Cooperation Via Intimidation: An Emergent System of Mutual Threats can Maintain Social Order

Détails

ID Serval
serval:BIB_E1BEBFF55B1B
Type
Article: article d'un périodique ou d'un magazine.
Collection
Publications
Titre
Cooperation Via Intimidation: An Emergent System of Mutual Threats can Maintain Social Order
Périodique
Journal of Artificial Societies and Social Simulation
Auteur⸱e⸱s
Patrzyk Piotr M., Takáč Martin
ISSN
1460-7425
Statut éditorial
Publié
Date de publication
31/10/2017
Peer-reviewed
Oui
Volume
20
Numéro
4
Pages
5
Langue
anglais
Résumé
Can human aggressiveness promote peaceful cooperation? Despite the seeming contradiction of these phenomena, our study suggests the answer is yes. We develop two agent-based models of cooperative interactions among aggressive agents threatening each other. In Model 1, we show that aggressive displays performed by dominance-seeking individuals create a system of mutual threats that effectively enforces cooperation and inhibits agents from escalating conflicts. This happens because agents observe each other fighting, which deters them from attacking each other due to aggressive reputations. In Model 2 we extend this effect to third-party interventions showing that forming alliances makes attacks more efficient and promotes the emergence of common rules determining whom to fight against. In such a state, social order is maintained by the existence of moral alliances – groups of agents willing to fight against norm violators. In summary, we argue that reputation for toughness and the aggressive predisposition of humans could have played an important role in the evolution of cooperation and moral systems.
Mots-clé
Cooperation, Punishment, Revenge, Conflict, Aggression, Morality
Open Access
Oui
Création de la notice
12/09/2017 8:20
Dernière modification de la notice
20/08/2019 17:05
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