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Coalitional Strategy-Proofness in Economies with Single-Dipped Preferences and the Assignment of an Indivisible Object
Games and Economic Behavior
We study two allocation models. In the first model, we consider the problem of allocating an infinitely divisible commodity among agents with single-dipped preferences. In the second model, a degenerate case of the first one, we study the allocation of an indivisible object to a group of agents. Our main result is the characterization of the class of Pareto optimal and coalitionally strategy-proof allocation rules. Alternatively, this class of rules, which largely consists of serially dictatorial components, can be characterized by Pareto optimality, strategy-proofness, and weak non-bossiness tin terms of welfare). Furthermore, we study properties of fairness such as anonymity and no-envy.
Single-dipped preferences, (Coalitional) strategy-proofness, Non-bossiness in terms of welfare, Serial-dictatorship
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