Payoff-based learning best explains the rate of decline in cooperation across 237 public-goods games.

Détails

ID Serval
serval:BIB_C65A18EDD533
Type
Article: article d'un périodique ou d'un magazine.
Collection
Publications
Institution
Titre
Payoff-based learning best explains the rate of decline in cooperation across 237 public-goods games.
Périodique
Nature human behaviour
Auteur⸱e⸱s
Burton-Chellew M.N., West S.A.
ISSN
2397-3374 (Electronic)
ISSN-L
2397-3374
Statut éditorial
Publié
Date de publication
10/2021
Peer-reviewed
Oui
Volume
5
Numéro
10
Pages
1330-1338
Langue
anglais
Notes
Publication types: Journal Article ; Research Support, Non-U.S. Gov't
Publication Status: ppublish
Résumé
What motivates human behaviour in social dilemmas? The results of public goods games are commonly interpreted as showing that humans are altruistically motivated to benefit others. However, there is a competing 'confused learners' hypothesis: that individuals start the game either uncertain or mistaken (confused) and then learn from experience how to improve their payoff (payoff-based learning). Here we (1) show that these competing hypotheses can be differentiated by how they predict contributions should decline over time; and (2) use metadata from 237 published public goods games to test between these competing hypotheses. We found, as predicted by the confused learners hypothesis, that contributions declined faster when individuals had more influence over their own payoffs. This predicted relationship arises because more influence leads to a greater correlation between contributions and payoffs, facilitating learning. Our results suggest that humans, in general, are not altruistically motivated to benefit others but instead learn to help themselves.
Mots-clé
Altruism, Avoidance Learning, Cooperative Behavior, Game Theory, Humans, Motivation, Psychology, Social, Risk Assessment, Risk-Taking, Social Behavior, Uncertainty
Pubmed
Web of science
Création de la notice
11/05/2021 12:18
Dernière modification de la notice
03/02/2024 7:13
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