The metaphysical underdetermination of time-reversal invariance.
Détails
Télécharger: s11229-023-04039-z.pdf (313.56 [Ko])
Etat: Public
Version: Final published version
Licence: CC BY 4.0
Etat: Public
Version: Final published version
Licence: CC BY 4.0
ID Serval
serval:BIB_FB96A07A112F
Type
Article: article d'un périodique ou d'un magazine.
Collection
Publications
Institution
Titre
The metaphysical underdetermination of time-reversal invariance.
Périodique
Synthese
ISSN
0039-7857 (Print)
ISSN-L
0039-7857
Statut éditorial
Publié
Date de publication
2023
Peer-reviewed
Oui
Volume
201
Numéro
1
Pages
29
Langue
anglais
Notes
Publication types: Journal Article
Publication Status: ppublish
Publication Status: ppublish
Résumé
In this paper I argue that the concept of time-reversal invariance in physics suffers from metaphysical underdetermination, that is, that the concept may be understood differently depending on one's metaphysics about time, laws, and a theory's basic properties. This metaphysical under-determinacy also affects subsidiary debates in philosophy of physics that rely on the concept of time-reversal invariance, paradigmatically the problem of the arrow of time. I bring up three cases that, I believe, fairly illustrate my point. I conclude, on the one hand, that any formal representation of time reversal should be explicit about the metaphysical assumptions of the concept that it intends to represent; on the other, that philosophical arguments that rely on time reversal to argue against a direction of time require additional premises.
Mots-clé
Classical electromagnetism, Classical mechanics, Direction of time, Laws, Quantum mechanics, Time, Time reversal
Pubmed
Web of science
Open Access
Oui
Création de la notice
06/03/2023 10:33
Dernière modification de la notice
19/07/2023 7:17