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STUDIES ON BHARTRHARI, 3: 
BHARTRHARI ON SPHOṬA AND UNIVERSALS.1

1. It will soon be 40 years since John Brough’s influential article “Theories of general linguistics in the Sanskrit grammarians” appeared in print.2 Among the topics discussed is the sphoṭa. Brough complains that “this term sphoṭa, which is of prime importance for Indian linguistic theory, has unfortunately been subjected by modern writers to a great deal of unnecessary mystification” (p. 405). Two writers in particular are mentioned, A. Berriedale Keith and S. K. De. Keith has described the sphoṭa as “a mysterious entity, a sort of hypostatization of sound”, while De has used the expression “a somewhat mystical conception”. Brough concludes that “it is hardly to be wondered at if the western reader, in the face of numerous comparable accounts, should come to the conclusion that the sphoṭa-theory represents a departure from lucidity which, coming as it does from men whose professional task was the clear presentation of linguistic facts, is quite inexplicable” (p. 406).

For Brough the sphoṭa is “simply the linguistic sign in its aspect of meaning-bearer (Bedeutungsträger)” (p. 406), or “simply the word considered as a single meaningful symbol” (p. 409). “In this conception of the sphoṭa,” Brough continues, “it seems to me that there is nothing ‘mysterious’: it is merely an abstraction to assist us in the handling of our linguistic material”. He concludes on p. 410: “It will thus be seen that the sphoṭa-doctrine, so far from being something ‘mysterious’, is in fact of central importance for the theory of language-symbolism.”

It may be that Brough’s observations are useful for general linguistics and linguistic philosophy. Indeed, this is what Brough had in mind, for he wrote this article — as he put it — “not merely as a matter of antiquarian curiosity, but because in their extraordinary linguistic and philosophic acumen these ancient authors are still, I believe, worthy of our respect” (p. 402). But whether or not [6] similar ideas are, or should be, present in modern linguistics, this has nothing to do with the question

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1 Thanks are due to the Rockefeller Foundation which enabled me, for a period of one month, to direct my undivided attention to Bhartrhari’s Vākyapadīya, in the Villa Serbelloni, Bellagio, Italy. Studies on Bharthari 1 and 2 have appeared in Bulletin d’Études Indiennes 6 (1988), pp. 105-143, and Studien zur Indologie und Iranistik 15 (1989), pp. 101-117, respectively.

whether Brough’s observations help us to understand the ancient Indian grammarians — and among them Bhartṛhari in particular.

Brough was aware that there may be more to the sphoṭa than is clear from his above-quoted remarks. He mentions in passing “the fact that the Indians themselves appear to have given ‘ontological status’ to this abstraction, and to have considered it as a sort of quasi-Kantian ‘Wort-an-sich’” (p. 409). On another page he mentions “the fact that on the basis of the sphoṭa-theory there was erected a metaphysical superstructure” (p. 411). Towards the end of the article (p. 412) he even quotes one of the few stanzas of the Vākyapadiya which make a statement about the ontological status of the sphoṭa; VP 1.96 (ed. Rau) says that ‘according to some’ the sphoṭa is a jāti ‘universal’;³ Brough rejects this view and claims that Bhartṛhari’s sphoṭa was rather an individual. Nothing further is however said about the ‘metaphysical superstructure’.

We have to face the question whether we really understand Bhartṛhari any better by knowing that one of his concepts correspond to a modern linguistic one, without knowing how it fits in his ‘metaphysical superstructure’. As long as the sphoṭa is not satisfactorily accounted for within the context of Bhartṛhari’s theory, are we not correct as describing it as a ‘mysterious entity’, or as a ‘somewhat mystical conception’?

The main effect of Brough’s article is that it creates in us a sense of familiarity with respect to the sphoṭa, but familiarity is not the same as understanding. For example, Brough’s exposition may make us receptive to the idea that the sentence is an undivided entity (cf. p. 412 f.); but this does not help us to understand why, for Bhartṛhari, also objects like pots are undivisible (VP 3.243). Nor can Brough’s arguments explain why the whole of the Rigveda is considered a unity by Bhartṛhari (VP 3.553).

