The Juxtaposition of Social Surveillance Controls with Traditional Organizational Design Components

Détails

ID Serval
serval:BIB_F2CC1E6C753A
Type
Article: article d'un périodique ou d'un magazine.
Collection
Publications
Titre
The Juxtaposition of Social Surveillance Controls with Traditional Organizational Design Components
Périodique
Contemporary Accounting Research
Auteur(s)
Widener S. K., Shackell M. B., Demers E. A.
ISSN
0823-9150
1911-3846
Statut éditorial
Publié
Date de publication
01/07/2008
Peer-reviewed
Oui
Volume
25
Numéro
2
Pages
605-638
Langue
anglais
Résumé
This study investigates how the relatively contemporary phenomenon of social surveillance controls, such as the use of teams and managerial monitoring, affects the design of the firm's more traditional organizational architecture, which is classically defined to consist of three primary components: incentive compensation, the delegation of decision rights, and performance measurement. We find that vertical surveillance (i.e., high-level monitoring) substitutes for delegation while horizontal surveillance (i.e., teams) substitutes for incentives. We find that the allocation of decision rights is positively associated with the use of incentives and that the use of incentives and reliance on,output-based performance measures are complements. Overall, our-data support the general notion that there are complementarities and substitutes among and between social surveillance controls and traditional organizational design components. Our study has implications for managers and boards responsible for organizational design decisions at the departmental or smaller business unit level.
Web of science
Création de la notice
24/07/2018 9:29
Dernière modification de la notice
27/08/2018 15:42
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