



UNIVERSITÉ DE GENÈVE



re-inventing citizenship  
in south caucasus :  
exploring the dynamics and  
contradictions between formal definitions  
and popular conceptions

**final research report**

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# 1 Introduction

*Carine Bachmann & Christian Staerklé*

The South Caucasus represents a challenge for those who wish to understand its current political situation. Located at the crossroads between southeastern Europe and the western border of Asia, the inhabitants of the region have passed through long and varied periods as separate nations and as parts of neighbouring empires. As a result of differing geographical conditions and varying outside influences, different cultures have developed in the region. In pre-Christian times, Georgia's location along the Black Sea opened it to cultural influence from Greece. During the same period, Armenia was settled by tribes from southeastern Europe, and Azerbaijan was settled by Asiatic Medes, Persians, and Scythians. In Azerbaijan, Persian cultural influence dominated in the formative period of the first millennium B.C. In the early fourth century, kings of Armenia and Georgia accepted Christianity after extensive contact with the proselytising early Christians at the eastern end of the Mediterranean. Following their conversion, Georgians remained tied by religion to the Roman Empire and later the Byzantine Empire centred at Constantinople. Although Armenian Christianity broke with Byzantine Orthodoxy very early, Byzantine occupation of the Armenian territory enhanced the influence of Greek culture on Armenians in the Middle Ages. In Azerbaijan, the Zoroastrian religion, a legacy of the early Persian influence there, was supplanted in the seventh century by the Muslim faith introduced by conquering Arabs. Conquest and occupation by the Turks added centuries of Turkic influence, which remains a primary element of secular Azerbaijani culture, notably in language and the arts. In the twentieth century, Islam remains the prevalent religion of Azerbaijan, with about three-quarters of the population adhering to the Shia branch. The Armenian, Azerbaijani, and Georgian languages also developed in different directions: Armenian grew out of a combination of Indo-European and non-Indo-European language stock, with an alphabet based on the Greek; Azerbaijani, akin to Turkish and originating in Central Asia, now uses the Roman alphabet after periods of official usage of the Arabic

and Cyrillic alphabets; and Georgian, unrelated to any major world language, uses a Greek-based alphabet quite different from the Armenian.

## 1.1 The transition from the Soviet era to independence

The three republics of the South Caucasus were included in the Soviet Union in the early 1920, after a short and unstable period of independence following World War I. They remained under Soviet control from 1922 until 1991, undergoing a similar degree of economic and political regimentation as the other constituent republics of the union (until 1936 the Transcaucasian Soviet Federated Socialist Republic included all three countries). The Sovietization process included intensive industrialization, collectivization of agriculture, and large-scale shifts of the rural work force to industrial centers, as well as expanded and standardized systems for education, health care, and social welfare. Although industries came under uniform state direction, private farms in the three republics, especially in Georgia, remained important agriculturally because of the inefficiency of collective farms.

Until the end of the 1980s, the South Caucasus was not on the map of international relations. Suddenly mass movements erupted, first in Nagorno Karabakh, and then other regions of the Caucasus, that brought the region into the spotlight. When perestroika began, neither its chief architects, nor the broad public were prepared for the possible rise of national movement (Cheterian, 2001). The first major wave of protest in the era of glasnost and perestroika that assumed specifically nationalist forms was the mobilisation in Armenia in support of separatism in Karabakh, which started in February 1988. One million Armenians occupied the streets of Yerevan asking Moscow to unify the mainly Armenian populated Autonomous Region of Nagorno Karabakh on the neighbouring Azerbaijani territory with Soviet Armenia. The demonstrators carried posters of Gorbachev and Leninist slogans for the right to self-determination and naively saw their movement as part of the reformist age and a call to correct the error committed by Stalin<sup>1</sup>. The Armenian

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<sup>1</sup> When borders were drawn between Armenia and Azerbaijan with great dispute under Stalin, in 1921, large minorities of Armenians and Azerbaijanis were located inside the titular republic of the other. The Karabakh Armenians were given their own federal subunit, an autonomous region. Armenians constantly complained that they were being discriminated against in economic investment and access to Armenian-language media. Local party officials raised the issue of Karabakh regularly from the 1920s onwards through petitions and letters, but these efforts were ignored by Moscow and the initiations often subjected to persecution by local Azerbaijani authorities. The possibility for contesting the Karabakh issue changed dramatically with the beginning of glasnost.

mobilization over the Karabakh issue was the first major wave of protest in the glasnost era that assumed a specifically nationalist form. Over the course of 1988 and 1989 politics moved increasingly from the government office into the streets, and with this move, the marginalized issues of nationalism was pushed into the political sphere. And suddenly, everywhere in the Soviet Union, hundreds of thousands of people occupied the streets.

In the West, this popular uprising was seen as the hour of the people, of the simple citizens. Suddenly, many others, united by a common desire for change, often underground, sometimes in prison, joined those who had laboured in oppositional civil society, in the street. People in the South Caucasus, as elsewhere in the Soviet Union, were persuaded that once the Soviet domination was overthrown, their respective nations would culturally and economically emerge and blossom<sup>2</sup>. The excitement about this new window of opportunity was generalized and the feeling of empowerment, fostered by mass movements and leading to the breakdown of the Soviet empire, touched all layers of the society. The historical moment seemed to hold lessons even for the more established liberal democracies in the West, which featured a much less heroic kind of democratic politics, beholden to routine, ambition, material interest, and money. For a moment, democracy in its most inspirational form seemed to be found in the East rather in the West and hopes concerning the emergence of democratic regimes in the countries of the former communist world were high, in the West as much as among the populations concerned (Dryzek & Holmes, 2002, 3).

But the process of nation building in the post-soviet South Caucasus has been accompanied by severe conflicts and deadly wars between and within the three states, producing massive migration flows, namely refugees and internally displaced people<sup>3</sup>. The initial mass movement in Armenia around the territorial issue of Karabakh soon turned into inter-ethnic violence, with former neighboring Soviet republics engaged in war. Other conflicts erupted in the years of dismemberment of the USSR, including a conflict between South Ossetia and Abkhazia on the one hand, and the central Georgian authorities in

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<sup>2</sup> Extract from an interview conducted in Armenia in winter 1993: “When the movement started we had big, big expectations. That Armenia would become a blossoming country because, not to take pride in ourselves, but Armenians are very industrious, very intelligent. Although we are a small country we have given a lot of scientists in different domains and our hope was that very fast it will blossom and become a beautiful country. We lived so long under the Russians! At that time all the richness of the republics were taken by the Russians and instead of them we used to receive certain things. We used to think that if we keep what is ours we would develop very fast” (Astrig, quoted in Bachmann, 1994, 70).

<sup>3</sup> For a detailed description of the conflicts in the region since the breakdown of the Soviet Union, see Cheterian, 2002 ;

Tbilisi. Similarly, civil wars erupted as a result of struggle for power in Tbilisi (1992) and in Baku (1993), underlying the fragility of the newly born republics in their early years.

In Georgia, minority separatist movements--primarily on the part of the Ossetians and the Abkhaz, both given intermittent encouragement by the Soviet regime over the years--demanded fuller recognition in the new order of the early 1990s. Asserting its newly gained national prerogatives, Georgia responded with military attempts to restrain separatism forcibly. A year-long battle in South Ossetia, initiated by Zviad Gamsakhurdia, post-Soviet Georgia's ultranationalist first president, reached an uneasy peace in mid-1992. Early in 1992, however, the violent eviction of Gamsakhurdia from the presidency added another opponent of Georgian unity as the exiled Gamsakhurdia gathered his forces across the border.

In mid-1992 Georgian paramilitary troops entered the Abkhazian Autonomous Republic of Georgia, beginning a new conflict that in 1993 threatened to break apart the country. When Georgian troops were driven from Abkhazia in September 1993, Georgia's President Eduard Shevardnadze was able to gain Russian military aid to prevent the collapse of the country. In mid-1994 an uneasy cease-fire was in force; Abkhazian forces controlled their entire region, but no negotiated settlement had been reached. Life in Georgia had stabilized, but no permanent answers had been found to ethnic claims and counterclaims.

The relationship of Russia to the former Soviet republics in the Transcaucasus caused increasing international concern in the transition years. The presence of Russian peacekeeping troops between Georgian and Abkhazian separatist forces remained an irritation to Georgian nationalists and an indication that Russia intended to intervene in that part of the world when opportunities arose. Russian military saw such intervention as an opportunity to recapture nearby parts of the old Russian, and later Soviet empire. In the fall of 1994, in spite of strong nationalist resistance in each of the Transcaucasus countries, Russia was poised to improve its economic and military influence in Armenia and Azerbaijan, as it had in Georgia, as a result of its mediations in the ethno-territorial conflicts of the South Caucasus.

The three ethno-territorial conflicts in the South Caucasus left a deep scar on the region. The conflicts has caused the death of 45-50 thousand people, and left a million and a half displaced from their place of origin. Moreover, several million people from the South Caucasus have migrated because of the violence and the economic hardship that followed. The three separatist regions, although have won self-rule, remain in physical and



political isolation: they are cut-off from the outside world, and no member of the UN has recognized their self-declared independence.<sup>4</sup>

For Armenia and Azerbaijan, the center of nationalist self-expression in this period was the Nagorno-Karabakh Autonomous Region of Azerbaijan. After the Armenian majority there declared unification with Armenia in 1988, ethnic conflict broke out in both republics, leaving many Armenians and Azerbaijanis dead. For the next six years, battles raged between Armenian and Azerbaijani regular forces and between Armenian militias from Nagorno-Karabakh ("mountainous Karabakh" in Russian), and foreign mercenaries, killing thousands in and around Karabakh and causing massive refugee movements in both directions. Armenian military forces, better supplied and better organized, generally gained ground in the conflict, but the sides were evened as Armenia itself was devastated by six years of Azerbaijani blockades. Today, all three major conflicts of the region are "frozen", but not solved.

But also within the three societies, the hopes for a "national renewal" were cruelly crushed. The achievement of independence in 1991 left the three republics with inefficient and often crumbling remains of the Soviet-era state systems. In the years that followed, political, military, and financial chaos prevented reforms from being implemented in most areas. The creation of state structures from the skeleton of the Soviet administrative model led to intense struggles for power and domination between new and old elites, resulting in a lingering, and sometimes resurgent authoritarianism<sup>5</sup>. The economic transition from a Soviet-style economy to primitive capitalism was disastrous for the majority of the populations who saw their living standard dramatically decreased. Social status, professional education and other identity markers suddenly became irrelevant, without a new reference system in sight. Moreover, generalized corruption and the increasing dichotomy between the capital and the regions, the generations, the poor and the rich, the

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<sup>4</sup> For more information on the conflicts, see Donabedian, Patrick, and Mutafian, Claude, *Artsakh, Histoire du Karabakh*, Sevig Press, Paris, 1989; Goldenberg, Suzanne, *Pride of Small Nations*, Zed Books, London, 1994; Djalili, Mohammad-Reza, (ed.), *Le Caucase Postsovietique: La Transition Dans le Conflit*, Bruylant, Bruxelles, 1995; Gall, Carlotta, De Waal, Thomas, *Chechnya, A Small Victorious War*, Pan Books, London, 1997; Michael Croissant, *The Armenian-Azerbaijan Conflict, Causes and Implications*, Praeger, London, 1998, Goltz, *The Azerbaijani Diary: A Rogue Reporter's Adventures in an Oil-Rich, War-Torn, Post-Soviet Republic*, M. E. Sharp, 1998. Svante Cornell, *Small Nations and Great Powers*, Curzon, London, 2001; François Thual, *La Crise du Haute-Karabakh, Une Citadelle Assiégée?*, IRIS, Presses Universitaires de France, Paris, 2002.

<sup>5</sup> Dryzek and Holmes (2002) speak about the emergence of « deliberative democracies », as defined by O'Donnell, 1994. Under delegative democracy, "whoever wins election to the presidency is thereby entitled to govern as he or she sees fit, constrained only by the hard facts of existing power relations and by a constitutionally limited term of office" (O'Donnell, 1994, 57 cited in Dryzek and Holmes, 2002, 8).

members of the titular majority and minorities are leading to a de facto denial of civil, political and social rights for growing sections of the populations in the three countries. Many of the high hopes of the early nineties have withered, and there is no doubt that today the majority of the populations of Armenia, Azerbaijan and Georgia feel dispossessed and deeply dissatisfied with promises made to them in the name of the nation, democracy, or the free market.

## 1.2 Why study popular conceptions of citizenship?

“That is, to understand if or how democracy works, we must attend to what people *make* of it, and what they think they are doing as they engage politics, or politics engages them”.

Dryzek and Holmes, 2002, 4

In this report, we present results from a study that investigated popular conceptions of citizenship in Armenia, Azerbaijan and Georgia. Citizenship generally refers to the legal and institutional criteria that confer civil, political, and social rights to specified individuals and groups on the basis of their membership in a political community, most often a nation-state. In 1991, the inhabitants of the three South Caucasian countries, and with them 287 million people in the former Soviet Union (Armstrong, 2002), suddenly became stateless as the newly independent nation-states struggled to define themselves and their inhabitants. By the mid-nineties, new citizenship regimes were established in the three countries under investigation, defining those who are full members of the political community and those who are not, with the associated formal and informal regulatory practices. Titular nationality groups in the South Caucasus have claimed sovereignty; those who fall outside these groups face increasingly nationalistic and exclusionary conceptions of citizenship by governments who foster top down ethno-nationalizing policies. In these countries, dominant ethnic groups hold exclusionary and defensive attitudes toward the access and practice of citizens' rights, believing that these rights are meant to serve primarily the interests of the majority. Hence, through its ethno-nationalizing policies the new governments shaped the beliefs of its citizens about nationhood in accordance with the view of the dominant titular majority, and sought to naturalize these understandings by presenting them as inevitable and unalterable. As a consequence, many laws related to the practice of citizenship (electoral laws, language laws, laws on minority rights, laws on the

status of government officials), informal institutional practices have further contributed to a deepening socio-political fragmentation with the societies of the South Caucasus and to narrow the concept of citizenship, leading to a de facto denial of the civil, political and social rights for certain groups of the populations.

Yet the concept of citizenship is not simply a matter of legal norms and institutional policies. It is also what people *make* of it, as reflected in social practices and their sense of civic inscription. With this in mind, a more active and process-oriented understanding of citizenship has recently expanded the concept (Isin & Wood, 1999). Today, many scholars understand citizenship as both status and social practice that can take many forms such as participation to family involvement.

So far, citizenship in the South Caucasus has only been studied through its legal and institutional content, as a status rather than a practice and little is known about the attitudes and judgments of ordinary people toward their respective rights and duties as citizens, and the meaning they confer to the notion of citizenship. By taking into account the beliefs, attitudes and judgments of ordinary citizens towards membership in the newly constructed political communities of the South Caucasus, and by investigating what democracy and citizenship means to them, we seek to reveal the variety of parallels and conflicts between particular models of democracy and post-communist political discourses. Furthermore, we also intend to generate insights into the prospects for democratic development and institutional change by providing a deeper and empirically grounded understanding of the dynamics underlying the adherence or rejection of the democratization process in the South Caucasus and the democratic legitimacy of the political options of the respective governments<sup>6</sup>.

### 1.3 Research team and process

The research has been initiated jointly by the private Swiss organization CIMERA ([www.cimera.org](http://www.cimera.org)) and the Chair of Social Psychology at the Faculty of Psychology and Educational Sciences (FPSE) of the University of Geneva. The scientific research has been carried out by Christian Staerklé, Assistant Professor at the University of Geneva, and

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<sup>6</sup> Our study can be seen as closely related to the recent work and concerns of Dryzek & Holmes (2002) on post-communist democratisation. The authors present thirteen country studies from Eastern Europe and the countries of the former Soviet Union mapping the way democracy and democratisation are thought about and lived by people in the post-communist world.

Carine Bachmann, Director of CIMERA, in close collaboration with the three research teams in the South Caucasus. Professor Willem Doise from the University of Geneva supervised the research throughout its various stages. The research team in Georgia was lead by Ghia Nodia, Professor, Chair of Political Sciences, Ilya Chavchavadze University of Language and Culture, and included David Losaberidze and Nana Sumbadze. In Armenia, the research team was composed by Gevorg Poghosyan, Director, Institute of Philosophy and Law, Armenian National Academy of Sciences and Rima Pogossian. In Azerbaijan, Javad Efendi, Head of the Department of Psychology, Azerbaijan Academy of Sciences, took the lead in collaboration with Tair Faradov and Imran Velyiev.

In a first step, the three interdisciplinary teams in the South Caucasus analyzed the political and institutional aspects of citizenship in their respective countries. They identified the major gaps between formal principles of citizenship and their application. The gaps are due to different problems: they can be a result of governmental incapacity and ineffectiveness in implementing citizenship process, to a willful denial (by authorities) or refusal (by citizens) of the practice of certain citizenship rights. Further, they described the major discourses and claims around the notion of citizenship and analyzed the current political debates around citizenship. The three national accounts have been edited by Carine Bachmann and form the basis of Chapter 3 of this scientific report.

In a second step, a regional survey on lay conceptions of citizenship was conducted among 650 students (mainly belonging to the titular majority) in the respective capitals of the three countries. The empirical study aimed at revealing how the respondents understand and define their belonging to the national community, and how they formulate their rights and duties as citizens. In order to reveal these lay representations of citizenship, the questionnaire was organised in two large parts, the first one that assessed perceptions and attitudes towards the current state of affairs in the country. This part was intended to reflect everyday preoccupations of citizens, whereas the second one was of a more normative nature as it was concerned with how the society *should* be organised and structured. The general theoretical rationale behind these two sections was that the perceptions and interpretations of the current social and political environment should determine preferences for one or another normative citizenship model, in terms of rights granted and duties imposed upon individuals and groups, of different forms of civic participation and of desired government responsibilities. The articulation between everyday perceptions of the social and political environment with attitudes towards

normative citizenship models generates popular conceptions of citizenship. The data collection was organized by the three national teams in the first months of 2002 in a large variety of educational settings in the three capitals, Tbilisi, Yerevan and Baku, respectively. The statistical analysis was conducted by the University of Geneva, with the help of Weimar Agudelo, research assistant at the Faculty of Psychology and Educational Sciences (FPSE). They have subsequently been interpreted in a comparative perspective by the two Swiss researchers, and from a national perspective by the three research teams in the South Caucasus. Intermediate results of the research were presented to a wider public on September 10, 2002, in the form of a round table at the University of Geneva.

The current scientific research report assembles the outcomes of the different research phases and has been edited by Carine Bachmann. The different chapters express the views of their authors, and not necessarily of the whole research team.

Last but not least, we would like to thank the SCOPES program of Swiss National Science Foundation, as well as the city of Lausanne, for their confidence and their financial support. Without their support, this research and all the precious contacts established during its course would not have been possible. A thank you goes also to Niculin Jaeger, who worked as an intern on the research project, and who contributed with his travels between the three South Caucasian countries to improve the communication between the different research teams. We hope that this scientific report will be the first stage in an agenda of research that will explore in greater empirical detail the prospects for the construction of more inclusive forms of citizenship in the post-soviet, and post-communist context.

# 2 The meanings of citizenship: from status to social process

*Carine Bachmann & Christian Staerklé*

“A polis or a state belongs to the order of ‘compounds’, in the same way as all other things which form a single ‘whole’, but a ‘whole’ composed, none the less, of a number of different parts. This being the case, it clearly follows that we must inquire into the nature of the citizen (i.e. the parts) before inquiring into the nature of the state (i.e. the whole composed of such parts). In other words, a state is a compound made up of citizens; and this compels us to consider who should properly be called a citizen and what a citizen really is.”

Aristotle, *The Politics*, originally written ca. 335 BC, cited in Blaug, R. & Schwarzmantel, J. , 2000, 208.

Who are the citizens and what does it mean to be a member of a political community? As the extract from Aristotle makes clear, the questions about the definition, meanings and roles of citizens have been debated ever since the time of the Greek polis. Citizenship is not a clear-cut and stable analytical concept; it has been constantly modified in political practices and accommodated to changing historical situations. In order to grasp what citizenship has become to mean in the contemporary world, it may be helpful to begin by identifying where the concept comes from and how its meaning has changed over time.

## 2.1 The origin and historical evolution of citizenship

The word ‘citizen’ derives from the Latin *civis* or *civitas*, meaning a member of an ancient city-state, preeminently the Roman republic. But *civitas* was a Latin rendering of the Greek term *polites*, a member of a Greek polis. The *polites* or citizen as defined by Aristotle was as a person who, by living in the city, participated in a process of cultivation, someone who rules and is ruled in turn. Thus, historically, citizenship was brought up as a

demarcation of an urban community of equals. For the Greeks, there was no clear distinction between morality and legality. A citizen was essentially a political being, by which was meant both a moral and a legal entity. Citizenship was an inherited privilege and included the rights to vote; to hold elective and appointive governmental offices; to serve on various sorts of juries; and generally to participate in political debates as equal community members. But since the polis was based on a restricted principle of equality between those included, as well as on a clearly defined territory, it also strictly excluded most of the population from participation in public affairs. Thus from the beginning, the term entails exclusion, since not everyone is in possession of it. In fact, most inhabitants of Athens, including the foreigner Aristotle himself, were ineligible to participate in citizenship. The more expansive or inclusionary citizenship becomes, the less it has to offer citizens. Consequently, it must be restricted. The Greeks preferred a strong citizenship of exclusion in order to restrict social resources and political rights to a small number of persons. Exclusion could either take the form of banishment from the geopolitical territory or subordination to non-citizen status, as was the fate of slaves, women, and children (Delanty, 2000, 11)<sup>7</sup>.

The meaning of a citizen as person with political rights to participate in processes of popular self-governance is the first and oldest meaning of citizenship (Smith, 2002, 103), making 'citizenship' conceptually inseparable from political governance. This old ideal of citizenship as *popular self-governance* continues to play a role in modern political discourse and has often served since as an inspiration and instrument for political efforts to achieve greater inclusion and democratic engagement in political life. But for that very reason, the ancient idea of citizenship often seemed politically threatening to many rulers who sought to abolish or redefine the concept.

This was for example the case under the Romans, where citizenship came to have a different meaning than the one articulated by Aristotle. In principle, Roman citizenship also carried with it the right to sit in the popular legislative assembly that had been the hallmark of Athenian citizenship (Smith 2002, 107 ff.). But as participation in that assembly became increasingly meaningless as well as impractical for most imperial inhabitants, Roman citizenship became essentially a legal status defining membership of the Roman political community, the *res publica*. It provided rights to legal protection by Roman soldiers and judges in return for allegiance to Rome. Consequently, the individual

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<sup>7</sup> Similar accounts of the origin of citizenship can be found in Isin & Turner, 2002; Giesen & Eder, 2001; Smith, 2002.

was seen, in the eyes of the law, as a legal being and with this came a firmer recognition of citizenship as a question of formal equality in the public domain. But being a citizen no longer entailed a relation to politics and citizenship no longer had any strong connection to actual practices of self-governance. Nevertheless, the Roman conception of citizenship sought to preserve a link with the Greek emphasis on participation in public life, but this was very much connected with the need for legal regulation of property rights in a society that was far more complex than the Greek polis. Thus, in the Roman society, law and property became the indicators of citizenship, which meant the participation in the community of shared common law (Delanty, 2002, 12).

The modern conception of citizenship was generated by the anti-monarchical revolutions that gave rise to the first modern republics, including the short-lived seventeenth-century Commonwealth and late eighteenth-century French Republics, as well as the United States. In eighteenth-century France and North America to be a citizen was once again understood as being someone involved in political self-governance. Their conceptions of citizenship referred to the experiences of Italian city-states during the Renaissance period that had achieved both independence and a meaningful measure of popular self-rule. But unlike in the Italian city-states of the Renaissance, the citizens of the “modern” republics of the eighteenth-century rejected rule by hereditary monarchical and aristocratic families in favor of a much broader community of political equals. Furthermore, in the modern republics, self-rule by ‘citizens’ no longer took place in ‘cities’, but within ‘nations’. These were substantially larger populations who could not have face-to-face knowledge of each other, but only be linked through symbolic ties . These “imagined communities” (Anderson, 1983) could engage in self-governance, if at all, only through more extensive reliance on systems of representation that became a distinctive feature of modern societies (Smith, 2002, 106 ff.). The basic form of modern citizenship then relied on the universalistic idea of equality as legal status while shifting the meaning of citizenship from the exclusive demarcation of a privileged group to the continual inclusion of new groups into the expansive demos.

## **2.2 Modern citizenship and the nation-state**

The modern understanding of citizenship emerged with the creation of an international system of states and was formalized and institutionalised along the lines of state formation. Thus, modern citizenship was born out of the nation-state in which certain



rights and obligations were granted to individuals under its authority. The state and citizenship became necessarily combined to form effective technologies of government. With the development of advanced administrative structures of the system of national governance, the state was able to mobilize citizenship as an aspect of nationalism. Nationalism consists of a collective claim to “nationhood”, which psychologically entails a claim of “groupness”, typically articulated in a definition and legitimisation of the group and its boundaries based on historic, territorial, linguistic, religious, or cultural interdependence among its members. It comes along with a message of ingroup distinctiveness and intergroup differentiation, as well as territorial claims (Azzi, 1998, 73). Nationalism therefore involves a social construction process whereby the existing differences between members of different groups are endowed with psychological significance such that the categories become part of a collective cognitive “representation” in which the group now appears to be a perceptual “unit” differentiated from other units.

The nation indeed constitutes the most frequently invoked category for identity construction, despite the massive diffusion of trans- and supranational discourses (Billig, 1995). For many, the nation is a point of stability and reference in an ever moving world, where the fragilization of social bonds and the growing material and existential insecurity contribute to feelings of powerlessness and inefficacy. But since the “nation” is necessarily an imagined community (Anderson, 1983), its cohesion needs to be defined and enforced in terms of symbols and values, which in turn implies a normative definition of criteria of inclusion. That is why the nation is particularly sensitive to threats against its founding values and myths (Staerke, Roux, Delay & Gianettoni, 2003). The desire to exclude members of certain social categories is grounded on the idea that the nation needs to be protected against persons who potentially could put into question values seen by a majority of the native population as foundation blocks of national cohesion.

The construction of “nationhood” therefore implies a constant redefinition of who is part of the political community, and who is not. On the legal level, processes of inclusion and exclusion rely on two basic regulative mechanisms, nationality and citizenship. Both nationality and citizenship refer to the nation state. Both identify the legal status of an individual in terms of state membership. They differ, however, inasmuch as each term refers to a different legal framework. While nationality refers to the international legal dimension in the context of an interstate system, citizenship is largely confined to the national dimension (Sassen, 2002, 278 ff.). According to international law, each state may determine who is considered a citizen of that state. Nationality is therefore a component of

citizenship, in the sense that it is a crucial dividing principle of access to citizenship by distinguishing between those who are granted the right to benefits and protection, and those to whom these rights are denied. Nationality performs what Kabeer (2003) calls an “*exclusion from without*”. The legal status of citizenship entails the specifics of citizen recognition by the state and provides the formal basis for the rights and responsibilities of the individual in relation to the state (Sassen, 2002, 279). It defines the legal and institutional criteria that confer civil, political, and social rights to specified individuals and groups on the basis of their membership in a nation state. Citizenship therefore performs an allocative function within the politically constructed boundaries of the nation state in that it controls access to scarce resources and provides legitimacy to social hierarchies between different groups within the society. It defines “*exclusions from within*” the nation-state (Kabeer, 2003). Struggles for inclusion within the circle of citizenship are consequently struggles over access to resources, and struggles over its meaning and membership are consequently also fights for social recognition. In the construction of “nationhood”, nationality and citizenship are both contested and debated in order to define, or redefine the borders and content of membership in the political community.

In the most general sense, the modern conception of citizenship has been based on the idea that membership in a society must rest upon a principle of formal equality (Delanty, 2000, 14). Typically, modern citizenship rights derived from membership in a nation-state include civil, political and social rights. This classic tripartite distinction of citizenship was introduced by the English sociologist T.H. Marshall in his seminal essay, *Citizenship and Social Class*, originally published in 1950. His conception of citizenship was a progressive one, since he argued that the three citizenship dimensions developed as part of the modernisation process of industrial, capitalist and nation-state-based, western societies from the late seventeenth century onwards. The progressive path through which citizenship evolved, he claimed, began with the acquisition of civil rights, followed by political and finally social rights. Civil and political rights were first granted in response to the demand of an emerging capitalist class, and expanded later to the working class. They helped to ensure freedom from the coercive exercise of power necessary for capitalist relations to flourish<sup>8</sup>. The civil dimension of citizenship rights includes the rights to property, individual freedom and legal protection. “The civil element is composed of the rights necessary for individual freedom – liberty of the person, freedom of speech, thought

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<sup>8</sup> For detailed accounts on the political struggles that lead to the extension of citizenship rights, see for example Roche, 2002; Smith, 2002.

and faith, the right to own property and to conclude valid contracts, and the right to justice.” (Marshall, 1950, 10). Political rights refer to participation in the public arena and include citizen’s right to vote and participate in the political process. “By the political element I mean the right to participate in the exercise of political power, as a member of a body invested with political authority or as an elector of the members of such a body” (Marshall, 1950, 11). Social rights, finally, included income and decent housing opportunities, as well as the right to health care and education for all citizens. Social rights brought to completion the purely formal rights of civic and political citizenship by alleviating the structural inequalities of capitalism, and thus were intended to bring about equalising effects and greater equality of social opportunity (Delanty, 2000, 16).

Marshall’s theory of citizenship has been severely criticised, especially for its hypothesis of a progressive path from civil to political to social rights<sup>9</sup>, as well as for the partiality of his account since he focused on the male working class during the industrial revolution in Britain. Marshall’s theory is indeed silent on race, on gender, and on the rights of those whose lands were colonised<sup>10</sup>. But Marshall’s theory has been so influential that many scholars and political activists equate genuine citizenship with the full possession of all three types of rights, and use his theory as a framework for the study of political rights and democratic governance, as well as a normative basis for the formulation of claims towards three institutions in modern societies involved in the regulation of citizenship, namely the legal, governmental, and welfare systems of modern western democracies.

Because citizenship rights are multidimensional and multilayered, it is useful to describe in more detail how these rights operate in society. Hohfeld (1978) has developed a theory of rights involving liberties, claims, powers and immunities to which Janoski and Gran (2002) refer in order to categorise the different citizenship rights. For them, a *liberty* is exercised without obliging others to help. A *claim* imposes a corresponding duty on others in order to uphold the right. Thus, a claim requires cooperation and is bounded, while a liberty is relatively open. *Powers* are cooperative controls that may be imposed on others, while immunities are the exact opposite allowing escape from control. For our purposes, we retain three categories of rights, liberties, claims, and powers, which seem

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<sup>9</sup> Citizenship rights do not necessarily develop according to this single progressive logic.

<sup>10</sup> For a discussion of the limits of Marshall’s theory on citizenship, see for example from a post-modern perspective Delanty, 2000, 17-22 and Isin & Wood (1999), from a post-colonialist perspective Kabeer, 2002, 7ff; from a feminist perspective Voet, 1998.

essential in order to be able to illustrate the different nature of citizenship rights<sup>11</sup>. Civil rights, such as freedom of religion, speech, due process, are often articulated as *liberties*, in the sense that they refer to the ability of individuals to act as they please as long as others are not hurt. Political rights are usually claimed as *powers*. By voting, citizens cooperatively control the agenda for political action. By holding office, citizens control other citizens in a direct way. Social rights, finally, are invoked in *claims* to education and a variety of welfare services that require correlative duties from others.

While the idea of citizenship may nowadays be universal, its meanings are not. Definitions of what it entails to be a citizen vary significantly across national contexts, since domestic laws about who is a citizen vary from state to state. Western conceptions of citizenship have evolved from, and continue to be framed by the two great “citizenship traditions”, namely the republican and liberal approaches to citizenship. The *liberal* theory is minimalist. Liberalism puts a strong emphasis on the individual as an autonomous social actor, and consequently liberal rights mostly reflect individual liberties. It purports that the role of the state is to protect the freedom of its citizens, especially by protecting the right to property and by removing obstacles to free exchange between individuals in the market place. The “liberal” conceptions of citizenship present civic membership as a *status* and tend to uphold a more passive conception of citizenship, since they understand citizenship rights mainly as *liberties* and do not imply collective responsibilities and participation (Smith, 2002; Schuck, 2002; Delanty, 2000). In contrast, republican conceptions of citizenship maintain that citizenship must involve rights and practices of political participation to achieve the common good: they stress an active and more practice-oriented conception of citizenship (Dagger, 2002; Delanty 2000). Republican theories put emphasis on both individual and rights and collective responsibility. They articulate citizenship rights as mainly *powers* and *claims*, and emphasize the role of conflict and contestation in the expansion of such rights. These traditions have in turn been elaborated over time in a number of different approaches, including their communitarian variations<sup>12</sup> (Delanty, 2000; Janoski & Gran, 2002). Communitarianism emphasizes the predominance of the

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<sup>11</sup> Janoski and Gran (2002) adapt Hohfeld’s classification of rights to categorize four types of citizenship rights, legal, social, political, and participation rights in a rather straightforward way, by making them correspond to one class of rights (social rights are claims, political rights are powers etc.). The practices of most citizenship rights seem far too complex to be subsumed under one category of rights.

<sup>12</sup> Much of the communitarian debate over citizenship has been confused by a failure to address the different forms it has taken. At least two forms need to be distinguished: liberal communitarianism, associated with Charles Taylor, Michael Sandel, Michael Walzer and Alisdair Macintyre; and its republican version, civic communitarianism, associated with the work of Hannah Arendt, Benjamin Barber, Quentin Skinner and J. Pocock (Delanty, 2002, 159 ff.).

community (society, nation) over its members. A primary concern of communitarian citizenship is a cohesive society organised around a common set of values which community members are expected to endorse. The good society is built through mutual support and group action rather than through atomistic choices and individual liberty (Janoski & Gran, 2002). Obligations to society may often predominate over rights because their goal is to build a strong community based on common identity, mutuality, participation, and integration.

While useful in the understanding of various theories and practices of citizenship across western democratic states, these three theories no longer appropriately capture the changing nature of citizenship in the twenty-first century (Isin & Gran, 2002). The reality of emigration and immigration, the formation of supranational and transnational bodies such as the European Union, the formation of new successor states, the movement of refugee populations, and the codification of international human rights norms has challenged modern understanding of belonging and has contributed to rethinking the meaning of citizenship. Many of these recent tendencies that put into question traditional views on citizenship can be observed in the South Caucasus.

## 2.3 Citizenship as social process: claims and groups

In the last two decades, two major processes challenged the nation-state as the *sole* source of authority of citizenship and democracy: globalization and post-modernisation. These twin pressures blurred the boundaries of citizenship rights and obligations and the forms of democracy associated with them, broadening the way citizenship is understood and debated. “The conception of citizenship as merely a status held under the authority of a state has been contested and broadened to include various political and social struggles of recognition and redistribution as instances of claim-making, and hence, by extension, of citizenship” (Isin & Gran, 2002, 2). In western countries, for example, major social issues such as the status of immigrants, refugees and diasporic groups, gender equality, environmental injustice, or homemade poverty have recently been framed as *citizenship concerns*. This new language of citizenship is a result of what has been termed the “rights revolution” (Doise, 2002; Ignatieff, 2003).

From the 1990s onwards, the issue of collective recognition, based on group claims, widens the scope of rights at stake, for example through claims to ethnic, cultural, linguistic and disability rights. Collective recognition is grounded on symbolic and

material motivations where groups strive for inclusion and belonging, either by seeking distinctiveness from others in order to affirm their identity, or, alternatively, by advocating principles of equality and non-differentiation. Such tensions between claims of equality and specificity are a central element in current debates on the role of collective rights (or group rights) in citizenship (Staerklé, Roux, Delay, Gianettoni & Perrin, 2003). By claiming group rights, minorities aim to correct a situation in which they feel disadvantaged, either because they are confronted to unfair treatment or structural disadvantages, or because they are unsatisfied with the symbolic status of their group in relation to a dominant reference group (including for example claims against discrimination or in favour of political autonomy). Since group rights are never granted in an unproblematic and consensual way, they always involve political debate, social struggle and collective mobilisation. Hence, group claims that are formulated as citizenship rights confer citizenship a *process-oriented* and *active component*.

Claiming groups are defined and define themselves in relation to other groups in a society structured by various principles of social division that organise the subordination of groups. In order to grant rights to group members, group boundaries need to be defined with as little ambiguity as possible, and the criteria retained to define them are regularly at the centre of political debate. Hence, by claiming rights, social groups are constructed as political agents, and endowed with a particular status through which they are recognised as a politically relevant unit.

More generally, these struggles have drawn the attention to informal citizenship practices that go beyond voting, including civic engagement, participation in social movements and protest, neighbourhood help, or actions that have been hitherto associated to the private realm, such as family involvement or caring activities. There is now growing agreement that citizenship must also be defined as a *social process* through which individuals and social groups engage in claiming, expanding or losing rights (Isin & Gran, 2002; Isin & Wood, 1999; Delanty, 2000; Lister, 1997).

Yet, increasingly, claiming rights in the name of a group is not only a social process, but also a source and marker of *social identity*. In south Caucasus group rights are often articulated around claims emanating from ethnic minorities. Identification with ethnic, religious or linguistic groups at a sub-national or transnational level shape the identities of citizens and the meaning they confer to their experience of citizenship. Depending on the groups to which citizens belong and feel attached, membership in the nation-state may be contested or defended.

## 2.4 Conceptual framework for the study of citizenship as social process

As the section on groups and claims has made clear, in the past ten years, scholarly interest has increasingly focussed on citizenship as the outcome of interaction processes between different forms of belonging, for example the articulation between membership in the nation-state and (ethnic) subgroup identification (Kabeer, 2002), between national, supranational or regional allegiances (Eder & Giesen, 2001), or, more generally, between principles of “difference” and “equality” (Isin & Wood, 1999). The way these interactions shape the patterns of access to and exclusion from citizenship rights in different political contexts has become a key theme in citizenship studies<sup>13</sup>. While the methodological and disciplinary approaches are highly diversified in the emerging field of citizenship studies, researchers from various disciplines and policy domains (education, welfare, international relations, migration to mention only a few) share the same urgent concern: to rethink the *political agent* (on the individual and group level) in these new economic, social and cultural conditions that make possible the articulation of new claims and their form and content *as citizenship rights* (Isin & Turner, 2002, 1).

To study this process of redefinition and reconfiguration of citizenship, Isin and Turner (2002, 1-2) propose a conceptual framework based on three fundamental axes of citizenship: extent, content and depth. The *extent* of citizenship in a given nation-state is determined by rules and norms of inclusion and exclusion, defining how the boundaries of membership within a political community or between political communities should be set. The *content* of citizenship relates to the specific combination of citizenship rights and responsibilities in a given context, regulating how the benefits and burdens of membership should be allocated. A modern democratic state is expected to uphold a combination of citizenship rights and obligations even though the precise combination and depth of such rights vary from one state to another. Finally, the practice of citizenship depends on its

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<sup>13</sup> Citizenship studies is not yet an institutionalized field. It has established itself de facto as an interdisciplinary field in the humanities and social sciences since the 1990s, and includes today a growing literature by scholars in feminist studies, queer studies, Aboriginal studies, African studies, diasporic studies, race and ethnic studies, migration studies, environmental studies, urban studies who are exploring and addressing concepts of sexual citizenship, ecological citizenship, diasporic citizenship, multicultural citizenship, differentiated citizenship (Isin & Gran, 2002).

*depth*, in other words on how the identities of the members of a political community should be comprehended and accommodated. “Thick” citizenship prescribes educated, active and participating citizens, whereas “thin” citizenship is based on a minimalist view of the members of a political community, merely entitled to passive rights of legal protection and formal participation through voting or paying taxes.

Tilly (1996) proposed an encompassing view of the complexities of modern citizenship, by describing citizenship as an historical, relational, cultural, and contingent public identity. It is **historical** in calling attention to the path-dependent actualisation of memories, understandings and means of action in the construction of citizenship. Nation-states often use other previously existing ties (e.g. founding myths, historical distortions) as bases for new forms of citizenship or as grounds for exclusion from citizenship. Imputed ethnicity or nationality provide cases in point. Citizenship is **relational** in the sense that it locates identities in connections among individuals, groups and the state rather than in the minds of particular persons or whole populations. Citizenship is **cultural**, Tilly insists, because social identities rest on shared understandings and their representations. And finally, citizenship is **contingent** in that it regards its practices as a strategic interaction liable to failure rather than as a straightforward expression of an actor’s attributes.

We aimed at founding our own approach to the study of popular conceptions of citizenship in south Caucasus upon such a large and inclusive notion of citizenship: we understand citizenship as a historically embedded, social process, and as an organizing principle of social interaction between individuals, social groups and the state. Most empirical citizenship studies focus on the regulation of citizenship from a legal, political or economic perspective. They study for example the social and political consequences of these regulative mechanisms for specific social groups, or the impact of public policies on citizenship-relevant domains such as education, welfare, migration, or international relations. We have chosen a different approach to the empirical study of citizenship: we analyse how a young generation of ordinary citizens makes sense of their citizenship experience, as members of the newly created nation-states in the South Caucasus. The political context, as well as the theoretical justification and the general work hypothesis that guided our empirical study of popular conceptions of citizenship are laid out in the following chapters.



# **3**      **P o l i t i c a l   t r a n s f o r m a t i o n s** **a n d   n a t i o n - b u i l d i n g   i n   t h e** **p o s t - s o v i e t   S o u t h** **C a u c a s u s**

*Ghia Nodia*

## **3.1 Triple transitions with uncertain outcomes**

For countries of the former Soviet Union the end of communism and break-up of the central Soviet state in early 1990s implied at least triple a transition: first of all, it meant carving up new states and new political communities; secondly, it meant creating new political regimes; and thirdly, it meant a radical change of the economic systems in place. In all these areas, it was assumed that people had to dramatically reject the immediate past and rebuild their lives and institutions according to completely different normative templates, all of them taken from Western experience. The Soviet concept of a supranational state espousing the ideology of proletarian internationalism was relinquished in favor of a modern European model of the nation-state, based on the ideology of civic or ethnic nationalism. The one-party totalitarian rule, based on the domination of a single ideology, was supposed to be replaced by a western-style liberal democracy and in the economic sphere, the monopolistic “command economy” that ruled out private property and private economic initiative, was rejected in favor of the market economy.

In this, its radicalism, the post-soviet and post-Yugoslavian transitions are unique. Nowhere else did societies face the necessity to tackle these three fundamental tasks at the same time. It is understandable that such a set of simultaneous transitions was an especially tough and painful experience. While this was true, the trajectories of change, as well as outcomes were rather different for specific countries and regions of the former Soviet space.

Regarding the first dimension, the dynamics and trajectories of change, it should be recognized how orderly and peaceful the transition was. The South Caucasus is notable for undergoing transitions in the most catastrophic mode – the only other post-communist region to which it can be compared is the Balkans. In late 1980s and early 1990s, both the South Caucasus and the Balkans became an arena of ethnic wars and political turmoil. Since 1994 the South Caucasus has been relatively calm, nevertheless the region is still considered volatile and unstable.

The second major parameter of comparison is the outcome of the transition processes. While there are obvious differences between each of the South Caucasian cases: Armenia, Azerbaijan and Georgia, there are some general features as well - political transformations did indeed begin, institutions of the past were rejected and societies did make some genuine steps in the direction of nation-building, democracy and free markets. Expectations were that the new political and economic orders would eventually approximate the chosen models even more. But today, more than ten years after independence, both political and economic institutions that have replaced the Soviet ones are a far cry from those normative models that they claim to be imitating, and there is no ground to insure that the subsequent developments will move these countries closer to their proclaimed goals. There is reasonable consensus with regards to negative assessments: no clear or stable system of nation-states, democratic institutions or free markets has emerged. On the other hand, there is no consensus as to define those institutions, political and economic practices that have in fact emerged in place of old ones. Scholars continue to develop new definitions. One has to note, though, that this general assessment applies not only to the states of the South Caucasus but to most, of the post-Communist countries as well.

### **3.2 The first stage of transformation: formulating the agendas**

One can discern several *stages of transformation* in the three countries of the South Caucasus. *The first* was the stage of liberalization or weakening of the Communist regime and the emergence of popular protest movements. This coincided with the beginning of perestroika and glasnost and the new liberalizing policies of then Soviet leader Mikhail Gorbachev, which started to gain momentum in 1987-88. Agendas of the protest movements that emerged at this time under the leadership of groups of intellectuals, mainly

with a background in humanities, defined the direction these countries took for years to come and continue to exercise today. In each of the countries, these movements had two major targets: anti-Communist (who rejected communism and advocated western democratic and free-market values), and ethnic nationalists. The nationalist agenda, in its own right, was also double-edged: on the one hand, it was the program of independence (targeted against the “Empire”, or the Moscow leadership), and on the other hand, it was targeted against homegrown minorities and/or neighboring states (in the Armenian case) that were considered “fifth columns”, threats or obstacles towards realizing a project of nation-state as constructed by the nationalist elites.

It was at that time that the lines designating friends and enemies were defined. As in all nation-building efforts, the issue of ethnic minorities proved especially painful and controversial. Georgia contained the largest number of number of ethnic minorities – about 30 percent of the population in the 1989 census.<sup>14</sup> Azerbaijan, according to the last Soviet census, had 18 percent ethnic minorities, while Armenia was the most ethnically homogenous republic of the Soviet Union – 93 percent of its population was of Armenian ethnicity. Ethnic nationalists viewed almost all ethnic minorities with some suspicion, but it soon became clear that the real problems were related to minorities that had their “own” ethnic autonomous regions within the Soviet administrative structure.<sup>15</sup> These units whose bureaucratic structures were dominated by respective ethnic groups provided strong institutional platforms for raising nationalist agendas in their own right. There were three such regions in Georgia: Abkhazia, Ajaria and South Ossetia, and one in Azerbaijan: Nagorno Karabakh (or Mountainous Karabagh), with its ethnic Armenian population. All of them, save for Ajaria,<sup>16</sup> became arenas of armed conflict.

### 3.3 The second stage: catastrophic change

*The second stage* (1990-94) was a period of catastrophic change and ethnic wars. In each of the three countries political leadership passed from Communists to nationalist-

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<sup>14</sup> Some commentators believe that this census, carried out against the backdrop of nationalist movements in Georgia, artificially increased the percentage of ethnic Georgians in the country, so the real share of the minority population may have been even greater.

<sup>15</sup> The Soviet administrative system provided for quasi-nation states of several orders: it was composed by fifteen Union Republics, but some of them also contained ethnically defined autonomous territories of different status (Autonomous Republic, Autonomous Oblast, Natsionalnii Okrug).

<sup>16</sup> Ajarians speak Georgian and have Georgian ethnic identity, but unlike the rest of ethnic Georgians are Muslims; Ajaria was the only autonomous region in the former Soviet Union that was based on confession rather than ethnicity.

democratic forces, mostly in an orderly manner. In May 1990, the All-Armenian National Movement led by Levon Ter-Petrosian severely defeated the Communists and rose to power in Armenia. In October-November of the same year this success was repeated by the Round Table coalition led by Zviad Gamsakhurdia in Georgia. Ter-Petrosian and Gamsakhurdia subsequently won presidential elections in their respective countries. In Azerbaijan, the elections in 1991 were won by the incumbent Communists, but in May 1992 a popular uprising brought to power the Azerbaijani Popular Front led by Isa Gambar and Abulfaz Elchibey (the latter was elected president in June 1992). During 1991, popular referenda were conducted in each of the three countries, with overwhelming majorities favoring independence. The final break-up of the Soviet Union in December 1991 made Armenia, Azerbaijan and Georgia internationally recognized independent countries.

But recognition only implied a license from the international community to govern on certain territories. How the government lived up to the task, was a wholly different issue. The three countries fared very differently from each other. Both Azerbaijan and Georgia became involved in bloody conflicts in their autonomous regions and experienced violent changes of power. Two of the wars – in Nagorno Karabakh and in South Ossetia – began when the South Caucasus was still part of the Soviet Union, although after the formal break-up, the violence escalated. In August 1992, war also broke out in Abkhazia. In all these cases, the leaderships of the autonomous units tried to change their status unilaterally and, in one way or another, declared independence or made steps in that direction; the governments in Tbilisi and Baku reacted by trying to establish control by force. In all three cases, the secessionist territories won, because they showed a higher degree of mobilization and because they received support from the outside (although the victorious parties are usually reluctant about admitting it). The fighting ended in July 1992 in South Ossetia, in September 1993 in Abkhazia and in June 1994 in Karabakh with cease-fire agreements (in the case of Abkhazia, the cease-fire agreement was actually signed in April 1994, but there had been no fighting for several months before that), that presumed further negotiations on the final status of the territories and return of refugees and internally displaced persons.

These conflicts were paralleled by political struggles over the control of power in the centre. The first democratically elected president of Georgia, Zviad Gamsakhurdia, was fast to radicalize his opposition and alienate part of his closest lieutenants. As a result, he was toppled in January 2002 after a two-week long fight in the center of Tbilisi. The victorious paramilitary groups invited Eduard Shevardnadze, who had been the Communist

ruler of Georgia (1972-85) and the foreign minister of the Soviet Union in its final years of existence to head the government. The supporters of Gamsakhurdia (the so-called 'Zviadists') did not reconcile themselves to the defeat and established control over the region of Megrelia, where Gamsakhurdia came from and which was adjacent to Abkhazia. This led to a general break-down of order throughout the country, with Georgia becoming prey to rivaling warlords, and the power of political leadership in Tbilisi rather nominal. It was only in the fall of 1993 that the Zviadist rebellion in western Georgia was finally quelled and Shevardnadze began gradually expanding effective control over the country.