There can be no doubt that the transcultural assimilation of concepts can remove the feeling of strangeness, but this should not be confused with understanding. It may, on the contrary, in certain cases give rise to confusion. The comparison of Pāṇini’s grammar with modern linguistics, for example, — besides contributing greatly to the general appreciation of Pāṇini — has tended to overlook, or even misinterpret, certain aspects of this grammar. Brough’s stated aim to demystify the concept of sphoṭa, therefore, appears to be an attractive slogan rather than an achieved goal.

2. The second publication I will consider is Bhartṛhari and the Buddhists, An Essay in the Development of Fifth and Sixth Century Indian Thought, by [7] Radhika Herzberger.⁴ Only a part of this book deals with Bhartṛhari’s ideas, and only some aspects of this part will here be discussed.

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³ Brough translates ‘class’, but ‘universal’ seems more appropriate.
⁴ Dordrecht / Boston / Lancaster / Tokyo: D. Reidel. 1986. (Studies of Classical India, 8.)
Herzberger complains about “the absence of an integrated portrait of Bhartrhari’s thought, a portrait that would convey the essential links between his grammatical ideas and his metaphysical ones” (p. 10). This shows that she attaches more value to Bhartrhari’s metaphysical ideas than Brough did. Yet she describes Brough’s above-mentioned article as a first step in the direction of a demystification of Bhartrhari’s metaphysical ideas (id.). How does Herzberger do justice to these ideas?

The basic question to her approach is: “What is the basis on which names are given to things?” (p. xvii-xviii, xxi). The main ideas which she attributes to Bhartrhari in this context can be briefly described as follows:

Bhartrhari distinguishes two kinds of universals: thing-universals (arthajåti) and word-universals (ßabdajåti). From among these two, word universals are by far the most important; indeed “the status of the thing universals is ignored” (p. 37). Word-universals — Herzberger calls them sometimes simply ‘universals’, as in the last line of p. 20 —, on the other hand, are “made up of three strands: a phonological strand, a syntactic strand and a semantic strand” (p. 21). The result is clear: “The speaker on the basis of the form of a word has immediate and unerring access to its meaning, its syntactic and phonological features” (p. 21). The semantic aspect of a word-universal makes the next step possible: word-universals participate in a hierarchical structure. “Thus the name šiµśapå has access through its universal šiµśapåtvam (sic!) to vrkåtam (sic!) (treeness) which is located in the name vrkå” (p. 33). This hierarchy can be extended upward. A šiµśapå is a tree, and for that reason animate, etc. At the top of this hierarchy we find the Great Being, which is the Supreme Universal, and which is consequently designated by all words (p. 35-36).

In order to confront this scheme with the text of the Våkyapadiya, I lift out the following points:

1) There are two kinds of universals: thing-universals and word-universals.
2) Word-universals have a semantic aspect.
3) Word-universals participate in a hierarchical structure.
4) The top of this structure is constituted by the Great Being, which is the Supreme Universal.

Let us now deal with these points one by one.

[8]

1) The first point is easily established, and obviously correct. VP 3.6 is thus translated by Herzberger (p. 29):"5

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5 The reading accepted by Herzberger is (p. 28): svå jåti˙ prathamaŁ açabdaiŁ sarvair evåbhidhiyate / tato 'rthaŁ jrítiräpuśu tadadhyaäropaäkalpaŁ //
All words first of all express their own universal; thereafter this universal (lit. it) is thought to be
superimposed upon the forms of universals of [external] things.

2) The second point is more problematic. The stanza which supposedly shows that
word-universals have a semantic aspect, is VP 3.3:

\[
ke\text{\textasciitilde}ncit s\text{\textasciitilde}hacaryena j\ddot{a}ti\dot{h} saktupal\text{\textasciitilde}k\text{\textasciitilde}nam / \\
khadir\ddot{a}d\text{\textasciitilde}sv \text{\textasciitilde}k\text{\textasciitilde}tre\text{\textasciitilde}ṣu saktah pratim\text{\textasciitilde}dh\text{\textasciitilde}yate //
\]

Herzberger translates (p. 20):\(^6\)

According to some, the universal indicates a capacity by way of accompaniment [of the
individual]; when [a post made of ] khadira lacks the capacity [to perform the function enjoined
by the injunction] something which has the capacity is substituted.

