Efficient Monopolies: The Limits of Competition in the European Property Insurance Market

Détails

ID Serval
serval:BIB_E7C5D18B3A49
Type
Livre: un livre et son éditeur.
Collection
Publications
Institution
Titre
Efficient Monopolies: The Limits of Competition in the European Property Insurance Market
Auteur⸱e⸱s
Von Ungern-Sternberg T.
Editeur
Oxford University Press
ISBN
9780199268818
Statut éditorial
Publié
Date de publication
2004
Langue
anglais
Résumé
Compares the market for property insurance in five European countries, Britain, Spain, France, Switzerland, and Germany. The comparisons are of particular interest, as the regulatory frameworks vary widely from country to country and so do the market outcomes, both in terms of premium level and in terms of available insurance cover. In particular, the state insurance monopolies in Spain and parts of Switzerland permit property owners to obtain global cover against a wide range of natural damages (including floods) at a very low premium rate. The premiums of private insurance companies are much higher because they typically spend more than one third of premium income on commissions and administrative costs. State monopolies are considerably more efficient in this respect.
Mots-clé
Adverse selection, Catastrophe insurance, Deregulation, Premium rate, Prevention, Property insurance, Regulatory capture, State monopoly
Création de la notice
19/11/2007 11:52
Dernière modification de la notice
20/08/2019 17:10
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