Separating selection and incentive effects in health insurance

Détails

ID Serval
serval:BIB_94F60482D344
Type
Rapport: document publié par une institution, habituellement élément d'une série.
Sous-type
Working paper: document de travail dans lequel l'auteur présente les résultats de ses travaux de recherche. Les working papers ont pour but de stimuler les discussions scientifiques avec les milieux intéressés et servent de base pour la publication d'articles dans des revues spécialisées.
Collection
Publications
Titre
Separating selection and incentive effects in health insurance
Auteur(s)
Gardiol Lucien, Geoffard Pierre-Yves, Grandchamp Chantal
Editeur
PSE, Ecole Normale Supérieure
Institution
Paris-Jourdan Sciences économiques
Adresse
Paris
Date de publication
2005
Numéro
2005-38
Genre
Working paper
Langue
anglais
Nombre de pages
44
Résumé
This paper provides an analysis of the health insurance and health care consumption. A structural microeconomic model of joint demand for health insurance and health care is developed and estimated using full maximum likelihood method using Swiss insurance claims data for over 60 000 adult individuals. The estimation strategy relies on the institutional features of the Swiss system, in which each individual chooses among the same menu of contracts, ranked by the size of their deductible. The empirical analysis shows strong and robust evidence of selection effects. Nevertheless, once selection effects are controlled for, an important incentive effect ("ex-post moral hazard") remains. A decrease in the copayment rate from 100% to 10% increases the marginal demand for health care by about 90% and from 100% to 0% by about 150%. The correlation between insurance coverage and health care expenditures may be decomposed into the two effects: 75% may be attributed to selection, and 25 % to incentive effects. [Authors]
Mots-clé
Insurance, Health , Health Services Needs and Demand
Création de la notice
14/03/2008 11:12
Dernière modification de la notice
03/03/2018 19:38
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