She concludes: “There does not seem to be, in view of this stanza, any reason for
denying that universals belonging in words lack semantic features.”

This conclusion shows — and the word ‘indicates’ in the translation suggested it
already — that in Herzberger’s opinion this stanza is about word-universals. It isn’t, but
it is easy to see how Herzberger arrived at this incorrect opinion. It is the result of her
incorrect understanding of the preceding stanza VP 3.2. She translates it correctly (p.
71):\(^7\)

In the artificial analysis of meanings / objects of words, a universal or an individual have been
described as the two really eternal objects / meanings of all words.

This stanza obviously concerns things. Yet Herzberger concludes from it that
“Bhart\text{\textasciitilde}hari preferred the two-fold division of words into individuals (dravya) and
universals (j\ddot{a}ti)” (p. 71), as if a division of words rather than of meanings / objects of
words were here under consideration. It is true that the preceding stanza VP 3.1 deals
with the division of words, but Herzberger is clearly mistaken in thinking that
“Bhart\text{\textasciitilde}hari had meant to subsume the former classification (of VP 3.1) within the latter,
more embracing categories (of VP 3.2)” (p. 20). One does not subsume a classification
of words within a classification of meanings / objects of words.

\[^9\] In the translation of VP 3.3 we may replace the word ‘indicates’ with ‘co-
implies’, a term which renders the Sanskrit upal\text{\textasciitilde}k\text{\textasciitilde}na at least as well, and makes very

\(^6\) The translation of the same stanza on p. 75 is slightly different.
good sense. In the injunction “Tie up the beast to a post of khadira”, the word khadira refers to the universal of khadira wood and, by co-implication, to the capacity of khadira wood to perform its function.

3) In order to substantiate the hierarchical structure of word universals, Herzberger adduces several stanzas. Consider first her translation of VP 3.7-8 (p. 31, 85; what follows is really an amalgamation based on these two translations):

Just as the essence (tattva), which is in the quality red, is designated in lacquer (kaśāya) and, as a result of contact with the conjoint (saṃyogisannikṣaṇa), is grasped even in garments; so also the universal, which is fixed in a word, as a result of the relation between word and object, brings about the effect of universals (jātikārya), when universals belonging in things are designated.

Herzberger makes much of the phrase ‘the effect of universals’ (jātikārya) in the second of these two stanzas. “‘The effect of universals’,“ she observes on p. 33, “derives from the hierarchical structure to which a universal located in a name has access. … Thus the name śimśāpā has access through its universal, śimśāpāvam to vrksatvam (treeness) which is located in the name vrksa. The name, on the basis of its own universal, has negative access to the universal located in the name palāśa.” Later on the same page she sums up: “Thus ‘the effect of universals’ … represents a theory of the analytic and antonymic content of names.”

These statements do not, of course, constitute evidence for the correctness of their contents, and Herzberger is aware of it. The evidence, as she indicates on p. 33, follows these statements, and it seems clear that VP 3.10 is adduced to fulfil this role. This stanza has to be read in combination with the one that precedes it, and I reproduce both of them as found in Rau’s critical edition:

VP 3.9: jātiśabdaikaše se jātinām jātir isyate / śabdajātaya ity atra tajjātiḥ sabdajātisu //
VP 3.10: yā śabdajātishadeṣu śabdeḥyo bhinnalaksanā / jātiḥ sā śabdajātitvam avyatikramya vartate //

The two stanzas deal with certain complications arising in connection with ekaśeṣa — translated by Herzberger as ‘Remainering of One’. An ordinary example of ekaśeṣa is vrksaś ca vrksaś ca vrksaś ca vrksaḥ, which justifies the use of one single word vrksaḥ ‘trees’ to refer to three or more objects, with the help of a plural ending.