In Azerbaijan, the anti-Communist forces came to power by force – and an armed rebellion, in June 1993, installed Heydar Aliiev in power. Aliiev, a Communist veteran who also had an extensive experience of ruling Communist Azerbaijan and then was promoted to a higher position in Moscow in the 1980s, was much faster in establishing his control over the country.

Armenia met the new challenges somewhat better than its neighbors. This does not mean that the life of its population in that period was less miserable than in neighboring countries. Armenia mobilized its resources for the war effort and it was squeezed between two hostile states – Azerbaijan and its ally, Turkey. The route to Armenia's best ally – Russia, was blocked by the war in Abkhazia. But at least the war that Armenia was involved in was not on its territory and, no less importantly, the Armenian side was victorious. Ter-Petrosian proved to be a more capable leader than his colleagues, Gamsakhurdia and Elchibey, as he managed to build a credible army but denied it the possibility to influence political life. Hence, the internal political life of Armenia was more stable and state institutions more effective.

### **3.4 The third stage: stabilization**

*The third stage* of development in the South Caucasus began after 1994, and it may be called the period of stabilization. The armed conflicts that turned the region into a permanent crisis zone were "frozen": no party to the conflict effectively challenged the status quo that was established as a result of the war, and all state actors accepted the general principle that solutions should be found through negotiations. The conflicts were largely internationalized, as the process of negotiations were mediated by international organizations (UN in the case of Abkhazia, OSCE in the case of South Ossetia) or groups of countries licensed by such organizations (such as OSCE Minsk group in the case of

Nagorno Karabakh). Negotiations did not lead to any tangible results in any of these cases, although at some points expectations of “breakthroughs” were reasonably high. While officially resolution of the conflicts remained high on the political agenda and nobody was reconciled to the status quo, as a matter of fact for the majority of both political elites and the general public in Abkhazia or Karabagh put it on the back burner. Though the issues were still highly emotional, it was only from time to time that they were drawn to the centre of the political agenda. Ongoing economic grievances or competition for power and resources took the center stage in the life of people and political elites.

Abkhazia proved to be the most unstable of the three “frozen” conflicts. Twice, in May 1998 and October 2001, the small-scale fighting was renewed, mainly due to activities of the Georgian partisans who in the second case were assisted, ironically, by the Chechen fighters (some of whom had an experience of fighting on the side of the Abkhaz in 1992-93). This, however, did not lead to any large-scale hostilities, as the central state refrained from any attempts to renew a conflict.

One of the most important effects of the “frozen conflicts” was the presence of a large amount of the refugees and internally displaced people: 930 thousand in Azerbaijan, 272 thousand in Georgia, 264 thousand in Armenia.<sup>17</sup> In Armenia, refugees from Baku and Nagorno Karabakh were received better than in the other countries, and the Armenian authorities tried to facilitate their integration, through modest financial support, shelters, and an alleged nationalization procedure to gain Armenian citizenship. Nevertheless, a large percentage of refugees from Azerbaijan re-emigrated to third countries, mainly Russia, because they were not able to create decent living conditions or did not feel welcomed by the local Armenian population. In fact, many Armenian refugees from Azerbaijan didn’t speak Armenian and were perceived as culturally different, and somehow “estranged” Armenians by the local population. In Georgia and Azerbaijan, IDPs (from Abkhazia, South Ossetia, and Nagorno Karabakh) were not oriented towards integration in their new place of residence, the official policy being that these populations would return to their place of origin once the conflict was resolved. Therefore the Georgian and Azerbaijani authorities only offered temporary conditions for the IDPs, which seriously hampered their chances to integrate. They are perceived as a social and political problem, draining on public resources and the “goodwill” of the population. Hence, their

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<sup>17</sup> UNHCR Statistical Yearbook 2001, p. 27.

presence exacerbates social and political tensions and they represent a segment of population that can be easily manipulated to justify radical political strategies.

Against the backdrop of relative peace, political regimes stabilized as well. In 1995, new constitutions were adopted in each of the countries, which provided for strong presidential powers (although there are some differences between the three states). In Georgia and Azerbaijan, Shevardnadze and Aliyev established themselves quite firmly in power – although Shevardnadze had to survive two attempts on his life and several plots against Aliyev were unveiled by the Azeri security services. Armenia showed itself relatively less stable this time: president Ter-Petrosian was forced to resign from his position in February 1998 under pressure from the military and security services, being accused of caving into international pressure on Nagorno Karabakh. In October 1999, a group of terrorists burst into a session of the Armenian parliament killing eight senior officials including the prime minister and the speaker of parliament. While these episodes did demonstrate certain fragility of constitutional order in Armenia, they were largely confined to the political elite and did not cause any large-scale destabilization.

This period was also notable for some level of economic growth after a period of economic collapse caused by the breakdown of the old economic and political order that was greatly exacerbated by the conflicts and political turmoil. Azerbaijan found itself in a somewhat better position economically due to its oil resources – and international attention that these resources attracted. This helped Azerbaijan to get a much greater amount of foreign investments – but their trickle-down effect was not felt much outside the capital.

### 3.5 The new regimes

What types of political regimes have finally stabilized in the South Caucasus? It is important to note, that each country is rather different, with its own set of problems, idiosyncrasies, achievements and challenges. But the three countries can be compared and understood according to similar parameters. Each of them may move within two cross-cutting dimensions formed by the poles of *democracy* – *autocracy* on the one hand; and *efficacious state* – *weak state* on the other. One might be tempted to call them *demoanocracies*: some kind of hybrid system between democracy, autocracy and anarchy. Each of the countries has made some important steps toward democracy: there is some level of political pluralism, freedom of expression, more or less competitive elections, etc. – and in this the difference from the Soviet totalitarian past is considerable. On the other

hand, all of them can be called at least semi-authoritarian: so far the opposition is allowed to take part in the elections but not to win (save maybe in the local elections), political opponents may be persecuted, considerable part of the media – especially the most influential electronic media – are still dominated by the state and are used as mouthpieces for official propaganda. And, thirdly, all three states are often described as *weak states*, that is states whose capacity to implement policies and impose regulations are considerably undermined by the fact that some actors can openly challenge some of the state regulations with impunity.

One can also find differences between Armenia, Azerbaijan and Georgia. Based on the opinion of most observers, internal and external, often informally expressed, one may venture to say that Georgia may be the closest to the democracy pole (though mainly on the same level as Armenia) with Azerbaijan the most autocratic. This evaluation is also confirmed by the widely used Freedom House ratings<sup>18</sup>. On the dimension of state efficacy, Armenia would be the most efficacious state, with Georgia the weakest one.

It might be more precise to say that these state institutions are dominated by informal patronage networks. These networks create parallel or shadow state structures alongside the official or public state. Local observers often refer to these networks as “clans” though this may be misleading: they may be based on large-scale regional-based loyalties (it is popular to speak of Nakhichevan or Baku clans in Azerbaijan, for instance), on ties of extended family (Aslan Abashidze’s and his wife’s relatives hold most important official positions in Ajaria, Georgia); or on other principles, such as former bureaucratic ties or purely personal loyalties. Nevertheless, it is important to bear in mind that in all three countries, there *is* an official or public state that has its institutions and budgets, that raises taxes, pays salaries and retirement pensions, provides certain services, prosecutes crime etc. Citizens usually evaluate its performance as less than satisfactory, but it does exist. There is also a shadow state that has a parallel system of revenues and provides its own services. These revenues consist of extortions from businesses (while many businesses may forego official taxation altogether or get away with miniscule payments to the treasury, no businesses are said to be able to avoid the parallel taxation – unless it has high enough political cover), bribes extorted from citizens like drivers on the roads or those who wish to get passports for travel, payments for obtaining state offices, kickbacks

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<sup>18</sup> In Freedom in the World country ratings for 2001-02 produced by the Freedom House, Armenia and Georgia have 4.4 points and Azerbaijan 6.5 (1 is free and 7 non-free). In 1999-2000 ratings, Georgia had 3.4 while Armenia the same at 4.4.



from state commissions, moneys creamed off from international grants and credits, etc. The majority of important state offices (though not all of them) have a price tag: public servants view buying a state office as an investment that has to be returned quickly (as positions bought may not be held for long). Salaries that the state pays to those occupying these offices are purely symbolic and they do not play any role in motivating the office holders. Therefore, the concept itself of a “public servant” sounds ironic<sup>19</sup>.

The shadow state also provides services. Of course it provides services first of all to the persons who serve it: they get some cut from revenues of the shadow state. But the number of beneficiaries may be broader than one might think at the first sight. A recent study among Georgian businessmen carried out by the Partnership for Social Initiatives in Georgia showed, for instance, that many of small and medium businessmen grew extremely cozy with their tax inspectors and were quite happy with the effective system of mixed taxation (a little to the official state, a little bit more to the shadow state): the tax inspector may even provide them cheap credit when businesses find themselves in economic downturns.

But the major overall “public service” provided by the shadow state is relative *stability*. While the state cannot pay its policemen wages to live on, it buys their loyalty by licensing them to bribe or steal. Large part of the population may be living in poverty, but there is a critical mass that benefits from the system and has a stake in preserving it. Those who do not are relatively passive (that’s why they failed to get in the system in the first place), and at least part of potential troublemakers may be bought over by integrating them into the shadow state structure.

But while the system may be indeed providing stability in the short run, its viability in the long run is rather questionable. It erodes material, political and moral resources on which the state is based. The system depends too much on key personalities in patronage networks, so personal changes in power may destabilize the system dramatically. This is why the forthcoming successions of power in Georgia and Azerbaijan, where both elderly leaders are expected to leave soon for natural or constitutional reasons, are expected with considerable anxiety both in these countries as well as by international actors interested in the region. Public legitimacy of the system is pretty low, as it condemns a large part of the population to poverty and services provided by the official state are utterly insufficient.

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<sup>6</sup> See on this, for instance, Robin S. Bhatti, *Tough Choices: Observations on the Political Economy of Armenia, Azerbaijan and Georgia*, Mimeo prepared for the World Bank, December 2002, [www.cis7.org/](http://www.cis7.org/).

The dissatisfaction of the general population triggers periodic rebellions and protest movements that usually (but not necessarily) coincide with election times. In response, the scared governments revert to wriggling elections that usually leads to public protests, the last example being the protests in Armenia after the February-March 2003 presidential elections. So far, the governments have managed to deal with these protest movements, which peter out without doing any important harm to the system – but there is no guarantee that it will always continue this way. The main reason why Georgia is often considered the weakest state in the South Caucasus may be that there is no single pyramid of control within its shadow state: rather, Shevardnadze allows several networks to compete putting himself in the indispensable position of the final arbiter. That makes even the shadow state ineffective and unpredictable.<sup>20</sup> Presence of some public servants who are actually honest and even make some steps to change the system (without any success so far) makes it all even more confusing.

### 3.6 The extent and content of post-soviet citizenship

How does citizenship play out in the states of the Caucasus? There are two major aspects in which issues related to citizenship are – or could be – important in the process of multiple transitions that the South Caucasian societies are undergoing. The first aspect relates to nation-building, and here citizenship is to be considered as a system of closure defining the extent of citizenship. The extent of citizenship in a given nation-state is determined by rules and norms of inclusion and exclusion, defining how the boundaries of membership within a political community or between political communities should be set.<sup>21</sup> In other words, the institution of citizenship is the best possible way to sort out whom “our” people are – those whom we want to see as our co-nationals, and those who are aliens. Naturally, in the political discourse defined by ethnic nationalism, there is usually a tendency to find ways for excluding ethnic aliens and include ethnic brethren.

Paradoxically, though, while the political discourse in all the three Caucasus countries was indeed dominated by the discourse of ethnic nationalism, especially in the last Soviet years and in the immediate aftermath of its break-up, the citizenship laws that were adopted in this period in all three countries were not used to serve as instruments of

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<sup>20</sup> Robin S. Bhatti, *Ibid*, p. 24.

<sup>21</sup> See, for instance, Rogers Brubaker, *Citizenship and Nationhood in France and Germany*, Harvard University Press: Cambridge, Mass., London, England, 1992, pp. 23-28.

exclusion. Moreover, the topic of citizenship was never central for the nationalist discourse. It is true that during the very first rallies of the nationalist movement in Georgia, for instance, some orators called for granting citizenship only to those who spoke Georgian, but in the end all three countries of the South Caucasus opted for the “zero option” without much debate: everybody who resided on the territory of one of the three South Caucasian countries at the moment that independence was proclaimed was automatically granted citizenship.

As a matter of comparison, one can mention the case of the Baltic States, where the issue of citizenship was central in political debates throughout the period of the struggle for independence. Although some moderate nationalist leaders advocated the zero option, in the end Latvia and Estonia opted for a concept of citizenship that excluded most of the non-Latvian population on the grounds that they or their ancestors had not been citizens of these countries before the Soviet-Bolshevik occupation in 1940.

There were some practical reasons why Georgians or Azeris would find it difficult to apply a similar principle to their own minorities: most of them were “historical” minorities whose ancestors had lived in their respective countries for centuries, rather than relatively recent newcomers like most of the Slavic populations in Latvia and Estonia. However, the near absence of the issue of citizenship in the nationalist discourse (with the exclusion of Armenia, where the interest was very different – it was related to the status of Diaspora Armenians) – requires greater explanation. One may hypothesize that at least part of the explanation lies in differences of political experience and, respectively, political culture. In the Baltic States, which had a fairly recent experience of independent statehood between two world wars, the nationalist agenda was usually formulated in the highly legalistic language of formal state institutions. In the countries of the South Caucasus, that had only very short-lived experiences of independence in 1918-21, and who rather identified themselves with their pre-modern past when the institution of citizenship did not exist, the language of citizenship was considered too “cold”, and nationalist agenda was rather expressed in a much “warmer” language of blood belonging and myths of ancient history. This may also explain why Baltic ethnic nationalisms – which were hardly less hostile to minorities than the Caucasian counterparts – avoided ethnic bloodshed and were much more successful in building effective nation-states.

Another aspect is the content of the institution of citizenship: what it entails to be a citizen, apart from being ascribed to certain state and carrying its identity documents? What relation between the citizen and the state does it presume? The content of citizenship

relates to the specific combination of citizenship rights and responsibilities in a given context, regulating how the benefits and burdens of membership should be allocated. While the topic of citizenship rarely becomes an explicit topic for discussions in the South Caucasus, several general observations may be made on this subject.

The current concept may be considered a mixture of institutional and mental legacies from the Soviet period, and new liberal-democratic ideas officially embraced by the state and promoted by a relatively small groups of pro-Western elites and the international community. Naturally, Soviet legacies may be said to constitute a deeper, more solidly entrenched layer of the understanding of citizenship. In his popular historical analysis of the evolution of the institution of citizenship in the west, T. H. Marshall<sup>22</sup> showed how the development started from civil rights (implying “the rights necessary for individual freedom”) to political rights (those related to political participation) and then proceeded on a much later stage to recognition that social rights should also be inherent in the concept of citizenship. This succession is historical but also logical: a new “generation” of rights assumes existence the of the previous one. If one accepts this scheme as the starting point, one would say that for majority of the people who live in the post-Communist realm the logical sequence is exactly the reverse. The state is seen as primarily the universal provider that is substantially obliged to take care of the material welfare of its citizens. In other terms, the state is seen primarily as the “nanny state”.

The Soviet state did indeed take care of the basic needs of its citizens, but for a price: it took away their individual liberties and the right to political initiative. Post-soviet citizens slowly embraced their civil liberties and political rights, but they do not necessarily think that they should give up some of overarching social guarantees. While they see that the state cannot meet their material needs the way it did before, they tend to consider this to be a result of corruption or incompetence of the current government rather than part of the irreversible structural change.

Soviet legacy also shows itself on the part of understanding citizen’s obligations. The major obligations of the Soviet citizen were obedience, and a display of enthusiastic support for the official ideology and the leaders who represented it. But the Soviet system did not suggest in any way, that citizens were financially responsible for their state or obliged to support it through taxation. How can a child be financially responsible for his own parent? The concept of taxation was rather foreign to Soviet citizens, and rightly so,

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<sup>22</sup> In *Citizenship and Social Class* (1950).

as all material assets belonged to the state anyway – that’s why it could breast-feed all of its citizens. That the state retained a percentage of one’s salary calling it “income tax” was considered just another extravagance of the Soviet accounting system – and it is very hard to blame Soviet citizens for that.

A common question asked in the Caucasus is, “why should I pay taxes to the state, if it does not pay me a salary”. For the people raised in the Soviet system, the idea that it is the citizens who are primary providers for the state, and the latter cannot pay salaries to anybody unless citizens pay their taxes first, seems outrageous. If Americans rebelled over “taxation without representation”, in the post-soviet states the reverse may be the problem: democracy (the system of representation) will hardly work if the citizens do not recognize their financial responsibility for the state.

Quite interesting results in this regard were noted in the Georgian Economic Development Institute (GEDI) study of public attitudes towards the system of taxation in Georgia.<sup>23</sup> The sample consisted of the employees of different organizations who were asked which services the Georgian state should provide, and what should be major sources of its revenues. While the majority supported a quite extensive social role for the state (that it should provide free medical services and education, etc. for all) 55.3 percent thought that major revenues of the state should come from the income of state-owned enterprises, only 31.5 percent thought that major revenues should come from taxing private businesses and 2.8 percent thought that it should come from taxing the citizens. One may assume the other countries in the South Caucasus would have the same results.

### 3.7 Major challenges and prospects

The states of the South Caucasus may have reached some level of stability, but this stability is hardly satisfactory for most of its citizens. The region finds itself in a volatile balance between war and peace (against the background of the “frozen conflicts”), between the normative attachment to democracy and the practice of oligarchic authoritarianism, between personality networks through which the people are used to doing business and the

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<sup>23</sup> GEDI, Readiness of society towards major provisions of the draft new Georgian Tax Code, Report on the quantitative research, part III, Tbilisi, October 2002.

understanding that it is effective modern institutions that the development of these countries really requires.

The presence of frozen conflicts is a major source of the persistent and deep-seated sense of insecurity for the citizens of these new countries, and even more so for the populations who live in unrecognized political entities of the region. The resulting sense of volatility is especially strong in Georgia, which not only has two such “frozen conflicts”, but which also recently suffered from a spillover effect of the war in neighboring Chechnya that has turned the Pankisi Gorge, a small territory adjacent to the war zone, into another centre of lawlessness. Georgia also happens to have the most volatile relations with its powerful northern neighbor, Russia.

But it is not only Georgia that finds itself in trouble. The current stability is precarious for all the states in the South Caucasus, recognized or unrecognized. The victorious parties in the Caucasian wars cannot enjoy results of their military victories as political uncertainty and lack of international legitimacy turns self-proclaimed territories into centers of illicit economy and crime. This is much truer of Abkhazia and South Ossetia than of Nagorno Karabakh that is de facto increasingly integrated into Armenia. However, the current condition condemns Armenia to an extremely uncomfortable position of a country living in a steadily hostile neighborhood. Overall, the current condition of “frozen conflicts” will continue to be the gravest strategic challenge to the development of the region.

Even outside the context of these conflicts, the assumption that corruption is endemic in the countries of the South Caucasus and that its citizens broadly accept these practices, is quite deceptive. The existing corrupt practices are indeed deep-rooted, but the political and economic system based on them also increasingly causes dissatisfaction of the population, and not only among western institutions and the elite of westernized intellectuals. The general dissatisfaction is further exacerbated by the unrealistic, exaggerated expectations towards the state’s capacity to provide for the economic welfare of its people – expectations that irresponsible political elites often choose to manipulate in their interests. This structural discrepancy between the normative expectations and the practice of governance will be very difficult to overcome. If preserved, however, it will constitute a permanent seed of discontent that will occasionally express itself in political crises – the exact format of which is impossible to predict.

Last but not least, the problems of carving a new civic identity in the ethnically and politically divided societies of the South Caucasus are a fundamental challenge for the

future of the region. Again, the situation differs from one country to another. This is a marginal problem for Armenia, which is ethnically almost homogenous, but it is quite important for Azerbaijan with its sizeable Lezgin and Talysh minorities, and even more urgent for Georgia, where minority populations (especially ethnic Armenian and Azeri) are both larger and less integrated.

Apart from the problem of ethnic minorities, the problem of religious relations becomes increasingly conspicuous. The presence of actively proselytizing religious groups like Jehovah's Witnesses causes hostility in the local populations, while in Georgia religiously motivated violence – and the government's inability or unwillingness to curb it – has become a major problem. In Azerbaijan, and in the Muslim populated regions of Georgia, there are concerns regarding the possible influence of radical Islamic groups. Combining the traditionally predominant role of "historical" Churches in Georgia and Armenia that are so central to respective national identities with religious freedoms inherent in a liberal society and protecting Azerbaijan – currently an even more secular Muslim society than Turkey – from export of radical Islam from Iran and other countries are issues that these countries will have to struggle with for some time to come.

# 4      C i t i z e n s h i p   r e g i m e s   i n   t h e S o u t h   C a u c a s u s

## 4.1 The citizenship regime in Georgia

*David Losaberidze*

### **Background**

Georgia is one of those countries whose roots extend long into ancient history, and the idea of an ancient people with rich historical heritage is quite central to the self-perception of Georgians today. But while on the one hand this heritage is a source of pride, there is also considerable soul-searching underway in Georgia whether and how much this historical heritage contributes to the current attempts to build the institutions of modern statehood.

First of all, it is noteworthy that nothing like western European city-states or communities have developed in Georgia in ancient eastern, antique-Hellenistic or feudal times. Therefore, no urban-type interest groups, which are characteristic of western societies, developed in Georgia, such as an aristocracy or patricians. Invasions of eastern despotic powers or Asian nomadic tribes that intensified since the 13<sup>th</sup> century also impeded development of institutions such as absolute monarchy or parliamentary representation that paved the way to modernity in the West.

Georgia's modernization process started in the early 19<sup>th</sup> century, when the Russian Empire annexed Georgian kingdoms, which consisted of a several weak and poorly institutionalized feudal political entities. The Russian domination, however, came in the shape of a bureaucratic militaristic autocracy, characteristic for Russia. Participation of the native population in state governance was insignificant. Semi-liberal reforms that Russia carried out in 60s-70s of the 19th century, that contributed to the development of institutions of self-governance in some of its provinces, had little, if any, effect in the Caucasus.



The abolishment of traditional legal institutions together with the lack of participation in state governance contributed to the estrangement of the society from the state and nihilism towards the law. The response was the creation of patronage networks that emerged in Georgia in the late 19<sup>th</sup> century, flourished in the Soviet period and continue to play an important role today.

The brief intermission of independence in 1918-21 that followed the 1917 Bolshevik revolution in Russia allowed Georgians to first be acquainted with democratic institutions. The country adopted a rather democratic constitution and elected a western-style legislation. During its two-year history the national assembly passed 126 laws, including laws on citizenship, local elections, judiciary, political-administrative arrangement of ethnic enclaves, national policy in public educational system, etc. Conversely, the country also went through a round of ethnic-territorial conflicts reminiscent of what would take place later, in the course of the break-up of the Soviet Union. However, this attempt was short-lived due to the Russian-Communist invasion and establishment of Soviet totalitarianism.

This system, naturally, only exacerbated the sense of estrangement from the state that existed before. While mass repressions and purges of the emergent elites were characteristic for the period of the 20s-30s, relative liberalization of the system in the post-Stalin period contributed to the strengthening of local patronage networks. The communist *nomenklatura* rejected the method of periodic purges in its own ranks and tried to achieve prosperity by way of corruption.

On the other hand, the system also produced alternative ideologies that expressed themselves in the small dissident movement or, more broadly, dissident attitudes that developed within networks of intellectuals. This cautious and hidden resistance to the system expressed itself in an eclectic mix of western democratic values and romantic nationalism of the 19<sup>th</sup> century. It tended not to distinguish between the notions of (nation-) state, nationality and ethnicity.

On the level of the general public, the major legacy of the Communist past may be formulated as overall lack of trust or cynicism towards public institutions. In Georgia, this attitude is often described as “anti-state thinking” or “anti-state mentality”. As the state was considered a purely repressive apparatus, cheating it and breaking the law for the benefit of family or private networks was widely considered as acceptable behavior.

The result is that today Georgia carries the major traits of a (neo-) patrimonial society: nepotism, regionalism (tribalism), clannish attitudes and, regional and national-

level clientelism. Analysis of the roots of corruption in the Georgian state apparatus reveals that respective values and methods, which fall short of the requirements of modern bureaucracy, still persist.

### **Citizenship as a status**

Current Georgian legislation, relevant to citizenship, represents a symbiosis of the Soviet system and western-style legislation.

A whole range of laws in the field of civil rights have been adopted since 1993. While the new legal framework is not free of internal contradictions and shortcomings, it does provide quite an extensive range of civil (property rights, freedom of speech, conscience, etc.), political (the right to create political associations, universal suffrage, etc.) and social (social security, education, health care, etc.) rights.

The most important legal document is, of course, the Constitution of Georgia adopted in August 1995. Chapter 2 of the document is specifically dedicated to the rights and freedoms of its citizens.

In accordance with article 14 of the Constitution, all citizens are free and equal by law regardless of race, ethnicity, gender, religion, political and other beliefs, national, ethnic and social group, origin, property, position, and residence. The state recognises and protects universally declared human rights and freedoms as supreme human values. In the governing process people and the state are restricted by these rights and freedoms, as well as by the existing law (article 7).

Foreign citizens and residents without citizenship living on the Georgian territory have equal rights and responsibilities with Georgian citizens (article 47).

At the same time, the Constitution defines citizens' responsibilities: every resident of Georgia is obliged to observe the country's constitution and legislation. Implementation of human rights and freedoms must not interfere with rights and freedoms of other citizens (article 44) and every citizen is subject to general military conscription (article 101).

The Constitution ensures civil freedoms. It declares freedom of religion (article 9), right for life (article 15)<sup>24</sup>, human respect and dignity (article 17), inviolability of personal freedom (article 18)<sup>25</sup>, freedom of speech, conscience and thought (article 19), privacy

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<sup>24</sup>The death penalty was abolished in Georgia by the "Law on Full Abolishment of the Extreme Punishment - Death Penalty", adopted on November 11, 1997.

<sup>25</sup>Arrests or any other kind of restriction of personal freedom shall be exercised only with court warrant. A citizen can be arrested only in situations defined by law and by an official with extraordinary

(article 20), private property (article 21)<sup>26</sup>, freedom of movement and free choice of residence (article 22), freedom of work (article 23), free information distribution without censorship (article 24), freedom of rallies (article 25) and labour (article 30)<sup>27</sup>.

Article 40 declares presumption of innocence - citizens are considered innocent as long as their guilt is not proved in court according to the law. The accused is not obliged to prove their innocence as the prosecution must take responsibility for proving the charges.

Every citizen of Georgia has the right to receive any files with information about themselves or other official documents from state agencies, provided they do not contain state, professional or commercial secrets (article 41).

Every citizen has a right to defend their rights and freedoms in court. Every citizen must be tried only by a court with jurisdiction over their case. Right for defence is guaranteed and nobody may be tried twice for the same charges. No one may be tried for actions that were not qualified as crimes at the time they were committed and laws have no retroactive effect, provided they do not discharge or ease the indictment. Illegally obtained proof shall not have any legal effect in court and any damages caused by illegal decisions of the governmental or self-government bodies must be fully compensated by court ruling from state funds (article 42).

The Constitution clearly defines the political rights of citizens. It guarantees self-government (article 2) and representative or direct democracy - by ways of referenda or other forms of direct democracy (article 5).

Article 12 deals exclusively with citizenship. Georgian citizenship can be obtained from birth and through naturalization. Citizens of Georgia may not have citizenship of other countries. The organic law defines procedures to obtain/abolish the citizenship of Georgia.

Every citizen has the right to create/join public associations, including trade unions. Georgian citizens have the right to create/join political parties or other political organizations in accordance with the organic law. At the same time, the law prohibits such political parties or political organisations that aim to undermine or overthrow the

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responsibilities. An arrested or otherwise detained citizen must be brought to court within 48 hours. If the court does not warrant the citizen's arrest or detention in the following 24 hours, they must be freed immediately. The term of preliminary detention of suspects shall not exceed 72 hours, while preliminary detention of convicts must not go beyond nine months.

<sup>26</sup> Citizens may be deprived of property for urgent social needs in situations defined by law, by court warrant and only with respective remuneration.

<sup>27</sup> The state undertakes to promote free entrepreneurship and competition. Monopolistic practices are prohibited, except in situations defined by law. The law defines mechanisms of consumer protection, fair employment conditions and wages, and conditions for women and underage employment.

constitutional order of Georgia, or propagate war and violence, ethnic, regional, religious or social intolerance (article 26).

The Constitution provides for universal suffrage: Georgian citizens have the passive right to vote from 18 years of age and the active right to run for state offices from 25 years of age (articles 28 and 49).

The state ensures implementation of citizens' social rights, ensures equal social-economic development of all regions of the country (article 31), carries out employment programs for the unemployed (article 32), promotes cultural development and citizens' unrestricted participation in cultural life (article 34).

The Constitution acknowledges the right to strike (article 33) and education (article 35). Primary education is obligatory and citizens have the right to secondary, professional and high education in state educational institutions in accordance with legal procedures, free of charge.

These general constitutional principles are elaborated in a number of more specific legislation. Here we will only dwell shortly on the law on citizenship of Georgia, which was adopted on April 25, 1993.

In accordance with article 1 of the law, Georgia only allows single citizenship (dual citizenship is not permitted). Georgian citizens have no right to have another country's citizenship simultaneously.

Citizenship was automatically granted to all those who had lived in Georgia for five years by the time of the enactment of this law and does not abrogate their citizenship by a written statement (Article 3). In addition, Georgian citizenship is granted from birth, by naturalization, or by other means stipulated in international agreements and laws (article 10). In particular, Georgian citizenship may be granted to any adult foreign citizen or resident without citizenship, who has permanently resided in Georgia for ten years, or those who have jobs or real estate in Georgia (article 26)<sup>28</sup>.

Georgian citizenship can be terminated if a citizen withdraws their citizenship or if a citizen is deprived of citizenship (article 30). The latter can happen if: the citizen serves in the military, police, judiciary or other government bodies of another state without authorization by the competent agencies of Georgia; resides permanently in a foreign state and fails to notify relevant consular authorities without a justifiable reason; obtains

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<sup>28</sup> Initial reading of the law required all applicants for citizenship to have knowledge of the state language, Georgian history and legislation. This provision was cancelled on October 15, 1996.

Georgian citizenship through forged documents; or becomes a citizen of another country. The head of state is authorized to take decisions on these matters.

If Georgia is a signatory to an international agreement that stipulates rules other than in the given law, the norms of the international agreement are given priority, provided they do not contradict the Georgian Constitution (article 46).

The law stipulates anti-discrimination principles as defined by the Georgian Constitution.

### **Citizenship in practice**

It is widely recognized that there is a considerable gap between generally quite liberal legislation and the actual practice of the enforcement of citizenship rights in Georgia. Challenges that exist in this area may be divided into several headings:

#### ***Violations of civil and political rights by the state – or the failure of the state to protect citizens from infringements upon their rights from the third parties***

In this area, the record of the independence period is mixed. There is considerable progress with regards to freedom of expression and association. No censorship is exercised in the media, and it can be as critical of the authorities as it chooses. Freedom of association may be illustrated by a development of NGOs, who became quite a vibrant sector of the civil society. Political parties are free to express their opinion and campaign (though they failed to develop into viable political organizations that express opinions and interests of large sectors of the society).

However, there are a number of issues with regards to relations between the state and citizen, most notably with law-enforcement authorities. It would not be an exaggeration to say that breaches of citizens' rights such as torture in the police stations and prisons or unfair lawsuits (especially in political cases) have become common in Georgia.

Citizens' political rights have been regularly violated against the backdrop of civil conflicts following the 1991-92 coup. While in the period of semi-anarchy of first half of the 1990s political competition often took violent form. The authorities often took arbitrary action to suppress the radical opposition, namely the supporters of the deposed president Gamsakhurdia, and later also towards members of paramilitary groups (like *Mkhedrioni*) who played a decisive role in deposing him. In particular the peaceful rallies of the ex-president Gamsakhurdia's supporters were dispersed by force, and Gamsakhurdia's

supporters and other political opponents (*Mkhedrioni* and its leader Jaba Ioseliani) did not get fair treatment in court. As a result of these trials, the number of political prisoners increased substantially.

With regards to the state's failure to protect citizens' rights from third parties, the most notorious example is that of widespread religious violence, where radical Orthodox groups attack members of minority religious denominations, such as Jehovah's Witnesses, Baptists, Evangelicals and others. Law enforcement bodies not only fail to prevent such violence, but they often demonstrate moral support for its perpetrators and at times even join in the violence themselves. There are other groups who openly espouse violence and go unpunished. This naturally leads to allegations that the government manipulates these groups in order to use them against its opponents (like democratic opposition).

### ***Collapse of the social security net***

The main reasons of the collapse of the social security system are the economic collapse of the early 90s (when the GDP fell to about a quarter of what it had been in the late Soviet period) and the failure to reform the old social security system that became unsustainable under the new circumstances.

The most vivid expression of this are pensions and salaries (in budget organizations) that are well below the living wage – and often unpaid for the reason of chronic budget deficits. Education and healthcare are in decline, and power supplies are frequently interrupted: the government failed to solve the problem even in the capital where most of its efforts are focused, while many regions of Georgia have been literally in the dark for years.

### ***Issues related to minority rights and minority participation***

Here, one should distinguish between issues related to ethnic conflicts of the early 90s in Abkhazia and South Ossetia, and issue of integration and rights of other minorities.

The idea of the traditionally tolerant nature of the Georgian nation was an important part of the self-perception of Georgians. However, the recent experience of ethnic strife has, to some extent, undermined this self-image. Conflicts in Abkhazia and South Ossetia occurred in the period of the break-up of the Soviet Union and the first years of Georgian independence, when the Moscow-backed political leadership of ethnic autonomous republics demanded to expand their autonomous status. Tbilisi showed insufficient flexibility and an unwillingness to compromise. To be fair, one should note that there were

some episodes when the Georgian government showed such will: a consociationalist system of de facto ethnic quotas were introduced for the 1991 elections in Abkhazia under the nationalist government of President Gamsakhurdia that eased the tensions for some time but could not prevent the conflict after the change of the government.

Especially in the early period of national independence, radical nationalist discourse prevailed with strong motives of Georgians' ethnic superiority and hostility towards minorities, and radical nationalists gained strong support from the majority of the society. Later, such open statements of hostility became rare; however, the damage to ethnic relations in the country was done.

Unsettled or "frozen" conflicts in Abkhazia and South Ossetia continue to be one of the gravest, if not the most important challenges to the consolidation of Georgian statehood. However, there is also a necessity to build trust between the Georgian majority and ethnic minorities. One set of issues comes from the compact settlements of respectively Armenian and Azeri ethnic minorities in regions such as Samtskhe-Javakheti and Kvemo Kartli; here people do not speak Georgian, are poorly integrated into society, and have very weak sense of Georgian citizenship. The majority mistrusts these minorities fearing that eventually they may develop secessionist agendas; the minorities, however, believe they are discriminated against in appointments to government positions, and in the sense that minority regions get less attention from the government. Recent statements of pro-government politicians that try to discredit certain opposition groups by calling them "Armenian" certainly does not contribute to better relations with minorities.

### ***Widespread corruption***

Corruption is often considered the major impediment towards the development of Georgia, and it has become probably the most politically conspicuous problem of recent years. This problem is directly relevant to the problem of citizenship: deep mistrust of the public towards state institutions may be at the root reason of the current scale of corruption, and it may also be its result. As people's hopes diminish for the state's ability to protect their rights by legal means, they try to solve their problems through clannish crony networks. Parallel to ineffective state regulation, there exists an institutionalised system of informal regulations which is sometimes described as a "shadow state", and is much more effective in its daily functioning.

***Sources of status other than citizenship***

As people feel estranged from formal institutions of the state, the sense of belonging to the body of the citizenry is weak and insignificant. This void has to be filled. What are the major group identities other than citizenship that define people's status and are usually more conspicuous and powerful in exercising social control than that of citizenship? The following may be listed:

- social groups (refugees/IDPs, beggars, NGOs, unemployed, etc.)
- ethnic or sub ethnic groups (Armenians, Azerbaijani, Russians, Megrelians, Ajaris, etc.)
- “clans” (implying patronage networks like leaderships of political parties or business groups united for the purpose of getting illegal economic or social benefits)
- corporate associations (police, civil servants, members of the ruling party or the opposition).

**Citizenship as a contested issue**

There is no adequate debate in Georgia regarding citizenship-related issues. One of the reasons for this may be that since life is largely regulated by a system of informal relations based on patronage networks, there are few incentives to discuss problems in public.

There is also a considerable gap between the reactions of the general public to citizenship-related issues and elite debates. Most people are preoccupied with economic and social issues. However, despite a sharp decline in living standards, Georgia has not experienced any large-scale social turmoil thus far. This does not mean that people did not take to the streets: citizens spontaneously rallied in protest against blackouts, low wages and pensions; several organisations went on strike and organised pickets in Tbilisi and in the regions. In some cases, NGOs, political parties and trade unions also took part in organizing protest actions. However, the common feature of these actions is weak organisation, a small number of participants and few sustainable results.

Political debates in parliament or in the media, however, are rather focused on protection and implementation of civil and political rights. The last two years, have been filled with elections on different levels, some politicians paid greater attention to social



issues, but this did not mean that there is any mature policy debate on how these issues should actually be solved.

The participants of policy debates for the most part are politicians and intellectuals/civil society activists from Tbilisi. There are few representatives of the regions, except those from the Ajarian autonomous republic, who are rather active in opposing the Tbilisi government. At the same time, the vast majority of the participants in the debates belong to ethnic and religious majority. The role of ethnic or religious minorities is insignificant and their rights are advocated by the liberal wing of the ruling titular majority. Public debates are generally quite open, frequent, heated and usually extremely confrontational. These includes parliamentary debates (broadcast live on Channel 2 of the state television), numerous talk-shows on different channels, and far less – by discussions in the print media. Many debates are prompted by dramatic events such as violence or public protests. In many cases, participants are preoccupied with accusing each other of hidden agendas and name-calling rather than focusing on certain approaches and policies. Talk-show hosts are often accused of provoking participants to use a more confrontational style in order to push ratings: however, MPs often resort to fist fights during sittings as well, and this cannot be blamed on the media.

Even though the confrontation lines change from one issue to another, one can still define two major groups shaping the public discourse on citizenship: the “ethnic nationalists” (who also tend to defend radical positions on religious issues), and the pro-Western liberals and representatives of the government, (who in many cases try to defend the middle ground on ethnic and religious issues but may be quite aggressive towards the opposition). When issues such as religious violence or ethnic nationality in identity documents (see below) are debated, ethnic nationalists usually blame liberals for undermining Georgia’s national interests and accuse them of being manipulated by western secret services, while the latter accuse their opponents of favoring Fascist agendas, or being agents of Russian security services.

This is true of debates that take place in the capital. In the regions, the forum for public debate is much less developed as the civil society infrastructure (like the media and civil society organizations) is weaker. However, when there are debates, they mostly follow the topics popular in the centre, though with somewhat greater emphasis on social issues. There are exceptions, though. For instance, the southern region of Javakheti is dominated by ethnic Armenians. Here, apart from the general social issues, problems related to ethnic minority rights are also important.

While most issues at stake concern problems of political governance (such as the latest fights in parliament; the government's failure or success to gather monthly budget revenues; there are yet some policy issues related to citizenship that have been revisited for years in a more or less regular manner and have direct bearing to problems of citizenship. Here we will briefly examine the state of public debate on several of them.

### ***Ethnic or civic identity: ethnic nationality field in citizen's IDs***

Problems arose in the of summer 2000, during parliamentary debates on the issue of citizen's IDs when the reformist leadership of parliament managed to secure a majority for a bill that abolished ethnic nationality entry in citizens' IDs (such entry was included in Soviet identity documents). This change faced strong opposition, not as one could expect from ethnic minorities (as in some other post-soviet countries, like Russia), but from those representing the Georgian ethnic majority. Some MPs with an intellectual background (like professor Guram Sharadze, and writer Revaz Mishveladze) said that such a change would threaten the Georgian identity and even called "for the defence of the Georgian genealogical fund". President Shevardnadze, who seemed anxious to improve his already low ratings, did not risk confronting the nationalists and supported restoration of the ethnic nationality entry, though using different rationale: he claimed that the abolishment of the statement may place obstacles to negotiations with separatist regimes (Abkhazia and South Ossetia).

The issue remains unresolved and returns to the focus of public attention from time to time. Some participants of the debate (like Revaz Mishveladze) later reversed their positions but the support for ethnic nationality registration remains strong, also presumably among the public at large (although there is no strict data to support that). One of the main reasons for the focus of attention on this issue, may be the Soviet heritage: in the context of the Soviet internationalist state, the ethnic nationality entry was considered a way to preserve one's national identity.

### ***The problem of religious freedom***

Article 9 of the Georgian Constitution declares full religious freedom but, at the same time, it acknowledges the special historical role of the Georgian Orthodox Church. How to combine these two principles, however, became a highly controversial issue. The Church has been steadily increasing its influence in society since the late 80s, a process that has been accompanied by a strengthening of its conservative wing. Considerable part

of the political elite and society (mainly those who supported ethnic nationalist slogans before) called for expanding the recognition of the special role of the Georgian Orthodox Church and for adopting legislation restricting activities of ethnic minorities (especially smaller religious groups like Jehovah's Witnesses). By the late 90s and early 2000s these demands became extremely popular and only a small part of the society (mainly represented by civil rights NGOs) openly opposed this trend. Being aware of the international reactions that the restriction of religious freedom would trigger, the government did not publicly oppose these demands, but dragged its feet in their application. Despite frequent demands, no law on religion, which – according to most of its advocates – would discriminate religious minorities, has been adopted so far.

A need for a Concordat-style agreement between the Orthodox Church and the state was widely discussed during this period. In October 2002, a Constitutional Agreement between the state and the Georgian Orthodox Church was indeed adopted by Parliament. As it was noted above, an extremist Orthodox movement has been increasingly active in Georgia in recent years, using violence and targeting various religious minorities. In this debate, the influence of the pro-Western liberals on public opinion is probably the weakest. While most people probably disapprove of the use of violence, the majority opinion is that the state should do more to curb the activities of “sects” or non-traditional religious minorities. At the same time, few politicians or public figures openly call for renouncing the constitutional principle of the freedom of worship: therefore, they find it difficult to propose a specific formula that would effectively restrict freedom of religious minorities. Recently, pro-Western liberals increasingly use the argument that religious violence is an anti-Georgian activity encouraged by Russia through its conservative church: this way Russia allegedly tries to undermine Georgia's good relations with the West.

#### ***Debates on the problem of Muslim Meskhetians deported from Georgia in 1944***

Muslim Meskhetians were deported in 1944 from a southern region of Georgia that neighbours Turkey for allegation that they clandestinely supported Turkey, Germany's ally in World War II. The majority Meskhetians identify themselves as ethnic Turks, while some say they are Muslim Georgians. Some of them have requested repatriation to Georgia. When Georgia became part of the Council of Europe in 1999, the country was obligated to solve the problem of repatriation within a 12 years period.

This obligation, however, caused a considerable backlash. The campaign is led by ultra-nationalist forces (such as the mentioned MP Guram Sharadze), who are

unconditionally opposed to the project of repatriation. However, the majority of the population either rejects the project of repatriation outright, or accepts only the return of those who consider themselves ethnic Georgians, and not loyal to, or wish to be a part of a separate Samtskhe-Javakheti. The opponents argue that the repatriation of the whole deported population (estimated at about 300,000) would change the ethnic balance in the region dramatically, lead to new ethnic conflicts (large parts of the current population in Samtskhe-Javakheti is Armenian, and their anti-Turkish sentiments are especially intense), and eventually may lead to the secession of the region from Georgia. In Samtskhe-Javakheti itself, the opposition is even more heated. While in the first half of the 90s some politicians supported repatriation, today few politicians would risk their careers to support such an unpopular issue. Therefore, only small groups of civic activists support unconditional repatriation, and base their arguments on general human rights values and the necessity for Georgia to honor its international obligations.

### ***Fairness of the electoral process***

Most Georgians believe that elections in Georgia are usually rigged one way or another. Therefore, this topic is extremely conspicuous in public debate. It includes not only allegations of specific electoral violations, but the issues of electoral legislation (which is dramatically changed before each election), and composition of electoral commissions being the most controversial problem of all. However, only political parties and those international or local NGOs that are directly involved in the election process as participants or observers, take part in these debates. Even among those groups, the debate is clearly dominated by the political parties themselves. Thus, there is an obvious gap between the great importance of the issue and the narrowness of the circle who tries to influence change in this area.

### ***Foreign policy orientation***

This is an ongoing debate between pro-Russian and pro-western forces. The majority of the Georgian political elite declare a “pro-western orientation”. For instance, the September 2002 vote in Parliament for a resolution obliging the government to apply for a membership in NATO was almost unanimous. On the other hand, in recent years, the attitude of the population has shifted towards a somewhat greater support of closer relations with Russia (probably, as a result of such Russian pressures as introduction of a

visa regime, or frustration with regards to exaggerated expectations of western assistance and its effects).

There are some political groups (mainly – Communists, part of the former Soviet *nomenklatura*, etc.), that demand more concessions to Russia (Russian military bases must remain in Georgia, pro-western policy should be dropped, etc). It is notable that these groups also try to take advantage of the rise of anti-western feelings (in connection with allegations of the West trying to undermine positions of the Georgian Orthodox Church, etc.). But still, this debate is not as important today as it was in 1993-94 when president Shevardnadze himself defended the necessity of the strategic alliance with Russia. Today, openly pro-Russian political groups find themselves in a small minority.

### ***Territorial arrangement of Georgia***

This is one of the most sensitive political issues in Georgia, and there is still a gap in the Georgian Constitution, which (in article 2) explicitly postpones definition of the territorial arrangement of the country until conflicts in Abkhazia and South Ossetia are solved. There is an increasing understanding though, that maintaining such a gap is unjustifiable. Debates on different models of territorial arrangement come to the fore of public attention from time to time. For instance, there was an intensification of such a debate in spring 2001 with participation of political parties and NGOs.

However, it has proved extremely difficult to create any consensus among the political elite on what kind of territorial arrangement is preferable for Georgia, and the debates did not lead to positions of different parties coming close to each other. Different approaches are largely motivated by political interests of the day: while the government supports a strongly centralized system (which is currently practiced), the opposition calls for decentralization of the government. The same politicians who were “centralists” while they were supporting the government, started to support devolution of power as soon as they moved to the opposition. One of the main arguments of the “centralist” position is that as a result of devolution of power to the local level, the central government may lose its control over ethnic minority regions.

### ***IDPs' rights to vote in local elections***

Since 1995 in presidential and parliamentary elections, IDPs from Abkhazia and South Ossetia have only been entitled to vote in presidential and partly in parliamentary

elections (they could vote for national party lists), but they could not for “majoritarian” candidates to Parliament and in local elections.

Before the 1998 local elections, several IDPs appealed to the Constitutional Court for a right to take part in local elections. The hearing of the case extended over several years, so that Georgia carried out parliamentary (1999) and presidential (2000) elections without resolution of the issue. Finally, the court rejected the IDPs’ demands. Human rights organisations have been campaigning for IDPs’ full voter rights.

However, despite attempts of the human rights activists, the topic has not attracted broad public interest thus far, and public debate on it never really took off.

### ***Gender problems***

There are a number of active women’s organizations in Georgia. Several feminist organisations have brought forward the issue of increasing women’s participation in political life, for instance through introducing quotas for women membership in electoral lists of political parties. However, so far the debate on this problem involves a rather limited number of participants and there are no signs that it is going to attract the attention of the broad public in the near future. In all likelihood, other problems are considered more urgent.

### **Concluding remarks**

The growing trend of public life in Georgia has been disenchantment with public institutions. So far, this disenchantment did not translate into large-scale political protest because people still seem to remember the effects of 1991-92 and they fear destabilization more than dislike the government. Involvement of the population in patronage networks also has a stabilizing effect provisionally.

Another trend is that support for liberal values such as tolerance to minorities, especially religious ones, seems to be on the decline. This still may be another result of the insecurities resulting from the low level of trust for formal institutions of government.

There exists a general crisis of the society’s self-identification. Neither the government nor the opposition seems to be able to propose any clear concept of civic integration. In particular, the majority is unable to propose any workable model of co-existence in a single political community to the minorities (ethnic, religious, or other).

On the positive side, there has been a notable intensification of political competition in the last two years. The June 2002 local elections showed increased levels of political activism among the public. Even more is expected for the November 2003 parliamentary elections and presidential elections in April 2005. However, in the absence of traditions and institutions of fair political competition, there are fears that the fight for power may get out of hand.

There is no universal remedy against such a situation. Various countries use different methods, more or less successfully, to satisfy the basic interests of society. So Georgia will have to work out a strategy of civil integration on its own.

Consolidation of society is usually based on historical experience, common mentality and effective institutions. From this viewpoint, Georgia has some advantages: despite large differences, ethnic, religious and social groups have many things in common - from the legacy of the totalitarian Soviet past, to a certain form of Caucasian mentality.

The west may play an important role in these processes. It may effectively use the aspirations of Eastern Europe (and of the Caucasus) towards westernisation and contribute to the development of a civil society.

