Article: article from journal or magazin.
Causal Warrant for Realism about Particle Physics
Journal for General Philosophy of Science
The final publication is available at http://link.springer.com
While scientific realism generally assumes that successful scientific explanations yield information about reality, realists also have to admit that not all information acquired in this way is equally well warranted. Some versions of scientific realism do this by saying that explanatory posits with which we have established some kind of causal contact are better warranted than those that merely appear in theoretical hypotheses. I first explicate this distinction by considering some general criteria that permit us to distinguish causal warrant from theoretical warrant. I then apply these criteria to a specific case from particle physics, claiming that scientific realism has to incorporate the distinction between causal and theoretical warrant if it is to be an adequate stance in the philosophy of particle physics.
Causal explanation, Entity realism, Inference to the best explanation, Neutrino, Particle physics, Scientific realism
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