Moral hazard and the demand for physician services: first lessons from a French natural experiment
Détails
ID Serval
serval:BIB_F8FCB6EEE045
Type
Article: article d'un périodique ou d'un magazine.
Collection
Publications
Institution
Titre
Moral hazard and the demand for physician services: first lessons from a French natural experiment
Périodique
European Economic Review
Statut éditorial
Publié
Date de publication
1998
Volume
42
Numéro
3-5
Pages
499-511
Résumé
This paper presents empirical results on moral hazard in demand for medical care, using a longitudinal dataset on 4578
individuals followed during two years. The dataset contains two subgroups, one for which a copayment rate of 10% for physician
visits was introduced in 1994, and an other for which no change occurred during the period of the study. This enables us to use
these data as coming from a controlled natural experiment. We test if the number of visits per agent was modified by this
copayment rate. The data reject the hypothesis for office visits, but do not for home visits. This suggests that there is moral
hazard in demand for some physician services, but also that when non-monetary costs are important, small changes in monetary
price may not induce any major change in behavior.
individuals followed during two years. The dataset contains two subgroups, one for which a copayment rate of 10% for physician
visits was introduced in 1994, and an other for which no change occurred during the period of the study. This enables us to use
these data as coming from a controlled natural experiment. We test if the number of visits per agent was modified by this
copayment rate. The data reject the hypothesis for office visits, but do not for home visits. This suggests that there is moral
hazard in demand for some physician services, but also that when non-monetary costs are important, small changes in monetary
price may not induce any major change in behavior.
Mots-clé
Health insurance, Empiral contract theory, Demand for health care, Moral hazard, Natural experiment
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Création de la notice
19/11/2007 11:55
Dernière modification de la notice
20/08/2019 17:24
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