The integration process must take into account traditional values as well. Their complete neglect may boost ethnic nationalism and social extremism.

## 4.2 The citizenship regime in Armenia

*Gevorg Poghosyan*

### **Background**

Armenia has its roots in the ancient world. The Armenian state extends far back in history, much before the country's adoption of Christianity as state religion in 301AD<sup>1</sup>. The country adopted codes and laws<sup>30</sup> in later periods which have survived, indicating that the Armenian society through time was composed of changing social groups, such as “free”, “villager”, “landowner”, “religious”, “laborer”, “subordinates” and so on, which have had various legal status. In the 11<sup>th</sup> century however, Armenia lost its statehood, and was subordinate to different empires such as Byzantine, Seljuk, Mongol, Persian, Ottoman and finally the Tsarist Empire. Armenia was conquered by new rulers several times and the subordination of Armenians was regulated by the laws of invading states. Foreign invaders often had negative influences on Armenian economic, cultural, state and legal development and forced the Armenian people to emigrate from their historical homelands. The most traumatic experience in Armenian history is the genocide perpetrated by Ottoman Turks in 1915 as a result of which the Armenian population living in its historic homeland for centuries disappeared.

The Armenian population living in the Russian part of the Caucasus survived during this period. After the Russian revolution and the collapse of the Tsarist regime, Armenia enjoyed a short-lived independence in the years 1918-1920. The pre-requisites for the development of the Armenian independent state system and the formation of citizenship institutions were established during the first republic. But as it didn't last long, the state was not able to fully formulate its citizenship institution.

During the “second republic”, from 1920 to 1991, Armenia was a part of the Soviet Union. During Soviet times, there was a unique citizenship regime on the entire territory of the Soviet Union; in other words, citizens of republics were citizens of a united Soviet empire. There was no Armenian citizenship at that time. The citizenship institution in

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<sup>29</sup> R. Avakyan. *Monuments of Armenian Law*. Yerevan. 2000. p.3.

<sup>30</sup> The rules of Ashtishat, 356, Code of laws of Mkhitar Gosh – 12<sup>th</sup> century, Armenian Code of rules - 717-728, Code of laws of Smbat Sparapet -1265, Code of laws of Astrakhan – 1773 and others.



Armenia gained a legal formulation only after regaining its sovereignty by the means of a referendum that was held on September 21, 1991. After the break up of the Soviet Union and until the adoption of Republic of Armenia Constitution on July 15, 1995, the Armenian population lost its former Soviet citizenship, without having a new legal system defining Armenian citizenship. With the adoption of the Constitution, the independent Armenian Republic tried to find a solution to its ambiguous citizenship situation.

As a result of this double process – the collapse of the Soviet state and the emergence of the 15 newly independent republics – various ethnic groups suddenly found themselves in the position of being minorities. The issue of the legal status of such groups had to be addressed and clarified. This problem was addressed by the Citizenship Law.

### **Citizenship as status**

In the Republic of Armenia all issues concerning citizenship are regulated by article 14 of the Constitution, and by the Law on Citizenship passed on November 16, 1995. The constitution of the Republic of Armenia and the Law on Citizenship ensure the equality of Armenian citizens in front of the law. In theory, Armenian citizens, irrespective of their nationality, race, gender, language, religion, political or other views, social origin, property or other conditions, enjoy all the same rights, freedoms and responsibilities established by the Constitution and legal system.

The Law on Citizenship defines the procedures leading to the recognition of citizenship (article 3), the conditions for obtaining Armenian citizenship (article 9), under which circumstances citizenship can be terminated (article 23), and the process of solving disputes (article 29).

According to article 55, sublinea 15 of the Constitution, the president grants and abolishes citizenship. After the dissolution of the Soviet Union, Armenian citizenship was automatically granted to those who have lived on the territory of Soviet Armenia at the time of the enactment of the Law on Citizenship and did not abrogate their citizenship by a written statement. In addition, citizenship is granted from birth and by naturalization. Thus, according to the article 11 of the Law on Citizenship, a child whose parents are Armenian citizens at the moment of their birth, is granted Armenian citizenship irrespective of the place of birth. There are some exceptions to this principle. According to article 12 of the law, a child who is born in Armenia from stateless parents is considered to be an Armenian citizen. The same applies to a child, whose parents are unknown (article 20). People with Armenian nationality are granted Armenian citizenship in an eased way. To receive

Armenian citizenship, the Law on Citizenship establishes several conditions, including provisions for citizens who have lived in the Republic of Armenia for three years (article 13). For foreigners who are of Armenian origin and who live in Armenia, citizenship is granted without any conditions regarding the length of residency.

Armenian citizenship is formally recognized either by an Armenian passport, (issued to individuals at 16 years old), or prior to reaching 16 years old, a birth certificate or a certificate confirming Armenian citizenship. The Armenian passport contains the following entries: name, surname, gender, date and place of birth, period of validity, and the authority issuing it. Some notes are taken about the periods of validity of passports in foreign countries and other matters. Armenian citizens need to inscribe their place of residence into their passport (*propiska*) and need an exit visa to leave the country. The passport is written in Armenian and English, and, if a citizen desires, in Russian as well.

The law is based on the concept that citizenship is a bilateral connection and agreement of both sides is necessary for its termination. Therefore, a citizen, on their discretion, cannot terminate Armenian citizenship unilaterally. In other words, a denial of Armenian citizenship doesn't bring about the loss of citizenship on its own (article 1). For example, the marriage of a citizen of the Republic of Armenia with a foreigner doesn't change their citizenship. In order to break off the relationship established by the institution of citizenship, it is necessary to have the permission of the state. The state can only deprive a citizen of its Armenian citizenship based on grave violations of the law specified in article 23. For example, if a citizen who gained his citizenship through naturalization lives abroad, and doesn't register for seven years at the Consulate, without adequate cause, he can be deprived of their Armenian citizenship. The same applies to a person who was granted citizenship based on false data or false documents.

Armenia does not have dual citizenship. The Constitution, in article 14, stipulates that an Armenian citizen cannot simultaneously be a citizen of another country.

According to article 22 of the Constitution, each person has the right to leave or to return to the republic. The state is obliged to accept an Armenian citizen living abroad, if they wish to return to their country. It is forbidden to deport an Armenian citizen from the Republic of Armenia.

## Citizenship in practice: major challenges

The spectrum of civil and political rights and freedoms guaranteed by the Constitution is large. However, not all the people of Armenia are full citizens, even if they enjoy all rights and responsibilities granted formally by their citizenship status. The real life of an Armenian citizen differs strongly from what is prescribed by the law.

### *Alienation*

A great number of Armenian citizens exercise one of their fundamental civil rights - the right to vote. Not to vote is to refuse ones own civil rights, which is quite popular phenomenon. The statistics regarding the participation of the population in elections (parliamentary, presidential and local) during last 10 years proves this fact. The number of persons taking part in elections is sliding<sup>31</sup>. This means, that many citizens of Armenia country voluntarily refuse some of their own fundamental civil rights, and obligations. There is a range of political and social reasons, why people do not vote.

When refusing fundamental civil rights, a part of the population is out of the frames of active citizenship. Legally they are considered as the citizens of the country, yet this concept remains largely theoretical. We call this phenomenon “partial” or “not full” citizenship. The phenomenon of “not full” citizenship is quite popular in the countries in transition and in the countries of former Soviet Union. In many respects it is explained as a result of the inertia of last decades and the incomplete development of democratic institutions and traditions. Properly speaking, people understand democracy as a guarantee of some civil freedoms (such as freedom of speech, freedom of movement etc.), yet they don't associate it with active participation in the decision-making processes, as in European countries.

### *Emigration*

According to expert estimates in 1991-2000 approximately 700,000 – 1 million Armenians left Armenia. The majority of the people who left the country consist of men 18-55 years old with high or secondary professional education. This demographic change reshaped the social structure of the country. Now the number of women has increased in the whole population, as well as that of the elderly and children. There is a segment of the

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<sup>31</sup> Electoral Experience, Confidence in Leadership and Civic Participation in Armenia: Public Attitudes Toward Political Life. IFES, 2000

population who employ all advantages given to them - they are of average age, economically active and working. Women and children (especially young children) and the elderly do not use their political rights and advantages to the utmost.

It is important to include in the concept of “not full or half citizen” the citizens of Armenia who left the country. This group did not refuse or are not deprived of their citizenship but actually they have been out of the social-economic and political processes of the country for a long time. The sheer volume of their numbers makes this phenomenon highly interesting and relevant. According to data, approximately 30 percent of the adult population of the country left the country<sup>3</sup>. They are so called civil outsiders. The evident attempts of outsiders (especially from the Russia) to influence the course of political processes in the country has failed so far.

### *Ethnic minorities*

Only three percent of the Armenian population belongs to ethnic minorities from various small groups: Kurds and Yezidis, Russians, Greeks, Asyrians, Ukrainians, Jews, and Georgians. Kurds and Yezidis form a rural population and often live together in separate villages, such as the Malagans, (Russians belonging to a religious community that broke away from the Orthodox Church in the 19<sup>th</sup> century). The rest of the non-Armenians live among the Armenian population. The Armenian Constitution does not discriminate against its non-Armenian citizens. They have equal rights and responsibilities with Armenians. A large part of the minority groups, especially Kurds, Yezidis and Asyrians, insist that Armenia is the only country in the region where they do not feel discriminated. However, it should be noted that, in spite of legal equality, there is only a very small percent of non-Armenians, among government officials. Some representatives of ethnic minorities have Armenian surnames. The latter proves that in the society there is a prejudice towards non-Armenians. In recent years, part of the ethnic minorities have left Armenia for the countries of their ancestors- Russia, Greece, Israel, etc. They have been joined by a number of Armenians who used false passports or false marriage certificates with someone from an ethnic minority. The social status and importance of non-Armenian citizens had increased. At one time a representative of an ethnic minority was considered to be an opportunity to leave the country, and gain citizenship of a foreign country.

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<sup>3</sup> Human Development Report. UNDP, Armenia, 1997

Even today representatives of other nationalities have great difficulty in gaining access to high levels of the government. As a rule, the ethnic Armenians occupy the highest administrative and political positions in the country. Nationalism could become a factor of state policy, which absolutely contradicts and denies the officially declared democratic values. The majority of the population consists of ethnic Armenians so the possibility to violate the civil rights of the other minorities is higher. It is also one of the effects of the phenomenon of “not full citizenship” or “restricted citizenship” because, in this case, there is no opportunity to voluntary refusal of fundamental civil rights (as was in the first case) but the restriction of them by “external” pressure of ethnic majority. It concerns not only the problem of national and ethnic minorities, but also religious, political, gender and other minorities<sup>2</sup>.

The principle of the pressure and domination of the majority transforms from the national sphere to all other spheres of society. In practice it does not appear to be persecution or violation of the legal rights of minorities. Most probably it is the private restriction of their rights without the evident infringement. The state cannot protect both the fundamental rights of its citizens, and other minorities as well.

In the countries of the South Caucasus belonging to an ethnic minority, automatically means the restriction of civil rights and freedoms. These citizens have the rights of “restricted citizenship” in accordance with universal silence not only from authorities but also of a large portion of the community. In this case as in many others, the law and real life differ sharply.

### ***Refugees and IDPs***

Refugees and IDPs form 12-15 percent of the population of Armenia. The main wave of refugees came between 1989-1991, when nearly 360,000 Armenians fled from neighboring Azerbaijan after anti-Armenian pogroms in Baku and Sumgait. In the same period, 6,000 refugees came to Armenia from Abkazia, a separatist region in neighboring Georgia, 4,000 from the Central Asian republics and nearly 75,000 Armenians from Nagorno Karabakh. Before these events, in 1988, approximately 100,000 Armenians lost their homes in the terrible earthquake that struck the Northern regions of Armenia and were forced to emigrate to Yerevan and other parts of the country. Moreover, during the war in Nagorno Karabakh, nearly 72,000 inhabitants of villages in the border regions of

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<sup>2</sup> *Conditions of Minorities in Armenia*. Case Study Report of IOM/ASA, Yerevan, 2001

Armenia had to evacuate and moved to the central regions and to Yerevan. Since the early 1990s, another 15-20,000 people had to leave their villages as a result of other natural disasters, such as flood, landslide, etc. On the whole Armenia has 200,000 internally displaced persons (IDPs) and 360,000 refugees.

The legal condition of refugees in the Republic of Armenia is regulated according to the Law on Refugees, passed on March 3, 1999. Refugees were issued refugee certificates established by the UN (UNHCR). Armenia signed an agreement on the reduction of non-citizenship adopted by the UN in 1961, which orders countries to grant citizenship to refugees and other people living on the territory and encourages the refugees to apply for citizenship. The Law on Citizenship foresees a simplified and accelerated procedure for their naturalization. Persons with refugee status should apply to the Department of Refugees and Migrants of the Republic's Ministry of Social Security, which delivers a corresponding certificate to the applicant. After this, the person can immediately apply for a passport. A person has to sign a paper that they have denied refugee status. But until now, only 12,000 refugees have asked for Armenian citizenship, the rest prefer to keep their refugee status, despite the fact that they deprive themselves of citizenship rights. The hope, that their UNHCR refugee certificate may help them to emigrate to a third country, is preferred to Armenian citizenship, and the prospect of staying definitely in the country.

Besides the phenomenon of "not full" or "half citizenship" there also exists the phenomenon of "semi-citizenship". There are large groups of people in modern Armenian society whose social status does not permit them to have access to all political rights of Armenian citizens. The first group in this category is refugees. Beginning with the 1988 Baku and Sumgait massacres 360,000 Armenians moved from Azerbaijan to Armenia. Some of the refugees received refugees ID cards (UN refugee identification). The other part kept their Azerbaijan passports stating USSR citizenship. Legally they are considered refugees but many of them (e.g. those who have no this status) are simply stateless. The USSR, whose citizenship papers they hold, no longer exists. On the other hand they are neither citizens of Azerbaijan nor citizens of Armenia. But they are persons of Armenian ethnicity living in Armenia side by side with the local population and building their lives and the lives of their children in a new place. They are deprived of the right to vote and to be elected themselves to various administrative and government positions. Moreover, they have difficulties in securing jobs in state institutions because they are not Armenian citizens. On the other hand many of their children serve in the military of the Republic and

study in state educational institutions. Taking into the consideration the abovementioned, it is difficult to consider them as “citizens” and also difficult to consider them “not citizens”. So, it is better to describe their status with the concept of “semi-citizenship”. Nevertheless, living more than 10 years in the country, which has accepted them as the refugees and accommodated in some way during these years, they can not be still considered as a full citizens of the state. There are between them 45-47,000 refugees who became citizens of the Republic of Armenia.

## **Recent public debates around citizenship issues**

### ***Diaspora Armenians and the issue of double citizenship***

The legal condition of foreigners and people without citizenship is regulated by the Law on the Legal Condition of Foreign Citizens in the Republic of Armenia, passed on July 17, 1994. Among the few foreigners living in Armenia, one group, in particular should be noted - ethnic Armenians from abroad (mainly the US, France, Lebanon, Great Britain etc.). The Armenian Diaspora, as well as other foreigners who wish to have economic and cultural activities in Armenia, may receive a ten-year, renewable residence permit in form of a special passport. This special status has been created to offer the conditions for involving foreign businessmen and attracting investments in the economic development of the republic. The Law on the Legal Condition of Foreign Citizens (article 29) concerns the right to work and create private businesses. Despite this special status for ethnic Armenians of other nationalities, there is an ongoing debate in Armenia about the necessity to allow dual citizenship, in order to favor the naturalization of Diaspora Armenians. The supporters of this idea find that by means of dual citizenship it would be possible to involve the financial investments of Armenian people living abroad, while the majority of the political elite fear the participation and interference of Armenians from abroad in local political and economic life.

Great numbers of ethnic Armenians live outside of Armenia, practically in the all of the countries of Europe, the Middle East and the Americas. According to data their number is three times more than the number of Armenians, living in Armenia. The Armenian Diaspora developed over many years. The primary peak was in the beginning of last century, as a result of the Armenian Genocide perpetrated by the Ottoman Turks, beginning in 1915. One and a half million of Armenians were murdered and an equal number of survivors escaped to Europe and America.

Today, living in different countries, the Diaspora preserved their culture, religion and language, but also maintained close relations with native Armenia. Many of the Diasporans have relatives in Armenia and visit our country often. The Armenians of Diaspora are full citizens of the countries in which they live. Many of them are very interested Armenia and wish to fully participate in the life of the country. During the difficult years following independence in Armenia and after the disastrous earthquake of 1988, the Armenians of the Diaspora rendered great material, moral and physical assistance to their countrymen. Many of them fought voluntarily on the fronts during the Nagorno Karabakh conflict. These individuals are very close to the country but do not have Armenian citizenship. Individuals in the Diaspora are very involved in assisting Armenia, but they are not the citizens. During last ten years, the Armenians of the Diaspora often advocated for the government to pass a dual citizenship law. But this law has not yet been passed. Under the influence of the Diaspora the Government of Armenia approved an order to allow some Armenians living abroad to receive the status of Permanent Residence by decision of the President. But as a rule, a very small number of people have this opportunity. The absolute majority of Armenians of the Diaspora do not enjoy the rights of Armenian citizenship. So there is an impression that they have the “right” to worry, to take care of Armenia, to build hotels, factories, to construct the roads, and to render financial assistance to the population of Armenia, but they do not have the right to become an Armenian citizen. The status given to this group who may be active in the country, without having full rights of citizenship, is describe as “empty citizenship”.

### **Concluding remarks**

The phenomenon of “not full or half citizen” is very common in Armenia. For example, in the European countries, with developed democracy, they speak about the protection of human rights and have established special legal organizations and institutes to address related matters. In countries such as Armenia, the violation of ordinary citizens’ rights is so common that one should rather speak about the phenomenon of “not full citizen” for the majority of population than about the single cases of the violation of civil rights. How fundamental rights are guaranteed (including the right to live) depends on the social status of the person. The law and the authorities are not at all indifferent toward the social status of offenders. That is why the great part of the unprotected or weak population in our country stays in the position of “not full citizen”. Citizenship has for them a situational character. They feel that they are full citizens of their own country only in some



situations of daily life. But at the same time during their life they meet a range of situations, where the fact of their citizenship does not play any role. As a rule, in such cases, the government plays the role of first fiddle, (e.g. it doesn't consider the rights on "full citizen" of own citizens). In such a country citizenship is not the inherent and constitutionally protected right of ordinary citizens and it depends strongly of the citizen's his current social and political status.

The civil rights and freedoms prescribed by the Constitution and laws mostly remain on paper. In real life, as it was shown above, there exist different types of citizenship for different social groups, and since these issues have not been resolved, Armenian society can not be called a civil society.

## 4.3 The citizenship regime in Azerbaijan

*Javad Efendi, Imran Veliev, and Tair Faradov*

### **Background**

Since Azerbaijan gained its independence in 1991, the country experienced a difficult search for its social-political and cultural development. The identity of the Azeri society is in crisis; the past Soviet identity has decomposed and a new one is still developing. After the crash of the Soviet ideology there appeared a certain ideological vacuum, which was rapidly filled with various new ideological tendencies and concepts. Citizens are trying hard to understand the social and political transformations that are taking place, and to recombine and redefine new social, political, ideological identities and ethno-cultural loyalties. The new attitudes and values concerning citizenship are mainly determined by the social, ethnic and confessional segmentation of the Azeri society. Therefore one can presuppose significant variations of views between ordinary people, the political elite, the opposition, the old intelligentsia, other parties and spiritual leaders.

In the difficult transition from totalitarianism to democracy, Azerbaijan (as many other post-soviet countries) is experiencing major difficulties and contradictions. Officially, Azerbaijan is moving towards democracy, the development of a civil society, and integration into the European community and western institutions. Constitutionally and legally the country has proclaimed the democratic principles of respect and guarantee of human rights, equality for all citizens concerning the law, pluralism and freedom of speech, and guarantees a wide range of civil rights irrespective of one's nationality or religion. One of the major challenges today is not simply proclaiming certain principles and norms, but to make them work in real life - to ensure that they are implemented by the authorities and followed by every member of society. Since gaining independence, some elements of the democratization of public life in Azerbaijani society have emerged. Nevertheless, the initial steps towards democracy revealed the extremely slow and contradictory character of this process. A so-called "political pluralism" has emerged in recent years. But there is still a key problem – the absence of civilized relations between authorities and opposition, as well as between ideological and political opponents.

Democratization in the post-soviet context presupposes a fundamental transformation of the political and social behavior of the people, a change of values, and a new way of conceiving citizenship. But instead, issues related to citizenship often become a sort of political bargaining chip. There were several cases of mass rejections and refusal of Azerbaijani citizenship that were connected with political motives, such as not receiving permission to register political parties or movements, and suppression and persecution of some ex-political leaders and figures.

### **Citizenship as status**

The Azerbaijan Republic has signed major international treaties, such as:

- The International Pact on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (July 21, 1992);
- The International Pact on Civil and Political Rights (July 21, 1992);
- The Convention and Protocol of the United Nations Concerning the Status of Refugees (Dec. 8, 1992);
- The Convention on the Reduction of the Number of People without Citizenship (May 31, 1996), and;
- The Frame Convention on the Protection of Ethnic Minorities (June 13, 2000).

In case of contradictions between these international treaties and the national legislation, the provisions of the international treaties are applied.

According to article 3 (Equal citizenship) of the Law of the Azerbaijan Republic, "On Citizenship of Azerbaijan Republic", citizenship of Azerbaijan Republic is equal for everyone irrespective of the basis of its possession. The rights, freedoms and responsibility of the citizens of Azerbaijan Republic are equal.

In article 52 (Right of Citizenship) of the Constitution of the Republic states, that persons, having a political and legal bond with the Republic, and also mutual rights and responsibilities, is a citizen of the Azerbaijan Republic. A person born on the territory of the Azerbaijan or born of a citizen of the Republic is a citizen of Azerbaijan Republic. A person, who has one parent who is a citizen of Azerbaijan, is a citizen of the Azerbaijan Republic.

In article 53 (Citizenship is the Guarantor of Rights) of the Constitution of the Azerbaijan Republic states that citizens of the Azerbaijan Republic, in no circumstances can be:

- Dispossessed of citizenship of the Republic.
- Ejected from the Republic or given to a foreign state.

The rights and freedoms of foreigners and persons without citizenship, including refugees, are mainly established by the Constitution and Law of Azerbaijan Republic, (About the Legal Status of Foreigners and Persons without Citizenship). Article 69 notes that, foreign persons without citizenship can exercise all rights and should execute all responsibilities at the same level with citizens of the Azerbaijan Republic, if other is not stipulated by the law or international treaty.

The limitations for this group of people concern civil and political rights (the right to participate in the political life of the state, the right to participate in government and elective franchise), but there are no limitations in the area of social rights. It is necessary to pay special attention to the rights on political asylum fixed in following articles of the Constitution and laws of Azerbaijan:

Article 70 (Right Regarding Political Asylum) of the Constitution states, that according to the conventional international rules of law, the Azerbaijan Republic offers political asylum to foreigners and persons without citizenship.

According to article 109 (Authority of the President of Azerbaijan Republic) the President of the Azerbaijan Republic solves issues involving political asylum.

According to part 1, article 14 (Acceptance of Citizenship of the Azerbaijan Republic) of the Law of the Azerbaijan Republic, (Regarding Citizenship), persons who have lived for the last five years on the territory of the Republic and who have presented a document proving knowledge the of state language of Azerbaijan, can receive citizenship irrespective of race, nationality, etc. This right is distributed to foreigners, persons without citizenship as well as refugees and IDPs.

The country has officially proclaimed such formal principles, as freedom of speech, expression, opinion, conscience, creed, respect for the rights of freedom of association and assembly, respect and guarantees of human rights, equality of all before the law, superiority of law, peace, stability and public order, social responsibility of all, credible and legitimate authorities, pluralism, and tolerance of others.

To conclude on the status of citizenship in Azerbaijan:

- Not everyone has national passport
- National ID's were issued for the first time only recently, and the document still indicates "place of living" (*propiska*)
- A large number of people preferred to get Russian citizenship (mostly for economic reasons, but also to have certain freedom in Azerbaijan)
- The level of emigration has not decreased
- There is a lack of public discourse on citizenship.

## **Citizenship in practice**

### ***Poverty and emigration***

The general economic situation in Azerbaijan is stagnating. In spite of a great deal of oil contracts, one may notice the difficult socio-economic plight, the drastic decline in the standard of living for the overwhelming majority of population, the overall instability, social tensions, existence of unresolved social problems, and sharp social polarization and marginalization of the population.

Mainly because of economic reasons and motives, there is a high level of migration from the country to Russia and farther abroad. According to unofficial sources, 1 million to 1.5 million Azerbaijani citizens left the country and have small businesses in other CIS countries. Living as labor migrants in Russia, they have no real protection either from the Russian government, or from the Azerbaijan government. They are often in the situation of being out of the law and even being killed with impunity by the criminals. There are often openly racist statements about "persons of Caucasian nationality" in the Russian media, and the government of Moscow is still able to violate the Russian Constitution regarding passport registration of this category of non-residents.

Besides the abovementioned, in 1989-92 over 600,000 IDPs, who moved from the regions of Azerbaijan occupied by Armenia, (40 percent illegally) have settled in the suburbs of Baku, as the capital was the only place offering possibilities for their economic development. A long list of economic, cultural and social problems arose after this population dealt with their trauma, poverty and different culture.

### *Alienation/lack of participation*

A decade after independence, the last sectors of the population is disappointed with institutional politics, whether be it those who are in power or in opposition. The skepticism and negative attitudes of citizens toward the government and public policy are among the growing challenges of Azerbaijani society. Public opinion is highly sensitive to the appearance of a new rich layer within the society. Moreover, the former optimism towards economic growth thanks to oil resources is fading.

As a result, political debates and participation are being marginalized. For example, the attitudes of ordinary citizens strongly indicate that most Azeris do not care much about the parliamentary elections. A public opinion poll showed that 78 percent of respondents were not interested in what was going on in the country related to elections. People consider it simply a "struggle for power" and an "internecine conflict" between the government and the opposition. More than a half of the respondents (54 percent) still did not know whether they would take part in the elections and roughly 25 percent of the respondents indicated they would not vote at all.

Quite a significant proportion of respondents (42 percent) were skeptical about the ability of the new parliament to have a positive effect on the socio-economical and democratic development of the country. This is principally why 38 percent of the respondents had not decided which party or candidate they would vote for.

The majority of the Azeri population feels excluded from the social-political processes taking place in the country and in response, remain very passive. This indicates a low level of political and civic participation and a low level of democratic consciousness in Azeri society.

The situation is aggravated by problems of high level of corruption, dependence of the judiciary on the executive power, and large split between the legislation and the practice of its implementation. Azeris have "equality before the law", but some people, "representing the ruling clan", are much more equal than all others.

### *Refugees and IDPs*

*De jure* ethnic minorities and IDPs are citizens of the Azerbaijan Republic, they have all basic the rights and freedoms, and also bear all responsibilities of citizens.

Regarding refugees, according to the 1<sup>st</sup> part of article 6 (Right and Responsibility of Refugees and IDPs) of the Law of the Azerbaijan Republic, (About the Status of the

Refugees and IDPs), refugees have the same rights and freedoms of the citizens of the Republic, and have identical responsibilities, indicated by the Constitution, present law and other acts.

However in this case, it is necessary to note, that the majority of the refugees, which from 1988-1992 moved to the Azerbaijan Republic from Armenia, were Azerbaijanis. So, according to item 3, article 5 of the Law of the Azerbaijan Republic (About Citizenship of the Azerbaijan Republic), refugees placed on the territory of the Azerbaijan Republic since January 1, 1988 through January 1, 1992, became citizens. According to the indicated article, regarding these persons, the privileges stipulated by the legislation of Azerbaijan for the IDPs, also are granted.

Other, smaller parts of the refugee population include: Afghans and Chechens from the Russian Federation, according to a part 3, articles 6 of the Law of Azerbaijan Republic (About the Status of Refugees and IDPs), employ rights and have responsibilities, which are stipulated by legislation of the Republic for foreigners and those having no citizenship.

Because of weak social security for refugees, IDPs and ethnic minorities, relative to other citizens, the government provides them with certain privileges and measures of social defense, including: temporary living space, employment, social security, material aid, medical maintenance, maintenance of the right of education, transport and dwelling-municipal privileges, tax privileges, distribution to the IDP of land lots, and granting of credits, etc.

### ***Minorities***

Azerbaijan is a multiethnic, multinational state. Various national groups and minorities live in Azerbaijan – Lesgins (2.2 percent), Russians (1.8 percent), Armenians (1.5 percent), Talyshs (1 percent), Avars (0.6 percent), Tartars (0.4 percent), Ukrainians (0.4 percent), Kurds (0.2 percent), Georgians (0.2 percent), Jews (0.1 percent) and others. Representatives of all these ethnic groups are equally founders and owners of statehood, including its territory, and comprise the multi-ethnic Azerbaijani nation.

Azerbaijan's pursuing the strengthening of national statehood and the desire of the Azerbaijani people to promote its national culture and language cause some concern and even fear among the representatives of the national minorities, who are also interested in preserving and defending their national legacy. Sometimes they perceive the current transformations in Azerbaijan as an explicit manifestation of nationalism. Such feelings can cause alienation among national minorities.

The respectful and tolerant attitude of the majority (Azeri) towards various ethnic minorities living in the country is worthy to note. Relationships of the titular ethnos - Azeri - with the minority of the population in general, still remains stable and, without obvious outside provocation, they would not cause a threat for new interethnic conflicts. Interethnic communication in the various spheres of social life - family, work place, local community and informal groups is quite satisfactory, and many people have friends of a differing nationalities and a tolerant attitude to ethnically mixed marriages.

Presently issues on interethnic relations are becoming more and more urgent. This is one of the key practical problems for Azerbaijan in this transitional period. Obviously, it is impossible to successfully implement the establishment of a democratic and civic society without taking into consideration the basic interests, needs and values of all ethnic groups in a state. This is extremely important for the creation of constructive, peaceful and stable interethnic relations and to prevent conflict situations and tensions.

There is official guarantee of ethnic minority rights. There is no official politics toward creating advantages for some groups and disadvantages for others. The politics of cultural pluralism and respect for civil rights of all ethnic minorities has been proclaimed. There are certain possibilities for ethnic groups to strengthen and develop their ethno-cultural systems and values without infringing on others, to satisfy their specific needs in the area of education and creating mass media.

A number of public organizations for national minorities and national-cultural associations have been formed and freely and actively operate in Azerbaijan. Their main goals are to defend social-cultural interests of the national minorities, to protect their rights, and to meet their national needs and interests.

However, some problems and obstacles exist regarding the degree of their satisfaction with their current socio-economic situation and living standards, including; the possibilities to preserve and develop their national culture and values; respect for traditions, customs and holidays; preservation of the language; access to all levels of education; self-consciousness, socio-psychological feelings and attitudes; protection of the national minorities' rights and freedoms, and their participation in the social-political life; as assessment of the current general interethnic situation and moral-psychological climate in Azerbaijan, as well as in the concrete place of residence.

Some public organizations working with national minorities experience specific problems in their activities including, a lack of social and legal protection as a result of a general weakening of the legal services. Under pressure from political rhetoric and foreign



propaganda some representatives of national minorities can form a psychological superiority or inferiority complex which, in turn, may lead to weakening of civil loyalty. One may note, as an example, the Lezgins separatist movement “Sadval”. As a result of this situation, their ethnic identity contradicted to the nation-state.

### ***Russian-speaking population***

There is also a Russian-speaking population in Azerbaijan. Newspapers, magazines, TV and radio programs (on the both state and private channels) in the Russian language are produced for this group. The youth has an opportunity to receive their education in the Russian language (both secondary and higher). At the same time, in the mass media there are intensive debates taking place about the function of the Russian language, which definitely impacts the interests and rights of the Russian-speaking population. Issues regarding the possibility to obtain high positions and to be elected into governmental entities are being discussed. There were some public discussions on the termination of educational activity in the Russian language, as well as regarding the closing of the Russian TV channels. Recently some high ranking diplomats decided that people from mixed “non-Azeri” families can not receive high positions in governmental entities. All this, to a certain degree, causes the exodus of Russian-speaking citizens from the country.

### ***Refugees and IDPs***

The existence of large number of forced migrants - hundreds thousands of refugees and internally displaced persons is, of course, the key problem for Azerbaijan. As a result of the military conflict between Armenians and Azeris over Nagorno-Karabakh, ethnic cleansing in Armenia against the Azeri population and the Armenian occupation of 20 percent of the territory of Azerbaijan, there are about 200,000 refugees and over 600,000 internally displaced persons in the country (these are minimal figures available in various reports). This population has been forcefully ousted from their home, found themselves in extremely hard living conditions, many currently living in refugee camps and many suffer from Post Traumatic Stress Disorders (see Annex).

Under conditions of unresolved conflict their rights to live in peace have been violated. After many years of deportation, the older generation - still not integrated into social life, waiting for repatriation, and without job opportunities - has become the most marginalized group of the population. Necessary measures need to be taken for the return these people to their previous places of residence.

Azerbaijan also gave asylum to 50-60,000 Meskheti Turks and to a large group of Chechens.

### ***Religious situation and inter-confessional tolerance***

The religious situation in Azerbaijan has been dramatically changing in recent years. Unlike Soviet times (total state control over religion, "scientific atheism", suppression, persecution and prohibitions, and intolerance to believers), religion currently exists under relatively free conditions. Freedom of religion and rights of religious minorities in the country are guaranteed by the Constitution. There is a multitude of confessions, freely operating religious groups, communities, organizations, associations and cultural centers dedicated to religious affairs.

Public interest in Islam, which has very deep historical and cultural roots and rich spiritual traditions in Azerbaijan, has considerably increased among the citizens over recent years, especially among intellectuals and youth. Religion is becoming one of the most important factors of public life.

But there exist some problems, contradictions and difficulties in this area. There are certain contradictions and misunderstandings among the representatives of traditional (Islam, Judaism, Orthodox Christianity) and non-traditional confessions. Also the growth in religion has already led to the spread of sectarianism and foreign missionary (both Muslim and Christian) activities.

Some foreign Muslim organizations propagandize their own understanding of the Islamic lifestyle, which, by many of its parameters, does not fit in with the Azerbaijani Muslims. On behalf of Islam, radicals preach ideas of Jihad, portray Muslims of other orientations as "enemies", blame them of unfaithfulness (unlike atheists), speak of their oppression, and propagandize fanaticism and intolerance.

The attitude towards sectarians is bad, as they are trying to alienate people from Islam. Elements of suspicion and distrust concerning some religious sects exist. In the future, this could lead to a further growth of mutual alienation and lack of understanding between followers of different religions and adversely affect the plight and dynamics of inter-religious relations, despite a generally high degree of tolerance in this sphere.

Although Azerbaijan has a history of tolerance towards mainstream religions such as Islam, Christianity and Judaism, tensions were observed recently. A group of Muslim women were not allowed to have passport photos taken with their heads covered, which

was regarded as violation of their rights. A committee aimed to protect their rights was formed.

### ***Gender issues***

Gender problems in Azerbaijan have a certain unique features. This relates to issues of gender asymmetry in all spheres of life: family, economics, labor, professional specialization, psychological problems of inter-gender relations, issues of equal rights and equal possibilities. The transition period decreased the social and economic status of women at work, in politics, in business and in everyday life. Possibilities for women to truly participate in public life decreased, including access to decision-making positions and government. There are certain cultural, social and economic sources creating sexist stereotypes. Probability of gender-related conflicts and extreme discrimination of women is rising. As there is a great need to form strategies and undertake concrete steps towards protecting the rights of women, women themselves have establish societies, associations, NGOs and coalitions to deal with their problems.

### **Concluding remarks**

It is obvious that the direction of social change and transformation in the country depends on those ideas and values will be accepted by the whole society and by groups, layers and categories of the population. Those ideas and values that will become a priority in the mass and elite consciousness will determine the models of development of the Azerbaijan society in near and far perspective.

At the present, several discussions regarding the place of the country in the international community, the role of western-democratic, Turkish and Islamic values in the social life of Azerbaijan nation exist.

There are different positions and viewpoints about the models of development. Some groups think that Azerbaijan should ally itself with the West and the Western-democratic, European values, other groups suppose that Azerbaijan should be developed within the Turkish or Islamic world, according to Oriental values, there is also a group of Russia-oriented individuals.

In the meantime, the attitude of various social groups towards democratic values varies a great deal - as where youth prefers "individual, personal freedom", the older generation gives preference to "stability and order" and "superiority of law".

The intellectual elite are in the process of elaborating new ideological concepts and principles.

Nowadays, these issues have shifted the focus of public and scientific attention, and have become the subject of very intensive discussions in the mass media, political and intellectual layers. There is a broad spectrum of diverse, sometimes diametrically opposite, opinions and judgments on the necessity, importance and desirable level of democratization, as well as the significance, role and place of democratic values in the life of the nation.

Additional issues are also in the forefront of public and political discussions - falsification of elections, existence of political prisoners, division of powers, judiciary independence, and settlement of conflicts and disputes.

The main thing Azeri society still has to discover is how to unify and satisfy all groups in the nation – for only those societies that satisfy their citizens may truly be considered democratic.

# **5      T h e   s o c i a l - p s y c h o l o g i c a l a n a l y s i s   o f   c i t i z e n s h i p : t h e o r e t i c a l   b a c k g r o u n d   a n d e m p i r i c a l   a p p r o a c h**

*Carine Bachmann & Christian Staerklé*

In this chapter, we present the theoretical background justifying our approach, and the hypothesis that defined our method. The focus of our research lies on empirically grounded, social-psychological analysis of citizenship conceptions in the South Caucasus. Our objective is to reveal how students in the three countries think about their belonging to a national community, how they define the borders of this community, particularly in relation with other social groups, how they formulate their rights and duties as citizens, and consequently, to reveal the way they think that society should be organized and structured. Our study is essentially concerned with the attitudes of ethnic majority groups, that is, the titular groups in the three respective countries. It is important to keep in mind that this is a serious limitation of our study, as the analysis of minority points of view would probably have yielded a different picture of lay conceptions of citizenship (see Azzi, 1998; Hagendoorn, Linssen & Tumanov, 2001, for a discussion of ethnic minority dynamics).

Evidencing common lay thinking about socially and politically relevant issues is the main feature of societal psychology (Doise & Staerklé, 2002). Issues embraced by societal psychology concern political involvement, development of attitudes towards legal and political institutions, explanations of political events as well as judgements of politically relevant social categories. Everyday reasoning and communication about abstract political issues necessarily presupposes some kind of common understanding between the parties involved. In a societal perspective, the construction of such shared meaning systems that allow individuals to communicate with each other is based on *social*

*representations*. According to the social representation theory<sup>32</sup>, these shared knowledge structures derive from symbolic regulations between social groups. They can be considered as defining the organizing principles of the common views about a given social issue by various members of a population under study. Therefore, an important phase in each study of social representations is the search for a common map or cognitive organization of the issues at stake. However, as Doise & Staerklé (2002) note, the theory of social representations does not imply that individuals sharing common references necessarily hold the same positions. Individuals may differ according to the strength of their adherence to various opinions, attitudes or stereotype. Social representation theorists therefore search to evidence the content and meaning associated with the observed differences in individual and group positioning towards specific social issues. The meanings of “democracy”, “human rights”, or “citizenship”, for example, are not, and probably never will be defined in a universally accepted way. Instead, social regulations and complex systems of interaction shape the way people interpret and conceptualise these abstract principles. Meaning regulation systems are not stable and immutable social knowledge structures, but are transformed as a function of historical events and political struggles. A further assumption therefore is that such systematic variations are anchored in collective realities, in different social psychological experiences embedded in a historical context. In other words, societal psychology, and in particular social representation theory, provides a theoretical framework to study the collective processes of meaning assignment in a representational field by identifying shared knowledge structures. This is done by evidencing and explaining differences of individual and group-based positioning towards common frames of reference<sup>33</sup>.

## 5.1 Societal representations

The theoretical assumptions underlying our study of popular conceptions of citizenship are based on research concerning the popular legitimacy of the Swiss welfare

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<sup>32</sup> See for example Moscovici, 1976 ; Doise, Clémence & Lorenzi-Cioldi, 1993 ; Augoustinos & Walker, 1995.

<sup>33</sup> This approach puts into perspective the sociological determinism and the methodological individualism which both characterize most of the current public opinion research. For a discussion of the differences between tradition opinion research and an analyses of public opinions based on social representation theory, see for instance Clémence, 2001 ; Doise, Clémence & Lorenzi-Cioldi, 1992 ; Moscovici & Hewstone, 1984 ; Moscovici, 1988 ; Staerklé, Roux, Delay & Gianettoni, 2003.

state<sup>34</sup> that has recently been completed by Staerklé, Roux, Delay and Gianettoni (2003). In their analysis, the organizing principles of public opinion toward the welfare state are structured around two dimensions that characterise lay perceptions of society. On the one hand, society is perceived in terms of intergroup versus intragroup dynamics; on the other hand, perception of society centred on the distribution of symbolic versus material resources. To “perceive” takes a thick meaning, as it is through these perceptual dimensions that we represent and understand our societal environment, or that we interpret and explain social stratification and collective opposition. These two systems of representations are therefore called *societal representations*; a specific kind of social representations that structure the meaning assigned to the antagonist social forces at work (Staerklé et al, 2003, 152 ff.). In the following, we will briefly outline the essence of the two dimensions underlying societal representations.

### **Relations between and within groups**

The representation of society in terms of *between-group (intergroup) dynamics* leads to a perception of social groups as distinct and separate entities, which confront each other like two teams in a football game (Sherif, 1967). The boundaries of social categories are seen as impervious or at least clearly delimited (Sidanius & Pratto, 1999). To move from one category to another is difficult, and often even impossible in the case of ascribed group membership (Azzi, 1998; Wright, Taylor & Moghaddam, 1990). The individuals are categorised as a function of collective features they share with other group members, such as ethnicity, nationality, gender, race, or culture. The differences between individuals are essentially conceived as categorical differences which are reflected in mutual prejudices and consensual stereotypes. The members of a given group are, in everyday thinking, seen as basically interchangeable. The social status of interacting groups is very often asymmetric, and framed for example in terms of a relationship between a minority and a majority group (Moscovici, 1980), or between a subordinate and a dominant group (Lorenzi-Cioldi, 1998). The relation between groups is among other factors determined by the perceived degree of compatibility of interests, goals and identities (Azzi, 1998). These factors determine if an intergroup relation is friendly, hostile, competitive or cooperative (Deutsch, 1985). In such an asymmetric system, the majority or dominant group tends to

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<sup>34</sup> « Droits et appartenances dans une société fragilisée : analyse de la légitimité populaire de l'état social suisse ». Final research report PNR 45, Fonds National Suisse pour la recherche scientifique.

preserve the prevailing social order which justifies its dominant position (Hoffmann & Hurst, 1990; Jost & Major, 2001; Sidanius & Pratto, 1999), whereas minority or marginalized groups (at least those who perceive their status as illegitimate and unfair) tend to question the social order and to protest against its subordination by asserting and defending their identity against the dominant group (Abrams & Randsley de Moura, 2001; Kelly & Breinlinger, 1996; Mugny, 1982; Wright & Tropp, 2002).

The representation of society determined by a within-group (intragroup) *perception* leads to a vision of society in which membership in a sub-group of society (for example an ethnic or religious group) is less important than membership in a superordinate category defined more by individual than by categorical characteristics. A group of friends or other groups where individuals get together on the basis of their similarities and shared preferences are examples of such groups. In an intragroup dynamic, the group is organized from within, without an explicit reference to an outside group. When society is perceived as an intragroup, its members are a priori seen as equals. Nevertheless, despite (or because of) the declared equality of the members of an intragroup, one can observe the emergence of social differentiation and of hostilities within the group, since the criteria of membership imply certain expectations toward group members. In an intragroup logic, the group tries to preserve its cohesion by ensuring harmony and order (Hogg, 1993). To achieve an inner order, the members of an intragroup are expected to respect and to conform to common norms and values. The lack of compliance of group members with these norms and values puts the cohesion of the group at risk. Therefore, deviance from ingroup norms is sanctioned by other members of the group. Moreover, the social order of an intragroup logic relies on a normative system that rewards the “good” members who contribute to its inner order, and sanctions directly or indirectly the “bad” members who are not complying, or are “different” (Abrams, Marques, Bown & Henson, 2000; Foucault, 1975; Marques, Paez & Abrams, 1998). But in contrast to intergroup dynamics, social tensions and differentiation processes are determined by individual characteristics and behaviours of group members, and not by their categorical membership (such as gender, ethnicity etc.).

### **Symbolic versus material differentiation**

The dynamic within and between groups takes on different forms depending on the nature of the resources at stake that define how conflict lines in society are framed: in terms of the redistribution of material resources and interests (see for instance Sherif, 1967; Bobo & Hutchings, 1996) or in terms of symbolic interests, such the assertion of social



identity and belonging (Tajfel, 1982), or group political participation and the recognition of the group's distinct culture (Azzi, 1998). Typically, societal conflicts structured around conformity and deviance, or around tolerance of diversity and respect of « difference » do not, *a priori*, depend on material resources or status considerations. Similarly, ethnic claims often focus on political representation and procedural claims which define the political rather than material status of subgroups within the larger (national) society. However, societal conflicts structured around redistributive struggles, such as scarce resources, are aimed at correcting material inequality and social stratification. Material resources can be quantified, and determine the social status of individuals and groups on hierarchical social scale where there is always a more and a less, a high and a low (Ridgeway, 2001). For the study of citizenship conceptions, these two modes of societal representation (symbolic versus material) seem particularly relevant since the construction of group identities and social order within a nation-state is closely connected with social conflicts and struggles for the (re)allocation of material resources.

Staerklé et al. (2003) suggest that the interaction between these two dimensions of societal representations leads to four visions of society which, at least in western democratic countries, substantially determine the variations in the perceived legitimacy of the welfare state, and, adapted to our research topic, the way citizenship is conceived (Table 1).

Four conceptual frames result from the interaction of the two dimensions of societal representations: *social order and disorder*, *market and inefficiency*, *diversity and discrimination*, *social justice and domination*. Their basic characteristics will be shortly outlined in order to develop a working hypothesis concerning their relevance for lay conceptions of citizenship in the South Caucasus.

### **Social order and disorder**

The combination between an intragroup logic and the symbolic dimension gives rise to a representation of society centred around the notion of order within the group, maintaining a social cohesion through the respect of common values and traditions. Translated to the subject of our research, the intragroup can be interpreted as the titular majority that makes up the “nation”. The “good” or “bad” citizens are constructed as a function of their conformity with the values (e.g., language, customs, institutions) of the titular majority. The threat to the “nation” is perceived to come from the inside. The “bad” citizens are the troublemakers calling into question the “traditions” or “national mentality”

of the national group, or those who refuse to “adapt”. In this logic, for example, the questioning of the “natural” sexual order and the patriarchal family would be perceived as a threat to the entire social organisation based upon this particular conception of the family. State institutions such as the military, the police, the intelligentsia, university professors and teachers, as well as the traditional family may take up the function of control, and upholder of the social order. The attitude deployed towards “bad” members of society is authoritarianism, asking by virtue of their moral superiority for others to adhere and conform to the value system of the “nation” and its “good” and prototypical members. These are expected to support strong corrective measures in case of « infractions » to the norms and traditions. In this logic, it seems normal that “good” citizens should have more rights and responsibilities than “bad” citizens.

### **Market and inefficiency**

The combination of the perception of society in an intragroup dynamic with a material, status-oriented dimension leads to a market-based logic. The relations within the group are competitive, since the interests and goals of its members are seen as incompatible. Again, transposed to the subject of our research, the titular majority represents the intragroup. The positioning and social status of the individual members of the titular majority is determined by the accumulation of economic and political resources, in other words, by socio-economic power, without taking into consideration their ethnic or religious background. In this model, people are expected to “play the game”; as a consequence, there are « winners » and « losers ». This vision of society gives priority to individual success, and accordingly holds up values such as individual strength, leadership and relational skills to create the right “entourage”. The threat to society is constituted by the weak and incapable, the ones that could not adapt to the new capitalist system and its values and rules, and that are ultimately vowed to marginalization and poverty. The institutions that function according to a market logic, such as private businesses, are entrusted to be the guardians of this logic. In the West, the attitudes that justify the antagonism within this logic are meritocracy, the belief in social mobility, the work ethic and individual responsibility. In the post-soviet context where business circles are closely connected with (and protected by) the political elite, one would rather think about attitudes such as pragmatism, and the choice of the right political allegiances to justify social antagonism. In this vision of society, it seems normal that the socio-economic elite would

have more rights and privileges than the disenfranchised groups that “didn’t make it” (for individual reasons) in the emerging, unregulated capitalism of the post-soviet era.

