The Juxtaposition of Social Surveillance Controls with Traditional Organizational Design Components

Details

Serval ID
serval:BIB_F2CC1E6C753A
Type
Article: article from journal or magazin.
Collection
Publications
Title
The Juxtaposition of Social Surveillance Controls with Traditional Organizational Design Components
Journal
Contemporary Accounting Research
Author(s)
Widener S. K., Shackell M. B., Demers E. A.
ISSN
0823-9150
1911-3846
Publication state
Published
Issued date
01/07/2008
Peer-reviewed
Oui
Volume
25
Number
2
Pages
605-638
Language
english
Abstract
This study investigates how the relatively contemporary phenomenon of social surveillance controls, such as the use of teams and managerial monitoring, affects the design of the firm's more traditional organizational architecture, which is classically defined to consist of three primary components: incentive compensation, the delegation of decision rights, and performance measurement. We find that vertical surveillance (i.e., high-level monitoring) substitutes for delegation while horizontal surveillance (i.e., teams) substitutes for incentives. We find that the allocation of decision rights is positively associated with the use of incentives and that the use of incentives and reliance on,output-based performance measures are complements. Overall, our-data support the general notion that there are complementarities and substitutes among and between social surveillance controls and traditional organizational design components. Our study has implications for managers and boards responsible for organizational design decisions at the departmental or smaller business unit level.
Web of science
Create date
24/07/2018 8:29
Last modification date
20/08/2019 16:19
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