in order to incorporate CSR, many SEOs still take a partial or cosmetic approach to social responsibility.

This type of attitude to social responsibility creates substantial risks to an SEO's legitimacy, image and credibility, which can become serious enough to threaten the organization's existence. Mega events such as the Olympic Games and FIFA World Cup have made a lot of progress in terms of CSR and SD, but they remain highly dependent on the ability of a host country/city to manage sustainability

and legacy issues in such a way as to justify the considerable sums invested in its event and the public subsidies it receives (as exemplified by the criticisms levelled at the 2014 Winter Olympics, 2014 Football World Cup and 2016 Summer Olympics). This is why SEOs will increasingly be obliged to show, via independent, global analyses, that their events produce positive socio-economic and environmental legacies.

Notes

- 1 This is notably the case in France, where CSR is sometimes referred to as “responsabilité sociétale des entreprises” rather than “responsabilité sociale des entreprises”. Some French researchers consider the term “societal” to be more global than “social”, a term that is often used in France to refer to the relations between employees and employers (Gond & Igalens, 2012).
- 2 See, for example, “Value for Nestlé” and “Value for Society”.
- 3 See the *Journal of Sport Management*, 2009 (vol. 23, n°6) and the *Journal of Management and Organization*, 2010 (vol. 16, n°4) which include around 15 papers on the subject of CSR in sport.
- 4 For more on this issue, see the special issue of *European Sport Management Quarterly*, due out in 2019, on CSR in European sport. Contributors to this issue were encouraged to take a transnational comparative approach in order to reveal differences between the CSR models adopted in different countries.
- 5 Theme created in the light of the results of a questionnaire completed by the 12 T14 clubs and 12 Pro D2 clubs, which showed that 80% of clubs had been heavily involved in all or some of the pillars of social action (local impact, solidarity, rugby community, environment and ethics).
- 6 The *Football League* was created in 1888, making it Europe’s oldest football competition. The “Premier League” replaced the original “first division” in 1992.
- 7 Because Lyon FC’s holding company, OL Groupe, is a listed company, article 116 of the 2001 NRE Act and the decrees issued following the second Grenelle Environment Forum in 2012 (see Section 1 of this chapter) require the club to publish a social responsibility report.
- 8 Three football clubs (Paris, Lyon, Marseille) have set up both an endowment fund and a foundation.
- 9 Source: Association of Summer International Olympic Federations (2013).
- 10 The document’s full title was “Sustainability through sport: implementing the Olympic movement’s Agenda 21”.
- 11 See paragraph 37 of Agenda 2030: “Sport is also an important enabler of sustainable development. We recognize the growing contribution of sport to the realization of development and peace in its promotion of tolerance and respect and the contributions it makes to the empowerment of women and of young people, individuals and communities as well as to health, education and social inclusion objectives”.
- 12 In this respect, see the numerous reports published by French leagues, such as the LFP, that now refer explicitly to the issue of CSR.
- 13 Source: interview with a senior manager at the IOC.
- 14 Ibid.
- 15 NBC paid the record sum of \$7.65 billion for the rights to televise the Olympic Games in the United States during the period 2021–2032. The American network had already obtained the rights for Sochi (2014), Rio (2016), Pyeongchang (2018) and Tokyo (2020) for \$4.38 billion. After the decision to award the 2024 Summer Olympics to France and 2028 Summer Olympics to the United States (2028), the

award of the 2022 Winter Olympics to China, and FIFA’s decision to award the 2018 World Cup to Russia and the 2022 World Cup to Qatar, the world’s largest economic and political powers have been served for the next 10 years.

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