Procedurally Fair and Stable Matching

Détails

ID Serval
serval:BIB_DF8374E941FE
Type
Article: article d'un périodique ou d'un magazine.
Collection
Publications
Titre
Procedurally Fair and Stable Matching
Périodique
Economic Theory
Auteur⸱e⸱s
Klaus B., Klijn F.
ISSN
0938-2259
Statut éditorial
Publié
Date de publication
2006
Peer-reviewed
Oui
Volume
27
Numéro
2
Pages
431-447
Langue
anglais
Résumé
We motivate procedural fairness for matching mechanisms and study two procedurally fair and stable mechanisms: employment by lotto (Aldershof et al. , 1999) and the random order mechanism (Roth and Vande Vate, 1990, Ma, 1996). For both mechanisms we give various examples of probability distributions on the set of stable matchings and discuss properties that differentiate employment by lotto and the random order mechanism. Finally, we consider an adjustment of the random order mechanism, the equitable random order mechanism, that combines aspects of procedural and "endstate" fairness.
Mots-clé
Procedural fairness, Random mechanism, Stability, Two-sided matching
Web of science
Création de la notice
11/05/2010 14:16
Dernière modification de la notice
20/08/2019 16:03
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