Agency Conflicts and Cash: Estimates from a Dynamic Model

Détails

ID Serval
serval:BIB_BC19E98F1917
Type
Article: article d'un périodique ou d'un magazine.
Collection
Publications
Titre
Agency Conflicts and Cash: Estimates from a Dynamic Model
Périodique
The Journal of Finance
Auteur(s)
Nikolov B., Whited M. T.
ISSN
0022-1082
Statut éditorial
Publié
Date de publication
2014
Peer-reviewed
Oui
Volume
69
Numéro
5
Pages
1883-1921
Langue
anglais
Résumé
Which agency problems affect corporate cash policy? To answer this question, we estimate a dynamic model of finance and investment with three mechanisms that misalign managerial and shareholder incentives: limited managerial ownership of the firm, compensation based on firm size, and managerial perquisite consumption. We find that perquisite consumption critically impacts cash policy. Size-based compensation also matters, but less. Firms with lower blockholder and institutional ownership have higher managerial perquisite consumption, low managerial ownership is a key factor in the secular upward trend in cash holdings, and agency plays little role in small firms' substantial cash holdings.
Web of science
Création de la notice
28/10/2016 15:38
Dernière modification de la notice
20/08/2019 15:30
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