### Model of societal representations of society

	<b>S y m b o l i c r e s o u r c e s</b>	<b>M a t e r i a l r e s o u r c e s</b>
<b>I n t r a g r o u p   p e r c e p t i o n</b>		
<b>Perception of society</b>	<b>ORDER DISORDER</b>	<b>MARKET INEFFICIENCY</b>
<b>Legitimacy of group membership/antagonism</b>	conformity with group values/ “good” & “bad”	equity, fairness / “winners” & “losers”
<b>Prototypical criteria of membership</b>	morality	success
<b>Prototypical attitudes of authority/individual compliance</b>	authoritarianism - conformism	meritocracy - individualism
<b>I n t e r g r o u p   p e r c e p t i o n</b>		
<b>Perception of society</b>	<b>DIVERSITY DISCRIMINATION</b>	<b>SOCIAL JUSTICE DOMINATION</b>
<b>Legitimacy of group membership/antagonism</b>	collective identity/ ingroup & outgroup	power/ dominant & subordinate
<b>Prototypical criteria of membership</b>	identity, culture	social status, wealth
<b>Attitudes of dominant group</b>	discrimination	domination
<b>Minority claims</b>	recognition	redistribution

### Diversity and discrimination

The representation of society in terms of intergroup relations invoking the symbolic dimension are essentially articulated around group identities, ethnic and cultural diversity and its counterpart, discrimination. This vision of society differentiates social groups on the basis of categorical membership, and tends to promote a thinking based on collective identities and « difference », without *a priori* consideration of social status. Social antagonism develops through a process of between-group differentiation and within-group homogenisation (Azzi, 1998; Doise, 1978; Oakes, Haslam & Turner, 1994). The titular majority, as the dominant group in the superordinate national category, establishes strict

group boundaries that make it difficult, or impossible, to become a member of the majority group (e.g., through language requirements). Groups that are perceived as “foreign” or “hosts”, such as ethnic, religious or sexual minorities, are kept at distance when majority attitudes are hostile to diversity. Discriminatory treatment and negative stereotypes are expected to be the emblematic attitudes deployed by members of the titular majority as well as by state institutions (typically controlled by ethnic majorities) when dealing with categories of “foreigners” (in the sense of culturally different groups). Ethnocentrism and sexism are common forms of prejudice in everyday thinking and discourse. Tolerance, respect of diversity, and acceptance of differences are attitudes that are developed to counterbalance this symbolic antagonism. Identity politics and “political correctness” are typical examples of such political movements in the West, but also extreme right-wing groups who claim that the national majority is “discriminated” by, or disadvantaged in relation to minorities. The allocation of rights is based on group rights, granted on grounds of group membership. Some religious or ethnic groups can be perceived as too different compared to the titular majority. As a consequence, the perceived absence of essential normative qualities in “foreigners” can hamper the practice of citizenship and therefore their integration into the “host society”.

### **Social justice and domination**

Finally, intergroup relations organized around material claims are characterized by competition and domination. In contrast to the market logic, in this vision of society, the material interests of entire groups, and not of individuals are incompatible (Blumer, 1958). The society is perceived as stratified in “classes” or social categories, located somewhere between the “top” and the “bottom” of the social scale (Ridgeway, 2001; Sidanius & Pratto, 1999). The threat to the nation is constituted by claims of redistribution of material resources and social justice by the groups at the bottom end of the scale. The titular majority sees itself as the legitimately dominant group, and they justify the existing inequalities between groups with various strategies of domination (Jost & Banaji, 1994). The institutions that represent this logic are the ones dominated and instrumentalized by the titular majority. In the post-soviet context, the state structures per se are perceived, in this logic, to serve more or less exclusively the interests of the titular majority. Claims of subordinate groups, or sub-groups are traditionally purported by civil society organisations fighting against structural inequalities, such as trade unions or associations of refugees.

Any social issue can be conceptualised from one or a combination of these four societal perceptions. As an example, consider of the different ways “foreigners” can be thought of in everyday discourse in a Western country. First, they can be perceived as a threat to the social order, and consequently majority members may ask them to « adapt » to the values of the native population (logic of social order). Or people may consider foreigners as lazy profiteers who try to acquire resources without contributing to the national economy and the common good (logic of the market). Still, they may be constructed as culturally “different” from the native population, and therefore remain, by definition, eternal “outsiders” (logic of diversity). Finally, foreigners can be perceived as competitors on the national labour market, stealing away work that would be otherwise given to nationals (logic of social justice).

## **5.2 Overview of the empirical approach to lay conceptions of citizenship**

In studying lay conceptions of citizenship in the highly diversified South Caucasus, we are particularly interested in analysing how members of the respective titular majorities form their opinions concerning currently debated “ethnic” policy options. These are aimed at regulating relationships between ethnic and other “cultural” groups, for example through language policies, rights to political representation, policies regulating activities of oppositional or religious minorities, and gender policies. Moreover, since state institutions are weak and often unable to guarantee basic rights and provide services, we are also interested in what exactly laypersons expect from state institutions. Thus, the dependent variables in our study are mainly policy opinions that reflect different citizenship models, measured with attitudes towards diversity regulation and government responsibility.

We attempt to describe opinion construction as a function of the various dynamics described in the societal perception model. We expect that perceptions and interpretations of the current social and political environment (in the form of societal perceptions) should shape preferences for one or another citizenship model. As a general hypothesis, we predict a congruence between a given perception of the society and support for policies that address this perception. For example, the perception of disorder should lead to the support of corrective measures to disorder (e.g., properly working state institutions) or to sanctions of the “bad” members of society (criminals, deviants, traitors, etc.); or those who

perceive ethnic diversity as threatening should support measures that favour the titular majority and oppose the granting of particularistic group rights.

Moreover, we also take into account how respondents evaluate their own personal situation. Thus, we investigate to what extent their feelings of risk (of being victimised, unemployed, etc.), of personal efficacy, their patterns of media consumption, their political involvement (through debate and discussion), their readiness to engage in collective action or their attitudes towards political elites shape opinions towards ethnic policies and government responsibilities.

In this model of the empirical study of citizenship, then, the articulation between everyday perceptions of the social and political environment with attitudes towards normative citizenship models generates popular conceptions of citizenship. These are therefore understood as organizing the perception of the relationship between citizens, their cultural and ethnic ingroups, and the national society along with its state institutions.

Finally, we should add that as the questionnaire does not contain enough measures to assess its validity without ambiguity, the societal perception model has a primarily heuristic function in this study. Furthermore, the model has been developed with a Western-democratic context in mind. Therefore, this study will be a first test as to its applicability and plausibility in a national context outside Western Europe.

# 6 Cross-national comparison of popular conceptions of citizenship in the South Caucasus

*Christian Staerklé & Carine Bachmann*

## 6.1 Comparing National Contexts

Creating measures to study cross-national commonalities and differences at the individual level is challenging in its own right. Attitude and opinion comparisons across cultural and national contexts bear well-known problems and difficulties (Leung & Bond, 1989; Van de Vijver & Leung, 1997). We will first address some of these issues, and describe how we deal with them and then proceed with the description of our sample populations and the research instrument.

Two broad categories of problems encountered in cross-national research can be distinguished: those related to the *measurement* of attitudes and opinions, and those associated with the *sampling* of populations under investigation. Shortcomings in the research strategy related to one or both of these categories can at best make comparisons difficult, or, at worst invalidate them all together. (Smith & Bond, 1998). *Measurement biases* occur for example when questions, or question wording, have different meaning, or are understood in different ways, across national and cultural settings (Green, 2003). This may be due to the fact that a particular concept or word (e.g. “citizenship” or “nation”) is less common, or used in different contexts, in a particular country. It may also be due to language issues, since often accurate translations of a concept do not exist, or have different meanings, in another language. This is a major difficulty we have to deal with in our research, since the three national contexts use not only three majority languages, Georgian, Armenian and Azeri language, but also three different alphabets.

Another requirement of comparison research is that identical questions must be asked in the three contexts. Thus, the questions necessarily become more general and perhaps more abstract in nature as the number of (national) units to be compared increases. As a consequence, we lose specificity in analysing particular national issues and social problems related to citizenship (e.g. Diaspora, IDP's), and are confined to compare topics which simultaneously apply to the three contexts (e.g. trust in authorities, status of majority group related to other groups in general). In our research, we made every possible effort to balance the competing interests between a cross-national study requiring identical and necessarily more general questions and a national study that can investigate in more depth the specificities of the respective national situations. Our questionnaire therefore consists of a large number of identical items, while integrating also some particular features to each of the three contexts (although these data will not be used in the comparative part of the report). The common English-language questionnaire was translated by the regional research teams in the three local or everyday languages (Georgian in Georgia, Armenian in Armenia, and Russian in Azerbaijan), keeping instructions, presentation, item order and item wording constant across the three contexts.

The second major issue in comparison research concerns *sampling* of respondents (Van de Vijver & Leung, 1997). In order to be comparable, we need to measure attitudes and opinions from similar national sub-samples. Comparing, say, a student population in one context with a representative sample in another, yields invalid comparisons, because sources of variation (in terms of social status, education, nationality, etc.) are confounded. The descriptions of the respective situations in each of the three contexts have demonstrated how dissimilar the problems and issues they confront are. Therefore, in a comparative research logic, each sub-sample representing the local contexts should come from a comparable and not overly dissimilar social background within their societies. Moreover, relatively modest sample sizes should go along with sub-sample homogeneity (in terms of social background, education, age, etc. within their society), that is, the less respondents a researcher can obtain in a given context, the more the sub-sample should be homogeneous. This strategy minimises possible confusion between within-context variability and between-context sources of variation. Therefore, the observed differences of individuals' attitudes between contexts can be interpreted as being due to the impact on individual opinions of the contexts themselves.

While in some studies the aim is to identify "cultural" or "national" differences, our comparative research strategy is twofold: on the one hand we are interested in the



similarity of individual determinants of social and political attitudes across national and cultural contexts (see Azzi, 1998). That is, to what extent do individual factors shape popular conceptions of citizenship in a similar way across contexts? These individual-level determinants (that will be described in more detail later on) include various perceptions of the socio-cultural and political environment (e.g. perceptions of conflict and disruptions of the social order), personal risk assessments (in terms of economic hardship, crime, etc.), communication practices (sources of information, political discussion, etc.), and trust in institutions. On the other hand, we are interested in cross-national variation, once we have established the impact of individual level factors (Doise, Spini & Clémence, 1998; Herrera, Lavallée & Doise, 2000). Such a double research strategy articulating individual and aggregate factors has been successfully used in prior social-psychological research on comparisons between former states of the Soviet Union (Hagendoorn, Linssen & Tumanov, 2001).

A focus on individual-level variation is also an antidote to simplistic culturalist accounts, because aggregate-level variation will not be treated as an indicator of “cultural” difference of members of the three national societies as such, but as reflecting popular citizenship attitudes in historically and politically contingent settings (Brubaker & Laitin, 1998). We are thus able to avoid any connotation of an essentialist account that would reduce differences in opinions and attitudes to membership in a group that is thought to determine by the sole criteria of “cultural” or “ethnic” or “religious” membership the ways its members think of their society (Brubaker & Cooper, 2000; Yzerbyt, Rocher & Schadron, 1997). Empirically, this strategy entails a lesser focus on country comparisons of mean responses to particular items (although we will also take into account such differences), and a stronger emphasis on comparisons of the links between opinions and their individual-level determinants.

The price to pay for a comparative approach, however, is a neglect of within-context structural relations. By homogenising a single sub-sample from a given context, only the point of view of a particular group that reflects a particular position in society can be analysed (Matsumoto, 2000). In our research, as in many other comparative studies, student samples were used (Smith & Bond, 1998). This choice has advantages: respondents are relatively easily accessible, they are accustomed to reading and answering questions, also on more abstract levels, and they constitute comparable samples in terms of age and social background.

But it is important to recognise that these student samples are far from being representative of the national population. First, the students are clearly younger than the average population. Hence, they are part of a generation for whom the Soviet experience is only a remote early childhood memory; their references are in the post-soviet era. Second, they are mostly members of the linguistic and titular majority group, that is, Georgian, Armenian and Azeri. Third, most of them presumably come from a relatively advantaged social position, at least compared to the majority of the population. They are therefore more likely to be part of the future elite of the countries. Thus, rather than representing their country as such, they stand for a particular category of the country, as young and educated members of the titular, dominant, majority group, who grew up in the post-soviet era. As a consequence, it is important to keep in mind that their attitudes are likely to reflect positions different from minority groups who stand in a more critical or sceptical relationship with state authorities and the national majority. It is nevertheless important in its own right to study student samples in comparative research, because some of them will be part of those who will shape future policies and institutions.

Comparative research thus yields several major advantages. It allows assessing commonalities in lay reasoning about citizenship across different contexts and provides an opportunity to evaluate the validity of universalistic hypotheses according to which similar pressures yield similar responses, and similar motivations and interests guide citizenship attitudes and behaviour. To what extent, for example, do feelings of injustice and relative deprivation determine ethnocentric attitudes across the three contexts (Azzi, 1998)? How does identification to ethnic groups determine the ways students think about citizenship? To what extent does government loyalty and trust in authorities predict defensive and negative reactions towards national minorities? How can the support for ethnic dominance by a majority group over minority groups be explained in Georgian, Armenian and Azeri student populations? We hope that our research will shed some light on crucial questions regarding the links between the perceived relationship between various ethnic and religious groups, individual economic factors and attitudes towards government policies. Systematic cross-national comparison helps to evaluate the universalistic or particularistic character of the observed links (Doise & Spini, 2003; Hagendoorn, Linssen & Tumanov, 2001).

In short, the weakness of our approach is that we are forced to neglect within-context categorical comparisons, for example between the titular group and minority groups (including Russians). We will also put aside specific aspects of each of the three countries, and instead focus on processes that are thought to operate in all of them. The

strength of this research lies in a high degree of comparability between the three national sub-samples, and the use of a questionnaire that features focused and comparable questions in all three contexts.

## 6.2 Method

### Samples

Final data collection with 650 participants took place during the first months of 2002. Members of the local research teams collected the data in a large variety of educational settings in Tbilisi, Yerevan and Baku, respectively. In the Georgian capital, 200 students participated in the research. They were mainly recruited at the *Tbilisi State University, the Academy of Arts, the Theatre and Film Institute, the Georgian School of Business, the Georgian Technical University, and the Asia & Africa Institute*. In Yerevan, the Armenian capital, 250 students filled in the questionnaire, from the *Yerevan State University* (at the faculties of *Sociology, Law, Physics & Mathematics, Philology and International Relations*), from the *Armenian Engineering University*, and the *University after Acharyan* (private university). In Baku, finally, 200 students were recruited, most of them from the faculties of *Psychology, History, International Relations, Technical Science, Law, Medicine, Management and Oil-Related Studies*. This eclectic mix of the studies the participants are involved in makes up three relatively representative student sub-samples. Due to the academic diversity, however, no meaningful common distinction (e.g. between human-social and technical-mathematical sciences) can be statistically used to assess variations within and across contexts.

*Men and women* were evenly distributed in Georgia, whereas in Armenia and Azerbaijan the distribution is somewhat uneven ( $X^2(2) = 16.7, p < .001$ ), since female respondents outnumbered male participants.

As far as their *age* is concerned, roughly half the students were 19 years old or younger. Nevertheless students in Armenia ( $M = 18.9$  years,  $SD = 2.1$ ) were significantly ( $p < .05$ , post-hoc test) younger than in Georgia where their mean age was 20.2 years ( $SD = 2.1$ ) and in Azerbaijan ( $M = 20.1$ ,  $SD = 2.6$ ). In the subsequent comparative analyses we will use the dichotomous variable opposing those under and above the age of 20.

We also asked participants their place of residence and birth, their mother tongue and everyday language, as well as their “nationality” (ethnic group) and their religious

membership. All of these questions yielded highly consensual answers, with the exception of “Birth place”. Thus, 93%, 88% and 99% *live in the national capitals*, that is, Tbilisi, Yerevan and Baku, respectively. 97% of the Georgian respondents declared Georgian as their *mother tongue*, whereas in Yerevan all but one respondent shared the Armenian mother tongue. In Baku, however, only 72% declared the Azeri language as their mother tongue, while 20% were originally Russian-speaking, and the others still had other linguistic origins. *Everyday language* yielded a similar pattern: 97% Georgian in Tbilisi, 97% Armenian in Yerevan, and 85% Azeri in Baku. Ethnic group membership is of course also linked to language: 95% of the Tbilisi respondents declare Georgian ethnic origin; a full 100% are of Armenian descent, whereas 77% of the Baku respondents declare Azeri origins, the others being chiefly split up in Russian, Georgian and Lezhgin origins. *Religious membership* is mainly Georgian Orthodox in Tbilisi (95%) and Armenian Apostolic in Yerevan (96%). In Baku, there is more variation: 44% are Shiites, 18% Sunnis, 13% declare no religion, 11% are Russian Orthodox, the remaining 14% being split up in other religions.

The only statistically useful information to distinguish respondents within a country on the basis of these membership categories concerns their *birth place*. Proportions presented in Table 1 show that around 70% of respondents are born in the respective capitals, the remaining students being born outside the capital (either from other parts of the country, or from foreign countries, mostly Russia). In Georgia, respondents with origins outside the capital came chiefly from Abkhazia (25 Georgians and one Abkhaz), Rustavi and Russia. In Armenia, non-capital respondents came mainly from other Armenian cities such as Armavir, Vanadzor and Artik, but also from Russia, Georgia and Azerbaijan. In Baku, non-local residents came from Russian, Ukrainian and Georgian cities, as well as from various Azeri cities such as Sumgait, Gangja, and Shemakha.

The final question answered by respondents concerned their *travel* activities. In each context, a majority of students has never travelled abroad, although in Armenia a smaller proportion of students have travelled,  $X^2(2) = 14.6, p < .001$ . Travelling requires resources (e.g. scholarships) that are not available to all students.

Table 1 summarises the distribution in the three contexts of the four variables that will be used in subsequent analyses as individual-level indicators, such as *Sex*, *Age*, *Birth place* and *Foreign travel experience*.

**Table 1:** Descriptive statistics of the three national samples

			Georgia	Armenia	Azerbaijan	Total
<b>Sex</b>	Male	N	98	76	75	<b>249</b>
		%	49.2%	30.4%	37.5%	<b>38.4%</b>
	Female	N	101	174	125	<b>400</b>
		%	50.8%	69.6%	62.5%	<b>61.6%</b>
<b>Age</b>	19 or less	N	83	170	106	<b>359</b>
		%	41.5%	68.0%	53.0%	<b>55.2%</b>
	20 or more	N	117	80	94	<b>291</b>
		%	58.5%	32.0%	47.0%	<b>44.8%</b>
<b>Birth place</b>	Outside capital	N	59	76	64	<b>199</b>
		%	29.5%	30.4%	32.0%	<b>30.6%</b>
	In capital	N	141	174	136	<b>451</b>
		%	70.5%	69.6%	68.0%	<b>69.4%</b>
<b>Foreign travel experience</b>	No	N	108	178	119	<b>405</b>
		%	54.3%	71.2%	59.5%	<b>62.4%</b>
	Yes	N	91	72	81	<b>244</b>
		%	45.7%	28.8%	40.5%	<b>37.6%</b>

## Questionnaire

The main feature of the empirical part of this research project is a standardised questionnaire, filled in by 650 students in the three capitals Tbilisi, Yerevan and Baku. The questionnaire is the outcome of a collaboration between the three research teams in the South Caucasus and the Swiss co-ordinators. In February 2001, researchers from each local team as well as the two Swiss co-ordinators met in a workshop in Tbilisi during which the broad outline of the study was defined, the sampling procedure determined, and the structure of the questionnaire discussed.

The content of the questionnaire is based on the social, legal and political analysis of the citizenship situation in the three countries that is presented in the first part of this report. A previous questionnaire used by the Georgian research coordinator Ghia Nodia in an earlier citizenship study in Georgia (Hanf & Nodia, 2000) was also a useful source for items. The major difficulty in elaborating the questionnaire, however, was to create a sufficient number of items that did not contain references to a particular national situations. Only with items that could be used in the three contexts it was possible to capture and compare attitudes towards the very different political and social situations in the three

contexts. After several preliminary versions and lively exchanges between the South Caucasus and Switzerland, a pre-test questionnaire was created.

This preliminary version of the final questionnaire was *pre-tested* during autumn 2001. On the whole, 69 respondents from the three Caucasian capitals, Tbilisi, Yerevan and Baku, filled in the questionnaire that was translated into Georgian, Armenian and Russian in the case of Azerbaijan. The results of this pre-test allowed to eliminate or reformulate the most consensual items and to ensure that all questions in the questionnaire were readily understood and answered by students. Pre-testing thus aimed at minimising missing responses due to poorly formulated items and at enhancing quality of items through careful wording. The English version of the final questionnaire was ready in the beginning of 2002, and translated by the research teams in Georgian, Armenian and Russian.

The *final questionnaire* comprised around 180 questions, with a few local variations and adaptations as a function of the national context. In this report, we will not present results pertaining to all parts of the questionnaire. We will briefly describe the parts of the questionnaire that have been used for comparative purposes (which cover about 2/3 of all items). The English version of the questionnaire with the precise wording of items (and their translations) can be found in the appendix to the present report. In the results section, the most important and relevant item wordings are summarised in the tables.

The questionnaire was organised in two large parts, the first one that assessed perceptions and attitudes towards the current state of things in the country. This part was intended to reflect everyday preoccupations of citizens, whereas the second one was of a more normative nature as it was concerned with how the society *should* be organised and structured. The general theoretical rationale behind these two sections was that the perceptions and interpretations of the current social and political environment should determine preferences for one or another normative citizenship model, in terms of rights granted and duties imposed upon individuals and groups, of different forms of civic participation and of desired government responsibilities. The articulation between everyday perceptions of the social and political environment with attitudes towards normative citizenship models generates popular conceptions of citizenship. The questionnaire was designed according to these general guidelines.

The different sections making up these two parts were mixed in the questionnaire in order to avoid a repetitive and tedious structure. We will nevertheless describe the questionnaire as a function of these two categories, and not as a function of the order in

which the items were presented to the respondents. The part covering *perceptions* of the current political and personal situation includes:

- Items on the *perceived respect of a wide range of civil, social and political rights* (e.g. equality before the law, freedom of opinion, equal access to education and healthcare, freedom of association), together with items measuring *trust in governmental and public institutions* (parliament, army, opposition, government, private and public media, courts, police, president). These items assessed a general feeling of how things are going in the country, to what extent the state fulfils its responsibilities, and how people evaluate national institutions.
- Items on perceived *fraud* of authorities and perceived *corruption* in the government
- Items on perceived quality of *inter-group relations* and differences between social categories (e.g. conflicts between ethnic and religious groups, gap between the rich and the poor, gender parity)
- Items on perceived *social order* and disorder (e.g. fear of crime, social upheavals)
- Items on *soviet past* (e.g. regrets, current visa regime)
- Perceptions of *international relations* (positive or negative impact of countries being involved in the region, as well as of international organisations such as World Bank or Red Cross)
- Items on *personal political attitudes* (e.g. political efficacy/alienation, readiness to get involved in collective action, frequency of political discussions, loyalty towards government)
- Items on personal *risks* (e.g. being unemployed, discriminated against, victim of crime)
- Items on *poverty explanations* (measuring endorsement of public vs. private responsibility of social problems)
- Items on *social distance* and proximity (measuring personal ethnic and religious tolerance)
- Items on *relative deprivation* (assessment of one's situation compared to other groups and individuals, or compared to an earlier period)
- Items on *sources of political information* (e.g. state / opposition / foreign media, internet, private and public debates)

Different sections tap normative attitudes towards citizenship models, that is, forms of political organisation that define responsibilities and rights of groups living within the nation-state. They include:

- Propositions on the desired forms of *political organisation* of the national context. Items include split-up in different ethnic states, a single party system, and a pluralist political organisation.
- Items addressing the *relative position of the national majority* compared to other (ethnic) groups (e.g. single official language, ethnicity stated in passport, more rights for majority members). These items are used as indicators of attitudes concerning ethnic and majority dominance and tolerance at the level of the political organisation of the country.
- Items concerned with advocated *methods, goals and responsibilities of the current government*. These include mostly disciplinary (e.g. persecution of persons, censorship, martial law, death penalty) as well as legal and social measures (e.g. social security, guarantee workers' salaries, law enforcement, ensure equality before the law)
- Items on attitudes towards *state-based religious and ethnic tolerance* (e.g. Jews should have the right to practice their religion everywhere they want, activities of religious groups such as the Jehovah's Witnesses should be prohibited)
- Two items (only in Georgia and Armenia) on ethnic citizenship definition
- Items on attitudes towards *liberal democracy* (e.g. democracy is power of the law, and not law of power) and critical attitudes towards democracy (is a western "cliché" artificially applied to the country)
- Items on gender policies and women's participation in society (e.g. women should stay home, women should get more active in the economic sphere/civil society/political life)
- Several items measured attitudes towards collective rights (e.g. rights of IDP's and members of the Diaspora). These items are necessarily specific to the different national context, and cannot be used for comparative purposes

Still other sections that will not be used for the comparative analysis were concerned with statements of the ideal country, with lay definitions of a "real citizen", with social identifications, and preferred comparison groups. Unless otherwise noted, all scales



ranged from 1 (“*Completely disagree*”) to 4 (“*Completely agree*”). Other scale-end formulations were adapted to the wording of the item (e.g. *very unlikely / likely, very bad / good idea, totally disapprove / approve, not at all important / very important, very negative / positive impact, never / very frequently*).

### 6.3 Overview of statistical analysis

Before presenting the results, we will briefly circumscribe the different stages of the comparative data analysis strategy. Before the actual comparative analyses, a large number of exploratory analyses were carried out in order to check for similarities and convergences in the three national contexts. Then, in a first step, two strategies to reduce the large number of variables to a more manageable set with fewer dimensions were used: the creation of composite scores and factor scores. *Composite scores* can be calculated if two or more items are found to measure the same underlying dimension. This similarity needs to be assessed with a coefficient of internal consistency of the items composing the score (such as Cronbach’s Alpha). If internal consistency is high enough (evidenced with an Alpha above .70, but in cross-national research lower values are common; Smith & Bond, 1998), composite scores can be calculated, by adding together, for every individual, all individual item scores, and by dividing them by the number items involved in the scale construction. Thus the composite score simply is the mean of the items that have been added together. We created nine composite scores that all present alpha-levels above .60 in all three contexts, that is, they can be said to measure an underlying dimension in the three contexts. Five out of the nine scores were used as predictor variables (e.g. perceptions of the political environment), and four as dependent variables (Table 2).

In a second stage, principal components analyses (factor analyses) were used to organise items into fewer dimensions. Two analyses were carried out on the predictor variables, tapping perceptions of the social and political environment (“Societal perceptions”, Table 3) and on citizen self-perceptions (Table 4). For each of these two analyses, nine factors were retained that were saved as individual factor scores. Subsequently, these factor scores were treated as organising principles (Doise, Clémence & Lorenzi-Cioldi, 1993) of attitudes and opinions towards normative citizenship models. Moreover, as the factor structure was common to all three contexts, national differences could readily be analysed for each factor. This procedure is a convenient way to summarise divergence and commonality between the three samples.

**Table 2:** Overview of composite scores used in comparative analyses

		<i>Total</i>	<i>Geo</i>	<i>Ar</i>	<i>Az</i>
<b>Perceptions (Independent / Predictor variables)</b>					
<b>Perceived rights respect</b>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>▪ Stability, security and public order</li> <li>▪ Equality of people before the law</li> <li>▪ Tolerance of minority groups</li> <li>▪ Equal access to school and education for everyone</li> <li>▪ Equal access to health for everyone</li> <li>▪ Freedom of association and assembly</li> <li>▪ Pluralism and freedom of opinion</li> <li>▪ Freedom to pursue individual interests</li> </ul>	.76	.70	.69	.81
<b>Trust in authorities</b>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>▪ The president</li> <li>▪ Government</li> <li>▪ By and large, I think that our present government is leading the country in the right direction</li> <li>▪ Police</li> <li>▪ Parliamentary majority</li> <li>▪ Courts</li> </ul>	.85	.77	.77	.90
<b>Corruption, exclusion and unrest</b>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>▪ Witness a large gap between the rich and the poor: the rich get richer, and the poor get poorer</li> <li>▪ Witness high levels of poverty among its population</li> <li>▪ Witness a very high level of corruption in the government</li> <li>▪ Witness serious social upheavals, because people are more and more dissatisfied with their living conditions</li> <li>▪ Be a very insecure and dangerous country for its citizens, because of high levels of criminality and violence</li> </ul>	.81	.84	.74	.83
<b>Ethnic / religious proximity</b>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>▪ I would not mind if a child of mine married someone from a different nationality provided they love each other</li> <li>▪ I would not mind if a child of mine married someone from a different religion provided they love each other</li> </ul>	.67	.64	.61	.64
<b>Helpful West</b>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>▪ European Union</li> <li>▪ The United States of America</li> <li>▪ United Nations</li> <li>▪ Germany</li> <li>▪ World Bank / IMF</li> </ul>	.75	.77	.69	.76
<b>Normative citizenship models (Dependent variables)</b>					
<b>Ethnic citizenship (Georgian version)</b>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>▪ Ethnic Georgians who live in other countries and are not citizens of Georgia should have more rights to occupy high positions in central government in Georgia than ethnic Armenians or Azeris who are Georgian citizens</li> <li>▪ [...] more rights to own lands in Georgia than ethnic Armenians or Azeris who are Georgian citizens</li> </ul>	--	.80	.75	Data not collected
<b>Religious tolerance</b>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>▪ Jews should have the right to practice their religion everywhere they want in G,A,A</li> <li>▪ Catholics should have the right to practice their religion [...]</li> <li>▪ Muslims should have the right to practice their religion [...]</li> </ul>	.78	.81	.64	.78
<b>Women's participation</b>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>▪ Women should be more active in civil society</li> <li>▪ Women should get more active in the economic sphere</li> <li>▪ More women should be members of political parties and take part in elections</li> </ul>	.74	.64	.69	.85
<b>Liberal democracy</b>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>▪ Best possible social and economic justice for all citizens</li> <li>▪ Power of the law, and not law of the power</li> </ul>	.65	.74	.64	.63

Table 5 shows the correlations between the two sets of factor scores that make up the predictor variables. Because principal components analysis with varimax rotation orthogonalises factors (that is, it does not allow factors to correlate with each other), correlations between factors from the same analysis amount to zero (for the total sample), and are not presented.

Dependent variables were prepared in a third step. We performed two principal components analyses on a set of dependent variables. In the first analysis, we included items on three forms of political organisation (Table 6), and the second one featured three types of government responsibility (Table 7). These two analyses yielded six factor scores that subsequently were used as attitude measures that are to be explained with the predictor variables. Again, national differences were first analysed by means of factor score differences. Table 8 shows the national scores for the four remaining dependent measures (composite scores), *Ethnic citizenship*, *Religious tolerance*, *Women's participation* and *Liberal democracy*.

All in all, we created 18 predictor variables and 10 dependent variables which capture and summarise around 2/3 of all questions included in the questionnaire. The final step in the comparative analysis consisted in a separate regression analyses (one for each national context) for each of the ten dependent variables (Table 9, Table 10 and Table 11). These analyses show how opinions on the ten citizenship issues across the three contexts are constructed. In addition, we also investigated to what extent the four anchoring variables (sex, birth place, age, travel experience) predicted attitudes towards normative citizenship models. These results allow us to assess to what extent the same perceptions contribute to the same opinions in different contexts. We also computed overall measures of similarity of response patterns across the contexts destined to assess overall similarity or dissimilarity of the construction of lay opinions on citizenship in Georgia, Armenia and Azerbaijan.

## 6.4 Results

### Cross-national organising principles of opinions

#### *Societal perceptions*

Twenty-four variables measuring “societal perceptions” (that is, perceived relationships, antagonisms and conflicts between social, ethnic, religious and national groups and institutions) have been submitted to a factorial principal components analysis (Table 3), including five composite scores described in Table 2. This analysis thus captures the structure of 45 items of the questionnaire (since the five composite scores summarise 26 items). Although separate analyses for the national contexts yielded often markedly different factorial structures, we decided to perform a common analysis in order to facilitate comparisons across contexts. The national differences in the factor scores capture at least part of the differences between the contexts, by showing how respondents in Tbilisi, Yerevan and Baku relate to this common factor structure.

**Table 3** : Principal components analysis (after Varimax rotation) on societal perceptions (N = 626)

	Trust in nation state	Corruption, poverty, unrest	Pro-Russian orientation	Ethnocentrism	Personal ethnic tolerance	National identity threat	Perception of categorical differences	Private poverty explanation	Pro-Western orientation	Communitarity
Perceived rights respect [CS8]	.78					-.23				.68
Trust in authorities [CS6]	.76	-.29		-.27	.15					.77
Trust in army	.72		.21	.18						.62
Trust in state media	.71	-.14				.12	-.11			.57
Authorities: rich richer, poor poorer		.73		.11		-.14	.10			.59
Suspicion of dishonest elections		.70		-.14		.24				.59
Fear of social conflicts [CS5]	-.23	.69			-.11	.18			.20	.62
Corrupted government officials	-.20	.42		.37		-.38	-.26			.58
Reunification with Russia			.85			.12				.75
Pity the Soviet Union broke up			.78		-.11	-.12	.11			.65
Russia helpful	.31	-.12	.60		.21				.13	.54
Differences : Christians and Moslems		.13		.76						.62
Closeness with own nationality				.75		.14				.60
A good friend is a good friend...		.23			.77				.10	.67
Ethnic / religious proximity [CS2]		-.16	.11	-.22	.67	-.19	.15	.13		.62
Loose identity : too many nationalities				.22		.76	-.11			.65
Serious conflicts : religious groups	-.20	.40		.12	-.12	.54				.53
Differences: capital and rest of country	.13			-.18	.18	-.13	.70			.59
Differences : majority and minorities	-.11	.23	.15		-.42		.57		.15	.62
Differences : the rich and the poor		.25		.27	.19		.53	-.27		.55
Poverty : bad education						.16	-.18	.80		.72
Poor don't try hard enough...		-.17		.11		-.19	.21	.74		.68
Helpful West [CS5]	.11		-.13		.12		.14		.85	.79
Red Cross		.26	.32	.16		-.14	-.10		.64	.65
Variance % (after rotation)	10.47	9.52	8.06	7.07	6.01	5.79	5.70	5.49	5.02	
<b>Georgia</b>	-.57a	.13a	-.71a	.15a	-.35a	.23a	-.24a	-.04	.01a	
<b>Armenia</b>	.30b	.06a	.52b	.41b	-.05b	.10a	-.16a	.02	-.15ab	
<b>Azerbaijan</b>	.18b	-.21b	.03c	-.69c	.42c	-.36b	.46b	.02	.20ac	
<i>F(2,623)</i>	52.3***	6.0**	109.4***	85.8***	30.6***	19.6***	31.2***	<1	6.7**	

*Note* : KMO = .72; loadings < .10 are not displayed; 'CSn' denotes composite score with number of items composing it (Cronbach's alpha > .60 in all three contexts); significant factor scores differences between contexts (at  $p < .001$ ) are highlighted. Factor score means sharing different subscripts differ at  $p < .05$  (Tukey post-hoc test).

\*\*\* =  $p < .001$ , \*\* =  $p < .01$ , \* =  $p < .05$

The analysis extracted nine factors with an eigenvalue above 1, explaining 63.13% of the total variance. The first factor groups together variables related to perceived rights respect and a positive evaluation of authorities and state institutions (army and state owned media). Clearly, this factor is about a sense of *Trust in nation-state institutions* and their proper and efficient functioning in terms of basic (human) rights respect. By virtue of its position as first factor, it explains the highest proportion of variance and therefore represents the most important organising principle of differences between individuals in this analysis.

The second factor is defined with variables that can be summarised as representing perceptions of corruption, increasing poverty and fears of public disorder. Thus the perception of a growing gap between the rich and the poor, the feeling that elections have not been carried out honestly, and the perceived corruption of authorities are all correlated with each other.

The third factor captures three items that grant a positive image to *Russia* (in terms of a desirable although unlikely reunification and regrets concerning the soviet break-up).

The fourth factor features two items linking religious differentiation and ethnic proximity, and has been labelled *Ethnocentrism* for its exclusionary tone that is supported with loadings of other variables on this factor.

The fifth factor denotes *Personal ethnic tolerance* as it includes variables that do not view ethnicity or nationality as a disturbing aspect of everyday relations (in marriage or friendship).

On the sixth factor, termed *National identity threat*, again appear two items linking ethnic and religious antagonisms to negative outcomes (losing the national identity and witnessing serious conflicts).

The seventh factor groups together three forms of perceived *Differences between social categories* (mostly between the capital and the rest of the country, but also between majority and minorities, and the rich and the poor).

Two *explanations of poverty* identify the eighth factor: one based on external attribution of poverty due to the lack or the low quality of education that should be granted by the state; the other stressing the individual and private responsibility (internal attribution) for poverty.

The ninth factor, finally, is mainly defined with the composite score of favourably evaluated and *helpful relations with the West* and other outside entities to which

is associated a positive judgement of the Red Cross. This factor can be understood as an expression of a pro-Western orientation, as opposed to a more nostalgic reference to Soviet discourse and values.

How do the respondents in the three capitals differ on these factors? For each of these nine “organising principles” (that is, dimensions that organise differences between respondents; Doise, Clémence & Lorenzi-Cioldi, 1993), we saved the factor scores, and then computed group differences, the values of which appear at the bottom of Table 3. The tables also include F-values that determine the statistical probability of random differences and thus stand for the size of the difference between the groups (the bigger the F, the larger and more significant the difference between groups). In addition, results of a one-way analysis of variance are presented that show exactly which group is different from which other group (two country-groups with different lower-case letters are significantly different from each other). It should also be noted that factor scores are standardised measures with a mean of 0 and a standard deviation of 1.

The largest difference is evidenced on the *Pro-Russian* factor, where Armenian respondents have a very favourable judgement and Georgian respondents a very unfavourable opinion, Azeri respondents being right in-between. Azeris have clearly the lowest score on the *Ethnocentrism* factor, that is, they are less ethnocentric than the other two groups. Armenia scores highest on Ethnocentrism. These differences are also due to the fact that the factor is partly defined with the relationship between Christians and Muslims. Very clear differences also characterise *Trust in nation-state*: the Georgians have much lower levels of trust than both other groups (which are not different from each other on this measure). On the *Personal ethnic tolerance* measure we find that the Georgians are the least and the Azeris the most tolerant, the Armenians being located in-between. The Azeris do perceive, however, the largest *categorical differences*, compared to both other groups. Georgians and Armenians alike feel that their nation is symbolically threatened as it might *lose its identity* because of too many nationalities, whereas the Azeris do not share this concern to the same extent. Smaller differences characterise *perceived conflicts* that are higher in Tbilisi and Yerevan than in Baku, whereas Azeris perceive the *West* as more helpful than the Armenians.

### ***Citizen self-perceptions***

The second principal components analysis was carried out on 20 items (without composite scores) that measured “*citizen self-perceptions*”, that is, activities and attitudes

related to participants' everyday life (Table 4). These include for example the channels through which they receive political and social information, fears and worries about their future, their relation with authorities, their readiness to get involved in collective action, or their feelings of powerlessness.

The analysis again extracted nine factors with eigenvalues above 1, accounting for 64.72% of the total variance. The first and therefore most important factor groups together items concerning one's own *personal feelings of insecurity*, especially concerning the economic situation, solitude and fear of crime.

The second factor features two items that stand for personal *loyalty with the government*.

The third factor is defined with two items indicating readiness for active participation in political life and involvement in collective protest; yet, it is difficult to know what collective activities participants exactly think of.

The fourth factor captures that the main *sources of information lie in the realm of the private or informal information sources (public debates)*, as opposed to official sources of information such the national mass media.

The fifth factor is chiefly defined with an item stating that citizens' political point of views are irrelevant for government activities to which is associated an item that describes the motivation to convince others of one's point of view. This factor is termed *Elitism*.

The sixth factor is defined with a well-known phenomenon in the social justice literature (for a recent overview, see Walker & Smith, 2002): *relative deprivation*. Two items describe the relative satisfaction and perceived quality of life *compared* to others and compared to earlier times.



**Table 4 :** Principal components analysis (after Varimax rotation) on citizen self-perceptions (personal risks, relationship with authorities, collective action, and communication; N = 637)

	Personal insecurity	Government loyalty	Active participation	Info source: Private & informal	Elitism	Relative deprivation	Info source: Foreign media	Info source: National media	Empowerment	Community
Not being paid for work	.71				-.16	.17			-.20	.62
Be unemployed	.70	.13	.20				-.19		-.29	.69
To live in solitude	.69		-.18		.12		.27	-.11	.20	.66
Become victim of violent crime	.67	-.29	.25		.16			-.10	.17	.67
Elections: good way to choose government		.68	.19					-.10	.18	.56
Unconditional government support	-.11	.68			.30		.12		-.18	.61
Ready for collective protest	.11		.77		.13	.12				.65
Citizens: Active and direct participation		.14	.69		-.27	-.17				.61
Info source: Public debates				.83						.72
Info source: Private conversations		-.13		.81			.13	-.11		.72
Authorities: should not pay too much attention to views of citizens			-.13		.78					.64
Self: Convince friends and family about politics and society		.27	.26	.21	.53		-.19	.23		.56
Relative dissatisfaction with current life (satisfied vs. angry)	.14	-.18				.78			.11	.67
Relative evaluation of life conditions: better or worse than five years ago?		.17				.77	-.11		-.15	.67
Info source: Internet		.10		.19	.13		.75			.63
Info source: Foreign media		.15	.11		-.32		.64	.37		.69
Info source: State media			-.14					.81		.70
Info source: Opposition media		-.36	.30			.29	-.11	.48	.13	.58
No influence on government actions	.11		-.10						-.80	.66
Subjective knowledge about politics	.17	.34	-.11	.11	-.39		-.23	.17	.46	.61
Variance %	10.22	7.47	7.45	7.32	7.17	6.98	6.26	5.96	5.89	
Georgia	-.02	-.85a	.06a	-.02	.42a	.07	-.04a	.13ab	.06a	
Armenia	.00	.39b	-.43b	.05	-.17b	.03	-.25a	.00a	.26a	
Azerbaijan	.02	.35b	.50c	-.04	-.20b	-.11	.36b	-.13ac	-.41b	
F(2, 634)	<1	147.0***	55.1***	<1	26.6***	1.7	21.7***	3.5*	27.2***	

Note : KMO = .62; loadings < .10 are not displayed; significant factor scores differences between contexts (at  $p < .001$ ) are highlighted. Factor score means sharing different subscripts differ at  $p < .05$  (Tukey post-hoc test).

\*\*\* =  $p < .001$ , \*\* =  $p < .01$ , \* =  $p < .05$

The seventh and the eighth factor again describe *sources of information*. The two factors separate *foreign media* (including Russian media) and the *internet* on side, and *national media* on the other (state and opposition media, the latter with a much lower loading on this factor, and several relatively high loadings on other factors). In other words, respondents seem to consider either outside sources (such as foreign media or the internet) or the national media as valid sources of information. It is interesting to note that the reliance on foreign media is negatively linked to the “elitism” factor that captures a very negative view of citizen participation and competence (*authorities should not take their view into consideration; they should be convinced about politics and society*). Furthermore, there is a considerable negative correlation between reading opposition media and loyalty to the government. Nevertheless, the factorial structure is counterintuitive inasmuch as it opposes foreign, outside sources of information to national, inside media, rather than opposition to state media (even though opposition media has a much lower loading on the National media factor, and Foreign media consumption also loads on this factor). In any case, internet use seems to be more associated with elites rather than with oppositional activities.

The last factor, finally, is defined with a highly negative loading of the feeling of powerlessness, and the feeling of knowing something about national politics. It is termed *Empowerment*.

Again, a range of differences between national categories are evidenced in the analysis of the factor scores. By far the largest difference concerns *Government loyalty*, extremely low in Georgia, compared to both Armenia and Azerbaijan which are not different from each other. Armenian respondents are least likely and Azeris most likely to get involved in active participation, the Georgians being in-between. Feelings of political *empowerment*, however, are lowest in Azerbaijan. Tbilisi respondents endorse *elitist ideas*, presumably reflecting the desire for an efficient state. Azeris get their political information more from *foreign media*, but it might be that they think first of all of Russian publications. A slight difference is evidenced between Tbilisi and Baku respondents concerning national media, the former being closer to national media information. It is noteworthy that no difference at all is found neither for levels of personal insecurity nor for relative deprivation, although this factor accounts for the largest proportion of variance between individuals. This result suggests that perceived dissatisfaction with one’s life and feelings

of insecurity are constant across student samples in Baku, Yerevan and Tbilisi. Hence, other than national sources of this variation must play a crucial role.

### Correlations between organising principles

Before examining how the 18 organising principles determine the construction of opinions towards a set of citizenship policies, we need to have a clearer picture of the links between the predictor variables. Because principal components analysis with varimax rotation makes the factors orthogonal and uncorrelated (although in reality they may correlate), links between factor scores resulting from one analysis cannot be studied. We are however able to study the links between factors resulting from two different analyses. Table 5 presents zero-order correlations between the two sets of nine factors, separately for each national context.

Due to the high number of possible correlations ( $9 \times 9 \times 3$ ), we will extract links that appear to be particularly interesting and reliable across contexts. The most significant correlations are highlighted in the table. First, it is noticeable that very few cases show reliable correlations for all three contexts, suggesting that the links are contingent upon the particular situations in each of them. Important exceptions include the negative links between *Trust in the nation-state* and *Relative deprivation* and *Personal insecurity* (without Georgia): the more respondents feel deprived and dissatisfied, the less they trust national institutions. Trust in the nation-state is however positively associated with government loyalty, and to some extent with national media information source.

*Perception of corruption, poverty and unrest* is related to one's personal insecure situation as well as to informal and private information sources. Elitist attitudes in Tbilisi and Yerevan, as well as feelings of knowledge and power in Tbilisi and Baku contribute to the perception of a *less* conflict-laden society, and thus to a more optimistic outlook on society.

Links to a *positive image of Russia* are particularly strong in Azerbaijan, where this attitude is linked to personal insecurity and relative deprivation, opposition to participation and feelings of powerlessness.

Ethnocentric attitudes are less readily described, since this measure involves the relationship between Muslim and Christian religious groups. Attitudes towards ethnic *tolerance*, however, are consistently linked to various measures: the less they are loyal towards the government (in Tbilisi and Baku), the less they endorse elitist attitudes (in

Yerevan and Tbilisi), the more they read the foreign media (in Yerevan), and the less they feel deprived and powerless (in Baku), the more *ethnically tolerant* respondents are.

**Table 5 :** Zero-order correlations between predictor variables (factor scores) as a function of national contexts

		Personal insecurity	Government loyalty	Active participation	Info source: Private & informal	Elitism	Relative Deprivation	Info source: Foreign media	Info source: National media	Empowerment
<b>Trust in nation state</b>	Georgia	.04	.20**	-.02	-.04	.09	-.18*	.03	.19**	.09
	Armenia	-.30**	.16*	-.01	.06	.16*	-.21**	-.04	.01	-.12
	Azerbaijan	-.28**	.41**	.24**	-.19*	.12	-.31**	-.09	.15*	-.04
<b>Corruption, poverty &amp; unrest</b>	Georgia	.14	-.25**	.13	.10	-.14*	.00	-.27**	.07	-.24**
	Armenia	.15*	-.07	.10	.11	-.21**	.22**	-.09	.12	.06
	Azerbaijan	.40**	.14*	-.24**	.34**	.03	.19*	-.06	-.05	-.32**
<b>Pro-Russian orient.</b>	Georgia	.11	.04	-.02	-.19**	-.02	.02	.09	-.09	.07
	Armenia	.04	.08	-.10	-.03	.03	-.06	-.04	.06	-.19**
	Azerbaijan	.30**	-.05	-.28**	.13	.08	.34**	.00	-.19**	-.32**
<b>Ethnocentrism</b>	Georgia	.14	.02	.22**	-.01	.11	-.01	-.06	.21**	-.05
	Armenia	-.07	.09	.10	-.02	-.18**	.07	.05	-.01	-.07
	Azerbaijan	.04	.04	.05	.14	.09	.14	.10	-.23**	-.13
<b>Personal ethnic tolerance</b>	Georgia	.05	-.25**	.04	-.09	-.08	-.02	.09	.01	-.01
	Armenia	-.11	.07	-.04	.13*	-.23**	-.07	.24**	.09	-.05
	Azerbaijan	-.12	-.31**	.20**	-.10	-.39**	-.29**	.05	.17*	.23**
<b>National identity threat</b>	Georgia	.27**	.06	-.01	-.20**	.14	.05	.04	.14	.13
	Armenia	.16*	-.01	.08	.16*	.07	-.03	.12	-.08	.16*
	Azerbaijan	.12	-.10	.06	-.20**	-.20**	-.22**	-.04	.19*	.15*
<b>Categorical differences</b>	Georgia	.05	.01	.00	.10	.07	.04	.14	.05	.02
	Armenia	.04	-.05	.14*	-.10	-.11	.08	.03	-.06	.04
	Azerbaijan	.16*	-.07	.17*	.05	-.11	-.13	.15*	.01	.02
<b>Private poverty explanation</b>	Georgia	-.18*	.08	-.05	.00	.19**	-.17*	.13	.01	.13
	Armenia	-.10	.05	.01	-.06	-.01	-.06	.23**	-.04	-.05
	Azerbaijan	.32**	.08	.08	.23**	.45**	.08	.19**	-.35**	-.01
<b>Pro-Western orient.</b>	Georgia	-.05	-.03	.10	-.09	.04	.02	.17*	.09	-.06
	Armenia	-.09	.08	.05	.04	-.09	-.05	.03	.07	.13*
	Azerbaijan	.07	.07	-.11	.17*	.22**	-.12	-.13	-.12	-.06

*Note:* \*\* =  $p < .01$ , \* =  $p < .05$ , significant correlations at  $p < .01$  are highlighted.

*National identity threat* is positively linked to personal insecurity: the more they feel insecure, the more respondents worry about the national symbolic cohesion (especially in Tbilisi). Subjective knowledge and personal efficacy are also consistently associated with perceived threat to the nation, although quite weakly.