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7 VP 3.2: padārthaṁ apoddhāre jātir vā dravyam eva vā / padārthau sarvaśabdaṁ nityāv evopavamitau //
8 VP 3.7-8: yathā rakte gune tattvaṁ kaśāye vyapadiśyate / saṃyogisannikṣaṇā ca vastraśīsv api gṛhyate / tatā śabdārthasaṁbhāc chabde jātir avasthitā / vyapadeśe ’rthajātinnām jātikāryāya kalpate //
The discussion in the Mahābhāṣya shows that this is possible because words do not only refer to individuals, but also to universals.⁹

If now we wish to form the plural *jātayaḥ* ‘universals’, we need the universal of the individuals referred to by the word *jāti*, i.e., the universal of universals. To justify the plural *śabdajātayaḥ* ‘word-universals’, similarly, we need the universal located in word-universals. However, no universals inhere in universals. How, then, is the formation of the plurals *jātayaḥ* and *śabdajātayaḥ* to be explained? The answer is provided by VP 3.8 (see above), which stipulates that where thing-universals (in the plural) are designated (*vyapadeśe ‘ṛthajātīnām*), the corresponding word-universal (*[ʃ]abde jātir avasthitā*) brings about the effect of universals (*jātikāryāya kalpate*), i.e., justifies the plural. The role of the thing-universal — which in this particular case does not exist — is taken over by the word-universal. This is possible because of the link that unites words and things (*śabdārthasambandhā[†]*), and therefore, indirectly, word-universals and thing-universals.

This explanation is confirmed by VP 3.9-10, which can be translated as follows:

In the case of *ekāśeṇa* of the word *jāti* (i.e., in the formation of the plural *jātayaḥ*), we need that universal of universals (viz., the universal inhering in the word *jāti*). In the case of [the plural] *śabdajātayaḥ*, the universal of that [word *śabdajāti†*] resides (in the manner indicated in stanzas 7-8) in the word-universals (*śabdajāti†*).

The universal which [inheres] in the words *śabdajāti†* [and makes the plural *śabdajātayaḥ* possible] is different from [those] words, [but] is nothing beyond a word-universal.

In order to understand Herzberger’s interpretation of the stanza, we must know that she follows the reading found in Iyer’s non-critical edition, which deviates from Rau’s in the case of stanza 10. Iyer has here:

*yā śabdajātiḥ sabdeṣu śabdebbhyo bhinnalakṣanā /
 jātis sā śabdajātitvam apy atikramya vartate //*

Herzberger translates the two stanzas as follows (p. 34, 90, cp. p. 93):

It [i.e. the higher word universal] is held to be the universal of [lower, more specific] universals when [the operation] Remaindering of One is performed for words which signify universals as ‘[these are] word universals here’; the higher word universal [lit. [11] it] is located in word universals. That word universal which is located in [all] words, [but] which is different from the words [in which it is located], resides there having even crossed over [its word universalness.

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Note that even this translation should leave no doubt that these stanzas concern the very special case of the plural of words which signify universals. It is hard to see how they could possibly be considered to justify a hierarchy of word-universals. We must assume that Herzberger drew some inspiration from the obscurity of stanza 10.

But we have already seen that this obscurity can be avoided by accepting the reading which is anyway to be preferred on the basis of Rau’s critical comparison of the Mss., and which gives a perfectly satisfactory meaning. Note that the reading accepted by Herzberger, and indeed her own translation, are still far removed from the ‘hierarchy of word-universals’, which can only be read into them with great effort. Indeed, Herzberger seems to be aware of this, for she introduces her explanatory remarks with the words: “I read this stanza in the following manner” (p. 34). She then continues: “A universal has the capacity to cross over both its own substratum as well as the phonetic features associated with it. Thus वृक्षात्वा loses its phonetic marks when it lodges in शिम्भापा. Shīmṣapā has the sense of वृक्षा, but not its phonetic features.” A far-fetched interpretation indeed!

4) VP 3.33 is quoted in order to show that “the hierarchy [of universals] reaches all the way up to the Supreme Universal, (mahāsāmānya), the Great Plenum, in which all words are properly fixed” (p. 35). Herzberger translates it as follows: 10

Divided into cows and so forth through distinctions present in those things which are its relata, [this] Being is called the [Supreme] Universal; and all words are fixed in this Universal.

