Strategy-Proofness, Solidarity, and Consistency for Multiple Assignment Problems

Details

Serval ID
serval:BIB_0E918133F57A
Type
Article: article from journal or magazin.
Collection
Publications
Title
Strategy-Proofness, Solidarity, and Consistency for Multiple Assignment Problems
Journal
International Journal of Game Theory
Author(s)
Klaus B., Miyagawa E.
ISSN
0020-7276
Publication state
Published
Issued date
2002
Peer-reviewed
Oui
Volume
30
Number
3
Pages
421-435
Language
english
Abstract
We consider a problem of allocating indivisible objects when agents may desire to consume more than one object and no monetary transfers are allowed. We are interested in allocation rules that satisfy desirable properties from an economic and social point of view. In addition to strategy-proofness and Pareto efficiency, we consider consistency and two solidarity properties (replacement-domination and population-monotonicity). In most of the cases, these properties are satisfied only by serially dictatorial rules.
Keywords
Serial dictatorship, Strategy-proofness, Population-monotonicity, Consistency
Web of science
Create date
11/05/2010 14:33
Last modification date
20/08/2019 12:35
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