*Private blaming* of individuals and families for poverty is common when respondents feel insecure in Baku. In Tbilisi, however, feelings common among relatively privileged positions in society (characterised with less insecurity and lower levels of relative deprivation) are linked to the blaming of individuals and families for their own poor fate. Such explanations are therefore also linked to elitist thinking in Tbilisi, and even more so in Baku, but not in Yerevan. A *pro-Western orientation* is linked to elitist thinking in Baku.

## Organising the dependent variables

### *Political organisation*

The second stage of the comparative analysis involved the definition of the dependent variables, that is, the attitudes and opinions we wish to explain with the predictor variables defined in the two previous factor analyses. According to the model of lay conceptions of citizenship, perceptions of current social relations and antagonisms (how relations *are* organised), together with various everyday experiences, should determine to a large extent the construction of attitudes towards desired policies, that is, how “relations *should* be organised”. Therefore, we focus on various policy proposals as dependent variables.

A first principal component analysis was performed on twelve items suggesting different ways to organise relations between ethnic and national groups within a nation-state. These items define the status granted by respondents to the national majority group, and its relation to various national minority groups. The analysis extracted three factors accounting for 46.36% of the variance, each defined with four items.

The first factor featured policies that favour the national majority, and explicitly state the goal of assimilation into the majority culture, especially with majority language policies. We therefore termed this factor *Ethnocentric system*.

The second factor was mostly characterised with the repression of opposition, irrespective of ethnic group membership (although the fourth item on this factor was

ethnically defined, its loading was weak, and almost as high as on the first, ethnic factor). This factor was called *Authoritarian rule*.

**Table 6 :** Principal components analysis (after Varimax rotation) on political organisation items (N = 643)

	Ethnocentric system	Authoritarian rule	Pluralist system	Communality
All people living in GAA: should understand and speak GAA	.76		.24	.63
Government : Favour use of single language	.75		.17	.59
Only GAA'ans should decide how to rule GAA	.64		-.30	.51
Nationality / Ethnicity : should be declared in passport	.43	.39		.34
Political organisation : Single party open for everyone rules without opposition	-.14	.77		.62
Approve government prohibiting political activities of opposition		.77		.59
Political organisation : One group rules over others, people who don't accept this should be quiet or leave	.13	.47	-.18	.27
GAA'ans : more rights than other nationalities	.42	.45	-.10	.39
Ethnic diversity : makes country culturally richer and more interesting			.74	.55
GAA : common house for many ethnic groups	.11		.62	.40
Ethnic groups : Accept each other as they are and respect mutual rights	-.22	-.19	.56	.40
In conflicts : All sides should seek compromise			.51	.27
<i>Variance %</i>	16.80	15.08	14.48	
<b>Georgia</b>	.32a	-.18ab	-.21a	
<b>Armenia</b>	-.08b	.16ac	-.26a	
<b>Azerbaijan</b>	-.22b	-.02a	.54b	
<i>F(2, 640)</i>	16.5***	6.3**	47.2***	

*Note:* KMO = .68; loadings < .10 are not displayed; significant factor scores differences between contexts (at  $p < .001$ ) are highlighted. Factor score means sharing different subscripts differ at  $p < .05$  (Tukey post-hoc test).

\*\*\* =  $p < .001$ , \*\* =  $p < .01$ , \* =  $p < .05$

The third factor was defined with policies supporting ethnic diversity and tolerance. Common themes of such policies are cultural richness, mutual respect and compromising to solve conflicts. This factor was termed *Pluralist system*.

Factor score differences between the countries show that Baku respondents are clearly more in favour of *Pluralism*, compared to both other samples. Georgians, however, scored higher than both other groups on the *Ethnocentrism* scale. A smaller, but

nevertheless significant difference was evidenced for the *Political dominance* attitude, more endorsed by Armenians than Georgians, the Azeris being in-between.

### ***Government responsibility***

The second factor analysis organised nine items on *preferred government goals and methods* (Table 7). Three factors were extracted with an eigenvalue above 1, totalling 55.39% of the variance. The first factor grouped together government goals related to equality before the law, a guarantee of workers' salaries, and territorial integrity of the nation. These aspects can be seen as basic and general responsibilities leading to citizen equality, and which one would expect from any efficient and protective state. We therefore call this factor *Protective state*.

The second factor featured policies aimed at providing social security through tax increases, enforcing law through larger police rights and the fight against corruption with less private enterprise. Although a clear-cut interpretation of the factor is not obvious, it seems to be poised between institutions pertaining to an *Interventionist state* that upholds citizen's social rights and social justice on the one hand, and government institutions that can potentially be controlled by the national majority in order to provide them with privileges (social security system, police, state-controlled economic system) on the other.

The third factor is more straightforward: the government should be given the right to introduce martial law, censor newspapers, and reinstate death penalty. These items are concerned with the maintenance of social order. Therefore, this factor was called *Disciplinary state*.

National context differences show that Armenian respondents are most clearly in favour of the disciplinary role of the government, whereas the Georgians were most opposed to it, the Azeris being in-between. Baku respondents mostly supported state efficiency, compared to both other groups. Economic and social justice was most advocated by Armenians, although the difference compared to Georgians and Azeris was non-significant. It should be noted that Georgians have the most negative loadings on all three factors, suggesting that they feel that the government is not up to handle any of these tasks. These results confirm that Georgians have the lowest levels of trust in whatever the government is doing.

**Table 7** : Principal components analysis (after Varimax rotation) on government responsibility items (N = 640)

	Protective state (Basic responsibilities)	Interventionist state (Majority institutions)	Disciplinary state (Social order)	Communitary
Government goal: Ensure equality before the law	.85			.72
Government goal: Guarantee that workers' salaries are paid	.82			.68
Government goal: Ensure territorial integrity of the nation	.81			.67
Government goal: Invest in social security (pensions), raise taxes	.13	.72	-.13	.56
Government goal: Enforce law by enlarging police rights		.67	.28	.53
Government goal: Fight corruption with less privatisation		.66	.10	.45
Government method: Martial law		.17	.71	.54
Government method: Censorship of newspapers			.68	.47
Government goal: Death penalty for the most violent criminals	.12		.59	.37
Variance %	23.28	16.27	15.84	
<b>Georgia</b>	-.17a	-.09	-.40a	
<b>Armenia</b>	-.07a	.14	.32b	
<b>Azerbaijan</b>	.26b	-.09	-.01c	
F(2, 637)	10.3***	3.8*	30.5***	

Note: KMO = .67; loadings < .10 are not displayed; significant factor scores differences between contexts (at  $p < .001$ ) are highlighted. Factor score means sharing different subscripts differ at  $p < .05$  (Tukey post-hoc test).

\*\*\* =  $p < .001$ , \*\* =  $p < .01$ , \* =  $p < .05$

### ***Ethnic citizenship, Religious tolerance, Womens' participation and Liberal democracy***

Finally, we also used four composite scores (described in Table 2) as dependent variables: *Ethnic citizenship*, *Religious tolerance*, *Women's participation* and *Liberal democracy*. These four variables denote a variety of policies organising relationships between social groups, namely between ethnic and religious groups, as well as between men and women. Liberal democracy defines relationships in terms of outcomes and procedures (justice and law). Table 8 gives the means and standard deviations for each of these four measures as a function of national context (Ethnic citizenship data were not collected in Azerbaijan).



Results reveal no difference between Tbilisi and Yerevan respondents concerning their attitude towards Ethnic citizenship, both values being somewhat below the scale midpoint (2.50). Religious tolerance strongly polarises attitudes of Baku and Yerevan respondents, the latter being religiously intolerant. Tbilisi respondents are in-between. Azeris support also more than Georgians and Armenians women's participation. Finally, attitudes towards the principle of liberal, procedural democracy are not differentiated between the three contexts, all of them providing high levels of support.

**Table 8 :** Attitudes towards Ethnic citizenship, Religious tolerance, Women's participation and Liberal democracy as a function of national contexts

		Ethnic citizenship	Religious tolerance	Women's participation	Liberal democracy
Georgia	m	2.17	2.39a	2.61a	3.48
	sd	.96	.93	.74	.70
Armenia	m	2.28	1.75b	2.60a	3.45
	sd	.83	.75	.73	.62
Azerbaijan	m	(data not available)	3.04c	2.96b	3.37
	sd		.77	.84	.75
		$F(1, 448) = 1.56, n.s.$	$F(2, 647) = 140.55^{***}$	$F(2, 647) = 14.65^{***}$	$F(2, 646) = 1.45, n.s.$

*Note:* Scales range from 1 (totally disagree) to 4 (totally agree); means sharing different subscripts differ at  $p < .05$  (Tukey post-hoc test).

\*\*\* =  $p < .001$ , \*\* =  $p < .01$ , \* =  $p < .05$

### Predicting attitudes towards political organisation in the three contexts

The final stage of the comparative analysis features a series of regression analyses destined to demonstrate how opinions towards citizenship policies are constructed. The ten variables described in the previous section (six factor scores and four composite scores) will be used as dependent variables. The analyses will be performed separately for each national context in order to highlight commonality and divergence, universalism and particularism, in opinion construction, that is, to evaluate to what extent respondents give the same reasons and justifications for their support of policies.

The first set of regression analyses was performed on the three factor scores presented in Table 6. The first factor, *Ethnocentric system*, favours a generalised dominant-language policy detrimental to national minorities. Table 9 gives the results with standardised regression coefficients to which significance levels are associated. Three categories of predictors are distinguished: Social anchoring, citizen self-perceptions and societal perceptions. No single predictor explains support for an ethnocentric political

system simultaneously across the three contexts. Not having travelled (in Armenia and Azerbaijan), perception of social conflicts due to poverty, crime and corruption (in Georgia and Armenia), and ethnocentric attitudes (in Georgia and Azerbaijan) contribute to support ethnic dominance of the national majority group. Moreover, Tbilisi respondents born outside the capital, those who are ready to actively participate in the political process, and those who perceive a threatened nation are likely to support ethnic majority rule. In Yerevan, loyalty with the government, elitist thinking, debating political issues and *not* paying attention to national media are linked to support of this form of political organisation. In Baku, women are more in favour of majority rule (keeping in mind that the other variables included in the model might be linked to gender differences and are controlled for in this regression model), but no self-perception effects are evidenced. Instead, Baku respondents who are intolerant, view Russia negatively, perceive large categorical discrepancies, endorse private poverty explanations and reject Western help are likely to support Azeri majority rule. It is noteworthy that explained variance is very high in Azerbaijan (all variables explain 52% of the individual differences in this opinion), and clearly lower in the other two contexts.

In order to assess judgement similarity between the three contexts, we computed correlations between the three series of regression coefficients. A strong positive correlation indicates similarity in opinion construction between two contexts, that is, respondents can be said to give similar reasons for their opinions, or their opinions are linked to similar determinants. When the correlation is close to zero, no links are evidenced in the opinion construction in two contexts. When the correlation is negative, predictors have opposite effects: whereas in one context a given factor contributes to support a given policy, in another context the same factor contributes to reject the policy. As far as opinions towards ethno-linguistic dominance are concerned, different factors seem to account for the opinions of Armenians and Georgians (the correlation is close to zero), whereas Azeri opinion construction is weakly linked to the other two contexts (two slightly positive correlations).

**Table 9** : Regression analysis (standardised beta coefficients) on three forms of political organisation (factor scores), as a function of national contexts

	<i>Ethnocentric system</i>			<i>Authoritarian rule</i>			<i>Pluralist system</i>		
	<i>Geo</i>	<i>Ar</i>	<i>Az</i>	<i>Geo</i>	<i>Ar</i>	<i>Az</i>	<i>Geo</i>	<i>Ar</i>	<i>Az</i>
<i>N</i>	181	250	183	181	250	183	181	250	183
<b>Social anchoring</b>									
Sex (female +)	.13	.01	.20**	.12	.10	.19**	.20**	.05	.01
Birth place (Capital +)	-.15*	-.05	.10	-.17*	-.14*	-.17*	.09	.01	.17*
Age (over 20 +)	.03	.09	.03	.01	.00	.07	.10	.00	.09
Travel (Yes +)	.05	-.15*	-.21**	-.11	.03	-.35***	.15	-.04	-.03
<b>Citizen self-perceptions</b>									
Personal insecurity	-.08	.12	-.11	.00	.05	-.04	.08	.18**	-.03
Government loyalty	.02	.13*	-.02	.04	.16**	.10	-.05	.09	-.09
Active participation	.16*	.10	.05	-.09	-.21**	-.15*	.13	-.06	.01
Info source: priv. & informal	.05	.16*	-.03	.07	.13*	.15*	-.01	.06	.15*
Elitism	-.09	.15*	.11	-.02	.04	.26**	.07	-.16*	.07
Relative Deprivation	.02	.07	-.09	-.04	-.03	-.09	-.06	-.08	.02
Info source: Foreign media	-.05	.00	-.03	.13	-.16**	.06	.00	-.04	-.01
Info source: National media	.01	-.17**	.01	-.07	-.11	-.13	.05	.11	-.01
Empowerment	.00	.04	.01	-.06	-.05	-.08	-.03	.04	.06
<b>Societal perceptions</b>									
Trust in nation state	.01	.01	-.04	.08	.08	-.22*	.25**	.16*	.48***
Corruption, poverty, unrest	.17*	.21**	-.06	-.11	.04	-.10	.05	.23***	.12
Pro-Russian Orientation	.05	-.06	-.36***	.13	.10	-.12	.10	.03	.01
Ethnocentrism	.21**	-.07	.17*	-.02	.07	.02	.06	-.04	.01
Personal ethnic tolerance	-.08	-.13	-.35***	-.29***	-.05	-.01	.22**	-.03	.52***
National identity threat	.19*	-.12	-.19**	.15*	.15*	-.01	-.21**	-.25***	-.05
Categorical differences	.09	-.08	.19**	-.08	-.21**	.23**	.17*	.17**	.09
Private poverty explanation	.00	.06	.23**	.06	.15*	-.34***	-.08	.04	-.11
Pro-Western orientation	-.10	.01	-.24***	-.05	-.04	.29***	-.05	.26***	.24**
<b>Adjusted R<sup>2</sup></b>	<b>.17</b>	<b>.21</b>	<b>.52</b>	<b>.16</b>	<b>.21</b>	<b>.35</b>	<b>.20</b>	<b>.26</b>	<b>.29</b>
r (22) Geo - Ar		-.02			.52*			.26	
r (22) Geo - Az		.19			.14			.52*	
r (22) Ar - Az		.25			-.05			.25	

*Note* : Geo: Georgia, Ar: Armenia, Az: Azerbaijan; beta coefficients significant at:  $p < .05$  are highlighted ; Citizenship measures and Societal perceptions are factor scores orthogonalised for the whole sample;  $r(22)$  denotes correlation between beta coefficients for the three pairs of countries;

\*\*\* =  $p < .001$ , \*\* =  $p < .01$ , \* =  $p < .05$

The second analysis was performed on *Authoritarian rule*, chiefly defined with repression and control over political opposition. It can therefore be seen as a neo-communist, but not soviet option that is independent of ethnic membership, but applied within the boundaries of the current nation-states. A single common factor is evidenced: in all three contexts, respondents born outside the capital are significantly more in favour of this form of political organisation. The unwillingness to actively participate, debating and discussing political information, and feelings of national identity threat are also consistently linked to support for authoritarian dominance. Moreover, ethnic intolerance predicts support for authoritarianism for Tbilisi respondents; in Yerevan, government loyalty, rejection of foreign media, perception of small categorical differences and private poverty explanations are in line with political dominance; in Baku, finally, women and students who have not travelled, as well as those who endorse elitist thinking, distrust the current nation-state, perceive large differences between social categories, reject poverty explanations and accept Western help are in favour of a neo-communist political organisation. The correlations show that Georgians and Armenians have a similar reasoning behind their attitudes towards political dominance, whereas the Azeri opinions seem to be independent of the other two contexts.

Thus, opinion construction towards both ethnic and political dominance is largely unrelated to feelings of relative deprivation and personal dissatisfaction with concrete, material aspects of their everyday lives. Instead, symbolic factors, that is, perceptions of social antagonisms, feelings of identity threat, and explanations of social phenomena (e.g. poverty) play a more important role in determining attitudes towards dominance. Furthermore, a birthplace outside the capital and the absence of foreign travel experience go along with support for models of either ethnic or political dominance. These latter two factors might also reflect status differences; if this is true, low status members of the national majorities are more likely to support either form of dominance. Debates and private discussions, rejection of national media (although weakly) as well as personal ethnic intolerance contribute to support forms of dominance. A few major differences characterise opinion construction towards these two forms of dominance: an ethnocentric system seems to be positively linked to active participation, whereas political dominance is associated with rejection of citizen involvement; and perception of social conflicts seems to lead more easily to a desire for ethnic dominance (perhaps because national minorities are seen as the cause of social unrest and conflict) than to support for authoritarian, ethnicity-neutral dominance.

The third regression model analyses opinion construction towards a *pluralist system*, defined with appreciation of ethnic diversity, respect and compromise. Various commonalities can be observed: most importantly, trust in the current nation state clearly contributes to support pluralism in all contexts. Personal ethnic tolerance (in Tbilisi and Baku), rejection of a national identity threat, recognition of categorical differences (both in Tbilisi and Yerevan) and a pro-western orientation (in Yerevan and Baku) all contribute to favourable attitudes towards ethnic pluralism. Moreover, in Tbilisi women are more in favour of pluralism. In Yerevan, personal insecurity and perception of social conflicts as well as rejection of elitist thinking go along with support for a pluralist system. In Baku, finally, respondents born in the capital and those discussing political information uphold ethnic pluralism. The correlation analyses generally show somewhat higher convergence between contexts compared to either form of domination, especially between Azeri and Georgian respondents.

### **Predicting attitudes towards government responsibility in the three contexts**

Three factor scores were used as indicators of different forms of government responsibility (see Table 7), and integrated in the regression models as dependent variables. The first model analyses opinion construction towards a *Protective state* and basic government responsibilities that are supposed to guarantee equal treatment of all citizens irrespective of their group memberships (concerning equality before the law, salary payment and territorial integrity). Results (Table 10) show that no sociological or self-perceptual characteristics account for opinions towards state efficiency; only Azeri respondents who have not travelled tend to be more opposed to basic government responsibility. Societal perceptions, present a fairly convergent pattern: in Tbilisi and Yerevan, perception of corruption, poverty and unrest and high levels of ethnocentrism predict support for basic state functions. In Tbilisi, dismissal of private poverty explanations goes also along with state support. Feelings of a threatened nation lead to rejection of basic state functions, especially in Yerevan and Baku, whereas only in Baku does personal ethnic tolerance lead to state support. The correlations between the predictive patterns of the three contexts show a reasonable level of convergence, all of them being significantly positive.

**Table 10** : Regression analysis (standardised beta coefficients) on three types of government responsibility (factor scores), as a function of national contexts

	<b>Protective state</b> (Basic responsibilities)			<b>Interventionist state</b> (Majority institutions)			<b>Disciplinary state</b> (Social order)		
	<b>Geo</b>	<b>Ar</b>	<b>Az</b>	<b>Geo</b>	<b>Ar</b>	<b>Az</b>	<b>Geo</b>	<b>Ar</b>	<b>Az</b>
<i>N</i>	183	250	183	183	250	183	183	250	183
<b>Social anchoring</b>									
Sex (female +)	.10	-.03	.01	<b>.23**</b>	.04	.14	-.01	-.01	<b>.20**</b>
Birth place (Capital +)	-.08	-.05	-.04	.06	-.01	.11	-.07	-.09	<b>-.19*</b>
Age (over 20 +)	.01	-.01	.11	-.01	-.03	.10	<b>-.14*</b>	.01	.07
Travel (Yes +)	.13	.00	<b>-.24**</b>	.02	.10	-.08	-.03	-.04	-.05
<b>Citizen self-perceptions</b>									
Personal insecurity	.06	-.01	.14	.06	<b>.25***</b>	.06	-.01	.10	-.05
Government loyalty	.02	.04	-.01	<b>.18*</b>	-.10	.05	.11	<b>.15*</b>	.05
Active participation	.11	.04	.12	.01	.04	.05	.02	<b>-.13*</b>	-.05
Info source: priv. & informal	.12	-.03	.04	.07	<b>.20**</b>	<b>-.18*</b>	-.02	<b>.14*</b>	<b>.19*</b>
Elitism	-.07	-.07	-.16	-.12	<b>.17**</b>	-.14	.12	.11	.01
Relative Deprivation	-.05	-.05	-.03	.06	<b>.16*</b>	-.13	.09	-.10	.07
Info source: Foreign media	.08	-.09	-.01	.03	.04	<b>.18*</b>	.03	-.09	<b>.18*</b>
Info source: National media	.02	-.04	-.03	-.05	<b>-.16*</b>	.04	.14	.02	-.08
Empowerment	-.02	.07	-.09	-.08	-.08	-.01	.11	-.10	-.06
<b>Societal perceptions</b>									
Trust in nation state	-.05	.10	.14	.04	.11	-.01	.10	.05	-.04
Corruption, poverty, unrest	<b>.19*</b>	<b>.32***</b>	.06	.13	.03	<b>.27**</b>	.05	.08	-.15
Pro-Russian Orientation	-.11	.03	-.13	.13	.03	-.10	.11	<b>.14*</b>	.01
Ethnocentrism	<b>.18*</b>	<b>.15*</b>	.09	<b>.16*</b>	.10	<b>.19*</b>	-.14	.05	.06
Personal ethnic tolerance	.11	.09	<b>.24*</b>	<b>-.19*</b>	-.10	-.05	-.14	.10	<b>-.28**</b>
National identity threat	-.07	<b>-.20**</b>	<b>-.22*</b>	<b>.21**</b>	.04	<b>.26**</b>	.12	.10	.02
Categorical differences	.06	.06	.08	-.04	-.09	.08	-.01	-.10	-.04
Private poverty explanation	<b>-.16*</b>	.04	-.07	.12	-.04	-.16	.04	<b>.17**</b>	.17
Pro-Western orientation	-.01	.08	-.06	<b>.17*</b>	<b>.15*</b>	.12	<b>-.26**</b>	-.07	.03
<b>Adjusted R<sup>2</sup></b>	<b>.18</b>	<b>.18</b>	<b>.15</b>	<b>.17</b>	<b>.14</b>	<b>.26</b>	<b>.21</b>	<b>.16</b>	<b>.24</b>
r (22) Geo - Ar		.43*			.25			.21	
r (22) Geo - Az		.44*			.40			.08	
r (22) Ar - Az		.45*			-.16			.12	

*Note* : Geo: Georgia, Ar: Armenia, Az: Azerbaijan; beta coefficients significant at:  $p < .05$  are highlighted; Citizenship measures and Societal perceptions are factor scores orthogonalised for the whole sample;  $r(22)$  denotes correlation between beta coefficients for the three pairs of countries;

\*\*\* =  $p < .001$ , \*\* =  $p < .01$ , \* =  $p < .05$

Attitudes towards *an interventionist state* with institutions that can potentially be controlled by the majority groups are analysed in the second regression set. A convergent pattern seems to predict support for such policies, at least in Baku and Tbilisi: ethnocentric attitudes, personal intolerance and feelings of national threats lead to support of redistribution and anti-corruption policies. As ethnocentric attitudes are clearly more strongly linked to the support of this form of government responsibility than any “materialist” attitudes, these results confirm our interpretation that these institutions might be seen as potential devices to grant privileges to the national majorities, particularly in Georgia and Azerbaijan. Moreover, it might also be an indication that respondents perceive members of non-national groups to be benefiting most of corruptive activities. In Tbilisi, women as well as persons who are loyal to the government and accept Western help are also more likely to support these policies. In Baku, on the other hand, avoiding political discussions, being informed by foreign (Russian) media and especially perceiving social conflicts contributes to support majority-controllable institutions. In Yerevan, opinions seem to follow a different logic. Respondents support basic government functions when they feel insecure and deprived, when they ignore national media and instead discuss political information, and when they endorse elitist thinking and accept Western help. Thus, in Armenia opinions seem to be more determined by the personal situation than by perceptions of group relationships within the country. The correlations between the predictors reflect a link between Georgia and Azerbaijan and to a lesser extent between Georgia and Armenia, whereas a weak negative correlation is found between Armenian and Azeri response patterns.

The third set of regression analyses was performed on the support for *Disciplinary functions* of the government (martial law, censorship, death penalty). A first glance at the results reveals little convergence between the contexts. In Tbilisi, support for strong disciplinary measures is more easily accepted by the younger respondents and by those who endorse an anti-Western orientation. In Yerevan, this support is linked to government loyalty, rejection of active participation, and political discussions. A positive orientation towards Russia and private poverty explanations also contribute to defend disciplinary policies. In Baku, women and respondents born outside the capital back such policies, but also those who participate in political discussions and are informed by foreign media. Ethnic intolerance strongly predicts support for a disciplinary government in Baku. All pattern correlations are weak.

## Correlations between attitudes towards government responsibility and political organisation

In order to gain a clearer picture of the meaning attributed to these three forms of government responsibility, we computed correlations between dependent variables. Table 11 shows the correlations between the three factor scores of government responsibility and the three political organisation scores.

Several results are striking. First, support for a protective and interventionist state is linked to support for an ethnocentric system (with the exception of Azerbaijan for the interventionist state). This suggests that by and large, “normal” government activities are easily seen as backing an ethnocentric system, especially in Georgia and Armenia. However, whereas the protective state is also consistently and strongly related to support for a pluralist system (even more so than to support for an ethnocentric system), it is unrelated to support for authoritarian rule. Put otherwise, ensuring basic services and rights (legal equality, salaries and territorial integrity) is compatible with an ethnocentric as well as with a pluralist system, but is negatively linked (although non-significantly) to authoritarian rule in all three contexts. In contrast, support for the interventionist state shows an opposite pattern, most clearly in Georgia: here, the interventionist state is associated to authoritarian rule, but is not linked to attitudes towards the pluralist system. Finally, as could be expected, support for disciplinary state is strongly linked to authoritarian rule. On the whole, these results seem to indicate that citizens are divided over concrete government activities should in the first place serve the national majorities, protect public order, or establish a pluralist society within national borders.

**Table 11:** Zero-order correlations between dependent variables (Government responsibility and political organization)

		Ethnocentric system	Authoritarian rule	Pluralist system
<b>Protective state</b> (Basic responsibilities)	Georgia	.29**	-.10	.30**
	Armenia	.17**	-.07	.40**
	Azerbaijan	.18*	-.06	.33**
<b>Interventionist state</b> (Majority institutions)	Georgia	.19**	.34**	-.05
	Armenia	.15*	.05	-.02
	Azerbaijan	-.24**	.25**	.32**
<b>Disciplinary state</b> (Social order)	Georgia	.06	.29**	-.10
	Armenia	.06	.54**	.06
	Azerbaijan	.25**	.34**	-.16*

*Note:* \*\* =  $p < .01$ , \* =  $p < .05$ , significant correlations at  $p < .01$  are highlighted.



### **Predicting attitudes towards ethnic citizenship, religious tolerance, women's participation and liberal democracy in the three contexts**

The final set of analyses was performed on four composite scores described in Table 2. Data for the first variable, *Ethnic citizenship*, were not collected in Azerbaijan. Results for Georgia and Armenia (Table 11) reveal substantial similarities, as evidenced in the high pattern correlation ( $r = .52$ ). Ethnic definitions of citizenship tend to be promoted in both contexts by feelings of deprivation (especially in Georgia), by rejection of elitist thinking (in Armenia), by trust in the institutions of the nation-state, by ethnic intolerance and by perceptions of a threatened nation. Moreover, in Yerevan women are more supportive of ethnic citizenship, and readiness for active participation also fosters ethnic citizenship.

*Religious tolerance* is most undoubtedly related to ethnic attitudes in all three contexts. Personal ethnic tolerance and rejection of ethnocentrism and of feelings of national threat all contribute to higher levels of religious tolerance. In Yerevan and Baku, religious tolerance is also predicted by personal insecurity (and also marginally by relative deprivation) as well as by the absence of perceptions of corruption, poverty and unrest. Moreover, in Tbilisi, older students are more supportive of religious tolerance. In Yerevan, on the other hand, respondents born in the capital uphold tolerance which is also fostered with feelings of powerlessness and incompetence as well as with private poverty explanations. In Baku, finally, respondents who have travelled abroad support religious tolerance, promoted also by readiness for active participation, elitist thinking, a pro-Russian orientation, refusal of private poverty explanations and acceptance of Western help. Pattern correlations are all clearly positive, indicating cross-national similarities in opinion construction.

In all three contexts, *Women's participation* is unmistakably defended by the women themselves. In Yerevan, this is the only clear effect. In Tbilisi, however, elitist thinking, national media consumption and ethnic tolerance are also linked to the support for women's involvement in the public sphere. Older students are also more likely to be supportive. In Baku, government loyalty, feelings of deprivation and rejection of national identity threat go along with the support for women's rights, as do participation in political debates and discussions and national media consumption. Again, all pattern correlations are markedly positive.

**Table 12** : Regression analysis (standardised beta coefficients) on attitudes towards Ethnic citizenship, Religious tolerance and Women's participation, as a function of national contexts

	<i>Ethnic citizenship</i>		<i>Religious tolerance</i>			<i>Women's participation</i>			<i>Liberal democracy</i>		
	<i>Geo</i>	<i>Ar</i>	<i>Geo</i>	<i>Ar</i>	<i>Az</i>	<i>Geo</i>	<i>Ar</i>	<i>Az</i>	<i>Geo</i>	<i>Ar</i>	<i>Az</i>
<i>N</i>	181	250	181	250	183	181	250	183	183	250	184
<b>Social anchoring</b>											
Sex (female +)	.05	.16*	.00	-.05	-.10	.39***	.31***	.31***	.09	.08	.00
Birth place (Capital +)	-.04	.00	.10	.15*	.06	.01	.03	.09	-.06	.04	.05
Age (over 20 +)	.03	.05	.23**	-.10	-.04	.14*	-.06	-.09	.09	-.03	.18*
Travel (Yes +)	-.08	.09	-.03	.04	.38***	.09	.02	-.12	-.01	-.01	-.01
<b>Citizen self-perceptions</b>											
Personal insecurity	.07	.14	.04	.22**	.20*	-.02	.08	-.08	.12	.04	.14
Government loyalty	.09	.04	.13	-.06	-.15	.12	-.04	.16*	-.07	.12*	.01
Active participation	.01	.13*	.13	.06	.18*	.08	.11	.08	.10	.08	.14
Info source: priv. & informal	-.12	.04	.00	.03	.01	-.09	.05	.23**	.09	.01	-.18*
Elitism	-.07	-.14*	.06	.04	.24**	.16*	.00	.08	-.09	-.12	-.12
Relative Deprivation	.22**	.09	-.02	.09	.11	-.01	.01	.30***	.06	-.03	.19*
Info source: Foreign media	-.06	-.10	.11	.01	.03	.03	.04	.03	.02	-.03	.00
Info source: National media	-.12	.01	.06	.10	-.01	.17*	.04	.19**	.04	.17**	-.21**
Empowerment	-.11	.03	-.05	-.17*	-.06	-.01	.12	-.08	.03	.04	-.03
<b>Societal perceptions</b>											
Trust in nation state	.12	.17*	.03	-.02	.00	-.07	-.11	.01	.08	.01	.45***
Corruption, poverty, unrest	-.11	-.02	-.01	-.17*	-.17*	.03	.04	-.06	.16*	.24***	-.04
Pro-Russian orientation	-.08	.11	-.01	-.09	.28**	.01	-.08	-.01	-.07	-.05	.00
Ethnocentrism	.05	.08	-.12	-.29***	-.12	.01	.13	-.01	.11	.22**	-.20*
Personal ethnic tolerance	-.14	-.26**	.19*	.24**	.25**	.21**	.11	.10	.10	-.12	.33**
National identity threat	.19*	.08	-.14	-.12	-.11	.04	.05	-.21**	-.09	-.10	-.29**
Categorical differences	-.02	.09	-.04	.10	-.03	.06	-.05	.01	.09	.00	.05
Private poverty explanation	.00	.02	-.02	.16*	-.20*	.02	-.07	.11	.10	-.05	-.16
Pro-Western orientation	.05	-.03	.14	.04	.20*	.00	.08	.08	.40***	.02	.10
<b>Adjusted R<sup>2</sup></b>	<b>.10</b>	<b>.09</b>	<b>.09</b>	<b>.14</b>	<b>.31</b>	<b>.19</b>	<b>.18</b>	<b>.43</b>	<b>.26</b>	<b>.14</b>	<b>.25</b>
r (22) Geo - Ar	.52*		.40			.49*			.27		
r (22) Geo - Az	-		.28			.31			.28		
r (22) Ar - Az	-		.44*			.25			-.20		

*Note* : Geo: Georgia, Ar: Armenia, Az: Azerbaijan; beta coefficients significant at:  $p < .05$  are highlighted; Citizenship measures and Societal perceptions are factor scores orthogonalised for the whole sample;  $r(22)$  notes correlation between beta coefficients for the three pairs of countries;

\*\*\* =  $p < .001$ , \*\* =  $p < .01$ , \* =  $p < .05$

Attitudes towards normative *Liberal democracy*, defined with a proceduralist, but quite abstract angle of law and justice, are determined by a complex pattern of predictors, with relatively little overlap between the contexts. On the whole, readiness for active participation, rejection of elitist thinking, personal insecurity and relative deprivation seem to promote support for liberal democracy, especially in Baku and Tbilisi. In Yerevan and Tbilisi, liberal democracy seems to be an answer to perceived corruption, poverty and unrest. National identity threats seems to hamper positive attitudes towards democracy, especially in Baku. In Tbilisi, a pro-Western orientation strongly predicts support for abstract democratic principles, whereas it is insignificant in the two other contexts. In Yerevan, however, government loyalty, national media consumption and ethnocentric attitudes go along with support for democracy. In Baku, finally, trust in current national institutions is the strongest predictor of supportive attitudes towards democracy. It is also linked to ethnic tolerance, to non-attendance in political debates and to rejection of national media; democratic principles are also more endorsed by older Azeri students.

# 7 Discussion and Conclusion

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The results of our survey on popular conceptions of citizenship in Georgia, Armenia and Azerbaijan are rich, even though we have restricted our data analysis on a strictly comparative perspective. The comparative analysis of popular conceptions of citizenship in the South Caucasus was carried out in three phases (see Doise et al., 1993<sup>35</sup>): First, we evidenced with factorial analysis the *common structure of attitudes* in the three contexts, which are the organising principles of popular conceptions of citizenship. Second, we compared the *differences between the three national samples* by studying their respective positions on a variety of factors that were used as indicators of lay conceptions of citizenship, including societal perceptions, feelings of insecurity, intergroup and ethnic attitudes, as well as attitudes towards government responsibility and different forms of political organisation. Third, we attempted to *explain citizenship related attitudes* towards concrete government policies and forms of political organisation, by studying their anchoring in societal perceptions, citizenship-relevant self-perceptions and personal characteristics of the participants.

## **Organising principles and societal perception model**

The two factor analyses on societal perceptions and citizenship related self-perceptions have yielded 18 factors. The results have shown that a limited number of these factors were consistently associated with attitudes towards government policies. We refer to these stable and recurrent policy predictors as *organising principles of popular conceptions of citizenship*.

One of the most important organising principles was a general sense of *trust in the current political system* and its authorities and institutions (e.g., president, government,

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<sup>35</sup> Although our empirical approach is derived from the three phase model of the study of social representations (Doise et al., 1993), it does not use all elements of this model (especially concerning analyses of the common field of representations).

parliament, courts, police, army, media). This sense of trust was closely linked to perceptions of basic human rights respect (e.g., stability, equality, access to education and healthcare, individual freedoms) in the respective countries. A second organising principle was the *perception of social conflicts* that occur between social groups (e.g., between the rich and the poor, between corrupt officials and the general population). The perception of such conflicts was clearly linked to the fear of disruptions of public order (e.g. violent criminality, upheavals). A third dimension along which attitudes were organised was defined with a series of intergroup attitudes, particularly concerning student's *relation to ethnic diversity*, perception of symbolic threats to the nation, and ethnocentrism. A fourth principle was a subjective evaluation of one's own situation in terms of sufficiency of material resources and physical security, giving rise to feelings of *relative deprivation and insecurity*. In other words, the individual positioning towards these four dimensions of attitudes determine the way citizenship is conceptualized and understood in everyday life.

A tentative link between these four main organising principles of citizenship attitudes and the societal perception model described earlier can now be proposed. Two of the organising principles, trust in authorities and ethnic attitudes, concern symbolic resources (identity, inclusion in the group as a respected member), and the two others, relative deprivation and social conflict, invoke material resources. Furthermore, relationship to authorities and relative deprivation (in the way it was measured in our study) relate to processes occurring within groups, whereas ethnic attitudes and social conflict address processes occurring between groups.

**Table 13:** Overview of organizing principles as a function of societal perception model

	<b>SYMBOLIC RESOURCES</b>	<b>MATERIAL RESOURCES</b>
<i>Within group relations</i>		
	<b>Trust in national authorities</b>	<b>Relative deprivation</b>
<u>Within group relations</u>	Nation-state	Family, close ingroups
<i>Between-group relations</i>		
	<b>Ethnic attitudes and prejudice</b>	<b>Social conflicts and inequalities</b>
<u>Between group relations</u>	Ethnic, religious groups	Rich vs. poor, elite vs. mass

Table 13 shows how the four cells are defined by the crossing of the two dimensions. *Trust in national authorities* concerns the relationship between the individual and the authorities and leaders of his or her national ingroup. Respect of civil rights and decent treatment by authorities is symbolic since it should lead to a sense of recognition as a “full” group member, that is, a citizen, independently of citizens’ material resources. *Relative deprivation* is defined with a sense of entitlement to material resources. While it can also be framed in terms of between-group (“fraternal”) deprivation (see Walker & Smith, 2002), we see relative deprivation here as the evaluation of the material situation of an individual and his or her immediate ingroups, typically the family. No intergroup comparisons are necessary to assess relative deprivation of the individual and his or her ingroup. *Ethnic attitudes and prejudice* are typical intergroup attitudes, as they concern judgements of outgroups to which the individual does not belong. Issues of tolerance are typically concerned with “difference”, rather than “status”. Finally, *social conflicts and inequalities* are defined with the perception of conflict between groups that can be traced back to material discrepancies between groups, for example between the rich and the poor, or the elite and the general population. This model suggests that predictors in each of the four cells are conceptually independent from each other, although they may empirically be related. On the whole, results support the organisation of predictors into this framework derived from the societal perception model (Staerklé et al., 2003).

### **Comparing positions of Georgian, Armenian and Azeri students on organising principles**

For the dimension of *Trust in national authorities*, results indicate that Georgian students were by far the most sceptical and reserved about virtually any of their government’s activity. They were less trusting of the government, perceived more rights violations, and were more disloyal to their government than Armenian and Azeri students. For this organising principle, no clear differences emerged between the latter two groups. Concerning the *Social conflicts and inequality* principle, Georgians and Armenians perceived more conflicts (corruption, poverty and unrest) than Azeris, and they also felt more than Azeris that their national identity was at risk because of a threatening ethnic diversity. Consequently, Azeris had consistently lower scores on the third organising principle, *Ethnic attitudes and prejudice*: they were generally less ethnocentric than the two other groups. Finally, and quite remarkably, no differences between the three countries

were observed on the fourth dimension, *Relative deprivation*. This last result suggests that students in these three countries do not experience different levels of discontent, relative deprivation and insecurity.

Concerning the support for different political systems, the overall picture suggests that Georgian students showed the highest support for an ethnocentric system, Armenians for an authoritarian rule of society, and Azeris for a pluralist system. Results also indicated that Armenians were most supportive of the disciplinary function of state institutions.

### **Convergences in the origins of opinions and attitudes**

Concerning the links between the two sets of organising principles, societal perceptions and self-perceptions, the most consistent results found across the three national contexts include a *negative link between relative deprivation and trust in national institutions*: the more people felt deprived and feared economic difficulties, the more pessimistic was their evaluation of perceived respect of rights and the less they trusted state authorities. *Relative deprivation, and the sense of personal insecurity and fragility, was positively linked to the feeling that national identity was at risk* because of ethnic diversity. Moreover, *government loyalty and elitist thinking were associated with ethnic intolerance*. It should be kept in mind, however, that factor scores originating from a principal components analysis with varimax rotation are by definition uncorrelated. We have thus certainly failed to evidence some relevant links between factors extracted out of the same analysis.

The analysis of links between organising principles and dependent variables reveals how perceptions of the society shape political attitudes. Here, results also show a mix between convergent and divergent links across the three contexts. Concerning political attitudes, a highly convergent result revealed that *trust in national institutions seems to be a prerequisite for support of a pluralist society* in all three contexts. Put otherwise, distrust of national authorities leads to opposition to a pluralist political organisation. This result is remarkable as it would have been plausible to expect the contrary: since national institutions tend to be controlled by majority members, trust in institutions could have been linked to support for an ethnocentric or authoritarian system. We need to stress, nevertheless, that there is a *clear difference between institutional trust and (“blind”) government loyalty*, the latter being more associated with ethnocentric and authoritarian attitudes, especially in Armenia.

*Support for ethnic nationalism was clearly linked to perceptions of social conflicts in terms of corruption, poverty and unrest in Armenia and Georgia. Support for authoritarian rule, however, was more linked to symbolic identity threats. Another difference between the two forms of political organisation is that active participation was linked to support for an ethnocentric system, whereas respondents who were unwilling to participate favoured an authoritarian society.* Interestingly, neither relative deprivation nor feelings of economic insecurity were, at least directly, associated with support for ethnocentric or authoritarian rule. More detailed analyses will show whether they exert an indirect influence on attitudes towards political organisations.

Thus, a considerable number of convergent predictors could be evidenced, some of them across the three contexts, and others across two out of three contexts. Yet, a large number of the significant links between the variables were also specific to the three contexts, indicating the particular situation in terms of ethnic relations and political structures within the countries. It must also be stressed that separate analyses on the countries would have yielded a somewhat different picture, especially concerning the factor structures. Future analyses will give a more precise picture of attitude construction on a within-country level.

### **Active and process-oriented citizenship**

We want to conclude this scientific report on the dynamics and contradictions between formal definitions and popular conceptions of citizenship with a few remarks on how a social-psychological perspective can shed light on processes that occur when societies are reorganised and boundaries between ethnic and national groups are redrawn or become blurred. The post-soviet South Caucasus is a terrain in which several processes at the heart of recent enlarged conceptions of citizenship intersect in complex and unique ways.

The survey results presented in this report attempted to provide a glimpse at how members of the “general population”, students in Georgia, Armenia and Azerbaijan in our case, position themselves towards these new citizenship issues. We tried to establish their political identities, by assessing trust in national institutions and studying affinities with a variety of political systems. New citizenship was framed in terms of dynamic social processes and citizen participation rather than status. We were therefore interested in different forms of participation in public life, ranging from more passive forms of media consumption to informal discussions and active, collective protest. Citizenship becomes



process, because participation implies claims to social change. Moreover, the extent to which people feel that they “have a say” in how things are going is linked to their perceived status as a respected member of the political community. But new citizenship also involves antagonism and conflict within the political community. Our approach was based on the idea that perceived antagonisms in society reveal specific visions of society, for example structured around distribution of material resources and power or around collective “identities” and perceived status as group members. Ethnic and religious prejudice, for example, is a manifestation of a societal representation organised around differences between groups. A comprehensive picture of lay conceptions of citizenship can only be sketched if these various elements can be drawn together in a plausible way.

But we have to be very cautious when looking at these results, not only because our sample consists of non-representative groups of students most of whom are members of titular majorities, or because we used questionnaires in three different languages. Another aspect is that transposing into the south Caucasian context citizenship concepts chiefly defined in the context of Western liberal democracies is at the very least not a straightforward task. It is indeed a delicate undertaking to try to understand how survey respondents assign meanings to abstract citizenship concepts such as “participation”, “trust”, “identity”, “right”, “change”, “protest” or “claim”. In the West, for example, there tends to be a positive connotation to “participation”, the problem at stake being that citizens are too passive, and “not participating”. But participation can take on many forms, especially in contexts where political structures are fragile. Thus, for example, involvement in violent ethnic conflicts is also “participation”, in which case the normative goal would switch from encouraging participation to preventing participation. In both cases, however, participation remains an important ingredient of popular conceptions of citizenship. A similar case could be made for “social change”, a concept usually associated with progressive and egalitarian change in the West. The change can nevertheless also be interpreted as a backward change intended to revive idealised conceptions of the past, such as ethnic homogeneity or all encompassing state institutions. Such examples of ambiguous meanings of abstracts concepts are of course not specific to the South Caucasus, but can easily also be found in the West, for example when right-wing groups advocate group rights for supposedly disadvantaged national majorities. They nevertheless illustrate the importance of taking into account what “lies behind the words” when studying popular conceptions of citizenship.

### **Toward a post-soviet citizenship?**

Notwithstanding such conceptual difficulties, we want to hint at some differences between the idealized, western-born conception of active citizenship and with what may be considered an emerging pattern of post-soviet citizenship conceptions. As a preliminary and tentative attempt, we sketch a few striking features of the popular conceptions of citizenship in the South Caucasus which emerged from our data. If and to what extent such results reflect a prototypical conception of citizenship born out of the post-soviet or post-communist experience needs yet to be investigated.

A striking result of our research is that popular citizenship conceptions of young members of the titular majority present a high degree of convergence as far as their support for democratic governance principles (political pluralism, change of power through elections) and rejection of ethnocentric, authoritarian, and one-party systems is concerned. Thus, after ten years of post-communist socialization to which these students have been exposed, and despite rather different political regimes and dissimilar ethnic and religious compositions of the three countries, students in all three contexts show a high acceptance of the normative scheme of democracy and believe that basic civil rights should be granted to all citizens and protected by the state. Such answers reflect the fact that these countries have adopted, after the breakdown of the Soviet Union, constitutions and legal frameworks in which such liberal-democratic principles are stressed.

But much like there is a gap between these principles and their implementation on the national and political level, a similar gap can also be found on a representational level. In people's thinking, formal agreements with democratic principles does not necessarily lead to their concrete application in political attitudes. Thus, a substantial proportion (although rarely a majority) also thinks that democracy is only a "Western cliché" that "does not fit our culture and mentality", that titular majorities should decide how to rule the country and be entitled to more rights, or that prohibition of oppositional activities and the introduction of martial law to protect the government's ability to govern is acceptable.

These examples show that endorsement of democratic values is not always translated into policy attitudes compatible with liberal-democratic ideals. Even though the same can certainly also be said of Western national populations (e.g., concerning sympathy with racist movements), the gap seems to be wider in South Caucasian countries. The normative support of liberal democracy is contrasted by the tendency to justify the exclusion of religious, and, to a lesser degree, ethnic minorities from inclusion and

participation, for example when tiny “imported” religious minority groups such as Jehovah’s Witnesses, radical Islamic or evangelical groups are perceived as *the* major threat to national identity and security, and strong repression of them is advocated.

Our survey has provided a range of results that are relevant for understanding the nature of this gap between “good intentions and bad outcomes”. Thus, while expectations towards the state are high (for example regarding job security), trust in state institutions and authorities which are supposed to put into effect these expectations are devastatingly low. Citizens perceive the respective governments of the South Caucasus as highly corrupt and inefficient, especially when the state is understood in its function as a provider of social services. Moreover, this distrust is expressed towards both pro-governmental and oppositional parties alike. The results have shown that the gap becomes wider when people experience relative deprivation and material discontent which subsequently gives rise to lower levels of trust in state institutions and authorities. As a consequence they are also less likely to support an ethnically pluralist political system. A high level of perceived corruption and social disorder, however, seems to lead to two opposing outcomes, that is, either to support for an ethnocentric system and more prejudiced attitudes, or to support for a pluralist system and liberal democratic principles.

Perhaps even more importantly for democratic governance, results revealed large variations in people’s opinions that were captured in the societal perception model. The attitudes citizens expressed towards particular policies were chiefly determined with their level of trust in national institutions and authorities, with their level of material discontent, with their attitudes towards other ethnic groups and with the perception of social conflicts.

On the whole, then, these results revealed that the young generation of the South Caucasus, at the beginning of the 21<sup>st</sup> century, shows clear support for liberal democratic principles. It is equally apparent, though, that their conceptions of citizenship bear relicts from Soviet times, most notably in the relative importance they attach to social rights, compared to civil and political rights as well as to democratic participation. Furthermore, for many students an ethnic definition of citizenship seems to be perfectly compatible with democratic principles.

One should not forget, however, the context in which these processes occur. The break-up of the Soviet Union has left a huge symbolic void for citizens who have lost well-established references and familiar guiding principles for their lives. The resulting conflicts and the disintegration of efficient state structures have led to a precarious stability and a fragile and volatile social order. Low levels of political efficacy and feelings of anger and

distrust are hardly surprising in such an environment. The hope for the future is that these feelings, perceptions and attitudes will serve the development of stable and peaceful societies in which principles of an active, inclusive and democratic citizenship are upheld. Future research needs to study in more detail the social-psychological underpinnings of the current gap between agreement with good intentions and incompatible outcomes. Hopefully, our research was a step in this direction.

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# 9 APPENDIX

## 9.1 Comments on the results from national perspectives

### 9.1.1 Preliminary remarks

*Christian Staerklé & Carine Bachmann*

Soon after we had carried out the first set of data analyses, we gave a short results report to the three national research teams. This report consisted mainly of raw country means and a series of factor analyses that showed the structure of the data, for each country separately, and also for the whole sample (see Appendix). We asked the teams to freely comment on these results, and to provide a results report written from the perspective of their respective countries.

