Extant approaches to the study of the autonomy of international organisations disregard the interaction taking place between the secretariat and members. Assuming member states' interest to be exogenous to the principal-agent relationship disregards the possibility of the secretariat playing an autonomous role in international politics via influencing member states' preferences. This neglect is due to a transposition of micro-economic theory (in particular principal-agent theory) into the realm of IR without questioning the applicability of its assumptions to the study of IOs. Grounded theory methodology has been used in order to develop a sketch of a theory of IO autonomy which attends closely to the empirical reality as perceived by secretariat officials. Particular attention has been paid to the interactive process between the staff of the Social Security Department of the ILO and member delegates. It is suggested that the secretariat, through the application of a broad set of strategies, attempts to convince members of certain policies and can succeed in doing so. However, officials engage in "self-censure" before pushing for a certain idea which reduces the extent of truly innovative thinking to be expected from IO secretariats.