Hospital price regulation and expenditure cap policy

Détails

ID Serval
serval:BIB_BF7DCC9E9518
Type
Article: article d'un périodique ou d'un magazine.
Collection
Publications
Titre
Hospital price regulation and expenditure cap policy
Périodique
Journal of Health Economics
Auteur(s)
Mougeot Michel, Naegelen Florence
ISSN
0167-6296
Statut éditorial
Publié
Date de publication
2005
Peer-reviewed
Oui
Volume
24
Numéro
1
Pages
55-72
Langue
anglais
Résumé
In several European countries, governments have chosen to put a global budget cap on health care expenditure. This paper analyzes the strategies of the providers facing this policy and evaluates its effects on provider and patient surplus. We consider this policy when it is applied to local monopoly hospitals and when it is applied to hospitals playing as Cournot competitors. Using a two-stage model to characterize the optimal expenditure cap policy taking the hospitals' optimal responses as given, we prove that this policy induces a level of welfare lower than the first-best outcome. However, we show that a second-best outcome may be achieved under this policy when the number of hospitals becomes large. [Authors]
Mots-clé
Health Expenditures , Hospital Charges , Public Policy
Pubmed
Création de la notice
14/03/2008 11:12
Dernière modification de la notice
03/03/2018 21:03
Données d'usage