4.6 Summary and Conclusion
In this chapter, we have first tried to make precise the distinctions between the concepts of parthood and coincidence and the concepts of causation and causal influence. These distinc-tions had never been made entirely explicit in the debate on mental causation before, despite the fact that they constantly figure in its background. Section 4.2 then demonstrated that the at-tained definitions are both compatible with all the solutions elaborated in chapters 2 and 3 and that they are even of great help in clarifying both what precisely the mentioned accounts are claiming respectively and what their mutual connections are. In sections 4.3. and 4.4, we have then tried to explore two possible solutions to the problem of mental causation that, at least in these particular versions, have not been explicitly defended in the literature. These solutions we dubbed "overdeteiminationism lite" and "plural determinism". We found the accounts both to bear impressive explanatory capabilities and to be vulnerable to far fewer problems than is commonly supposed. We also found out that they have many corresponding aspects and that their theoretical costs stand in a relation of a relative mutual balance. Our final discussion in section 4.5 revealed, however, that overdetenninationism lite should probably be considered the more successful theory. The fact that it needs to endorse the existence of two kinds of causation, although not unproblematic itself, did not appear as a commitment as strong as that of an ontological hierarchy that extends over all time, which at least the broad version of plural determinism was forced to make.