Again it is difficult to find support for Herzberger’s point of view in this stanza. The only hint in that direction which I find in the translation is the word ‘Supreme’. But this word is rightly put between hooks, for no word in the Sanskrit text corresponds to it; the addition of ‘Supreme’ is clearly an invention of the translator. 11

I shall not here discuss the question in how far Herzberger’s interpretation — which does not fit the text of the Vākyapādiya, as we have seen — represents [12] Helārāja’s views. Herzberger herself expresses her ‘surprise’ at the discovery that Helārāja deviates from her interpretation at a crucial junction (p. 54). Nor does her interpretation of Bhartrhari find much support in her understanding of Dignāga, which — as she frankly admits on p. xxiii — “is shaped largely by my reading of

10 VP 3.33: sambandhibhedāt sattaiṣa bhidyamānā gavādiṣu / jātir ity ucyate tasyān sarve śabdā vyavasthitāḥ //

11 Note that Brough, too, made a similar addition while translating this stanza; he has “the Class (par excellence)”. See however below.
Bhartṛhari”. The conclusion is inevitable that Herzberger has not succeeded in her courageous attempt to elucidate Bhartṛhari’s ideas on the subject of universals.

3. Both Brough and Herzberger worked from 'below' 'upward' in their attempt to understand Bhartṛhari’s thought. Brough never reaches the metaphysical 'superstructure', whose existence he none-the-less does not deny. For Herzberger the 'superstructure' is the 'top' of a construction built by her 'from below'. For Bhartṛhari, however, we can be sure that the metaphysical superstructure did not come at the end, but rather at the beginning. It comes at the beginning literally, for the first stanzas of the Vākyapadīya speak of Brahman. But it must have come at the beginning in another sense as well: Bhartṛhari wrote his work starting from a vision, in which the metaphysical aspects of his thought were already clearly represented. This at any rate seems an extremely reasonable assumption to make.

Let us therefore try to understand Bhartṛhari’s ideas — at least as far as they concern the sphoṭa and universals — 'from top to bottom'. We begin with a stanza discussed by both Brough and Herzberger, VP 3.33, which we shall study in its context:13

From among the real and the unreal parts which are present in each thing, the real [part] is the universal, while the individuals are traditionally said to be unreal. (32)

Being itself, when divided into cows etc. on account of the different things with which it is connected, is called 'universal'; all words are based on it. (33)

They call it the meaning of the nominal stem and the meaning of the verbal root. It is eternal, it is the great ātmān; [the abstract suffixes] tva, tal etc. refer to it. (34)

[13]

When it assumes sequence in individual cases, it is called 'activity'; when its sequential form is destroyed, it is called 'Being' (sattva). (35)

It reaches the six states in the transformation of things, in order; on account of its own powers it appears like that. (36)

Also sequence belongs to it. In it there is the experience of [the power called] 'time', divided as it were in earlier, later and so on. (37)

It is the [posterior] non-existence of things, when we agree that they have disappeared; when the disappearance is in progress, it is known in the form ‘it is being destroyed’. (38)

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12 See also p. 106: "Dignāga wrote against the assumed background of Bhartṛhari’s thought, and without an awareness of this background Dignāga’s laconic statements remain obscure and odd.”

13 VP 3.32-39: satyasatyau tu yau bhagau pratibhāvaṁ vyavasthitau / satyam yat tatra sa jātir asatyā vyaktaṁ saṁśritā / satyam satyau pratibhāya ca dhīvarthān ca pracaśate / sā nitya sa mahān ātmā tāṁ ātus tvatālayāṁ // prāptakramāṁ viśēṣeṣu kriyāṁ saivabhādhīyate / kramāpiṣaṁ saṁbhāre tat sattvam iti kathate / saiva bhāvavikāre śad avasthāṁ prapadyate / kramaṁ śaktibhūtāṁ śvabhār evaṁ pratyavabhāṣate // ātmabhūtāṁ kramo ‘py asyā yatredaṁ kālabārasatam / pauvāparāyādiriṣṭena prāvibhaktam iā sthitam // tirobhāvabhupagame bhavanaṁ saiva nāstita / labhakrame tirobhāve naśyatīti pratiyate // pūrvasmāt pracyutā dharmād aprāpiṁ cattaraṁ padam / taddantarāle bhedānāṁ āśrayāj janna kathate //
It is called 'birth' when it has left its earlier characteristic and has not [yet] reached its next position, because in the meantime it is the basis of different [forms of appearance]. (39)

These stanzas undoubtedly describe Bhartṛhari's absolute, which he sometimes calls 'Brahman'. In the next article of the present series I intend to argue that this absolute is conceived of as a whole, as the totality of all there is, was, and will be. The present stanzas support this interpretation. Stanza 33, for example, speaks of Being which is divided into cows etc. The stanzas also refer to the 'powers' of Brahman, which play a role in producing the unreal world of our experience. Reality, on the other hand, only belongs to Brahman.

