Enhancing centralized enforcement of EU law : Pandora's toolbox ?
Détails
Télécharger: BIB_D1E6FDF02D52.P001.pdf (437.36 [Ko])
Etat: Public
Version: Final published version
Etat: Public
Version: Final published version
ID Serval
serval:BIB_D1E6FDF02D52
Type
Article: article d'un périodique ou d'un magazine.
Collection
Publications
Institution
Titre
Enhancing centralized enforcement of EU law : Pandora's toolbox ?
Périodique
Common Market Law Review
ISSN
0165-0750
Statut éditorial
Publié
Date de publication
2014
Peer-reviewed
Oui
Volume
51
Numéro
4
Pages
1057-1092
Langue
anglais
Résumé
State compliance with EU Law is crucial to the very existence of the Union. Traditionally, it has been secured through a combination of strong "private" and of weak "centralized" enforcement. However, this arrangement is no longer perceived to be sufficient. By endowing the Union with new tools vis-à-vis its Member States - penalties, conditionality, and the like - current reforms try to complement symbolic sanctioning with real "consequences". The goal is to reinforce the authority of EU Law. In this article, we question whether the new toolbox is fit for the purpose, or whether it risks to produce adverse effects which might even go as far as upsetting the Union's constitutional template.
Mots-clé
Union européenne, sanctions, droit constitutionnel, surveillance fédérale, conditionnalité, Pacte fiscal, institutions européennes
Site de l'éditeur
Création de la notice
26/09/2014 18:41
Dernière modification de la notice
20/08/2019 15:52