Do Workers Work More if Wages Are High? Evidence from a Randomized Field Experiment

Détails

ID Serval
serval:BIB_B1C6C0A7079C
Type
Article: article d'un périodique ou d'un magazine.
Collection
Publications
Titre
Do Workers Work More if Wages Are High? Evidence from a Randomized Field Experiment
Périodique
American Economic Review
Auteur(s)
Fehr E., Goette L.
ISSN
0002-8282
Statut éditorial
Publié
Date de publication
2007
Peer-reviewed
Oui
Volume
97
Numéro
1
Pages
298 - 317
Langue
anglais
Résumé
Most previous studies on intertemporal labor supply found very small or insignificant substitution effects. It is possible that these results are due to constraints on workers' labor supply choices. We conducted a field experiment in a setting in which workers were free to choose hours worked and effort per hour. We document a large positive elasticity of overall labor supply and an even larger elasticity of hours, which implies that the elasticity of effort per hour is negative. We examine two candidate models to explain these findings: a modified neoclassical model with preference spillovers across periods, and a model with reference dependent, lossaverse preferences. With the help of a further experiment, we can show that only loss-averse individuals exhibit a negative effort response to the wage increase.
Création de la notice
10/08/2009 13:06
Dernière modification de la notice
20/08/2019 15:20
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