The following section features these three national reports in their original, unaltered form. They give an idea about the complexity and the richness of an analysis of popular conceptions of citizenship in three national contexts. The three reports are written in somewhat different styles, and they focus on different results. We can assume that the choice of the presented and commented results reflects the most interesting and sometimes maybe the most controversial issues in each of the three contexts. It is for this reason that interpretations of the local research teams are invaluable for a contextualised understanding of the dynamics of popular citizenship.

The downside of this open strategy is that some caution should be exercised when drawing conclusions on the basis of the various interpretations of the data. Some claims and comments would need to be statistically confirmed in order to be tenable, and others appear to be somewhat selective. Therefore it is best to look at these national reports as commentaries, rather than as formal descriptions of results.

In the Georgian commentary, two paragraphs concerning data collection (irrelevant to data interpretation) have been deleted. In the Armenian commentary, only the passages that bear on the results have been reproduced.

The data to which these three national reports refer are presented after the reports.

### 9.1.2 Notes on the results of the quantitative survey: The Georgian national perspective

*By Ghia Nodia and Nana Sumbadze*

1. Very interesting results, in the two ways – the national pictures, and divergences within the region. Of course, it is risky to draw too far-reaching conclusions from these small samples of student opinion, but still the differences are quite obvious. I do not know how much other comparative research like that had been made before, it would be interesting to compare, but I have not seen anything published.
2. I am not an empirical asocial researcher and I am not good at statistical methods. But I discussed the matter with Dr. Nana Sumbadze and I will be able to present certain major findings and conclusions.
3. [...] (*technical note*)
4. [...] (*technical note*)
5. Firstly, what is striking about Georgians is the highest ratio of insecurity. Georgians have the highest level of agreement with statements like “Be a very insecure and dangerous country for its citizens, because of high levels of criminality and violence”, “Most likely to be aggressed from the outside (like Russia)”, “Witness serious conflicts between national or religious groups”, “Witness serious social upheavals, because people are more and more dissatisfied with their living conditions”, most likely to “Become a victim of violent criminal actions”, they give the lowest rating to “Stability, security and public order” in their country. The explanation lies on the surface: Georgia is the most internally instable country, there is the most real danger of an external aggression – as the recent Russian bombing confirmed, the highest probability of social upheavals, and quite high rates of crime. At least, these are the issues very widely discussed in the media.
6. Georgians are also support the highest level of freedom and are least likely to accept repression from the state. They are the least likely to support such measures as “Limit personal freedoms in order to ensure order and stability”, “Reinstate death penalty for the most violent criminals”, “Persecution of people and groups working against the national interest”, “Prohibiting political activities of opposition”, “Censorship or ban of

newspapers”. Georgians are much less supportive than Armenians to “Concentrate to enforce law by enlarging police rights” although more supportive of this than Azeris – probably because in Azerbaijan the arbitrary actions of the police is already too unchecked, while in Georgia something is done about it. They are least likely to “Even if the government acts in a way I do not understand, I would still support it in an election”. Georgians are the most supportive of the institution of elections: “Elections in my country are good way for people to choose by whom they want to be governed”. Georgians also are most supportive of the most radical – in a sense anarchic – interpretation of democracy: “Everyone is free to do whatever he/she wants.” If the question that asks whether the state should “Invest more in social security (e.g. old-age pension,...) by increasing taxes” can be interpreted as one that checks the level of support towards the social welfare state versus more libertarian state, Georgians give greater support to the libertarian version (although, in absolute numbers the level of support towards the social welfare state is quite high every where in the region). One could combine this with the previous finding to say that Georgia is maybe the freest but the least orderly country.

7. There is an interesting statement that Georgians are also most likely to agree to: Democracy is a “Western "cliché" that is artificially applied to our country”, or “The concept does not quite fit our culture and mentality” (in the latter case, the statistical variance is less significant, but the two statements are basically the same). It is interesting to interpret it: Georgians seem to be more supportive of democratic freedoms, but also more afraid that traditional Georgian culture is an impediment for democracy. I do not know about other countries, but this “mentality” problem is very widely discussed in Georgian media, not just in professional intellectualist discourse.
8. This (being freer but the least orderly) correlates well with the least support of political institutions. Astonishingly enough, Georgians are least trustful of any institutions, including oppositional parties or independent media – or they are the most cynical. On some occasions, the differences between countries are statistically insignificant, but in most cases they are quite strong: mistrust to the president and the police are especially high as compared to two other countries. Georgians are the most likely to see “a very high level of corruption in the government”. Of course, it should be noted that the level of trust to the government is quite low in all three countries. The respondents in all three countries tend to agree, for instance, that “Often, I have the impression that the

government serves the interests of some groups, especially business groups” – that is, in all three countries they think (rightly, I believe) that the existing political regime is closer to an oligarchy than a democracy (statistical variance in this case is insignificant). But maybe, Georgians are somewhat less likely to accept this oligarchic character of their regime.

If you compare Georgian scores not to other countries, but attitudes to different institutions, than “parliamentary majority”, “government”, “police” and “president” get the especially low scores, and private media is certainly the most trusted as compared to anybody else. It is no wonder that the Georgian media predicted large anti-government upheavals the whole summer, and the government has a good ground to be nervous – the level of trust towards it is really very low. The only point of consolation they have is that trust towards the political opposition is not very high either, and the prevalent government strategy is rather to discredit the opposition than to show that the government is successful.

If we continue comparison with other countries, the interpretation, as in many other ways, may be twofold: is the government worse or is the criticism stronger. For instance, the Georgians are least trustful of fairness of elections: I suspect that the last Parliamentary elections have not been carried out honestly (though it should be noted that the variance is statistically not very important). But for the sake of argument: does this mean that elections are least honest in Georgia, or that the protests in the media are the loudest?

The higher level of criticism is also obvious in questions pertaining assessment of the level of implementation of different rights. The Georgians give the lowest scores as compared to Azeri and Armenian respondents on such accounts as Equality of people before the law, Freedom to pursue individual interests, Equal access to school and education for everyone, Tolerance of minority groups, Equal access to health for everyone, (we have mentioned “Stability, security and public order” already, but this is somewhat different matter). In “Pluralism and freedom of opinion” Georgians give better score than Azeri’s but lower than Armenians, while “Freedom of association and assembly” as assessed by respondents in all three countries almost equally. Now, if we compare outside comparative assessments of the level of civic and political rights in Georgia, including fairness of elections, Georgia usually gets clearly better scores than

Azerbaijan and scores close to, but sometimes better, than Armenia. So, if we correlate that with the somewhat higher level of public support to civic liberties, these low assessments of the situation probably express higher level of public dissatisfaction with the existing level. Provided we deal with students that are a group more exposed to the elite discourse, this may also correlate with the very aggressive stance of Georgian media and NGOs on human rights issues.

9. Georgians are also most prone to be nationalistic. They have the highest scores in questions like: “The government should favour the use of a single official language (of course, Georgian) in our country”, “Only Georgians should decide how to rule Georgia”, “All people living in Georgia should understand and speak Georgian”, They most prefer “to be with people who speak my own language”, they are least supportive of such ideas as “All nationalities have equal rights”, “Ethnic diversity makes a country culturally richer and more interesting”, “A good friend is a good friend, it does not matter which ethnic background he / she has”, Georgians are most afraid to “lose its true Georgian identity, because too many nationalities live on its territory”, and least accept to marry members of their families to people of different ethnic origin or religion. When answering the questions whether the function of the state is to “Uphold and promote national ideals” Georgians do not differ from their neighbours in quite enthusiastically supporting this statement, that in most western societies would be considered a statement that demands of the state to be not just national, but probably quite nationalist.

There may be different lines of interpretation for this. First, it is kind of pleasant to me because it corroborates my view at which I arrived in a purely theoretical way that there is a high level of correlation between democracy and nationalism. Democracy needs molding of a political community within which democratic norm and procedures may work on the assumption of certain level of trust, and this molding is usually based on ethnic criteria. I know that we are in the country that constitutes the most famous exception from this rule, but still, this is true in most cases, and certainly in the Georgian case. Young, immature democracy that is not based on deep traditions of civil society tends to be ethnically divisive, whether we like it or not.

Hanf’s and my survey in 1997 corroborated the same thing very strongly: the group of people whom than Hanf called “pious Jacobins”, who were most supportive of democratic values, were also most religious and most nationalistic. Conversely, people

with the highest level of “conviviality”, that is acceptance of ethnic pluralism, were less democratic and more close to Soviet discourse in this regard. We should also remember that internationalism or “conviviality” is associated with the Soviet politically correct discourse. So, this nationalism also correlates with the fact that Georgian sample was the least nostalgic of the Soviet Union.

Second, more practical interpretation is that Georgia is more threatened with ethnic issues than other countries. For Armenia, ethnic issues are really theoretical, and though Azerbaijan also faces some remaining ethnic issues (I do not mean Karabagh conflict here), still they are not as potentially explosive like issues of Javakheti. Georgia has gone through two ethnic wars rather than one.

In any case, as it was also noted in Hanf book, this “Jacobite” approach to ethnic pluralism issues is very dangerous for Georgia. It should develop a national project that should combine openness to ethnic diversity, rather than consider it as a pure impediment.

10. Religious component. Here Georgians are not on any of the extremes, they are in the middle, with Azeri more religiously tolerant, but Georgians somewhat more tolerant than Armenians. Namely, this is checked by questions like “Catholics (and Jews) should have the right to practice their religion everywhere they want”, or “Activities of religious groups such as Jehovah’s Witnesses or the Baptists should be prohibited”. All three countries are concerned that Witness a high level of missionary activities and sectarianism – that is, all three consider this to be a serious threat to the national identity.

This, however, is an important area for Georgia because the last years have been marred by numerous instances of religious violence perpetrated by radical supporters of the mainstream Orthodox faith against different religious minorities, especially Jehovah’s witnesses, but not only them. People who have liberal attitude to these issues – including myself – consider this to be a national disgrace. The gravest problem here, I and many people like myself think, is that the public support from the freedom of worship is alarmingly low in the country. However, the survey showed that the level of religious tolerance, that the level of acceptance of religious diversity is extremely low in the region at large, and in it Armenia is even lower. When most students think that activities of Why is there, however, no religious violence in Armenia? As I understand,



there the legislation on religion is more restrictive, while in Georgia it is still quite liberal (although there is a very strong pressure to make it more restrictive, and Armenia is often cited as an example to emulate by those who support a more restrictive legislation). Therefore, in Georgia we have a larger gap between liberal legislation and illiberal public attitude, and this expresses itself in the religious violence.

11. Interestingly enough, despite all this criticism, sense of vulnerability and mistrust, Georgians are more likely to say that they are better off than five years ago (though variance, especially with Azerbaijanis, is small), and in general more satisfied with life. As I said, they are least nostalgic of the Soviet Union. This is usually corroborated by other surveys such as Euro barometer: Georgians are the most optimistic people in the South Caucasus. It is hard to say why. Mamardashvili: groundless joy. Maybe, this is social capital. Maybe, Georgians are just a little off their head.
12. International relations also showed usual and predictable results. Georgians are most wary of Russia. Germany continues to be the most popular foreign actor (save for Red Cross). Some reduction of popularity of the US is notable, that follows some trends in the elite discourse. Azerbaijan gets somewhat higher score than Armenia – probably due to Armenia’s being close to Russia. Turkey is acceptable, but still not very popular – due to cultural fears.
13. A bloc on social security/social rights. What can be said here? In absolute numbers, I think, in the all three countries people are very supportive of the state to take up functions of the social welfare. Rather, the people tend to take it for granted. This can be explained by the fact that these are societies that are coming from a communist state - and although the respondents are students, that are probably the first generation not socialized under the communism, they still share this “take it for granted” attitude towards social obligation of the state. Among the general normative notions of democracy, the respondents in each country give the highest score to the idea that a democratic state should provide “Best possible social and economic justice for all citizens”. When it comes to explaining poverty, almost nobody hesitates to put the primary blame on the government: “The state doesn't provide people with jobs”, and “Government officials are corrupted and [western} assistance does not reach them”.

And everywhere people are especially concerned that the state is failing to meet in social obligations. In every country, the statement that the state should “Guarantee that the workers’ salaries are paid” has the highest scores when the respondents are asked about what the state should do. Interestingly for me, the Georgian score is somewhat lower than Armenian and Azeri. As far as I understand this is not because the Georgian state is more successful in guaranteeing worker’s salaries, rather to the contrary, the fiscal crisis in Georgia is even more severe than in the neighboring countries, that corresponds with the general weakness of the state. So, my interpretation is that this confirms that Georgians are still marginally more libertarian than their neighbors.

On the other hand, Georgians, as I said above, tend to be somewhat more libertarian – but this – that is the list supportive of the state to “Invest more in social security (e.g. old-age pension,) by increasing taxes”. Of course, this could be interpreted as not so much lack of support to the welfare state, but as correlating to the general lack of support towards the state institutions, that expresses itself in refusal to pay more taxes. On the other hand, Georgians are more supportive of the proposal to “Manage the economic development of the country by carrying out full privatization” than Armenians are (the Azeri sample did not answer this question.). Paradoxically, Georgians are also marginally more supportive than both neighbors of the statement that the government should “Fight government corruption with less privatization” (although the statistical variance here is insignificant). In this question, however, two issues: privatization and corruption were combined, and although the answers may suggest that in general, people of all three countries generally accept that corruption in their countries is linked to privatization, they answered more to the necessity to fight corruption but did not necessarily accept that privatization is the main reason for corruption.

But not all data of the survey suggest that Georgians are more libertarian. For instance, they are the most supportive of the idea that a democratic state should provide “Best possible social and economic justice for all citizens”. Georgians are more concerned than their neighbors that they “Witness high levels of poverty among its population” and Witness a large gap between the rich and the poor: the rich get richer, and the poor get poorer” (although this concern is very high in each of the three countries. Georgians are also more likely than the others to attribute poverty to the fact that “The state doesn't provide people with jobs” – although this may rather correlate with the general

mistrust of the government than with exaggerating the state's economic function: any time a respondent has a chance to blast the government, he/she does not fail to use it.

14. Gender: this I found most difficult to interpret. When asked the most simple and normative question, "Women should first of all stay at home and look after their children and their family", the Georgian sample was the most progressive or "feminist", that is, less likely to support such a traditionalist proposition. In absolute numbers, student respondents may be much more traditionalist than their student counterparts in western countries would be, but the support for this maxim is still clearly below average. On the other hand, Georgians are less supportive of the idea that "Women should serve in the army". This was somewhat puzzling to me, but this may be to be explained not by the distribution of traditionalist- progressive attitudes, but attitudes to the army: it may be that the Georgian society is less militaristic, or it may correlate with the fact that Georgians are less trustful of their national army and actually nobody wants to serve there, male or female. In the set of question that measure not general values, but wishes of change of gender roles with regards to the status quo ("Women should get more active in the economic sphere", "Women should be more active in civil society"), as well as general question with regards to women's political participation ("More women should be members of political parties and take part in elections"), Georgians are firmly in between: they demand greater activism from women than Armenians do, but less so than the Azeri do. These questions are more difficult to interpret as the respondent's answers may correlate with the real situation (that women are less involved in economic, civic or political life) in a given country or with normative views (women should be involved). Probably, there is a mixture of both here. The same logic may be applied to answers to the question "In \_\_\_\_, men get higher salaries than women for the same kind of job".

### 9.1.3 Citizenship or Nationality? Post-soviet ambiguities in Armenia

*By Gevorg Poghosyan*

Our analysis of citizenship as a concept in post-communist societies shows that nationalism had his unique impact on the citizenship process as well. Thus, in Europe and America the word “national” usually stands for the concept of “State” (National Library, National Security, etc.), whereby here in Armenia the term “national” is perceived exactly with the meaning of “national”, and not “State” (National Academy, National Assembly, etc.).

During the years of soviet domination, people in our countries were so used to the all-embracing and overwhelming role of the state that very few of them ever thought about the role of the society not talking about the role of individual citizens. The issue of citizenship was not discussed at all and had a very simple solution – everyone is a citizen of the USSR and hence unquestioningly obeys the authorities. The state itself prescribed the limits of the activities and activeness of its citizens, their functions, liberties and liabilities.

The concept of citizenship at that time bared an all-obligatory, official and strictly defined meaning. The word “citizen” was as a rule addressed to somebody by the police. If somebody was addressed by the word “citizen” it was meant, in advance, that he or she is being called to order, or even worse - is being blamed for violation of the order. In police state the address “citizen” first of all meant an accusation or a call for order.

Having declared an independent democratic republic, Armenia gave another sound and another meaning to the concept of “citizenship”. A “citizen” today is a person who practices the constitutional civic rights of the Republic of Armenia and besides, what is probably the most important, is a free citizen of the Republic of Armenia whose liberties are guaranteed by the Constitution and laws. For many inhabitants of the Republic of Armenia the concept of citizenship started to incorporate a new meaning for the first time.

However, the concept of citizenship has experienced a certain evolution during past 10 years. In societal consciousness today “citizen” is no more a “demographic” category, but rather political or social. The concept of “population”, “people” is being constantly distanced from the concept of “citizenship” in societal consciousness. Not all members of the society simultaneously feel themselves full-right citizens of the country. From juridical point of view, according to the Constitution of the RA, all individuals, who were born and

are living in Armenia, are citizens of the RA and can hence, practice all of the existing civic rights. First of all, this concerns the electoral right – a right to vote and to be elected in the positions of State Governance. The spectrum of civic rights and liberties, being fixed in and guaranteed by the Constitution, is quite wide. However in real life not all inhabitants of this country are practicing those rights and liberties to their full extent, as the results of the survey clearly show. Although limited possibilities of the project allowed a questioning sample of only 250 students of Armenian Institutes of higher education, nevertheless ASA can draw some general conclusions, concerning a number of questions being approached.

### ***Perceived equality and rights respect***

The overwhelming majority of students gave negative answer to the question, “How well equality of all people is protected by the law in Armenia?” (See Q.1): 82.8% answered it was not protected at all. Mean values from that question were following: 1.54 in Georgia, 1.86 in Armenia and 2.21 in Azerbaijan. As one can see, people in all three Republics do not feel that everybody is equal in the face of law. Rather low mean indices of the trust towards governments (1.36; 1.80; 2.43), presidents (1,40; 1,98; 3,06), police (1,26; 1,85; 1,98), law-courts (1,83; 1,97; 1,99), and parliaments (1,45; 1,69; 1,96) also indicates the same (see Q.2 of the questionnaire). First of all it is obvious that far not all of the country’s inhabitants simultaneously appear to be its full-right citizens, even if formally they do use the citizenship of the RA. Much of what is written in the Constitution and the laws of the RA stays just there, on the paper. Real life is quite different from what is prescribed by or postulated in the laws. For instance, according to the opinion of the majority of interviewed students, the principle of equality of all members of society in the face of law is not provided completely in Armenia (Mean=1,86, See Q1.1).

### ***Democracy as an empty, imported concept***

According to the opinion of the main part of interviewed students, democracy is the concept that does not quite fit our culture and mentality (Mean=2,34. See Q.14.5). There is even a number of students who do think that it is Western “Cliché” that is artificially applied to our country (Mean=1,88, See Q14.2). This causes a certain form of disappointment and self-limitation or withdrawal from active life position, which, in turn, causes the phenomenon of the “non-full citizenship”.

26% of interviewed students stated that they personally have little influence on social and political life of the country (See Q. 28.4). Slightly more than half of students

think that people like themselves have no influence on government activities (Mean=2,64. See Q.17.1). Although they are quite sure that the urgent problems of their country can only be resolved with pro-active and direct participation of the citizens (Mean=3,12. See Q.17.7). However, the fact that they realize this does not make them attending more active in real life.

### ***Discrimination of ethnic and religious minorities***

Though the majority of students agree with the statement that the country is a common house for many ethnic groups (Mean=2,72. See Q.5.1), even so they consider that Armenians should have more rights than members of other nationalities (Mean=2,77. See Q.5.2). They emphasize that all people living in Armenia should understand and speak Armenian language (Mean=3,06. See Q.5.8). Additionally they are of the opinion that the nationality/ethnicity of a person should always be declared in Armenian passport (Mean=3,37. See Q.5.6). Hint: in instantaneous Armenian passports nationality is not pointed out.

Tolerance towards minorities is not very high by the opinion of students, participated in this survey. The following mean indices were obtained for three Republics: 2.86 in Georgia, 2.90 in Armenia, and 2.85 in Azerbaijan.

According to the results of the survey, religious tolerance is also not high. Therefore, rather low mean indices were obtained, concerning the rights of Muslims, Catholics and Jews to profess their religion freely: 1.53; 1.80; and 1.90 (see Q.10 of the questionnaire). The composite score, obtained in the form of a new variable “religious tolerance” turned out to be a little lower for Armenia ( $\alpha=0,64$ ), compared to Azerbaijan ( $\alpha=0,78$ ) and Georgia ( $\alpha=0,81$ ). Though, this is quite natural for mono-ethnic and mono-confessional Armenia. The lower religious tolerance can also be visible from the answers of students to the question, concerning the necessity of prohibiting the activity of religious sects such as “Jehovah’s Witnesses” and Baptists.

The mono-ethnization of our countries occurred as a result of migration, and the blossoming of nationalism can appear to be the most dangerous consequence of this process. It is very difficult for the representatives of other nationalities to get to the higher state echelons in our society today. As a rule, national personnel take the higher administrative and political positions in the country. This contradicts the officially declared democratic values.

The prevailing majority of the population represents the indigenous nationality, and the other minorities feel the increasing pressure of the majority and experience limitation of civic rights. This is another manifestation of “non-full citizenship”, or “limited citizenship”, because in this case we do not encounter a volunteer denial from certain basic civic rights (as we did in the previous case), but a limitation of these rights from “outside”, due to the pressure imposed by the social majority. Moreover, this concerns not only the rights of national and ethnic minorities, but also of religious, political, sexual and other minorities.<sup>11</sup> In real life, however, this is not seen as persecution or violation of the minorities’ legal rights. This rather takes a form of a latent limitation of their rights without any manifest violation of the letter of the law. The state often is not capable to ensure the basic civic rights of its citizens and representatives of indigenous nationality, not talking about different minorities. The fact of belonging to a social, mainly national, minority in the countries of Southern Caucasus in reality turns out as a limitation of civic rights and liberties for them. These are citizens who, by common suppression of both, the authorities and public, practice the rights of “limited citizenship”. The law and reality in this case (as in many others) has a wider gap.

***Ethnic Armenians and their differentiated access to rights: foreigners, emigrants, refugees***

The concept of “non-full” or “partial citizenship” can be extended and applied to those hundreds of thousands of citizens of the RA who departed from the Republic and live abroad for many years without a return. They neither declined from nor lost the Armenian citizenship, but in fact for a long period of time they felt out from the social, economical and political process of the country. They do not practice their civic rights since long time in the past and do not fulfil any civic functions in social life of Armenia. There are a great many of them, in economically active age. According to estimations of experts this number counts approximately for 30% of the adult population of the country.<sup>12</sup> The attempts of several influential businessmen, particularly from Russia, to influence the political processes happening within the country have crashed. The authorities of the country keep total and safe control in this sphere and do not allow “strangers” to invade it.

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<sup>11</sup> Selected Groups of Minorities in Armenia. Case study. ASA, Yerevan, 2001.

<sup>12</sup> Human Development Report. Armenia 1998. UNDP.

According to this survey the students opinion concerning this question do not differ strongly from the position of authorities. Interviewed students think that only Armenian born in Armenia should be given the right to decide how to rule RA (Mean=2,61. See Q.5.5). But when the question is related to rights they think that all ethnic Armenians should have equal rights (Mean=3,34. See Q.5.4).

Together with the phenomenon of “non-full” or “partial” citizenship there exists a phenomenon, which we call “semi-citizenship”. Big groups of people, social status of which allows speaking about their “semi-citizenship” exist in contemporary Armenian society. Refugees can be ascribed to this category first of all. Since 1988, 360.000 Armenians moved from Azerbaijan to Armenia as a result of the pogroms. They are living in Armenia for more than 10 years now and partially those refugees have received a refugee card (a UN document, refugee identity card). The other part kept the former Azerbaijani passports of the USSR citizens. From the juridical point of view they refer to the category of refugees, although most of them (those who do not have the status) are simply stateless. The Soviet Union of which they were citizens while living in Azerbaijan doesn't exist anymore. From the other point of view they are neither citizens of Azerbaijan nor Armenia. However, these people of Armenian nationality are living in Armenia side by side with the indigenous population and build their lives and the lives of their children on a new place for already many years. They do not have a right to vote in the elections of the authorities of the country and also do not have the right to be elected into such positions. It is very difficult for them to find a job in state institutions, because they are not citizens of the RA. Seen from another side, many of their children serve in the Armenian army and study in state educational institutions. Considering all above-mentioned it is quite difficult to ascribe their civil status as to the category of “citizens”, so as to the one of “not citizens”. For this reason, we think, their condition is being described the best by the concept of “semi-citizenship”.

Living in a country, which adopted them as refugees for more than 10 years, and having settled in Armenia somehow, they are still far from being considered full-right citizens of our country. There are about 45-47.000 refugees among them who adopted Armenian citizenship.<sup>13</sup>

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<sup>13</sup> Naturalization of Refugees in Armenia. Sociological research. UNHCR/ASA. Yerevan 2002.



Interviewed students think that IDPs and refugees should be granted a right to participate in local elections (Mean=2,79. See Q.9.1). It could extenuate their grave position (condition).

Finally, it is necessary to describe one more phenomenon of citizenship, which is connected with the Armenians from the Diaspora. It is known that a huge number of ethnic Armenians are living outside Armenia, in practically all countries of Europe, Asia and America. According to the data presented by experts, their number exceeds three times the number of Armenians living in Armenia. The Armenian Diaspora was formed through many years. The main peak was encountered in the beginning of the last century, when as a result of the Armenian genocide in Ottoman Turkey in 1915-1916, 1.5 millions of Armenians were killed and the remaining found shelter in Europe and America.

Interviewed students are of the opinion that Armenia should grant the right to its citizens to achieve double citizenship (Mean=2,97. See Q.5.9). It mostly relates to the Armenians of Diaspora, who want to receive second citizenship in Armenia. Currently, they do not see a danger of a serious tension by the reason that Armenians of Diaspora can “buy” Armenia (Mean=2,14. See Q.7.8). Overall they evaluate the influence of Armenian Diaspora positively (Mean=3,39. See Q.12.12). It is highly typical that a large number of students consider that Armenians living in foreign countries, who are not citizens of Republic of Armenia (on nationality) should be possessed of more rights than citizens of Armenia, appearing representatives of other nationalities (Russian, Kurd) (Mean=2,39. See Q.16.1). In other words they give preference to nationality in detriment of citizenship. This example is very likely to illustrate ASA’s idea put as the title of the given article in the best way. For many people the notion (concept) of nationality replaces and substitutes the notion of citizenship. It happens here and there, when the representatives of indigenous nationality are being granted more rights in real practice than foreign citizens of the country.

Thus, even though the concept of “citizenship” has experienced a serious evolution in independent Armenia and was filled with the real meaning of this word, it is anyway far from perfection. The civic rights and liberties, being declared by the Constitution and fixed in the laws still mostly stay on paper. In real life, as it was shown above, there are several types of citizenship for different categories of social groups. Thus, as an example, in European countries with developed democracy they speak about protection of human rights; special human rights’ defence organizations and institutions are established and operating. In countries like Armenia, the violation of the rights of ordinary citizens has

such a mass nature that it is more correct to talk about the phenomenon of non-full citizenship in case of the majority of population than about single cases of violation of their civic rights. Thus, even the very basic rights for living have a relative nature in our country. Depending to which stratum you belong to, your basic civic rights (including the right for living) can be either very well protected, or not protected at all. You can kill a man and stay unpunished. Everything depends on who was killed and who committed the murder. If you belong to the caste of “the powers that be” or that of “the rich”, and the victim appeared to be a “man from the crowd”, then you most probably have a full guarantee of your impunity. The law and the law-enforcing bodies are far not indifferent towards the social status of the law-breaker. The legal relativism puts the Law in a status of a maiden for the Power and Money. Hence, a significant part of the unprotected or weakly protected population occurs in a condition of “non-full citizenship”. The citizenship for them rather depends on the situation. In some situations of everyday life they feel themselves full-right citizens of their country. But equally during their lives they face a whole range of situations where the fact of their citizenship doesn’t play any role and is not being considered by anyone. In such cases the authority usually plays a role of the first violin, that is, it doesn’t even recognize the right of certain citizens of its country for “full citizenship”. The citizenship in such a country is not an inseparable and constitutionally protected right of each ordinary citizen; it is rather highly dependent on his/her current social and political status.

### ***Conclusion: Nationality meaning citizenship***

As a conclusion, we can say that the notion of citizenship itself is very often associated with nationality in the social consciousness of the prevailing part of population of our country. It is therefore not a contingency that students (in Armenia, in Georgia, and in Azerbaijan) mentioned the following characteristics (along with others) as the best characteristics of a citizen of a country:

- The one who loves his country (A.G.A.) - 86,4%; 83%; 92%
- The one who was born in the country (A.G.A.) – 22%; 25,5%; 14,6%
- The one who is A. G. A. by origin – 25,6%; 8,5%; 13,1%

This tendency is most pronounced in Armenia (See Q.15).

Nationality is a group of self-identification, which is manifested by Armenian students minds most often– 33,2% (See Q.21), next terms are “student”, and “citizen of RA” which is only on the third position.

In all three Republics “family” takes the first position in the scale of preferences, and “friends” remain on the second position. It can be assumed that these categories characterize traditional Caucasus value. Tertiary Armenian students ranked “nation”, Georgian students – “country”, and Azerbaijan students – “work collective”.

The scale consisted of 8 gradations allowed to reveal preferences of students: exactly which social group they consider to be the most important for themselves. (Hint: such a “group” as neighbours is practically moved away on the last position by students of all three countries, which is a result of urbanization in those states).

### 9.1.4 Azerbaijan: Social-psychological survey of popular concepts of citizenship

*By Tair Faradov & Javad Efendi*

The survey conducted in Azerbaijan has answered a number of important questions: What is the degree of young citizens' adherence to democracy? What is their understanding of citizenship? What is the level of civic participation? Are they satisfied with democratic performance in the country? What is youths' public opinion more oriented to – liberal-democratic or totalitarian values?

Let's review the most informative blocks of results of the survey.

#### *Normative Democracy*

First of all, it was interesting to see what «democracy» really means for our respondents. It was a key point. We suppose that a general perception and interpretation of "democracy" has a certain impact on their political and civic attitudes, as well as on the patterns of political behaviour.

The survey has shown that Azeri young people understand the term "democracy" in quite a different ways. We can see that our respondents' general understanding the concept of "democracy" was quite close to the original, correct, so to say, meaning and classical essence of this term. In addition to that, we can say that this notion was rather highly estimated by surveyed young people.

For example, quite large group of respondents (3.39) who supposes that "democracy" is the "best possible social and economic justice for all citizens" and it is a "power of the law, and not the law of the power" (3.33). Seems like young people in Azerbaijan agree that "democracy" is the system, when "if citizens are unsatisfied with the government, they can elect another one" (3.54).

On the other hand there's a small group of respondents, who see "democracy" as an anarchy, when "everyone is free to do whatever he/she wants" (2.26), and as "Western «cliché» that is artificially applied to our country" (2.10). Also is rather small (2.32) share of respondents, who think that "this concept does not quite fit our culture and mentality".

Factor analysis also clearly shows that division in two main groups of opinion:

1<sup>st</sup> factor is for all basic proclaimed and declared principles of democracy. It shows full conscious, deliberate acceptance of all main democratic principles. It is more normative by a character.

2<sup>nd</sup> factor is more about attitudes to what is actually going in political life of our society in and what *is* most of the time called as “democracy”. Here we do not see any objection towards idea of democracy, rejection of any of its basic principles. At the same time they seem to think that these essential principles are not coinciding with our mentality. Most of the “democratic” endeavours end with situation when everyone does whatever he/she wants. This is a group of, so to say, pessimistic realists that display dissatisfaction with how basic democratic principles are used as a “shield”, a slogan that serves to cover activity of antidemocratic forces in society.

Nevertheless, we can say that in majority Azeri youth is accepting, at least normatively, democratic norms and principles. At the same time it is obvious that there are a certain debates in society about the ways of applying those norms in Azerbaijan. Young respondents tend to define "democracy" in a rather practical way, not as just an abstract concept. This is to some extent refuting the existing stereotype that people of "oriental" cultural orientation and mentality (in this particular case - the Azeri) rarely have positive attitude towards modern liberal political values, and mostly inclined to totalitarian or authoritarian rule.

### ***Perceived rights respect***

To what extent our respondents believe that the following principles are upheld in Azerbaijan?

The highest position (3.12) is for “equal access to school and education for everyone” unlike “equal access to healthcare for everyone”, (which are only 2.29). “Stability, security and public order”, as well as “freedom to pursue individual interests” (2.62) are quite low. According to respondents, “freedom of association and assembly” (2.85), “tolerance of minority groups” (2.79), “equality of people before the law” (2.21), “pluralism and freedom of opinion” (2.32) are seen to be respected at a similarly medium level.

Young people obviously feel their vulnerability in front of social circumstances. At the same time, being a country in transition, Azerbaijan still has quite a lot of problems in social sphere. Plus, general approach of Azeri people is more “social-oriented” in contrast

to more policy-oriented approach of Georgian people and rather “national” one of Armenians.

The most interesting fact is that factor analysis has shown just a single very strong factor. Young respondents see “human rights” as a single, whole unity. This clearly shows deep understanding of the nature of human rights among the whole sample.

### ***Institutional trust***

Means show that highest positions are given to president (3.06) and “private media (e.g. ANS, Space, Lider)” (2.95). At the same time, quite large (2.80) number of respondents suspect that last parliamentary elections have not been carried out honestly – seems strange.

Factor analysis shows that there are 3 main opinion groups:

First one – the strongest - is mainly pro-governmental, but at the same time, strongest component is for oppositional parties out of the parliament (?). We’ll come to interpretation of this factor after reviewing the second one.

The most powerful elements in Factor 2 are army, president and private media. The factor is pro-militaristic, supports enforcement. Recently one of the most influential private media concern - ANS - has acquired pro-militaristic orientation, and supports very much military solution of Karabakh conflict, and this should be a reason behind such combination of elements in a factor. Since peaceful resolution of the conflict is, realistically, the only feasible one, these tendencies reflect internal policies of the government trying to show it has power enough.

We think that the second factor is an actual core of pro-governmental, authoritarian orientation, whereas first one is mainly composed by the people, who simply are not that involved in nuances of political life and simply accept the declared slogans. On the other hand, 3<sup>rd</sup> factor clearly displays strong oppositional dissatisfaction with acting authorities. This division into “authority” and “opposition” in our society is very strong.

Incongruities within the factors’ composition, and results presented below prove that young people, as well as the rest of the population, still is used to pronounce pro-governmental slogans; nevertheless, they don’t quite support them. This is, in our view, an obvious characteristic of totalitarian society.

### ***Attitudes to government***

The image of government in the Azeri youth opinion is extremely negative. In general, the word “government” is accompanied by a lot of negative, unfavourable connotations. Thus, a quite large (3.11) portion of respondents, who think that “the activities of our authorities make the rich richer, and the poor poorer”, as well as “often have the impression that the government serves the interests of some groups, especially business groups” (2.98). Also, a large share of respondents (3.04) supposes, that people in Azerbaijan are poor because “government officials are corrupted and assistance does not reach them”. At the same time, there a group of respondents (not very little one) supporting the idea that “our present government is leading the country in the right direction” and even - that «even if the government acts in a way they do not understand, they would still support it in an election».

The main reason of negative attitudes to government, of course, is corruption. The respondents’ expectations regarding the “growing levels of corruption” in future are very high. Almost all young people assume that government should carry out “persecution of corrupt officials and policemen”.

Factor analysis has found three main factors, which are almost equal by their weight.

1<sup>st</sup> factor reflects position of an opinion group, which is mainly for tuff, forceful, strong methods, “hard hand” in government policy. This stream supports present president and appears to be a fundament for prolongation of totalitarian tendencies in political life, but, nevertheless, declares quite democratic goals to be reached. Policies supported by this stratum brought up an overdeveloped police apparatus, which serves “bringing order and stability through limiting personal freedoms”.

2<sup>nd</sup> opinion group implies position: “You should not suppress people inside country, you’d better be involved in creating, and building normal state, stop internal political terror and repressions, there are a lot of external problems”. This group is nationalistic by its nature, and is quite strong in the society, since Karabakh conflict is still unresolved. We would say, this is an opinion group finding its energy in a nationalistic sources, but (since the most democratic-oriented group is passive or disabled by authorities) working to bring social changes of a democratic character.

3<sup>rd</sup> factor has a rather pro-social orientation; it is more sober and realistic. We would say that this factor is a reflection of intellectual “intelligentsia” values. This opinion group is obviously against forceful coercive methods in both internal and foreign policy. It

is a democratic “left” wing, which has very clear view on present issues in the country, sees and proposes ways of civil solution.

Inner structure of these factors once again demonstrates how intense is social stratification, and how unequal are contributions of these strata to actual political life of the country.

### *Political efficacy*

Democratization is successful only if citizens involved into public and political affairs, properly abide the laws and duties, actively participate in elections, rule- and decision-making, can influence the functioning of the society. Otherwise, it is impossible to achieve sustainability and "automatic regime" of the democratization process.

The positive empirical fact is that opinion like “the urgent problems of our country can only be resolved with active and direct participation of the citizens” has got during interview quite a high score (3.51). Our young respondents have also good attitudes towards elections, considering that “elections are a good way for people to choose by whom they want to be governed” (3.03).

But, in fact, we can notice contradictory elements between the following two points. On the one hand, our respondents “in the present situation would be ready to get involved in public activity in order to try to change things” (2.84), as well as “often try to convince their friends and family of their views about politics and society” (2.34). On the other hand, they suppose that people like them “have no influences on what the government is doing” (3.04). According to respondents’ self-estimation, they have a low level of knowledge and awareness of current political life. They think that “they know quite a bit about Azerbaijani politics” (2.38), which also is not a positive fact.

This block of results reflects, in our view, once again the quasi-democratic features of social-political life in the country. At a normative level youth is “well prepared” to speak about what democracy is, and sees it quite clear. One can see that even some “practical” attempts are made to realize civil activity. But those indicator of political apathy and scepticism that we find among young people – the stratum to be the most enthusiastic about bringing positive changes into social organization – displays much deeper pessimistic attitudes of elder population.

These facts are depressing also because such an ideological use of democratic discourse brings society to a state when term “democracy” itself (as a holistic core of democratic discourse) devaluates. One can see how people consider speeches and action



programs of present politicians as a slightest modification of similar ones of Brezhnev period.

### *National risks*

Respondents mainly concern about social-economic factors, such as “growing levels of poverty among population” (3.34), “a larger gap between the rich and the poor: the rich get richer, and the poor get poorer” (3.18). By the way, a great majority of respondents (3.67) think that differences between the rich and the poor groups in Azerbaijan are very large. Almost the same perception of the differences between «Baku and the rest of the country” (3.40). Concerns related to “rising insecurity and danger for citizens, because of criminality and violence” (2.79) are not so major, but still quite strong.

One of the risks that was evaluated as one of a high probability - “social upheavals, because people are more and more dissatisfied with their living conditions” – has already become an actual reality. As you may know during last 4 months there were several big demonstrations and actions in different regions of Azerbaijan: people are very much dissatisfied with bad provision of electricity and gas in rural places during cold season. At the same time, pure socio-economic demands are accompanied with political ones, and this shows the depth of dissatisfaction.

Factor analysis of risk perception for the country reflects 3 main opinion groups:

First one is obviously purely social. It is twice stronger than all other factors. Our country faces a great number of problems that reflect ineffective social-economic policy and overload people’s patience. One can trace those through analyzing perception of personal risks given below.

2<sup>nd</sup> group’s attention is focused on a risk of religious and ethnic conflicts that are seen as a result of ineffective internal policy. Potential for conflict, actually, still exists now. Political interests of some groups could use these sensitive areas and cause conflicts. During last ten years various religious and ethnic conflicts were used or even misused as point of manipulation. They were conceived as a means of power division. Therefore, young people are afraid of these processes and foresee them as a serious risk for the country. It is also seen through inner structure of this factor that pressure of socio-economic problems makes religious and ethnic conflicts easy to start.

3<sup>rd</sup> factor is linked to oil boom and rising activity of a lot of foreign companies and organizations. There is a broadening development of Christian and Muslim sects, which people perceive as an outcome of rising foreign presence in the country and certainly

dislike. Foreigners, non-citizens of former USSR are perceived as “alien” comparing to expatriots. This factor, in facts, is oppositional to globalization. This is, somehow, pro-Azerbaijani, anti-globalization stream, which shows that there are some concerns about losing national norms, values and traditions. We analyze this issue in more details below in an “international; inter-religious relation” sections.

### ***Personal risks***

And what about personal risks: our respondents have mentioned that they predict during the next few years to “be unemployed” (3.31) and “not being paid for the work they do” (2.82).

Young people are not very much satisfied with life in this country (2.95). But at the same time, it is interesting to know that they do considerably better regarding to their life conditions five years ago (3.41).

### ***Penal policies***

Attitudes of the respondents towards different methods that government can use to protect its ability to govern a country could be interpreted in a quite ambivalent way: “seeking political solutions by negotiation” (3.64), “persecution of people and groups working against the state” (3.24), “prohibiting political activities of the opposition” (1.95), “censorship or ban of newspapers” (1.77), “introduction of martial law” (1.75).

As we can see, extreme methods are not very popular among young people. But at the same time meaning of “persecution of people and groups working against the state” depends on which political orientation respondent holds. If he/she is of pro-totalitarian group, then this could mean anti-oppositional repression. Therefore, inner composition of this element should be read through our sample’s attitude to government described above.

### ***Gender policies***

Regarding the gender issues most of Azerbaijani respondents think that women should be more active in civil society, and in the economic sphere. At the same time more women should be members of political parties and take part in elections (e.g., there should be a given number of positions reserved for women).

It means, first of all, that respondents see current level of women participation as not quite high – and this has a certain truth behind. One can find a number of women organizations in third sector; name women, who are members of parliament and political parties. But general level of political activity is more “artificial” and, so to say, demonstrative rather than actual. That’s, we think, why an issue of women participation is seen by respondents this way.

Additionally, we should note that there’s serious difference between life in Baku – the capital – and life in rural regions. Rural population is still quite far away from seeing Western way of full active participation of women in social life as something acceptable. That’s not hard to understand why our sample (mainly composed by students) didn’t reflect this issue in their answers.

But factor analysis clearly shows us 2 main streams of mass opinion in this field:

1<sup>st</sup> factor shows that women’s participation is an important part of implementing democratic principles. Nevertheless, we think, that this is more normative approach - at a level of slogan. In Azerbaijan such a strong rejection of a need for women to look after their children (as in composition of this factor) is more than strange – seems to be a result of pure speculative rejection of traditional approach, in order to appear in a more western style.

2<sup>nd</sup> factor supports need for increase women’s social activity, but in this case we see more realistic approach. Young people do not exclude that women must look after their children, and clearly see that presently men get higher salaries.

One point needs more attention here – this factor includes a strong view that says “women should serve in the army”. We think that recent media reports from Israel have played major role in this. Baku always was a home for strong Jewish community, and this community had and still has quite an influence on mass opinion. Main stream of influence can be described as “there’s no hope for this country’s future – we should leave it”. These views are still strong among Russian-speaking population of Baku; nevertheless, most of Jewish families have immigrated. But those who have decided to stay now try to apply Israeli model onto Azerbaijan society. We see this tendency as a quite positive one, once again considering the fact that influence of this opinion group is still quite strong.

### *Attribution to poverty*

Our respondents mainly think that people in the country are poor because “the state doesn’t provide them with jobs”, “they do not try hard enough to get out of poverty” and because “their families did not provide a good education to them”.

The main explanations relate to government’s policy and a lack of individual persistence and energy. One should know that these considerations have appeared in a situation, where majority of people, who are considered to be poor, are refugees and IDP population. Besides that, recently one could notice an increasing number of so called “professional poor” people on Baku streets. These factors make attribution to poverty a bit interfered and aberrated.

### *Perception of interethnic relations*

For Azerbaijan, which is a multiethnic state, the problem of interethnic relations is one of the key practical problems in transitional period. It would be impossible to build democratic and civil society without constructive, peaceful and stable relations between different national groups and minorities. Our findings and conclusions reflect processes in this area.

Analyzing means, one can conclude that there are no sensible problems in this area. The considerable majority of young respondents sure that “ethnic diversity makes a country culturally richer and more interesting” (3.52), “all nationalities should have equal rights” (3.40), “Azerbaijan is a common house for many ethnic groups” (3.38) and “different ethnic groups living in one country can easily accept each other as they are and respect each other’s mutual rights» (3.63). Our young respondents think that «a good friend is a good friend, it does not matter which ethnic background he/she has» (3.78) and would not mind if «a child of their married someone from a different nationality provided they love each other» (3.35).

On the contrary, small number of respondents supposes that “the nationality/ethnicity of a person should always be declared in the passport” (2.78), “Azeri should have more rights than members of other nationalities” (2.32) and “only Azeri should decide how to rule Azerbaijan” (2.24).

First block can be seen as a legacy of Soviet normative traditions in national policy – meaning that this has to deal with those ethnic groups, who were represented in USSR. We think that second block – a bit nationalistic one – is determined by increasing flow of western people into country. Big oil companies and consortiums, banks and humanitarian organizations play their active role in a life of the country, and this activity is well

accepted. But foreigners on the streets, pubs and fancy hotels are intensifying perception of social stratification; they are seen by some people as a reason behind devaluation of traditions, rising prostitution and delinquency among teenagers. That's also why great majority of our respondents support the idea that "all people living in Azerbaijan should understand and speak Azeri language".

Contemporary Azeri youth do not demonstrate ethnocentric attitudes and feel comfortable in multiethnic settings. According to their answers, only 2.07 "prefer to be with people who speak their own language" and 2.62 "feel very close to people of their own nationality, whatever their education, wealth, or political views".

Our respondents do not particularly worry about any possible conflict situations, tensions or clashes due to ethnic reasons, for example, «losing Azeri identity, because many nationalities live here» (1.71) and «be unfairly treated because of their ethnicity (1.80).

Exception to the rule is Azerbaijani-Armenian relations: as a consequence of years of lasting conflict and absence of any relations between the countries most of respondents think that "peace and co-operation between Azeri and Armenians may have become impossible" (2.81).

### ***Perception of inter-religious relations***

Respondents' perception of inter-religious relations is proving our supposition: Our respondents predict «a rise in missionary activities and sectarianism» in future (2.40), and insist that "activities of some religious groups should be prohibited" (2.88).

The great majority of respondents think, "Muslims should have the right to practice their religion everywhere they want in Azerbaijan" (3.68). But, at the same time, it is very remarkable that attitudes to Christians and Jews are very tolerant and positive. Our respondents agree with the statements that "Christians should have the right to practice their religion everywhere they want in Azerbaijan" (2.74), "Jews should have the right to practice their religion everywhere they want in Azerbaijan" (2.69) and really do not see any considerable differences between "the religious majority and other religious confessions" (2.48). Also 2.94 would not mind "if a child of theirs married someone from a different religion provided they love each other".

As in a previous paragraph, here we see clear difference respondents make between those confessions, which were presented in the country during Soviet rule and those, which are new for mass perception. So, if Christianity (meaning Orthodox Russian Church) and

Judaism are well accepted, then a recent rise in missionary activities and sectarianism (which is also associated with the flow of foreigners into the country) is perceived as a thread to national identity, and is not welcome. Several conflicts and scandals around Jehovah Witnesses, Wahabbists and few Evangelist sects appeared to be strong support to these views.

Factor analysis for social distance marriage has shown two obvious opinion streams regarding interethnic relations issue:

1<sup>st</sup> factor is multiethnic and clearly anti-nationalistic. This factor is sensibly stronger and is seen as prove of supposition about positive changes in mass consciousness towards civil society.

2<sup>nd</sup> factor is clearly nationalistic. Difference in their “weight” is obvious demonstration of degree of their social acceptance.

### ***Perception of international relations***

It is extremely important for Azerbaijan as the newly independent state to determine its priorities in geopolitical orientations in the long-run perspective, to establish partner or friendly relationships with a number of countries and international organizations.

Therefore, it was interesting to see how Azeri youth consider impact (positive or negative) of some countries or organization on our country.

Such countries and organizations, as Turkey (presently relations with this country are really very popular in Azerbaijan), The United States of America, European Union and Germany are viewed and regarded in a most positive manner. Also good rating is seen for World Bank / IMF, United Nations, Red Cross and Georgia.

The popularity of Russia is considerably less high, as well as of Iran. Azeri young people do not want to see Azerbaijan within the Russia-Byelorussia Union but, at the same time, do not think, “It is a good idea to introduce the visa regime with Russia”. Considering the fact that majority of our respondents are young enough not to remember Soviet past, to some degree it was unexpected for us that some of them (2.31) feel sorry that “the Soviet Union broke up”.

Youth’s assessment of Armenia is a particular case, of course, due to military conflict with this country. The conflict plays major role in forming attitudes towards Russia and Iran as well, because of strategic positions of these countries concerning the situation.

Factor analysis for West relations:

1st factor is pro-Western, pro-Euro-American. Since this opinion group seems to be the most influential, we can state quite strong tendencies towards cooperation with Western countries. But there are also other streams too.

