Some Things Couples always wanted to know about Stable Matchings (but were afraid to ask)

Détails

ID Serval
serval:BIB_E27C6078F373
Type
Article: article d'un périodique ou d'un magazine.
Collection
Publications
Titre
Some Things Couples always wanted to know about Stable Matchings (but were afraid to ask)
Périodique
Review of Economic Design
Auteur(s)
Klaus B., Klijn F., Masso J.
ISSN
1434-4742
Statut éditorial
Publié
Date de publication
2007
Peer-reviewed
Oui
Volume
11
Numéro
3
Pages
175-184
Langue
anglais
Résumé
In this note we study the National Resident Matching Program (NRMP) algorithm in the US market for physicians. We report on two problems that concern the presence of couples, a feature explicitly incorporated in the new NRMP algorithm (cf. Roth and Peranson in Am Econ Rev 89:748–780, 1999). First, we show that the new NRMP algorithm may not find an existing stable matching, even when couples’ preferences are ‘responsive’, i.e., when Gale and Shapley’s (Am Math Monthly 69:9–15, 1962) deferred acceptance algorithm (on which the old NRMP algorithm is based) is applicable. Second, we demonstrate that the new NRMP algorithm may also be anipulated by couples acting as singles.
Mots-clé
Matching, Stability, Couples
Création de la notice
13/04/2010 14:08
Dernière modification de la notice
20/08/2019 16:06
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