Political self-serving bias and redistribution

Détails

ID Serval
serval:BIB_D38895218800
Type
Article: article d'un périodique ou d'un magazine.
Collection
Publications
Institution
Titre
Political self-serving bias and redistribution
Périodique
Journal of Public Economics
Auteur⸱e⸱s
Deffains B., Espinosa R., Thöni C.
ISSN
0047-2727
Statut éditorial
Publié
Date de publication
2016
Volume
134
Pages
67-74
Langue
anglais
Notes
DeffainsEspinosaThoni2016JPubE
Résumé
We explore the impact of the self-serving bias on the supply and demand for redistribution. We present results from an experiment in which participants decide on redistribution after performing a real effort task. Dependent on individual performance, participants are divided into two groups, successful and unsuccessful. Participants' success is exogenously determined, because they are randomly assigned to either a hard or easy task. However, because participants are not told which task they were assigned to, there is ambiguity as to whether success or failure should be attributed to internal or external factors. Participants take two redistribution decisions. First, they choose a supply of redistribution in a situation where no personal interests are at stake. Second, they choose a redistributive system behind a veil of ignorance. Our results confirm and expand previous findings on the self-serving bias: successful participants are more likely to attribute their success to their effort rather than luck, and they opt for less redistribution. Unsuccessful participants tend to attribute their failure to external factors and opt for more redistribution. We demonstrate that the self-serving bias contributes to a polarization of the views on redistribution.
Mots-clé
Redistribution, Self-serving bias, Experimental, Veil of ignorance, Polarization
Web of science
Création de la notice
08/09/2016 14:09
Dernière modification de la notice
20/08/2019 15:53
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