Corporate Governance and Accrual Earnings Management

Détails

ID Serval
serval:BIB_E91665DFCEEC
Type
Article: article d'un périodique ou d'un magazine.
Collection
Publications
Institution
Titre
Corporate Governance and Accrual Earnings Management
Périodique
Managerial and Decision Economics
Auteur⸱e⸱s
Bekiris  F. V., Doukakis  L. C.
ISSN
0143-6570
Statut éditorial
Publié
Date de publication
08/2011
Peer-reviewed
Oui
Volume
32
Numéro
7
Pages
439-456
Langue
anglais
Résumé
This study examines the association between corporate governance and accruals earnings management using a corporate governance index consisting of 55 individual corporate governance measures. Prior literature has focused primarily on certain individual corporate governance measures, overlooking the multidimensional character of corporate governance. Based on a sample of firms listed on the Athens, Milan and Madrid Stock Exchanges, we find an inverse relationship between corporate governance and earnings management. Corporate governance provisions seem to constrain the tendency of management to manage earnings leading to higher credibility for financial statements. Additional tests suggest that the negative relationship holds for large and middle capitalization firms but not for the small capitalization sample. In addition, corporate governance provisions limit upwards but not downwards earnings management. This study emphasizes the multilevel character of corporate governance and suggests the usage of comprehensive measures of corporate governance in the academic research. This study also stresses the importance of introducing corporate governance mechanisms in order to ensure the integrity of the financial reporting process. Practitioners are expected to evaluate the corporate governance provisions that each firm has put in place, whereas policy makers are expected to mandate the application of a wide range of corporate governance mechanisms.
Création de la notice
16/09/2011 15:36
Dernière modification de la notice
21/08/2019 6:15
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