2<sup>nd</sup> factor reflects position of an opinion group denying positive role of Red Cross and USA. It displays pro-Turkish, pro-Iranian orientation, for which the only reasonable explanation is an Islamic view on international relations. From strategic geopolitical point of view there is a certain sense of meaning: for transitional country it is important, first of all, to build good relations with the closest neighbours. Unfortunately, a group, which is able of such transcription of pro-Turkish and pro-Iranian orientation it is very weak (unlike in 3<sup>rd</sup> factor). So, here we should say that this factor is mainly composed by Muslims.

3<sup>rd</sup> factor is in favour of Russia and Iran - also our nearest geographical neighbours. We have tense relations with them because of our common history and their present role in Azerbaijani-Armenian conflict. So the fact that a certain groups of people consider friendly, cooperative relations with them to be correct is quite understood. But in reality we have quite conflictous relations to these our neighbours. There is a sign of duality, double perception that causes social-psychological problems - an additional stress, pressing national identity.

### ***Symbolic policies (within-nation)***

The respondents have expressed their opinions on the best ways of ruling a multiethnic, multicultural, multi-confessional country. Statements like: “all people vote for any party they like and the winning parties rule with other parties in the opposition” (3.30) and “joint government with a fixed number of positions for all major nationalities” (2.77), which are pro-democratic ones, were the most acceptable. At the same time “a single party open to everyone rules without opposition” was quite acceptable for the sample, unlike “one group (majority or not) rules over the others, and people who refuse to accept this should keep quiet or leave”, which is simply the more sincere verbalization of the same idea.

So here we once again see two main streams in mass opinion (at least among young population of Azerbaijan): first is obviously democratic by nature; second one is pro totalitarian by nature, and it prefers not to be seen so.

### ***Symbolic policies / collective rights, ethnic and religious policies***

The ways conflicts are being resolved in the country - are one of the main indicators of advancement of civil society. Our respondents have shown support and sympathy to non-violent methods of solving any conflicts in society, to finding compromise, mutually acceptable solutions: “in the present political confrontation in our country all sides should seek compromises and try to find agreement” (3.40), “violence can never be justified, no matter how important the goals” (3.47).

In this area Azerbaijan never was characterized by aggressiveness or any preference to violent ways of solution. Declaration of preference to pro-military solutions could be a tool designed for use in terms of internal policy. At the same time it would be a mistake to say that there are no people promoting aggressive methods in conflict resolution means. Let's see how our sample divides into opinion groups when concrete examples are being discussed:

Results of factor analysis of symbolic and religions policies have demonstrated the following (see tables attached):

**Factor 1** is the most strong and influential one. It comprises such positions (variables), as “Christians should have the right to practice their religion everywhere they want in Azerbaijan”, “Jews should have the right to practice their religion everywhere they want in Azerbaijan”, “Muslims should have the right to practice their religion everywhere they want in Azerbaijan” and “Different ethnic groups living in one country can easily accept each other as they are and respect each other's mutual rights». So we can see that policy providing religious tolerance is of a primary importance for respondents. Section on interethnic relations above gives more detailed analysis on this topic.

Inner structure of the factor shows that religious tolerance of Azeri youth is strongly correlated with their ethnic tolerance. There could be a various explanations of this empirical fact. First explanation, probably, comes from the immanent, natural, original for Baku citizens an extremely tolerant attitude towards “others”. They accustomed to live and work in multi-cultural and multi-religious environment and community. And youth in Baku has inherited this type of cultural tradition and patterns of behaviour from their parents. Azeri people in Baku respect all another ethnic groups and minorities, respect their rights to be an equal status groups and do not consider them as a “second class” group.

It would be correct to say that for majority of Azerbaijani population religion is a part of cultural life. Historically, peoples inhabited on a territory of present Azerbaijan Republic have lived through periods of different confessions dominating over the others. Kazak state was the only historical state where three world religions were presented at the



same time. Analysis of present “versions” of practiced Islam, Christianity and Judaism are full of ancient (even pagan) inclusions. As a result of such background, majority of Azerbaijani population confuses “religion” with “nationality/ethnic group”, for example, “Azeri” with “Muslims”, or “Russians” with “Christians”. Therefore, during interviews they might have perceived religious and ethnic groups in the same way.

**Factor 2** comprises such statements and positions (variables), as “ethnic diversity makes a country culturally richer and more interesting”, “Azerbaijan is a common house for many ethnic groups”, “joint government with a fixed number of positions for all major nationalities”, “all people vote for any party they like, and the winning parties rule with other parties in the opposition”.

**Factor 2** is dual and unifies issues touching “political organization” and “ethnicity” issues. We can notice that respondents here highly appreciate ethnic diversity, and support that issue of citizenship is touching all ethnic groups and minorities. They like to live in poly-ethnic society, providing possibility for cultural exchange of values and traditions between all ethnic groups. And probably for that reason they suppose, that ethnic diversity should be presented in the structure of executive authorities. Thus, one can notice how democratization influences young generation’s preferences of a certain political organization of society.

**Factor 3** includes such statements and positions (variables), as “Azeri’s should have more rights than members of other nationalities” and “all people vote for any party they like, and the winning parties rule with other parties in the opposition”. At the same time, this **Factor 3** displays rejection of statements like “Different ethnic groups living in one country can easily accept each other as they are and respect each other’s mutual rights» and “all nationalities should have equal rights”.

This factor is obviously nationalistic. Presently we are observing the revival, revitalization of Azeri national identity, which is connected to independence country has achieved. This process under the certain circumstances can be accompanied by the raise of national, and maybe even nationalistic, sentiments among a certain groups of population. Section on interethnic relations above demonstrates that these tendencies are not welcome among our respondents.

**Factor 4** includes such statements as “the nationality/ethnicity of a person should always be declared in the passport”, “a single party open to everyone rules without opposition”, “one group (majority or not) rules over the others, and people who refuse to

accept this should keep quiet or leave” and rejects a possibility of “joint government with a fixed number of positions for all major nationalities”.

This factor reflects mainly anti-democratic and nationalistic views of pro-totalitarian group. It means that currently in our country there is a certain group of people who are opposing democratic rule and are committed to tough, strict approaches governmental organization. It could be probably explained by cruel confrontation between political forces and parties. Some young people really think that social problems can be solved by coercive methods, like suppression of opposition, prohibitions of their activity. Supporters of the ruling party consider it as a good way to keep this type of “stability” and “public order” in society. These anti-democratic views correlate with such Soviet habit and “tradition”, as declaration the nationality/ethnicity of a person in the passport, which recently was eliminated.

**Factor 5** includes positions for “ensure territorial integrity of the state”, “uphold and promote national ideals”, “ensure equality of everyone in front of the law”.

This factor shows strong interrelation between desire of respondent to restore and preserve of state territorial integrity and their support for such fundamental democratic principle, as equality of everybody before the law. It also shows that during the long period of occupation of Azeri lands the principle of restoring territorial integrity has become our national idea. People in our country are really preoccupied with this idea, which has become a topic of everyday conversations and emotional discussions in the mass media. Azerbaijani respondents demonstrate the importance of resolution of the Karabakh conflict in order to achieve national accord, social justice and political stability. It means that the less principles of social justice are respected in the country, the less it has capacity to keep its territorial integrity and the more it is vulnerable before external threats and forces. This factor is a manifestation of quite strong civic position regarding very important issue.

Unfortunately, as a result of more than 10 years prolongation of the conflict, solution of Karabakh issue became a kind of pre-condition for democracy in the country, and is being widely used as a card in internal policy games played by pro-totalitarian forces.

**Factor 6** includes such statements, as “violence can never be justified, no matter how important the goals”, “in the present political confrontation in our country all sides should seek compromises and try to find agreement”, and strongly rejected “the government should favour the use of a single official language in our country: Azeri

language” and “one group (majority or not) rules over the others, and people who refuse to accept this should keep quiet or leave”.

This opinion stream appreciates pacifism expresses orientation toward compromises. One can clearly see that this is mainly Russian-speaking population. Since this group constitutes majority of well-educated “intelligentsia”, it is no surprise that they are strongly against totalitarian tendencies in the country. In our view, this group is the main element of civil society (nevertheless this term could rarely be used in Azerbaijan yet).

**Factor 7** includes such statements and positions (variables), as “a single party open to everyone rules without opposition”, “activities of some religious groups should be prohibited”, “all people living in Azerbaijan should understand and speak Azeri language”, “the government should favour the use of a single official language in our country: Azeri language”.

This factor reflects positions of opinion group exactly opposite to the previous one. It is clearly pro-totalitarian, and spreads its views onto spheres of interethnic and inter-confessional relations as easy, as onto political organization of the country.

**Factor 8** is nationalistic in its core, and is mainly focused on priorities and preferences should be given only to Azeri population - Only Azeri should decide how to rule Azerbaijan. Fortunately, this factor is the weakest one. But its inner structure indicates that members of such opinion group often contribute to seemingly pure democratic factors. Here again one can see that democratic discourse is often just a veil.

### ***Conclusion***

Results analyzed above widely describe various aspects of how “citizenship” concept is seen and understood by Azerbaijani respondents. Since issue of citizenship is strongly correlated with variety of indicators of democratic processes in society, survey has uncovered nuances of processes of social stratification, as well as polarization political views of population e.g. tensed opposition of totalitarian tendencies and will to establish democratic civil society in Azerbaijan today.

As one can see, despite of still quite obvious Soviet legacy influencing respondents attitudes towards a number of issues, young generation of Azerbaijani citizens is mostly democratic oriented and does well manage to apply their views in various fields of social, economic and political life of the society.

## 9.2 Results I: Attitudes towards government policies as a function of national contexts

### 9.2.1 Expectations from the state (welfare, poverty, disciplinary measures)

	Georgia		Armenia		Azerbaijan		F
	Mean	sd	Mean	sd	Mean	sd	
Ensure territorial integrity of the state	<b>3.75</b>	.59	<b>3.68</b>	.61	<b>3.81</b>	.43	2.69
Ensure equality of everyone in front of the law	<b>3.71</b>	.66	<b>3.79</b>	.51	<b>3.91</b>	.32	8.03***
Guarantee that the workers' salaries are paid	<b>3.68</b>	.66	<b>3.81</b>	.45	<b>3.92</b>	.32	11.81***
Persecution of corrupt officials and policemen	<b>3.57</b>	.87	<b>3.39</b>	.83	<b>3.66</b>	.59	7.35***
Uphold and promote national ideals	<b>3.40</b>	.83	<b>3.49</b>	.75	<b>3.48</b>	.74	<1
Seeking political solution by negotiation	<b>3.20</b>	.95	<b>3.25</b>	.82	<b>3.64</b>	.58	19.00***
Fight government corruption with less privatisation	<b>2.85</b>	1.04	<b>2.80</b>	.94	<b>2.69</b>	1.01	1.35
Persecution of people and groups working against the national interest	<b>2.75</b>	1.18	<b>3.04</b>	.93	<b>3.24</b>	.85	12.12***
Manage the economic development of the country by carrying out full privatisation	<b>2.58</b>	1.06	<b>2.25</b>	1.03			
Invest more in social security (e.g. old-age pension,...) by increasing taxes	<b>2.54</b>	1.18	<b>2.69</b>	1.07	<b>2.94</b>	1.09	6.54***
Concentrate to enforce law by enlarging police rights	<b>1.95</b>	1.15	<b>2.43</b>	1.00	<b>1.86</b>	.71	22.53***
Limit personal freedoms in order to ensure order and stability	<b>1.88</b>	1.08	<b>2.14</b>	.94	<b>2.15</b>	1.04	4.53**
Reinstate death penalty for the most violent criminals	<b>1.83</b>	1.09	<b>2.66</b>	1.12	<b>2.67</b>	1.32	35.46***
Introduction of martial law	<b>1.83</b>	.95	<b>2.40</b>	1.17	<b>1.75</b>	.87	27.69***
Prohibiting political activities of opposition	<b>1.75</b>	.92	<b>2.02</b>	.93	<b>1.95</b>	.90	4.84**
Censorship or ban of newspapers	<b>1.46</b>	.81	<b>1.68</b>	.86	<b>1.77</b>	.81	7.81***

*Note* : All scales range from 1 to 4 (1 = completely disagree, 4 = completely agree)

\*\*\* :  $p < .001$ , \*\* :  $p < .01$ , \* :  $p < .05$ .

## 9.2.2 Ethnic and religious policies (within-nation)

	Georgia		Armenia		Azerbaijan		F
	Mean	sd	Mean	sd	Mean	sd	
The country is divided up and nationalities form their states, with their own governments	<b>1.61</b>	.98	<b>1.66</b>	.90			
One group (majority or not) rules over the others, and people who refuse to accept this should keep quiet or leave	<b>1.68</b>	.97	<b>1.65</b>	.89	<b>1.64</b>	.79	<1
A joint government with a fixed number of positions for all major nationalities	<b>2.47</b>	1.01	<b>2.26</b>	.98	<b>2.77</b>	.93	15.34***
A single party open to everyone rules without opposition	<b>2.17</b>	1.09	<b>2.11</b>	1.01	<b>2.26</b>	1.04	1.05
All people vote for any party they like, and the winning parties rule with other parties in the opposition	<b>3.19</b>	1.02	<b>3.08</b>	.93	<b>3.30</b>	.92	2.96*
The country is a common house for many ethnic groups (G,A,A) should have more rights than members of other nationalities	<b>2.82</b>	1.06	<b>2.72</b>	1.01	<b>3.38</b>	.84	28.13***
	<b>2.44</b>	1.20	<b>2.77</b>	1.15	<b>2.32</b>	1.10	9.36***
The government should favour the use of a single official language in our country: G,A,A	<b>3.56</b>	.81	<b>2.83</b>	1.15	<b>2.99</b>	1.08	28.97***
All nationalities have equal rights	<b>3.15</b>	1.00	<b>3.34</b>	.86	<b>3.40</b>	.79	4.45**
Only (Georgians, Armenians, Azeris) should decide how to rule G,A,A	<b>2.85</b>	1.16	<b>2.61</b>	1.07	<b>2.24</b>	1.17	15.18***
The nationality/ethnicity of a person should always be declared in the G,A,A passport	<b>3.00</b>	1.19	<b>3.37</b>	.87	<b>2.78</b>	1.14	17.75***
Ethnic diversity makes a country culturally richer and more interesting	<b>2.79</b>	1.01	<b>3.04</b>	.88	<b>3.52</b>	.80	34.5***
All people living in G,A,A should understand and speak G,A,A	<b>3.50</b>	.83	<b>3.06</b>	1.03	<b>3.38</b>	.89	13.88***
Armenia should grant the right to its citizens to get double nationality			<b>2.97</b>	1.01			
In the present political conflicts in our country all sides should seek compromises and try to find agreement	<b>3.49</b>	.85	<b>3.36</b>	.76	<b>3.40</b>	.66	1.78
Catholics should have the right to practice their religion everywhere they want in G,A,A	<b>2.66</b>	1.06	<b>1.90</b>	1.01	<b>2.74</b>	1.02	46.27***
Violence can never be justified, no matter how important the struggle	<b>3.03</b>	1.05	<b>3.02</b>	1.03	<b>3.47</b>	.76	14.62***
I fear that peace and co-operation between ___ and ___ may have become impossible	<b>2.44</b>	1.05	<b>2.74</b>	.93	<b>2.81</b>	1.04	7.78***
Jews should have the right to practice their religion everywhere they want in G,A,A	<b>2.44</b>	1.10	<b>1.80</b>	1.00	<b>2.69</b>	1.02	44.22***
Even very different ethnic groups living in one country can easily accept each other as they are and respect each other's mutual rights	<b>3.12</b>	.91	<b>3.09</b>	.87	<b>3.63</b>	.68	27.89***
I fear that peace and co-operation between Georgians and Ossetians may have become impossible	<b>2.25</b>	.96					
Activities of religious groups such as Jehovah's Witnesses or the Baptists should be prohibited	<b>2.99</b>	1.10	<b>3.18</b>	1.14	<b>2.88</b>	1.14	3.88*
Muslims should have the right to practice their religion everywhere they want in G,A,A	<b>2.09</b>	1.11	<b>1.53</b>	.95	<b>3.68</b>	.70	306.93** *

Note: All scales range from 1 to 4 (1 = completely disagree, 4 = completely agree)

\*\*\* :  $p < .001$ , \*\* :  $p < .01$ , \* :  $p < .05$ .

## 9.2.3 Gender policies

	Georgia		Armenia		Azerbaijan		F
	Mean	sd	Mean	sd	Mean	sd	
Women should first of all stay at home and look after their children and their family	<b>1.96</b>	1.05	<b>2.26</b>	1.06	<b>2.12</b>	1.02	4.32**
In ____, men get higher salaries than women for the same kind of job	<b>1.79</b>	.93	<b>2.28</b>	.95	<b>1.97</b>	.84	16.68***
Women should get more active in the economic sphere	<b>2.78</b>	.90	<b>2.66</b>	.87	<b>2.89</b>	.94	3.74*
Women should be more active in civil society	<b>2.71</b>	.96	<b>2.56</b>	.93	<b>3.17</b>	.90	24.65***
Women should serve in the army	<b>1.55</b>	.93	<b>1.70</b>	.92	<b>1.74</b>	1.01	2.30
More women should be members of political parties and take part in elections	<b>2.35</b>	1.05	<b>2.59</b>	.99	<b>2.83</b>	1.02	11.29***

*Note:* All scales range from 1 to 4 (1 = completely disagree, 4 = completely agree)

\*\*\* :  $p < .001$ , \*\* :  $p < .01$ , \* :  $p < .05$ .

## 9.2.4 Normative democracy

	Georgia		Armenia		Azerbaijan		F
	Mean	sd	Mean	sd	Mean	sd	
Everyone is free to do whatever he/she wants	<b>2.49</b>	1.07	<b>1.74</b>	.83	<b>2.26</b>	1.05	34.31***
Western "cliché" that is artificially applied to our country	<b>2.37</b>	1.05	<b>1.88</b>	.77	<b>2.10</b>	1.01	15.08***
Best possible social and economic justice for all citizens	<b>3.50</b>	.72	<b>3.30</b>	.76	<b>3.39</b>	.79	4.05*
Power of the law, and not law of the power	<b>3.46</b>	.86	<b>3.60</b>	.68	<b>3.33</b>	.97	5.98***
The concept does not quite fit our culture and mentality	<b>2.46</b>	1.03	<b>2.34</b>	.94	<b>2.32</b>	.99	1.28
If citizens are unsatisfied with the government, they can elect another one	<b>3.42</b>	.85	<b>3.25</b>	.82	<b>3.54</b>	.60	8.24***

*Note:* All scales range from 1 to 4 (1 = completely disagree, 4 = completely agree)

\*\*\* :  $p < .001$ , \*\* :  $p < .01$ , \* :  $p < .05$ .

## 9.3 Results II: Societal perceptions as a function of national contexts

### 9.3.1 Perception of intergroup (within-nation) relations

	Georgia		Armenia		Azerbaijan		F
	Mean	sd	Mean	sd	Mean	sd	
Loose its true G,A,A identity, because too many nationalities live on its territory	<b>2.41</b>	1.08	<b>2.31</b>	1.06	<b>1.71</b>	.62	32.73***
Witness a high level of missionary activities and sectarianism	<b>2.98</b>	.99	<b>2.98</b>	1.02	<b>2.40</b>	.96	24.30***
Be a very insecure and dangerous country for its citizens, because of high levels of criminality and violence	<b>3.07</b>	.90	<b>2.99</b>	.94	<b>2.79</b>	1.00	5.01**
Witness a very high level of corruption in the government	<b>3.50</b>	.73	<b>3.38</b>	.79	<b>3.30</b>	.84	3.27*
Witness serious conflicts between religious groups	<b>3.07</b>	.94	<b>2.72</b>	.99	<b>2.08</b>	.76	60.88***
Witness high levels of poverty among its population	<b>3.46</b>	.74	<b>3.39</b>	.78	<b>3.34</b>	.81	1.29
To be aggressed by (Russia, Turkey, outside)	<b>3.21</b>	.80	<b>2.78</b>	.95	<b>3.11</b>	.94	13.79***
Witness serious conflicts between national groups	<b>2.86</b>	.89	<b>2.14</b>	1.04	<b>2.04</b>	.96	43.11***
Witness a large gap between the rich and the poor: the rich get richer, and the poor get poorer	<b>3.39</b>	.81	<b>3.36</b>	.75	<b>3.18</b>	.92	4.20**
Witness serious social upheavals, because people are more and more dissatisfied with their living conditions	<b>3.38</b>	.76	<b>3.00</b>	.93	<b>3.06</b>	.92	11.31***
Differences between Christians and Moslems	<b>3.44</b>	.84	<b>3.49</b>	.72	<b>2.48</b>	.83	106.80***
Differences between The rich and the poor in _	<b>3.67</b>	.63	<b>3.61</b>	.60	<b>3.67</b>	.55	<1
Differences between Georgians and Abhasians, Armenians and Russians, The national majority and minorities	<b>2.53</b>	.96	<b>2.56</b>	.92	<b>2.52</b>	.94	<1
Differences between Tblisi, Yereban, Baku and the rest of the country	<b>2.55</b>	1.04	<b>2.81</b>	.86	<b>3.40</b>	.80	47.34***
Differences between Georgians and Ossetians	<b>2.83</b>	.94					
Differences between Armenians from Armenia and Diaspora Armenians			<b>3.02</b>	.78			

*Note:* All scales range from 1 to 4 (1 = very unlikely / very small differences, 4 = very likely / very large differences)

\*\*\* :  $p < .001$ , \*\* :  $p < .01$ , \* :  $p < .05$ .

### 9.3.2 Group identification / Social distance

	Georgia		Armenia		Azerbaijan		F
	Mean	sd	Mean	sd	Mean	sd	
I prefer to be with people who speak my own language	2.82	1.05	2.66	1.05	2.07	.86	31.99***
A good friend is a good friend, it does not matter which ethnic background he / she has	3.49	.78	3.58	.57	3.78	.55	10.73***
I would not mind if a child of mine married someone from a different nationality provided they love each other	2.72	1.04	3.01	.99	3.35	.80	22.17***
I feel very close to people of my own nationality, whatever their education, wealth, or political views	2.97	.97	3.20	.81	2.62	1.09	20.48***
I would not mind if a child of mine married someone from a different religion provided they love each other	1.83	.95	2.00	.94	2.94	1.07	75.39***

*Note:* All scales range from 1 to 4 (1 = completely disagree, 4 = completely agree)

\*\*\* :  $p < .001$ , \*\* :  $p < .01$ , \* :  $p < .05$ .

### 9.3.3 Relative deprivation

	Georgia		Armenia		Azerbaijan		F
	Mean	sd	Mean	sd	Mean	sd	
As regards your life conditions, are you better off or worse off than five years ago? Are you: (a)	3.44	1.19	3.22	1.09	3.41	1.11	2.61
Thinking about your life in this country, how do you feel? Are you:(b)	3.26	1.15	3.07	.89	2.95	.92	5.01**

*Note:* Scales range from 1 to 5

a. 1= Much worse off

b. 1= Very satisfied with life as it is

5= Much better off

5= Angry and impatient with life it is

\*\*\* :  $p < .001$ , \*\* :  $p < .01$ , \* :  $p < .05$ .



### 9.3.4 Perception of international relations

	Georgia		Armenia		Azerbaijan		F
	Mean	sd	Mean	sd	Mean	sd	
Red cross	3.19	.86	3.43	.61	3.11	.86	11.01***
European Union	3.02	.78	2.94	.72	3.23	.69	9.00***
Russia	1.94	.90	3.30	.72	2.82	.72	168.24***
Turkey	2.12	.89	1.50	.66	3.45	.73	373.75***
Germany	3.16	.73	2.69	.76	3.19	.62	35.47***
United Nations	2.99	.86	3.13	.73	3.14	.76	2.39
World Bank / IMF	2.93	.96	2.72	.92	3.41	.71	34.50***
Iran	2.09	.84	2.44	.82	2.22	.74	10.77***
Armenia	2.34	.83			1.34	.48	108.38***
Azerbaijan	2.47	.85	1.52	.71			
Georgia			2.31	.83	3.07	.79	
Diaspora			3.39	.67			
North Caucasian peoples	2.25	.83					
The United States of America	2.89	.91	2.78	.85	3.23	.73	16.57***
It is a pity the Soviet Union broke up	1.48	.88	2.28	1.02	2.31	1.18	43.09***
It was a good idea to introduce the visa regime with Russia	1.87	1.02	1.62	.86	1.72	.90	3.98*
Georgia, Armenia should be reunified with Russia (Azerbaijan should join the Russia-Byelorussia Union)	1.32	.81	2.19	1.02	1.72	.86	50.84***

Note : Scales range from 1 to 4. (1 = Very negative impact / completely disagree, 4 = Very positive impact / completely agree)

### 9.3.5 Perceived rights respect

	Georgia		Armenia		Azerbaijan		
	Mean	sd	Mean	sd	Mean	sd	
Equality of people before the law	1.54	.69	1.86	.75	2.21	.87	37.61***
Stability, security and public order	1.68	.77	2.16	.80	2.69	.86	77.78***
Pluralism and freedom of opinion	2.49	.87	2.64	.87	2.32	.92	7.09***
Freedom to pursue individual interests	2.03	.81	2.76	.96	2.62	.92	38.71***
Equal access to school and education for everyone	2.33	.90	2.62	1.06	3.12	.92	33.90***
Tolerance of minority groups	2.14	.98	2.67	.89	2.79	.97	27.26***
Freedom of association and assembly	2.86	.85	2.90	.81	2.85	1.02	<1
Equal access to health for everyone	1.97	.83	2.30	.99	2.29	1.08	7.91***

Note : All scales range from 1 to 4 (1 = Not at all upheld, 4 = Totally upheld); \*\*\* :  $p < .001$ , \*\* :  $p < .01$ , \* :  $p < .05$ .

## 9.3.6 Trust in institutions

	Georgia		Armenia		Azerbaijan		F
	Mean	sd	Mean	sd	Mean	sd	
Parliamentary majority	<b>1.45</b>	.68	<b>1.69</b>	.66	<b>1.96</b>	.92	23.25***
Army	<b>1.77</b>	.85	<b>2.78</b>	.91	<b>2.25</b>	1.02	64.99***
Oppositional parties which are out of parliament	<b>1.72</b>	.80	<b>1.84</b>	.82	<b>1.71</b>	.76	1.79
Private media	<b>2.70</b>	.93	<b>2.73</b>	.81	<b>2.95</b>	.76	5.23**
Government	<b>1.36</b>	.68	<b>1.80</b>	.83	<b>2.43</b>	1.03	78.76***
State media	<b>1.87</b>	.83	<b>2.36</b>	.95	<b>1.99</b>	.88	18.58***
Courts	<b>1.83</b>	.86	<b>1.97</b>	.85	<b>1.99</b>	.86	2.10
Police	<b>1.26</b>	.58	<b>1.85</b>	.82	<b>1.98</b>	.83	52.97***
Parliamentary opposition	<b>1.80</b>	.76	<b>1.95</b>	.73			2.03
The president	<b>1.40</b>	.73	<b>1.98</b>	.89	<b>3.06</b>	1.14	161.95***
By and large, I think that our present government is leading the country in the right direction	<b>1.43</b>	.75	<b>1.72</b>	.77	<b>2.66</b>	.99	119.47***
The activities of our authorities make the rich richer, and the poor poorer	<b>3.21</b>	1.05	<b>3.20</b>	.97	<b>3.11</b>	.90	<1
I suspect that the last Parliamentary elections have not been carried out honestly	<b>2.98</b>	1.05	<b>2.93</b>	.88	<b>2.80</b>	1.01	1.79

Note : All scales range from 1 to 4; (1= Not trust at all, 4 = Complete trust)

\*\*\* :  $p < .001$ , \*\* :  $p < .01$ , \* :  $p < .05$ .

## 9.3.7 Personal risks

	Georgia		Armenia		Azerbaijan		F
	Mean	sd	Mean	sd	Mean	sd	
Be unemployed	<b>2.73</b>	1.15	<b>2.92</b>	.95	<b>3.31</b>	.89	17.84***
Be discriminated against because of my ethnicity	<b>1.79</b>	1.01	<b>1.54</b>	.86	<b>1.80</b>	1.00	5.47***
Not being paid for the work I do	<b>2.86</b>	1.09	<b>2.76</b>	1.03	<b>2.82</b>	1.00	<1
Become a victim of violent criminal actions	<b>2.70</b>	1.03	<b>2.21</b>	1.06	<b>2.29</b>	.86	15.16***
To live in solitude	<b>2.05</b>	1.14	<b>1.95</b>	.99	<b>1.84</b>	.91	2.04
Be sent to war	<b>2.02</b>	1.15	<b>2.11</b>	1.08			<1

Note : All scales range from 1 to 4 (1 = Very unlikely, 4 = Very likely)

\*\*\* :  $p < .001$ , \*\* :  $p < .01$ , \* :  $p < .05$ .

## 9.3.8 Political efficacy

	Georgia		Armenia		Azerbaijan		F
	Mean	sd	Mean	sd	Mean	sd	
People like me have not influence on what the government is doing	<b>2.69</b>	1.09	<b>2.64</b>	1.05	<b>3.04</b>	1.01	9.36***
Elections in my country are good way for people to choose by whom they want to be governed	<b>1.91</b>	1.04	<b>2.91</b>	.97	<b>3.03</b>	.91	82.11***
Often, I have the impression that the government serves the interests of some groups, especially business groups	<b>3.05</b>	1.01	<b>3.12</b>	.84	<b>2.98</b>	.92	1.29
I think I know quite a bit about Georgian (Armenian, Azerbaijani) politics	<b>2.24</b>	.92	<b>2.98</b>	.83	<b>2.38</b>	.97	43.14***
State authorities should not pay too much attention to the views of ordinary citizens	<b>1.84</b>	1.04	<b>1.59</b>	.80	<b>1.43</b>	.65	12.07***
I often try to convince my friends and my family of my views about politics and society	<b>2.31</b>	.97	<b>2.24</b>	.89	<b>2.34</b>	.92	<1
The urgent problems of our country can only be resolved whit active and direct participation of the citizens	<b>3.11</b>	.84	<b>3.12</b>	.86	<b>3.51</b>	.63	17.22***
Even if the government acts in a way I do not understand, I would still support it in an election	<b>1.43</b>	.70	<b>1.92</b>	.87	<b>1.98</b>	.83	28.27***
In the present situation, I would be ready to get involved in collective protest in order to try to change things	<b>2.61</b>	1.07	<b>2.05</b>	.96	<b>2.84</b>	.98	37.54***

*Note* : All scales range from 1 to 4 (1 = completely disagree, 4 = completely agree)

\*\*\* :  $p < .001$ , \*\* :  $p < .01$ , \* :  $p < .05$ .

## 9.3.9 Explanations of poverty

	Georgia		Armenia		Azerbaijan		F
	Mean	sd	Mean	sd	Mean	sd	
The state doesn't provide them with jobs	<b>3.54</b>	.74	<b>3.49</b>	.71	<b>3.34</b>	.74	3.86*
They do no try hard enough to get out of poverty	<b>2.11</b>	1.02	<b>2.43</b>	.99	<b>2.53</b>	.98	9.78***
They just had bad luck	<b>1.71</b>	.82	<b>1.80</b>	.88	<b>1.46</b>	.71	9.87***
Their families did not provide a good education to them	<b>2.21</b>	.95	<b>2.11</b>	.94	<b>2.04</b>	.85	1.74
The West does not help them enough	<b>1.84</b>	.95	<b>1.74</b>	.92	<b>1.90</b>	.89	1.76
They belong to the wrong ethnic group	<b>1.50</b>	.79	<b>1.58</b>	.81	<b>1.52</b>	.69	<1
Government officials are corrupted and assistance does not reach them	<b>3.54</b>	.78	<b>3.38</b>	.77	<b>3.04</b>	.99	18.04***

*Note* : All scales range from 1 to 4 (1 = completely disagree, 4 = completely agree)

\*\*\* :  $p < .001$ , \*\* :  $p < .01$ , \* :  $p < .05$ .

## 9.4 Results III: Principal components analyses (with varimax rotation) on ethnic and religious policies

### 9.4.1 Georgia: Principal components analysis on ethnic and religious policies

	Com	1	2	3	4	5	6	7
(G,A,A) should have more rights than members of other nationalities	.67	<b>.80</b>					-.11	
Only (Georgians, Armenians, Azeris) should decide how to rule G,A,A	.58	<b>.69</b>	-.18	.12			.11	.19
The nationality/ethnicity of a person should always be declared in the G,A,A passport	.54	<b>.66</b>	-.17		.11	.23		
Activities of religious groups such as Jehovah's Witnesses or the Baptists should be prohibited	.40	<b>.61</b>			.11			
Jews should have the right to practice their religion everywhere they want in G,A,A	.76		<b>.86</b>	.12				
Catholics should have the right to practice their religion everywhere they want in G,A,A	.73	-.14	<b>.83</b>	.11				
Muslims should have the right to practice their religion everywhere they want in G,A,A	.66	-.17	<b>.78</b>			.13		
Even very different ethnic groups living in one country can easily accept each other as they are and respect each other's mutual rights	.54		.19	<b>.67</b>	.10	-.20		
Ethnic diversity makes a country culturally richer and more interesting	.51			<b>.62</b>		.30	-.15	
Violence can never be justified, no matter how important the struggle	.45		.14	<b>.59</b>		.17	.22	
In the present political conflicts in our country all sides should seek compromises and try to find agreement	.44	.14		<b>.56</b>	.27	.19		
One group (majority or not) rules over the others, and people who refuse to accept this should keep quiet or leave	.53			<b>.52</b>			.17	-.47
Ensure territorial integrity of the state (INT)	.83	.11		.18	<b>.84</b>	.24		-.13
Ensure equality of everyone in front of the law	.84			.33	<b>.83</b>	.13		-.13
Uphold and promote national ideals	.62	.29		-.12	<b>.66</b>	-.16	.14	.20
The government should favour the use of a single official language in our country	.62	.39				<b>.67</b>	.10	
The country is a common house for many ethnic groups	.49	-.13		.16		<b>.59</b>		-.30
All people living in G,A,A should understand and speak G,A,A	.65	.41			.37	<b>.51</b>	.21	.17
All nationalities have equal rights	.67	-.37	-.14	.43		<b>.50</b>	.16	.22
A single party open to everyone rules without opposition	.69	-.12					<b>.80</b>	-.15
A joint government with a fixed number of positions for all major nationalities	.54						<b>.72</b>	
All people vote for any party they like, and the winning parties rule with other parties in the opposition	.74							<b>.85</b>
Variance % (after rotation)		11.8	10.0	9.9	9.6	7.7	6.4	<b>5.7</b>

N= 194 KMO .72

Com = communality

### 9.4.2 Armenia : Principal components analysis on ethnic and religious policies

	<b>Com</b>	<b>1</b>	<b>2</b>	<b>3</b>	<b>4</b>	<b>5</b>	<b>6</b>	<b>7</b>
The government should favour the use of a single official language in our country	.68	<b>.80</b>	.15					-.10
All people living in G,A,A should understand and speak G,A,A	.69	<b>.77</b>	.10		-.23		.15	.12
The nationality/ethnicity of a person should always declared in the G,A,A passport	.45	<b>.55</b>	.14	-.21	.25			
(G,A,A) should have more rights that members of other nationalities	.46	<b>.44</b>		-.28		.34	-.18	-.16
Ensure equality of everyone in front of the law	.67		<b>.79</b>	-.10			.14	.10
Ensure territorial integrity of the state (INT)	.59		<b>.74</b>				.18	
Uphold and promote national ideals	.53	.25	<b>.66</b>	-.15		-.14		
Catholics should have the right to practice their religion everywhere they want in G,A,A	.67			<b>.80</b>		.17		
Jews should have the right to practice their religion everywhere they want in G,A,A	.59			<b>.74</b>		-.17		
Muslims should have the right to practice their religion everywhere they want in G,A,A	.47		-.14	<b>.65</b>			-.11	
All nationalities have equal rights	.63	.11		-.16	<b>.73</b>		.19	-.13
Only (Georgians, Armenians, Azeris) should decide how to rule G,A,A	.57	.43			<b>-.58</b>	.18		.13
Even very different ethnic group living in one country can easily accept each other as they are and respect each other's mutual rights	.51	-.14	.19	.11	<b>.48</b>	-.25	.11	.37
A single party open to everyone rules without opposition	.67					<b>.81</b>		
One group (majority or not) rules over the others, and people who refuse to accept this should keep quiet or leave	.48				-.17	<b>.64</b>	-.15	
A joint government with a fixed number of positions for all major nationalities	.45	.16	-.20		.19	<b>.47</b>		.35
Activities of religious groups such Jehovah's Witnesses or the Baptists should be prohibited	.51		.12	-.16			<b>.66</b>	.11
Violence can never be justified , no matter how important the struggle	.50	-.22	.11	.22	.13		<b>.61</b>	
In the present political conflicts in our country all sides should seek compromises and try to find agreement	.48		.28		.33		<b>.53</b>	
The country is a common house for many ethnic groups	.58	.12	.39	.20	.32	.16	<b>-.49</b>	
All people vote for any party they like, and the winning parties rule with other parties in the opposition	.74				-.18			<b>.83</b>
Ethnic diversity makes a country culturally richer and more interesting	.47	.35	.31	.23	.24			<b>.37</b>
<i>Variance % (after rotation)</i>		10.2	9.7	9.0	7.5	7.4	7.0	5.6

N= 250 KMO .69

com= communality

### 9.4.3 Azerbaijan: Principal components analysis on ethnic and religious policies

	Com	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8
Catholics should have the right to practice their religion everywhere they want in G,A,A	.85	<b>.85</b>			-.11		.24	-.16	
Jews should have the right to practice their religion everywhere they want in G,A,A	.78	<b>.81</b>			-.27			-.18	-.12
Muslims should have the right to practice their religion everywhere they want in G,A,A	.80	<b>.71</b>	.14	.26	.28	.12		.27	-.21
Even very different ethnic group living in one country can easily accept each other as they are and respect each other's mutual rights	.57	<b>.66</b>	.10	-.33					
Ethnic diversity makes a country culturally richer and more interesting	.78		<b>.82</b>	-.11			.19	-.16	-.13
A joint government with a fixed number of positions for all major nationalities	.63	-.16	<b>.61</b>	-.14	-.40	-.15			-.13
The country is a common house for many ethnic groups	.54		<b>.58</b>	.15		.33	-.16	.15	
All nationalities have equal rights	.75	.13	.14	<b>-.82</b>		-.14			.11
(G,A,A) should have more rights than members of other nationalities	.70	-.12		<b>.74</b>	.18		.25		.20
All people vote for any party they like, and the winning parties rule with other parties in the opposition	.74	.25	.47	<b>.48</b>	-.18		-.23		.36
The nationality/ethnicity of a person should always be declared in the G,A,A passport	.76	-.12			<b>.83</b>	.10	-.13		.16
A single party open to everyone rules without opposition	.64		-.12		<b>.55</b>	-.30		.36	-.29
One group (majority or not) rules over the others, and people who refuse to accept this should keep quiet or leave	.58	-.22	-.21	.18	<b>.54</b>		.35	.15	.15
Ensure territorial integrity of the state (INT)	.68			.14		<b>.79</b>			
Uphold and promote national ideals	.59				.20	<b>.67</b>		.14	.28
Ensure equality of everyone in front of the law	.40		.17	-.20		<b>.50</b>	.28		
Violence can never be justified, no matter how important the struggle	.79	.21		.18			<b>.83</b>		
In the present political conflicts in our country all sides should seek compromises and try to find agreement	.50	-.10	.27	-.16	.33		<b>.49</b>		-.21
Activities of religious groups such as Jehovah's Witnesses or the Baptists should be prohibited	.74	-.10		-.15				<b>.83</b>	
All people living in G,A,A should understand and speak G,A,A	.82		.17			.20	.23	<b>.61</b>	.56
The government should favour the use of a single official language in our country	.69	-.13	.16	.23		.29	-.46	<b>.48</b>	.26
Only (Georgians, Armenians, Azeris) should decide how to rule G,A,A	.75	-.18	-.25		.13	.12	-.11		<b>.78</b>
<i>Variance % (after rotation)</i>		12.0	8.9	8.8	8.6	8.0	7.6	7.5	7.1

N= 191 KMO .55

Com= communalities

## 9.5 English version of the questionnaire

For clarity, the questionnaire presented in the appendix contains headings that were used to classify items. The headings were taken out for the questionnaire submitted to participants. It also presents items used as dependent variables in bold type. Item order, however, is identical to the questionnaire used for data collection. The questionnaire comprised the following categories of items :

### **Societal perceptions** (predictors, independent variables)

*(Perceptions and interpretations of social environment, intergroup attitudes, institutional positionings, etc)*

1. **Symbolic-ethnic, religious, economic**
2. **Group identification / Social distance**
3. **Relative deprivation**
4. **International**
5. **Perceived rights respect**
6. **Trust in institutions 1 & 2**
7. **Political efficacy**
8. **Personal risks**
9. **Attribution of poverty**

### **Government policies** (opinions , dependent variables)

*(prescriptive positionings towards policies which organise intergroup relationships, "how people want relations organised")*

1. **Ethnic, national, religious government policies**
2. **Welfare & poverty; punishment, Rights restrictions**
3. **Gender policies**
4. **International policies**
5. **Citizenship measures**
6. **Normative democracy**

**PERCEIVED RIGHTS RESPECT**

To what extent do you believe that the following principles are upheld in Georgia:

	<i>Not at all upheld</i>		<i>Totally upheld</i>	
1. Equality of people before the law	<input type="checkbox"/> <sub>1</sub>	<input type="checkbox"/> <sub>2</sub>	<input type="checkbox"/> <sub>3</sub>	<input type="checkbox"/> <sub>4</sub>
2. Stability, security and public order	<input type="checkbox"/> <sub>1</sub>	<input type="checkbox"/> <sub>2</sub>	<input type="checkbox"/> <sub>3</sub>	<input type="checkbox"/> <sub>4</sub>
3. Pluralism and freedom of opinion	<input type="checkbox"/> <sub>1</sub>	<input type="checkbox"/> <sub>2</sub>	<input type="checkbox"/> <sub>3</sub>	<input type="checkbox"/> <sub>4</sub>
4. Freedom to pursue individual interests	<input type="checkbox"/> <sub>1</sub>	<input type="checkbox"/> <sub>2</sub>	<input type="checkbox"/> <sub>3</sub>	<input type="checkbox"/> <sub>4</sub>
5. Equal access to school and education for everyone	<input type="checkbox"/> <sub>1</sub>	<input type="checkbox"/> <sub>2</sub>	<input type="checkbox"/> <sub>3</sub>	<input type="checkbox"/> <sub>4</sub>
6. Tolerance of minority groups	<input type="checkbox"/> <sub>1</sub>	<input type="checkbox"/> <sub>2</sub>	<input type="checkbox"/> <sub>3</sub>	<input type="checkbox"/> <sub>4</sub>
7. Freedom of association and assembly	<input type="checkbox"/> <sub>1</sub>	<input type="checkbox"/> <sub>2</sub>	<input type="checkbox"/> <sub>3</sub>	<input type="checkbox"/> <sub>4</sub>
8. Equal access to healthcare for everyone	<input type="checkbox"/> <sub>1</sub>	<input type="checkbox"/> <sub>2</sub>	<input type="checkbox"/> <sub>3</sub>	<input type="checkbox"/> <sub>4</sub>

**INSTITUTIONAL TRUST 1**

Please indicate, for each of the following Georgian institutions, to what extent do you trust them.

	<i>No trust at all</i>		<i>Complete trust</i>	
1. Parliamentary majority	<input type="checkbox"/> <sub>1</sub>	<input type="checkbox"/> <sub>2</sub>	<input type="checkbox"/> <sub>3</sub>	<input type="checkbox"/> <sub>4</sub>
2. Army	<input type="checkbox"/> <sub>1</sub>	<input type="checkbox"/> <sub>2</sub>	<input type="checkbox"/> <sub>3</sub>	<input type="checkbox"/> <sub>4</sub>
3. Oppositional parties which are out of parliament	<input type="checkbox"/> <sub>1</sub>	<input type="checkbox"/> <sub>2</sub>	<input type="checkbox"/> <sub>3</sub>	<input type="checkbox"/> <sub>4</sub>
4. Private media (e.g. Rustavi 2, channels 4, 7, 9, ...)	<input type="checkbox"/> <sub>1</sub>	<input type="checkbox"/> <sub>2</sub>	<input type="checkbox"/> <sub>3</sub>	<input type="checkbox"/> <sub>4</sub>
5. Government	<input type="checkbox"/> <sub>1</sub>	<input type="checkbox"/> <sub>2</sub>	<input type="checkbox"/> <sub>3</sub>	<input type="checkbox"/> <sub>4</sub>
6. State media (Channel 1 and 2 of TV)	<input type="checkbox"/> <sub>1</sub>	<input type="checkbox"/> <sub>2</sub>	<input type="checkbox"/> <sub>3</sub>	<input type="checkbox"/> <sub>4</sub>
7. Courts	<input type="checkbox"/> <sub>1</sub>	<input type="checkbox"/> <sub>2</sub>	<input type="checkbox"/> <sub>3</sub>	<input type="checkbox"/> <sub>4</sub>
8. Police	<input type="checkbox"/> <sub>1</sub>	<input type="checkbox"/> <sub>2</sub>	<input type="checkbox"/> <sub>3</sub>	<input type="checkbox"/> <sub>4</sub>
9. Parliamentary opposition	<input type="checkbox"/> <sub>1</sub>	<input type="checkbox"/> <sub>2</sub>	<input type="checkbox"/> <sub>3</sub>	<input type="checkbox"/> <sub>4</sub>
10. The President	<input type="checkbox"/> <sub>1</sub>	<input type="checkbox"/> <sub>2</sub>	<input type="checkbox"/> <sub>3</sub>	<input type="checkbox"/> <sub>4</sub>

**INSTITUTIONAL TRUST 1**

To what extent do you agree with the following statements :

	<i>Completely disagree</i>		<i>Completely agree</i>	
1. By and large, I think that our present government is leading the country in the right direction	<input type="checkbox"/> <sub>1</sub>	<input type="checkbox"/> <sub>2</sub>	<input type="checkbox"/> <sub>3</sub>	<input type="checkbox"/> <sub>4</sub>
2. The activities of our authorities make the rich richer, and the poor poorer.	<input type="checkbox"/> <sub>1</sub>	<input type="checkbox"/> <sub>2</sub>	<input type="checkbox"/> <sub>3</sub>	<input type="checkbox"/> <sub>4</sub>
3. I suspect that the last Parliamentary elections have not been carried out honestly	<input type="checkbox"/> <sub>1</sub>	<input type="checkbox"/> <sub>2</sub>	<input type="checkbox"/> <sub>3</sub>	<input type="checkbox"/> <sub>4</sub>



### SYMBOLIC POLICIES 1 (WITHIN-NATION)

There are many countries like ours – that is, a country with different religious, language and ethnic groups. There are different forms of government in these countries and different opinions about which is the best way of ruling such a country. We will give you some of these opinions. Please tell us to what extent you find each of the following statements a good or a bad idea.

	<i>Very bad idea</i>		<i>Very good idea</i>	
1. The country is divided up and nationalities form their own states, with their own governments	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
2. One group (majority or not) rules over the others, and people who refuse to accept this should keep quiet or leave	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
3. A joint government with a fixed number of positions for all major nationalities	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
4. A single party open to everyone rules without opposition	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
5. All people vote for any party they like, and the winning parties rule with other parties in the opposition	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>

### SYMBOLIC POLICIES 2

To what extent do you agree with the following statements :

	<i>Completely disagree</i>		<i>Completely agree</i>	
1. Georgia is a common house for many ethnic groups	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
2. Georgians should have more rights than members of other nationalities	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
3. The government should favour the use of a single official language in our country: Georgian.	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
4. All nationalities should have equal rights	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
5. Only Georgians should decide how to rule Georgia	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
6. The nationality/ethnicity of a person should always be declared in the Georgian passport	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
7. Ethnic diversity makes a country culturally richer and more interesting	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
8. All people living in Georgia should understand and speak Georgian	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>

### PENAL POLICIES

A government can use different methods to protect its ability to govern a country. To what extent do you approve the following methods:

	<i>Totally disapprove</i>		<i>Totally approve</i>	
1. Persecution of people and groups working against the national interest	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
2. Persecution of corrupt officials and policemen	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
3. Prohibiting political activities of the opposition	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
4. Seeking political solutions by negotiation	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
5. Censorship or ban of newspapers	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
6. Introduction of martial law	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>

### PERCEPTION OF INTERGROUP RELATIONS (WITHIN-NATION)

Now, please indicate to what extent Georgia risks to :

	<i>Very unlikely</i>		<i>Very likely</i>	
1. Loose its true Georgian identity, because too many nationalities live on its territory	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
2. Witness a high level of missionary activities and sectarianism	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
3. Be a very insecure and dangerous country for its citizens, because of high levels of criminality and violence	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
4. Witness a very high level of corruption in the government	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
5. Witness serious conflicts between religious groups	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
6. Witness high levels of poverty among its population	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
7. <i>To be aggressed by Russia (INT)</i>	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>
8. Witness serious conflicts between national groups	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
9. Witness a large gap between the rich and the poor : the rich get richer, and the poor get poorer	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
10. Witness serious social upheavals, because people are more and more dissatisfied with their living conditions	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
11. Other:				

### PENAL, ECONOMIC POLICIES

In the present situation, what should be the government's most important goals ?

