Moral hazard and the demand for physician services: first lessons from a French natural experiment

Details

Serval ID
serval:BIB_F8FCB6EEE045
Type
Article: article from journal or magazin.
Collection
Publications
Title
Moral hazard and the demand for physician services: first lessons from a French natural experiment
Journal
European Economic Review
Author(s)
Geoffard, P.-Y., Chiappori, P.-A., Durand, F. 
Publication state
Published
Issued date
1998
Volume
42
Number
3-5
Pages
499-511
Abstract
This paper presents empirical results on moral hazard in demand for medical care, using a longitudinal dataset on 4578
individuals followed during two years. The dataset contains two subgroups, one for which a copayment rate of 10% for physician
visits was introduced in 1994, and an other for which no change occurred during the period of the study. This enables us to use
these data as coming from a controlled natural experiment. We test if the number of visits per agent was modified by this
copayment rate. The data reject the hypothesis for office visits, but do not for home visits. This suggests that there is moral
hazard in demand for some physician services, but also that when non-monetary costs are important, small changes in monetary
price may not induce any major change in behavior.
Keywords
Health insurance, Empiral contract theory, Demand for health care, Moral hazard, Natural experiment
Create date
19/11/2007 10:55
Last modification date
20/08/2019 16:24
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