For further details of Bhartṛhari's vision of the world I must refer to future articles in the present series. Here we must concentrate on universals.

Stanza 33 identifies Being — i.e., Brahman — and 'universal'. Does Bhartṛhari have here some kind of 'supreme universal' in mind, as Brough and Herzberger maintain? Nothing in the stanza — nor indeed in any other stanza — suggests that. Nor is this interpretation in any way necessary. Consider stanza 32. It states that every object (bhāva) has a real and an unreal part. The real part is its universal. We may add that the real part of every object is Brahman. How? Stanza 33 explains it: it is Brahman as divided into cows etc.

We see that the division of Brahman must be visualized as consisting of two phases. There is the division of Brahman into universals. These universals are essentially identical with Brahman and do not contain any 'unreal' elements. 'Unreal' elements appear when a further division takes place under the influence of the 'powers' of Brahman. These powers introduce spatial and temporal divisions, among other things, and give rise to our 'unreal' phenomenal world. Stanza 35 strongly suggests that the introduction of sequence — the effect of time — is an important factor on the way from 'real' to 'unreal'.

The universals themselves contribute in the continuous creation of the phenomenal world:

Nothing originates which has no universal; the universal urges the causes to manifest it. (25)
The universals, entering both the eternal and the non-eternal causes, manifest themselves again and again in certain effects. (26)
The universal is also effective in producing activity; it urges the activity to manifest the object in which it resides. (27)

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14 VP 3.25-27: na tad utpadyate kiñcid yasya jātīr na vidyate / atmābhivyaktaye jātīh kāranānām prayojikā // kāranās ca pādām krtvā nityānītyesu jātayaḥ / kvacit kāreyesv abhivyaktum upaśānti punah punah // nirvartyaṃ ānām yat jātīs tatāpi sādhanaṃ / svāśrayasyābhiniśpattyai sā kriyāyāḥ prayojikā //
The picture which thus evolves of universals is hardly that of an abstract entity different from the things in which it manifests itself, like the universals of the Vaiśeṣika philosophy. In an important way Bhārtṛhari’s universal rather is the thing. It is not correct to think that there is a pot, and the universal potness which is different from it. Quite on the contrary, the pot in as far as it really exists is the universal; its not really existing shadow in the phenomenal world is the individual. It is therefore not possible to say that pot and potness are different, even though the former has a spatial and temporal dimension, which the latter has not. Universals, seen in this way, can most easily be compared with Plato’s ideas: they are real and unchanging, while the things that figure in our experience are their unreal reflections.

Returning now to Bhārtṛhari’s sphoṭa, if the real pot is the universal, the same must be true of words: the real word, i.e. the sphoṭa, is a universal. This is exactly the opinion attributed to ‘some’ in VP 1.96, the stanza so easily brushed aside by Brough:¹⁵

Some consider that the sphoṭa is the universal revealed by the various individual instances, and they consider that the individuals belonging to this [universal] are the sounds.

If we forget for a moment the attribution of this opinion to ‘some’, we see that we have arrived at a perfect understanding of the sphoṭa in the context of Bhārtṛhari’s theory. To repeat the main points: like everything else, words too have two aspects, the real word and its phenomenal manifestations, which are not real. The phenomenal manifestation of the word is sound, the real word its universal, which is the essence of the word (śabdatattva), identical with Brahman (VP 1.1).

