Status Quo Solutions for Public Choice Economies on Tree Networks and in Euclidean Spaces
Détails
ID Serval
serval:BIB_EAC2A3E5BABA
Type
Actes de conférence (partie): contribution originale à la littérature scientifique, publiée à l'occasion de conférences scientifiques, dans un ouvrage de compte-rendu (proceedings), ou dans l'édition spéciale d'un journal reconnu (conference proceedings).
Collection
Publications
Institution
Titre
Status Quo Solutions for Public Choice Economies on Tree Networks and in Euclidean Spaces
Titre de la conférence
Logic, Game Theory and Social Choice: Proceedings of the International Conference LGS'99
Editeur
Tilburg University Press
ISBN
90-361-9959-X
9789036199599
9789036199599
Statut éditorial
Publié
Date de publication
1999
Peer-reviewed
Oui
Editeur⸱rice scientifique
de Swart H.
Pages
214-225
Langue
anglais
Résumé
We consider the problem of choosing the location of a public facility either (a) on a tree network or (b) in a Euclidean space.
(a) Ching and Thomson (1996) characterize the class of status quo solutions on a tree network by Pareto optimality and population-monotonicity. Using Vohra's (1998) characterization of solutions that satisfy Pareto optimality and replacement-domination, we give a short proof of the previous characterization and show that it also holds on the domain of symmetric preferences.
(b) For the similar problem of choosing the location of a public facility in a Euclidean space, it turns out that none of the status quo solutions satisfies replacement-domination or population monotonicity (or strategyproofness). Therefore, instead of Pareto optimality, we consider unanimity and characterize the class of coordinatewise status quo solutions by unanimity, strategy-proofness, and either population-monotonicity or replacement-domination.
(a) Ching and Thomson (1996) characterize the class of status quo solutions on a tree network by Pareto optimality and population-monotonicity. Using Vohra's (1998) characterization of solutions that satisfy Pareto optimality and replacement-domination, we give a short proof of the previous characterization and show that it also holds on the domain of symmetric preferences.
(b) For the similar problem of choosing the location of a public facility in a Euclidean space, it turns out that none of the status quo solutions satisfies replacement-domination or population monotonicity (or strategyproofness). Therefore, instead of Pareto optimality, we consider unanimity and characterize the class of coordinatewise status quo solutions by unanimity, strategy-proofness, and either population-monotonicity or replacement-domination.
Création de la notice
25/05/2010 15:38
Dernière modification de la notice
20/08/2019 17:13
Données d'usage
