The role of representation in Bayesian reasoning: Correcting common misconceptions

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ID Serval
serval:BIB_BB66B7E0B06C
Type
Article: article d'un périodique ou d'un magazine.
Collection
Publications
Institution
Titre
The role of representation in Bayesian reasoning: Correcting common misconceptions
Périodique
Behavioral and Brain Sciences
Auteur⸱e⸱s
Gigerenzer G., Hoffrage U.
ISSN
0140-525X
Statut éditorial
Publié
Date de publication
2007
Peer-reviewed
Oui
Volume
30
Numéro
3
Pages
264-267
Langue
anglais
Résumé
The terms nested sets, partitive frequencies, inside-outside views and dual processes add little but confusion to our original analysis (Gigerenzer & Hoffrage 1995; 1999) The idea of nested set was introduced because of an oversight; it simply rephrases two of our equations. Representation in terms of chances, in contrast, is a novel contribution yet consistent with our computational analysis - it uses exactly the same numbers as natural frequencies. We show that non-bayesian reasoning in children, laypeople, and physicians follows multiple rules rather than a general-purpose associative process in a vaguely specified "System 1." It is unclear what the theory in "dual process theory" is: Unless the two processes are defined, this distinction call account hoc for almost everything. In contrast, an ecological view of cognition helps to explain insight is elicited from the outside (the external representation of information) and, more generally, how cognitive strategies match with environmental structures.
Web of science
Open Access
Oui
Création de la notice
24/02/2009 14:34
Dernière modification de la notice
14/02/2022 7:56
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