As in the case of the pot, it is not possible to say that sphoṭa and sound are different, even though the latter, unlike the former, has a spatial and a temporal dimension. This is exactly what is stated in VP 1.99:¹⁶

And a connection with space etc. is also seen in the case of corporeal objects (such as pots); [in the same way] there is no difference between sound and word (i.e. sphoṭa), even though we distinguish different locations [in the case of sound].¹⁷

The identical nature of sphoṭa and sound is illustrated with the help of the doctrine according to which the sense organ is of the same nature as the object it perceives:¹⁸

¹⁵ VP 1.96: anekavyaktyabhivyaṅgyā jātiḥ sphoṭa iti smṛtā / kaiścid vyaktaya evāsyā dhvanītvena prakalpitāḥ //
¹⁶ VP 1.99: deśādhibhiś ca saṁbandho dṛṣṭaḥ kāyavatām api / deśabheda vikalpe ’pi na bheda dhvaniśābdasyaḥo //
¹⁷ This interpretation of the stanza differs from the one offered in the Vṛttī; see Appendix.
According to this doctrine, the organ of smell is constituted of earth, of which smell is the characteristic property; the organ of sight is fire, which has colour as its characteristic property, and so on. The nature of the sense faculty and its object are therefore identical.

Why is the view of sphota as universal attributed to 'some'? Does it mean that Bhartṛhari himself did not accept this point of view?

The situation appears to be somewhat more complicated. In point of fact, Bhartṛhari recognizes two possible views as to the thing denoted by words: it is the universal or the substance (dravya). In the Jñātisasundesa (VP 3.1-110) the point of departure is the view that words denote universals; in the following Dravyasundesa (VP 3.111-128) words are taken to denote substance. Bhartṛhari does not appear to make a choice between these two alternatives.

Consider now the first two stanzas of the Dravyasundesa:

'Self' (ātman), 'abiding essence' (vastu), 'own nature' (svabhāva), 'body' (śarīra) and 'true principle' (tattva), these are synonyms of 'substance' (dravya); it is traditionally believed to be eternal. (111)

The abiding essence (vastu), which is real, is known through its forms which are unreal. The real [abiding essence] is denoted by words which have unreal delimitations. (112)

The content of the second of these two stanzas resembles to some extent VP 3.32-33, studied above. Here again we find that objects have a real and an unreal part. But in the case of the present stanza the real part is the substance, not the universal. Substance and universal are not the same thing for Bhartṛhari. Bhartṛhari rather deals, in these two sections of the third Kāṇḍa of his Vākyapadīya, with the two views regarding the

18 VP 1.100-101: grahanagrāhīyaḥ svadhiṣṭā yogatā niyataḥ yathā / vyānīvyānīja kabhāvena tathaiva sphoṭaṁ kādayoḥ // sadṛśa-grahānām ca gandhānām prakāśakam / nimittāṁ niyataṁ loke pratidravyam avasthitam // I prefer the reading -bhāvena in 100c to bhāve 'pi, which is slightly better supported by the Mss.

19 See VP 3.2, quoted and translated above. Herzberger translates dravya with 'individual'; I prefer 'substance'.

20 VP 3.111-112: ātman vastu svabhāvaś ca śarīraṁ tattvam ity api / dravyāṁ ity asya paryāvās tac ca nityam iti smṛtam / satyaṁ vastu tadāśārāṁ satyair avadhiṛyate / asatyopādhibhiḥ śabdaṁ satyam evādhiḥitiye //
denotation of words, and shows that either way, whether one accepts the one or the other, all words denote Brahman.

Let us again return to the *sphoṭa.* Besides the view that the *sphoṭa* is a universal, we would, in view of the above, expect some stanzas in the first Kāṇḍa which present the opinion of 'others' according to whom the *sphoṭa* is substance.

This is exactly what we find. The discussion of the *sphoṭa* as universal begins in VP 1.96 and extends up to 1.104. VP 1.105-110 and 120-121 (111-119 are really part of the *Vṛtti*) then present the alternative view; 1.105 reads:

> Others declare that the *sphoṭa* is [the utterance] produced by the organs [of speech] on account of their contact and separation; the utterances born from [this initial] utterance are the sounds.

The 'substantial' nature of the *sphoṭa* here described becomes especially clear in stanzas 110 and 120:

> Some accept that the real word is wind, [others] that it is atoms, [others again] that it is knowledge; for in debates the different points of view are endless. (110) The [real] word (whether it be wind, atoms or knowledge), though ceaselessly active, is not perceived because of its subtle nature; it is noticed because of its cause, just as wind [is noticed] on account of a fan [which moves it]. (120)

We see that Bhartṛhari, on the substantivalist alternative, pictures sound as a superfine substance which is not noticed until certain causes specific to it have exerted their influence. This substance by itself does not undergo modifications; it is rather its 'power' which does so when words are pronounced:

> The power of the [word], which resides in the breath and in the mind, is differentiated when it manifests itself in the points of articulation.

