Analysis of a Merger from a Governance Perspective: The Case of Abitibi‐Consolidated and Donohue

Détails

ID Serval
serval:BIB_CD97ED59FDB5
Type
Article: article d'un périodique ou d'un magazine.
Collection
Publications
Titre
Analysis of a Merger from a Governance Perspective: The Case of Abitibi‐Consolidated and Donohue
Périodique
Canadian Journal of Administrative Sciences / Revue Canadienne des Sciences de l'Administration
Auteur⸱e⸱s
André P., Magnan M., St-Onge S.
ISSN
0825-0383 (Print)
1936-4490 (Electronic)
Statut éditorial
Publié
Date de publication
06/2008
Peer-reviewed
Oui
Volume
25
Numéro
2
Pages
153-169
Langue
anglais
Résumé
Adopting a governance perspective, this study analyzes the merger between closely-held Donohue Inc. and widely-held Abitibi-Consolidated Inc. Findings suggest that the absence of a controlling shareholder and weak board governance at Abitibi might explain both (a) its executives' interests in the transaction and (b) its CEO's compensation increase despite underperformance. Second, an intergeneration shift of control at Quebecor (Donohue's parent company) led to a strategic reorientation that (a) transformed Donohue into a target and (b) insured that Donohue's executives had incentives to pursue a deal. Finally, Donohue's noncontrolling shareholders benefited from the transaction while Abitibi shareholders experienced wealth reduction. The merger's aftermath provides some counter evidence regarding blockholders' power in widely-held firms.
Mots-clé
Merger, Managerial compensation, Governance, Dual class shares, Pyramid structure
Web of science
Création de la notice
29/04/2016 15:57
Dernière modification de la notice
20/08/2019 15:48
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