The Influence of Causal Knowledge in Two-Alternative Forced-Choice Tasks

Détails

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Etat: Public
Version: Final published version
ID Serval
serval:BIB_BC9E9B55F94A
Type
Article: article d'un périodique ou d'un magazine.
Collection
Publications
Institution
Titre
The Influence of Causal Knowledge in Two-Alternative Forced-Choice Tasks
Périodique
Open Psychology Journal
Auteur⸱e⸱s
Garcia-Retamero R., Hoffrage U., Mueller S. M., Maldonado A.
ISSN
1874-3501
Statut éditorial
Publié
Date de publication
2010
Peer-reviewed
Oui
Volume
3
Pages
136-144
Langue
anglais
Résumé
Making decisions can be hard, but it can also be facilitated. Simple heuristics are fast and frugal but nevertheless fairly accurate decision rules that people can use to compensate for their limited computational capacity, time, and knowledge when making decisions. These heuristics are effective to the extent that they can exploit the structure of information in the environment in which they operate. They require knowledge about the predictive value of probabilistic cues. However, it is often difficult to keep track of all the available cues in the environment and how they relate to any relevant criterion. We suggest that knowledge about the causal structure of the environment helps decision makers focus on a manageable subset of cues, thus effectively reducing the potential computational complexity inherent in even relatively simple decision-making tasks. Specifically, we claim that causal knowledge can act as a meta-cue for identifying highly valid cues and help to estimate cue-validities. Causal knowledge, however, can also bias people's decisions. We review experimental evidence that tested these hypotheses.
Mots-clé
Causal Knowledge, Information Search, Belief Revision Model, Take the Best, Decision Making, Judgment.
Open Access
Oui
Création de la notice
23/06/2010 10:23
Dernière modification de la notice
20/08/2019 15:30
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