The timelessness of the *sphoṭa* can thus be maintained.

The enumeration of 'knowledge' (*jñāna*) in VP 1.110 might cause surprise; knowledge is not normally considered a substance. This depends however on one's point of view. For an idealist substance derives its reality from, is nothing but,
knowledge. And indeed, Bhartṛhari himself, in his commentary on the Mahābhāṣya, enumerates knowledge among a number of 'substances' which are all, ultimately, identical with Brahman:25

'Because substance is eternal' (Mbh I p. 7 I. 11-12). The element earth is eternal. What is the true [part] in the element earth? The analytic imagination. What is the true [part] in the analytic imagination? Knowledge. What is the true [part] in knowledge? Om. And that is Brahman.

Back to VP 1.110. Here, as so often, Bhartṛhari declines to choose between the alternatives. It doesn't matter to him which substance constitutes the sphaṭa, as long as is clear that the view that the sphaṭa is a substance is shown to be tenable. As we have seen, it may also be a universal. Either way the duration of the sphaṭa is not affected by the duration of the perceived sound (cf. VP 1.106).

Appendix: the authorship of the Vṛtti

There are a number of reasons which have convinced me that the Vṛtti was not composed by the author of the stanzas of the Vākyapadya; these have been presented in another publication.26 Here I propose to deal with one argument — [18] admittedly neither the most important nor strongest — which is directly related to the interpretation of VP 1.96-110, 120-121 presented in the last part of the present article. This interpretation deviates from the one given in the Vṛtti in some important details. I shall contrast the two interpretations, and show that the one given in the Vṛtti is more forced and artificial than its competitor.

The interpretation of the Vṛtti leads to difficulties under VP 1.99, translated above. Its last pāda states that there is no difference between sound and word (na bhedo dhvanisabadayoh); this at any rate would be its straightforward interpretation. This interpretation makes good sense in the context of sphaṭa conceived as a universal, for universals and individuals represent the same thing, be it from its real and its unreal side; see VP 3.32 translated above.

According to the Vṛtti, on the other hand, there is no denial of difference between sound and sphaṭa in this stanza, but denial of difference of location. And pāda c (deśabhedavikalpe 'pi) — which we translated 'even though we distinguish different locations [in the case of sound]' — is, of necessity, interpreted in the Vṛtti as 'even

26 "Études sur Bhartṛhari, 1. L'auteur et la date de la Vṛtti." (above, note 1.)
though we wrongly distinguish different locations [for sound and sphoṭa].27 But this makes little sense, for the tendency is to confuse sound and sphoṭa, not to assign different locations to them.

Regarding the stanza as a whole, the Vṛtti feels obliged to consider it an answer to a rather absurd double objection. The first objection is:28 “The word is not manifested, because there is a difference of location [between it and that which manifests it]. For pots etc. are manifested by lamps etc. [only] when they are in the same location. But words are perceived at a location different from the conjunctions and disjunctions of the organs [of speech] which manifest them.” The first objection loses its force if one assumes that rather the sounds manifest the word,29 so the Vṛtti raises its second objection:30 "How is a word, which is located in one single place, manifested by sounds which are located in several places, far removed [from the word]?

The absurdity of this second objection — the only one that remains — follows from the fact, already stated above, that the tendency is to confuse sound and sphoṭa, not to assign different locations to them.

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27 Ed. Iyer p. 163 l. 2-3: ... saty api desabhedavikalpabhimane naivasa tayor bheda vidyata iti.
28 Ed. Iyer p. 162 l. 3-5: desabhedam nabhivyayate sabdaḥ / samādeśastha hi ghatādayah pradīpādibhir vyajyante / karaṇasanyogavibhibhyām tu vyanjakaḥbhīyām anyatra sabdopalabdhir iti /
29 Id. l. 5: sa cāyaḥ dhvaniṣu vyanjakeṣv aprasaṅgaḥ /
30 Id. l. 5-6: katham ekadeśasthaḥ sabdo nāmeśair ativipraṅṣṭaḥ dhvaniṣibhir vyajyata iti /