<b>The government should :</b>	<i>Not at all important</i>		<i>Very important</i>	
1. <b>Limit personal freedoms in order to ensure order and stability</b>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
2. <b>Invest more in social security (e.g. old-age pension, ...) by increasing taxes</b>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
3. <b>Fight government corruption with less privatisation</b>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
4. <b>Concentrate to enforce the law by enlarging police rights</b>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
5. <b>Reinstate death penalty for the most violent criminals</b>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
6. <b>Manage the economic development of the country by carrying out full privatisation</b>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
7. <b>Guarantee that the workers' salaries are paid</b>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
8. <b>Ensure territorial integrity of the state (INT)</b>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
9. <b>Ensure equality of everyone in front of the law</b>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
10. <b>Uphold and promote national ideals</b>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>

**SYMBOLIC POLICIES / COLLECTIVE RIGHTS**

	<i>Completely disagree</i>		<i>Completely agree</i>	
1. IDPs and refugees should be granted full voters' rights in local elections	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
2. Muslim Meshketians should be allowed to be repatriated in Georgia and <u>live in Meshketi</u>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
3. Regions inhabited by Armenians and Azeri should have special rights to make their own decisions	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
4. Muslim Meshketians should be allowed to be repatriated in Georgia and <u>live anywhere in Georgia except Meshketi</u>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
5. Local government officials (Gamagebeli) should be elected by the people, and not appointed by the President.	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>

**ETHNIC AND RELIGIOUS POLICIES**

	<i>Completely disagree</i>		<i>Completely agree</i>	
1. In the present political conflicts in our country all sides should seek compromises and try to find agreement	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
2. Catholics should have the right to practice their religion everywhere they want in Georgia	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
3. Violence can never be justified, no matter how important the struggle	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
4. I fear that peace and co-operation between Georgians and Abkhazians may have become impossible	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
5. Jews should have the right to practice their religion everywhere they want in Georgia	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
6. Even very different ethnic groups living in one country can easily accept each other as they are and respect each other's mutual rights	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
7. I fear that peace and co-operation between Georgians and Ossetians may have become impossible	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
8. Activities of religious groups such as Jehova's Witnesses or the Baptists should be prohibited	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
9. Muslims should have the right to practice their religion everywhere they want in Georgia	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>

**PERCEPTIONS OF INTERGROUP RELATIONS**

Generally speaking, how large do you think are the differences between the following groups in Georgia ?

<b>Differences between:</b>	<i>Very small differences</i>		<i>Very large differences</i>	
1. Christians and Moslems	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
2. The rich and the poor in Georgia	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
3. Georgians and Abkhasians	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
4. Tblisi and the rest of the country	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
5. Georgians and Ossetians	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>

### PERCEPTION OF INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS

Relationships with a number of foreign governments and international organisations have had a certain impact on our country. For each country or organisation we mention, please tell us to what extent do you consider that their impact has been positive or negative.

	<i>Very Negative impact</i>		<i>Very positive impact</i>	
1. Red Cross	<input type="checkbox"/> <sub>1</sub>	<input type="checkbox"/> <sub>2</sub>	<input type="checkbox"/> <sub>3</sub>	<input type="checkbox"/> <sub>4</sub>
2. Armenia	<input type="checkbox"/> <sub>1</sub>	<input type="checkbox"/> <sub>2</sub>	<input type="checkbox"/> <sub>3</sub>	<input type="checkbox"/> <sub>4</sub>
3. European Union	<input type="checkbox"/> <sub>1</sub>	<input type="checkbox"/> <sub>2</sub>	<input type="checkbox"/> <sub>3</sub>	<input type="checkbox"/> <sub>4</sub>
4. Russia	<input type="checkbox"/> <sub>1</sub>	<input type="checkbox"/> <sub>2</sub>	<input type="checkbox"/> <sub>3</sub>	<input type="checkbox"/> <sub>4</sub>
5. Turkey	<input type="checkbox"/> <sub>1</sub>	<input type="checkbox"/> <sub>2</sub>	<input type="checkbox"/> <sub>3</sub>	<input type="checkbox"/> <sub>4</sub>
6. Germany	<input type="checkbox"/> <sub>1</sub>	<input type="checkbox"/> <sub>2</sub>	<input type="checkbox"/> <sub>3</sub>	<input type="checkbox"/> <sub>4</sub>
7. United Nations	<input type="checkbox"/> <sub>1</sub>	<input type="checkbox"/> <sub>2</sub>	<input type="checkbox"/> <sub>3</sub>	<input type="checkbox"/> <sub>4</sub>
8. World Bank / IMF	<input type="checkbox"/> <sub>1</sub>	<input type="checkbox"/> <sub>2</sub>	<input type="checkbox"/> <sub>3</sub>	<input type="checkbox"/> <sub>4</sub>
9. Iran	<input type="checkbox"/> <sub>1</sub>	<input type="checkbox"/> <sub>2</sub>	<input type="checkbox"/> <sub>3</sub>	<input type="checkbox"/> <sub>4</sub>
10. Azerbaijan	<input type="checkbox"/> <sub>1</sub>	<input type="checkbox"/> <sub>2</sub>	<input type="checkbox"/> <sub>3</sub>	<input type="checkbox"/> <sub>4</sub>
11. North Caucasian peoples	<input type="checkbox"/> <sub>1</sub>	<input type="checkbox"/> <sub>2</sub>	<input type="checkbox"/> <sub>3</sub>	<input type="checkbox"/> <sub>4</sub>
12. The United States of America	<input type="checkbox"/> <sub>1</sub>	<input type="checkbox"/> <sub>2</sub>	<input type="checkbox"/> <sub>3</sub>	<input type="checkbox"/> <sub>4</sub>

### PERCEPTION OF INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS

In your own opinion, which country comes closest to an ideal country ?

\_\_\_\_\_

To what extent do you agree with the following statements :

	<i>Completely disagree</i>		<i>Completely agree</i>	
1. It is a pity the Soviet Union broke up	<input type="checkbox"/> <sub>1</sub>	<input type="checkbox"/> <sub>2</sub>	<input type="checkbox"/> <sub>3</sub>	<input type="checkbox"/> <sub>4</sub>
2. It was a good idea to introduce the visa regime with Russia	<input type="checkbox"/> <sub>1</sub>	<input type="checkbox"/> <sub>2</sub>	<input type="checkbox"/> <sub>3</sub>	<input type="checkbox"/> <sub>4</sub>
3. Georgia should be reunified with Russia	<input type="checkbox"/> <sub>1</sub>	<input type="checkbox"/> <sub>2</sub>	<input type="checkbox"/> <sub>3</sub>	<input type="checkbox"/> <sub>4</sub>

### NORMATIVE DEMOCRACY

People understand the term "Democracy" in different ways. In which of the following terms do you understand the concept of democracy ?

	<i>Completely disagree</i>		<i>Completely agree</i>	
1. Everyone is free to do whatever he/she wants	<input type="checkbox"/> <sub>1</sub>	<input type="checkbox"/> <sub>2</sub>	<input type="checkbox"/> <sub>3</sub>	<input type="checkbox"/> <sub>4</sub>
2. Western «clishé» that is artificially applied to our country	<input type="checkbox"/> <sub>1</sub>	<input type="checkbox"/> <sub>2</sub>	<input type="checkbox"/> <sub>3</sub>	<input type="checkbox"/> <sub>4</sub>
3. Best possible social and economic justice for all citizens	<input type="checkbox"/> <sub>1</sub>	<input type="checkbox"/> <sub>2</sub>	<input type="checkbox"/> <sub>3</sub>	<input type="checkbox"/> <sub>4</sub>
4. Power of the law, and not the law of the power	<input type="checkbox"/> <sub>1</sub>	<input type="checkbox"/> <sub>2</sub>	<input type="checkbox"/> <sub>3</sub>	<input type="checkbox"/> <sub>4</sub>
5. The concept does not quite fit our culture and mentality	<input type="checkbox"/> <sub>1</sub>	<input type="checkbox"/> <sub>2</sub>	<input type="checkbox"/> <sub>3</sub>	<input type="checkbox"/> <sub>4</sub>
6. If citizens are unsatisfied with the government, they can elect another one	<input type="checkbox"/> <sub>1</sub>	<input type="checkbox"/> <sub>2</sub>	<input type="checkbox"/> <sub>3</sub>	<input type="checkbox"/> <sub>4</sub>

## CITIZENSHIP

In the list below, you find several ways of behaving in the society as a citizen. Please choose four among them that best describe a real citizen of Georgia.

**In my opinion, a real Georgian citizen is a person who...**

(please check **four** boxes)

- <sub>1</sub> has a lot of respect for our authorities
- <sub>2</sub> loves Georgia
- <sub>3</sub> accepts the differences between the various national groups living in Georgia
- <sub>4</sub> defends his/her own rights
- <sub>5</sub> works hard
- <sub>6</sub> tries to help people in need
- <sub>7</sub> is an ethnic Georgian
- <sub>8</sub> obeys the laws
- <sub>9</sub> participates in protest movements and strikes
- <sub>10</sub> supports the Georgian government's actions
- <sub>11</sub> feels close to people of his/her own nationality
- <sub>12</sub> was born in Georgia
- <sub>13</sub> serves in the army
- <sub>14</sub> pays taxes
- <sub>15</sub> brings up children in a right way

## SYMBOLIC POLICIES

To what extent do you agree with the following two statements :

	<i>Completely disagree</i>		<i>Completely agree</i>	
1. <b><u>Ethnic Georgians</u> who live in other countries and are not citizens of Georgia should have more rights to occupy high positions in central government than <u>ethnic Armenians or Azeris</u> who are Georgian citizens</b>	<input type="checkbox"/> <sub>1</sub>	<input type="checkbox"/> <sub>2</sub>	<input type="checkbox"/> <sub>3</sub>	<input type="checkbox"/> <sub>4</sub>
2. <b><u>Ethnic Georgians</u> who live in other countries and are not citizens of Georgia should have more rights to own lands in Georgia than <u>ethnic Armenians or Azeris</u> who are Georgian citizens</b>	<input type="checkbox"/> <sub>1</sub>	<input type="checkbox"/> <sub>2</sub>	<input type="checkbox"/> <sub>3</sub>	<input type="checkbox"/> <sub>4</sub>

## POLITICAL EFFICACY

People have different opinions about how they can influence the functioning of the society. To what extent do you agree with the following statements ?

	<i>Completely disagree</i>		<i>Completely agree</i>	
1. People like me have no influence on what the government is doing	<input type="checkbox"/> <sub>1</sub>	<input type="checkbox"/> <sub>2</sub>	<input type="checkbox"/> <sub>3</sub>	<input type="checkbox"/> <sub>4</sub>
2. Elections in my country are a good way for people to choose by whom they want to be governed.	<input type="checkbox"/> <sub>1</sub>	<input type="checkbox"/> <sub>2</sub>	<input type="checkbox"/> <sub>3</sub>	<input type="checkbox"/> <sub>4</sub>
3. Often, I have the impression that the government serves the interests of some groups, especially business groups	<input type="checkbox"/> <sub>1</sub>	<input type="checkbox"/> <sub>2</sub>	<input type="checkbox"/> <sub>3</sub>	<input type="checkbox"/> <sub>4</sub>
4. I think I know quite a bit about Georgian politics	<input type="checkbox"/> <sub>1</sub>	<input type="checkbox"/> <sub>2</sub>	<input type="checkbox"/> <sub>3</sub>	<input type="checkbox"/> <sub>4</sub>
5. State authorities should not pay too much attention to the views of ordinary citizens	<input type="checkbox"/> <sub>1</sub>	<input type="checkbox"/> <sub>2</sub>	<input type="checkbox"/> <sub>3</sub>	<input type="checkbox"/> <sub>4</sub>
6. I often try to convince my friends and my family of my views about politics and society	<input type="checkbox"/> <sub>1</sub>	<input type="checkbox"/> <sub>2</sub>	<input type="checkbox"/> <sub>3</sub>	<input type="checkbox"/> <sub>4</sub>
7. The urgent problems of our country can only be resolved with active and direct participation of the citizens	<input type="checkbox"/> <sub>1</sub>	<input type="checkbox"/> <sub>2</sub>	<input type="checkbox"/> <sub>3</sub>	<input type="checkbox"/> <sub>4</sub>
8. Even if the government acts in a way I do not understand, I would still support it in an election	<input type="checkbox"/> <sub>1</sub>	<input type="checkbox"/> <sub>2</sub>	<input type="checkbox"/> <sub>3</sub>	<input type="checkbox"/> <sub>4</sub>
9. In the present situation, I would be ready to get involved in collective protest in order to try to change things	<input type="checkbox"/> <sub>1</sub>	<input type="checkbox"/> <sub>2</sub>	<input type="checkbox"/> <sub>3</sub>	<input type="checkbox"/> <sub>4</sub>

## PERSONAL RISKS

Here, we would like to know your opinion on different risks. For each of the following events, please tell us to what extent do you think it is likely that they will happen to you during the next few years.

	<i>Very unlikely</i>		<i>Very likely</i>	
1. Be unemployed	<input type="checkbox"/> <sub>1</sub>	<input type="checkbox"/> <sub>2</sub>	<input type="checkbox"/> <sub>3</sub>	<input type="checkbox"/> <sub>4</sub>
2. Be discriminated against because of my ethnicity	<input type="checkbox"/> <sub>1</sub>	<input type="checkbox"/> <sub>2</sub>	<input type="checkbox"/> <sub>3</sub>	<input type="checkbox"/> <sub>4</sub>
3. Not being paid for the work I do	<input type="checkbox"/> <sub>1</sub>	<input type="checkbox"/> <sub>2</sub>	<input type="checkbox"/> <sub>3</sub>	<input type="checkbox"/> <sub>4</sub>
4. Become a victim of violent criminal actions	<input type="checkbox"/> <sub>1</sub>	<input type="checkbox"/> <sub>2</sub>	<input type="checkbox"/> <sub>3</sub>	<input type="checkbox"/> <sub>4</sub>
5. To live in solitude	<input type="checkbox"/> <sub>1</sub>	<input type="checkbox"/> <sub>2</sub>	<input type="checkbox"/> <sub>3</sub>	<input type="checkbox"/> <sub>4</sub>
6. To be sent to war	<input type="checkbox"/> <sub>1</sub>	<input type="checkbox"/> <sub>2</sub>	<input type="checkbox"/> <sub>3</sub>	<input type="checkbox"/> <sub>4</sub>

## ATTRIBUTION OF POVERTY

Many poor people live in our society. For each of the following reasons, please indicate to what extent do you think that they explain poverty.

<b>People are poor because:</b>	<i>Completely disagree</i>		<i>Completely agree</i>	
1. The state doesn't provide them with jobs	<input type="checkbox"/> <sub>1</sub>	<input type="checkbox"/> <sub>2</sub>	<input type="checkbox"/> <sub>3</sub>	<input type="checkbox"/> <sub>4</sub>
2. They do not try hard enough to get out of poverty	<input type="checkbox"/> <sub>1</sub>	<input type="checkbox"/> <sub>2</sub>	<input type="checkbox"/> <sub>3</sub>	<input type="checkbox"/> <sub>4</sub>
3. They just had bad luck	<input type="checkbox"/> <sub>1</sub>	<input type="checkbox"/> <sub>2</sub>	<input type="checkbox"/> <sub>3</sub>	<input type="checkbox"/> <sub>4</sub>
4. Their families did not provide a good education to them	<input type="checkbox"/> <sub>1</sub>	<input type="checkbox"/> <sub>2</sub>	<input type="checkbox"/> <sub>3</sub>	<input type="checkbox"/> <sub>4</sub>
5. The West does not help them enough	<input type="checkbox"/> <sub>1</sub>	<input type="checkbox"/> <sub>2</sub>	<input type="checkbox"/> <sub>3</sub>	<input type="checkbox"/> <sub>4</sub>
6. They belong to the wrong ethnic group	<input type="checkbox"/> <sub>1</sub>	<input type="checkbox"/> <sub>2</sub>	<input type="checkbox"/> <sub>3</sub>	<input type="checkbox"/> <sub>4</sub>
7. Government officials are corrupted and assistance does not reach them	<input type="checkbox"/> <sub>1</sub>	<input type="checkbox"/> <sub>2</sub>	<input type="checkbox"/> <sub>3</sub>	<input type="checkbox"/> <sub>4</sub>

## GENDER POLICIES

	<i>Completely disagree</i>		<i>Completely agree</i>	
1. Women should first of all stay at home and look after their children and their family	<input type="checkbox"/> <sub>1</sub>	<input type="checkbox"/> <sub>2</sub>	<input type="checkbox"/> <sub>3</sub>	<input type="checkbox"/> <sub>4</sub>
2. In Georgia, men get higher salaries than women for the same kind of job	<input type="checkbox"/> <sub>1</sub>	<input type="checkbox"/> <sub>2</sub>	<input type="checkbox"/> <sub>3</sub>	<input type="checkbox"/> <sub>4</sub>
3. Women should get more active in the economic sphere	<input type="checkbox"/> <sub>1</sub>	<input type="checkbox"/> <sub>2</sub>	<input type="checkbox"/> <sub>3</sub>	<input type="checkbox"/> <sub>4</sub>
4. Women should be more active in civil society	<input type="checkbox"/> <sub>1</sub>	<input type="checkbox"/> <sub>2</sub>	<input type="checkbox"/> <sub>3</sub>	<input type="checkbox"/> <sub>4</sub>
5. Women should serve in the army	<input type="checkbox"/> <sub>1</sub>	<input type="checkbox"/> <sub>2</sub>	<input type="checkbox"/> <sub>3</sub>	<input type="checkbox"/> <sub>4</sub>
6. More women should be members of political parties and take part in elections (e.g., there should be a given number of positions reserved for women)	<input type="checkbox"/> <sub>1</sub>	<input type="checkbox"/> <sub>2</sub>	<input type="checkbox"/> <sub>3</sub>	<input type="checkbox"/> <sub>4</sub>

### GROUP IDENTIFICATIONS

People in a country can be in different social groups at the same time. You have a job, a religion, a language, a nationality, you live in a village or in a town, you may belong to a political party – and all these things may be of different importance to you. If somebody asks you what you are, how would you describe yourself ?

**In the first place I feel**

1. ....

2. ....

3. ....

### SOCIAL DISTANCE

To what extent do you agree with the following statements :

	<i>Completely disagree</i>		<i>Completely agree</i>	
1. I prefer to be with people who speak my own language.	<input type="checkbox"/> <sub>1</sub>	<input type="checkbox"/> <sub>2</sub>	<input type="checkbox"/> <sub>3</sub>	<input type="checkbox"/> <sub>4</sub>
2. A good friend is a good friend, it does not matter which ethnic background he / she has	<input type="checkbox"/> <sub>1</sub>	<input type="checkbox"/> <sub>2</sub>	<input type="checkbox"/> <sub>3</sub>	<input type="checkbox"/> <sub>4</sub>
3. I would not mind if a child of mine married someone from a <u>different nationality</u> provided they love each other	<input type="checkbox"/> <sub>1</sub>	<input type="checkbox"/> <sub>2</sub>	<input type="checkbox"/> <sub>3</sub>	<input type="checkbox"/> <sub>4</sub>
4. I feel very close to people of my own nationality, whatever their education, wealth, or political views.	<input type="checkbox"/> <sub>1</sub>	<input type="checkbox"/> <sub>2</sub>	<input type="checkbox"/> <sub>3</sub>	<input type="checkbox"/> <sub>4</sub>
5. I would not mind if a child of mine married someone from a <u>different religion</u> provided they love each other	<input type="checkbox"/> <sub>1</sub>	<input type="checkbox"/> <sub>2</sub>	<input type="checkbox"/> <sub>3</sub>	<input type="checkbox"/> <sub>4</sub>

**Of the following groups and communities, which one counts most for you ?**  
*Please rank-order, with numbers from 1 to 8, the following groups and communities according to the importance of each of them. (1 = most important group, 8 = least important group)*

Example with five groups:

- 5   Neighbourhood
- 3   Labour collective
- 1   Professional group
- 2   Family
- 4   Region

**What counts most for me is:**

- Neighbourhood
- Labour collective
- Professional group
- Family
- Region
- Nation (ethnic group)
- Country
- Group of friends



## RELATIVE DEPRIVATION

	<i>Completely disagree</i>		<i>Completely agree</i>	
1. When I see what rich people have I get angry and want to have the same	<input type="checkbox"/> <sub>1</sub>	<input type="checkbox"/> <sub>2</sub>	<input type="checkbox"/> <sub>3</sub>	<input type="checkbox"/> <sub>4</sub>
2. Unfortunately, people of my nationality live in less favourable conditions than other nationalities in this country	<input type="checkbox"/> <sub>1</sub>	<input type="checkbox"/> <sub>2</sub>	<input type="checkbox"/> <sub>3</sub>	<input type="checkbox"/> <sub>4</sub>

**As regards your life conditions, are you better off or worse off than five years ago ?**

**Are you** (*check only one*):

- <sub>1</sub> Much worse off
- <sub>2</sub> A little bit worse off
- <sub>3</sub> It's still the same, nothing has really changed
- <sub>4</sub> A little bit better off
- <sub>5</sub> Much better off

**Thinking about your life in this country, how do you feel ?**

**Are you** (*check only one*):

- <sub>1</sub> Very satisfied with life as it is
- <sub>2</sub> Just satisfied but not very satisfied with life as it is
- <sub>3</sub> Not satisfied but also not dissatisfied – in the middle
- <sub>4</sub> Dissatisfied with life as it is
- <sub>5</sub> Angry and impatient with life as it is

**When you think about your progress in life, in your work and your home, who do you compare yourself with most often ?** (*several answers possible*)

- <sub>1</sub> People of other nationalities in your country
- <sub>2</sub> People in Russia
- <sub>3</sub> Westerners
- <sub>4</sub> People like you ten years ago
- <sub>5</sub> Rich businessmen
- <sub>6</sub> Your neighbours
- <sub>7</sub> Your schoolmates at university
- <sub>8</sub> With nobody
- <sub>9</sub> People of your own nationality in your country

## POLITICAL EFFICACY

In what ways do you participate in public and political life of the country ?

(Check as many as you like)

- <sub>1</sub> I don't care about politics at all
- <sub>2</sub> I follow public and political events through media
- <sub>3</sub> I participate in public associations and/or organisations
- <sub>4</sub> There's not much I can do
- <sub>5</sub> I am a member of a political party
- <sub>6</sub> I take part in elections
- <sub>7</sub> I am an elected politician
- <sub>8</sub> I take part in political actions (demonstrations, meetings, protest actions, etc.)
- <sub>9</sub> I publish my views and opinions in media

- <sub>10</sub> I try to find a job in another country  
<sub>11</sub> There's nothing I can do  
<sub>12</sub> It's better to wait that things get better

### MEDIA

How often do you get information concerning social and political life through the following communication systems ?

	<i>Never</i>		<i>Very frequently</i>	
1. State sponsored media	<input type="checkbox"/> <sub>1</sub>	<input type="checkbox"/> <sub>2</sub>	<input type="checkbox"/> <sub>3</sub>	<input type="checkbox"/> <sub>4</sub>
2. Opposition media	<input type="checkbox"/> <sub>1</sub>	<input type="checkbox"/> <sub>2</sub>	<input type="checkbox"/> <sub>3</sub>	<input type="checkbox"/> <sub>4</sub>
3. Foreign media (Russian, Turkish, Iranian, Western)	<input type="checkbox"/> <sub>1</sub>	<input type="checkbox"/> <sub>2</sub>	<input type="checkbox"/> <sub>3</sub>	<input type="checkbox"/> <sub>4</sub>
4. Internet	<input type="checkbox"/> <sub>1</sub>	<input type="checkbox"/> <sub>2</sub>	<input type="checkbox"/> <sub>3</sub>	<input type="checkbox"/> <sub>4</sub>
5. Private conversations	<input type="checkbox"/> <sub>1</sub>	<input type="checkbox"/> <sub>2</sub>	<input type="checkbox"/> <sub>3</sub>	<input type="checkbox"/> <sub>4</sub>
6. Public debates	<input type="checkbox"/> <sub>1</sub>	<input type="checkbox"/> <sub>2</sub>	<input type="checkbox"/> <sub>3</sub>	<input type="checkbox"/> <sub>4</sub>

### Personal information

We remind you that all information will be treated confidentially and anonymously

1. Gender : <sub>1</sub> male <sub>2</sub> female

2. Age: \_\_\_\_\_ years

3. Place of residence : \_\_\_\_\_

4. Place of birth : \_\_\_\_\_

#### 5. Mother tongue

- Russian..... <sub>1</sub>      Abkhazian . <sub>5</sub>  
 Georgian... <sub>2</sub>      Azeri..... <sub>6</sub>  
 Armenian .. <sub>3</sub>      Ossetian .... <sub>7</sub>  
 Kurdish..... <sub>4</sub>      other..... <sub>8</sub>

#### 6. Language that you use everyday

- Russian..... <sub>1</sub>      Abkhazian . <sub>5</sub>  
 Georgian... <sub>2</sub>      Azeri..... <sub>6</sub>  
 Armenian .. <sub>3</sub>      Ossetian .... <sub>7</sub>  
 Kurdish..... <sub>4</sub>      other..... <sub>8</sub>

#### 7. Your nationality (ethnic group)

- Russian..... <sub>1</sub>      Ossetian .... <sub>9</sub>  
 Georgian... <sub>2</sub>      Assyrian .... <sub>10</sub>  
 Armenian .. <sub>3</sub>      Greek ..... <sub>11</sub>  
 Azer ..... <sub>4</sub>      Daghestani <sub>12</sub>  
 Talish ..... <sub>5</sub>      Jew..... <sub>13</sub>  
 Avar ..... <sub>6</sub>      Kurd ..... <sub>14</sub>  
 Lezhgin ..... <sub>7</sub>      other..... <sub>15</sub>  
 Abkhaz..... <sub>8</sub>

**8. Your religion**

- |   |   |
|---|---|
| Russian Orthodox <input type="checkbox"/>   | Judaism ..... <input type="checkbox"/>  |
| Georgian Orthodox <input type="checkbox"/>  | Protestant .. <input type="checkbox"/>  |
| Armenian Apostolic <input type="checkbox"/> | Evangelist .. <input type="checkbox"/>  |
| Shiite ..... <input type="checkbox"/>       | Catholic ..... <input type="checkbox"/> |
| Sunni ..... <input type="checkbox"/>        | Mormon ..... <input type="checkbox"/>   |
| Wahhabite ..... <input type="checkbox"/>    | Pentacostal <input type="checkbox"/>    |
| Jehovah`s witness <input type="checkbox"/>  | other ..... <input type="checkbox"/>    |
| Baptist ..... <input type="checkbox"/>      | none ..... <input type="checkbox"/>     |

**9. Are you an university student/staff ?**      yes \_1      no \_2

*If yes, please indicate your University and faculty:* \_\_\_\_\_

**10. Do you work ?**      yes \_1      no \_2

*If yes, please describe your jobs:* \_\_\_\_\_

**11. Did you travel professionally or as a tourist in the last five years ?**    yes \_1      no \_2

*If yes, please indicate in which countries you have travelled :*

- |                                       |                                   |                                     |                                     |
|---------------------------------------|-----------------------------------|-------------------------------------|-------------------------------------|
| Armenia .... <input type="checkbox"/> | Europe <input type="checkbox"/>   | Turkey.... <input type="checkbox"/> | other..... <input type="checkbox"/> |
| Azerbaijan. <input type="checkbox"/>  | Russia . <input type="checkbox"/> | Iran..... <input type="checkbox"/>  | USA..... <input type="checkbox"/>   |

**We thank you for your collaboration !**

**If you have any comments on this questionnaire, please write them on the back of this page.**

## 9.6 National citizenship legislation

### 9.6.1 Georgia

Legislation relevant to citizenship in Georgia can be found in the Constitution of Georgia (August, 1995), as well as in the following specific laws:

#### *Civil sphere:*

- The law on emigration (1993-20-07)
- The law on immigration (1993-27-07)
- The law on ombudsman (1996-16-05)
- The law on rallies and demonstrations (1997-12-06)
- The law on IDPs (1993-28-06)
- The law on adoption (1997-17-10)
- The law on non-military alternative service (1997-28-10)
- The law on full abolishment of the extraordinary punishment - death penalty (1997-11-11)
- The law on acknowledgement of Georgian citizens as victims of political repression and their social protection (1997-11-12)
- The law on refugees (1998-18-02)
- The law on state support of children and youth unions (1999-22-06)
- The law on imprisonment (1999-22-07)
- The law on the rights of patients (2000-05-05)

#### *Political sphere:*

- The law on parliamentary elections (1995-01-09)
- The law on presidential elections (1995-01-09)
- The law on referendum (1995-15-05)
- The law on political associations of citizens (1997-31-10)
- The law on elections of local representative bodies - *sakrebulo* (1998-25-06)

#### *Social sphere*

- The law on social protection of the invalids (1995-14-06)

- The law on protection of consumer rights (1996-20-03)
- The law on trade unions (1997-02-04)
- The law on the scheme of calculating the subsistence level (1997-17-04)
- The law on medical insurance (1997-18-04)
- The law on insurance (1997-02-05)
- The law on education (1997-27-06)
- The law on public health care (1997-10-12)
- The law on non-state pension insurance and maintenance (1998-30-10)
- The law on the procedure of settling collective conflicts at work (1998-30-10)
- The law on primary professional education (1998-09-12)
- The law on protection of cultural heritage (1999-25-06)

Among other important legislative acts, which are connected with citizens' legal guarantees, one must note the following ones:

- The law on the constitutional court (1996-31-01)
- The law on independent arbitration (1997-17-04)
- The civil code of Georgia (1997-26-06)
- The law on military service and military obligation (1997-17-09)
- The general administrative code of Georgia (1999-25-06)
- and etc.

## 9.6.2 Armenia

### **The Law of the Republic of Armenia on the Citizenship of the Republic of Armenia**

#### **Charter 1**

#### **General Provisions**

##### ***Article 1. Citizenship of the Republic of Armenia.***

The Order of acquisition and the termination of the citizenship of the Republic of Armenia shall be qualified by this Law. A person shall lose citizenship of the Republic of Armenia following the termination of citizenship.

Every person in the Republic of Armenia has the right to acquire citizenship in the manner prescribed by Law. Ethnic Armenians shall acquire citizenship of the Republic of Armenia in a simplified way.

A citizen of the Republic of Armenia cannot simultaneously hold citizenship of another state.

A citizen of the Republic of Armenia cannot be deprived of the citizenship of the Republic of Armenia or of the right to change citizenship except in cases prescribed by this Law. Change of citizenship of the Republic of Armenia shall be regulated by this Law and international treaties.

Rejection of citizenship of the Republic of Armenia shall not lead to automatic loss of citizenship of the Republic of Armenia.

##### ***Article 2. Legislation of the Republic of Armenia on Citizenship***

The legislation of the Republic of Armenia on citizenship includes the Constitution of the Republic of Armenia, international treaties of the Republic of Armenia, this Law and other legal acts of the Republic of Armenia. The norms qualified in the international treaties adopted by the Republic of Armenia prevail over the norms of this Law.

##### ***Article 3. Citizen of the Republic of Armenia***

Citizens of the Republic of Armenia are the persons who have acquired the citizenship of the Republic of Armenia according to this Law. The Citizens of the Republic of Armenia are equal before the Law, irrespective of the basis of the acquisition of the citizenship, nationality, race, sex, language, religion, political and other opinions, social origin, property and position; enjoy all rights, freedoms and have obligations qualified by the Constitution and laws.

***Article 4. Documents Establishing Citizenship of the Republic of Armenia.***

The documents establishing the citizenship of the Republic of Armenia are: the passport of the citizen of the Republic of Armenia and, prior to age of 16, the birth certificate or the certificate confirming citizenship of the Republic of Armenia.

***Article 5. Prohibition of extraditing Citizens of the Republic of Armenia to Another State.***

It is prohibited to extradite citizens of the Republic of Armenia to another state.

***Article 6. Preservation of Citizenship of the Republic of Armenia.***

Residence outside the territory of the Republic of Armenia shall not result in automatic loss of citizenship of the Republic of Armenia

Marriage of a citizen of the Republic of Armenia to a foreigner shall not result in automatic loss of citizenship of the Republic of Armenia.

Change of citizenship by one spouse shall not cause change of citizenship of the other spouse.

***Article 7. Protection of Citizens of the Republic of Armenia Outside the Republic***

The citizens of the Republic of Armenia shall enjoy the protection and patronage of the Republic of Armenia.

Republic of Armenia, its diplomatic and consular missions and their officials shall protect the rights of the citizens of the Republic of Armenia abroad and take measures towards the restoration of the infringed rights of the citizens of the Republic of Armenia according to the legislation of the host country and international treaties.

***Article 8. Foreign Citizens and Stateless Persons.***

A person not holding citizenship of the Republic of Armenia and holding citizenship of another state shall be considered as a foreign citizen.

A person with no citizenship of the Republic of Armenia residing in the territory of the Republic of Armenia and having no proof of citizenship of another state shall be considered as a stateless person.

The Republic of Armenia shall encourage acquisition of citizenship of the Republic of Armenia by stateless persons and shall not hinder acquisition of citizenship of another state by them. The legal status of foreign citizens and stateless persons in the territory of the Republic of Armenia shall be governed by the legislation of the Republic of Armenia and the international treaties of the Republic of Armenia.

**Charter 2****Acquisition of Citizenship of the Republic of Armenia.*****Article 9 Basis for Acquisition of Citizenship of the Republic of Armenia.***

The citizenship of the Republic of Armenia shall be acquired:

1. through recognition of citizenship;
2. by birth;
3. through acceptance into citizenship;
4. through restoration of the citizenship;
5. through group acceptance into citizenship;
6. by the basis prescribed by the international treaties of the Republic of Armenia;
7. in other cases provided by this Law.

***Article 10. Recognition of Citizenship of the Republic of Armenia.***

The following persons shall be recognized as citizens of the Republic of Armenia:

1. Citizens of the former Arm. SSR permanently residing in the territory of the Republic of Armenia, who have not acquired citizenship of the another state before the enactment of the Constitution or have rejected that Citizenship within one year from the day of the enactment of this Law;
2. Stateless persons or the citizens of other Republics of the former USSR who are not foreigners, who were permanently residing in the territory of the Republic of Armenia for the last three years till the day of the enactment of this Law and have applied for acquisition of the citizenship of the Republic of Armenia within one year from the day of the enactment of this Law;
3. The citizens of the former Arm. SSR who have been residing abroad since 21 September 1991, who have not acquired citizenship of another state, as well as ethnic Armenians, who were citizens of the former Arm. SSR having resided abroad before that and not having acquired citizenship of another state and were registered with the consulate of the Republic of Armenia by the day of the enactment of this Law.

***Article 11. Citizenship of a Child Born from Citizens of the Republic of Armenia.***

A child, whose parents hold citizenship of the Republic of Armenia at the moment of his/her birth, shall acquire citizenship of the Republic of Armenia regardless of the place of birth. A child, whose one parent holds citizenship of the Republic of Armenia at the moment of his/her birth, while the other parent is unknown or is a stateless person, shall acquire citizenship of the Republic of Armenia.



In case one of the parents holds citizenship of the Republic of Armenia at the moment of the child's birth and the other parent is a foreign citizen, the child's citizenship shall be determined based on a written consent of both parents.

In case of absence of such consent the child shall acquire citizenship of the Republic of Armenia if he/she was born in the territory of the Republic of Armenia, or if he/she might become a stateless person unless he/she acquires citizenship of the Republic of Armenia, or if the parents permanently reside in the territory of the Republic of Armenia.

***Article 12. Citizenship of a Child of Stateless persons.***

A child of stateless persons born in the territory of the Republic of Armenia, shall acquire citizenship of the Republic of Armenia.

***Article 13. Acceptance into the Citizenship of the Republic of Armenia.***

Any person 18 years of age not holding citizenship of the Republic of Armenia may apply to be accepted into the citizenship of the Republic of Armenia, if he/she has resided in the territory of the Republic of Armenia as prescribed by Law for the last 3 years, has basic knowledge of the Armenian language and is familiar with the Constitution of the Republic of Armenia.

Acceptance into the citizenship of the Republic of Armenia shall be performed according to the decree of the President of the Republic of Armenia on granting citizenship.

A person with no citizenship of the Republic of Armenia may be accepted into the citizenship of the Republic of Armenia without the requirement of residence, if he/she:

1. Marries a citizen of the Republic of Armenia or has a child, father or mother who are citizens of the Republic of Armenia;
2. Has parents or at least one parent that had formerly held citizenship of the Republic of Armenia, or were born in the territory of the Republic of Armenia and applied for the citizenship of the Republic of Armenia within 3 years upon coming the age of 18;
3. Is Armenian by origin and has settled in the territory of the Republic of Armenia.

The petition to be accepted into the citizenship of the Republic of Armenia may be rejected, if the actions of the applicant hazard the state and social security, public order, public health and traditions or rights, freedoms, dignity and good reputation of other persons.

Citizenship of the Republic of Armenia can be granted regardless of the provisions of this Article to persons who have provided exceptional services to the Republic of Armenia.

The person accepting the citizenship of the Republic of Armenia administers the following oath: " I, (name, surname) becoming the citizen of the Republic of Armenia, swear to be loyal to the Republic of Armenia, to comply with the Constitution and the legislation of the Republic of Armenia, to defend the independence and the territorial integrity of the Republic of Armenia. I take

up responsibility to respect the state language, the national culture and the traditions of the Republic of Armenia.”

The person accepting the citizenship of the Republic of Armenia shall read the text of the oath in Armenian and sign it.

***Article 14. Restoration of Citizenship of the Republic of Armenia***

A person having lost the citizenship of the Republic of Armenia may, upon his/her request, have it restored, if the requirements of item 4 of Article 13 of this Law, provided he/she was not deprived of the citizenship of the Republic of Armenia.

***Article 15. Group Acceptance into Citizenship of the Republic of Armenia***

Group acceptance into the citizenship of the Republic of Armenia upon repatriation or other cases prescribed by Law shall be performed by the decree of the President of the Republic.

**Charter 3**

**Citizenship of Child in Cases of Change of Citizenship of Parents or Adoption.**

***Article 16. Citizenship of child in Case of acquisition by Parents of Citizenship of Republic of Armenia.***

A child under 14, whose parents have acquired citizenship of the Republic of Armenia, shall acquire citizenship of the Republic of Armenia.

If one of the parents has acquired citizenship of the Republic of Armenia, while the other is a foreign citizen or stateless person, their child under 14 years shall acquire citizenship of the Republic of Armenia, if there is a consent of both parents, or if the child resides in the territory of the Republic of Armenia, and consent of the parent holding citizenship of the Republic of Armenia.

***Article 17. Citizenship of Child in Case of Loss of Citizenship of the Republic of Armenia by Parents***

A child under 14, whose parents have lost citizenship of the Republic of Armenia, shall lose citizenship of the Republic of Armenia, if he/she acquires citizenship of another state.

If one of the parents has lost citizenship of the Republic of Armenia, while the other is a citizen of the Republic of Armenia, their child under 14 shall lose citizenship of the Republic of Armenia, if consent of his/her parents exists or if the child resides outside the territory of the Republic of Armenia and, consent of the parent holding citizenship of the Republic of Armenia exists.

***Article 18. Citizenship of Child in Case of Adoption***

A child adopted by citizens of the Republic of Armenia shall acquire citizenship of the Republic of Armenia.

If one of the adopting spouses is a stateless person, while the other is citizen of the Republic of Armenia, the child shall acquire citizenship of the Republic of Armenia.

If one of the adopting spouses is a foreign citizen, while the other is a citizen of the Republic of Armenia, the child shall acquire citizenship of the Republic of Armenia, provided:

1. the consent of the spouses exists;
2. the child resides in the territory of the Republic of Armenia and consent of the parent holding citizenship of the Republic of Armenia exists;
3. the child is or may become a stateless person.

***Article 19. Preservation of Citizenship of the Republic of Armenia in Case of Adoption.***

A child holding citizenship of the Republic of Armenia adopted by foreign citizens, or a married couple one of the spouses being a foreign citizen while the other holding citizenship of the Republic of Armenia, shall retain citizenship of the Republic of Armenia. In such a case a child may relinquish citizenship of the Republic of Armenia only through an application by his/her adopting parents. A child, holding the citizenship of the Republic of Armenia adopted by stateless persons or a married couple one of the spouses being a stateless person, while the other holding citizenship of the Republic of Armenia, shall retain citizenship of the Republic of Armenia.

***Article 20. Citizenship of a Child whose Parents are Unknown***

A child residing in the territory of the Republic of Armenia, whose parents are unknown, shall be a citizen of the Republic of Armenia. In case of discovery of at least one of the parents or a guardian, the citizenship of the child may be changed according to this Law.

***Article 21. Preservation of Citizenship of a Child in Custody or Guardianship***

A child holding citizenship of the Republic of Armenia being in custody or guardianship of citizens of the Republic of Armenia, shall retain citizenship of the Republic of Armenia, regardless of the fact of rejection of the citizenship of the Republic of Armenia by parents. In such a case the child can relinquish citizenship of the Republic of Armenia based on an application filed by his/her parents if they are not deprived of their parents' right.

***Article 22. Requirement of the Child's Consent upon Changing his/her Citizenship.***

In case of changing the citizenship parents, citizenship of the children between 14-18 years of age shall change in accordance with this Law, with the consent of the children.

## **Charter 4**

### **Cessation of Citizenship of the Republic of Armenia.**

***Article 23. Basis for Cessation of Citizenship of the Republic of Armenia.***

The citizenship of the Republic of Armenia ceases:

1. In case of changing the citizenship of the Republic of Armenia;
2. In case of losing the citizenship of the Republic of Armenia;
3. In cases provided for by the international treaties of the Republic of Armenia
4. based on the provisions of this Law.

***Article 24. Change of Citizenship of the Republic of Armenia.***

Any citizen of the Republic of Armenia under 18 years of age, may change the citizenship of the Republic of Armenia - give up citizenship of the Republic of Armenia and acquire citizenship of another state.

The request for giving up the citizenship of the Republic of Armenia may be rejected, if the person giving up the citizenship

1. is under arrest;
2. is convicted by the decision or sentence of court and is pending punishment;
3. if hazards the state security interests of the Republic of Armenia;
4. has liabilities related to interests of the state, companies or citizens.

***Article 25. Loss of Citizenship of the Republic of Armenia.***

The citizenship of the Republic of Armenia may be considered lost:

1. if the person has acquired citizenship of the Republic of Armenia in accordance with Article 13 of this Law, has permanently resided abroad failing to register with the consular section for 7 years without reasonable justification;
2. if the citizenship of the Republic of Armenia has been acquired through false information or documents;
3. if the person has acquired citizenship of another state, violating the legislation of the Republic of Armenia on citizenship.

**Charter 5****Entities Regulating Issues Related to Citizenship of the Republic of Armenia.*****Article 26. The President of the Republic of Armenia.***

The President of the Republic of Armenia shall decree on the issues of acquisition of the citizenship of the Republic of Armenia, restoration of the citizenship of the Republic of Armenia, group acceptance into the citizenship of the Republic of Armenia, cessation of the Citizenship of the Republic of Armenia, shall determine the procedure of processing applications concerning citizenship.

***Article 27. The Commission for Matters of Citizenship under the President's Office.***

The President of the Republic shall establish a Commission for matters of citizenship under the President's Office. The Charter of the Commission shall be approved by the President of the Republic of Armenia.

***Article 28. The Government***

The Government shall:

1. ensure the conformity of the decrees of the Government, ministries and other governmental agencies with this Law;
2. define the procedure of processing and issuing documents establishing the citizenship of the Republic of Armenia.
3. define the list of the required documents for acquisition and cessation of the citizenship;
4. pass decrees to ensure enactment of this Law.

Via relevant entities, the Government shall:

1. Receive applications and other documents concerning the citizenship of the Republic of Armenia, verify their authenticity and substantiality;
2. Forward the applications, petitions and other similar documents along with relevant conclusions to the President of the Republic of Armenia;
3. Present the recommendations on cessation of the citizenship of the Republic of Armenia to the President of the Republic of Armenia;
4. Perform registration of the citizens of the Republic of Armenia;
5. Establish whether or not a person residing in the territory of the Republic of Armenia holds citizenship of the Republic of Armenia, as prescribed by this law.

**Charter 6****Lawsuits Related to Citizenship of the Republic of Armenia.*****Article 29. Proceedings Filing and Processing Applications, Petitions on Issues of Citizenship of the Republic of Armenia.***

The written form of applications, petitions concerning citizenship shall be mandatory.

The applications concerning the issues of citizenship shall be processed within one year. In case of refusal, an application may be re-filed after a year from the day of refusal, as prescribed by this Article.

***Article 30. Appealing Against Illegal Actions of Officials in Matters of Citizenship.***

Officials' refusal to accept applications concerning citizenship, breach of processing dates and other illegal actions may be appealed against to the court.

## Other citizenship laws in Armenia

### *Political Sphere*

- RA Constitution, 05.07. 1995
- RA elective legislation, which includes the elections of RA President, RA National Assembly (parliament), local self-governing bodies, 10.10. 1999.
- RA Law on social-political organizations, 26.02. 1991.
- RA Law on NGOs, 01.11. 1996.
- Law on RA citizenship 16.11.1995.
- The requirement of the order of presenting the materials about getting a special status of living in the Republic of Armenia to RA President, 03.01. 1995.
- RA Law on press and other means of media, 08.10. 1991.
- RA Law on local self-governing, 25.07. 1996.
- Law on the legal status of foreign citizens in the Republic of Armenia, 17.06. 1994.

### *Civil Rights*

Political rights are regulated by the following legal sources:

- RA Constitution, 05.07. 1995.
- RA Law on freedom of conscience and religious organizations, 17.06. 1991.
- RA Law on Refugees, 03.03.1999.
- Law of the Republic of Armenia on imprisoned people, 14.06. 1994.

### *Social Rights*

Social rights are regulated by the following legal sources:

- RA Constitution, 05.07. 1995.
- RA Law on providing state pensions to citizens of the Republic of Armenia, 06.12. 1995.
- RA Law on conditions of establishing working pensions for long-term service, 1996.05.03.
- RA Law on social security of disabled people in the Republic of Armenia, 1993.24.05.

- Law of the Republic of Armenia on social security of military servants and members of their families, 1993.07.01.
- The order of RA President on motherhood and childhood protection, 1996.29.03.
- Regulation for the order of establishing and paying monthly pensions to lonely mothers, 1995.01.07.
- Regulation for the order of establishing and paying monthly benefits to people, who have children under two years old for taking care of them, 1995.01.07.
- RA Law on employment of the population, 1996.26.12.
- RA Law on education, 1999.14.04.
- RA Law on privatization of state and public funds, 1993.29.06.
- RA Law on medical aid of population and service, 1996.04.04.
- RA Law on authority rights and related rights, 1996.27.05.

Political, civil and social rights are also regulated by the following legal documents:

- RA civil legislation, 1998.05.05.
- RA civil judgment legislation, 1998.09.09.
- RA criminal judgment legislation, 1998.01.07.
- RA Law on Policy, 2001. 16.04.
- RA Law on mediate courts and mediate judgments, 1998.05.05.
- RA on RA public prosecutor, 1998.01.07.
- RA Law on documentary activity, 1998.18.06.
- RA Law on court formulation, 1998.18.06.
- RA Law on judge status, 1998.17.06.

### 9.6.3 Azerbaijan

Among other legislative acts, one must note the following laws.

- Family Code of Azerbaijan Republic (01-06-2000)
- Civil Code of Azerbaijan Republic (01-09-2000)
- Criminal Code of Azerbaijan Republic (01-09-2000)
- Code of Civil Procedure of Azerbaijan Republic (01-09-2000)
- Code of Criminal Procedure of Azerbaijan Republic (01-09-2000)
- Code of Administrative Delinquencies of Azerbaijan Republic (01-09-2000)
- Labor Code of Azerbaijan Republic (01-07-1999)
- Law of Azerbaijan Republic “About Legislation acts of Azerbaijan Republic” (06-09-1994)
- Law of Azerbaijan Republic “About refugees & IDPs status ” (21-05-1999)
- Law of Azerbaijan Republic “ About Registration on Residence “ (04-04-1996)
- Law of Azerbaijan Republic “About Education” (07-10-1992)
- Law of Azerbaijan Republic “About Social defense of IDPs” (21-05-1999)
- State Program “On Refugees’ and IDPs’ problem solution” (06-09-1998)
- Law of Azerbaijan Republic “ About Departure, Entrance and Passports” (14-06-94)
- Law of Azerbaijan Republic “ About Health defense of the population “ (26-06-97)
- Tax Code of Azerbaijan Republic (01-01-2001)
- Law of Azerbaijan Republic “About Freedom of Conscience” (20-08-1992)
- Law of Azerbaijan Republic “About Social Associations” (10-11-1992)
- Law of Azerbaijan Republic “About Political Parties” (25-06-1992)
- Law of Azerbaijan Republic “About Non-Governmental Organizations (social associations and funds)” (06-10-2000)
- Law of Azerbaijan Republic “About Business Activity” (15-12-1992)
- Law of Azerbaijan Republic “About Elections of the President of the Azerbaijan Republic” (09-06-1998)
- Law of Azerbaijan Republic “About Elections to the Milli Mejlis (Parliament) of the Azerbaijan Republic” (05-07-2000)
- Law of Azerbaijan Republic “About Procedures of the Election to the Local Communities” (02-07-1999)
- Law of Azerbaijan Republic “About Trend Unions” (24-02-1994)
- Law of Azerbaijan Republic “About Freedom of Assembly” (13-11-98)